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* JUDGE HICKS
VERSUS
*
* MAGISTRATE PEREZ-MONTES
BRIAN E. CRAWFORD; LAWRENCE W. *
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PETTIETTE, JR.; JAMES D. BUDDY
CALDWELL; JON K. GUICE; JUDGE
CARL V. SHARP; JUDGE FREDERIC C.
AMMAN; JUDGE J. WILSON RAMBO;
JUDGE
BENJAMIN
JONES;
and
ALLYSON CAMPBELL
Defendants
*
******************************************************************************
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS UNDER FRCP 11 AND 28 U.S.C. 1927
Sanctions are warranted in this case. Attempts at justification after the fact do not satisfy
Rule 11s duty of reasonable inquiry into the facts and law before filing. Similarly, any reckless
disregard of the duty owed to the court can suffice to establish an attorneys improper purpose
under 1927.1 To identify the illegitimate purpose in filing under Rule 11, this Court must identify
unusual circumstances that serve to support the inference of such purpose by focusing on objective
circumstances rather than subjective intent.2 It does not get much more unusual than this case
given the larger context at work and ever-changing interpretations of clear public record.
Plaintiff and her attorneys oppose Crawfords Motion for Sanctions via Olympic-caliber
obfuscation. Plaintiff Judge Marchmans allegations that Crawford and Campbell made baseless
accusations about her in Palowsky v. Campbell directly contradict her own attorneys admissions
in state court filings and in open court. On the horns of a dilemma, they now attempt to reconcile
1
2
Edwards v. General Motors Corp., 153 F. 3d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1998).
Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government, 14 F. Supp. 3d 760, 766 (W.D. La. 2014).
the clearly conflicting versions of events and advance their faulty timeline with yet more
alternative interpretation.
First, Plaintiff and her attorneys contend that Mr. Ward did not mean what he said when
he said that:
In this one case Ive gone far beyond which I would normally do to interview to
make sure what Im putting in the pleading is accurate. Ive actually had a judge
inside the court confirm things to me or I wouldnt have put them down to
start with. . . . Under these circumstances, Your Honor, I request the motion to
strike be denied in all respects. . . .3 (Emphasis added).
Despite their clear import, those statements did not mean that Mr. Ward satisfied his duty of inquiry
as to the veracity of the factual content of the Palowsky v. Campbell pleadings via Plaintiff Judge
Marchman. On the contrary, Plaintiff Judge Marchman categorically denies that she ever had
any communications with Messrs. Ward and Banks before the pleadings were filed in July 2015.4
Or, alternatively, if this Court believes Mr. Ward meant what he clearly stated, then the
misunderstanding has to do with the word pleading. Ignoring the fact that, as an experienced
attorney, Mr. Ward knows that pleadings under Louisiana law do not include memoranda, he
would have this Court believe that he was actually referring to the memorandum in opposition
regarding information that came from Plaintiff Judge Marchman. 5 However, that explanation
stands in sharp contrast with the fact that Mr. Ward only referred to Plaintiff Judge Marchman
rather than any of the other witnesses identified in the memorandum. 6 It also ignores the fact that
what was set before and argued to Judge Barbera that day was not a motion to strike the opposition
memorandum of October 28, 2015. It was to strike the immaterial and prejudicial allegations
concerning Campbell and the defendant judges and filed on July 22 and 31, 2015.7 Indeed, Judge
Barbara struck the references to Campbells confidential employment incidents and complaints
and personnel matters handled internally by the judges, more than half of the paragraphs in the
pleadings.8
Judge Barbera neither considered nor made rulings concerning Mr. Wards
Moreover, the information to which Messrs. Ward and Banks certified that Plaintiff Judge
Marchman would testify was already in the pleadings, such as:
That a complaint had been made in 2012 by a Monroe attorney to Judge Sharp that
Campbell withheld or shredded his court document in a pending case, along with details of
the internal investigation conducted by Judge Sharp and its outcome. 13
That Judge Sharp covered up Campbells purported document destruction and remained
silent about it.14
That Campbell was the only subject of a confidential internal audit of the Fourth Judicial
District Court.15
That Judges Amman and Rambo approved Campbells time sheets.16
That Campbell was suspended for the month of May 2014 without pay.17
That an internal investigation of the Fourth Judicial District Court was conducted involving
52 missing writ applications, along with details of the internal investigation and its
outcome. 18
That Judge Jones investigated the same 2012 complaint by a Monroe attorney in 2014,
along with details of the internal investigation and its outcome; specifically that Judges
Sharp and Jones interviewed a witness who supported the complaint but they closed the
investigation anyway.19
13
In a further wrinkle, Plaintiff admits for the first time to providing her personal file to counsel
via return on a subpoena duces tecum that Judge Sharp had quashed, but that was not really
quashed since the Second Circuit later invalidated Judge Sharps rulings at some point after the
August 20, 2015 hearing. 20 This convoluted explanation leads to the next tortuous leg of Plaintiffs
argument.
Having been confronted with the transcript clearly showing that at the August 20, 2015
hearing Judge Sharp permitted Plaintiff to give the two letters in her hand to counsel, neither of
which contained any of Campbells confidential employment information, Plaintiff Judge
Marchmans narrative has shifted once again. 21 As the hearing transcript plainly shows, Plaintiff
Judge Marchman identified the two documents, confirming to Judge Sharp, [s]o thats my
return.22 Judge Sharp responded that she could give her return--the two documents--to Mr.
Ward. 23 Now Plaintiff Judge Marchman contends that Judge Sharps instruction to give Mr. Ward
the two letters she held up at the hearing permitted further reinterpretation of the original quashed
subpoena duces tecum to extend to a heretofore unmentioned personal file she evidently kept of
Campbells confidential personnel information.24 Nothing in the transcript supports such a leap.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs explanation of how her attorneys came to be in possession of information
in August 2015 that had already been disclosed in July 2015 pleadings belies belief.
Section 1927 addresses the concern that frivolous arguments waste judicial resources and
increase the parties legal fees.25 This case morphed from:
20
Doc. 75 at p. 6, fn. 4.
Doc. 40, Exhibit 12 at pp. 50-51.
22
Doc. 40, Exhibit 12 at p. 51, line 20.
23
Doc. 40, Exhibit 12 at p. 51, lines 29-31.
24
Doc. 74 at p. 7.
25
Baulch v. Johns, 70 F. 3d 813, 817 (5th Cir. 1995).
21
Palowsky v. Cork, a state court dispute between corporate shareholders initiated by Messrs.
Ward and Banks, currently pending and inactive in the Fourth Judicial District Court,
into Palowsky v. Campbell, a sensationalized and baseless series of immaterial claims
against a law clerk and judges of the Fourth Judicial District Court also initiated by Messrs.
Ward and Banks, the dismissal of which is currently on appeal in the Second Circuit,
into this federal civil rights suit, again initiated by Messrs. Ward and Banks, by one sitting
judge of the Fourth Judicial District Courtand witness for Messrs. Ward and Banks in
the immediately previous debacle--against a law clerk and her supervising sitting judges,
along with any attorney who happened to represent them, over personnel issues and internal
disputes within the Fourth Judicial District Court.
Like the shifting legal theories introduced by Plaintiff Judge Marchman in opposition to the
various defendants Motions to Dismiss, 26 Plaintiff and her counsel have twisted what are distinct
facts evident from public record filings and admissions of her counsel into ludicrous and costly
contortion.
For example, while accusing Crawford of misleading the Court with material
misstatements:
Plaintiffs opposition criticizes Crawford for spending the bulk of his argument addressing
other pleadings or activities in state court. That statement is nonsensical because the other
pleadings or activities in state court proceedings are the factual basis of Plaintiffs causes
of action against Crawford.
Marchmans pleadings concerning her causes of action against Crawford have to do with
26
See Defendant Guices concise summary of Plaintiffs ever evolving legal theories contradicted by her own
pleadings and apt analogy to judicial whack-a-mole at Doc. 67 at p. 1, fn. 1.
filings he made on Campbells behalf in Palowsky v. Campbell, which arose directly out
of unsuccessful attempts to raise the same claims in Palowsky v. Cork.27
Plaintiffs opposition criticizes Crawford for spending the bulk of his argument addressing
other pleadings or activities in state court, then does just that. Plaintiff discusses at length
filings Crawford made on February 26, 2016 in a state court proceeding. 28
Plaintiffs opposition represents to this Court that Crawford accused her of criminal
acts.29 That characterization is inaccurate hyperbole which contradicts her own pleadings.
Crawford never accused Plaintiff Judge Marchman of criminal acts, nor do Plaintiffs
pleadings allege that he has. As Plaintiff correctly alleged in her complaints, in filings on
behalf of Campbell, Crawford truthfully represented that Plaintiff violated Judge Simons
Judgment by illegally and improperly disclosing Campbells confidential personnel
information--not that Plaintiff was a criminal. 30
Plaintiffs opposition suggests that Campbells guilt or innocence is dispositive of whether
she illegally disclosed Campbells confidential personnel information and whether
Crawford correctly so stated that she did. Plaintiff and her counsel repeatedly stress that
Crawford has misled this Court concerning the status of that investigation. Plaintiff and
her counsel have attached, under seal, out of context portions of the Louisiana State Police
report in an effort to convince this Court that review of criminal conduct remained
pending. 31 Significantly, as of July 15, 2016, the Louisiana Attorney General deemed the
27
investigation complete and concluded that the facts determined in the investigation by the
Louisiana State Police and Office of the Inspector General do not give rise to evidence
sufficient to support a prosecution of Campbell.32 However, regardless of what the official
investigation found, or whether Plaintiff Judge Marchman erroneously believed Campbell
committed wrongdoing, the public record demonstrates that Plaintiff Judge Marchmans
attorneys identified her as the source of Campbells confidential information illegally and
improperly included in the July 2015 petitions.
Hence, the constantly evolving nature of her narrative of events and unwillingness to dismiss
factually and legally implausible positions support the inference of an illegitimate purpose and
improper motive in filing under Rule 11 and persisting in this matter under 1927. As such,
sanctions are warranted.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above and in Crawfords Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 60), the
signing, filing, and advocating of the Complaint and Amended Complaint violate Rule 11(b)(1),
(2) and (3) as well as the duties imposed by 1927 and appropriate sanctions are warranted against
Plaintiff Judge Marchman and her attorneys.
32
Exhibit 1, July 15, 2016 letter from Brandon Fremin, Director of Criminal Division, Office of the Attorney General.
Respectfully submitted:
ALLEN & GOOCH
A Law Corporation
/s/ James H. Gibson
____________________________________
JAMES H. GIBSON 14285
jimgibson@allengooch.com
2000 Kaliste Saloom Rd Suite 400
Lafayette, LA 70508
P. O. Box 81129
Lafayette, LA 70598-1129
Direct Dial 337-291-1300
Direct Fax 337-291-1305
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT, BRIAN E.
CRAWFORD
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Reply Memorandum was filed electronically
with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. Notice of this filing will be sent to all counsel
of record by operation of the Courts electronic filing system.
Lafayette, Louisiana, this 19th day of July, 2016.
/s/ James H. Gibson
__________________________________
JAMES H. GIBSON
State of Louisiana
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
P.O. BOX 94005
BATON ROUGE
70804-9005
Jeff Landry
Arromey General
EXHIBIT 1
JUL 18 2016