Frequently Asked Questions

1. What is the International Court of Justice?

2. Who may submit cases to the Court?
3. What differentiates the International Court of Justice from the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc international
criminal tribunals?
4. How does the International Court of Justice differ from other international courts?
5. Why are some disputes between States not considered by the Court?
6. Are decisions of the Court binding?
7. How does one attend hearings of the Court?
8. Is it possible to visit the Peace Palace, seat of the Court?
9. How does one apply for a job at the Court?
10. Does the Court offer internships?
11. Does the Court issue official certificates or other documents to individuals?
12. How to find out more about the Court.
1. What is the International Court of Justice?
The Court is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It was established by the United Nations Charter, signed in
1945 at San Francisco (United States), and began work in 1946 in the Peace Palace, The Hague (Netherlands).
The Court, which is composed of 15 judges, has a dual role: in accordance with international law, settling legal disputes
between States submitted to it by them and giving advisory opinions on legal matters referred to it by duly authorized United
Nations organs and specialized agencies.
The official languages of the Court are English and French.
2. Who may submit cases to the Court?
Only States are eligible to appear before the Court in contentious cases. At present, this basically means the 192 United
Nations Member States.
The Court has no jurisdiction to deal with applications from individuals, non-governmental organizations, corporations or any
other private entity. It cannot provide them with legal counselling or help them in their dealings with the authorities of any
State whatever.
However, a State may take up the case of one of its nationals and invoke against another State the wrongs which its
national claims to have suffered at the hands of the latter; the dispute then becomes one between States.
3. What differentiates the International Court of Justice from the International Criminal Court and
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals?
The International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to try individuals accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity. As
it is not a criminal court, it does not have a prosecutor able to initiate proceedings.
This task is the preserve of national courts, the ad hoc criminal tribunals established by the United Nations (such as
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR)) or in co-operation with it (such as theSpecial Court for Sierra Leone)), and also of the International Criminal
Court, set up under the Rome Statute.
4. How does the International Court of Justice differ from other international courts?
The International Court of Justice differs from the European Court of Justice (the seat of which is in Luxembourg), whose
role is to interpret European Community legislation uniformly and rule on its validity, as well as from the European Court of
Human Rights (in Strasbourg, France) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (in San Jos, Costa Rica), which deal
with allegations of violations of the human rights conventions under which they were set up. As well as applications from
States, those three courts can entertain applications from individuals, which is not possible for the International Court of
Justice.
The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is general and thereby differs from that of specialist international
tribunals, such as theInternational Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
Lastly, the Court is not a supreme court to which national courts can turn; it does not act as a court of last resort for
individuals. Nor is it an appeal court for any international tribunal. It can, however, rule on the validity of arbitral awards.
5. Why are some disputes between States not considered by the Court?
The Court can only hear a dispute when requested to do so by one or more States. It cannot deal with a dispute of its own
motion. It is not permitted, under its Statute, to investigate and rule on acts of sovereign States as it chooses.
The States concerned must also have access to the Court and have accepted its jurisdiction, in other words they must
consent to the Court"s considering the dispute in question. This is a fundamental principle governing the settlement of
international disputes, States being sovereign and free to choose the methods of resolving their disputes.
A State may manifest its consent in three ways:

- A special agreement: two or more States in a dispute on a specific issue may agree to submit it jointly to the Court and
conclude an agreement for this purpose;
- A clause in a treaty: over 300 treaties contain clauses (known as compromissory clauses) by which a State party
undertakes in advance to accept the jurisdiction of the Court should a dispute arise on the interpretation or application of the
treaty with another State party;
- A unilateral declaration: the States parties to the Statute of the Court may opt to make a unilateral declaration
recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as binding with respect to any other State also accepting it as binding. This optional
clause system, as it is called, has led to the creation of a group of States each having given the Court jurisdiction to settle
any dispute that might arise between them in future. In principle, any State in this group is entitled to bring one or more
other States in the group before the Court. Declarations may contain reservations limiting their duration or excluding certain
categories of dispute. They are deposited by States with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
6. Are decisions of the Court binding?
Judgments delivered by the Court (or by one of its Chambers) in disputes between States are binding upon the parties
concerned. Article 94 of the United Nations Charter lays down that "each Member of the United Nations undertakes to
comply with the decision of [the Court] in any case to which it is a party".
Judgments are final and without appeal. If either of the parties challenges their scope or meaning, it has the option to
request an interpretation. In the event of the discovery of a fact hitherto unknown to the Court which might be a decisive
factor, either party may apply for revision of the judgment.
As regards advisory opinions, it is usually for the United Nations organs and specialized agencies requesting them to give
effect to them or not by whatever means are appropriate for them.
7. How does one attend hearings of the Court?
The hearings of the Court are public, unless it has been decided to hold a closed hearing. For information on the
appropriate procedure, please refer to the "Visits" pages on our Internet site.
Representatives of the media wishing to cover the hearings must be duly accredited. For further information, please refer to
the "Accreditation" page in the Press Room.
8. Is it possible to visit the Peace Palace, seat of the Court?
The Carnegie Foundation, which owns the Peace Palace, arranges guided tours on weekdays. There is a charge for such
visits.
However, no tours are arranged when the International Court of Justice is holding hearings or when other events are taking
place in the Peace Palace.
9. How does one apply for a job in the Registry of the Court?
For all information concerning job vacancies, please refer to the "Current vacancies" page on our Internet site.
10. Does the Court offer internships?
Yes. Further information on this subject may be found under "Summer internship programme" on our Internet site.
11. Does the Court issue official certificates or other documents to individuals?
The Court issues no such documents to individuals relating to the lottery, transfers of funds or certifying transactions. The
Court regularly receives requests for information about documents bearing its logo or the crudely forged signature of certain
senior officials. Members of the public are advised that these constitute fraud.
12. How to find out more about the Court
For further information on the Court, please refer to the section "Questions and Answers on the Court" in the Press Room
or download theHandbook of the Court (updated to 31 December 2013).
You can also subscribe to the Mailing List in order to receive the Court's press releases by e-mail.

Like it or not, UNCLOS arbitration is legally binding for China

11 July 2016
Author: Jerome A. Cohen, NYU
International media have come to focus on Tuesdays anticipated decision in the Philippines
arbitration against China. Beijings recent propaganda and diplomatic blitz has raised the
prominence of the case to new heights. The dispute involves no fewer than 15 issues, many of
them highly technical. Yet the basic issue in the case whether the decision will be legally
binding on China as well as the Philippines is reasonably straightforward. Still there appears
to be widespread misunderstanding surrounding it.

We should recognise that this will not be a decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the
Hague, as so many press reports state. That institution is the facilitating administrative institution
for the arbitration tribunal that has been established under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in response to the claim submitted by the Philippines against
China. The decision will be made by the UNCLOS tribunal, which consists of five of the worlds
leading law of the sea experts.
Although any outcome can be arbitrarily dismissed as debatable, if properly understood there
should be no doubt that despite Beijings endlessly repeated denunciations of the tribunals
legitimacy and even the competence and fairness of the arbitrators China will be legally
bound by the tribunals decision.
China claims that it has indisputable sovereignty over the land features and waters involved in
the South China Sea. It refuses to be bound by the tribunals anticipated decision on the grounds
that the decision will necessarily deal with issues of territorial sovereignty (who owns which
disputed islands) and maritime delimitation (how conflicting national water boundary claims
should be resolved) and that China has never consented to any third party impartial arbitration of
these issues.
Chinas argument here is misleading. The tribunal has already indicated that its award will not
decide those issues but will only concern itself with other important questions, all of which
involve the interpretation and application of UNCLOS and are therefore within the tribunals
decision-making authority. By ratifying the Convention, which requires compulsory dispute
resolution and commits all parties to abide by whatever decision results, China clearly consented
to accept the arbitration tribunals decision.
For example, the tribunal may amplify the meaning of the crucial Article 121.3 of the
Convention by clarifying and applying the criteria for determining whether or not an island, no
matter who owns it, is entitled to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and
continental shelf as well as the 12 nautical mile territorial sea that attaches to every island.
The tribunal may also clarify the relationship of the Convention to national maritime claims that
existed prior to adoption of the Convention. In particular, it may decide whether Chinas

ambiguous nine-dash-line which first appeared on a Chinese government map after World
War II before the current Communist government was established should be deemed an
historic right that survived the Conventions adoption.
The Convention plainly provides for the determination of such questions by an impartial,
independent group of five specialists whose membership and rules of procedure are prescribed at
length. No further consent is required from any nation that has ratified the Convention and has a
relevant claim brought against it.
When China ratified the Convention and agreed to be bound by any decision that resulted from
such a compulsory third party determination, this consent was a free exercise of Chinese
sovereignty and a solemn international treaty commitment to respect and comply with whatever
decision emerged from the proceedings.
Of course, since China argues that in substance the issues raised by the arbitration involve
questions of territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation and are therefore outside the
scope of the tribunals jurisdiction it has the right to present these arguments for the tribunals
determination. But China declined to participate in the tribunals proceedings, unilaterally
claiming that, since to its own satisfaction its arguments are legally correct, it need not present
them for the tribunals impartial consideration. Despite this, the tribunal has done its best to
evaluate Chinas jurisdictional arguments.
Just think what a legal system the world would have if a country that has consented to
compulsory third party decision-making as countries have in over 90 international agreements
could simply renounce its solemn treaty promise while remaining within the treaty system and
thumb its nose at the decision of the authorised independent tribunal. The provisions of
UNCLOS clearly prohibit such conduct, which obviously constitutes a violation of international
law.
China is evidently frantic to avoid being branded a violator of international law, even though, as
its supporters point out, the United States, in a dispute with Nicaragua three decades ago, ignored
a decision of the International Court of Justice after the court rejected its claim that the court
lacked jurisdiction. That unfortunate action of the Reagan administration continues to damage
the USs reputation to this day. Washingtons reluctance to accept impartial third party dispute
resolution may well be one of the reasons why the United States, disappointingly, has never
ratified UNCLOS.
Chinas current leaders, apparently only recently aware of the widespread opposition to their
South China Sea legal stance, have been striving to limit the damage Beijing is about to suffer.
Their spokespeople have presented all sorts of unpersuasive defences of their governments
refusal to honour its UNCLOS commitment. A few have even argued that China, by denouncing
the tribunals allegedly improper actions, has become the true defender of international
law. Instead of trying to stand international law on its head, China would be wiser to renew
bilateral negotiations with the Philippines on the basis of the tribunals binding decision.