The Death of Basil II: ήηαν όλα καηάβαζη από εδώ.

1
David G. Terrell
April 16, 2010

When one measures a Civilization, like the Byzantine Empire, the most effective unit of measure

is the number of persons over which it exerts domination or influence. Domination, or perhaps

governance, is based upon the subjugation of individual sovereignty to another person or to a ruling

group. This subjugation is accomplished through the use of persuasion and exploitation. Such persuasion

can be peaceful and sometimes voluntarily, in the case of diplomacy or implicit trust. Often, however,

domination is achieved violently and involuntarily—through the application of military force and/or

economic exploitation, in the imposition of taxation or tariff. Influence is based upon the voluntary

adoption of varied cultural attributes, such as religion, or through the exchange of economic value in trade

goods and raw materials. The ability of a sovereign power to maintain and expand its dominance and

influence is essentially sustained by internal harmony. This harmony is created when a focused,

unchallenged authority is able to implement a successful concept of operations, using a successfully

mobilized populace (i.e., those already dominated or influenced). This historian concurs with

Ostrogorsky’s assertion that the reign of Emperor Basil II (r. 960-1025)2 represented the zenith of the

Byzantine Empire’s dominance and influence.3 After the death of Basil II on 15 December 1025, it was

essentially “all downhill”.

The Byzantine Empire survived over a thousand years after the fall of the Roman Empire. As

exemplified in Figure 1, during the early Empire, between the year 300 and the time of Justinian (r. 527-

565), its population fluctuated between 17 and 26 million persons,4 while its land area rather consistently

filled a substantial area: the south part of Iberia, all of the Italic peninsula, Hellas, the Balkans, the coast

1
“It was all downhill from here.” Google Translate.
2
All dates are CE.
3
George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, (Revised Edition (1969). Translated by Joan Hussey. New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 298.
4
Warren T. Treadgold, A History of the Byzantine State and Society, (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 1997), 137, 278.
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David G. Terrell

of North Africa, Egypt, Asia Minor, and the Levant.5 By the time Basil II died in 1025, the land area

controlled by the Empire had diminished by approximately one-half and consisted of southernmost Italy,

the Balkans, Asia Minor and the northern Levant.6 However, in spite of the impact of the Byzantine-Arab

wars in the interregnum, the population remained nearly the same, about 12 million persons.7 As a

measure of reduced dominion, in the three centuries after Basil II, the population of the Empire

diminished, varying between 5 and 10 million persons. By the reign of the Palaeologi (c. 1300), near the

Empire’s end, the population had decreased to 2 million persons in and about the capital, the only land

remaining in the Empire’s control.8

30
Death of
25
Pop (Millions)

Basil II
20
15
10
5
0
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
Year CE

FIGURE 1. The Population of the Eastern Roman Empire, from Treadgold.9

Ostrogorsky, in chapter four of his History of the Byzantine State, describes Basil II’s many

accomplishments towards successfully increasing the effectiveness of the Empire’s ability to project

dominance (in the spheres of diplomacy, military suasion, and economic exploitation by taxation); and, to

project influence (through religion and trade). Basil made effective and perceptive use of these

capabilities to advance the Empire’s area of control. For example, Basil continued and even expanded the

5
Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, 2009), 82.
6
Luttwak, 194.
7
Treadgold, 570.
8
Treadgold, 700, 841.
9
Treadgold, 137, 278, 570, 799, 841.
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David G. Terrell

use of Themes, effectively organizing the populace to provide consistent sources of military recruits and

tax revenues. He made a very successful diplomatic alliance with the Russians by the unprecedented step

of offering a daughter “born to the purple” in marriage to the Tsar. As part of the alliance, the Russian

conversion to Orthodox Christianity brought a large populace and land area into the Byzantine sphere of

influence.10

After ensuring internal harmony in Asia Minor, with the help of his new Russian allies, Basil II

turned to the Balkans and defeated Bulgaria, making it a vassal nation in a decisive, violent campaign that

likely included active subversion of Bulgarian nobles to foment internal disharmony. After retaking the

Balkan Peninsula, Basil ruled it with surprising moderation, given the nature of his military campaigning

and, dividing it into themes, assimilated Bulgaria’s economic output into the Empire’s. He also

established an archbishopric in the Balkans that was subject to the Emperor, rather than to the Patriarch of

Constantinople, so as to limit the power of that religious leader relative to his own. The reincorporation of

the Balkans into the Empire gave Basil a set of resources he could use to balance against Asia Minor,

reducing the overall influence of that region’s aristocracy over the Imperium. Basil also strengthened the

Empire’s tax-base by restricting the expansion of tax-exempt church property and by making the

magnates (feudal nobles) in control of large landholdings responsible for the taxes due from their

tenants.11

Ostrogorsky then describes, in chapter five, the systematic reversal of every pillar upon which the

Empire’s ability to project dominance and influence rested. In his words:

“The ineffective successors of Basil II were not capable of carrying on the struggle against the
feudal magnates; and the collapse of the military small-holdings proceeded at a break-neck pace,
thus undermining the imperial defenses and the state’s system of taxation.”12

10
Ostrogorsky, 303-304.
11
Ostrogorsky, 306-311.
12
Ostrogorsky, 320.
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David G. Terrell

Religious influence was diminished by the schism between intransigent popes and patriarchs

previously kept in check by strong Emperors. The mild diplomacy Basil had imposed on the Bulgarians

was revoked and the levels of oppression provoked the Balkan peoples to rebellion which, although not

successful, required the unnecessary expenditure of military and financial resources to maintain

Byzantine domination. The direct control of the area eliminated a buffer state between the Empire and the

outside world that exacerbated later threats. The Empire’s ability to respond militarily was adversely

effected by the systematic reduction of the armed forces an aristocracy who failed to understand the past

benefits of allied buffer states and who assumed no new threats would arise from beyond the Empire’s

borders. When such a threat did arrive, in the form of the Turks, a similar diplomatic lack of consideration

led to the annexation of Armenia, a valuable buffer against the nomads beyond the northern borders. The

system of taxation and levying military forces from the citizenry failed, the Empire’s capabilities were

diminished, and Asia Minor and its peoples were lost to the invading Turks.13

The foundation for projecting dominance and influence to enlarge one’s civilization is internal

harmony. Basil II’s success was founded upon his alliance with the Russians; the victory over the

aristocracy in Asia Minor after thirteen years of struggle; the even-handed manner in which he governed

the Balkans, after their subjugation; his single-minded dedication to proactively expanding the Empire’s

sphere of influence; and, maintaining internal harmony by any means necessary.14 After his death, the

Empire’s leadership turned inward and the aristocracy abandoned efforts to maintain the virtual borders

secured by dominance and influence. They set themselves to enjoying the fruits of Basil’s efforts in

“byzantine” splendor. The only redeeming aspect of this period of narcissistic expenditure and inward-

focus was its explosion of intellectual activity. Basil’s reign was marked by the militant asceticism he

13
Ostrogorsky, 320-350.
14
Ostrogorsky, 305.
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David G. Terrell

exemplified in his own behavior. The sudden release of inhibitions in the wake of his death produced

extraordinary scholarship, even as it released baseness in morality and deplorable political activity.15

Nevertheless, in every measurable aspect, the Empire’s ability to project dominance and influence

upon its friends, enemies and competitors declined after the death of Basil II. The result was a relatively

constant reduction in the number of people identifying with, or having favor towards, the Byzantine

Empire. Eventually reduced to the environs of Constantinople, the Empire no longer possessed the human

and financial capital needed to resist the forces of dominance and influence projected by its neighbors—

and it was absorbed into obscurity.

David G. Terrell
Herndon, VA

15
Ostrogorsky, 327.
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David G. Terrell

Works Cited

Luttwak, Edward N. The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.

Ostrogorsky, George. History of the Byzantine State. Revised Edition (1969). Translated by Joan Hussey.
New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1969.

Treadgold, Warren T. A History of the Byzantine State and Society. Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 1997.

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