Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as
Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local
Government, respondents.
Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.
Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

SARMIENTO, J.:p
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of Local Government), to suspend
and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R.
No. 93746), respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city
officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and
immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. 1 The personalities involved are
Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health
Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia Redondo
members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in
the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals. 2 We quote:
xxx xxx xxx
In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due to
political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the
exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her qualifications are best suited and
assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-career service employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the
office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant's duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place.
The petitioner's act are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as
Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any explanation or justification; that her salary was

withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run-around treatment in the
approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in
an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido,
German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their
complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without previous
notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the other
complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner, together with its fully-armed security
men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the
radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to
witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the
firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders.
Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13,
1988, without the benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at the
City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing injuries He was
released only the following day. 3
The Mayor thereafter answered 4 and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth the
succeeding events:
xxx xxx xxx
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the
Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties
received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and was
represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come
all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually held only on June 20,1988 in view of the inability and
unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the
proceedings and moved for a postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers
denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).
In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants and their witnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until
October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked for a postponement to September
26,1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their respective counsel. The
petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these hearings which were held in Mala the petitioner testified in Adm.
Case No. C-10298 and 10299.
The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testified including their witnesses.
On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved for a postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7
to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion for change of venue as denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on
November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for
postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was
indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the
investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.
The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due
to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.

On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to
December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were
considered submitted for resolution.
In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent
ordered the petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able
to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second
preventive suspension was not enforced. 5
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local
Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction.
Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another
sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted,
Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition, 6 (Malabor it is to be noted, is
one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise
promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying
the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court.
On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension
orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course
thereto.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of Local Government in hearing the ten cases against
him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards
him 7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party 8 and the running political
rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections;9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. 10 He
also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay
elections of November 14, 1988), 11notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more
suspension orders of the aforementioned cases. 12 He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were
held in Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request. 13 He states that he asked for
postponement on "valid and justifiable" 14 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which required
confinement; that his "vital" 15 witness was also hospitalized 16 but that the latter unduly denied his request. 17
Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of
any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No.
93746).
As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what manner the Mayor might have
been deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis-Santos were (are) political rivals and
that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter does not appear to have denied these
contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would have under less political
circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud" has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to join the
administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not
accept them, at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them 18 for the same reasons above-stated
and furthermore, because his say so's were never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public official,
Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary
evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.
As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day
ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact
restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners. 19

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we should overturn
the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides,
postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not
convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.
We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or
remove local officials.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did,
to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant,
first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase 21 as may be provided by law to strip the
President of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the
Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of
their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 22
It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all
Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 23
The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power
of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.
It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the
specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian
concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said
complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the respondent.
No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed
with the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be
lifted. 24
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent
is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal
mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that
the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the
offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after
the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation
of the proceedings against him until its termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect
or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. 25
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be
provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2)
Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the
constitutional language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend
to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative
sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to

underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The
Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal
corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the
United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically
to "small republics." 26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature,
albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government
units from over-dependence on the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the
passage of a local government code, 27 a local tax law, 28 income distribution legislation, 29 and a national representation law, 30 and
measures 31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places
the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to
include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal
powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. 32
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers
to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of
local legislation. 33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through
the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly
excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held, 34 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extent
of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over
executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different
things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In
administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government
officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in
Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. ... 35
xxx xxx xxx
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter." 36 "Supervision" on the other
hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. 37 As we
held, 38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". The impression is
apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson v. Roque, 39 Hebron v. Reyes, 40 and Mondano
v. Silvosa, 41 and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General. 42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control
powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law," 43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that
the President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on
appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." 44 However, neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically

banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because
no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson:
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken.
Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject
to constitutional limitations. 45
In Hebron we stated:
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and
adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary-which does not et with respect to municipal officers
... 46
In Mondano, the Court held:
... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor
who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude."
And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of
such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one affecting the official integrity of the officer in
question." Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the
Department Head over the administration of ... municipalities ... . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the
same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional
power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l), Article VII of the Constitution. 47
xxx xxx xxx
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal from the provincial
board pursuant to the Administrative Code. 48
Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because we did not think that the
President can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases ii
which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him. 49
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the
President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose
Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, 50Commissioner Blas Ople would not. 51
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we
said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger
expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg.
337 is still in force and effect. 52
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization." 53 The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from
the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the
central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a
radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than
precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government.
As we observed in one case, 54 decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national

concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according
to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units
declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "selfimmolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency. 55
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what
indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the
possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating
misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him
serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held: 56
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not
for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he
would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of
October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the
people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course,
be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, Ms culpability must be established. Moreover,
if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified.
Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were
acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by
him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga They were deprived of the services of the
man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive
suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to
avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 57
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, 58 and so also, because it is out of the
ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 59 is simply "to prevent the
accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" 60 or to
keep him off "the records and other evidence. 61
It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local
Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, 62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is
otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial.
In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.
Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we
held, 63 a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and
purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension
permanent.
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will
be for naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure
considerably.
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it
is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had
sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor without suspending him a day longer. What is
intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him
down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of
the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact premature.
The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty
days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code which brings to light a pattern
of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a
concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the
Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of
Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual
remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from
meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.
In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials
remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local
governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental
premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein,
impose disciplinary action against local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does
not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the
offenses he was charged originally; provided:
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted
in computing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for
which proper charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being
preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions
of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions
on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The
Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 175368

April 11, 2013

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES and HON. ANGELO T. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of
DENR, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,1 praying that this Court order the following: ( 1) declare as
unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 and
Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar
respondents from exercising control over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy
and Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial
Governor of Bulacan.
The Facts are as follows:
On March 28, 1996, Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) filed with the DENR Mines and Geosciences
Bureau Regional Office No. III (MGB R-III) an Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) covering an area of
61,136 hectares situated in the Municipalities of San Miguel, San Ildefonso, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. 2
On April 29, 1998, the MGB R-III issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement for failure to secure area clearances from the Forest Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR
Regional Office No. III.3
On November 11, 1998, Golden Falcon filed an appeal with the DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau Central Office (MGB-Central
Office), and sought reconsideration of the Order dated April 29, 1998.4
On February 10, 2004, while Golden Falcon's appeal was pending, Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and
Liberato Sembrano filed with the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan their respective
Applications for Quarry Permit (AQP), which covered the same area subject of Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement.5
On July 16, 2004, the MGB-Central Office issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's appeal and affirming the MGB R-III's Order dated
April 29, 1998.
On September 13, 2004, Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an Application for
Exploration Permit (AEP) covering 5,281 hectares of the area covered by Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement.6
On October 19, 2004, DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos, in response to MGB R-III Director Arnulfo V. Cabantog's memorandum
query dated September 8, 2004, categorically stated that the MGB-Central Office's Order dated July 16, 2004 became final on August
11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after Golden Falcon received the said Order, per the Certification dated October 8, 2004 issued by the
Postmaster II of the Philippine Postal Corporation of Cainta, Rizal.7
Through letters dated May 5 and May 10, 2005, AMTC notified the PENRO of Bulacan and the MGB R-III Director, respectively, that
the subject Applications for Quarry Permit fell within its (AMTC's) existing valid and prior Application for Exploration Permit, and the
the former area of Golden Falcon was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004 per the Memorandum dated October 19,
2004 of the MGB Director, Central Office.8
On June 24, 2005, Ricardo Medina, Jr., PENRO of Bulacan, indorsed AMTC's letter to the Provincial Legal Officer, Atty. Eugenio F.
Resurreccion, for his legal opinion on which date of denial of Golden Falcon's application/appeal April 29, 1998 or July 16, 2004 is

to be considered in the deliberation of the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) for the purpose of determining when the land
subject of the Applications for Quarry Permit could be considered open for application.
On June 28, 2005, Provincial Legal Officer Eugenio Resurreccion issued a legal opinion stating that the Order dated July 16, 2004 of
the MGB-Central Office was a mere reaffirmation of the Order dated April 29, 1998 of the MGB R-III; hence, the Order dated April
29, 1998 should be the reckoning period of the denial of the application of Golden Falcon.
On July 22, 2005, AMTC filed with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal protest against the aforesaid Applications for Quarry Permit on the
ground that the subject area was already covered by its Application for Exploration Permit.9
On August 8, 2005, MGB R-III Director Cabantog, who was the concurrent Chairman of the PMRB, endorsed to the Provincial
Governor of Bulacan, Governor Josefina M. dela Cruz, the aforesaid Applications for Quarry Permit that had apparently been
converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S.
Valdez (formerly Liberato Sembrano).10
On August 9, 2005, the PENRO of Bulacan issued four memoranda recommending to Governor Dela Cruz the approval of the
aforesaid Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit.11
On August 10, 2005, Governor Dela Cruz issued the corresponding Small-Scale Mining Permits in favor of Eduardo D. Mercado,
Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez.12
Subsequently, AMTC appealed to respondent DENR Secretary the grant of the aforesaid Small-Scale Mining Permits, arguing that: (1)
The PMRB of Bulacan erred in giving due course to the Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit without first resolving its formal
protest; (2) The areas covered by the Small-Scale Mining Permits fall within the area covered by AMTC's valid prior Application for
Exploration Permit; (3) The Applications for Quarry Permit were illegally converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit; (4)
DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos' ruling that the subject areas became open for mining location only on August 11, 2004 was
controlling; (5) The Small-Scale Mining Permits were null and void because they covered areas that were never declared People's
Small-Scale Mining Program sites as mandated by Section 4 of the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (6) Iron ore is not
considered as one of the quarry resources, as defined by Section 43 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which could be subjects of
an Application for Quarry Permit.13
On August 8, 2006, respondent DENR Secretary rendered a Decision 14 in favor of AMTC. The DENR Secretary agreed with MGB
Director Horacio C. Ramos that the area was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after the receipt by
Golden Falcon on July 27, 2004 of a copy of the MGB-Central Office's Order dated July 16, 2004, which Order denied Golden Falcon's
appeal. According to the DENR Secretary, the filing by Golden Falcon of the letter-appeal suspended the finality of the Order of
denial issued on April 29, 1998 by the Regional Director until the resolution of the appeal on July 16, 2004 by the MGB-Central
Office. He stated that the Applications for Quarry Permit were filed on February 10, 2004 when the area was still closed to mining
location; hence, the Small-Scale Mining Permits granted by the PMRB and the Governor were null and void. On the other hand, the
DENR Secretary declared that AMTC filed its Application for Exploration Permit when the area was already open to other mining
applicants; thus, AMTCs Application for Exploration Permit was valid. Moreover, the DENR Secretary held that the questioned SmallScale Mining Permits were issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the authority of the Provincial Governor
pursuant to Section 43 of R.A. No. 7942, because the area was never proclaimed to be under the People's Small-Scale Mining
Program. Further, the DENR Secretary stated that iron ore mineral is not considered among the quarry resources.
The dispositive portion of the DENR Secretarys Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-III-02-04 of Atlantic Mines and Trading Corp. is declared valid and may now
be given due course. The Small-Scale Mining Permits, SSMP-B-002-05 of Gerardo Cruz, SSMP-B-003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado,
SSMP-B-004-05 of Benedicto S. Cruz and SSMP-B-005-05 of Lucila S. Valdez are declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, the said
permits are hereby CANCELLED.15
Hence, petitioner League of Provinces filed this petition.
Petitioner is a duly organized league of local governments incorporated under R.A. No. 7160. Petitioner declares that it is composed
of 81 provincial governments, including the Province of Bulacan. It states that this is not an action of one province alone, but the
collective action of all provinces through the League, as a favorable ruling will not only benefit one province, but all provinces and all
local governments.
Petitioner raises these issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 17(B)(3)(III) OF THE, 1991 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND SECTION 24 OF THE PEOPLE'S SMALL-SCALE
MINING ACT OF 1991 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR PROVIDING FOR EXECUTIVE CONTROL AND INFRINGING UPON THE LOCAL
AUTONOMY OF PROVINCES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT OF RESPONDENT [DENR] IN NULLIFYING, VOIDING AND CANCELLING THE SMALL-SCALE MINING
PERMITS AMOUNTS TO EXECUTIVE CONTROL, NOT MERELY SUPERVISION AND USURPS THE DEVOLVED POWERS OF ALL
PROVINCES.16
To start, the Court finds that petitioner has legal standing to file this petition because it is tasked under Section 504 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 to promote local autonomy at the provincial level; 17 adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of
all provinces and its officials and employees;18 and exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the
league may prescribe for the welfare of the provinces.19
Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that
ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid.20 This presumption is rooted in
the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy
for each other's acts.21 This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, 22 leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court. 23
In this case, petitioner admits that respondent DENR Secretary had the authority to nullify the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by
the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale
Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR.
Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. No. 7061 or The
Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942, otherwise
known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.24 The pertinent provisions of law sought to be declared as unconstitutional by petitioner
are as follows:
R.A. No. 7061 (The Local Government Code of 1991)
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise
exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to
efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
xxxx
(3) For a Province:c
xxxx
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, enforcement of forestry laws limited to
community-based forestry projects, pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the
environment; and mini-hydro electric projects for local purposes; x x x25
R.A. No. 7076 (People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991)
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. - There is hereby created under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary
a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board, which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and
shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush areas for small-scale mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;

(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;

(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a peoples small-scale mining area, an area that is declared a
small-mining; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of this Act. 26
Petitioner contends that the aforecited laws and DENR Administrative Order No. 9640 (the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995) did not explicitly confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR Secretary the power to reverse,
abrogate, nullify, void, or cancel the permits issued by the Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the
PMRB. The statutes are also silent as to the power of respondent DENR Secretary to substitute his own judgment over that of the
Provincial Governor and the PMRB.
Moreover, petitioner contends that Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076,
which confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are unconstitutional, as the Constitution states
that the President (and Executive Departments and her alter-egos) has the power of supervision only, not control, over acts of the
local government units, and grants the local government units autonomy, thus:
The 1987 Constitution:
Article X, Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with
respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that
the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 27
Petitioner contends that the policy in the above-cited constitutional provision is mirrored in the Local Government Code, which
states:
SEC. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. - (a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President
shall exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and independent component
cities; through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and through the city and municipality with respect
to barangays.28
Petitioner contends that the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 show that the
relationship between the President and the Provinces or respondent DENR, as the alter ego of the President, and the Province of
Bulacan is one of executive supervision, not one of executive control. The term "control" has been defined as the power of an officer
to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his/her duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter, while the term "supervision" is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers
perform their function in accordance with law.29
Petitioner argues that respondent DENR Secretary went beyond mere executive supervision and exercised control when he nullified
the small-scale mining permits granted by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the former substituted the judgment of the latter.
Petitioner asserts that what is involved here is a devolved power.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to regulate small-scale mining has been devolved to all provinces. In the
exercise of devolved powers, departmental approval is not necessary. 30
Petitioner contends that if the provisions in Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 and Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of
1991 granting the power of control to the DENR/DENR Secretary are not nullified, nothing would stop the DENR Secretary from
nullifying, voiding and canceling the small-scale mining permits that have been issued by a Provincial Governor.
Petitioner submits that the statutory grant of power of control to respondents is unconstitutional, as the Constitution only allows
supervision over local governments and proscribes control by the executive departments.
In its Comment, respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, stated that contrary to the assertion of petitioner,
the power to implement the small-scale mining law is expressly limited in Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code, which

provides that it must be carried out "pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR."
Moreover, the fact that the power to implement the small-scale mining law has not been fully devolved to provinces is further
amplified by Section 4 of the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, which provides, among others, that the People's Small-Scale
Mining Program shall be implemented by the DENR Secretary.
The petition lacks merit.
Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the Constitution 31 provides that "the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State."
Moreover, paragraph 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the Congress may, by law, allow small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens x x x."
Pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, was enacted,
establishing under Section 4 thereof a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in
coordination with other concerned government agencies.
The People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 defines "small-scale mining" as "refer[ring] to mining activities, which rely heavily on
manual labor using simple implement and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment." 32
It should be pointed out that the Administrative Code of 198733 provides that the DENR is, subject to law and higher authority, in
charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate, under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, to control and supervise
the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale
mining law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of
1991, while the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is to be
implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government agencies.
Indeed, Section 4, Article X (Local Government) of the Constitution states that "[t]he President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments," and Section 25 of the Local Government Code reiterates the same. General supervision
by the President means no more than seeing to it that laws are faithfully executed or that subordinate officers act within the law. 34
The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government
authority.35 It does not make local governments sovereign within the State.36 Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of
powers, but subject to limitations like following national policies or standards, 37 and those provided by the Local Government Code,
as the structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the different local
government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress 38 under Section 3, Article X of the
Constitution.
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution mandated Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of
local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units."
In connection with the enforcement of the small-scale mining law in the province, Section 17 of the Local Government Code
provides:
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise
exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to
efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
xxxx
(3) For a Province:c

xxxx
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, enforcement of forestry laws limited to
community-based forestry projects, pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the
environment; and mini-hydro electric projects for local purposes;39
Clearly, the Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial
government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and
higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization of the country's natural resources.40
Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 is in harmony with R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act
of 1991,41 which established a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR, thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared of the State to promote, develop, protect and rationalize viable small-scale
mining activities in order to generate more employment opportunities and provide an equitable sharing of the nation's wealth and
natural resources, giving due regard to existing rights as herein provided.
xxxx
Sec. 4. People's Small-Scale Mining Program. - For the purpose of carrying out the declared policy provided in Section 2 hereof, there
is hereby established a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, hereinafter called the Department, in coordination with other concerned government agencies, designed to
achieve an orderly, systematic and rational scheme for the small-scale development and utilization of mineral resources in certain
mineral areas in order to address the social, economic, technical, and environmental problems connected with small-scale mining
activities.
xxxx
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. There is hereby created under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary
a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board, which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and
shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush areas for small-scale mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;
(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a peoples small-scale mining area, an area that is declared a
small-mining; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of this Act. 42
DENR Administrative Order No. 34, series of 1992, containing the Rules and Regulations to implement R.A. No. 7076, provides:
SEC. 21. Administrative Supervision over the People's Small-Scale Mining Program. The following DENR officials shall exercise the
following supervisory functions in the implementation of the Program:
21.1 DENR Secretrary direct supervision and control over the program and activities of the small-scale miners within the people's
small-scale mining area;
21.2 Director the Director shall:
a. Recommend the depth or length of the tunnel or adit taking into account the: (1) size of membership and capitalization of the
cooperative; (2) size of mineralized areas; (3) quantity of mineral deposits; (4) safety of miners; and (5) environmental impact and
other considerations;
b. Determine the right of small-scale miners to existing facilities in consultation with the operator, claimowner, landowner or lessor
of an affected area upon declaration of a small-scale mining area;

c. Recommend to the Secretary the withdrawal of the status of the people's small-scale mining area when it can no longer be
feasibly operated on a small-scale basis; and
d. See to it that the small-scale mining contractors abide by small-scale mines safety rules and regulations.
xxxx
SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. The Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board created under R.A. 7076 shall
exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
22.1 Declares and segregates existing gold rush area for small-scale mining;
22.2 Reserves for the future, mineralized areas/mineral lands for people's small-scale mining;
22.3 Awards contracts to small-scale miners cooperative;
22.4 Formulates and implements rules and regulations related to R.A. 7076;
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within ninety (90) days upon filing of protests or complaints;
Provided, That any aggrieved party may appeal within five (5) days from the Board's decision to the Secretary for final resolution
otherwise the same is considered final and executory; and
22.6 Performs such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of R.A. 7076.
SEC. 6. Declaration of People's Small-Scale Mining Areas. The Board created under R.A. 7076 shall have the authority to declare
and set aside People's Small-Scale Mining Areas in sites onshore suitable for small-scale mining operations subject to review by the
DENR Secretary thru the Director.43
DENR Administrative Order No. 23, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known
as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, adopted on August 15, 1995, provides under Section 123 44 thereof that small-scale mining
applications should be filed with the PMRB45 and the corresponding permits shall be issued by the Provincial Governor, except smallscale mining applications within the mineral reservations.
Thereafter, DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40, otherwise known as the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, adopted on December 19, 1996, provides that applications for SmallScale Mining Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City Mayor through the concerned Provincial/City Mining Regulatory
Board for areas outside the Mineral Reservations and with the Director though the Bureau for areas within the Mineral
Reservations.46 Moreover, it provides that Local Government Units shall, in coordination with the Bureau/ Regional Offices and
subject to valid and existing mining rights, "approve applications for small-scale mining, sand and gravel, quarry x x x and gravel
permits not exceeding five (5) hectares."47
Petitioner contends that the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. No. 7076, DENR Administrative Orders Nos. 95-23 and 96-40
granted the DENR Secretary the broad statutory power of control, but did not confer upon the respondents DENR and DENR
Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the Provincial Governor or small-scale mining
contracts entered into by the Board.
The contention does not persuade.
The settlement of disputes over conflicting claims in small-scale mining is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076, thus:
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. There is hereby created under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary
a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board, which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and
shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
xxxx
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a people's small-scale mining area, an area that is declared a
small mining area; x x x
Section 24, paragraph (e) of R.A. No. 7076 cited above is reflected in Section 22, paragraph 22.5 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7076, to wit:

SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. The Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board created under R.A. No. 7076 shall
exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
xxxx
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within ninety (90) days upon filing of protests or complaints;
Provided, That any aggrieved party may appeal within five (5) days from the Board's decision to the Secretary for final resolution
otherwise the same is considered final and executory; x x x
In this case, in accordance with Section 22, paragraph 22.5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7076, the AMTC
filed on July 22, 2005 with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal protest against the Applications for Quarry Permits of Eduardo Mercado,
Benedicto Cruz, Liberato Sembrano (replaced by Lucila Valdez) and Gerardo Cruz on the ground that the subject area was already
covered by its Application for Exploration Permit.48However, on August 8, 2005, the PMRB issued Resolution Nos. 05-8, 05-9, 05-10
and 05-11, resolving to submit to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan the Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo
Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz for the granting/issuance of the said permits. 49 On August 10, 2005, the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan issued the Small-Scale Mining Permits to Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and
Gerardo Cruz based on the legal opinion of the Provincial Legal Officer and the Resolutions of the PMRB of Bulacan.
Hence, AMTC filed an appeal with respondent DENR Secretary, appealing from Letter-Resolution No. 05-1317 and Resolution Nos.
05-08, 05-09, 05-10 and 05-11, all dated August 8, 2005, of the PMRB of Bulacan, which resolutions gave due course and granted, on
August 10, 2005, Small-Scale Mining Permits to Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz involving
parcels of mineral land situated at Camachin, Doa Remedios Trinidad, Bulacan.
The PMRB of Bulacan filed its Answer, stating that it is an administrative body, created under R.A. No. 7076, which cannot be
equated with the court wherein a full-blown hearing could be conducted, but it is enough that the parties were given the
opportunity to present evidence. It asserted that the questioned resolutions it issued were in accordance with the mining laws and
that the Small-Scale Mining Permits granted were registered ahead of AMTC's Application for Exploration Permit. Further, the Board
stated that the Governor of Bulacan had the power to approve the Small-Scale Mining Permits under R.A. No. 7160.
The DENR Secretary found the appeal meritorious, and resolved these pivotal issues: (1) when is the subject mining area open for
mining location by other applicants; and (2) who among the applicants have valid applications.1wphi1 The pertinent portion of the
decision of the DENR Secretary reads:
We agree with the ruling of the MGB Director that the area is open only to mining location on August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days
after the receipt by Golden Falcon on July 27, 2004 of a copy of the subject Order of July 16, 2004.1wphi1 The filing by Golden
Falcon of the letter-appeal suspended the finality of the Order of Denial issued on April 29, 1998 by the Regional Director until the
Resolution thereof on July 16, 2004.
Although the subject AQPs/SSMPs were processed in accordance with the procedures of the PMRB, however, the AQPs were filed
on February 10, 2004 when the area is still closed to mining location. Consequently, the SSMPs granted by the PMRB and the
Governor are null and void making thereby AEP No. III-02-04 of the AMTC valid, it having been filed when the area is already open to
other mining applicants.
Records also show that the AQPs were converted into SSMPs. These are two (2) different applications. The questioned SSMPs were
issued in violation of Section 4 of RA 7076 and beyond the authority of the Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 43 of RA 7942
because the area was never proclaimed as "People's Small-Scale Mining Program." Moreover, iron ore mineral is not considered
among the quarry resources.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-III-02-04 of Atlantic Mines and Trading Corp. is declared valid and may now
be given due course. The Small-Scale Mining Permits, SSMP-B-002-05 of Gerardo Cruz, SSMP-B-003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado,
SSMP-B-004-05 of Benedicto S. Cruz and SSMP-B-005-05 of Lucila S. Valdez are declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, the said
permits are hereby CANCELLED.50
The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance with the power of review granted to the DENR
Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing
Rules and Regulations.52 It is noted that although AMTC filed a protest with the PMRB regarding its superior and prior Application for
Exploration Permit over the Applications for Quarry Permit, which were converted to Small-Scale Mining Permits, the PMRB did not

resolve the same, but issued Resolution Nos. 05-08 to 05-11 on August 8, 2005, resolving to submit to the Provincial Governor of
Bulacan the Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz for the
granting of the said permits. After the Provincial Governor of Bulacan issued the Small-Scale Mining Permits on August 10, 2005,
AMTC appealed the Resolutions of the PMRB giving due course to the granting of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial
Governor.
Hence, the decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be
given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of
review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power
to review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the
Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is,
and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the
facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. 53 The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No.
7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting
claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial
Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of
the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.
In determining whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are
unconstitutional, the Court has been guided by Beltran v. The Secretary of Health, 54 which held:
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has
in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to
declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail. 55
In this case, the Court finds that the grounds raised by petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Section 17 (b )(3)(iii) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 'of R.A. No.7076 failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said provisions of
law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989
DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU MACALIMPOWAC DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTANA
BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS, representing the other taxpayers of
Mindanao, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 89965 November 10, 1989
ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Budget, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Abbas, Abbas, Amora, Alejandro-Abbas & Associates for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 89651 and 89965.
Abdullah D. Mama-o for and in his own behalf in 89965.

CORTES, J.:
The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, 1 scheduled
for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."
These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite
and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734,
or parts thereof, unconstitutional .
After a consolidated comment was filed by Solicitor General for the respondents, which the Court considered as the answer, the
case was deemed submitted for decision, the issues having been joined. Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a "Manifestation
with Motion for Leave to File Reply on Respondents' Comment and to Open Oral Arguments," which the Court noted.
The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the government of the Republic of the Philippines of the
Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial Commission Members of the
Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference" took effect on December 23, 1976. It
provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of autonomy." 2
In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided for regional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the
charter provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be
vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies.
The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive and representative of the
constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of both
Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be
organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall be
the responsibility of the National Government.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989.
1. The Court shall dispose first of the second category of arguments raised by petitioners, i.e. that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734
conflict with the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is part of the law of the land, being a binding
international agreement . The Solicitor General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not having been
entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign state and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987
Constitutions, nor a binding international agreement.
We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on
the Philippine Government whether under public international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution
itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of
R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734
and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming
for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of
the law of the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines,
rather it would be in the same class as the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974), citing Head Money
Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli

Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would
result in the granting of the reliefs sought. 3
2. The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions which have been raised by petitioners.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted
provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of
the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that "[t]here is hereby created the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the
purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution." Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision
makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an
autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.
Firs, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article X of the Constitution which sets forth the conditions
necessary for the creation of the autonomous region. The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it
clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional requirements.
Second, there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the
same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier
than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces
and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and
cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor
of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall
not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite
contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it. [See
III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 482-492 (1986)].
As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is made effective upon the approval
"by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The question has been
raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units,
or a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?
We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.
If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so
indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the
autonomous region, which reads:
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2].
it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite,
but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of
the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as

that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual
constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent
units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided
under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.
Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the other hand, maintains that only those areas which, to
his view, share common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the
cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such
concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the
same characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that
Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas
should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that
share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to
go into the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers. [Angara
v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936); Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].
After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of basis, petitioner Mama-o would then adopt the
extreme view that other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should likewise be covered. He argues that since the Organic Act covers
several non-Muslim areas, its scope should be further broadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order
for the other non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal protection of the law, and therefore is violative of the Constitution.
Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision he had earlier invoked. Any determination by
Congress of what areas in Mindanao should compromise the autonomous region, taking into account shared historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics, would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other
areas. As earlier stated, such determination by Congress of which areas should be covered by the organic act for the autonomous
region constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court.
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification [People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1963); Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372
(1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413]. In Dumlao v.
Commission on Elections G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392], the Court ruled that once class may be treated differently
from another where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee of equal protection is thus not
infringed in this case, the classification having been made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the
Constitution itself.
Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise
of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict
between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and the national law on the other
hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah)
is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law.
Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and
national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.
As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual controversy
between litigants must first exist [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra; Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43
SCRA 677]. In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the
application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be
called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.

Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which, among others, states:
. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain
in the existing administrative regions:Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the
existing regions.
According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the
Constitution upon the President. That the President may choose to merge existing regions pursuant to the Organic Act is challenged
as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution which provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the
National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization
Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by Pres. dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not
territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While
the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally
been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec.
4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the
constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a
merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.
Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which create an Oversight Committee to supervise the
transfer to the autonomous region of the powers, appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional government by the
organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said provisions mandate that the transfer of certain national government offices and their
properties to the regional government shall be made pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee, and that such
transfer should be accomplished within six (6) years from the organization of the regional government.
It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional because while the Constitution states that the creation of the
autonomous region shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an Oversight committee tasked
with supervising the transfer of powers and properties to the regional government would in effect delay the creation of the
autonomous region.
Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is
approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region
immediately takes effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.
Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is
approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region
immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do
not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to
the operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government.
The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no bases therefor.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No.
L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734; Morfe v. Mutuc, supra; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30].
Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a
declaration. otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is,
therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 93054 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 100
Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue), Ifugao Provincial Board Member CORAZON MONTINIG,
(Mayoyao), Former Vice-Mayor MARTIN UDAN (Banaue), Municipal Councilors MARTIN GANO, (Lagawe), and TEODORO HEWE,
(Hingyon), Barangay Councilman PEDRO W. DULAG (Lamut); Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. CHANGIWAN, and DONATO TIMAGO;
Lamut resident REY ANTONIO; Kiangan residents ORLANDO PUGUON, and REYNAND DULDULAO; Lagawe residents TOMAS
KIMAYONG, GREGORIO DANGO, GEORGE B. BAYWONG, and VICENTE LUNAG; Hingyon residents PABLO M. DULNUAN and
CONSTANCIO GANO; Mayoyao residents PEDRO M. BAOANG, LEONARDO IGADNA, and MAXIMO IGADNA; and Banaue residents
PUMA-A CULHI, LATAYON BUTTIG, MIGUEL PUMELBAN, ANDRES ORDILLO, FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY BINOMNGA, GABRIEL
LIMMANG, ROMEO TONGALI, RUBEN BAHATAN, MHOMDY GABRIEL, and NADRES GHAMANG, Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS; The Honorable FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary; The
Cabinet Officer for Regional Development; Hon. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management; and Hon.
ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC, National Treasurer, Respondents.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the
creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
The antecedent facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of
Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region."
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a
majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces
and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been
approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the same date, the Secretary of Justice
issued a memorandum for the President reiterating the COMELEC resolution and provided:
". . . [A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the
province of Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably then, alone, legally and validly constitutes the CAR." (Rollo, p. 7)
As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the elections in the Cordillera Autonomous
Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991.: nad
Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary on February 5, 1990 issued a Memorandum granting
authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive
Order No. 220.
On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The
COMELEC merely noted said petition.
On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board
and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the offices created under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification
of the Organic Act.- nad

The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the
Secretary of Justice, the memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and
prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending public funds for the purpose and (2) declare
Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still
in force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly
ratified by the voters in the constituent units. We treat the Comments of the respondents as an answer and decide the case.
This petition is meritorious.
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis Supplied)
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the
thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.
(Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a
province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins
other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other
relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.- nad
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood
in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed, must then, be applied in this case. (See Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770, [1988]; J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423 [1970]).
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the petitioner's position that the
Region cannot be constituted from only one province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera
government consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that:
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance and development
of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . ."
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region.
Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of
regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be
elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the cities composing the Autonomous
Region. chanrobles virtual law library
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then be elected only from the province of
Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in
the Philippines, population-wise, it would have too many government officials for so few people.:-cralaw
Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development Board composed of the Cordillera Governor, all the
provincial governors and city mayors or their representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly, and members representing
the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the provincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator.
The Board's functions (Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the Provincial

Coordinator's (Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 Local Government Code). If it takes only
one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on the other hand it takes an entire Board to perform almost the
same tasks in the regional level, it could only mean that a larger area must be covered at the regional level. The respondent's theory
of the Autonomous Region being made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to the Regional Government for its
initial organizational requirements cannot be construed as funding only a lone and small province.
These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera Autonomous Region was never contemplated by the
law creating it.
The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas enumerated in Article I, Section 2 (b) of Republic Act
No. 6766 which include Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City. It has the second smallest number of
inhabitants from among the provinces and city above mentioned. The Cordillera population is distributed in round figures as follows:
Abra, 185,000; Benguet, 486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; Kalinga-Apayao, 214,000; Mountain Province, 116,000; and Baguio City, 183,000;
Total population of these five provinces and one city; 1,332,000 according to the 1990 Census (Manila Standard, September 30,
1990, p. 14).
There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or which cannot be complied with. Section 16 of
Article V calls for a Regional Commission on Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and are (6) members coming from
different provinces and cities in the Region. Under the respondents' view, the Commission would have a Chairman and only one
member. It would never have a quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as practicable, to come from various
provinces and cities of the Region. Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various indigenous cultural
communities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a common regional language based upon the various
languages and dialects in the region which regional language in turn is expected to enrich the national language.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which rule against the
sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.:-cralaw
To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be impractical and illogical.
Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1969), is not applicable in the case at bar contrary to the
view of the Secretary of Justice.
The Abbas case laid down the rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
called for the purpose" found in the Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It stated:
x x x
". . . [I]t is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual
constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent
units."
This was the pronouncement applied by the Secretary of Justice in arriving at his conclusion stated in his Memorandum for the
President that:
x x x
". . . [i]t is believed that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) as mandated by R.A. No. 6766 became effective
upon its approval by the majority of the votes cast in the province of Ifugao. And considering the proviso in Section 13 (a) that only
the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted
favorably can, alone, legally and validly constitute the CAR." (Rollo. p. 40).
The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 for the Cordillera and Republic Act No. 6734 for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao determine (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in the Cordillera and in
Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in the two Republic Acts, shall comprise said
Autonomous Regions. (See III, Record of the Constitutional Commission, 487-492 [1986]).

The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall comprise the autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao which is, consequently, the same rule to follow with regard to the autonomous region in the Cordillera. However, there is
nothing in the Abbas decision which deals with the issue on whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim Mindanao or
Cordillera could exist despite the fact that only one province or one city is to constitute it.chanrobles virtual law library
Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legally constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. The issue is not whether the province of Ifugao is to be included in the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is the
first issue which the Court answers in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the
creation of an autonomous region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990
memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while
Executive Order No. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, G.R. No. 177597

Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN,
Respondents.
x------------------------x

PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 178628

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

BRION, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 16, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These consolidated petitions[1] seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. [2]

The Facts

The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first
legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.[3] Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA
9054).[4] Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM
but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.

On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054,[5] enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.MMA Act 201 provides:
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura,
and Upi are hereby separated from the Province ofMaguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is
hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

xxxx

Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the
governor and majority of the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to serve their unexpired terms in the
province that they will choose or where they are residents:Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces becomes
vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall have
preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the time being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and
shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further, that they
shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries
in accordance with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the mother province.

Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.

Later, three new municipalities[6] were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total
number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative
district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.

The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify
the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act
201.
In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo
with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407, which
adopted the recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department under a Memorandum dated27 February 2007, [7] provides in
pertinent parts:

Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law Department
that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)

However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating
that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.[8]

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by
renaming the legislative district in question asShariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao
with Cotabato City).[9]

In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast
in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution[10] and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. [11] Thus, Sema asserted that the
COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in
Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the
lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district. [12] Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No.
7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts.

In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to reach the merits of the case and
merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the
COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of
prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on
1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.

In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because
in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan including Cotabato City. Respondent Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did
not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed
Maguindanaos first legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion
Maguindanaos first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts
lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under Section
5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city. [13]

Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents Comments and reiterating her claim that the
COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902.

In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No. 177597 to comment on the issue of whether a
province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. The parties submitted
their compliance as follows:

(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court in Felwa v. Salas[14] stated that when a
province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute
which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment; (b) Section
462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) affirms the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation of a province; and
(c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate
the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces.

(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos.
07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is self-executing. Thus,

every new province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and

(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following grounds: (a) the province contemplated in Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in RA 7160 on the
creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures
relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of
Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the
disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the Regional Assembly can create provinces
without regard to the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than 250,000, is
not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives.

On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in
the affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. [15]

In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the
issues raised in the oral arguments.[16] On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in G.R.
No. 177597 adopted the following positions:

(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the
power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their
organic acts, legislative powers over other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.[17] However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant
in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated
in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. [18] Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19
should be construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with the minimum
criteria under RA 7160.[19]

(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the
power to create provinces was not among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower
than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
and the Equal Protection Clause; and

(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position the
COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054
is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and Section 6, [20] Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create
provinces was withheld from the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.

On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House
of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent
Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007.
The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position on this issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054
is unconstitutional.

The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the
Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R.
No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters
of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the
COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the
enactment by Congress of the appropriate law.

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

I. In G.R. No. 177597:

(A) Preliminarily
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No.
7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted
the petition in G.R. No. 177597.

(B) On the merits

(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such province.

II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first
legislative district of Maguindanao (as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City]), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and
(3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
On the Preliminary Matters

The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate

to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations

The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.[21] On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person to perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.[22] True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the
exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[23] Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from
canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. These, however, do
not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of
Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and
regulations.[24]

Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation

Does Not Moot the Petition

There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for
representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province withCotabato City mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent
Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality
of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines
whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City will be
included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of
the novel issues raised here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the
other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future
additional provinces.

On the Main Issues

Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly

Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan

The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three
conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such
creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or
local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can
delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no
conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, [25] subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government
Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities. [26]

Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the
power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional
legislative bodies.[27] In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power
to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create
municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and
cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member x x x.

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as
well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more
cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or
more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000
involves the power to create a legislative district because once the citys population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes
entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to
create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative.

Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned

Only by an Act of Congress

Under the present Constitution, as well as in past[28] Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides:

SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

xxxx

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative
districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a
law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of
the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law
passed by Congress. InMontejo v. COMELEC,[29] we held that the power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the
power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a
national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative
districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local
legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body,
created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.

The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress
of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended.
Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.

Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or
reapportion legislative districts for Congress.

On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, The Regional Assembly may
exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x. Since the ARMM Regional
Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose
representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative
is always elected in the next national elections from the effectivity of the law. [30]
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of
Representatives, is a national official.[31] It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to
create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is
maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the
legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can
never create a national office.

To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs
territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional
Assemblys legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x.

The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress power to create or
reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201
provides that:

Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall
remain. (Emphasis supplied)

However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that each province
shall have at least one representative. Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is
unconstitutional.

Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied)

and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:

Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be
entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of
Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or
where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission
on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to
one member in the House of Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the
statement in Felwa that when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence
neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution,
without a reapportionment.

The contention has no merit.

First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was
unconstitutional for creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution. The Court answered
in the negative, thus:

The Constitution ordains:

The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned
among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall
have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same
number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present
Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory.
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation of a province for
each province shall have at least one member in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several representative
districts within a province. The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof
refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of

provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from
the fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is
created by statute, the corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which
cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions under which a province may be created,
except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed in the
Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created or
subdivided into other provinces, with the consequent creation of additional representative districts, without complying with the
aforementioned requirements.[32] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative districts indirectly through a
special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the
maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because
in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely
by aregional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.

What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress power to
reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative
district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution
provides that each province shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from the
constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other
legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a province such legislative body
must have the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by
operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district.

Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave
Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a
legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City
alone as the surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires
that [E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one representative.

Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section
19,[33] Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard
to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory
of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.[34] The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:

(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and thus increase the
membership of a superior legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution
(unless a national law provides otherwise);

(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one representative for at least every 250,000
residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA
7160 that every province created must have a population of at least 250,000; and

(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of Representatives through the ARMM
Regional Assemblys continuous creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM.

The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 highlights the absurdity of Semas position that
the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces:

Justice Carpio:
So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and pack Congress with their own representatives [?]

Atty. Vistan II:[35]

Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that.
Justice Carpio:
So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x provinces x x x and, therefore, they can have thirty-five (35)
new representatives in the House of Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is that what you are saying? That can be done,
under your theory[?]

Atty. Vistan II:

Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances.

Justice Carpio:
Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new provinces, there may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand
(100,000) [population], x x x, and they will each have one representative x x x to Congress without any national law, is that what you
are saying?

Atty. Vistan II:

Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying.

xxxx
Justice Carpio:
So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one thousand (1000) representatives to the House of
Representatives without a national law[,] that is legally possible, correct?

Atty. Vistan II:

Yes, Your Honor.[36] (Emphasis supplied)

Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional autonomy, [37] nor Congress in
enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of
government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress
but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.

The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the
Ordinance to the Constitution which states, [A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member, refers to a province created by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that
the creation of a province increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can
decide.Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 219[38] district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the
House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there should at
least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200
seats for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress
to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new provinces.

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x. The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the
ARMM Government is established within the framework of the Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution
which mandates that the ARMM shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative
district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with
the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of
such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an
appropriate case.

In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot
create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative
district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district
representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial
jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.

Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution

Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the
Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional
Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 is VALID.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA,

in his personal capacity, and in representation of
MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS
IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J.
USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN,
ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH ALSAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM
ALUH SAUPI,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 196271

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,

- versus -

PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its

President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA,
JR., Office of the President Executive Secretary,
FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and
ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines,

ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,

Respondents.

REYES, and

x----------------------------------------------x

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

BASARI D. MAPUPUNO,
Petitioner,

Promulgated:

October 18, 2011

- versus -

SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the

Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity
as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his
capacity as Senate President, and FELICIANO
BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 196305

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,

Petitioner,

- versus -

PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the

Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU

CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO
PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN),
Petitioners,

- versus -

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its

Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as

G.R. No. 197221

Secretary of the Department of Budget and

Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his
capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL,

Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 197280

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

LUIS BAROK BIRAOGO,

Petitioner,

- versus -

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

JACINTO V. PARAS,
Petitioner,

- versus -

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and

the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

G.R. No. 197282

Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x

MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC.,

Respondents-Intervenor.

G.R. No. 197392

G.R. No. 197454

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BRION, J.:

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the
ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide
with the countrys regular national and local elections. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge
(OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly,
who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.

Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No.
4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was
passed.

Factual Antecedents

The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:

Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely
carry into effect the granted autonomy.

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies.
The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative
assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide
for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall
be included in the autonomous region.

On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734
entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. A plebiscite was held on November 6,
1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first
regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.

RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending
for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended) was
the next legislative act passed. This law provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic
act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.

Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140[1] - on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally
scheduled under RA No. 9054, toNovember 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15,
2001.

RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001. The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the
same date.

RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of August 2005, and
on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.

RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM
elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred
ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.

After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13)
Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred with the Senate amendments, and
on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.

As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this Court G.R. No. 196271[3] - assailing the
constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with
the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another petition[4] also
assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.

With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as
well to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality:

a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the House of Representatives against
Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197221;

b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R.
No. 197282;

c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary Injunction[7] filed by Louis Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC
and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392; and

d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives against Executive
Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454.

Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko
Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus[9] against the COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No.
9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.

Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their
own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011,
the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the
constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.

Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their respective
memoranda within twenty (20) days.

On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering
the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of
their term on September 30, 2011.

The Arguments

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to
comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in
order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading
requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of
the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the elective and representative character of the executive and legislative

departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake
the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed
office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in
complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

The Issues

From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and
16, 2011:

I.

Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite

A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?

B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?

C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution?

IV.

Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:

A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

VI.

Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.

We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.

OUR RULING

We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.

I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate

The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this
position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of
the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan
Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall
serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year and the
remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes
of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1992.
We agree with this position.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent
towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, [10] which show the extent to
which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.[11]

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the shortening the
terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether
national or local to once every three years.[12] This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations.[13]
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as
patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of
May, 1992 and for all the following elections.

This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national and local elections as a constitutional mandate.
In Osmea v. Commission on Elections,[14]we explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and
year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as
the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This
common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to
be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x x records
of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local
election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in common use
and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails.[15] As this Court explained in People v. Derilo,[16] [a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its language
should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed.

Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district,
often a community or minor political subdivision.[17] Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and
regional assembly representatives obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve
within the limited region of ARMM.

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident
from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15
to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local
government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not include the regional elections of the
ARMM unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions below, as this concept permeates the
consideration of the various issues posed in this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.

II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2),
Article VI of the Constitution[18]which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they
must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills
immediate enactment.

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the following
manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies
the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been
printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari
jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and
third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the President as
urgent.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. [20] Following
our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three
separate readings requirement.

On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity
or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or
the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2)
is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of
bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]

The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave full recognition to the Presidents
certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our power of judicial review. [21]

The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial
department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by both the House of Representatives
and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters committed to
them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand. [22]

In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on separate
days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently
respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they
shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process.[23]

We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had
sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.

III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article
XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:

Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the
Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.

Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the
approval of such amendment or revision.

We find no merit in this contention.

In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No.
9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore
existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and
thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to
RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or
supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular elections.

This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion
finds support in ARMMs recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only
did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections, [24] leaving the date
to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, [25] RA No. 8176,[26] RA No. 8746,[27] RA No. 8753,[28] and RA
No. 9012[29] were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part

or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any
plebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on
the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 [30] to reset the date of the ARMM
elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No.
9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite
held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31] which further reset the date of the ARMM regional
elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM
elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No.
10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No.
9054.

III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement
required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32] has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable
law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other
words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the
quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or
approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement
is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to
amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Courts pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS[33] on this subject best explains
the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of
future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary
powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to
forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.

xxx

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial
jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution
or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained.
Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at

the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This
legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent
legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.[34] (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the
passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators room for action and
flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement,
as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the enlargement of the
plebiscite requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a
violation of the Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for
determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that
amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to become effective, [35] questions on the
extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and
the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. With these wordings as standard, we
interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the
Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic
structure of the regional government; (b) the regions judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government under
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.[36]

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to
provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any
change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance
with these requirements.

IV. The synchronization issue

As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for
and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact already exists RA No. 7166 as the
forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national
and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments (with the exception
ofbarangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of
what is already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by express constitutional
recognition.[37]

To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have
been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to
be held in May 2013).

During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options
are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of
RA No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; [38](2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the
terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to
appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office.

As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose
the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.

V.

A.

The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153

Basic Underlying Premises

To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material premises must be fully understood. The first is the extent of the
powers of Congress to legislate; thesecond is the constitutional mandate for the synchronization of elections; and the third is on the
concept of autonomy as recognized and established under the 1987 Constitution.

The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. [39] The legislative body possesses plenary power for
all purposes of civil government.[40]Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.[41] Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative
power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. [42]

The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations are generally provided in
some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Other
constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions
of Article X) provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are found in the evident purpose which was in view and
the circumstances and historical events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic law. [43]

The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution constitute express
limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what is otherwise the
unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance of the autonomous region.

Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure of
government i.e., that the government must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both of which must be elective
and representative of the constituent political units; national government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted
under Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17, Article X, all powers and functions not granted by this
Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.

The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a standard that Congress must observe in dealing with
legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no doubt on what the Constitution
intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and
administrative matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the permeating principles of national sovereignty and the
territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.[44] In other words, the
Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio[45] in the relationship
between the national and the regional governments.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and
established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the difference
is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests
directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.

These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To succinctly
describe the legal situation that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional elections with the national,
congressional and all other local elections (save for barangay and sangguniang kabataanelections) left it with the problem of how to
provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period between the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008
and the assumption to office twenty-one (21) months away of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.

The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period, consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its
established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is not a
strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape. The Constitutions Transitory Provisions themselves collectively provide
measures for transition from the old constitution to the new[46] and for the introduction of new concepts.[47] As previously
mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and of elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the
Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that
synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present problem is with us today.

The creation of local government units also represents instances when interim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon del
Sur[48] and Dinagat Islands,[49] the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an interim governor, vice-governor and
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although these positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive officials
were to serve until a new set of provincial officials shall have been elected and qualified. [50] A similar authority to appoint is provided
in the transition of a local government from a sub-province to a province.[51]

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or
used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably
accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.

To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers in our discussion of the options
available to Congress to address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the ARMM elections, properly understood as
interim measures that Congress had to provide. The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume prime
materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional objective
of synchronization that cannot legally be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the Constitution when it
addressed through RA No. 10153 the concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it?

B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional

We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the
2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC:[52]

It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are
elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution
fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even
though the successors fail to qualify within the time.

In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:

It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of which is limited
by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as limited by the Constitution. [Emphasis ours.]

Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that where the
Constitution has itself made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated should be
respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary
corollary is that none of the three branches of government can deviate from the constitutional mandate except only as the
Constitution itself may allow.[53] If at all, Congress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional
command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other hand, may only interpret the mandate
if an interpretation is appropriate and called for.[54]

In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing
legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term
of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to
create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally
infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of
the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory.[55] Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the
President.[56] Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.

Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was brought before, and given the
imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings, particularly
from Sambarani v. COMELEC,[57] Adap v. Comelec,[58] and Montesclaros v. Comelec,[59]where the Court ruled that the elective officials
could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.

All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for
in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local elective officials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM ViceGovernor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the term
for which they were originally elected.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of
RA No. 9054) in the past,[60] we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express
or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. [61]

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed
under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of
Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation,[62] except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections

Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special
elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions
of the Constitution:

Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives
shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President and Vice-President, states:
xxxx

Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]

These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice
President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or
officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of
that power.[63]

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another
date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing,
Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom thatit shall not call special elections as an
adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at
the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and
effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. [64] But our power rests on very narrow ground and is
merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself
should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot
compel COMELEC to call for special elections.

Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call
for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.[65] Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory
grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to another date.
However, this power is limited to, and can only be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. We
quote:

Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest
election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any
interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard,
shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and
hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]

A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address instances where elections have already been scheduled to
take place but have to be postponedbecause of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible in any political subdivision. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the term analogous causes will be
restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. These analogous causes
are further defined by the phrase of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible.

Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where elections have already been scheduled but do not take place
because of (a) force majeure, (b)violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous causes the election in any polling place
has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections do not occur or had to be
suspended because of unexpectedand unforeseen circumstances.

In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law i.e., by congressional policy and is pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronizationof national and local elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these reasons be
given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal
causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of
interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. [66] Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP
881 can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections.

D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise
exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials elected in the synchronized
elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the
term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials,[67] is specifically given to Congress.
Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining
the least votes,[68] and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President[69] in order to synchronize elections; Congress was
not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. [70] More
particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM
for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years[71] as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be
shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will
happen a term of less than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result
is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on
their term (where the term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right and fixes the interval after

which the several incumbents shall succeed one another, while the tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually
holds the office).[72] As with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure
of elective ARMM officials. They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they do so.

E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs

The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs
to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that
Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this
power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. [73] The
appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers
of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. [74]

Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the
President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear
constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the
assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective and representative of the
constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real
only if RA No. 10153 were to bemistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM
positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms
of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to
the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials
elected in the May 2013 elections.

As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that RA No.
10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim
measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based
on its unambiguous facial terms.[75] Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding
to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given the
legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and based on the above
considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities
for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed
and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an unconstitutional or
unreasonable choice for Congress to make?

Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond
the adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not democratic and republican. For then, the
peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to besystemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an
undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the elective and representative governance requirement of
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.

But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed
and, more importantly, the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 will
not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and
continuously, with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that
synchronization of elections requires.

Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as
well as the communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the
manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in the creation of local government units [76] and the adjustments of subprovinces to the status of provinces.[77] These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization
of elections (considered vis--vis the regional interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from
the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the
interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances.

Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this
requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the elective aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of
OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections

3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their
Qualifications.

Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its proper context is a law that is not violative of the
Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.

VI. Other Constitutional Concerns

Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments that upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153
would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus allowing him
to replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the
President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers. Even Congress, as
discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively undertake with respect to elections.

If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose the synchronization of
elections. It was a temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that the
Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the
cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for special elections can occur only in accordance with
the power already delegated by Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.

Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms,
and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum in
governance in the ARMM.

To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of 21 months or close to 2 years intervenes
from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired and the time the new ARMM elective officials begin their
terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao history past and current teach us, many developments, some of them critical and
adverse, can transpire in the countrys Muslim areas in this span of time in the way they transpired in the past. [78] Thus, it would be
reckless to assume that the presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully functioning Regional
Legislative Assembly can be done away with even temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present
circumstances is an absolute necessity.

Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc.,
et al.:[79]

It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered
to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with
the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code
and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be
similarly applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This
argument has no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members

of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides
otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of
representation and governance in their own local government.

In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc.,
the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the
delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.[80](Emphasis ours.)

As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant
for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the
proper management of the affairs of the regional government, and in responding to critical developments that may arise. When
viewed in this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs
is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.

B. Autonomy in the ARMM

It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the
autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume that there exists a conflict
between two recognized Constitutional mandates synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one
over the other.

We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction ut magis valeat quam pereat:
that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, [81] and one mandate should not be given importance over the other except
where the primacy of one over the other is clear.[82] We refer to the Courts declaration inAng-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,[83] thus:

A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be interpreted as a
whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full
force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]

Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that this Court should
reconcile and give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to transit to synchronized
regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that must be respected.Particularly, regional autonomy will be
respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing features, except in a very
temporary manner and only as necessitated by the attendant circumstances.

Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the national and local elections in
order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough and tumble of nationwide
and local elections. This argument leaves us far from convinced of its merits.

As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution
never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger framework
of the State and is still subject to the national policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by

the Constitution for regional autonomous determination. As reflected during the constitutional deliberations of the provisions on
autonomous regions:

Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the central government, but rather an efficient working
relationship between the autonomous region and the central government. We see this as an effective partnership, not a separation.

Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as complete independence.

Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the larger political framework of the nation.[84] [Emphasis
supplied.]

This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by the
express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in
light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Upon further
reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provision in order to make it clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the
powers of the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised by the national government[.][85] Of
note is the Courts pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre[86] which we quote:

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local
governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In
turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth
and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated
and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and
Congress. [Emphasis ours.]

In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. Since the
synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy
granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no
less than the Constitution.

Conclusion

Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of national and local elections when
it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and
cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. [87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law
and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it. [88]

Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should address what is essentially a legislative problem. It is not
within the Courts power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the exclusive prerogative of
Congress.[89] The petitioners, in asking this Court to compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so,
are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a
republican and democratic government the separation of powers.

The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. [90]

We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted
within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization
demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find
no reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed
valid.[91] Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the validity of a
statute has the onerous task of rebutting this presumption. [92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved
in favor of its constitutionality.[93] As this Court declared in Garcia v. Executive Secretary:[94]

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are
valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the
doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied
and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[95] [Emphasis ours.]

Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and
confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit,
and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution
of September 13, 2011. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G. R. No. 119775. October 24, 2003]
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, MATEO CARIO FOUNDATION INC., CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS
FOUNDATION INC., REGINA VICTORIA A. BENAFIN REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS. ELISA BENAFIN, IZABEL M.
LUYK REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS. REBECCA MOLINA LUYK, KATHERINE PE REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY
HER MOTHER ROSEMARIE G. PE, SOLEDAD S. CAMILO, ALICIA C. PACALSO ALIAS KEVAB, BETTY I. STRASSER, RUBY C. GIRON,
URSULA C. PEREZ ALIAS BA-YAY, EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, CARMEN CAROMINA, LILIA G. YARANON, DIANE
MONDOC, petitioners, vs. VICTOR LIM, PRESIDENT, BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; JOHN HAY PORO POINT
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY OF BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.) CO. LTD., ASIAWORLD INTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC.,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By the present petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners assail, in the main, the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 420, Series of
1994, CREATING AND DESIGNATING A PORTION OF THE AREA COVERED BY THE FORMER CAMP JOHN [HAY] AS THE JOHN HAY
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7227.
Republic Act No. 7227, AN ACT ACCELERATING THE CONVERSION OF MILITARY RESERVATIONS INTO OTHER PRODUCTIVE USES,
CREATING THE BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY FOR THIS PURPOSE, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, which was enacted on March 13, 1992,
set out the policy of the government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the former
military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military
reservations as well as their extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay or the camp) in the City of Baguio. [1]
As noted in its title, R.A. No. 7227 created public respondent Bases Conversion and Development Authority [2] (BCDA), vesting it with
powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance with the
declared government policy.
R.A. No. 7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and bounds of which were to
be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines. [3]
R.A. No. 7227 granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses therein from
local and national taxes, to other hallmarks of a liberalized financial and business climate. [4]
And R.A. No. 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of
the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark
military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay. [5]
On August 16, 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with private respondents Tuntex
(B.V.I.) Co., Ltd (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws of
the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp
John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. Four months later or on December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and
ASIAWORD executed a Joint Venture Agreement[6] whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint venture company known as the
Baguio International Development and Management Corporation which would lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for
the purpose of turning such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally envisioned by the parties under their
Memorandum of Agreement.
The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in response to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and
administrator of Camp John Hay.
By Resolution[7] of September 29, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City (the sanggunian) officially asked BCDA to
exclude all the barangays partly or totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of any plan or program for its
development.

By a subsequent Resolution[8] dated January 19, 1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its
ownership over the home lots being occupied by residents of nine (9) barangays surrounding the military reservation.
Still by another resolution passed on February 21, 1994, the sanggunian adopted and submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for the
development of Camp John Hay.[9] Thesanggunians vision expressed, among other things, a kind of development that affords
protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented type of tourist destination, priority in employment opportunities for
Baguio residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed participation of the city government in the management and
operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously named nine barangays from the area for development, and liability for local taxes
of businesses to be established within the camp.[10]
BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals of the sanggunian.[11] They stressed
the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full development in accordance with the mandate of R.A.
No. 7227.[12]
On May 11, 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to order the determination of realty taxes which may
otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John Hay.[13] The resolution was intended to intelligently guide
the sanggunian in determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ, it (the sanggunian) being of the view that
such declaration would exempt the camps property and the economic activity therein from local or national taxation.
More than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255, (Series of 1994),[14] seeking and supporting, subject
to its concurrence, the issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential proclamation declaring an area of 288.1 hectares of the
camp as a SEZ in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7227. Together with this resolution was submitted a draft of the
proposed proclamation for consideration by the President. [15]
On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420,[16] the title of which was earlier indicated, which established a
SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay and which reads as follows:
xxx
Pursuant to the powers vested in me by the law and the resolution of concurrence by the City Council of Baguio, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS,
President of the Philippines, do hereby create and designate a portion of the area covered by the former John Hay reservation as
embraced, covered, and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as
amended, as the John Hay Special Economic Zone, and accordingly order:
SECTION 1. Coverage of John Hay Special Economic Zone. The John Hay Special Economic Zone shall cover the area consisting of Two
Hundred Eighty Eight and one/tenth (288.1) hectares, more or less, of the total of Six Hundred Seventy-Seven (677) hectares of the
John Hay Reservation, more or less, which have been surveyed and verified by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) as defined by the following technical description:
A parcel of land, situated in the City of Baguio, Province of Benguet, Island of Luzon, and particularly described in survey plans Psd131102-002639 and Ccs-131102-000030 as approved on 16 August 1993 and 26 August 1993, respectively, by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, in detail containing :
Lot 1, Lot 2, Lot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, Lot 7, Lot 13, Lot 14, Lot 15, and Lot 20 of Ccs-131102-000030
-andLot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, Lot 7, Lot 8, Lot 9, Lot 10, Lot 11, Lot 14, Lot 15, Lot 16, Lot 17, and Lot 18 of Psd-131102-002639 being
portions of TCT No. T-3812, LRC Rec. No. 87.
With a combined area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT AND ONE/TENTH HECTARES (288.1 hectares); Provided that the area
consisting of approximately Six and two/tenth (6.2) hectares, more or less, presently occupied by the VOA and the residence of the
Ambassador of the United States, shall be considered as part of the SEZ only upon turnover of the properties to the government of
the Republic of the Philippines.
Sec. 2. Governing Body of the John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7227, the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority is hereby established as the governing body of the John Hay Special Economic Zone and, as
such, authorized to determine the utilization and disposition of the lands comprising it, subject to private rights, if any, and in
consultation and coordination with the City Government of Baguio after consultation with its inhabitants, and to promulgate the

necessary policies, rules, and regulations to govern and regulate the zone thru the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation,
which is its implementing arm for its economic development and optimum utilization.
Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to Section 5(m) and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7227, the
John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation shall implement all necessary policies, rules, and regulations governing the zone,
including investment incentives, in consultation with pertinent government departments. Among others, the zone shall have all the
applicable incentives of the Special Economic Zone under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 and those applicable incentives
granted in the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991, and new
investment laws that may hereinafter be enacted.
Sec. 4. Role of Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities. All Heads of departments, bureaus, offices, agencies,
and instrumentalities of the government are hereby directed to give full support to Bases Conversion and Development Authority
and/or its implementing subsidiary or joint venture to facilitate the necessary approvals to expedite the implementation of various
projects of the conversion program.
Sec. 5. Local Authority. Except as herein provided, the affected local government units shall retain their basic autonomy and identity.
Sec. 6. Repealing Clause. All orders, rules, and regulations, or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Proclamation, are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
Sec. 7. Effectivity. This proclamation shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-four.
The issuance of Proclamation No. 420 spawned the present petition [17] for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief which was
filed on April 25, 1995 challenging, in the main, its constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of the Memorandum of
Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between public respondent BCDA and private respondents TUNTEX andASIAWORLD.
Petitioners allege as grounds for the allowance of the petition the following:
I. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, SERIES OF 1990 (sic) IN SO FAR AS IT GRANTS TAX EXEMPTIONS IS INVALID AND ILLEGAL
AS IT IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE BY THE PRESIDENT OF A POWER GRANTED ONLY TO THE LEGISLATURE.
II. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, IN SO FAR AS IT LIMITS THE POWERS AND INTERFERES WITH THE AUTONOMY OF THE
CITY OF BAGUIO IS INVALID, ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
III. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, SERIES OF 1994 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT IT VIOLATES THE RULE THAT ALL TAXES
SHOULD BE UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE.
IV. THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RESPONDENTS BASES
CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY HAVING BEEN ENTERED INTO ONLY BY DIRECT NEGOTIATION IS ILLEGAL.
V. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
RESPONDENT BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS (sic) ILLEGAL.
VI. THE CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF RESPONDENTS NOT HAVING UNDERGONE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IS
BEING ILLEGALLY CONSIDERED WITHOUT A VALID ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT.
A temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction was prayed for to enjoin BCDA, John Hay Poro Point
Development Corporation and the city government from implementing Proclamation No. 420, and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD from
proceeding with their plan respecting Camp John Hays development pursuant to their Joint Venture Agreement with BCDA.[18]
Public respondents, by their separate Comments, allege as moot and academic the issues raised by the petition, the questioned
Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement having already been deemed abandoned by the inaction of the parties
thereto prior to the filing of the petition as in fact, by letter of November 21, 1995, BCDA formally notifiedTUNTEX and
ASIAWORLD of the revocation of their said agreements.[19]
In maintaining the validity of Proclamation No. 420, respondents contend that by extending to the John Hay SEZ economic incentives
similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was established under R.A. No. 7227, the proclamation is merely implementing the
legislative intent of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of business activity or investment. They underscore the point

that the governments policy of bases conversion can not be achieved without extending the same tax exemptions granted by R.A.
No. 7227 to Subic SEZ to other SEZs.
Denying that Proclamation No. 420 is in derogation of the local autonomy of Baguio City or that it is violative of the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection, respondents assail petitioners lack of standing to bring the present suit even as taxpayers and in the
absence of any actual case or controversy to warrant this Courts exercise of its power of judicial review over the proclamation.
Finally, respondents seek the outright dismissal of the petition for having been filed in disregard of the hierarchy of courts and of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Replying,[20] petitioners aver that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies finds no application herein since they are
invoking the exclusive authority of this Court under Section 21 of R.A. No. 7227 to enjoin or restrain implementation of projects for
conversion of the base areas; that the established exceptions to the aforesaid doctrine obtain in the present petition; and that they
possess the standing to bring the petition which is a taxpayers suit.
Public respondents have filed their Rejoinder[21] and the parties have filed their respective memoranda.
Before dwelling on the core issues, this Court shall first address the preliminary procedural questions confronting the petition.
The judicial policy is and has always been that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it except when the redress sought cannot
be obtained in the proper courts, or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of this Courts primary jurisdiction.[22] Neither will it entertain an action for declaratory relief, which is partly
the nature of this petition, over which it has no original jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, as it is only this Court which has the power under Section 21[23] of R.A. No. 7227 to enjoin implementation of projects
for the development of the former US military reservations, the issuance of which injunction petitioners pray for, petitioners direct
filing of the present petition with it is allowed. Over and above this procedural objection to the present suit, this Court retains full
discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the
issues raised, warrant.[24] Besides, remanding the case to the lower courts now would just unduly prolong adjudication of the issues.
The transformation of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay into a SEZ is not simply a re-classification of an area, a mere
ascription of a status to a place. It involves turning the former US military reservation into a focal point for investments by both local
and foreign entities. It is to be made a site of vigorous business activity, ultimately serving as a spur to the countrys long awaited
economic growth. For, as R.A. No. 7227 unequivocally declares, it is the governments policy to enhance the benefits to be derived
from the base areas in order to promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in
general.[25] Like the Subic SEZ, the John Hay SEZ should also be turned into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and
investment center.[26]
More than the economic interests at stake, the development of Camp John Hay as well as of the other base areas unquestionably
has critical links to a host of environmental and social concerns. Whatever use to which these lands will be devoted will set a chain
of events that can affect one way or another the social and economic way of life of the communities where the bases are located,
and ultimately the nation in general.
Underscoring the fragility of Baguio Citys ecology with its problem on the scarcity of its water supply, petitioners point out that the
local and national government are faced with the challenge of how to provide for an ecologically sustainable, environmentally
sound, equitable transition for the city in the wake of Camp John Hays reversion to the mass of government property. [27] But that is
why R.A. No. 7227 emphasizes the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their
extensions consistent with ecological andenvironmental standards. [28] It cannot thus be gainsaid that the matter of conversion of the
US bases into SEZs, in this case Camp John Hay, assumes importance of a national magnitude.
Convinced then that the present petition embodies crucial issues, this Court assumes jurisdiction over the petition.
As far as the questioned agreements between BCDA and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD are concerned, the legal questions being raised
thereon by petitioners have indeed been rendered moot and academic by the revocation of such agreements. There are, however,
other issues posed by the petition, those which center on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420, which have not been
mooted by the said supervening event upon application of the rules for the judicial scrutiny of constitutional cases. The issues boil
down to:
(1) Whether the present petition complies with the requirements for this Courts exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional issues;

(2) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax exemption within and granting other
economic incentives to the John Hay Special Economic Zone; and
(3) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or interfering with the local autonomy of Baguio City;
It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial review only if
the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of
the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[29]
An actual case or controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural
or anticipatory.[30] The controversy needs to be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of parties who are pitted
against each other due to their adverse legal interests.[31] There is in the present case a real clash of interests and rights between
petitioners and respondents arising from the issuance of a presidential proclamation that converts a portion of the area covered by
Camp John Hay into a SEZ, the former insisting that such proclamation contains unconstitutional provisions, the latter claiming
otherwise.
R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base
areas in the country.[32] The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on the bases conversion is
equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or
surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the
legality of Proclamation No. 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the government act being challenged.[33] Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not
merely an interest in the question involved or an incidental interest, [34] for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proclamation No.
420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City.
Petitioners locus standi parallels that of the petitioner and other residents of Bataan, specially of the town of Limay, in Garcia v.
Board of Investments[35] where this Court characterized their interest in the establishment of a petrochemical plant in their place as
actual, real, vital and legal, for it would affect not only their economic life but even the air they breathe.
Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the
local governance of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the question of whether
to concur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, petitioners Claravall and
Yaranon, as city officials who voted against[36] the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) supporting the issuance of the
now challenged Proclamation No. 420, have legal standing to bring the present petition.
That there is herein a dispute on legal rights and interests is thus beyond doubt. The mootness of the issues concerning the
questioned agreements between public and private respondents is of no moment.
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is deemed to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough
to awaken judicial duty.[37]
As to the third and fourth requisites of a judicial inquiry, there is likewise no question that they have been complied with in the case
at bar. This is an action filed purposely to bring forth constitutional issues, ruling on which this Court must take up. Besides,
respondents never raised issues with respect to these requisites, hence, they are deemed waived.
Having cleared the way for judicial review, the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420, as framed in the second and third issues
above, must now be addressed squarely.
The second issue refers to petitioners objection against the creation by Proclamation No. 420 of a regime of tax exemption within
the John Hay SEZ. Petitioners argue that nowhere in R. A. No. 7227 is there a grant of tax exemption to SEZs yet to be established in
base areas, unlike the grant under Section 12 thereof of tax exemption and investment incentives to the therein established Subic
SEZ. The grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ, petitioners conclude, thus contravenes Article VI, Section 28 (4) of the
Constitution which provides that No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of Congress.
Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, the challenged provision, reads:

Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to Section 5(m) and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7227, the
John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation shall implement all necessary policies, rules, and regulations governing the zone,
including investment incentives, in consultation with pertinent government departments. Among others, the zone shall have all the
applicable incentives of the Special Economic Zone under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 and those applicable
incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991,
and new investment laws that may hereinafter be enacted. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 provides:
xxx
(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local
Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and
investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign
investments;
b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement
of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and
duty free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the
Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the
Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines;
(c) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, no taxes, local and national, shall be
imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three percent (3%) of the gross income earned by all
businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be remitted to the National Government, one percent (1%)
each to the local government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area, and other factors.
In addition, there is hereby established a development fund of one percent (1%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and
enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone to be utilized for the Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous
to be base areas. In case of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption privileges in the Subic Special
Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor of the latter;
(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures shall be allowed
and maintained in the Subic Special Economic Zone;
(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise and regulate the operations of banks and other financial
institutions within the Subic Special Economic Zone;
(f) Banking and Finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign currency depository units of local commercial banks
and offshore banking units of foreign banks with minimum Central Bank regulation;
(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose continuing investment shall not be less than Two Hundred fifty
thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse and dependent children under twenty-one (21) years of age, shall be granted
permanent resident status within the Subic Special Economic Zone. They shall have freedom of ingress and egress to and from the
Subic Special Economic Zone without any need of special authorization from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. The Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority referred to in Section 13 of this Act may also issue working visas renewable every two (2) years to
foreign executives and other aliens possessing highly-technical skills which no Filipino within the Subic Special Economic Zone
possesses, as certified by the Department of Labor and Employment. The names of aliens granted permanent residence status and
working visas by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within thirty
(30) days after issuance thereof;
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic SEZ which was granted by Congress with tax exemption,
investment incentives and the like. There is no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the
time via presidential proclamation.
The deliberations of the Senate confirm the exclusivity to Subic SEZ of the tax and investment privileges accorded it under the law,
as the following exchanges between our lawmakers show during the second reading of the precursor bill of R.A. No. 7227 with
respect to the investment policies that would govern Subic SEZ which are now embodied in the aforesaid Section 12 thereof:

xxx
Senator Maceda: This is what I was talking about. We get into problems here because all of these following policies are centered
around the concept of free port. And in the main paragraph above, we have declared both Clark and Subic as special economic
zones, subject to these policies which are, in effect, a free-port arrangement.
Senator Angara: The Gentleman is absolutely correct, Mr. President. So we must confine these policies only to Subic.
May I withdraw then my amendment, and instead provide that THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE OF SUBIC SHALL BE ESTABLISHED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING POLICIES. Subject to style, Mr. President.
Thus, it is very clear that these principles and policies are applicable only to Subic as a free port.
Senator Paterno: Mr. President.
The President: Senator Paterno is recognized.
Senator Paterno: I take it that the amendment suggested by Senator Angara would then prevent the establishment of other special
economic zones observing these policies.
Senator Angara: No, Mr. President, because during our short caucus, Senator Laurel raised the point that if we give this delegation
to the President to establish other economic zones, that may be an unwarranted delegation.
So we agreed that we will simply limit the definition of powers and description of the zone to Subic, but that does not exclude the
possibility of creating other economic zones within the baselands.
Senator Paterno: But if that amendment is followed, no other special economic zone may be created under authority of this
particular bill. Is that correct, Mr. President?
Senator Angara: Under this specific provision, yes, Mr. President. This provision now will be confined only to Subic.[38]
x x x (Underscoring supplied).
As gathered from the earlier-quoted Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the privileges given to Subic SEZ consist principally of exemption
from tariff or customs duties, national and local taxes of business entities therein (paragraphs (b) and (c)), free market and trade of
specified goods or properties (paragraph d), liberalized banking and finance (paragraph f), and relaxed immigration rules for foreign
investors (paragraph g). Yet, apart from these, Proclamation No. 420 also makes available to the John Hay SEZ benefits existing in
other laws such as the privilege of export processing zone-based businesses of importing capital equipment and raw materials free
from taxes, duties and other restrictions;[39] tax and duty exemptions, tax holiday, tax credit, and other incentives under the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987;[40] and the applicability to the subject zone of rules governing foreign investments in the
Philippines.[41]
While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the creation and success of SEZs, free trade zones and the like, the grant
thereof to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained. The incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the
extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no support therein. Neither does the same grant of privileges to the John Hay SEZ
find support in the other laws specified under Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, which laws were already extant before the
issuance of the proclamation or the enactment of R.A. No. 7227.
More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is one of tax exemption. It is the legislature, unless limited by a
provision of the state constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its
power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax.[42] Other than Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for specific tax
exemptions,[43] or local governments may pass ordinances on exemption only from local taxes.[44]
The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitutions imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must
have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.[45] In the same vein, the other kinds of privileges extended to the
John Hay SEZ are by tradition and usage for Congress to legislate upon.
Contrary to public respondents suggestions, the claimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest
and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based; it must be expressly granted in a statute stated in a language
too clear to be mistaken.[46] Tax exemption cannot be implied as it must be categorically and unmistakably expressed.[47]

If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ the same tax exemption and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it
would have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227.
This Court no doubt can void an act or policy of the political departments of the government on either of two groundsinfringement
of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion.[48]
This Court then declares that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ is void for
being violative of the Constitution. This renders it unnecessary to still dwell on petitioners claim that the same grant violates the
equal protection guarantee.
With respect to the final issue raised by petitioners that Proclamation No. 420 is unconstitutional for being in derogation of Baguio
Citys local autonomy, objection is specifically mounted against Section 2 thereof in which BCDA is set up as the governing body of
the John Hay SEZ.[49]
Petitioners argue that there is no authority of the President to subject the John Hay SEZ to the governance of BCDA which has just
oversight functions over SEZ; and that to do so is to diminish the city governments power over an area within its jurisdiction, hence,
Proclamation No. 420 unlawfully gives the President power of control over the local government instead of just mere supervision.
Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit. Under R.A. No. 7227, the BCDA is entrusted with, among other things, the following
purpose:[50]
xxx
(a) To own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wallace Air Station, ODonnell Transmitter
Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station, Mt. Sta. Rita Station (Hermosa, Bataan) and those portions of Metro Manila
Camps which may be transferred to it by the President;
x x x (Underscoring supplied)
With such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDA over Camp John Hay, BCDA virtually has control over it,
subject to certain limitations provided for by law. By designating BCDA as the governing agency of the John Hay SEZ, the law merely
emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role or functions it has been granted.
The unconstitutionality of the grant of tax immunity and financial incentives as contained in the second sentence of Section 3 of
Proclamation No. 420 notwithstanding, the entire assailed proclamation cannot be declared unconstitutional, the other parts
thereof not being repugnant to law or the Constitution. The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp
John Hay as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President to do so by means of a proclamation. [51] The requisite prior
concurrence by the Baguio City government to such proclamation appears to have been given in the form of a duly enacted
resolution by the sanggunian. The other provisions of the proclamation had been proven to be consistent with R.A. No. 7227.
Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced.[52] This Court finds that the other provisions in Proclamation No. 420 converting a delineated
portion of Camp John Hay into the John Hay SEZ are separable from the invalid second sentence of Section 3 thereof, hence they
stand.
WHEREFORE, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly
declared of no legal force and effect. Public respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the aforesaid void provision.
Proclamation No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effective.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
Puno, J., no part, due to relationship.
Quisumbing, J., due prior action, no part.
Ynares-Santiago, and Corona, JJ., on leave.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156264. September 30, 2004]
ALLIED DOMECQ PHIL., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. SESINANDO E. VILLON of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 23; CLARK
LIBERTY WAREHOUSE, INC., BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and/or DISTRICT COLLECTORS OF CUSTOMS, PORT OF MANILA and CLARK
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE, and BUREAU OF FOOD AND DRUGS (BFAD) and/or DIRECTOR OF BFAD, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 27, 2002 and
Resolution[2] dated November 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63802 which dismissed the special civil action for certiorari filed by Allied
Domecq, Philippines Inc. (ADPI), herein petitioner, for want of jurisdiction.
The factual background of this case is as follows:
On May 8, 1996, petitioner ADPI entered into an exclusive distributorship agreement with Pedro Domecq, S.A., a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of Spain, engaged in the manufacture of wine and brandy. Under the said agreement, Pedro
Domecq, S.A. granted petitioner the sole and exclusive right to import and distribute in the Philippines various Pedro Domecq, S.A.
products including Fundador brandy until May 17, 2000. Upon its expiration, the agreement is deemed automatically extended for
an indefinite period of time.
Petitioner then applied for a Certificate of Registration with the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), pursuant to Department of Health
Administrative Order No. 17, series of 1979, requiring all imported food products to be registered with the BFAD prior to their
distribution in the local markets.
On June 2, 1998, BFAD wrote then Director Quintin L. Kintanar of the Bureau of Customs, requesting that entry of imported
shipments of Fundador brandy should not be allowed in thePhilippines, unless the importer presents a valid Certificate of
Registration issued by the BFAD. The Bureau of Customs granted petitioners request and on July 13, 1998, issued Customs
Memorandum Circular No. 228-098.
On April 12, 1999, Clark Liberty Warehouse, Inc. (Clark Liberty), herein private respondent, a duly licensed duty-free shop operating
in the Clark Special Economic Zone, imported 800 cases or a total of 9,420 bottles of Fundador brandy.
Since the importation by respondent Clark Liberty was not covered by the BFAD Certificate of Product Registration, the Bureau of
Customs seized and impounded the shipment pursuant to Customs Memorandum Circular No. 228-98, in relation to Sections 101 (K)
and 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The imported brandy then became the subject of seizure proceedings before the District
Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, docketed as S.I. No. 99-140.
Petitioner then filed a motion to intervene in S.I. No. 99-140 alleging, among others, that it sustained damages caused by
respondent Clark Libertys illegal importation. However, the Bureau of Customs District Collector failed to resolve the motion.
On September 15, 1999, petitioner sent respondent Clark Liberty a letter demanding that the latter cease and desist from importing,
distributing, selling, or marketing Fundador brandy in the Philippines. Petitioner also demanded that Clark Liberty refrain from
claiming the seized shipment and participating in the seizure proceedings. Clark Liberty, however, refused to heed petitioners
demands.
On October 8, 1999, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint was raffled to
Branch 23 of the Manila RTC, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 99-95337.
On August 15, 2000, after hearing petitioners application for TRO and injunctive relief, the RTC issued an Order denying the
same. The trial court held that petitioner failed to prove that respondent Clark Liberty engaged in unfair competition as there is no
showing that it employed deceit or otherwise committed acts constituting bad faith; [3] that the bottles of Fundador brandy imported
by respondent are the ones imported by plaintiff[4] and that these bottles are not genuine, defective, or of poor quality. [5]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC in its Order dated December 28, 2000.
On March 16, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63802.

On May 27, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued its assailed Decision dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Its ratiocination is
quoted as follows:

[I]t is an admitted fact respondent Clark Liberty is one of the duly licensed and authorized duty free shops at the Clark Special
Economic Zone since 1998 which sells imported grocery items including liquors, appliances, household wares, etc. and is exclusively
regulated by the Clark Development Corporation, created by Republic Act No. 7227, known as the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992. It is therefore a juridical creation of Republic Act No. 7227 in relation to Executive Order No. 62 and
Presidential Proclamation No. 163, creating the Clark Special Economic Zone, under the exclusive jurisdiction, authority and
regulation of the Clark Development Corporation. As such juridical creation, this Court has no jurisdiction to determine whether or
not petitioner is entitled to the issuance of an injunctive relief since such authority and jurisdiction belong the Honorable Supreme
Court in accordance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7227.[6]
Hence, the instant petition for review anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE FORMER THIRTEENTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN LAW IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 63802 UNDER RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION.
II
THE FORMER THIRTEENTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY NOT LOOKING INTO THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND IN NOT RESOLVING WHETHER OR NOT
PETITION IS ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTION RELIEF PRAYED FOR IN ITS PETITION.
III
IN DISMISSING THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 63802, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE NOT THEREFORE DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT OR HAS DECIDED IT IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT. [7]
Petitioner submits that the Appellate Court gravely abused its discretion in holding that under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7227,
only the Supreme Court can issue a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner contends that its cause of action has nothing to do with
the implementation of the projects for the conversion of the military reservation into alternative productive uses governed by the
said law. Since jurisdiction is conferred by law, the Court of Appeals cannot diminish its own jurisdiction under Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.
The Solicitor General and respondent Clark Liberty counter that the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition before it
for lack of jurisdiction. They point out that in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioner admitted that Clark Liberty is a
registered enterprise of the Clark Special Economic Zone, thus subject to the operation of R.A. 7227. Under Section 21 of this law,
only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to enjoin the implementation of the projects for the conversion into
alternative productive uses of the military reservation.
The pivotal issue, therefore, is whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in holding that it has no jurisdiction over
CA-G.R. SP No. 63802 pursuant to Section 21 of Republic Act 7227.
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause. [8] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine
the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.[9] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and not by
the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. [10] Basic is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the cause or causes of action as alleged in the complaint.[11] But where the
actual issues are evident from the records of the case, then jurisdiction over the subject matter need not depend upon the literal
averments in the complaint, but on the law as applied to established facts. [12]
Here, in order to determine whether the court a quo has jurisdiction over petitioners complaint for injunction, we have to interpret
the law as applied to the established facts. There is no question that respondent Clark Liberty is a registered enterprise of the Clark
Special Economic Zone and is primarily regulated by R.A. No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992.

The underlying purpose of the Legislature in enacting R.A. No. 7227 is provided by Section 2, thus:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. It is hereby declared the policy of the Government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion
into alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions (John Hay Station, Wallace Air
Station, ODonnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station and Capas Relay station), to raise funds by the sale
of portions of Metro Manila military camps and to apply said funds for the development and conversion to productive civilian use of
the lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended.
It is likewise the declared policy of the Government to enhance the benefits to be derived from said properties in order to promote
the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general.
Republic Act No. 7227 goes on further to provide that:
SEC. 4. Purposes of the Conversion Authority. The Conversion authority shall have the following purposes:
xxx
(c) To encourage the active participation of the private sector in transforming the Clark and Subic military reservations and their
extensions into other productive uses;
The establishment, registration, and operation of respondent Clark Liberty and the other enterprises within the Clark Special
Economic Zone are projects (involving the private sector) which convert Clark Air Base, a military reservation, into productive
uses. In this connection, Section 21 of R.A. No. 7227 provides:
SEC. 21. Injunction and Restraining Order. The implementation of the projects for the conversion into alternative productive uses of
the military reservations are urgent and necessary and shall not be restrained or enjoined except by an order issued by the Supreme
Court of the Philippines.
Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err when it dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 63802 for want of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 27, 2002 and its Resolution dated
November 29, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 63802 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 82217 January 29, 1990
LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their spouses, BRAULIO D. YARANON and DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR.,
respectively; JAMES BRETT and SINAI C. HAMADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary, HON. VICENTE JAYME, Secretary of Finance, HON.
GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC National Treasurer,
respondents.

CORTES, J.:
In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the
(Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the
Congress and the creation of' the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a
plebiscite.
Relative to the creation of autonomous regions, the constitution, in Article X, provides:
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
SEC. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested
in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and
legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall
likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in
a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of both
Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development ;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall
be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions
shall be the responsibility of the National Government.
A study of E.O. No. 220 would be incomplete Without reference to its historical background.
In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on ideological grounds from the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm the New People's Army. (NPA).
After President Aquino was installed into office by People Power, she advocated a policy of national reconciliation. She called on
all revolutionary forces to a peace dialogue. The CPLA heeded this call of the President. After the preliminary negotiations,
President Aquino and some members of her Cabinet flew to Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on September 13, 1986 and
signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (As Commander of the CPLA and Ama Mario Yag-ao (as President of Cordillera Bodong
Administration, the civil government of the CPLA a ceasefire agreement that signified the cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7,
E.O. 220).
The parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and
violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations. The negotiations shall be a continuing process until the
demands of the Cordillera people shall have been substantially granted.
On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of the government], in pursuance of the September 13, 1986
agreement, flew to the Mansion House, Baguio City, and signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman of the Cordillera panel) a joint
agreement, paragraphs 2 and 3 of which state:
Par. 2- Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could perform policy-making and
administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.
Par. 3- Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the representatives
of the Cordillera people.
On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into law, known now as E.O. 220. [Rejoinder G.R. No. 82217,
pp. 2-3].
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) , which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, KalingaApayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in
the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main function is to
coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local
government units as well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in

identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region [sec. 5]. It shall also monitor the
implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall have a Cordillera
Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The
CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is established and
organized [sec. 17].
Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its last "Whereas" clause provides:
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of the organic act for a Cordillera autonomous region,
there is an urgent need, in the interest of national security and public order, for the President to reorganize immediately the
existing administrative structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein and the Government's
legitimate concerns in the areas, without attempting to pre-empt the constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the
creation of an autonomous region on a permanent basis.
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under
E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766, to wit:
SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Region Assembly as well as all offices and agencies created under Execute
Order No. 220 shall cease to exist immediately upon the ratification of this Organic Act.
All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly shall automatically be
transferred to the Cordillera Autonomous Government.
I
It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that respect for the inherent and stated powers and prerogatives of the law-making body, as
well as faithful adherence to the principle of separation of powers, require that its enactment be accorded the presumption of
constitutionality. Thus, in any challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the burden of clearly and unequivocally proving its
unconstitutionality always rests upon the challenger. Conversely, failure to so prove will necessarily defeat the challenge.
We shall be guided by these principles in considering these consolidated petitions.
In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers
prior to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated
task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. We have carefully studied the Constitution
and E.O. No. 220 and we have come to the conclusion that petitioners' assertions are unfounded. Events subsequent to the
issuance of E.O. No. 220 also bear out this conclusion.
1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery
of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a
step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the
Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. A regional
consultative commission shall first be created. The President shall then appoint the members of a regional consultative
commission from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic
act for the autonomous region. The organic act shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within eighteen
months from the time of its organization and enacted into law. Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the
organic act [Art. X, sec. 18]. Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be created.
Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet
convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic
act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. These measures we find in E.O. No. 220. The steps taken by the
President are obviously perceived by petitioners, particularly petitioner Yaranon who views E.O. No. 220 as capitulation to the
Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA) of Balweg, as unsound, but the Court cannot inquire into the wisdom of the measures

taken by the President, We can only inquire into whether or not the measures violate the Constitution. But as we have seen
earlier, they do not.
2. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts,
"the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras" [Petition, G.R. No. 79956, p. 25].
The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region composed of an elective executive and
legislature and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a guide, we find
that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for
administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services
[secs. 2 and 5]. To determine policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session,
tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and development programs [sec. 9]. To serve as an implementing body, it
created the Cordillera Executive Board composed of the Mayor of Baguio City, provincial governors and representatives of the
Cordillera Bodong Administration, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations as regular members and all
regional directors of the line departments of the National Government as ex-officiomembers and headed by an Executive Director
[secs. 10 and 11]. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they
autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing
local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental
organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
The creation of the CAR for purposes of administrative coordination is underscored by the mandate of E.O. No. 220 for the
President and appropriate national departments and agencies to make available sources of funds for priority development
programs and projects recommended by the CAR [sec. 21] and the power given to the President to call upon the appropriate
executive departments and agencies of the National Government to assist the CAR [sec. 24].
3. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the Congress, after it was convened, enacted Republic Act No. 6658 which created
the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission. The President then appointed its members. The commission prepared a draft
organic act which became the basis for the deliberations of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The result was Republic
Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region, which was signed into law on October 23, 1989. A plebiscite
for the approval of the organic act, to be conducted shortly, shall complete the process outlined in the Constitution.
In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than two years and we find that, despite E.O. No. 220, the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras is still to be created, showing the lack of basis of petitioners' assertion. Events have shown
that petitioners' fear that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras was totally
unfounded.
Clearly, petitioners' principal challenge has failed.
II
A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the CAR: whether or not it is a territorial and political subdivision. The
Constitution provides in Article X:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras contemplated by the Constitution, Thus, we
now address petitioners' assertion that E. 0. No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political
subdivision.
After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new territorial and political subdivision
or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision.

1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical
personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public
corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources
of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and
services in the covered areas.
The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services is nothing new. The Integrated
Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the law of the land by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1, established
eleven (11) regions, later increased to twelve (12), with definite regional centers and required departments and agencies of the
Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field offices therein. The functions of the regional offices to be established
pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations of the
department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effective service to the people in the area; (3)
to coordinate with regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with local
government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be provided by law. [See Part II, chap. III, art. 1, of
the Reorganization Plan].
We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit
under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires the participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the
National Government but also the local governments, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations in bringing
about the desired objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.
2. Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices created under E.O. No.
220, and considering further the indispensable participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be
considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the regional
development councils which the President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils are "composed of
local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from nongovernmental organizations within the region for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the
units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise,
the CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional development council.
III
Finally, petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local
autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which
compose the CAR.
We find first a need to clear up petitioners' apparent misconception of the concept of local autonomy.
It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to
the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government
authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987
Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10]. And while there was no express guarantee
under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No.
5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the country [Villegas v.
Subido, supra.]
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987
Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy these regions. Thus, the
provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive
department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the
autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for
the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions
already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.

Anent petitioners' objection, we note the obvious failure to show how the creation of the CAR has actually diminished the local
autonomy of the covered provinces and city. It cannot be over-emphasized that pure speculation and a resort to probabilities are
insufficient to cause the invalidation of E.O. No. 220.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92649

February 14, 1991

SPOUSES LEONOR and ROSA BADUA, petitioners,

vs.
CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION, CORDILLERA PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY, MANUEL TAO-IL, AMOGAO-EN KISSIP,
DALALO ILLIQUES, JUANITO GAYYED, PEDRO CABANTO, VICENTE DAYEM and DAVID QUEMA, respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
Whether a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid and executory decision in a land dispute is the
legal issue presented by this petition.
The petitioners, spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua, allegedly own a farm land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra. In July 1989, they
were forcibly ejected from the land by virtue of a "decision" of the Cordillera Bodong Administration in Case No. O, entitled "David
Quema vs. Leonor Badua."
The factual background of the case, as recited in the undated "decision" (Annex A, translation is Annex A-1) is as follows:
In 1966, Quema, as the owner of two parcels of land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra, evidenced by Tax Declarations Nos. 4997
and 4998 mortgaged said parcels of land for P6,000 to Dra. Erotida Valera. He was able to redeem the land twenty-two (22) years
later, on August 14, 1988, long after the mortgagee had already died. He allegedly paid the redemption price of P10,000 to the
mortgagee's heir, Jessie Macaraeg.
On the other hand, Rosa Badua, alleged that the land was sold to her by Dra. Erotida Valera when she was still alive. However, Rosa
could not produce the deed of sale because it is allegedly in the possession of Vice-Governor Benesa.
As Quema was prevented by Rosa Badua from cultivating the land, he filed a case before the Barangay Council, but it failed to settle
the dispute, A certain Judge Cacho advised Quema to file his complaint in the provincial level courts. Instead, Quema filed it in the
tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. The tribal court conducted a trial on February 19, 1989 and rendered the following decision:
9. The Maeng Tribal Court, therefore, decides to give the land to DAVID QUEMA and ROSA BADUA and her husband must pay the
persons to whom they mortgaged the said land. The Maeng Tribal Court also decides that ROSA BADUA and her husband must
reimburse the expenses of DAVID QUEMA in following-up the land case amounting to P2,000.00. The Maeng Tribal Court further
decides to penalize ROSA BADUA and her husband in the amount of P5,000.00 for telling the lie that they bought this land from the
late DRA. EROTIDA VALERA; for misleading the Maeng Tribal Court which handled the continuation of this case here in Bangued, CBA
Provincial Office where they failed to make an appearance; and their illegal acquisition of the said parcel of land. This decision is
based on the "PAGTA." (pp. 16-17, Rollo.)
When Leonor and Rosa Badua did not immediately vacate the land, they received on June 30, 1989 a "warning order" from Ka
Blantie, Zone Commander, Abra Zone-1 of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, thus:
WARNING ORDER
Mr. & MRS. LEONOR BADUA
A last warning from the armed CPLA of the CBA reiterates the order that you not to interfere any longer with the parcels of land
decided in favor of DAVID QUEMA as per "Court Order" of the Maeng Tribal Court. You are also to pay back the expenses he
incurred for the case amounting to P2,000.00 and your fine of P5,000.00.
Non-compliance of the said decision of the Court and any attempt to bring this case to another Court will force the CPLA to settle
the matter, in which case, you will have no one to blame since the case has been settled. (p. 20, Rollo.)

Fearful for his life, Leonor Badua went into hiding. In September 1989, his wife, Rosa, was arrested by the Cordillera People's
Liberation Army and detained for two days.
On April 2, 1990, the Baduas filed this petition "for Special and Extraordinary Reliefs" (which may be treated as a petition
for certiorari and prohibition) praying that:
1. a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to stop the respondents from enforcing the decision of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration during the pendency of this case;
2. the respondents be prohibited from usurping judicial power and hearing cases; and
3. the legal personality of the Cordillera Bodong Administration and Cordillera People's Liberation Army be clarified.
Petitioners allege that the decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration is null and void because:
1. petitioners were denied due process or formal hearing; and
2. the Cordillera Bodong Administration has no judicial power nor jurisdiction over the petitioners nor over the private respondent
as neither of them are members of the Maeng Tribe.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court on April 5, 1990 required the respondents to comment, but, unable to serve said resolution
on the respondents, the court requested the Philippine Constabulary Commander of the Cordillera Region to do it.
Respondents through counsel, Atty. Demetrio V. Pre, filed their comment on October 26, 1990. They alleged that: the Maeng Tribe is
a cultural minority group of Tingguians inhabiting the interior mountain town of Villaviciosa, Abra. The tribe is a part of the Cordillera
Bodong Association or Administration whose military arm is the Cordillera People's Liberation Army. The tribal court, or council of
elders, is composed of prominent and respected residents in the locality. It decides and settles all kinds of disputes more speedily
than the regular courts, without the intervention of lawyers.
Respondents further allege that the proceedings and decisions of the tribal courts are respected and obeyed by the parties, the
municipal and barangay officials, and the people in the locality, ostracism being the penalty for disobedience of, or non-compliance
with, the decisions of the council of elders in the areas where tribal courts operate.
Respondents contend that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the tribal courts because they are not a part of the judicial
system.
Respondents concede that if the petitioners "want to test the wisdom of the decision of the council of elders," the petitioners should
file the necessary suit, not in the Supreme Court, but in the trial courts where evidence can be presented. Respondents pray that the
decision of the tribal court be maintained and the petition for certiorari and prohibition be dismissed.
After deliberating on the petition and the comment thereon of the respondents, which the Court decided to treat as the latter's
answer, the Court finds the petition to be meritorious, hence, resolved to grant the same.
In Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander P. Ordillo, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 93054,
December 4, 1990, the Court en banc, found that in the plebiscite that was held on January 23, 1990 pursuant to Republic Act 6766,
the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected by all the provinces and city * of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao
province, hence, the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come to be.
Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the February 14,
1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order
No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect
until properly repealed or amended.
As a logical consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created under Section 13 of Executive
Order No. 220, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region (Sec. 1, Art. VII,
Rep. Act 6766), and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army as a regional police force or a regional command of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (Secs. 2 and 4, Article XVIII of R.A. 6766), do not legally exist.
Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an
indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs
and traditions of an indigenous cultural community.

Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which
have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). They do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or
conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is
to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise.
An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has the force and
effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can be enforced only through the local city or municipal court to
which the secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the period to annul
or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on compromise or arbitration, as provided in P.D.
1508, may be enforced or set aside, in and through the regular courts today.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. The decision rendered on February 18, 1989 by
the Maeng Tribal Court in Case No. 0, entitled "David Quema vs. the Leonor Badua," is hereby annulled for lack of jurisdiction. The
respondents Cordillera Bodong Administration, Cordillera People's Liberation Army, Manuel Tao-il, Amogao-en Kissip, Dalalo Illiques,
Juanita Gayyed, Pedro Cabanto, Vicente Dayem and David Quema, are hereby ordered to cease and desist from implementing said
decision, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action by the parties in the proper competent courts of the land as
provided by law. Costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 72492 November 5, 1987
NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., PATERIO TORRES and ARTURO UMBAC, petitioners,
vs.
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE, THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF
DUMAGUETE and ANTONIO S. RAMAS UYPITCHING, respondents.

CORTES, J.:
An attempt by the respondent Ad Hoc Committee of the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete to punish nonmembers for legislative contempt was halted by this special civil action of certiorari and Prohibitionwith Preliminary Injunction
and/or Restraining Order questioning the very existence of the power in that local legislative body or in any of its committees. On
November 7, 1985, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order:
. . . enjoining respondents, their agents, representatives, and police and other peace officers acting in their behalf, to refrain from
compelling the attendance and testimony of Petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac at any and all future investigations to be
conducted by aforesaid respondents, and from issuing any contempt order if one has not been issued yet or from executing any such
contempt order if one has already been issued.
Assailed is the validity of a subpoena dated October 25, 1985 (Annex "A", Petition) sent by the respondent Committee to the
petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac, Chairman of the Board of Directors and the General Manager, respectively, of
petitioner Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative NORECO II), requiring their attendance and testimony at the Committee's
investigation on October 29, 1985. Similarly under fire is the Order issued by the same Committee on the latter date, (Annex "D",
Petition) directing said petitioners to show cause why they should not be punished for legislative contempt due to their failure to
appear at said investigation.
The investigation to be conducted by respondent Committee was "in connection with pending legislation related to the operations
of public utilities" (Id.) in the City of Dumaguete where petitioner NORECO II, an electric cooperative, had its principal place of
business. Specifically, the inquiry was to focus on the alleged installation and use by the petitioner NORECO II of inefficient power
lines in that city (Comment, Rollo, p. 50). Respondent Antonio S. Ramas Uypitching, as Chairman of the Committee on Public Utilities
and Franchises and Co-Chairman of the respondent Ad Hoc Committee, signed both the subpoena and the Order complained of.
Petitioners moved to quash the subpoena on the following grounds:
a. The power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged
exclusively with the National Electrification Administration; and
b. Neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the Local Government Code grants (the Sangguniang Panlungsod) any specific
power to investigate alleged inefficient power lines of NORECO II. (Annex "C", Petition)
The motion to quash was denied in the assailed Order of October 29, 1985 directing the petitioners Torres and Umbac to show cause
why they should not be punished for contempt. Hence this Petition for certiorari andProhibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Restraining Order.
Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of the power to compel the attendance
and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of witnesses who fail to obey itssubpoena. It is further argued that
assuming the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be exercised in the
investigation of matters affecting the terms and conditions of the franchise granted to NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Rollo pp. 7-8).
Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondentSangguniang Panlungsod is
the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within
its jurisdiction (Rollo, p. 46). It is also the position of the respondents that the contempt power, if not expressly granted, is

necessarily implied from the powers granted theSangguniang Panlungsod (Rollo, pp. 48-49). Furthermore, the respondents assert
that an inquiry into the installation or use of inefficient power lines and its effect on the power consumption cost on the part of
Dumaguete residents is well-within the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and its committees.
1. A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative power under the Constitution, and
those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local government unit, e.g. theSangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete
which, as mere creatures of law, possess delegated legislative power.While the Constitution does not expressly vest Congress with
the power to punish non-members for legislative contempt, the power has nevertheless been invoked by the legislative body as a
means of preserving its authority and dignity (Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 [1950]); Amault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 [1955]), in the
same way that courts wield an inherent power to "enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and
ensure the effectiveness of the administration of justice." (Commissioner v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716, 723 [1967]; In re Kelly 35 Phil. 944
950 [1916], and other cases). The exercise by Congress of this awesome power was questioned for the first time in the leading case
of Arnault v. Nazareno, (87 Phil. 29 [1950]) where this Court held that the legislative body indeed possessed the contempt power.
That case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called and examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was
Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a portion of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate,
investigation, Amault refused to reveal the Identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant at Arms and imprisoned "until
he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as wen as
answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith." (Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, 43 [1950]). Arnault petitioned for
a writ of Habeas Corpus.
In upholding the power of Congress to punish Arnault for contumacy the Court began with a discussion of the distribution of the
three powers of government under the 1935 Constitution. Cognizant of the fact that the Philippines system of government under
the 1935 Constitution was patterned after the American system, the Court proceeded to resolve the issue presented, partly by
drawing from American precedents, and partly by acknowledging the broader legislative power of the Philippine Congress as
compared to the U.S. Federal Congress which shares legislative power with the legislatures of the different states of the American
union (Id., pp. 44-45). The Court held:
xxx xxx xxx
... (T)he power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended
to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true
recourse must be had to others who possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 ALR 1) The fact that the Constitution
expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude
the power to punish for contempt by any person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheaton 204; 5 L. ed., 242)
But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into
which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26, L.ed., 377.)
The Court proceeded to delve deeper into the essence of the contempt power of the Philippine Congress in a subsequent decision
(Arnault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 [1955]) arising from the same factual antecedents:
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy.
Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the
knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge
and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the
principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the real of its respective authority, it must have intended
each department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's authority or power. And how could the authority
and power become complete if for every act of refusal every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body
must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with
the affronts committed against its authority or dignity. . . (Arnault v. Balagtas, L-6749, July 30, 1955; 97 Phil. 358, 370 [1955]).

The aforequoted pronouncements in the two Arnault cases, supra, broke ground in what was then an unexplored area of
jurisprudence, and succeeded in supplying the raison d' etre of this power of Congress even in the absence of express constitutional
grant. Whether or not the reasons for upholding the existence of said power in Congress may be applied mutatis mutandis to a
questioned exercise of the power of contempt by the respondent committee of a city council is the threshold issue in the present
controversy.
3. The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the government vested
with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt
power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same
reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the
character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government. The same thing cannot be said
of local legislative bodies which are creations of law.
4. To begin with, there is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt.
Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a
subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behaviour would be for said power to be deemed implied in
the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature.
They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative
functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would
run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Thus, the contempt power, as well as the subpoena power, which the framers of the fundamental law did not expressly provide for
but which the then Congress has asserted essentially for self-preservation as one of three co-equal branches of the government
cannot be deemed implied in the delegation of certain legislative functions to local legislative bodies. These cannot be presumed to
exist in favor of the latter and must be considered as an exception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides for liberal rules of
interpretation in favor of local autonomy. Since the existence of the contempt power in conjunction with the subpoena power in any
government body inevitably poses a potential derogation of individual rights, i.e. compulsion of testimony and punishment for
refusal to testify, the law cannot be liberally construed to have impliedly granted such powers to local legislative bodies. It cannot be
lightly presumed that the sovereign people, the ultimate source of all government powers, have reposed these powers in all
government agencies. The intention of the sovereign people, through their representatives in the legislature, to share these unique
and awesome powers with the local legislative bodies must therefore clearly appear in pertinent legislation.
There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory
process and the power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the
petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can
exercise these powers.
5. Even assuming that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the
subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires.The contempt power (and the
subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction
of the legislative body (Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, citing Kilbourn v. Thompson). As admitted by the respondents in their Comment,
the investigation to be conducted by the Ad-Hoc Committee was to look into the use by NORECO II of inefficient power lines "of prewar vintage" which the latter had acquired from the Visayan Electric Com. company, and "to hear the side of the petitioners"
(Comment, Rollo, p. 50). It comes evident that the inquiry would touch upon the efficiency of the electric service of NORECO II and,
necessarily, its compliance with the franchise. Such inquiry is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and
the respondent committee.
There is no doubt that a city government has the power to enact ordinances regulating the installation and maintenance of electric
power lines or wires within its territorial jurisdiction. The power subsists notwithstanding the creation of the National Electrification
Administration (NEA), to which body the franchise powers of local government units were transferred by Presidential Decree No.
269. Section 42 of the Decree states:
SEC. 42. Repeal of Franchise Powers of Municipal City and Provincial Governments. The powers of municipal, city and provincial
governments to grant franchises, as provided for in Title 34 of the Philippines Statutes or in any special law, are hereby repealed;
Provided, That this section shall not impair or invalidate any franchise heretofore lawfully granted by such a government or repeal
any other subsisting power of such governments to require that electric facilities and related properties be so located, constructed

and operated and maintained as to be safe to the public and not to unduly interfere with the primary use of streets, roads, alleys and
other public ways, buildings and grounds over, upon or under which they may be built. (This Section was not among those amended
by Pres. Dec. Nos. 1370 [May 2, 1978] and 1645 [October 8, 1979]).
This particular power of the city government is included in the enumeration of powers and duties of a Sangguniang Panlungsod in
Section 177 of the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, February 10, 1983), to wit:
SEC. 177. Powers and Duties. The Sangguniang Panlungsod shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(j) . . . regulate the digging and excavation for the laying of gas, water, power, and other pipelines, the building and repair of tunnels,
sewers and drains, and all structures thereunder; the placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas mains,
electric, telegraph and telephone wires, conduits meters and other apparatus, and the correction, condemnation of the same when
dangerous or defective;
xxx xxx xxx
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete may, therefore, enact ordinances to regulate the installation and maintenance of
electric power lines, e.g. prohibit the use of inefficient power lines, in order to protect the city residents from the hazards these may
pose. In aid of this ordinance making power, said body or any of its committees may conduct investigations similar to, but not the
same as, the legislative investigations conducted by the national legislature. As already discussed, the difference lies in the lack of
subpoena power and of the power to punish for contempt on the part of the local legislative bodies. They may only invite resource
persons who are willing to supply information which may be relevant to the proposed ordinance. The type of investigation which
may be conducted by the Sangguniang PanLungsod does not include within its ambit an inquiry into any suspected violation by an
electric cooperative of the conditions of its electric franchise.
The power to inquire into the efficiency of the service supplied by electric cooperatives is within the franchising powers of the NEA
under Sec. 43 of Pres. Dec. No. 269, i.e.:
(2) to repeal and cancel any franchise if the NEA finds that the holder thereof is not then furnishing, and is unable to or unailling
within reasonable time to furnish adequate and dependable service on an area coverage within such area;
xxx xxx xxx
In the exercise of this power, the NEA may conduct hearings and investigations, issle subpoenas and invoke the aid of the courts in
case of disobedience to its subpoenas (Sec. 47 & Sec. 54, P.D. 269). Clearly, then, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete cannot
look into an suspected failure of NORECO II to comply with the standards of electric service prescribed by law and in its franchise.
The proper recourse is to file a complaint with the NEA against NORECO II if there be sufficient basis therefor.
WHEREFORE, the subpoena dated October 25, 1985 requiring the attendance and testimony of the petitioners at an investigation by
the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee, and the Order issued by the latter on October 29, 1985 directing herein petitioners to show
cause why they should not be punished for legislative contempt for their disobedience of said subpoena, is declared null and void for
being ultra vires. The respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee are without power to punish nonmembers for contempt. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on November 7, 1985 enjoining said respondents,
their agents and representatives, and the police and other peace officers from enforcing the aforesaid Order of the respondent
committee is made permanent. Petition is GRANTED. No costs.
SO ORDERED
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.