Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
1 Wigmore
FACTS:
FACTS:
Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and each is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The
appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24
March 1993, the Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January
1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent
Motion to Withdraw Appeal.
They were granted a conditional pardon that with their
acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants will be
released from confinement, the appellants impliedly admitted
their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal
should be dismissed. They were discharged from the New
Bilibid Prison on 28 December 1993. Atty. Lao further
informed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for his
province without consulting her. She then prays that the Court
grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it
withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon.
Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by
the trial court is enforceable.
HELD:
No pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction
becomes final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is
seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused commences to
serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly
waived in writing, except where the death penalty was
imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies
for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. Where the
judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet
therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive
clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section
19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of
pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an
accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or
parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those
responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those
in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon
as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y
Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof
within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his
appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon
granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only
upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance
with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody
the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the
assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National
Bureau of Investigation.
RAMON C. TAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal
Industries, located at 301 Jose Abad Santos St., Tondo, Manila,
engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers or spare
did not state the reason therefor. The SC first required the
counsel of the appellants to comment on the urgent motion.
On 22 March 1996, the SC received a 1st Indorsement from
Superintendent Venancio Tesoro informing the Court that
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin "were released on
Conditional Pardon on January 25, 1996."
Upon direction by the SC, Tesoro submitted certified true
copies of the conditional pardons separately granted to
accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
showing that they were released from confinement on January
25, 1996 in view of the grant of conditional pardon.
ISSUE:
Whether the conditional pardons were valid.
HELD:
No. It is clear that the conditional pardons separately
extended to the accused-appellants were issued during the
pendency of their instant appeal.
In a prior resolutions, the SC categorically declared the
"practice of processing applications for pardon or parole
despite pending appeals" to be "in clear violation of law." The
"conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19,
Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of
pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court.
Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted
upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun
unless the appeal is withdrawn. The acceptance of the pardon
shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal,
and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon,
commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of
an appeal shall render those responsible administratively
liable.
It follows then that the conditional pardons granted in this
case to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
are void for having been extended on January 19, 1996 during
the pendency of their instant appeal.
PEOPLE VS TADULAN
(PARDON BY THE OFFENDED PARTY)
FACTS:
Complainant B owns a house in Metro Manila, where she
resides with her common-law husband and their minor
daughter A. Beside their house is an apartment building
wherein one unit was rented by accused Irvin Tadulan along
with his family.
One morning, when Complainants minor daughter A was
playing outside the apartment, accused Tadulan brought
called her and brought her upstairs where he eventually had
intercourse with the child. Initially, A did not inform her
mother about the incident, and it was only when the laundry
woman discovered bloodstains on the panty of A that they
knew of the said incident. When accuseds wife returned to
the apartment, Complainant B told her of her husbands
sexual advancement towards her her daughter A, and that
she would not take legal action against the accused if he
would vacate the apartment unit right away. Accuseds wife
promised to uphold the condition, but her husband was still
coming home to the apartment every night.
Days later, Complainant B heard a commotion in the
apartment unit of the accused, where she saw the accused
arguing with his wife. B called the police, and when they
came, the accuseds wife denounced him and told the police
RULING:
The court ruled that the transaction
between Narciso and the spouses was an agency and not a
sale on credit. The Kasunduan at Katibayan, document
covering the transaction expressly states that the accused
received the items to sell it in behalf of the complainants. It
was a consignment and Narciso was under obligation to
account for the proceeds. The court denied Narcisos
contention that their contract was novated from agency to
loan when he paid partial payments to the spouses. Novation
must be clear and express. Furthermore, even if there was
Novation, the court held that. . . .
Novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability.
It is well settled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected
by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public
offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the
Government on its own motion even though complete
reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by
the offended party. A criminal offense is committed against
the People and the offended party may not waive or
extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the
commission of the offense. The criminal liability for estafa
already committed is not affected by the subsequent novation
of the contract.
In short, Novation is not a ground to extinguish
criminal liability. Therefore, Narciso is guilty.
FACTS:
On February 1, 1965, the fiscal filed information for slight
physical injuries allegedly committed by the petitioner on
December 2, 1964. Since the information was filed after the
prescribed 60-day period, petitioner moved to quash the
criminal prosecution on the ground of prescription.
Respondent contended that it was filed within the prescriptive
period since the last day fell on a Sunday or legal Holiday,
therefore, should not be counted.
ISSUE:
Whether period of prescription is interrupted by Sundays or
Legal Holidays.
HELD:
No. A Sunday or legal holiday does not interrupt nor stop the
running of the prescriptive period as a matter of statutory
articulation. According to Article 91, the only exception is the
offenders physical absence and no other cause can be
sufficient to interrupt prescription.
The Court ruled that Where the sixtieth and last day to file
information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day
period cannot be extended up to the next working day.
Prescription has automatically set in. The fiscal cannot file
the information on the next following working day as it would
tantamount to extending the prescriptive period fixed by law.
Therefore, the motion to quash the criminal prosecution was
granted on the valid ground of prescription.
CABRAL V. PUNO 1976
70 SCRA 606
FACTS:
Petitioner Eugenio Cabral was accused of Falsification of Public
Documents for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the
signature of private respondent Silvino San Diego in a deed of
sale of a parcel of land. Cabral moved to quash the
Information on the ground of prescription of the crime charge,
since the said document of sale was notarized on August 14,
1948 and registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on
August 26, 1948. The said notarization caused the
cancellation of the original certificate of title and a new
transfer certificate of title was then issued. On March 25,
1975, the motion to quash was granted on the ground of
prescription. Private prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said Resolution. However, according to
petitioner Cabral, respondent San Diego can no longer
intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action
against the same accused (Cabral) on the basis of the same
factual averments contained in the criminal information. The
Fiscal, upon the order of respondent Judge Puno, submitted his
comment expressing the view that the crime, has not
prescribed as Silvino San Diego stated that he only discovered
the crime sometime in October 1970, and that in the interest
of justice, arraignment and trial is proper to ventilate the
respective evidence of both parties in their total meaning.
Two (2) days later, respondent Judge set aside the grant of
motion to quash. Petitioner Cabral moved for reconsideration
of the Order on the ground that (a) "the judgment of acquittal
which became final immediately upon promulgation and could
not, therefore, be recalled for correction or amendment"; and
ISSUES:
(1) W its discovery may be deemed to have taken place from
the time the document was registered with the Register of
Deeds. YES
(2) W the rule on constructive notice may be applied to
criminal cases. YES
RULING:
The crime of falsification of a public document carries with it
an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00.
Being punishable by a correctional penalty, this crime
prescribes in ten (10) years. The ten (10) year prescriptive
period commences to run "from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents . . ."
Citing Cabral vs Puno, x x x This crime prescribes in ten (10)
years. Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice
of the alleged
forgery after the document was registered
in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.
The rule is well-established that registration in a public
registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is
constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal
and equitable, included therein.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
DECISION:
1.
2.
HELD:
The Supreme Court agrees with the court
administrator only in so far as the dismissal of the instant
case is concerned. The respondent judge was correct in
stating that Slight Physical Injuries is a light offense (arresto
menor- one day to thirty days), being a light offense, the
crime of slight physical injuries prescribes in two months.
Article 91 of RPC provides the period of prescription
shall be interrupted by filing the complaint of information. In
the case of Reodica vs CA, filing of the complaint even with
the fiscals office suspends the running of the statute of
limitations (citing Fransisco vs CA and Pp vs Cuaresma).
In the Reodica case, Section 9 of Rule on Summary
Procedure which provides that cases covered thereby, the
prosecution commences by filing the complaint or information
directly with the MeTC, RTC or MTCC cannot be taken to
mean that prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing
of a complaint or information directly with said court. In case
of conflict between Rule on Summary Procedure and RPC
(which is a substantive law), latter prevails.
Respondent Judge erred in declaring the crime of
slight physical injuries had prescribed and that the filing of the
complaint before the Prosecutors Office did not toll or
suspend the running of the prescriptive period.
The matter however is judicial in nature and the rule
is that a partys remedy (if prejudiced by the orders of a judge
given in the course of trial) is the proper reviewing court and
not with the Office of the Court Administrator by means of
administrative complaint.
REPUBLIC VS COJUANGCO ET AL
Facts:
finger of Mrs. Garca and inquired where she bought it, which
the defendant answered from her Comare. Spouses Garcia
together with Lt. Cementina and their Attorney proceeded to
the store of Mr. Rebullida who examined the ring, Rebudilla
confirmed that indeed it was her ring. Mrs. Garcia refuted that
the said ring was purchased by her from Mrs. Miranda who got
it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in turn got it from the
owner , Aling Petring who was boarding in her house; that the
ring might be similar but not the same with that she bought
from Rebudilla.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mrs. Garcia is liable for the lost ring
of Mrs. Guevara
HELD:
Yes, according to Article 559 of the Civil Code,
recovery of the lost possession even though the one who got
it is in good faith. But in the case at bar, Mrs. Garcia cannot
invoke good faith since she ought to know that the said ring is
a property in question. The Court found out that Aling Petring
is a mysterious and ephemeral figure. The testimony of Mr.
Rebullida was reliable. Therefore, Mrs. Garcia will pay
Attorneys fee and Exemplary damage.
THE PEOPLE OF
GECOMO y OSIT
THE
PHILIPPINES
vs.
PERCIVAL
FACTS:
Complainant Regina Rapuzon alleges that she has been raped
twice by the accused-appellant Percival Gecomo the first
instance being on June 20, 1994 and the second on July 3,
1994.
Regina and Percival were co-employees at Kim Hiong
Restaurant located near Gil Puyat Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila
where the former worked as a waitress and the latter, a
mami steamer. Both worked in the 7:00 P. M. to 5:00 A. M.
shift of said restaurant.
According to the complainant, on June 20, she was walking
towards her workplace when the accused suddenly placed his
left arm over her shoulder and poked a knife at her. She was
threatened of being killed if she wouldnt come with him.
Scared and intimidated, the victim went with him and she was
brought to Mansion Hotel where she was hit in the stomach
twice leaving her unconscious. When she woke up, she found
blood on her genitalia. The accused slapped her and then
again had carnal knowledge of her and was threatened that
she would be killed if she told anyone about it.
On July 3, Regina went to her workplace to inform her
employer about her resignation. As she was going home, the
accused again intercepted her as he did on June 20 and took
her to his house where the second instance of rape happened.
Upon arriving home in the morning of the following day,
July 4, 1992, complainants mother noticed her wounded and
blackened right cheek and asked her how she got those
injuries. It was then that she told her mother everything that
happened to her. They then went to the Jose Abad Santos
Police Station in Tondo to report the crimes committed by
appellant.
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) medico-legal officer Dr.
Louella I. Nario conducted a physical examination of Regina.
Genital findings compatible with sexual intercourse with man
on or about the alleged date of commission.
For his defense, appellant vehemently denied the
charges of rape. He claimed that the complainant was his
girlfriend and that the sexual intercourses on June 20 and July
3, 1992 were with the voluntary will of complainant. He
added that the second carnal intercourse occurred in the
Pension Hotel, and not in his house as alleged by complainant.
PANGAN v GATBALITE
GR No. 141718 January 21, 2005
Petitioner : Benjamin Pangan y Rivera
Respondents : Hon Lourdes F. Gatbalite Col. James D. Labordo
FACTS
The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in a criminal
case in Angeles City MTC.During the trial of the case, Atty.
Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the case for decision
without offering any evidence, due to the petitioners constant
absence at hearings.
begins to run.
The period for prescription of penalties begins only when the
convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the
term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered
deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000
and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping
during the term of his service, the period for prescription
never began.
FACTS:
In 1979, Torres was convicted of estafa and was pardoned by
the president with the condition that if he shall violate any
penal law again, his sentence will be carried out. Petitioner
accepted the conditional pardon and was released from
prison. However, by 1982, the Board of Pardons and Parole
recommended to the President the cancellation of the
conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been
charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of
sedition. His pardon was cancelled. He appealed the issue
before the Supreme Court. He contended that his pardon
should not have been cancelled since the judgment on the
new estafa cases were still on appeal. Through his wife and
children, he petitioned to be released from prison alleging that
he was denied due process, and that his constitutional rights
to be presumed innocent and to a speedy trial were violated
upon his recommitment to prison.
ISSUE:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final
judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms
of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance
of his original sentence.
RULING:
Where a conditional pardonee has allegedly
breached a condition of a pardon, the President who opts to
proceed against him under Section 64
of the Revised
Administrative Code need not wait for a judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his
conviction therefore by final judgment, in order to effectuate
the recommitment of the pardonee to prison.
It did not matter that Torres was allegedly been acquitted in
two of the three criminal cases filed against him subsequent
to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains
pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his
right to a speedy trial.
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's
liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. The
incarceration of Torres is legal since he would have served his
final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000,
had he not violated the conditions of the pardon and had thus
had it revoked.
Lastly, only the President has the prerogative to reinstate the
pardon if in his own judgment.Courts have no authority
to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a
convicted criminal.A final judicial pronouncement as to the
guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to
determine whether or not there has been a breach of the
terms of a conditional pardon.
MONSATO VS FACTORAN
FACTS:
ARNEL
PROBATION
COLINARES
v.
PEOPLE
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of
attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the
penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of
four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and
four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this
new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right
to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that "probation will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed.
RULING:
"SEC. 5. Post Sentence Investigation. No person shall be
placed on probation except upon prior investigation by the
probation officer and a determination by the court that the
ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as
that of the defendant will be served thereby."cralaw virtua1aw
library
It is evident from the foregoing that the potentiality of the
offender to reform is not the sole, much less the primordial
factor, that should be considered in the grant or denial of an
application for probation. Equal regard to the demands of
justice and public interest must be observed. Thus, Section 8
of P.D. 968 lays down the criteria for the placing of an offender
on
probation,
as
follows:
"Sec. 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. In
determining whether an offender may be placed on probation,
b)
HELD:
FACTS:
Petitioner Alicia Cabatingan was convicted for operating an
illegal Jai-Alai betting station. She applied for probation, but
the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan on the grounds
that there is undue risk of her committing another crime
and that the granting of the petition will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense she committed. The decision was
mainly based on the probation officers recommendation for
dismissal of the said application.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on
Sandiganbayans act of denying petitioners application for
probation.
HELD:
YES. In the case at bar, it was established by ample evidence
that petitioner is entitled to the benefits of probation.
Moreover, it was not established that she is a hardened
FACTS:
Petitioner allegedly falsified an Extrajudicial Declaration of
Heirs with Waiver of Rights and Partition Agreement, as the
signatures contained therein were not the signatures of the
true owners of the land. Petitioner and Ildefonsa also allegedly
caused it to appear that a certain Remedios Abangan, who
was already dead, signed the document. On 28 November
2000, the RTC convicted petitioner of the crime of Falsification
of Public Documents under Article 172 in relation to Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code, but Ildefonsa was acquitted.
On 13 December 2002, a copy of the Order denying
reconsideration of the judgment was received by
petitioners counsel. Due to petitioners failure to interpose
a timely appeal, an entry of judgment was issued on June 5,
2003.
Pending resolution of the Motions to Recall Warrant of Arrest
and to Vacate Entry of Judgment with Reconsideration,
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on 17 June 2003.
Subsequently, in an Order dated 22 July 2003, respondent
Judge denied the Motions to Recall Warrant of Arrest and to
Vacate Entry of Judgment. Petitioners Notice of Appeal was
also denied for having been filed out of time.
FACTS:
On 1994, petitioner Alejandra Pablo was charged with a
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as
the Bouncing Checks Law, in three separate Informations, for
issuing three bad checks in the total amount of P2,334.00
each to complainant Nelson Mandap.
LAGROSA VS PP (PROBATION)
Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D, 94-00198-D
and 94-00199-D, respectively, the three cases were not
consolidated.
FACTS:
The RTC of Tagbilaran City, rendered a decision in Criminal
Case finding petitioners Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin
guilty of violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 for having in their
possession forest products without permits. The trial court
sentenced them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from (2) years, (4) months and (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC, with the modification as to
the penalty imposed, which was reduced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from (6) months and (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, tom(1) year, (8) months and (21)
days of prision correccional, as maximum.
Petitioners filed an application for Probation with the trial
court which was denied. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA. However, the CA still affirmed the
resolutions of the trial court.
Petitioners contend that they should be allowed to apply for
probation even if they had already appealed the decision of
the trial court. They argue that their case should be
considered an exception to the general rule which excludes an
accused who has appealed his conviction from the benefits of
probation. In the case at bar, the trial court sentenced
petitioners to a maximum term of eight years, which was
beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became
eligible for probation after the CA reduced the penalty
imposed on them. They submit that the ruling in the case of
Francisco v. CA is not applicable because the accused
appealed their conviction notwithstanding the fact that the
maximum term of the prison sentence imposed by the trial
court was less than six years.
OSG reiterates the express provision of P.D. 968 prohibiting
the grant of probation to those who have appealed their
convictions. It argues that, even if the petitioners have
appealed for the purpose of reducing an incorrect penalty, this
fact does not serve to remove them from the prohibition in
Section 4 of P.D. 968 for the law makes no such distinction.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners can apply for probation. Held:
HELD: No. Petitioners should be precluded from seeking
probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto
relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the
Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to prevent
speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who,
although already eligible, does not at once apply for
probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal.
Although it has been suggested that an appeal should not bar
the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is solely
to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be
equitable, the court did not accept this proposition, especially
given the factual circumstances of this case. Had the
petitioners appeal from the decision of the trial court raised
the impropriety of the penalty imposed upon them as the sole
issue, perhaps the Court would have been more sympathetic
to their plight.
PABLO
V.
CASTILLO
(2000)
On June
rendered
convicting
her a fine
LEON
CUYO
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
FACTS:
On August 25, 2009, Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) in San Fernando City, La Union, found petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of perjury
under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced
him to imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day to
ISSUE:
WON Morenos sentence was in fact served.
HELD:
Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. the
phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence should
have been interpreted and understood to apply both to those
who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude and to those who have been
sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment. It has been held that the
perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative
remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which
is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an
accused who, although already eligible, did not at once apply
for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order
placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather,
in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held
that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the
imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the
accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed
upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of
probation. It appears then that during the period of probation,
the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a
public office because the accessory penalty of suspension
from public office is put on hold for the duration of the
probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is under
probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence
adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides
that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the
sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer
does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but
is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed
in the probation order.
Law-Information-Aggravating
Facts:
Visitacion Locaas is a mother of 3 and wife of a convict. On
October 31, 1991, respondent ALBERTO DAGAMI entered
the house of the victim Visitacion. The respondent with the aid
of a gun, raped the victim.
HELD:
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is
found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. [17] This liability
is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the
award is made.[18] However, before execution against an
employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing
set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an employeremployee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in
some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty
of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense
in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he
commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and 4) that
said employee is insolvent.[19]
There are two instances when the existence of an employeremployee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged
Later, the victim went to her father and reported the incident
to the Barangay Captain which is the respondents brother
who told them to lodge the complaint to the police. Visitacion
submitted herself to an examination by an OB-GYNE. Which
the latter affirmed that rape actually happened.
Upon the release of her husband, Visitacion later went to fetch
and live with him.
In the respondents defense, he invoked the sweetheart
story. He alleged that Visitacion and him had an illicit affair
while the formers husband is in jail. His testimonies were
supported by some witnesses.
RTC found the respondent guilty. .with the use of a deadly
weapon, a handgun, and applying the pertinent provisions of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, convicts him to suffer an
2.
heirs of the victim P 77, 421 for the actual and moral
damages including death indemnity.
ISSUE:
W/ N the trial court erred in the civil indemnity and actual and
moral damages given to the heirs of the victim
HELD:
2.
P75,000.00
as
indemnity
for
Adlawans
death, P93,100.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00
as moral damages;
3.
PEOPLE VS MALLARE
FACTS:
On October 4, 1999, an Information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan charging Melchor M. Mallare (Mallare) and
Elizabeth M.
Gosudan (Gosudan), Mayor and Treasurer,
respectively with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the accused
were public officers and that an audit report was made. There
was also restitution in the amount of 110,000.00.
Additionally, there was a written demand on the accused to
pay the shortage amount of 1,487,107.40.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court is correct in convicting Mallare and
Gosudan of Malversation of funds
HELD :
PEOPLE VS CASTILLANO
(Civil Indemnities)
FACTS:
The family of victim Diosdado Volante, a farmer, and
that of accused Jaime Castillano and his family, were in bad
blood since the latters frequent indiscriminate firing of his
gun in their neighborhood. This incident worsened when the
victim approached the accused and asked to stop firing his
gun, for fear of someone from his family getting hit; but
accused rebutted that their neighbors arent even
complaining. A heated altercation ensued, and prompted the
accused to fire towards the house of the victim. Since then,
the accused was always carrying a bolo everytime he passed
the
house
of
the
victim.
A week later, a neighboring teacher witnessed the
accused and his two sons as they were planning to go to the
victims house, and tried to convince them to settle the
dispute peacefully. But the accused and his sons forged on
towards the house of the victim at night. At first, the victim
did not mind them, but the accused and sons barged inside
the house and his sons ganged up on the victim by taking
turns on stabbing him. The victim died.
When the trial ensued, the victims wife testified that
when he was still alive, he had an annual income of over P
65,000. She also spent P 18,000 for the funeral and 9,000 for
the food and other expenses. She also suffered sleepless
nights and mental anguish from his death. Thus, the trial court
found the sons of the accused guilty of murder and to pay the