Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S.

200 (1927)
U.S. Supreme Court
No. 292
Argued April 22, 1927
Decided May 2, 1927
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
Syllabus
1. The Virginia statute providing for the sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions
supported by the State who shall be found to be afflicted with an hereditary form of
insanity or imbecility, is within the power of the State under the Fourteenth
Amendment. P. 274 U. S. 207.
2. Failure to extend the provision to persons outside the institutions named does not
render it obnoxious to the Equal Protection Clause. P. 274 U. S. 208.
143 Va. 310, affirmed.
ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia
which affirmed a judgment ordering
Page 274 U. S. 201
the Superintendent of the State Colony of Epileptics and Feeble Minded to perform
the operation of salpingectomy on Carrie Buck, the plaintiff in error.
Page 274 U. S. 205
Mr. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of the
State of Virginia affirming a judgment of the Circuit Court of Amherst County by
which the defendant in error, the superintendent of the State Colony for Epileptics
and Feeble Minded, was ordered to perform the operation of salpingectomy upon
Carrie Buck, the plaintiff in error, for the purpose of making her sterile. 143 Va. 310.
The case comes here upon the contention that the statute authorizing the judgment
is void under the Fourteenth Amendment as denying to the plaintiff in error due
process of law and the equal protection of the laws.
Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman who was committed to the State
Colony above mentioned in due form. She is the daughter of a feeble minded
mother in the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble minded
child. She was eighteen years old at the time of the trial of her case in the Circuit
Court, in the latter part of 1924. An Act of Virginia, approved March 20, 1924,
recites that the health of the patient and the welfare of society may be promoted in
certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives, under careful safeguard, &c.;
that the sterilization may be effected in males by vasectomy and in females by
salpingectomy, without serious pain or substantial danger to life; that the
Commonwealth is supporting in various institutions many defective persons who, if
now discharged, would become

Page 274 U. S. 206

a menace, but, if incapable of procreating, might be discharged with safety and
become self-supporting with benefit to themselves and to society, and that
experience has shown that heredity plays an important part in the transmission of
insanity, imbecility, &c. The statute then enacts that, whenever the superintendent
of certain institutions, including the above-named State Colony, shall be of opinion
that it is for the best interests of the patients and of society that an inmate under
his care should be sexually sterilized, he may have the operation performed upon
any patient afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility, &c., on complying
with the very careful provisions by which the act protects the patients from possible
abuse.
The superintendent first presents a petition to the special board of directors of his
hospital or colony, stating the facts and the grounds for his opinion, verified by
affidavit. Notice of the petition and of the time and place of the hearing in the
institution is to be served upon the inmate, and also upon his guardian, and if there
is no guardian, the superintendent is to apply to the Circuit Court of the County to
appoint one. If the inmate is a minor, notice also is to be given to his parents, if any,
with a copy of the petition. The board is to see to it that the inmate may attend the
hearings if desired by him or his guardian. The evidence is all to be reduced to
writing, and, after the board has made its order for or against the operation, the
superintendent, or the inmate, or his guardian, may appeal to the Circuit Court of
the County. The Circuit Court may consider the record of the board and the
evidence before it and such other admissible evidence as may be offered, and may
affirm, revise, or reverse the order of the board and enter such order as it deems
just. Finally any party may apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals, which, if it
grants the appeal, is to hear the case upon the record of the trial
Page 274 U. S. 207
in the Circuit Court, and may enter such order as it thinks the Circuit Court should
have entered. There can be no doubt that, so far as procedure is concerned, the
rights of the patient are most carefully considered, and, as every step in this case
was taken in scrupulous compliance with the statute and after months of
observation, there is no doubt that, in that respect, the plaintiff in error has had due
process of law.
The attack is not upon the procedure, but upon the substantive law. It seems to be
contended that in no circumstances could such an order be justified. It certainly is
contended that the order cannot be justified upon the existing grounds. The
judgment finds the facts that have been recited, and that Carrie Buck
"is the probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted,
that she may be sexually sterilized without detriment to her general health, and that
her welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization,"

and thereupon makes the order. In view of the general declarations of the
legislature and the specific findings of the Court, obviously we cannot say as matter
of law that the grounds do not exist, and, if they exist, they justify the result. We
have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for
their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the
strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those
concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better
for all the world if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime or to
let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly
unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination
is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U. S. 11. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.

dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due
process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of
the hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause?

Page 274 U. S. 208

Held: No. Judgment reversed.
But, it is said, however it might be if this reasoning were applied generally, it fails
when it is confined to the small number who are in the institutions named and is not
applied to the multitudes outside. It is the usual last resort of constitutional
arguments to point out shortcomings of this sort. But the answer is that the law
does all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all
within the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and
so fast as its means allow. Of course, so far as the operations enable those who
otherwise must be kept confined to be returned to the world, and thus open the
asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly reached.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER dissents.
Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
J. Fernando
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel
del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be
applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to
regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also
asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void
for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose
P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second
class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form
specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels
and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed
this to be violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of
certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a

Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police
power. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of
legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such
factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the
matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity
must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and
prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional
guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due
process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to
which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of
due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close
and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.

Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged
failure to meet the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the
police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license
and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are
allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside
from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to
interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the
amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were
viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every
24 hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace
and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in
his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness
for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike
in the sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent
given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of
property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of
establishments, and the full rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."
TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. BOT
117 SCRA 597
Facts: Petitioner Taxicab Operators seek to declare the nullity on Memorandum
Circular No. 77-42 of the Board of Transportation. Herein petitioner is a domestic
corporation compound of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificate of Public
Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in
Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. The Memorandum issued by BOT ordered the
phasing out and replacement of old and dilapidated taxis. Now, pursuant to this
policy, the Board promulgated a regulation in the effect that no car beyond six
years shall be operated as a taxi. Petitioners contend that procedural due process

was violated because position papers were not asked of them and because there
was no public hearing prior to the issuance of the regulation.
Issue: Whether procedural due process was violated in the case at bar.
Held: No, there was no violation of petitioners constitutional right to due process.
The Board has a valid range of choices for gathering information or data and is not
bound to make use all of them. Moreover, previous notice and hearing so required in
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings but not in the promulgation of general rule.
Inchong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its
purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a
stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations
the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to
continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law,
until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after
the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of
the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and
other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the
ff: reasons:
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of
their liberty and property without due process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business
thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens
the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are
treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of
the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislatures target in
the enactment of the Act.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of
China guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals upon the same
terms as the nationals of any other country. But the nationals of China are not
discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the
United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited
from engaging in the retail trade.
But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always
subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may
never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.
LIM vs. PACQUING
G.R. 115044, January 27, 1995

The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and
the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien
owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in
times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of
the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people
on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and
practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy
endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

101 PHIL 155
Facts: The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes the retail
trade business, Republic Act No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business, prohibiting aliens in general to engage in retail trade in our country.
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA No. 1180,
brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether Congress in enacting R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, the UN
Declaration of Human Rights and the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity.
Held: The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and
freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing
more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations.

Facts: On 15 September 1994, respondent Associated Development Corporation

(ADC) filed a petition for prohibition seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing the
provisional authority that had been granted them to operate jai-alai. ADC's franchise
was invalidated by PD No. 771, which expressly revoked all existing franchises to
operate all forms of gambling facilities issued by local governments.
Respondent contends that Ordinance No. 7065 authorized the Mayor to allow ADC to
operate Jai-Alai in the City of Manila. ADC also assails the constitutionality of PD No.
771 as violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether ADC has a valid franchise to operate the Jai-Alai de Manila.
Held: PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the State.
Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and
erodes the value of good, honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD
No. 771, a vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not eradicate) in
pursuit of social and economic development. Jai-alai is not a mere economic activity
which the law seeks to regulate. It is essentially gambling and whether it should be
permitted and, if so, under what conditions are questions primarily for the
lawmaking authority to determine, talking into account national and local interests.
Here, it is the police power of the State that is paramount. On the alleged violation
of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it should be
remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it
is more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the
government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police
power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power
for the public welfare.
ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai therefore, it may not
operate even if it has a license from the Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of
Manila.

LUTZ VS. ARANETA

GR L-7859, 22 December 1955
Facts: A Walter Lutz, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio
Jayme Ledesma, sought to recover the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as
taxes from the Commissioner under Section E of Commonwealth Act 567 (the Sugar
Adjustment Act), alleging that such tax is unconstitutional as it levied for the aid
and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which is in his opinion not a public
purpose.
Issue: Whether the tax is valid in supporting an industry.
Held: The tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, i.e. to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. The act is primarily
an exercise of police power, and is not a pure exercise of taxing power. As sugar
production is one of the great industries of the Philippines; and that its promotion,
protection and advancement redounds greatly to the general welfare, the legislature
found that the general welfare demanded that the industry should be stabilized, and
provided that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its
component to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in tax that it had to
sustain. Further, it cannot be said that the devotion of tax money to experimental
stations to seek increase of efficiency in sugar production, utilization of by-products,
etc., as well as to the improvement of living and working conditions in sugar mills
and plantations, without any part of such money being channeled directly to private
persons, constitute expenditure of tax money for private purposes. The tax is valid.
Magtajas vs Pryce Properties, Inc. [234 SCRA 255]
(Municipal Corporation Tests of a Valid Ordinance)
Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a
corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games
of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, this Court
sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity
to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government.
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by leasing a
portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc. for its casino.
On December 7, 1992, Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted ordinance 3353,
prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit
to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion
thereof for the operation of a casino.
On January 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of
casino and providing penalty for violation therefore.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor.

The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement. CDO City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of
Court with the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of
casino operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution.
Held: No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to
the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In
the exercise of its own discretion, the Congress may prohibit gambling altogether or
allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow
others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.
Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are
authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, gambling and other prohibited
games of chance.
Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments are only
agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held
that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

It
It
It
It
It
It

must
must
must
must
must
must

not contravene the constitution or any statute.

not be unfair or oppressive.
not be partial or discriminatory.
not prohibit but may regulate trade.
be general and consistent with public policy.
not be unreasonable.

MINERS ASSOCIATION VS FACTORAN 240 SCRA 100 (1995)

Facts: The instant petition seeks a ruling from this Court on the validity of two
Administrative Orders issued by the Secretary of the Dept. of Environment and
Natural Resources to carry out the provisions of certain Executive Orders
promulgated by the Pres. In the lawful exercise of legislative powers.
Herein controversy was precipitated by the change introduced by Art. XII Sec. 2 of
the 1987 Constitution on the system of exploration, development and utilization of
the countrys natural resources. The options open to the State are through direct
undertaking or by entering into co-production, join venture; or production-sharing
agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for
large scale exploration, development and utilization.
Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Executive Order # 279, the DENR Secretary issued on June
23, 1989 DENR Administrative Order # 57, series of 1989, captioned Guidelines of
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive Order # 279 where all

existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and
gravel and quarry resources covering an area of 20 hectares or less, shall be
converted into production-sharing agreements within 1 yr from the effectivity of
these guidelines.

x x x
(f)
To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and
keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants
the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of
the Board of Medical Education;

On Nov. 20 1980, the Secretary of the DENR Administrative Order # 82, series of
1990, laying down the Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation. Requiring the persons or entities
to submit Letter of Intent (LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSAs) within 2 yrs from the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order # 57 or until
July 17, 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed period shall cause the
abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims.

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical

schools:

ISSUE: In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines,
Inc. mainly contends that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both Administrative
Order # 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under Sec. 6 of Executive
Order # 279. On the assumption that the questioned administrative orders do not
conform with Executive Order #s 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both orders
violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Art. III, Sec. 10 of the 1987
Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order # 57 unduly pre- ???
(damn =_=)
Tablarin Vs. Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730 G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987
Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement
from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the
taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility
for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and
from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The
trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and
administered as previously scheduled.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the
"Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for
registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the
practice of medicine in the Philippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions
as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
"(a)
To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized
college of medicine;

"Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has
not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving
moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree
in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from
the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by
two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing
in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in
addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed
admissible.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of
a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines,
beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2.
The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the
selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to
improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the
successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every
year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the
other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall
serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for
admission into the medical colleges.
Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended,
and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum
scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do
not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable
power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important
interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community. An
important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well
being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate
objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs
some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the

prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on

the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community,
on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling
that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the
medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit
in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical
practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in
our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current
stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that
the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means
for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country.
We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall,
is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence
and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for
disease or trauma.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the
respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
TIO vs VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
151 SCRA 208
Principle: Requirements as to title of bills
FACTS: The petition assails the constitutionality of PD No. 1987 entitled An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry. Following its promulgation is the annual tax of
5% and 30% on gross receipts payable to the local government.
The petitioners grounds is that the imposition of tax is a rider and is harsh
and confiscatory, oppressive and/or unlawful restraint of trade.
It is also alleged that the imposition of taxes is invalid since the title of the
bill said only for the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, not for the
imposition of taxes. This violates the One-Subject-One-Title Rule
ISSUES: Whether or not the imposition of taxes is invalid in the promulgation of PD
No. 1987
HELD: No.

RATIONALE: The constitutional requirement that Every Bill shall be expressed in

the title thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that
the title express each and every end that the stature wishes to accomplish. The
requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statutes are related and germane to
the subject matter expressed in the title , or as long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign with the general subject and title.
In the case at hand, the title may be read as only for the creation of the
VRB, but the imposition of taxes is a direct consequence of the act, to perform its
purpose to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms.
Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659
J. Cruz
Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer
confiscated by the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A
which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to
another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of
the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive
order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O.
due to the outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before
an impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper
exercise of legislative power by the former president under Amendment 6 of the
1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of
instruction that had the force of law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they
should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound
or excise the affliction.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really
presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an

existing law due to the grant of legislative authority over the president under
Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery.
In the due process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain
resilient. This was due to the avoidance of an iron rule laying down a stiff
command for all circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every
situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they be
confined to its interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against
arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or
rational connection between facts proved and fact presumed. An examples is a
passport of a person with a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which
both restrains and is restrained by dure process. This power was invoked in 626-A,
in addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it cant be
said that it complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition
and the purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due
process is not juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a
court of justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the
method toconfiscate carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or
his defense and punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separataion of
powers.
The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ
146 SCRA 323, 1986
Facts: The present case involves consolidated cases for crime committed for
violation of B.P. 22 or known as the bouncing check law. The accused of these cases
asserted that B.P. 22 is a violation of constitutional inhibition that no person shall be
imprisoned for non-payment of debts, and therefore, unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the effuse punished by B.P. 22 is the non-payment of an obligation.
Held: The gravemen of B.P. 22 is the issuance of a worthless check, not the nonpayment of an obligation. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanction, the making of the worthless check and putting them into circulation.
Because of its deleterious effect on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by

the law. The law punishes the act not as offense against property but an offense
against public order.
The legislature may not validly be considered as non-payment of debt ex contracts,
and an act may not be considered and punished as malum in se, but each act may
be penalized under police power as malum prohibitum because of the harm it cause
to the public.
Police power of the state has been described as the most essential, insistent and
illimitable powers which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of the society.
Bunting v. State of Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (TOO LONG)
G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioner
vs Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., respondent
POnente: Puno
Facts:
MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila. Bel-Air is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are
homeowners of Bel-Air Villagee in Makati City. Bel-Air is the registered owner of the
Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
December 30, 1995 Bel-Air received a notice from MMDA requesting Bel-Air to open
Neptune St. to public vehicular traffic. On the same day, MMDA apprised that the
perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would
be demolished.
January 2, 1996, MMDA instituted a case for injunction against Bel-Air; and prayed
for a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining Neptune St. and prohibiting the
demolition of the perimeter wall. Court issued a TRO the next day.
After due hearing, RTC denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction. MMDA
question the denial and appealed to the CA. CA conducted an ocular inspection of
Neptune St. then issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the MMDA
proposed action.
On January 27, 1997, appellate court rendered a decision finding MMDA no
authority to order the opening of Neptune St. It held that the authority is in the City
Council of Makati by ordinance.
The motion for reconsideration is denied hence this recourse.

Issues: (1) MMDA has the authority to mandate the opening of Neptune St. to
public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers? (2) Is passage of an
ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the opening of
subdividion roads to public traffic? (3) Is Bel-Air estopped from denying the
authority of MMDA? (4)Was Bel-Air denied of due process despite the several
meetings held between MMDA and Bel-Air? (5) Has Bel-Air come to court with
unclean hands?
MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the
Government endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila. From the premise of police powers, it follow then that it need not for an
ordinance to be enacted first.
**Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is lodged
primarily in the National Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President
and administrative boards, LGU or other lawmaking bodies.
**LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a legislative body
empowered to enact ordinances, approved resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the province/city/municipality.
**Metro Manila is declared as a special development and administrative region in
1995. And the administration of metro-wide basic services is under the MMDA.Which

includes, transport and traffice management. It should be noted that MMDA are
limited to the acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies and installation of a
system and administration. MMDA was not granted with legislative power.
Ruling:
(1) The basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice
of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president.
The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed
opening of Neptune St.
(2) The MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is
the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.)
No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers
which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.
(3) Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily
responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA's
jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services
that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power.
Petition Denied.