Legislative Drafting - Chapter On GC Act, 1897

CHAPTER XII
T H E GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 18971

(10 OF 1897)
INTRODUCTION
The General Clauses Act 1897 belongs to the class of Acts which may be
called as interpretation Acts. An interpretation Act lays down the basic
rules as to how courts should interpret the provisions of an Act of Parliament.
It also defines certain words or expressions so that there is no unnecessary
repetition of the definition of those words in other Acts. In other words, an
Interpretation Act provides a standard set of definitions or extended
definitions of words and expressions commonly used in legislation (and is
thus an Act of wide application). It also provides a set of rules which regulate
certain aspects of operation of other enactments. In addition there are other
provisions which are not merely definitions or rules of construction but
substantive rules of law, such as the provisions relating to the effect of the
repeal of an Act. Interpretation Acts have a long history. The Interpretation
Act 1850 (13 & 14 Viet. 21) was an Act of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom passed in 1850 that simplified the language that was used in
statutes. It was also known as Lord Brougham's Act, and its long title was
An Act for shortening the Language used in Acts of Parliament. It devised the
current system of dividing legislation into sections which are automatically
substantive enactments, and also made various other provisions for
interpreting other statutes. For example it stated that the masculine includes
the feminine (thus enabling " h e " to be written instead of "he or she"),
unless expressly indicated otherwise. The 1850 Act was repealed by the
Interpretation Act, 1889. The 1889 Act became the mother of the many
Interpretation Acts one reads about in all Commonwealth countries. It
was repealed by the Interpretation Act 1978. The Interpretation Act which
For Statement of Objects and Reasons, see Gazette of India, 1897, part V, at 38; for
Report of Select Committee, see Gazette of India, 1897, part V, at 77 and for
proceedings in Council, see Gazette of India, 1897, part VI, at 35, 40, 56 and 76.
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is in force in India is called as the General Clauses Act, 1897. A brief outline
of the provisions of the General Clause Act 1897 and the decesions of the
courts while interpretating this are as follows.
T H E G E N E R A L CLAUSES A C T ,
1897
An Act to consolidate and extend the General Clauses Acts, 1868 and
1887.
Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and extend the General Clauses Acts,
1868 and 1887;
It is hereby enacted as follows:
PRELIMINARY
1. Short title. (1) This Act may be called the General Clauses Act, 1897.1
O B J E C T OF A C T
The General Clauses Act, 1897, may be described as the draftsman's Act.
It is the utmost importance to him for the purposes of his craft. Its objects
are to shorten the language of statutory enactments, to provide, as far as
possible, for uniformity of expression giving prima facie definitions of a
series of terms in common use, to state explicitly certain common rules of
construction and to guard against slips and oversights by incorporating by
implication into every Act certain standard clauses which otherwise would
have to be inserted expressly and which might otherwise have been
overlooked. 2
According to the Supreme Court. 3
"The purpose of the Act is to place in one single statute different provisions
as regards interpretation of words and legal principles which would otherwise
have to be specified separately in many different Acts and regulations.
Whatever the General Clauses Act says, whether as regards the meanings of
words or as regards legal principles, has to be read into every statute to
which it applies."
In short, the value and utility of the General Clauses Act is considerable,
because it not only constitutes he reference book of the judge when dealing
with statutes, but also serves as the draftsman's labour-saving device. It lays
2
3
See also the Sixtieth Report of the law Commission of India on the General Clauses
Act, 1897 (May, 1974).
The Chief Inspector of Mines v. K. C. Thaper (1962) 1 SCR 9atl 8; see also Rayarappan
v. Madhavi Amma, AIR 1950 FC 140, 141; N. Subramania Iyer v. Official Receiver,
AIR 1958 SCI.
The General Clauses Act, 1897
265
down rules which would have been tedious to repeat in every statute, thus
shortening the language of legislative enactments.
HISTORY OF LEGISLATION
The General Clauses Act, 1868 (1 of 1868) was the earliest Act to be passed
in India with the avowed object of shortening the language of Acts of the
Governor-General in Council. This Act was an adaptation with modifications
of Lord Brougham's Act (13 & 14 Viet., c. 21), which was passed in 1850.
The General Clauses Act, 1887 (1 of 1887) supplemented the earlier Act by
defining a few more words in common use and laying down certain new
rules of construction.
In so far as these two Acts contained statutory definitions, it was obviously
expedient that the legislative dictionary, as it may be called, should be
combined in a single enactment and similar considerations could equally
well have applied to the rules of construction also. In the process of
consolidating these two Acts, additions suggested by subsequent experience
and the provisions contained in the Interpretation Act, 1889, of the United
Kingdom came to be incorporated. The General Clauses Act, 1897, was
drafted by Sir C. Ilbert and is in effect a careful revision and extension of
the Interpretation Act, 1889. (52 and 53 Viet, c 63, now-repealed and
replaced by the Interpretation Act, 1978, (1978, c 30, which came into
force on 1.1.1979). Although the provisions of the earlier Indian Acts have
been incorporated in the General Clauses Act of 1897, they may still be
needed for the interpretation of the enactments of the Central legislative
authority passed before 1897.
N E E D FOR FURTHER AMENDMENT
Later experience suggests the need for a further revision of the General
Clauses Act. For example, the Act could very well include a general provision
with respect to the extent of application of Central Act, thereby eliminating
the necessity for extent clauses except where absolutely necessary. The legal
significance of marginal notes, punctuation marks and the like could very
well be defined by legislation instead of being left to case-law. How far
Government is to be regarded as bound by enactments, which it helps to
pass, could also be clarified. The legal effects which follow on the expiration
of temporary statutes could be suitably defined and definitions of a general
nature, which are still to be found in other enactment, (example"Public
Servant" in the Indian Penal Code) could very well be transferred to this
Act. Other clauses which of late have to be repeated in many central
enactments (for instance, punishment of companies for offences committed
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by them, the necessity for, and the consequences flowing from laying before
Parliament of rules made by the Central Government under power given
to it by the statute under which they are made) could also be considered
for inclusion in a more comprehensive General Clauses Act. Such an Act
could more appropriately be named the Interpretation and General Clauses
Act. The present Act contains more rules of interpretation then common
form clauses, but no change has so far been attempted in the tide although
in o t h e r c o u n t r i e s the c o r r e s p o n d i n g Act is generally cited as the
Interpretation Act 4 . The Law Commission, however, has not recommended
any change in the tide.
In this connection a reference to article 367(1) of the Constitution may
not be out of places.
It reads as follows: "367 (1). Unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses
Act, 1897, shall subject to any adaptations and modifications that
may be made therein under article 372, apply for the interpretation
of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the
legislature of the Dominion of India."
The words italici2ed (which appear to be somewhat unfortunate in the
present context) may give rise to the arguments (1) that the General Clauses
Act cannot be repealed and re-enacted with additions and modifications;
(2) that substantial amendments cannot be made therein unless it is possible
to keep the amendments distinct from the principal Act; (3) that the
General Clauses Act in its unmodified form should always continue to
apply to Acts of the Dominion Legislature as that is a condition precedent
for the application of the Act to the Constitution.
It was for the above reasons that in early 1949 a separate Act was
contemplated for the Acts to be passed by Parliament after independence;
4
G.R. Rajagopaul in the first edition of The Drafting of IMWS, (1980) at 63, while he
was functioning as the Legal and Constitutional Adviser to the Government of
Meghalaya, he had the privilege of drafting for that Government a new Act called
the Interpretation and General Clauses Act (1970). Being a new State, this Act could
be re-written on a clean state, could be given a more comprehensive tide and could
incorporate most of the above suggestions. In the United Kingdom, a new
Interpretation Act, 1978 (1978, c.30) has taken the place of the Act of 1889. It is a
consolidating measure and seeks to give effect to the recommendations of the Law
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission. Two of the important additions to
the old Act are the ones dealing with the effect of expiry of temporary Acts and with
the application of the Act to subordinate legislation.
The General Clauses Act,
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but as a measure of caution the matter was referred by the Government to

the Law Commission of India, the Law Commission after considering the
whole question has made the following observations.
"We have carefully considered the matter in all its aspects, and are
inclined to take the view that the simultaneous existence of two
Interpretation Acts is likely to create unnecessary complications.
Citizens as well as lawyers will be required to make themselves
familiar with both the Acts for a considerable time to come, because
it is unlikely that all existing Central Acts will be removed from
the statute book within a reasonably foreseeable future. Diversity
of judicial interpretation in respect of two sets of identical provisions
may also create p r o b l e m s , and such diversity will harm the
uniformity of law. It would, thus, be a serious anomaly if the statute
book were to have two General Clauses Acts for the interpretation
o f C e n t r a l A c t s . N o d o u b t t h e initiation of a totally n e w
Interpretation Act (with only prospective effect) has an advantage
in as much as radical changes will not apply to existing Acts. But
the same object could, in a fair measure, be achieved by suggesting
new provisions for incorporating in the present Act, at the same
time making those new provisions prospective. The proposal for
having two Acts does not, in this respect, have any peculiar merit". 5
The Law Commission justified prospective amendments in the existing
Act by saying that the present Act already makes a distinction between (a)
Central Acts made after the 3 rd January 1887 and (b) Central Acts and
Regulations made after the 14th January, 1887 and (c) Central Acts made
after the 11 th March, 1897. To these could be added one more category,
namely Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of
the amending Act. The Law Commission, while fully conscious of the
complicated nature of the scheme, felt that it cannot be avoided, as the
structure of the present Act is already complicated. As regards article 367,
the Law Commission's view is that its effect is not to freeze the General
Clauses Act, 1897, for all times. The Act can be revised or modified but
the unamended Act will continue to govern the interpretation of the
Constitution. In the light of their study they have suggested certain
amendments to the existing Act which are yet to be implemented.
5
See the Sixtieth Report of the Law Commission of India (1974). Compare schedule
2 to the Interpretation Act 1978 (1978 C.30), which makes suitable provisions for
the application of the Act to existing enactments.
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APPLICATION OF A C T
The General Clauses Act is a consolidating as well as an extending measure.

As a consolidating measure it did not purport to make any changes in the
provisions of law repealed and reenacted by it. The General Clauses Act
does not require to be extended to become operative. By reason of section
3, the Act becomes statutorily a part of every Central Act passed after 1897
and by its own force applies to the interpretation of every such enactment. 6
The Central Acts to which this Act applies are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
Acts of the Indian Parliament;

Acts of the Dominion Legislature passed between the 15th August,
1947 and the 26 th January, 1950;
Acts passed before the commencement of the Constitution by the
Governor-General in Council or the Governor-General acting in a
legislative capacity.
This Act cannot, except where any specific provision (e.g., sections 4A, 12,
25 and 26) is clearly of universal application, be used to interpret the Acts
of Provincial Legislature. 7 Its provisions apply expressly to Central Acts
and Regulations, but section 20 provides that expressions used in rules
etc. made under Central Acts or Regulations shall have the same meaning
as in the Act or Regulation which confers the power to make the rules.
Therefore words used in statutory rules and defined inthe General Clauses
Act will have the meaning assigned to them therein if they are used in the
Act under which the rules are made and all the provisions of the General
Clauses Act will be applicable for the construction of rules which by the
Act under which they are made are to have effect as if enacted therein. The
rules of interpretation laid down in the General Clauses Act may also be
safely applied for the construction of statutory rules. 8
In some rules, e.g., in the Indian Arms Rules, 1920 made under section
17 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, the Defence of India Rules made under
the Defence of India Act, 1971, there is a specific provision to the effect
6
7
Devanagere Cotton Mills v. Dy. Commissioner, Chitradurga AIR 1961 SC 144; see also
Habbalal v. State of Madhya-Bharat, AIR 1955 Madhya Bharat 36.
Romesb Chander Bose v. Sorju Kanta Ray (1880) ILR 5 Cal. 713; Queen Empress v.
Pherojshah Hormusjee (1899) I Bom.LR 164.
See Potts orRidellv. Reid(1942) All ER 161; see Sec. 23 of the Interpretation Act,
1978, which seeks to apply the Act to subordinate legislation in general.
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that the General Clauses Act shall apply for the purpose of interpreting the
rules. 9
Some of the provisions of the Act apply to enactments passed before it
came into force, while others do not. In this, it differs from the Act of
1887. The Interpretation Act, 1889 applied only to Acts made after it was
passed. The new Interpretation Act, 1978, in the United Kingdom, has
necessarily to provide for the application of the Act to existing enactments
as it replaces the Act of 1889.
Sections 13, 15, 16, 20, 2 1 , 25 and 26 apply to any Central Act or
Regulation whenever made. 10 Section 12 applies to any enactment in force
at the time the Act was passed and also to those to be in force thereafter.
The definition is section 3, generally speaking, apply to enactments passed
after the commencement of the Act. But by section 4, some specified
definitions apply also to certain earlier Acts and Regulations, and by section
4A certain definitions inserted by the Adaptation of Laws Orders issued
from time to time on constitutional changes taking place in India apply to
all Indian laws (an expression which includes all laws in force in India but
excludes Acts of British Parliament and any instruments made there under).
Sections 6, 6A, 8, 11, 24, 27 and 28(2) and sections 7, 9, 10, 14, 17, 18
and 19, except in so far as they are modified by sub-section (2) of the
section in each case, apply only to e n a c t m e n t s m a d e after t h e
commencement of the Act.
By reason of section 29, the Act cannot be invoked to interpret earlier
enactments even when thee have been continued or amended by enactments
made after the commencement of the Act."
STATE GENERAL CLAUSES ACTS
Each State has its own General Clauses Act for the interpretation of statutes
passed by the State legislature. The first of such Acts was passed by Bombay
in 1866 and this was followed by similar Acts in Madras and Bengal in
Ram Choudhri v. \Mxman ILR (1938) Bom. 734, where, on the ground that it is
desirable that for the sake of uniformity the same interpretation should be given to an
expression occurring in a judicial order as would be given to it in a statute, section 9
was applied to the interpretation of an order of court.
10 Bbagchandv. Secretary of State (1924) ILR 48 Bom. 87, affirmed by the PC in
(1927) ILR 51 Bom. 725, where section 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act,
which is similar in terms to section 21 of this Act, was held to have retrospective
effect
11 See Rash Bebari v. Narain Dass (1922) 27 CWN 251; but see also note to section 10.
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1867. E x c e p t with regard to a few m i n o r m a t t e r s , the State General Clauses

Acts c o n f o r m s t o the Central pattern, as o t h e r w i s e considerable c o n f u s i o n
will arise. T h i s has resulted in a considerable a m o u n t o f uniformity in t h e
language of legislation in the country. 1 2
12 The following is a list of the State General Clauses Acts. While every attempt has
been made to obtain accurate information, the available material is so scattered that
errors cannot be ruled out.
Incidentally, while a new General Clauses Act was suggested for post-independence
Central Acts, a wish was also expressed that it might be possible to persuade the State
Governments to pass the necessary resolutions under article 252 of the Constitution
so that the new law could be made applicable to State Acts also.
1. Andhra Pradesh
(a) Hyderabad General Clauses Act, 1308 (Hyderabad Act 3 of 1308) (in
Telangana area).
(b) Madras General Clauses Act, 1867 (in Andhra area).
(c) Hyderabad General Clauses (Amendment and Supplementary) Act (18 of
1950) (in Telangana area).
(d) Madras General Clauses Act, 1891 (1 of 1891) - now adapted as the
Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1891 (See Andhra Pradesh code,
1963, Vol. 5, page 53).
2. Assam
Assam General Clauses Act, 1915 (Assam Act 2 of 1915).
3.
Bihar
Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, 1917 (Bihar and Orissa Act 1 of 1917).
4. Delhi (Union-territory)
The Bengal General Clauses Act (Bengal Act 1 of 1899) has been extended to
Delhi by Notification S.R.O. 862 dated 31st May, 1951 issued under section
2 of the Part C. State (Laws) Act, 1950 (30 of 1950) now Union Territories
(Laws) Act with certain adaptations.
5.
Gujarat
Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 (Bombay Act 1 of 1904)(Bombay Act 1 of
1904) as adapted.
6. jammu & Kashmir
Jammu & Kashmir General Clauses Act (Jammu & Kashmir Act 20 of 1977).
(The year 1977 is according to the local Calendar).
7.
Karnataka
(a) Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899 (Mysore Act 3 of 1899).
(b) Madras General Clauses Act (Act 1 of 1867), (in areas transferred from
Madras State).
(c) Madras General Clauses Act (1 of 1891) (in areas transferred from Madras
State).
(d) Bombay General Clauses Act (1 of 1904), (in areas transferred from
Bombay State).
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2. (Repeal) Repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act, 1903 (1 of

1903)
GENERAL DEFINITIONS
3. Definitions. "In this Act, and in all Central Acts and Regulations made
after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in
the subject or context, "
Section 3 has been wholly substituted for the earlier version by the
Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, made under article 372 of the Constitution
of India. While most of these definitions retained their earlier form, certain
adaptations were required in quite a few of the definitions and as a matter
of drafting it was thought fit to replace the entire section. In the United
(e) Hyderabad General Clauses Act (3 of 1308) in areas transferred from

Andhra State).
(f) Hyderabad General Clauses (Amendment and Supplementary) Act (18 of
1950), (in areas transferred from Andhra State).
8. Kerala
Kerala Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125.
Note - Travancore Cochin Interpretation and General Clauses Act (7 of 1125)
was enacted on 5th January, 1950 (21 st Dhanu 1125) and amended by Kerala
Act 3 of 1957 so that its present title is "Kerala Interpretation and General
Clauses Act."
9. Madhya Pradesh
Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1957 (Madhya Pradesh Act 3 of 1958).
10. Maharashtra
Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 (Bombay Act 1 of 1904), as adapted.
11. Orissa
Orissa General Clauses Act, 1904 (Bombay Act 1 of 1904), as adapted.
12. Punjab
Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898 (Punjab Act 1 of 1898).
13. Rajasthan
Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 8 of 1955).
14. Tamil Nadu
(a) Madras General Clauses Act, 1867 (Madras Act 1 of 1867).
(b) Madras General Clauses Act, 1891 (Madras Act 1 of 1891).
(The Act of 1891 applies to all post 1891 Acts).
15. U.P.
UP. General Clauses Act, 1904 (U.P. Act 1 of 1904).
16. West Bengal
Bangal General Clauses Act, 1899 (Bengal Act 1 of 1899).
17. Meghalaya
The Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1970.
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Kingdom, all the definitions are now relegated to a schedule, Interpretation

Act, 1978, Sch. I.
This section seeks to define 67 phrases and terms commonly used in
enactments and is intended to serve as a dictionary for the phrases and
terms so used and the Courts are expected to look into this dictionary in
the first instance for their interpretation. However, such definitions are not
meant to give a hide-bound meaning to terms and phrases generally
occurring in legislation. That is the reason why the definition section
contains words like "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or
context". Ordinarily, terms defined in the section will have the same
meaning in subsequent enactments which employ the same terms unless
there is anything inconsistent with or repugnant to the context of the
latter Act. 13
Even when a definition given in an Act is exhaustive, it may have to be read
differently in the context in which it occurs. That is why definition sections
always begin with the words "unless the context otherwise requires" (which
is another variation of the expression "unless there is anything repugnant
in the subject or context"). For instance, the word "insurer" in the Insurance
Act, 1938, in certain sections, was held to include an insurer w h o has
closed down his business. 14
It has also been observed that the omission of words like "unless there is
anything repugnant in the subject or context" may be of little import in
certain cases because some such words would always be implied in statutes
where the expressions which are interpreted by a definition clause are used
in a number of section with meanings sometimes of a wide and sometimes
of an obviously limited character.15
As pointed out by Bartley in his commentary on the General Clauses Act,
a definition may be explanatory, restrictive or extensive. The expression
"means" or "shall mean" is explanatory and prima facie restrictive. The
expression "shall include" is extensive. A definition extending the meaning
13 IV. Subramania Iyer v. Official Receiver, AIR 1958 SC 1, atlO; Kamanathan Chettiar
v. Somasundaram Chettiar, AIR 1964 Mad. 527.
14 V.F.E.G. Insurance Co. v. M/s Fraser <&Ross, 1960 AIR SCI971; In this context it may
be useful to recall the warning repeated by several Parliamentary Counsel that a word
ought not to be made to mean something which no person would ever dream of
being included in it. Sir William Grahame Harrison, a Parliamentarhy counsel, refers
to the example given by Vice-Chancellor Hall while testifying in 1875 of a definition
of "land" as including a "ship".
15 Knightsbridge Estates Trust Ltd. v. Byrne & Co. (1940) AC 613 at 62\;Choudhary
Mohammed v. Sebait of Sri Sri Ishwar etc., AIR 1943 Cal. 361.
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of a word does not take away its ordinary meaning. Where the word "means"
is used, in relation to a particular expression, it implies that no meaning
other than the one laid down in the definition can be assigned to the
expression in question. The words "include" and "shall include" or "shall
be deemed to include" are intended to enlarge the meaning of the defined
words without taking away their ordinary meaning. They are words of
enlargement rather than of restriction. The definition does not purport to
be exhaustive nor does it exclude any interpretation which the sections of
the Act may otherwise have. It merely provides that certain specified cases
shall be included. 16
In some places one comes across phrases such as "means and includes" or
"shall mean to include". For example, sections 17 and 18 of the Indian
C o n t r a c t Act, 1872 states that " f r a u d " m e a n s and includes, and
"misrepresentation" means and includes. It may be pointed out here that
such expressions lead to uncertainty and confusion. It raises a doubt as to
whether the definition is intended to be restrictive or extensive. Such
definitions are not recommended by the draftsmen. 17
(1) "abet", with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, shall
have the same meaning as in the Indian Penal Code (45 of I860)";
The definition incorporates by reference sections 107 to 117 of the Indian
Penal Code. As reproduction of the aforesaid sections in this Act might be
1 6 Queen v. Herman (1879) LR 4 QB 284; Mellows v. \MW and others (1923) I KB 522
at 526; George Robinson v. The lj>cal Board of Barton-Hccles (1883) App. Cas. 798;
DarbarilMlv. Dharnwti, AIR 1957 All 64\; A.C Patelv. I'ishvanath, AIR 1954
Bom. 204; S.K.Gupta v. K.P.Jain, AIR 1979 SC 734. In Dilworth and others v. The
Commissioner of Stamps etc., (1899) AC 99, at 105 and 106, the Court observed,
"The word "include" is very generally used in interpretative clauses in order to
enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and
when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not
only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those
things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. But the word
"include" is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if
the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the
purpose of adding sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose
of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions defined. It may be
equivalent to mean and include and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation
of the meaning, which for the purpose of the Act, must invariably be attached to
those words or expressions."
17 Ilbert, legislative Methods and Forms, 281(1901); Craies, Statute IMW, 6th Ed. at
212; Satrugna Saha v. The State of Orissa AIR, 1958 Orissa 191.
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legislative Drafting - Shaping the Law for the New Millennium
cumbrous, the General Clauses Act contents itself with this referential
definition.
(2)
"act", used with reference to an offence or a civil wrong, shall include a

series of acts and words which refer to acts done extend also to illegal
omissions";
This definition is based on sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Penal Code
and applies to civil wrongs as well as crimes. 'Act' includes illegal omissions
as well 1 8 but it does not include an omission which is not illegal.19 In the
illustration to section 36 of the Indian Penal Code, the act 'by which A
causes Z's death consists of a series of acts, namely, the blows given in
beating him, plus a series of illegal omissions, namely, wrongfully neglecting
or refusing to supply him with food at proper times.
However, every omission is not an illegal omission. As pointed out by the
Supreme Court in Amalgamated Electricity Co. {Belgaum) Ltd., v. Municipal
Committee, Ajmer,20 failure of the municipality to discharge its liability
under the provisions of the Ajmer-Merwara Municipalities Regulation 1925,
will not ordinarily become an illegal omission as it does not entail penal
consequences for the public official responsible for it.
(3)
"Affidavit" shall include affirmation and declaration in the case of

persons by law allowed to affirm or declare instead of swearing;
In order to be valid, an affidavit must be sworn before, and not simply
attested by, a judicial officer. If it is not so sworn it ceases to be an affidavit
of the signatory.21
The Law Commission 22 has criticized this definition as inaccurate since it
seems to equate "affidavit" with "oath". The term oath has been defined in
section 3(37) in the same words whereas, in fact, the two are different. As
pointed out by the Law Commission, "What an affidavit really means is
the written statement made on oath (or o n solemn affirmation etc.) and
not the affirmation or oath itself." Accordingly it has recommended that
the term be redrafted as follows
"affidavit" shall mean a statement in writing purporting to be a
statement of facts signed by the person making it and confirmed
by him by oath. 23
18
19
20
21
22
23
]agannath Bhagwan v. Municipal Board of Allahabad, AIR 1928 All. 130.

Revati Mohan Das v. jetendra Mohan Ghosh AIR 1934 PC 96.
AIR 1969 SC 227at 231.
Chunnilalw. State of Punjab ILR (1967) 2 Punjab 11 at 15.
See the Law Commission of India, 60th Report, at 14.
Id. at 16.

(4)
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"barrister" shall mean a barrister of England or Ireland or a member

of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland";
Section 2(14) of the General Clauses Act, 1868, contained a similar

definition.
(5) "British I n d i a " shall mean, as respects the period before the
commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935, all
territories and places within His Majesty's dominions which were for
the time being governed by His Majesty through the Governor-General
of India or through any G o v e r n o r or officer subordinate to the
Governor-General of India, and, as respects any period after that date
and before the date of establishment of the Dominion of India, means
all territories for the time being comprised within the Governors'
provinces and the Chief Commissioners' provinces, except that a
reference to "British India" in an Indian Law passed or made before
the commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935
shall not include a reference to Berar";
This definition may be needed for construing the expression in the few
cases where it may still have to be retained in the Indian Statute book. By
s.2 (8) of the General Clauses Act, 1868, as originally passed, "British
India" was defined to mean "the territories for the time being vested in Her
Majesty by the Statute 21 & 22 Vict.c.106, other than the settlement of
Prince of Wales' Island, Singapore and Malacca. The last twelve words were
deleted by the Repealing and Amending Act, 1891 after the above territories
were removed from British India and placed under the colonial office.
While the first half of the definition can be traced to section 18(4) of the
Interpretation Act, 1889, the second half was replaced by the Government
of India (Adaptation of Laws) Order, 1947, as a result of India becoming a
Dominion on the 15 th August 1947. See also the definition of "British
India" in section 311(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The
expression "British India" occurs in the definition of "India" in section
3(28) of this Act, and by reason of s.4A this definition applies to all Indian
laws. The exception with reference to Berar at the end of the definition was
necessitated by the provisions of sections 46 and 47 of the Government of
India Act, 1935.
(6)
"British possession" shall mean any part of Her Majesty's dominions,

exclusive of the United Kingdom, and, where parts of those dominions
are under both a Central and a local Legislature, all parts under the
Central Legislature shall, for the purposes of this definition, be deemed
to be one British possession;
276
This definition is taken from section 18(2) of the Interpretation Act,

1889 (See now Sch. I, Interpretation Act, 1978). British India was a
British possession and not a colony as then understood.
( 7 ) . "Central Act" shall mean an Act of Parliament and shall include
(a)
an Act of the Dominion Legislature or of the Indian Legislature

passed before the commencement of the Constitution, and
(b) an Act made before such commencement by the Governor
General in Council or the G o v e r n o r General, acting in a
legislative capacity";
This definition was inserted by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950. The
Chapter on the Indian Statute Book, ante, gives a list of the lawmaking
authorities at the Centre both before and after the Constitution and the
definition is intended to cover all Acts passed by the Central law making
authority as thus understood.
(8) "Central Government" shall
(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the
Constitution, mean the Governor-General or the GovernorGeneral in Council, as the case may be, and shall include
(i)
in relation to functions entrusted under sub-section (1) of

section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the
Government of a Province, the Provincial Government
acting within the scope of the authority given to it under
that sub-section, and
(ii)
(b)
in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's

Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope
of the authority given to him under sub-section (3) of
section 94 of the said Act; and
in r e l a t i o n to a n y t h i n g d o n e or to be d o n e after t h e
commencement of the Constitution, mean the President, and
shall include
(i)
in relation to functions entrusted under clause (1) of article

258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the
State Government acting within the scope of the authority
given to it under that clause,
(ii)
in relation to the administration of a Part C State before

the c o m m e n c e m e n t of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n (Seventh
A m e n d m e n t ) Act, 1956, the Chief Commissioner or
Lieutenant-Governor or Government of a neighboring State
or other authority acting within the scope of the authority
1897
277
given to him or it under article 239 or article 243 of the

Constitution, as the case may be, and
(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union territory, the
administrator thereof acting within the scope of the
a u t h o r i t y given to him u n d e r article 239 of t h e
Constitution";
The Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937,
substituted the expressions "Central Government" in all Indian Laws for
the expressions "Governor-General of India in Council", "Governor General
of I n d i a " , G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l in C o u n c i l , " G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l and
Government of India". 24
Under the Constitution of India, the executive authority of the Union is
vested in the President (article 53) and all executive action of the Government
of India has to be taken in the name of the President, (article 77). N o
doubt, the expression "Government of India" or "Central Government"
would be useful to denote impersonally the executive authority as where
provisions is made for suits or rights or liabilities or the granting of loans
(cf. Chapters II and III of Part XIII); but the correct expression to use in
Indian laws, where the exercise of the executive authority of the Union is
contemplated is " T h e President". Presumably, having regard to the
adaptation made in 1937 and to the fact that the expression "Central
Government" is more readily understood as having been in constant use,
the Adaptations order of 1950, preferred to retain this expression, while
defining it in relation to things done or to be done after the Constitution
as meaning the "President".
This definition, as adapted in 1950, underwent a further adaptation in
1956 when Part C States ceased to exist and Union territories came into
existence.
24 The Government of Burma (Adaptation of Laws) Order, 1937 which came into
force on the same day as its Indian counterpart substituted the word "Governor" for
the expressions "Governor-General of India in Council", "Chief Commissioner of
British Burma," "Chief Commissioner of Burma," "Lieutenant Governor of Burma".
"Lieutenant Governor" "Local Government of Burma", "Local Government" as the
entire executive authority of Burma came to be vested in the Governor and all
executive action had to be taken in the name of the Governor under the Government
of Burma Act, 1935.
Similarly, when Burma became independent in 1948, all executive authority came
to be vested in the President of the Union of Burma, and the Union of Burma
(Adaptation of Laws) Order, 1948 (which the present author had the privilege of
drafting) substituted the word "President" for the words "Governor" or "Governor
of Burma".
278
Legislative Drafting - Shaping the haw for the New
Millennium
In the case of documents drafted without reference to any statutory provision,

the practice adopted by the Government of India appears to be to use the
expression "President" as all executive action has to be taken in the name of
the President.
It has been held that the definition is so far as it relates to Part C States
(now Union territories) cannot be construed to mean that it is the same as
the Central Government. It merely recognizes that Part C States are centrally
administered through the President. It should not be construed so as to
destroy the fundamental distinction made in the Constitution between
the Government of the Union and that of the State. It has not the effect of
putting an end to the status of Part C States as independent units distinct
from the Union Government. 2 * As pointed out in that case, though Part C
States are centrally administered under article 239 of the Constitution,
nevertheless, they do not become merged with the Central Government.
Consequently, a suit by or against a Part C State has to be brought in the
name of the State and cannot be brought in the name of the Central
Government. 26 Similarly, where a suit in respect of a contract entered into
by the Government of Vindhya Pradesh was filed against the Government,
the Supreme Court held that the proper defendant was the State of Vindhya
Pradesh and not the Union of India even though the State Government
was defined in section 3(60) (c) of the General Clauses Act as the Central
Government. 2 7
O n the other hand, the Lt. Governor of the Union territory of Goa, Daman
and Diu is competent to exercise the powers conferred on the Central
Government as the Administrator of that territory.28
(9)
"Chapter" shall mean a Chapter of the Act or Regulation in which

the word occurs;
This definition reproduced the definition given by section 3(2) of the

General Clauses Act, 1887. It is supplemented by the definitions of "part",
"section", "sub-section" and "schedule" occurring, later in this Act.
The Law Commission has suggested the inclusion of a definition of the
word "clause", which is normally the sub-division of a section or sub-section.
(10) "Chief Controlling Revenue Authority" or "Chief Revenue Authority"
shall mean25
26
27
28
Satya Dev v. Padma Dev, AIR 1955 SC 5at 6.

Madho Prasad Salig Ram v. Vindhya Pradesh State AIR 1955 Vind. Pra. 1.
State of Vindhya Pradesh v. Moula Bux, AIR 1962 SC 145.
Uttam Bala v. Assistant Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Goa, AIR 1970 SC
1765.

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
1897
279
in a State where there is a Board of Revenue, that Board:

in a State w h e r e there is a Revenue C o m m i s s i o n e r , that
Commissioner,
in Punjab, the Financial Commissioner; and
elsewhere, such authority as, in relation to matters enumerated
in List I in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the Central
G o v e r n m e n t , and, in relation to o t h e r matters, the State
G o v e r n m e n t may, by notification in the official G a z e t t e ,
appoint";
In some of the older enactments, these expressions were used without

definitions or special definitions were inserted for the purpose. T h e
Government of India (Adaptation of Laws) Order, 1937, inserted a general
definition and this has been continued with further modifications as a
result of constitutional changes.
The power of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, say under the
Stamp Act, 1899, cannot be exercised by any other authority as his delegate
unless statutory provision exists for such delegation. 29
(11) "Collector" shall mean, in a Presidency-town, the Collector of Calcutta,
Madras or Bombay, as the case may be, and elsewhere, the chief officer
in charge of the revenue administration of a district";
In some States Collectors are know as Deputy Commissioners. They are
not courts, although they may have to take decisions on certain matters. 30
Although the General Clauses Act was not extended to the State of Mysore
by the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951, the Supreme Court held that this
definition could be applied in the interpretation of the expression "collector"
in the Cotton Cess Act, 1923 (an Act passed after March 11, 1897) and
therefore the Deputy Commissioner could exercise the powers of a collector
under section 7 of the Act aforesaid, he being the chief officer in charge of
the revenue administration of the district. 31
(12) "colony"(a) in any Central Act passed after the commencement of Part III of
the Government of India Act, 1935, shall mean any part of His
Majesty's dominions exclusive of the British Islands, Dominions
of India and Pakistan (and before the establishment of those
Dominions, British India), any D o m i n i o n as defined in the
29 Barium Chemical Lid. v. Registrar of Companies, AIR 1959 Andh. Pra. 664.
30 E.E. Ebrahim v. The Collector of Malabar, AIR 1954 Mad. 1091at 1101.
31 Devanagere Cotton Mills v. Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga, AIR 1961 SC 1441.
280
legislative Drafting Shaping the Law for the New
(b)
Millennium
Statute of Westminster 1931, any Province or State forming part

of any of the said Dominions and British Burma; and
in any Central Act passed before the commencement of Part III
of the said Act, shall mean any part of His Majesty's dominions
exclusive of the British Islands and of British India.

And in either case where parts of those dominions are under both a Central
and local Legislature, all parts under the Central Legislature shall, for the
purpose of this definition, be deemed to be one colony";
This definition as it stood before amendment by the Government of India
(Adaptation of Laws) Order, 1937, reproduced section 18(3) of the
Interpretation Act 1889. That Act defined British Islands to mean the
United Kingdom (which now means Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man (s. 18(1). By the Statute of West
minister, 1931, s.ll, "colony" used in any Act of the United Kingdom
passed after 11 t h December 1931, does not include a Dominion, i.e.,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland,
or any province or state forming part of a Dominion. Section 311(4) of the
G o v e r n m e n t of India Act, 1 9 3 5 , a m e n d e d t h e definition in the
Interpretation Act by adding after the words "British India" the words
"and of British India".
'Colony' is now defined by the Interpretation Act, 1978, (Schedule I) to
mean any part of Her Majesty's dominions outside the British Islands,
except
(a)
(b)
(c)
c o u n t r i e s h a v i n g fully r e s p o n s i b l e status w i t h i n t h e
Commonwealth;
territories for whose external relations a country other than the
United Kingdom is responsible;
associated states;
and where parts of such dominions are under both a central and
a local legislature, all parts under the central legislature are
deemed for the purpose of this definition to be one colony".
The expression "colony" is not a political term and does not imply any
particular form of government.
(13) "Commencement", used with reference to an Act or Regulation, shall
mean the day on which the Act or Regulation comes into force";
Under section 5(3), unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act or
Regulation shall be construed as coming into operation immediately on
the expiration of the day preceding its commencement. In the light of this
1897
281
provision, it might have been more accurate if this definition had stated that
commencement means the time at which an Act comes into operation. As
Indian Acts generally use the expression "shall come into force on the ... day
of . . . " when referring to their commencement, it was perhaps felt that the
expression "day" is more appropriate in that context. Under the Interpretation
Act, 1978, and Act comes into force at the beginning of the day on which it
is stated to come into force or at the beginning of the day on which the Act
receives the Royal assent, as the case may be.
In respect of areas to which an Act may subsequently be extended, the date
of commencement would be the date of extension. 32
It has been held 33 that the mere extension of an Act, like the Bombay
Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887, to Kutch (an erstwhile Native State)
under the powers available to the Central Government under the Extra
Provincial (now Foreign) Jurisdiction Act, 1947 by an Application of Laws
Order, will not have the effect of automatically bringing that Act into force
in Kutch when that Act included a provision in section 1 whereby the Act
was to be brought into force by a notification issued by the authority
specified in that section. It is quite possible that the intention underlying
the Application of Laws Order extending the Gambling Act was to make
the Act applicable immediately, and not wait for a further notification. In
order that such doubts do not arise it might be prudent to use the combined
expression "is hereby extended to and shall be in force in" when an Act
with a commencement clause is sought to be extended for application in a
new area. The ttfbrking adopted in section 3 of the Part B States (Laws) Act,
1951, when a large number of Central Acts was sought to be made applicable
to Part B States (former princely States), may be seen in this connection.
(14) "Commissioner" shall mean the chief officer in charge of the revenue
administration of a division.
(15) "Constitution" shall mean the Constitution of India.
(16) "Consular officer" shall include consul-general, vice-consul, consular
agent, pro-consul and any person for the time being authorized to
perform the duties of consul-general, consul, vice-consul or consularagent";
This definition is taken from s. 3 of the Consular Salaries and Fees Act,
1891 (54 and 55 Viet; c 36) and is slightly different from the definition
32 Hajari Lai v. Kanhaya Lai, AIR 1953 All. 686.

33 The State of Bombay v. Salat Prayi Karamsi, (1957) SCR 745.
282
Millennium
contained in section 12(20) of the Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 and 53 Viet, c
63). M
(17) "District Judge" shall mean the Judge of a principal civil court of
original jurisdiction, but shall not include a High Court in the exercise
of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction";
The High Court of Madras was held to be a district court for the purposes
of this definition when it was not exercising its ordinary or extraordinary
civil jurisdiction conferred by clauses 11 to 18 of the Letters Patent. 35
There is a conflict of authority on whether the expression will include an
additional district judge. 36
(18) "document" shall include any matter written, expressed or described
upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more
than one of those means which is intended to be used, or which may
be used, for the purpose of recording that matter";
This definition was taken from section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872;
but "shall include" was substituted for the word "means". The words "which
is" were inserted and the word "written" was added at the Select Committee
stage to incorporate the definition of writing (clause 65) and thereby include
printing, lithography and photography. See also s. 29 of the Indian Penal
Code.
This definition has been rightly criticized by Bartley in his Book on the
General Clauses Act as not being happily expressed. Any written thing
capable of being evidence is properly described as a document, and it is
immaterial on what the writing may be inscribed". 37 The defect in the
present definition is that it refers to the matter and not the material or
substance upon which the matter is recorded. The Law Commission in its
sixtieth Report has examined this definition at great length and has suggested
the following redraft
3 4 In view of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963, the Law Commission
has suggested the following redraft of this provision, "Consular Officer" shall mean any person entrusted with the exercise of consular
functions, irrespective of his designation, and shall include consul-general, consul,
vice-consul and consular agent".
Under the Interpretation Act, 1978 'consular officer' has the meaning assigned to it
by Article 1 of the Vienna Convention set out in Schedule I to the Consular Relations
Act, 1968.
35 In re Kuppu Swarny AIR (1930) Mad. 779; In the matter ofS.K No.8238 of 1953,
AIR 1953 Mad. 974.
36 G.C. Be^baruav. State of Assam, AIR 1954 Assam. \ 61; Mangharam v. KB. Kher, AIR
1956 Madh. Bharat, 173 at 187.
37 R. v. Daye, (1908) 2 KB 333.
The General Clauses Act, 1897
283
"document" shall include any substance having any matter written,

expressed, inscribed, described or otherwise recorded upon it by
means of letters, figures or marks or by any other means, or by
more than one of those means, which are intended to be used or
which may be used for the purpose of recording that matter".
Section 29 of the Indian Penal Code defines the word "document" in the
following terms:
. ^"document" denotes any matter expressed or described upon any
substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than
one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, as
evidence of that matter."
The addition of the words "which is" in the General Clauses Act definition
did not improve matters because it is not clear what the antecedent of
those words is. Is it "matter" or the whole phrase following it? In Indian
law, it is the matter written and not the substance on which it is written
which is a document. The Law Commission, however, has suggested in the
revised definition that the substance should be the document and the
words "which is" should be replaced by " which are" so as to make it clear
that these words refer only to letters, figures, marks, etc.
(19) "enactment shall include a Regulation (as hereinafter defined) and
any Regulation of the Bengal, Madras or Bombay Code, and shall
also include any provision contained in any Act or in any such
Regulation as aforesaid";
This definition was introduced into the 1897 General Clauses Act because
questions had arisen whether a Regulation and whether a particular provision
in any Act were each an enactment. Section28, introduced at the same
time, uses the expression "enactment" only as equivalent to a complete
Act, a sense in which it is also used in section 8, while sections 6, 6A, 7 and
26 use it in both the senses.
There is no provision corresponding to this section in the Interpretation
Act 1889. Before 1850, the practice in England (and also India) was to
preface each distinct portion of an Act by enacting words. The division of
Act into sections had also no legislative authority. Lord Brougham's Act,
1950, provides that all Acts shall be divided into sections if there be more
enactment s than one, and each such section shall be deemed to be a
substantive enactment without any introductory words.38 Section 1 of
38 Craies, Statute Law, 6th Ed., 216 (1963).
284
the Interpretation Act, 1978 (replacing section 8 of the Act of 1889), now
provides that "Every section of an Act takes effect as a substantive enactment
without introductory words". Thus in England, a particular section or part
of an Act of Parliament may be an enactment. 39
Judicial decisions had to clarify whether the word "enactment" as in
exhaustively defined here included an Ordinance promulgated by the
President under the Constitution as it is not enacted) 40 or a State Act (in
the context of its repeal by a Central Act). 41 It does not, however, include
a statutory rule. 42
Having regard to the above difficulties in the construction of the definition,
the Law Commission has suggested a redraft in the following terms
"enactment" shall include any law passed or made by any legislature or
other authority acting in a legislative capacity, and shall also include any
provision contained in any such law, but shall not include a statutory
instrument".
(20) "Father" in the case of anyone whose personal law permits adoption,
shall include an adoptive father";
(21) "Financial year" shall mean the year commencing on the first day of
April";
Compare the corresponding definition in Schedule I of the Interpretation
Act, 1978.
(22) " G o o d faith""a thing shall be deemed to be done in good faith
where it is in fact done honesdy, whether it is done negligendy or
not";
The definition of good faith in the General Clauses Act is more liberal than
that in the Indian Penal Code or the Limitation Act. Under the Indian
Penal Code a thing will not be deemed to have been done in good faith if
it is done negligently, although honesdy. Under the Limitation Act, 1963
(s.2 (7) nothing will be deemed to have been done in good faith which is
not done with due care and attention.
In ordinary parlance good faith is opposed to had faith and not to negligence
and so where it is necessary to depart from the accepted meaning of the
term it would be better to make express provision in that behalf. T h e
General Clauses Act lays emphasis on one aspect only, namely, honesdy. 43
39
40
41
42
43
Wakefield Light Railway Company v. Wakefield Corpn. (1906) 2 KB 140 at 145.

H.M. Metha v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1967 Guj. 229 at 245.
State of Punjab v. Sukh Dev Sarup, AIR 1970 SC 1641 at 1642.
Goberdhone Das v. Doolichand Sethna, (1921) ILR 48 Cal. 955, 966, 983.
Kailash Siting Works v. Municipality of Bhiwandi, AIR 1969 Born. 127.
1897
285
(23) "Government" or "the Government" shall include both the Central

Government and any State Government";
The object of this definition is to make it clear that the word "Government",
frequendy used as a convenient abbreviation, may be construed according
to the context in either of the two senses indicated. Government generally
connotes three wings, the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary; but
in a narrow sense it is used to connote the Executive only. Meaning to be
assigned to that expression, therefore, depends on the context in which it
is used. 44
(24) " G o v e r n m e n t securities" shall mean securities of the Central
Government or of any State Government, but in any Act or Regulation
made before the commencement of the Constitution, shall not include
any securities of the Government of any part B State";
By virtue of section 4A, this definition applies to all Indian laws.
(25) "High Court", used with reference to civil proceedings, shall mean
the highest civil court of appeal (not including the Supreme Court)
in the part of India in which the Act or Regulation containing the
expression operates:"
It may be n o t e d that this definition applies only in relation to civil
proceedings although there is no reason why under the present circumstances
the definition may not be widened to cover all proceedings.
Under certain Acts the question arose whether this definition meant only
the High court in its appellate jurisdiction or whether it meant the High
Court as a whole and it was held that the expression means and includes
the High Court in its appellate as well as its original jurisdiction. 43
(26) "Immovable property' shall include land, benefits to arise out of land,
and things attached to the earth or permanentiy fastened to anything
attached to the earth".
Apart from the General Clauses Act, the expression "immovable property"
finds a place in the Sale of Goods Act, the Transfer of Property Act and the
Registration Act. But it is nowhere precisely defined since the definitions
in all those Acts do not say what exactly immovable property means. They
only specify what is included or not included therein. In Shantabai v. State
44 PasupatiNath SukuN. Nemchandjain, AIR 1984 SC 399: (1984) 2 SCC 404,412 and
413.
45 Janu Kumar Das v. Ram Kumar Das, AIR 1940 Cal. 264; M.KGooha v. Registrar of
Trade Unions, West Bengal, AIR 1961 Cal. 165.
286
of Bombay,46 the Supreme Court pointed out that trees must be regarded as
immovable property because they are attached to or rooted in the earth.
Section 2(6) of the Registration Act expressly says so and though the Transfer
of Property Act does not define immovable property beyond saying that it
does not include "standing dmber, growing crops and grass "trees attached
to the earth (except standing timber) are immovable property even under
the Transfer of Property Act because of section 3(26) of the General Clauses
Act. In the absence of a special definition, the general definition must
prevail.
Two tests are necessary to determine when things attached or annexed to
the earth become immovable property under the Act, (1) the degree or
mode of annexation and (2) the object of annexation and of these two, the
latter, which is more important, depends upon the circumstances of each
case. 47
An agreement to convey forest produce like tendu leaves, timber bamboos
etc., the soil for making bricks, the right to build on and occupy the land
for business purposes and the right to grow new trees and to get leaves
from trees that grow in further are all included in the term immovable
property. 4 8
Insurance policies covering immovable properties have been held to be
movable property since the definition of immovable property in the Act
does not cover insurance policies.49
A sale of right to catch and carry away fish, being a "profit a prendre' is a
profit or benefit arising out of land, and so has to be regarded as immovable
property within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act, read in the
light of s.3 (26) of the General Clauses Act.50
(27) "Imprisonment" shall mean imprisonment of either description as
defined in the Indian Penal Code".
By section 53 of the Indian Penal Code, the punishment to which offenders
are liable under that Code are imprisonment which is of two descriptions,
namely, rigorous, that is with hard labour and simple. So, when an Act
provides that an offence is punishable with imprisonment, the Court may,
in its discretion, make the imprisonment rigorous or simple.
46
47
48
49
50
AIR 1958 SC 532 at 536.

D.H. Subhiah v. Covindrao, AIR 1953 Nagpur, 224; ILR (1953) Nagpur, 488.
Mahadeo v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 735.
Bulchand Chandiram v. Bank of India, AIR 1968 SC 147.
Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen's Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh, AIR
1977 SC 2149 at 2153; see also AnandBehara v. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 17.
1897
(28) "India shall mean

(a) as respects any period before the establishment of the
of India, British India together with all territories
Rulers then under the suzerainty of His Majesty, all
under the suzerainty of such an Indian Ruler, and
areas;
(b)
287
Dominion
of Indian
territories
the tribal
as respects any period after the establishment of the Dominion

of India and before the commencement of the Constitution,
all territories for the time being included in that Dominion;
and
(c)
as r e s p e c t s any p e r i o d after t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t of t h e
Constitution, all territories for the time being comprised in the
territory of India".
In the order statutes, the term "India" was often used in the narrower sense
now given to British India, e.g. s.l of the Government of India Act, 1858.
When there is reorganization of states or changes of territories between two
states, a provision is generally made to continue the existing laws in the
affected territories until altered by the competent legislature. 51
(29) "Indian law" shall mean any Act, Ordinance, Regulation, rule, order
or bye-law or other instrument, which before the commencement of
the Constitution, had the force of law in any province of Indian or
part thereof, or thereafter has the force of law in any Part A State or
Part C State or part thereof, but does not include any Act of Parliament
of the United Kingdom or any Order in Council, rule or other
instrument made under such Act".
In the light of this definition, the words, "law in force" in article 372 of the
Constitution is wide enough to include not merely a legislative enactment
but also any regulation or order which has the force of law.52 Administrative
rules not being 'law in force' are not continued by Article 372 of the
Constitution. 33 The word "order" in this clause would include a notification
issued under section 3 of the Bar Councils Act, 1926.34 The word "order"
has to be construed in the context in which it is used in this clause. The
difference between law, Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation is
based on the difference between the authorities passing or making them.
51 Ram Badan Raiv. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 166 at 178: (1999) 1 SCC 705.
52 Edward Mill Co. Lid. v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1955 SC 25.
53 Union of India v. Majja Jangammajya, AIR 1977 SC 757 at 767: (1997) 1 SCC
606; Ajay Kumar Bhuyan v. State of Orissa, (2003) 1 SCC 707 at 720.
54 P.C. Gupta v. Registrar, High Court, AIR 1955 All. 269.
288
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In the strict sense of the word, a law is made by the legislature, an Ordinance
by the President or the Governor of a State, an order by a competent
authority and a bye-law by a statutory authority. A notification containing
an executive order does not fall within this definition. 55 However it has
been held that notifications issued under Statutory powers exempting certain
matters from the general provisions of the statute are legislative in nature
and effect of law.56 It has been held that" laws in force" continued by
Article 372 of the Constitution include not only statutory laws but also
usage and custom having the force of law and rules of common law in force
in India. Common law rule of priority of crown debts continues to be in
force in India and State debts have priority over other unsecured debts. ^
(30) "Indian State" shall mean any territory which the Central Government
recognized as such a State before the c o m m e n c e m e n t of the
Constitution, whether described as a State, an estate, a jagir or
otherwise;
For earlier definitions, see The Government of India (Adaptation of Laws)
Order, 1937; s. 311(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the
Indian and Burma (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1940 (3 & 4 Geo.
6.c.5).
(31) "Local authority" shall mean a municipal committee, district board,
body of port commissioners or other authority legally entided to, or
entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of
municipal or local fund";
The words "legally entided tolocal fund" have been held to qualify the
words "or other authority" only and do not relate to municipal committee,
district board etc. 58
The Law Commission has recommended an expanded definition in the
following terms"local authority" shall mean a municipal corporation or
committee, a cantonment board or a body of port commissioners or any
other authority constituted for the purpose of local self-government or
village administration".
55 Vandal and another v. State of MB. AIR 1953 M.B. 84.

56 K.N. Chikkaputtaswamy v. State of A.P., AIR 1985 SC 956: (1985) 3 SCC 387;
Video Electronice Pvt. Ud. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1990 SC 820 at 835: (1990) 3
SCC 87; Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. M/s Swaran Rekha Cokes and Coal Pvt.
Ud., AIR 2004 SC 3380: (2004) 6 SCC 689.
57 Dena Bank v. Bhikhabai Parekh & Co., AIR 2000 SC 3654: (2000) 5 SCC 494.
5 8 Official Assignee of Madras v. Trustees of Port Trust, Madras, ILR (1937) Mad. 178.
1897
289
(32) "Magistrate" shall include ever4y person exercising all or any of the
powers of a magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the
time being in force";
As the definition is merely enumerative and not exhaustive, it will include
a village munsif in Madras 39 and is not confined to magistrates appointed
under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 60
(33) "Master" used with reference to a ship, shall mean any person (except
a pilot or harbour master) having for the time being control or charge
of the ship";
(34) " M o n t h " shall mean a month reckoned according to the British
Calendar";
The expression "Gregorian calendar" would be more accurate than British
calendar as this reform in the calendar was introduced by Pope Gregory
XIII in the 16th century.
This definition does not apply to contracts, nor to cases where the context
shows a different meaning. 61
The word "month occurring in s.271 (l)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
was construed to mean a period of thirty days and not a month as defined
in the General Clauses Act; to apply the present definition would have
meant that in certain cases a defaulting assessee may escape the deterrent
penalty prescribed by the Income-tax Act.62
(35) "Movable property" shall mean property of every description, except
immovable property";
Debts, shares electricity are movable property. 63
(36) "Oath" shall include affirmation and declaration in the case of persons
by law allowed to affirm or declare instead of swearing ";
See the Oaths Act, 1969, and also the definition of "affidavit" and swear"
contained in this section.
(37) "Offence" shall mean any act or omission made punishable by any
law for the time being in force";
In view of the definition of "act" in this section, the words "or omission" are
perhaps superfluous.
59 Empress v. Ramanjiyya, (1878) ILR 2 Mad.5.
60 Panchonadhen Pillai v. Emperor, AIR 1929 Mad. 487.
61 South British Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Brajo Nath Saha, (1909) ILR 36 Cal.
516; Varna Deva Desikarv. Murugesa Mudali (1905) ILR 29 Mad. 75.
62 Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpurv. Laxmi Rattan (1973) 2 ITJ 35.
63 Imperial Bank of India v. Bengal National Bank, AIR 1931 PC 245; Vadilal v.
Menekji, AIR 1923 Bom. 372; Associated Power Co. v. Ram Taran Roy, AIR 1970
Cal.75.
290
Millennium
Any law for the time being in force means any law for the time being in force
in India. Now law of India punishes an act committed outside save in respect
of persons subject to extra territorial or person jurisdiction. In such cases an
additional content is given to the definition.
(38) "Official Gazette" or Gazette" shall mean the Gazette of India or the
Official Gazette of a State";
This definition was inserted by the Government of India (Adaptation of
Laws) Order, 1937 replacing earlier expressions like Gazette of India, local
official Gazette local Gazette, etc.
(39) "Part" shall mean a part of the Act or Regulation in which the word
occurs".
This definition was ; ntended to obviate the danger referred to by Lord
Thring 64 that courts might, where an Act uses the expression "this part",
refuse to recognize the division into parts unless the Act contained a section
declaring the Act to be divided into parts. (See for instance s.2 London
Building Act, 1930 (20 & 21 Geo. 5 c. 168)]. It would also obviate the
necessity for tagging on the words "of this Act" to the word "Part".
(40) "Part A State" shall mean a State for the time being specified in Part A
of the First Schedule to the Constitution (as in force before the
Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956; "Part B State shall
mean a State for the time being specified in Part B of that Schedule
and "Part C State" shall mean a State for the time being specified in
Part C of that Schedule or a territory for the time being administered
by t h e P r e s i d e n t u n d e r the p r o v i s i o n s of article 243 of the
Constitution";
The First Schedule now classifies the territory of India as comprising States
and Union territories.
(41) " p e r s o n " shall include any company, or association or body of
individuals, whether incorporated or not";
Under section 13 words in the singular prima facie include the plural.
Schedule I of the Interpretation Act, 1978 defines "person" as including a
body of persons corporate or unincorporated.
An idol is a juridical person.6-> A public body to be a person need not
always be set up by statute; it may be set up by the Government in exercise
64 Lord Thring, Practical Legislation, at 59-60.
65 Jagadindra Nath Roy v. Hemanta Kumar Debi, (1904) ILR 32 Cal. 129; In re
Vadivelu Arsuthiyar, ILR (1944) Mad. 685; Jogendra Nath v. Commissioner of IncomeTax Calcutta (a Hindu deity falls within the meaning of the word "individual" under
s.3 of the Income-Tax Act.
1897
291
of its executive functions. 66 Person will include a juristic person. For

example, an idol or guruugranth sahib installed in a public temple or a
company.6^
(42) "Political Agent" shall mean
(a) in relation to any territory outside India, the principal officer,
by whatever name called, represendng the Central Government
in such territory, and
(b) in relation to any territory within India in which the Act or
Regulation containing the expression does not extend, any officer
appointed by the Central Government to exercise all or any of
the powers of a political Agent under that Act or Regulation";
(43) "Presidency-town" shall mean the local limits for the time being of
the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature
at Calcutta, Madras, or Bombay, as the case may be";
There are now no presidency-towns as such, but the definition may be
needed in the construction of Acts where this expression may occur; e.g.
the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act 1909.
(44) " P r o v i n c e " shall mean a Presidency, a Governor's Province, a
Lieutenant-Governor's Province or a Chief Commissioner's Province";
This definition was inserted by the Government of India (Adaptation of
Indian Laws) Order, 1937. The former definition of Province was the
territories for the time being administered by a local Government.
India now stands divided into States and Union territories.
(45) "Provincial Act" shall mean an Act made by the Governor-in Council,
Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council or Chief Commissioner-in Council
of a Province under any of the Indian Councils Acts or the Government
of India Act, 1915 or an Act made by the Local Legislature or the
Governor of a Province under the Government of India Act, or an Act
made by the Provincial legislature or Governor of a Province or the
Coorg Legislative Council under the Government of India Act, 1935";
(46) "Provincial Government" shall mean, as respects anything done before
the commencement of the Constitution, the authority or person
authorized at the relevant date to administer executive government
in the Province in question".
66 Bijqy Ranjan v. B. C. Dasgupta AIR 1953 Cal. 289.

67 Shromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee Amritsure v. Shri Som Nath Dass, AIR
2000 SC 1421: (2000) 4 SCC 146, Union Bank of India v. Khader International
Construction, AIR 2001 SC 2277: (2001) 5 SCC 22.
292
Millennium
The right of any person to sue the provincial government is not affected by
any protection given to the Governor of a Province under s. 306 of the
Government of India Act, 1935, merely because Governor means the
provincial Government. The proviso to that section was enacted as a measure
of caution to safeguard the right of the citizen. 68 (See now article 361 of
the Constitution.)
(47) "Public nuisance" shall mean a public nuisance as defined in the
Indian Penal Code;
Under section 268 of the Indian Penal Code, a person is guilty of a public
nuisance who does nay act or is guilty of an illegal omission which causes
any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to people in
general w h o dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must
necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who
may have occasion to use any public right. A common nuisance is not
excused on the ground that it causes some convenience or advantage.
(48) "Registered", used with reference to a document, shall mean registered
in India under the law for the time being in force for the registration
of documents";
(49) "Regulation" shall mean a Regulation made by the President under
article 240 of the Constitution, and shall include a Regulation made
by the President under article 243 thereof and a Regulation made by
the Central Government under the Government of India Act, 1870,
or the Government of India Act, 1915 or the Government of India
Act, 1919 or the Government of India Act, 1935";
Article 243 of the Constitution has now been repealed. It authorized
Regulations being made for the territories then specified in Part D of the
First Schedule to the Constitution, which included the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands.
(50) "rule" shall mean a rule made in exercise of a power conferred by any
enactment, and shall include a regulation made as a rule under any
enactment";
This definition is intended to distinguish between statutory and nonstatutory rules. Sections 20 to 24 of this Act make certain provisions with
respect to rules as thus defined.
(See Chapter XIV on Subordinate Legislation, for a further discussion.)
(51) "Schedule" shall mean a schedule to the Act or Regulation in which
the word occurs;
68 P. V. Rao v. Khushaldas S. Advani, AIR 1949 Bom. 277.
1897
293
"A schedule in an Act is a mere question of drafting, a mere question of

words. The schedule is as much a part of a statute and as much an
enactment as any other part".69 Where a passage in a schedule to a statute
was repugnant to one in the body of the statute, the latter was held to
prevail; and the mere wording of a specimen form in a schedule to an
Act cannot restrict or enlarge a provision in the Act itself.70
(52) "Scheduled district" shall mean a "scheduled district" as defined in
the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874;
In view of their backward nature, various parts of British India were never
brought within or were removed from the operation of the general Acts
and Regulations. T h e Scheduled Districts Act sought to define the
boundaries of such areas to be known as scheduled districts and to provide
a readier means of ascertaining the laws in force therein, and for
administration thereof.
The Act ceased to have effect on 1st April 1937, and scheduled districts
became, in so far as they were not absorbed into provinces, either excluded
areas or partially excluded areas. See ss.91 and 92 of the Government of
India Act, 1935. Under the Constitution, the President has power to declare
any area in any State to be a Schedule area whereupon the provisions of the
fifth schedule to the Constitution will apply to the administration thereof.
See art.244 and paragraph 6 of the fifth Schedule.
(53) "Section" shall mean a section of the Act or Regulation in which the
word occurs;
There is no rule as to how many sentences, each containing a substantive
enactment, may be comprised in one section. If a section is likely to be
long and complex, it would be divided into sub-sections.
(54) "ship" shall include every description of vessel used in navigation not
exclusively propelled by oars:
(55) "sign" with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall,
with reference to a person who is unable to write his name, include
"mark" with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions;
Compare the definition of "writing", s.3 (65).
This definition does not define "signature" itself. A signature may be
described as the writing or otherwise affixing a person's name by himself or
by his authority, with the intention of authenticating a document as being
69 Ijord Esher in Attorney General v. Lamplough, (1878) 3 Ex. D. 314 at 329.

70 Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Kd., 156 (1962).
294
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that of, or as binding on the person whose name is so written or affixed. '
(56) "Son" in the case of any one whose personal law permits adoption,
shall include an adopted son;
See, for instance, the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.
(57) "State"
(a) as respects any period before the commencement of the Constitution
(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall mean a Part A State, a Part B
State or a Part C State, and
(b) as respects any period after such commencement, shall mean a State
specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution, and shall include
a Union territory.
On the coming into force of the Constitution in 1950, roughly speaking,
the former British Indian provinces came to be known as Part A States, the
Indian States which underwent amalgamations and merger came to be
known as Part B States and the former Chief Commissioner's or LieutenantGovernor's provinces came to be known as Part C States. The last included
some territories of the former Indian States also. After the reorganization of
States in 1956, the Constitution recognized only States and U n i o n
territories, the latter being administered by the President. 72
(58) "State Act" shall mean an Act passed by the Legislature of a State
established or continued by the Constitution;
(59) "State Government"
(a) as respects anything done before the commencement of the
Constitution, shall mean, in a Part A State, the provincial
government of the corresponding Province, in a Part B State,
the authority or person authorized at the relevant date to exercise
executive government in the corresponding acceding State and
in a Part C State, the Central Government;
(b)
as respects anything d o n e after the commencement of the

Constitution and before the commencement of the Constitution
(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall mean, in a part A State,
the Governor, in a Part B State, the Rajpramukh, and in a Part
C State, the Central Government;
71 Mathura Das v. Babu Lai, (1878) ILR All. 683; Eyekielv. Ananda Charan Sen, (1922)
ILR 50 Cal. 180 Gangadarrao v. Shridramapa, (1893) ILR 18 Bom. 586; Hindustan
Construction Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 526.
7 2 The definition of "State" as including a Union territory was applied in the construction
of the word "State" in article 3 of the Constitution, see Ram Kishore Sen v. Union of
India, AIR 1966 SC 644; see also Management of Advance Insurance Co. v. Gurudasmal,
AIR 1970 SC 1126.
1897
295
(c)
as respects anything done or to be done after the Constitution

(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall mean, in a State, the
Governor, and, in a Union territory, the Central Government;
and, shall in relation to functions entrusted under article 258A of the
Constitution to the Government of India, include the Central Government
acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that article;
This is a new definition inserted by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950
and amended by the Adaptation of Laws (No. 1) Order, 1956.
Under article 258A of the Constitution (inserted as a result of the
reorganization of States) the Governor of a State may, with the consent of
the Government of India, entrust either conditionally or unconditionally
to that Government or to its officer's functions in relation to any matter to
which the executive power of the State extends.
A combined reading of clauses (8), (58)(b) and (60)(c) of this section
shows that the Central Government in relation to the administration of a
Union territory is the Administrator acting within the scope of the authority
given to him u n d e r article 239 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n and the "State
G o v e r n m e n t " in relation to a U n i o n t e r r i t o r y means the C e n t r a l
Government. 7 3
(60) "Sub-section" shall mean a sub-section of the section in which the
word occurs.";
(61) "Swear" with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, shall
include affirming and declaring in the case of persons by law allowed
to affirm or declare instead of swearing;
Compare the definitions of "affidavit" and "oath" ante
(62) "Union territory" shall mean any Union territory specified in the First
Schedule to the Constitution and shall include any other territory
comprised within the territory of India but not specified in that
Schedule.
Union Territories though administered by the Central Government under
Article 239 do not get merged with the Central Government and lose their
identity. 7 4
73 Chowgule Real State and Construction Co. v. Government of Goa, AIR 1970 Goa. 80.
74 Government of NCI Delhi v. All India Central Civil Accounts, JAO's Association, AIR
2001 SC 3090 at 3093; (2002) 1 SCC 344; Chandigarh Administration v. Surinder
Kumar, (2004) 1 SCC 530: AIR 2004 SC 992.
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Legislative Drafting - Shaping the IMW for the New Millennium
(63) "Vessel" shall include any ship or boat or any other description of vessel
used in navigation;
This definition is taken from s.742 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894
(57 & 58 Vict.,c.60). It supplements the definition of "ship" in clause
(55).
Under section 48 of the Indian Penal Code, "vessel" denotes anything made
for the conveyance by water of human beings or of property.
(64) "Will' shall include a codicil and every writing making a voluntary
posthumous disposition of property;
Section 31 of the Indian Penal Code defines a will as denoting any
testamentary document.
Under section 2 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, "will" means the legal
declaration of the intentions of the testator with respect to his property
which he desires to be carried into effect after his death; and "codicil"
means an instrument made in relation to a will and explaining, altering or
adding to its dispositions.
(65) Expressions referring to "writing" shall be construed as including
references to printing, lithography, photography and other modes of
representing or reproducing words in a visible form;
This definition is taken from section 20 of the Interpretation Act, 1889.
"Writing" is now defined by the Interpretation Act, 1978, to include typing,
printing; lithography, photography and other modes of representing or
reproducing words in a visible form and expressions referring to writing are
construed accordingly. See also the definition of "document" ante.
(66) "Year" shall mean a year reckoned according to the British Calendar."
This definition will not apply to cases where the probabilities are that the
parties did not intend to go by the Gregorian calendar.75
4.
Application of foregoing definitions to previous enactments.

(1)
T h e definitions in section 3 of the following w o r d s and

expressions, that is to say, "affidavit", "barrister", "District Judge",
"father", "immovable property", "oath", "person", "section", "son",
"swear", "will" and "year" apply also, unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or context, to all Central Acts made
after the third day of January, 1868 and to all Regulations made
on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.
(2)
The definitions in the said section of the following words and

expressions, that is to say "abet", "chapter" "commencement",
75 Bhojrajv. Shankaranath, AIR 1922 Nag. 265.
1897
297
"financial year", "local authority", "master", "offence", "part",

"public nuisance", "registered", "schedule", "ship", "sign", "sub
section" and "writing" apply also, unless there is anything repugnant
in the subject or context, to all Central Acts and Regulations made
on or after the fourteenth day of January 1887.
This section preserves the effect of the definition given by the repealed
General Clauses Acts of 1868 and 1887 as regards the Acts and Regulations
to which they respectively applied and avoids reference to the repealed
definitions.
By the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937 the
expressions "British India", " G o v e r n m e n t of India" (for which was
substituted the expression "Central Government") and "High Court were
removed from this section and included in the new section 4A inserted by
the Order. These definitions apply therefore to all Indian Laws and not
merely to Acts made after 3 rd January 1868 and Regulations made on or
after 14th January 1887.
4A. Application of certain definitions to Indian laws. (1) The definitions
in section 3 of the expressions "British India", "Central Act", "Central
G o v e r n m e n t " , "Chief Controlling Revenue Authority", "Chief
Revenue Authority", "High Court", "India", "Indian Law", "Indian
(2)
State", "merged territories", "Official Gazette", "Part A State", "Part

B State", "Part C State", Provincial Government", "State" and "State
Government" shall apply, unless there is anything repugnant in the
subject or context, to all Indian laws.
In any Indian Law, references, by whatever form of words, to revenues
of the Central Government or of any State Government shall, on and
from the first day of April 1950, be construed as references to the
Consolidated Fund of India or the Consolidated Fund of the State, as
the case may be. 76

Section 4A refers only to the expression "Government" and not to the
expression "the Government" both of which occur in section 3(23). It
seems this has been done for obvious reasons. If a State Act refers to "the
Government", ordinarily that expression would mean the Government of
the State. It is only when the State Act refers to "Government" in the
indefinite sense that it would mean b o t h the Central and the State
Governments. There is, therefore, good reason why by section 4A both the
76 See the Constitution of India, article 266; this article makes provision for the
Consolidated Funds of India and of the States.
298
legislative Drafting - Shaping the haw for the New
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expressions "Government" and "the Government" were not made applicable

to all Indian laws.77
T h e d e f i n i t i o n of " S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t " as i n c l u d i n g the C h i e f
Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him
under Article 239 of the Constitution would apply to State laws as well as
Central Laws. 78
This section does not find a counterpart in the State General Clauses Acts as
they are in a way complementary to the Central Act and a repetition of this
provision in those Acts would not necessary.
G E N E R A L R U L E S OF C O N S T R U C T I O N
5.
Coming into operation of enactments. (1) Where any Central Act is

not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, it shall
come into operation on the day on which it receives the assent
(a) in the case of a Central Act made before the commencement of
the Constitution, of the Governor-General, and
(b) in the case of an Act of Parliament, of the President.

(2) Unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act or Regulation shall be
construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of
the day preceding its commencement.
The words "Central Act" in this section does not include an Ordinance
(see section 30). An Ordinance is promulgated by the President, and it is
generally assumed that it comes into operation on some other date. It will
be noticed that Ordinances promulgated by the President under article
123 of the Constitution generally state that they shall come into force at
once, presumably, as a measure of caution.
Section 5 is based on the principle contained in the Acts of Parliament
(Commencement) Act 1793 (33 Geo. 3, c.13). The earlier rule was that
every Act of Parliament in which the commencement thereof is not directed
to be from a specified time commences from the first day of the session of
Parliament in which the Act was passed. The whole session was regarded
as one day. It was soon realized that this rule was likely to produce great
injustice and the Act of 1793, after referring to the earlier rule, provided
that every Act of Parliament passed after the 8th day of April, 1793 shall
commence on the date on which it was passed and received the Royal
assent, unless of course some other commencement date is provided in the
77 Balmukund & Co. v. Mangaldas AIR 1953 Bom. 200; see also Rana Partap v. Dominion
of India, AIR 1935 Bom. 170.
78 Pragji Karamshi v. State of Kutch, AIR 1954 Kutch 52.
1897
299
Act itself. The Clerk of the Crown was under an obligation to indorse on
every Act of Parliament the date of Royal assent. The Interpretation Act
1889, in turn defined "commencement " as the time at which an Act of
Parliament came into operation (see s. 36 (1).
The State General Clauses Acts, on the other hand, provide that an Act of
the State Legislature shall come into operation on the day on which the
assent thereto of the Governor or the President, as the case may be, is first
published in the official Gazette. Although the Law Commission of India
in its Sixtieth Report has not suggested any change in this part of the
section, prima facie, the rule embodied in State Acts appears to be more
just and equitable. 79
There have been cases where there is some time lag between the date on
which the assent of the President is given to an Act of Parliament and its
publication in the Gazette of India, although every effort is made to
synchronize the two. Although there is no statutory obligation to publish
Central Acts in the Official Gazette, publication in the Gazette is no
doubt the most authentic form of publication. 80 The Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 further provides that Gazette copies of Acts are prima facie
evidence of the correctness of the texts thereof (sections 81 and 84).
Under section 3 of the Interpretation Act, 1978, every Act is a public Act
to be judicially noticed as such, unless the contrary is expressly provided
by the Act.
The assent copies of Central Acts are kept in the Ministry of Law (Legislative
Department) and constitute the authentic texts of the Acts. These Acts are
later reprinted in a convenient form by the Legislative Department.
Sub-section (2) is taken from s. 36 (2) of the Interpretation Act, 1889 (see
now section 4 of the Interpretation Act, 1978) and adopts the general
79 The observations of the Supreme Court in Harla v. State of Kajasthan (1952) SCR
110 may be cited in this connection. "Natural justice requires that before a law can
become operative it must be promulgated or published. It must be broadcast in some
recognizable way so that all men may know what it is... The thought a decision
reached in the secret recesses of a chamber to which the public have no access or to
which even their accredited representatives have no access and of which they can
normally know nothing, can nevertheless affect the lives, liberty and property by the
mere passing of a Resolution without anything more is abhorrent to civilized man...
Promulgation or publication of some reasonable sort is essential."
80 See Subramania Aijarv. Shannugam Chettiar, AIR 1926 Mad. 65; Brindaban Prasad
v. Mahabir Prasad, 97 IC 316. (Conflict between text of Act in official Gazette and
text of Act printed by the Superintendent, Government Printing).
300
Legislative Drafting - Shaping the LMW for the New Millennium
principle that the law takes no cognizance of fractions of a day. 81 Thus

where an Act provides that it is to come into force on the first day of
January, it will come into force as soon as the clock has struck twelve on the
night of the 31 st December and it is immaterial if the President did not
give his assent till 3 P.M. on the first January. The Indian Income-tax
(Amendment) Act, 1930, was expressed to come into force on the first
April but it received the assent of the Governor-General on the 4th April. It
is, however, clear that once the assent is given, the commencement of the
Act would be the 1st April.82
Article 20 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be convicted
of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the
commission of the act charged as on offence may have to be borne in mind
in this context. There is no illegality in giving assent on a Sunday. The Sunday
Observance Act of the United Kingdom has no application in India. 83
Incidentally, the expression ordinarily used in Acts of Parliament is "coming
into force" and not "coming into operation". In Common Cause v. Union of
India?* it has been held that section 5 has no application when the Act provides
that it will come into force on a date to be notified by the Central Government.
An Act cannot be said to commence or to be in force unless it is brought into
operation by legislative enactment or by exercise of authority by a delegate
empowered to bring it into operation. 85 A provision in a statute cannot be
made operative by applying the doctrine of legitimate expectation when the
provision is yet to come into force on a notification issued by the executive
Government. 86 When an Act is preceded by an identically worded Ordinance
and the Act contains a provision that 'all actions and orders under the
Ordinance are deemed to have been under the Act,' for all practical purposes
the Act will be deemed to be in operation and effective from the date of
commencement of the Ordinance. 87
81 Tomlinson v. Bultock (1878) 4 QB 230, 232, 233 Chenchiah v. Commissioner of Police,
AIR 1948 Mad. 258: ULunv. L Chit Hlaing, (1941) RangLR 101.
8 2 At the time the assent is given, the President must be validly in office, say, by taking
the oath. See Prahaladjena v. State AIR 1950 Orissa 157; Carpal Singh v. State AIR
1950 All. 562; Shoukat-un Nissa v. State of Hyderbad, AIR 1950 Hyd. 20.
83 Lalchandv. Kersten, (1890) II.R 15 Bom. 338.
84 (2003) 8 SCC 250 at 262: AIR 2003 SC 4493.
85 Union of India v. Sukumar Sen Gupta, AIR 1990 SC 1692: 1990 Supp. SCC 545
86 R. v. Director of Public Prosecutions exparte Kebeline, (1999) 4 All ER. 801 at 833
(HL).
87 Furest Day Lawon Ltd. v. JindalExports Ud, AIR 2001 SC 2293 at 2296, 2301,
2302: (2001) 6 SCC 336.

"6.
1897
301
Effect of repeal. Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation

made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment
hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention
appears, the repeal shall not
(a)
(b)
revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the

repeal takes effect; or
affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or
anything duly done or suffered hereunder; or
(c)
affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,

accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect
of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect
of any such right privilege, obligation liability, penalty, forfeiture
or punishment aforesaid;
And any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted,
continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment
may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed."
This section is taken from section 38 of the Interpretation Act, 1889, (see
now section 16 of the Interpretation Act, 1978). Before the passing of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, it was the practice in Indian legislation to
insert provisions corresponding to section 6.
It has been held that Validation Act entitled the States to retain only the
cess and taxes already collected before 4.4.1991. They were not entitled to
collect the cess and taxes due unto 4.4.91 but could not be collected till
that date. Validation Act did not enable the States to collect the cess and
taxes not collected because there was no saving clause in the Validation Act
and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act had no application to expiry of a
temporary statute. 88 A Rule made under an Act is not a Central Act or
regulation and if a rule is repealed by another rule, Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act will not be attracted neither the prosecution could be continued
nor could punishment be imposed in absence of any saving clause.89
88 District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron & Steal Co., AIR 2001 SC 3134 at 3135: (2001) 7
SCC 358; Kannadasan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1996 SC 2560:1996 (5) SCC 670
overruled.
89 Rayala Corporation v. Director of Enforcement AIR 1970 SC 494 at 604 (para 15):
(1969) 2 SCC 412; Kolapur Cane Suger Works \Jd. v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC
811 at 819, 820: and Shiv Shakti Co-operative Housing Society Nagpur v. Swaraj
Developers (2000) 2 SCC 536.
302
Millennium
E F F E C T OF OMISSION OF W O R D S - W H E T H E R HAS T H E E F F E C T OF REPEAL?
When the object is to repeal only a portion of an Act words 'shall be omitted'
are n o r m a l l y used. T h i s is the drafting p r a c t i c e t h r o u g h o u t the
commonwealth. However there are observations in cases that omission of a
provision is different from repeal. In General Finance Co. Assistant
Commissioner of Income Tax,90, the issue before a three judge bench of the
Supreme Court was that whether despite the omission of section 276-DD
of the Income Tax Act 1961, prosecution could be continued or not. The
Supreme Court following the two Constitution Bench judgment (Rayala
Corporation and Kolhapur Sugarcane) held that neither the prosecution
could be continued nor could punishment be imposed in absence of any
saving clause, see section 6 was inapplicable to omission. However, the legislative
practice in India shows that 'omission' of a provision is treated as repeal.
For example sections 6(a), 13, 22(a), 52, ~M, 72, 77 of the Finance Act,
1999. In Bhagat Ram has been held that there is no real distinction between
repeal and an amendment. Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India!n It most
respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court is contrary to the wellestablished drafting practice and is contrary to the drafting precedents followed
in India for more than 150 years and requires to be reviewed or legislatively
addressed.
E F E C T OF R E P E A L OF A C E N T R A L A C T O N C E N T R A L A C T A D O P T E D BY
STATE U N D E R A R T I C L E
252
When a Central Act has been adopted under Article 252 by a State by a
resolution passed by the State Legislature, the amendment or repeal of the
Central act by Parliament does not affect its continuance as a State Act
unless the Central amending or repealing Act is also adopted under Article
252 by the State.92 Substitution of a provision results in repel of the earlier
provision and its replacement by the new provision. 93
SPECIAL SAVING CLAUSE IN R E P E A L I N G ANY A M E N D I N G A C T S
FLven now, in Repealing and Amending Acts which are a periodical feature
in Indian law for clearing dead wood, a saving clause is inserted which is
90 AIR 2002 SC 3126: (2002) 7 SCC 1.
91 AIR 1988 SC 740 at 746: (1988) Supp. SCC 30.
92 State of West Bengal v. Pranob Kumar, AIR 2003 SC 2313 at 2319: (2003) 9 SCC
490.
93 State of Rajasthan v. Mangilal Pindwal, AIR 1996 SC 2181 at 2183: 1996 (5) SCC
60.
1897
303
somewhat different and wider in terms then those of this section.94 Such
Acts (that is, Repealing & Amending Acts) have no legislative effect but are
designed for editorial revision, being intended only to purge dead matter
from the statute book and to reduce its volume. Mostly, they expurgate
amending Acts because having imparted the amendments to the main Act,
these Acts have served their purpose and have no further reason for their
existence. At times inconsistencies are removed by Repealing and Amending
Acts. The only object of such Acts, which in England are called Statute Law
Revision Acts, is legislative spring cleaning and they are not intended to make
any change in the law. liven so, they are guarded by saving clauses drawn with
elaborate care.95
R E P E A L OF A N D BY O R D I N A N C E S
By reason of section 30, the words "Central Act" in this section would
include an Ordinance promulgated by the president under ardcle 123 of
the Constitution and, therefore, the same principles of interpretation will
apply when an Ordinance repeals a previous enactment. It has been held
that section 6 will also apply when an Ordinance which is temporary in
nature is repealed by an Act before its actual expiry.96 That is to say, an
Ordinance would be an enactment within the meaning of this section. An
Ordinance promulgated by the President when Parliament is not in session
ceases to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of
Parliament and would thus get completely obliterated unless steps are taken
to re-enact its provisions in the meantime. Moreover, in the case of
Ordinances thus expiring. The Constitution does not provide for any savings
as has been done in the case of certain temporary Acts, say under articles
249 and 356, and the old common law rule relating to repeals will apply
94 See for instance section 4 of the Repealing and Amending Act, 1964 (52 of 1964)
which is in the following terms - "The repeal by this Act of any enactment shall not
affect any other enactment in which the repealed enactment has been applied,
incorporated or referred to; and this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect
of consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, tide, obligation or
liability- already acquired, accmed or incurred or any remedy or proceeding in respect
thereof, or any release or discharge of, or from, any debt, penalty, obligation, liability,
claim or demand, or any indemnity already granted or the proof of any past act or
thing".
95 Khuda Buxv. Manager, Calenonian Press, AIR 1954 Cal. 484, cited with approval in
Jethanandv. The State of Delhi, AIR 1960 SC 89 at 91.
96 State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84.
304
Legislative Drafting Shaping the haw for the New Millennium
with full force in such circumstances. An exception may be, where an Ordinance
validates an election, its expiry may not invalidate the election.
Ordinarily, the effect of a repeal would be to obliterate the statute as
completely as if it had never been passed and had never existed.97 Section 6
makes an exception to this general rule. Repeal may include cases where the
repeal is followed by fresh enactment on the same subject 98 or where a
new section replaces an old section. Section 6 will apply to partial repeals
also.99
R E P E A L BY IMPLICATION
Repeal by implication is the consequence of contradictory or inconsistent

legislation and should not be imputed to a legislative authority unless one
is driven to do so. Even when there is repeal or amendment of an earlier
law by necessary implication. The repeal need not extend to the whole of
the provisions of the earlier enactment and certain provisions of the earlier
enactment may survive the repeal or amendment. 100
T h o u g h the law does not generally favour implied repeals, yet, if the
provisions of a later Act are so inconsistent with or repugnant to those of an
earlier Act that the two cannot stand together, then the earlier stands
impliedly repealed by the later one. 101 In the Orissa case, the question was
whether section 6 is confined to cases of express repeal or covered cases of
implied repeals also. A central law in this case had sought to cover the
entire field of legislation in respect of a particular matter under the power
given to the Central legislature by the Constitution, and the court held
that enactments of State Legislatures in the same field would be overborne
on the ground of repugnancy and it would be appropriate to apply section
6 in such a case as if the State Acts had been impliedly repealed. The court
held that it is the legislative intent rather than the express words used
which is more important and added:
97 Kay v. Goodwin (1830) 6 Bing, 576 at 582; Surtees v. Ellison, (1829) 9 B & C 750 at
752; Eemm v. Mitchell (1912) AC 400; State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch & Co. AIR
1964 SC 1284.
98 State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84.
99 Ekambarappa v. Excess Profits Tax Officer, AIR 1967 SC 1541.
100 N. Chennkannu Pillaiv. N.S. Sundaram, AIR 1951 Mad. 437; see also Om Prakash
v. The State, AIR 1955 All. 275.
101 State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch & Co. AIR 1964 SC 1284; see also Kayantilal
Amritlalv. Union of India (1971) 1 SCR 426; Delhi Municipality v. Shiv Shankar
AIR 1971 SC 815.
1897
305
"So far as statutory construction is concerned, it is one of the cardinal

principles of the law that there is no difference between an express
provision and a provision which is necessarily implied, for it is only
the form that differs in the two cases and there is no difference in
intention or substance."
Where a law, which replaces an old Act, provides for the continued operation
of the old law in respect of certain matters and for the operation of the new
law in respect of some other matters, the application of section 6 may be
ruled out. 102
V O I D , INVALID INOPERATIVE E T C .
A question may arise whether the word "repeal" may be construed as being
s y n o n y m o u s with the following e x p r e s s i o n s w h i c h o c c u r in the
Constitutionnamely "invalid" (articles 245, 255, 276); "cease to have
effect" (article 358): "cease to operate" (article 372): "void" (article 13,
254); 'shall be inoperative" (article 251). In KM. Menon v. State of Bombay'03
the Supreme Court thought that the expression "stand abrogated" may
mean the same as "stand repealed" while the expression "void" may be a
stronger expression. The Court however, applied the principle underlying
s. 6 to a law which had become void by reason of article 13 of the
Constitution.
Section 6 cannot be invoked in regard to statutes, which are temporary in
nature, that is to say statutes the operation of which is limited to specified
periods, 104 unless they are repealed before their expiry.105 The general rule
in this regard is that unless specifically provided otherwise proceedings
which are commenced against a person under a temporary statute will
automatically terminate on the expiry of the statute. 106 Where a statute
expires by efflux of time, n o prosecution for acts d o n e during the
continuance of the expired statute can be commenced after the date of
expiry because that will amount to the enforcement of the expired act.107
102 Indira Sohanlalv. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi, AIR 1956 SC 77.
103 AIR 1951 SC 128, see also In re Keshava Madhava Menon, 52 Bom. LR 540; State
of Bombay v. H.S. Alreja AIR 1952 Bom. 16.
104 State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84; State of Orissa v. Bhupendra
Kumar Bose, AIR 1962, SC 495.
105 State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (1955) SCR 893; Tarak Chandra v. Ratan IMI, AIR
1957 Cal. 257.
106 Gopichandv. Delhi Administration, AIR 1959 SC 609.
107 State of UP. v. Seth Jagamander Das, AIR 1954 SC 683.
306
Legislative Drafting - Shaping the haw for the New Millennium
M E A N I N G OF " E X C E P T AS R E S P E C T S T H I N G S D O N E OR O M I T T E D T O
BE D O N E "
Generally speaking, the position in regard to Acts which automatically

expire by efflux of time and Acts which are expressly repealed should be
the same in regard to, say, offences committed during the operadon of
the two kinds of enactments, and therefore the draftsman generally takes
care to insert a suitable saving clause in most of the temporary enactments.
This may take the form of a repetition of the relevant provisions in section
6 of the General Clauses Act (see for instance section 1(3) of the Defence
of India Act 1971 (Act 42 of 1971); (Section 16(2) of the Interpretation
Act 1978 now makes all the general savings in regard to repeal of
enactments applicable to expiry of temporary enactments) or a brief
statement that the temporary Act shall expire on the specified date "except
as respects things done or omitted to be done". The latter phrase occurs
in several places in the Constitution itself (see for instance, articles 249,
356) and has been judicially noticed. But it is not clear whether this cryptic
expression can carry with it all the implications underlying section 6 of the
General Clauses Act. In B.S. <& Co. v. French India Importing Corporation*
Sarkar J. (who was in a minority) said in his dissenting judgment that he
was not able to read the saving clause in paragraph 6 of the French
Establishments (Application of Laws) Order, 1954, which provided that
certain earlier French Laws shall cease to have effect except as respects
things done or omitted to be done as if it were the same as section 6 of
the General Clauses Act.
REPEAL OF R U L E S
Section 6 may not also be

because it is provided in
that they shall have effect
would be well advised to
available in cases where rules are repealed merely

the enactment under which the rules are made
as if enacted in the Act. uw In fact, the draftsman
avoid using this expression.
REPEAL OF LAW BY TEMPORARY A C T
When a repeal is effected by a temporary Act, the law is that the original
legislation would automatically resume its force on the expiration of the
108 AIR (1961) SC 41; see also M/s French India Importing Corporation: Delhi v. The
Chief Controller of Import-Exports, AIR 1961 SC M52; Jonas v. Rosenberg, (1950)
All. ELR 296.
109 Emperor \. Rajan, AIR 1944 Bom. 250.
1897
307
temporary repealing enactment. N o re-enactment of the original statute is

required to revive it.110 The practice followed by the draftsman in the case
of temporary Acts making changes in permanent Acts is generally to provide
that during the continuance in force of the temporary Acts, the permanent
Acts (to be specified) shall have effect as if certain provisions therein had
been omitted or had effect subject to the changes indicated in the temporary
Act and so on. (cf. the Defence of India Act, 1971, section 6) Such a device
makes it clear that the original law stands revived when the temporary Act
expires.
REPEALS HAVE PROSPECTIVE EFFECT O N L Y
Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this, that a

retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an
existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matters of procedure,
unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language
of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly
capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective
only". 1 1 '
Barring some right to property contained in the Government of India Act,
1935, it could be stated broadly that before the Constitution came into
force there was no such thing as a fundamental right. Article 13 declared
that any law in force at the commencement of the Constitution which is
inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution dealing
with fundamental rights shall be void, and the Supreme Court has held
that the article cannot be construed as having retrospective operation so as
to effect proceedings pending at the commencement of the Constitution. 112
"6A. Repeal of Act making textual amendment in Act or Regulation. Where
any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this
Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or
Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or
substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears,
the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment
made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of
such repeal."
110 Ungagoudagouda, (1946) MWN 571.

111 Maxwell op.cit. at 205 and the cases cited therein.
112 KM. Menon v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128; see also In re Kesbava Madhava
Menon, 52 Bom. LR 540.
308
At one time doubts appear to have been entertained as to whether the repeal
of an Act which had altered the wording of an earlier Act, did or did not
have the effect of restoring the original wording. To remove the doubt, section
6A was inserted by an amendment in 1936 (Act 19 of 1936). The law on this
subject, however, is fairly clear and such doubts appear to have been needlessly
entertained. It may be noted that when the Burma legislature adapted the
General Clauses Act for that country, it omitted s. 6A as being unnecessary
(See the Burma Laws (Adaptation) Act, 1940).
This section refers only to enactments making amendments which are
textual amendments. The word "text" in its dictionary meaning means
"subject or theme". When an enactment amends the text of another, it
amends the subject or theme of it, though it may sometimes expunge
unnecessary words without altering the subject. The word "text" is therefore
comprehensive enough to take in the subject as well as the terminology
used in a statute. n 3
The practice in India is to repeal all amending Acts making amendments
of a textual nature sometime after they have served their purpose. This
would obviate the necessity for republishing the amending Act and so
increase the size of the India Code. This section expressly provides that the
repeal of the amending Act would not undo the textual amendments they
had effected. This section will not however apply where the amendment is
not of a textual nature but is intended to modify the interpretation or
application of an earlier enactment, say, for a specified period. See for
instance, section 6 of the Defence of India Act, 1971 (42 of 1971).
" 7 . Revival of repealed enactment. In any Central Act or Regulation
made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be necessary, for
the purpose of reviving either wholly or partially, any enactment wholly
or partially repealed, expressly to state that purpose.
(2) This section applies to all Central Acts made after the third day of
January 1869, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth
day of January 1887"
Compare section 11(1) of the Interpretation Act, 1889, now section 15 of
the Interpretation Act, 1978.
The English common law rule was that when an Act which repealed another
was itself repealed, the first Act was revived. This rule was abrogated by
statute in 1850 and the principle laid down in this section is also the same
in England.
113 Jethananad v. The State of Delhi, AIR 1960 SC 89 at 92.
1897
309
Under this section, if any enactment is repealed wholly or partially and if any
part of the repealed enactment is sought to be revived, then, it is necessary to
state that fact specifically. In other words, to revive a repealed statute, it is
necessary to state an intention to do so.' 14
"8.
Construction of references to repealed enactments. (1) Where this or

Act, repeals and re-enacts with or without modification, any provision
of a former enactment, then, references in any other enactment or in
any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different
intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so reenacted.
(2) Where before the fifteenth day of August, 1947, any Act of Parliament
of the United Kingdom repealed and re-enacted with or with out
modification, any provision of a former enactment, then references in
any Central Act or Regulation or instrument to the provision so
repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as
references to the provision so re-enacted."
In the corresponding provision in the Interpretation Act, 1889, (s.38 (1))
the words "or in any instrument" did not appear. They do not appear in
some of the State Acts also. But see n o w section 17(2) (9) of the
Interpretation Act, 1978, read with section 23, for the application of the
corresponding provisions to subordinate legislation.
Where an earlier statute is repealed and re-enacted, it is the re-enacted
provision that will take the place of the corresponding provision in the
repealed enactment in so far as its incorporation by reference in other statutes
is concerned. Illustrating, the Limitation Act, 1908, has now been replaced
by the Limitation Act, 1963. References in any Act to the Limitation Act
of 1908 must therefore be construed as references to the Limitation Act of
1963. ns It may be noted that this section deals with reference or citation
of one enactment in another; it does not deal with incorporation." 6
It has been held that the repealing and re-enacting Act need not take the
form of a repealing and amending Act. n ? It has also been held that this
114 Vidhya Behn v.J.N. Bhatt, AIR 1974 Guj. 23; see also SyedShamshuddin v. Mimira
Begum, AIR 1963 Andh. Pra. 459.
11 5 Ram Prasadv. Bejqy Kumar, AIR 1966 Cal. 488; see also Hindustan Journals Ltd. v.
Dinesb, AIR 1957 Madh. B. 125; Sukbdev Sarup v. Punjab State, AIR 1965 Pun.
399.
116 Collector of Customs, Madras v. N.S. Chetty, (1952) 3 SCR 786.
117 Narayan v. Surendranatb AIR 1972 Orissa 115 at 17; Khuda Bux v. Manager
Caledonian Press, AIR 1954 Cal. 484.
310
section applies where a Central Act repeals a State Act while reenacting its
provions." 8
In the context of this section, the word "instrument" has been construed as
including reference to an Order made by the President of India under the
Constitution. 1 " The Supreme Court observed, "it (the instrument) has to
be understood as including reference to a formal legal writing like an order
made under a statue or subordinate legislation or any document of a formal
character made under constitutional or statutory authority".
Sub-section (2) may perhaps be omitted as no longer necessary.
"9.
Commencement and termination of time. (1) In any Central Act or

Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be
sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or
any other period of time, to use the word "from", and, for the purpose
of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time to
use the word "to".

(2) This section applies to all Central Acts made after the third day of
January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth
day of January, 1887."
N o similar provision appears in the Interpretation Act, 1889. Arthur
Symonds {Papers Relative to the Drawing of Acts of Parliament, 1838) proposed
in almost the very words used here this provision to get rid of the phase
"from and after". Lord Brengham's Act of 1850 was "to commence and
take effect from the immediately after the commencement of the next session
of Parliament".
This section gives statutory recognition to the well established principle of
construction enunciated in Radclijf v. Bartholomew^
If the intention of an Act is that it should commence on a particular day,
the draftsman should use appropriate words to make the intention clear.
In India, some of the earlier Finance Acts used the expression "with effect
from the 1st day of April" and doubts legitimately arose as to whether the
taxation measure took effect on the 1st April or the day after. Later Acts
started using the expression "year beginning on the 1st day of April".
A notification contained in Fort St. George Gazette of 5 th May, 1922,
imposed increased court fees on suits in the High Court. The increase was
118 State of Punjab v. Gupta, AIR 1970 SC 1641.
119 Mohan Chowdhary v. Chief Commissioner, Union Territory of Tripura, AIR 1964 SC
173.
120 (1892) 1 QB 161.
1897
311
to have effect from the date of publication in the Gazette. The majority in the
Court took the view that as there was only a terminus a quo "from" meant "on
and after".121
To include the first of a series of days, the Indian practice is to use the
expression "on and after" or "on and from". See also the use of the expression
"on or after" in the General Clauses Act itself. If both the first of a series of
days and the last in a series of days are to be included the word "inclusive"
may be added to make the intention clear.122 The expression 'for the time
being' may indicate a single period or an indefinite period of time depending
upon the context in which it is used. 121 A notification which fixes the
outer limit of time for its operation does not extend beyond that period
because of the words 'until further orders'. 124
" 1 0 . Computation of time. (1) Where by any Central Act or Regulation
made after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is
directed or allowed to be done or taken in any court or office on a
certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the court or office
is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act
or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is
done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the court or office
is open:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding
to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1887, applies.
(2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and Regulations made on
or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887."
It is a recognized principle that persons who are prevented from doing
anything in court on,a particular day not by any act of their own but by
the court itself are entitled to do it at the first subsequent opportunity.
Section 4 of the Limitation Act and section 10 of the General Clauses Act
embody the general principles enshrined in the two maxims lex non-cogit
ad impossibilia and actua curiae nominem gravabit. Even if section 4 of the
Limitation Act is not applicable, the respondent to an appeal can invoke
section 10 of the General Clauses Act and, if neither of these provisions can
assist the respondent, he can still invoke the general principles embodied
121 In re Court Fees,lLR 46 Mad. 685.

122 See Halsbury'sLaws of England, 2nd ed. Vol. XXXII at 138.
123 Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Rajesh Kumar Basandhi AIR 2003 SC 3230:
(2003) 11 SCC 549.
124 Jayashra Chemicals v. Orissa State Electricity Board (2004) 3 SCC 674: AIR 2004
SC 1585.
312
Millennium
in the two provisions. 125

The expression "office" is used in contradistinction to court and therefore the
word "office" cannot include office of a court.126
This section applies to cases where an act is allowed or ordered to be done by
an Act of the legislature. It does not apply when, for instance, and act is
ordered to be done by a compromise decree. 127
The words 'Day' is not defined. In its ordinary meaning, which has to be
assigned to it when there is no contrary context, meant midnight to
midnight and covers a period of 24 hours. 128
" 1 1 . Measurement of distances. In the measurement of any distance, for
the p u r p o s e s of any Central Act or Regulation made after the
commencement of this Act, that distance shall, unless a different
intention appears, be measured in a straight line on a horizontal plane."
Compare section 8 of the Interpretation Act, 1978.
" 1 2 . Duty to be taken pro rata in enactments. Where, in any enactment
now in force or hereafter to be in force, any duty of customs or excise,
or in the nature thereof, is leviable on any given quantity, by weight,
measure or value of any goods or merchandise, then, a like duty is
leviable according to the same rate on any greater or less quantity."
For the construction put upon the phrase "a penny per ton per mile."129
" 1 3 . Gender and number. In all Central Acts and Regulations, unless there
is anything repugnant in the subject or context
(1) words importing the masculine gender, shall be taken to include
females;
(2) words in the singular shall include the plural and vice-versa."
This section applies to all Central Acts and Regulations and not merely to
those passed afterl868.
Compare section 6 of the Interpretation Act 1978, which includes a further
provision stating that words importing the feminine gender include the
masculine.
The context may rule out the application of this section in certain cases.
Thus to construe "previous year" in section 2(11) of the Income-tax Act to
include previous years would be to nullify the very definition of "previous
125 Raja Patide v. S. Pande, AIR 1942 All. 422; Rambhirv. Prabhakar, AIR 1955 Nag.
300. .
126 L Prasadv. Girdharilal, AIR 1939 Pat. 667.
127 Ram Kinkarv. Kama/Bhasin, ILR 17 Pat. 191.
128 Raj Kumar Yadav v. Samir Kumar Mahaseth (2005) 3 SCC 601 at 605
129 Pryce v. Monmouthshire Canal Co. (1879) 4 AC 197 at 216.
1897
313
year" enacted therein.130 Having regard to the objects of the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, and the use of the word "workmen" in the plural, the
applicability of the Act to an individual dispute as opposed to a dispute
involving a group of workmen is ruled out unless it acquires the general
characteristics of an industrial dispute. 131
Where a word connoting a common gender is available but the word used
conveys a specific gender, there is a presumption that the provisions of the
General Clauses Act do not apply. Thus the word "bullocks" cannot be
interpreted to include "cows". The pronoun 'he' and its derivates may be
construed to refer to any person whether male or female. So the words 'his
father and mother' as they occur in section 125 (l)(d) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been construed to include 'her father and
mother'. 1 3 2 But the general rule in section 13 (1) has to be applied with
circumspection for interpreting laws dealing with matter of succession. w
Singular includes the plural and vice versa. T h e words 'male and female
heirs' in section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 were interpreted to
cover a case where there is a single male heir.134 Similarly the word 'machine'
in an exemption notification issued under section 25 of the Customs Act,
1962 was interpreted to include 'machines.' 135
" 1 4 . Powers conferred to be exercisable from time to time. (1) Where by
Act, any power is conferred then, unless a different intention appears,
that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires.
(2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and Regulations made on
or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887."
Where a power is vested in the court by statute, that power may be exercised
from time to time as the occasion requires, with reference to he jurisdiction
whether existing at the time of coming into force of that Act or conferred
on it by any subsequent legislation.136
130
131
1 32
133
134
Messers. Dbandania v. Commissioner of Income Tax; AIR 1959 SC 219.

Newspapers v. State Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1957 SC 532.
Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashiram Rajaram Sawai (1987) 2 SCC 278 at 281.
Madhu Kishwarv. State of Bihar MR 1996 SC 1864 at 1881: (1996) 5 SCC 125.
Narshimha Murthy v. Susheelabai, 1996 (3) SCALE 625 at 640: (1996) 4 SCC
644.
135 Collector of Customs v. United Electrical Industrial \Jd, AIR 1999 SC 3796: (2000)
10 SCC 31.
136 N.S. Thread Co. v. James Chadwick <& Bros., AIR 1953 SC 357; see also Express
Newspapers Ud. v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578.
314
Millennium
The Law Commission has recommended that this section may be amended
to include performance of duties (cf. section 2(1) of the Interpretation Act,
1978) and that its provisions may be extended to cover instruments.
Notwithstanding the provision made in this section, draftsmen have been
found to unnecessarily repeat the phrase "from time to time" in many an
enactment, presumably to make assurance doubly sure.
Relying on section 14, the Supreme Court has held that power under
section 51(3) of the States Reorganization Act, 1956 can be exercised by
the Chief Justice as and when occasion arose for its existence.137
15.
Power to appoint to include powers to appoint ex offtcio, Where, by

any Central Act or Regulation, power to appoint any person to fill
any office or execute any function is conferred, then, unless it is
otherwise expressly provided, any such appointment, if it is made
after the commencement of this Act, may be made either by name or
by virtue of office.
In view of this section, there can be no objection if an appointment is

made by virtue of office and not by name. Hence a notification appointing
all special land acquisition officers to perform functions of collectors within
their respective jurisdictions would be valid.138
16.
Power to appoint to include power to suspend or dismiss. Where by

any Central Act or Regulation a power to made any appointment is
conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority
having for the time being power to make the appointment shall also
have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed whether by
itself or by any other authority in exercise of that power.
It was stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons that a power to

appoint should ordinarily include a power to remove the person appointed.
It is however, not certain that this construction would be universally adopted
by the courts, especially in view of the fact that it has been usual in Indian
Acts expressly to take both powers. The opportunity has therefore, been
sought to establish the rule once for all for the future.
In the words of the Supreme Court, "it is now firmly established that the
power to terminate service is a necessary adjunct of the power to appoint
and is exercised as an incident to or a consequence of that power."139
137 State of Maharashtra v. Narajan, AIR 1983 SC 46 at 52: (1982) 3 SCC 519.
138 A. Hussain Tayafali v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 432.
139 Heckett Engineering Co. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1977 SC 2257 at 2261; see also
Ukhrajv. N.K Shah, AIR 1966 SC 334; Bool Chand v. Chancellor, Kurukshetra
University, AIR 1963 SC 2923.
1897
315
Under the Assam Elementary Education Act, 1962, the Assistant Secretary
has to appoint teachers on the advice of the Board But as he is the appointing
authority, he can dismiss those appointed by him calling in aid section 18 of
the Assam General Clauses Act which is in similar terms. 140
A power to make rules of appointment does not necessarily imply a power
to make rules for dismissal. Such a proposition does not flow either from
section 16 or otherwise. 141
The insertion of the words "for the time being" and "whether by itself or
any other authority7" by Act XVIII of 1928 was for the purpose of meeting
cases where powers of appointment had been transferred under laws relating
to centralization or decentralization.
" 1 7 . Substitution of functionaries. (1) In any Central Act or Regulation
made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for
the purpose of indicating the application of a law to every person or
office, to mention the office, to mention the official title of the officer
at present executing the functions, or that of the officer by whom the
functions are commonly executed.
(2) This section applies also to all Central Acts made after the third day
of January, 1861, and to all Regulations made on or after the
fourteenth day of January, 1887."
T h e Law C o m m i s s i o n in its Sixtieth R e p o r t has r e c o m m e n d e d the
replacement of the words "at present" by the words "at the time when the
Central Act or Regulation is made".
" 1 8 . Successors.
(1)
In any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement

of this Act, it shall be sufficient for the purpose of indicating
the relation of a law to the successors of any functionaries or of
corporations having perpetual succession, to express its relation
to the functionaries or corporations.
(2)
This section applies also to all Central Acts made after the third
day of January 1868 and to all Regulations made on or after the
fourteenth day of January 1887."
It is not essential that the same statutory authority that initiated a scheme
under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, should also implement
it. It is open to the successor authority to implement or continue the
same. 142
140 State of Assam v. Kripanath Sharma, AIR 1967 SC 459.
141 B.H. Yadavv. State, AIR 1977 All. 6 at 7.
142 KG. Krishnayya v. State, AIR 1959 Andh. 292.
316
Legislative Drafting Shaping the Law for the New
Millennium
Similarly, in a case under the Preventive Detention Act, when there is a change
in the Advisory Board after service of the detention order, the new Advisory
Board can consider the case pending before the earlier Board.143
"19. Official chiefs and subordinates, (1) In any Central Act or Regulation
made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient for
the purpose of expressing that a law relative to the chief or superior of
an office shall apply to the deputies or subordinates lawfully
performing the duties of that office in the place of their superior, to
prescribe the duty of the superior.
(2) This section applies also to all Central Acts made after the third day
of January 1868 and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth
day of January, 1887."
An acting district magistrate can discharge the function of a district
magistrate. 144 It need not be emphasized that the deputy or subordinate
must be lawfully performing the duties of the office, and not as a matter of
administrative convenience.
PROVISIONS A S T O O R D E R S , R U L E S , E T C . , M A D E U N D E R E N A C T M E N T S
"20. Construction of orders etc., issued under enactments. Where by any

Central Act or Regulation a power to issue any notification order,
scheme, rule, form or bye-law is conferred, then, expressions used in
the notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, if it is made
after the commencement of this Act, shall, unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or context, have the same respective meanings
as in the Act or Regulation conferring the power."
Compare section 31 of the Interpretation Act, 1889. Section 11 of the
Interpretation Act, 1978 now provides that where an Act confers power to
make s u b o r d i n a t e legislation (an expression defined in section 21)
expressions used in that legislation have, unless a contrary intention appears,
the meanings which they bear in the Act. The term "collector" used in rule
4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963, will have the same
meaning as in section 3(c) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 145
" 2 1 . Power to i s s u e to include power to a m e n d , vary or rescind
notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws. Where, by any Central Act
or Regulation a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws
is conferred, then, that power includes a power, exercisable in the like
143 R. Goswrmiv. C.K Krishnamurti, AIR 1969 Assam 14.
144 KandasamiPillaiv. Emperor, ILR 2 Mad. 69 at 75.
145 A Hussain Tayabaliv. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 432.
1897
317
manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions, if any, to add to,
amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so
issued."
Compare section 32(3) of the Interpretation Act, 1889, which makes the
sub-section applicable only if there is no contrary intention in the context.
This appears to be a necessary safeguard. For instance, where an Act may
be brought into force by notification and such a notification has been issued,
the authority which has issued the notification cannot subsequently rescind it
under this section: such a notification would have the effect of virtually
repealing the Act after it is brought into force. Section 32(3) of the
Interpretation Act 1889 has now been replaced by section 14 of the
Interpretation Act, 1978.
The power to cancel or vary notifications issued under sections 4 and 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by virtue of this section cannot be exercised after
the land has statutorily vested in the Government under that Act and possession
has been taken.14*
The words "may from time to time determine" tax payable under s. 135(2)
of the Railways Act, 1890, does not imply an authority to alter an order
passed for a particular period.' 4 "
The power to amend given by the section does not carry with it the power
to make the amendment operate retrospectively. 148
Section 21 relied upon to support an order of the FJection Commission
canceling recognition of political party as a national part}' under the Flections
Symbols (Reservation & Allotment) Order, 1968. ,,<)
The rule enacted in section 21, is merely a rule of construction and may be
displaced to the extent to the provision of scheme and object of any particular
statute indicating a contrary intention. The application of section 21 was
denied to amend or vary a notification issued under section 3 of he
Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952.150
Section 21, has no application to vary or amend or review a quasi-judicial
order. The Election Commission cannot by recourse to section 21 dercgister
or cancel the registration of a political party under section 29A of the
146 Lf. Governor of HimacbalPradesh v. Avinash Sharma, AIR 1970 SC 1576.
147 ILR1944 Mad. 802.
148 Straw Board Mfg. Co. Ud. v. Mill Worker's Union, AIR 1953 SC 95; see also
Maharaja Shri V'maid v. Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur, AIR 1954 Raj. 274.
149 Janata Dal (Samajwadi) v. FJection Commission of India, 1995 (6) SCALE 558:
(1996) 1 SCC 235.
1 50 State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ajay Singh AIR 1993 SC 825 at 838: (1993) 1 SCC
302.
318
Legislative Drafting Shaping the Law for the New Millennium
Representation of People Act, 1951, as the decision of the Commission to

register a political party under section 29A is quasi judicial in nature. lDl
" 2 2 . Making of rules or bye-laws and issuing of orders between passing
and commencement of enactment. Where by any Central Act or
Regulation which is not to come into force immediately on the passing
thereof, a power is conferred to make rules or bye-laws or to issue
orders with respect to the application of the Act or Regulation, or
with respect to the establishment of any court or office or the
appointment of any judge or officer there under or with respect to
the person by whom, or the time when, or thee place where or the
manner in which, or the fees for which, anything is to be done under
the Act or Regulation, then, that power may be exercised at any time
after the passing of the Act or Regulation: but rules, bye-laws or
orders so made or issued, shall not take effect till the commencement
of the Act or Regulation."
This section corresponds to section 37 of the Interpretation Act, 1889.
Section 13 of the Interpretation Act, 1978 has now replaced this section
with certain modifications to give effect to the recommendation of the Law
Commission. It is an enabling provision, its contents and purpose being to
facilitate the making of rules, bye-laws and orders before the commencement
of the enactment in anticipation of its coming into force. In other words, it
validates rules, bye-laws and orders made before the coming into force of
the enactment, provided they are made after its passing and as preparatory
to the enactment coming into force. It does not, for instance, authorize the
making of substantive orders, say, under the Preventive Detention Act.
The expression "with respect t o " prescribes the limit and scope of the power.
Orders can be issued only with respect to the time when, or the manner in
which, anything is to be done under the Act. An order for the extension of
the detention of a person could only be made under the Act and after it has
come into force and cannot be said to be preparatory to the Act. The
expression "order" means an order laying down directions about the manner
in which things are to be done under the Act.132 It, however, confers no
authority to pass substantive orders in exercise of the authority conferred
by any particular section of the Act.153
151 Indian National Congress v. Institute of Social Welfare, AIR 2002 SC 2158: (2002) 5
SCC 685.
152 Venkateswaraloo v. Superintendent, Centraljail, Hyderabad, AIR 1953 SC 49.
1 53 Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2003 SC 2889 at 2899: (2003) 6 SCC
545.
The Genera/ Clauses Act,
1897
319
Certain rules were framed under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, and
published on 28-3-1955. The Act received the assent of the President on 2212-1954 and was to come into force on 1-4-1955. It was held that the rules
would be operative from 1-4-1955.154
Rules framed under section 2 of the Defence of India Act, a section which
came into force immediately, must be read as part of the section and as
effective from the date of publication and are not dependent on the
remainder of the Act being brought into operation. 155 This decision would
cover cases where an Act is brought into force piecemeal and in the meantime
rules have to be made under sections which have come into force. In this
context "commencement" does not mean commencement of the entire
Act. '^ Compare the modifications made in section 13 of the Interpretation
Act, 1978, in order that that section may take note of the former practice
of bringing an Act into force piecemeal, in certain cases.
Where rules have to be placed before the Legislature for approval, the
application of this section is not automatically rules out. The approval of
the legislature is merely part of the procedure or machinery for the making
of the rules and by virtue of this section it must be assumed that this
provision is also in operation from the date of the passing of the Act. So the
power to make rules can be exercised at any time after the passing of the
Act but the rules will not take effect until the commencement of the Act.' 37
" 2 3 . Provisions applicable to making of rules or bye-laws after previous
publication. Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to
make rules or bye-laws is expressed to be given subject to the condition
of the rules or bye-laws being made after previous publication, then,
the following provisions shall apply, namely: (1) the authority having power to make the rules or bye-laws shall, before
making them publish a draft of the proposed rules or bye-laws for the
information of persons likely to be affected thereby;
1 54 State of Rajasthan v. Mewar Sugar Mills Ud. AIR 1969 SC 880.
155 Kandasmi Pillai v. Emperor, ILR 42 Mad. 69.
1 56 Compare section 31, Wheat Amendment Act, 1939 (2 & 3 Geo., 6.C. 37) which
is in the following terms
Any power to make bye-laws conferred by this Act may be exercised at any time
after the passingof this Act but bye-laws made for giving effect to any provision of
this Act which does not come into operation before thefirstday of August nineteen
hundred and thirty nine shall not come into operation before that date:
Nothing in this sub-section shall be construed as affecting the operation in relation
to this Act of the Interpretation Act, 1889.
157 K.G. Kangaswami Chettairv. Govt. of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 301.
320
(2)
Legislative Drafting Shaping the haw for the New Millennium

the publication shall be made in such manner as that authority deems to
be sufficient, or, if the condition with respect to previous publication so
requires, in such manner as the Government concerned prescribes;
(3)
there shall be published with the draft a notice specifying a date on or

after which the draft will be taken into consideration;
(4) the authority having power to make the rules or bye-laws and where
the rules or bye-laws are to be made with the sanction, approval or
concurrence of another authority, that authority also , shall consider
any objection or suggestion which may be received by the authority
having power to make the rules or bye-laws from any person with
respect to the draft before the date so specified;
(5) the publication in the official Gazette of a rule or bye-law purporting
to have been made in exercise of a power to make rules or bye-laws
after previous publication shall be conclusive proof that the rule or
bye-law has been duly made."
Section 23(5) raises a conclusive presumption that after the publication of
the rules in the official Gazette, it is to be inferred that the procedure for
making the rules had been followed. Any irregularities in the publication
of the draft cannot therefore be questioned. 158 It is also open to the authority
publishing the draft and entitled to make the rules to make suitable changes
in the draft before finally publishing them. It is not necessary for that
authority to re-publish the rules in the amended form before their final
issue so long as the changes made are ancillary to the earlier draft and
cannot be regarded as foreign to the subject matter thereof.139
The phrase "duly made" means that the publication of the rules in the
official Gazette, which are purported to have been made in exercise of the
power to make rules after previous publication, is conclusive proof that the
rules have been duly pre-published as required by law and once the factum
of pre-publication is brought to the notice of the court such pre-publication
cannot be questioned. The phrase has not been used in a wider and more
comprehensive sense to mean and to imply that the factum of publication
in the official Gazette invests the rules with an absolutely unassailable
character as to their validity also in the sense that they may be in excess of
or repugnant to the Act under which they are made or they are otherwise
158 Maula Bux v. The Appellate Tribunal of State Transport Authority, Jaipur, AIR 1962
Raj. 19.
159 Ibid
1897
321
invalid.160 In this case, the time given to the persons likely to be affected
was so short as to amount to a denial of the right given to them by this
section.
"24. Continuation of orders etc., issued under enactments repealed
and re-enacted. Where any Central Act or Regulation is, after the
commencement of this Act, repealed and re-enacted with or without
modification, then unless, it is otherwise expressly provided, any
appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law made
or issued under the repealed Act or Regulation shall, so far as it is not
inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be
deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so reenacted, unless and until it is superseded by any appointment,
notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law made or issued
under the provisions so re-enacted; and when nay Central Act or
Regulation, which, by a notification under section 5 or 5A of the
Scheduled Districts Act, 1874 or any like law, has been extended to
any local area, has by a subsequent notification, been withdrawn from
and re-extended to such area or any part thereof, the provisions of
such Act or Regulation should be deemed to have been repealed and
re-enacted in such area or part within the meaning of this section."
This section accords statutory recognition to the general principle that if a
statute is repealed and re-enacted in the same or substantially the same
terms, the re-enactment neutralizes the previous repeal and the provisions
of the repealed Act which are re-enacted, continue in force without
interruption. If however, the statute is repealed and re-enacted in somewhat
different terms, the amendments and modifications operate as a repeal of
the provisions of the repealed Act which are changed by and are repugnant
to the repealing Act. The inconsistency which the law contemplates should
be such a positive repugnancy between the provision of the old and the
new statutes that they cannot be reconciled and made to stand together.161
This section applies to the repeal of a Central Act and not a State Act.162
The Mines Act of 1923 was repealed and replaced by the Mines Act of
1952. Rules made under the repealed Act must be deemed to continue in
160 The Automobile Transport Rajasthan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1962 Raj.
24.
161 State v. N.B. Hawkins, AIR 1937 Pun. 148; see also State of Madhya Pradesh v. A.K
Jain, AIR 1958 M.P. 162.
162 Deepchandv. State of UP., AIR 1959 SC 648.
322
Millennium
force by virtue of this section until superseded. 163

Where an Act is repealed and re-enacted, the fact that the repealed Act
stated that rules made under that Act shall have effect as if enacted in the
Act does not mean that the rules automatically disappear with the repeal
of the Act under which they are made and that there is no room for the
application of this section. 164
MISCELLANEOUS
" 2 5 . Recovery of fines. Secdons 63 to 70 of the Indian Penal Code and

the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the time being
in force in relation to the issue and execution of warrants for the levy
of fines, shall apply to fines imposed under any Act, Regulation, rule
or bye-law, unless the Act, Regulation, rule or bye-law contains express
provision to the contrary.
2 6. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments.
Where an Act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more
enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and
punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be
liable to be punished twice for the same offence."
Compare section 33 of the Interpretation Act, 1889 (now section 18 of
the Interpretation Act, 1978) which applies only where no contrary intention
appears.
Article 20(2) of the Constitution states that no person shall be prosecuted
and punished for the same offence more than once.
Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974 after stating that a
person convicted or acquitted of an offence cannot be tried again for the
same offence, details the circumstances in which or the conditions subject
to which a new trial may be possible. It also provides that nothing in that
section shall affect the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act,
1897.
Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code limits the punishment which may be
awarded in cases where an offence is made up of parts, any of which part is
itself an offence.
Compare also section 127(1) of the Army Act, 1950, under which a person
convicted or acquitted by a Court-martial may, with the previous sanction
163 State v. Kunj Behari Chandra, AIR 1954 Pat. 371; Mineral Development Ltd. v.
Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 1543; Neel v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC
2006.
164 State of Madhya Pradesh v. A.K. Jain, AIR 1958 M.P. 162.
1897
323
of the Central Government, be tried by a criminal court for the same offence
and on the same facts. Sub-section (2), however, provides that the criminal
court shall have regard to the punishment already inflicted on the accused
under certain sections of the Act. See also section 126 of the Air Force Act,
1950. In the case of the armed forces, however, special provision can be
made by reason of article 33 of the Constitution.
According to the Supreme Court, a plain reading of section 26 shows that
there is no bar to the trial or conviction of an offender under two enactments,
but there is only a bar to the punishment of the offender twice for the same
offence. In other words, the section provides that where an act or omission
constitutes an offence under two e n a c t m e n t s , the offender may be
prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but shall
not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.165
The section applies only when both complaints relate to the same offence.' 66
For a false statement in a verification of Income-tax return, a person may be
prosecuted both under section 177 of the Indian Penal Code and section
52 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, at the same time. As stated earlier, section
26 only bars punishment of the offender twice for the same offence and
does not bar his trial or conviction. When there are two alternative charges
in the same trial, e.g., section 409 of the Indian Penal Code and section
5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the fact that the accused is
acquitted of one of the charges will not bar his conviction on the other.167
The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is not impliedly repealed by the
Essential Commodities Act. This section has been enacted with a view to
avoiding implied repeal of general enactments by special enactments. Both
the aforesaid Acts can operate side by side in their own parallel channels.
Even if the overlap, this section protects the offender against a double
penalty. 1 6 8
This section is wider in scope than the corresponding section of the
Interpretation Act, 1889. Not only does it deal with an act which is an
offence under the Indian Penal Code and any other special or local Act but
also, it seems having regard to the meaning of "enactment", with an act
which constitutes an offence under two or more sections of the same Act.169
165
166
167
168
169
Baliahv. Rangachari, AIR 1969 SC 701 at 706.

State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte, AIR 1961 SC 578.
State of M.P. v. V.R. Agnihotri, AIR 1957 SC 592.
Delhi Municipality v. Shiv Shanker, AIR 1971 SC 815.
Jayarama Iyer v. State of Hyderabad AIR. 1954 Hyd. 56.
324
Provisions of section 26 and Article 20(2) of the Constitution apply only

when the two offences which form the subject of prosecution are the same,
i.e., the ingredients which constitute the two offences are the same. If the
offences under the two enactments are distinct and not identical, none of
these provisions will apply.' "
" 2 7 . Meaning of sendee by post. Where any Central Act or Regulation
made after the commencement of this Act authorizes ore requires any
document to be served by post, whether the expression "give" or "send"
or any other expression is used, then unless a different intention
appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly
addressing, prepaying and p o s t i n g by registered post, a letter
containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have
been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in
the ordinary course of post."
Compare section 7 of the Interpretation Act, 1978.
A presumption of due service under this section will arise as soon as it is
established that the cover containing, say, a notice has been transmitted by
registered post to the defendant. Compare section 114 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872.
The deeming provision in this section would be subject to proof to the
contrary. 171
When the addressee refuses to accept a letter sent to him by registered
post, there is due service and he is imputed with the knowledge of the
content of the letter by the combined effect of the presumption arising
under section 27 of the General Clauses Act and section 114 of the Evidence
Act. ,72 When the notice is returned with postal endorsements 'not available
in house', 'house locked' and 'shop closed' due service may be presumed.' 7 '
The principal incorporated in section 27 has been applied to a properly
addressed notice issued by post under section 138 (1) of the Negotiable
170 V.K Agarwah. Vasanlraj Bbagwanji Bhati, AIR 1988 SC 1106 at 1111: (1988) 3 SCC
467; State of Bihar v. Murad AH Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1 at 9: (1988) 4 SCC 655;
AA.Mulla v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1997 SC 145; State of Rajastban v. Hat Sing
(2003) 2 SCC 152 at 158-159.
171 In re De Sou^a, ILR 54 All. 548.
172 Uarcharan Singh v. Shiv R*/.AIR 1981 SC 1284: (1981) 2 SCC 535, Jagdisb
Singh v. Nathu Singh AIR 1992 SC 1604: (1992) 1 SCC 647; Haryana Urban
Development Authority v. Nathu Ram (2005) 1 SCC 567.
173 State of M.P. v. Heerala (1996) 7 SCC 523; V. Rajkumariv. P. Solbbarama Kaid;
AIR 2005 SC 109: (2004) 8 SCC 774.
1897
325
Instruments Act, 1881 which was returned unclaimed.' 74

"28. Citation of enactments, (1) In any Central Act or Regulation, and in
any rule, bye-law, instrument or document made under or with reference
to any such Act or Regulation, any enactment may be cited with reference
to the title or short title (if any) conferred thereon or by reference to the
number and year thereof, and any provision in any enactment may be
cited by reference to the section or sub-section of the enactment in
which the provision is contained.
(2) In this Act and in any Central Act or Regulation made after the
commencement of this Act, a description or citation of a portion of
another enactment shall, unless a different intention appears, be
construed as including the word, section or other part mentioned or
referred to as forming the beginning and as forming the end of the
portion comprised in the description or citation."
Compare section 35 of the Interpretation Act, 1889. For a revised and
more comprehensive version of this section, see now section 19 of the
Interpretation Act, 1978. See also the Indian Short Titles Act, 1897 (14 of
1897). Short titles were also conferred on a number of Regulations made
under the Government of India Act, 1870 by means of an executive order.' 73
In connection with sub-section (2), see the headings to the schedules to
the Repealing and Amending Act, 1891 (12 of 1891).
" 2 9 . Saving for previous enactments, rules and byelaws. The provisions of
this Act respecting the construction of Acts, Regulations, rules or
bye-laws made after the commencement of this Act, shall not affect
the construction of any Act, Regulation, rule or bye-law made before
the commencement of this Act, although the Act, Regulation rule or
bye-law is continued or amended by an Act, Regulation, rule or byelaw made after the commencement of this Act."
Compare section 25(3) of the Interpretation Act, 1978.
The definition of "good faith" in this Act does not, for instance, apply to
the term as used in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an earlier Act. 1 ' 6
Where textual amendments are made after 1897 to an Act passed before
that date, the amendments cannot be interpreted with the help of this
Act, except to the extent expressly provided in this Act. (See for instance
sections 4, 4A, 13).
174 K. Bbaskaran v. Sankamn laidhyan Balan (1999) 7 SCC 510: JT (1999) 7 SC
558.
175 See Gazette of India, 1875 Part 1 at 529.
176 lMchmiPrasadv. LachmiNarain, AIR 1928 All. 41.
326
Millennium
"30. Application of Act to Ordinances. In this Act, the expression "Central

Act", wherever it occurs, except in section 5, and the word "Act" in
clauses (9). (13), (25), (40), (43), (52) and (54) of section 3 and in section
25 shall be deemed to include an Ordinance made and promulgated by
the Governor-General under section 23 of the Indian Councils Act,
1861 (24 & 25 Viet., c67) or section 72 of the Government of India
Act, 1915 (5 & 6 Geo., 5, c. 61) or section 42 of the Government of
India Act, 1935 (26 Geo., 5., c.2) and an Ordinance promulgated by the
President under article 123 of the Constitution."
Under section 3(19), an Ordinance is not included in the definition of
"enactment". But when an Ordinance was a permanent one and was later
repealed by another Ordinance, the Supreme Court felt that even in the
absence of an express provison making section 6 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897, applicable, the same result would appear to flow from section
6, read with section 30. As stated before, the repealed ordinance was not
temporary in nature but had been made permanent before its repeal.177
Section 30A, 31 and 32 repealed.
177 RCJal/Parsiv. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 1282 at 1285.

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Legislative Drafting - Chapter On GC Act, 1897

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CHAPTER XII

T H E GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 18971

Legislative Drafting - Shaping the Law for the New Millennium

The General Clauses Act, 1897

Legislative Drafting - Shaping the haw for the New Millennium

The General Clauses Act,

but as a measure of caution the matter was referred by the Government to

Legislative Drafting - Shaping the Law for the New

The General Clauses Act is a consolidating as well as an extending measure.

Acts of the Indian Parliament;

The General Clauses Act,

the haw for the New

1867. E x c e p t with regard to a few m i n o r m a t t e r s , the State General Clauses

The General Clauses Act,

2. (Repeal) Repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act, 1903 (1 of

(e) Hyderabad General Clauses Act (3 of 1308) in areas transferred from

Legislative Drafting - Shaping the Law for the New

Kingdom, all the definitions are now relegated to a schedule, Interpretation

The General Clauses Act,

legislative Drafting - Shaping the Law for the New Millennium

"act", used with reference to an offence or a civil wrong, shall include a

"Affidavit" shall include affirmation and declaration in the case of

]agannath Bhagwan v. Municipal Board of Allahabad, AIR 1928 All. 130.

The General Clauses Act,

"barrister" shall mean a barrister of England or Ireland or a member

Section 2(14) of the General Clauses Act, 1868, contained a similar

"British possession" shall mean any part of Her Majesty's dominions,

Legislative Drafting - Shaping the Law for the New Millennium

This definition is taken from section 18(2) of the Interpretation Act,

an Act of the Dominion Legislature or of the Indian Legislature

in relation to functions entrusted under sub-section (1) of

in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's

in relation to functions entrusted under clause (1) of article

in relation to the administration of a Part C State before

The General Clauses Act,

given to him or it under article 239 or article 243 of the

Legislative Drafting - Shaping the haw for the New

In the case of documents drafted without reference to any statutory provision,

"Chapter" shall mean a Chapter of the Act or Regulation in which

This definition reproduced the definition given by section 3(2) of the

Satya Dev v. Padma Dev, AIR 1955 SC 5at 6.

The General Clauses Act,

in a State where there is a Board of Revenue, that Board:

In some of the older enactments, these expressions were used without

legislative Drafting Shaping the Law for the New

Statute of Westminster 1931, any Province or State forming part

exclusive of the British Islands and of British India.

The General Clauses Act,

32 Hajari Lai v. Kanhaya Lai, AIR 1953 All. 686.

Legislative Drafting - Shaping the Law for the New

The General Clauses Act, 1897

"document" shall include any substance having any matter written,

38 Craies, Statute Law, 6th Ed., 216 (1963).

Legislative Drafting - Shaping the Law for the New Millennium

Wakefield Light Railway Company v. Wakefield Corpn. (1906) 2 KB 140 at 145.

The General Clauses Act,

(23) "Government" or "the Government" shall include both the Central

Legislative Drafting - Shaping the Law for the New Millennium

AIR 1958 SC 532 at 536.

The General Clauses Act,

(28) "India shall mean

as respects any period after the establishment of the Dominion

Legislative Drafting - Shaping the Law for the New