REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF DEMOCRITO O.

PLAZA, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Petitioner implores this Court to review and set aside the decision of February 8, 1993 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 34950 which affirmed the decision of June 14, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in
LRC Case No. M-99 confirming respondent Democrito O. Plazas title over Rel. Plan 1059, which is the relocation
plan of Psu-97886.
After the filing of private respondents Comment, this Court, in its resolution of May 24, 1993, gave due course
to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. The petitioner filed its Memorandum
on June 29, 1993 while private respondent filed his Memorandum on July 6, 1993.
The factual background is summarized in the Decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
According to petitioner-appellee, the subject property situated at Liwanag, Talon (formerly Pamplona), Las Pinas,
Rizal, now Metro Manila, having an area of 45,295 sq. m., was first owned by Santos de la Cruz who declared the
same in his name under Tax Declaration Nos. 3932, for the year 1913; 3933 for 1917; and 6905, for 1921 (Exhs. 2B, 2-C and 2-D, Exh. K for petitioner-appellee, pp. 514-516, Record). Subsequently, the subject property was
successively bought or acquired by Pedro Cristobal, Regino Gervacio, Diego Calugdan and Gil Alhambra. To
evidence their respective acquisition of the property in question, Tax Declaration Nos. 7937, for the year 1923;
8463, for 1927; 9467, for 1934; and 2708 (year not available) were presented. After Gil Alhambra died, his heirs
extrajudicially partitioned the subject property and declared it in their names under Tax Declaration Nos. 5595 and
5596 for the year 1960. On 5 July 1966, they executed a Deed of Sale With Mortgage deeding the subject property
to petitioner-appellee for P231,340.00 payable in three (3) installments, the payment of which was secured by a
mortgage on the property. Upon receipt of the full payment, they executed a Release of Mortgage on 1 August
1968. After the sale, petitioner-appellee took possession of the subject property and paid the taxes due thereon for
the years 1966 up to 1986, and in 1985 declared it in his name under Tax Declaration Nos. B-013-01392 and B-01301391. He appointed Mauricio Plaza and Jesus Magcanlas as the administrator and caretaker thereof,
respectively. Due to losses, the property in question was cultivated only for a while. Five (5) years according to
Mauricio Plaza, and from 1966 up to 1978 according to Jesus Magcanlas.
On 14 November 1986, petitioner-appellee filed a petition, which was amended on 17 July 1987, for the registration
and confirmation of his title over the subject property alleging, among others, that:
1. by virtue of the deed of sale, he is the owner thereof;
2. he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the property prior to, and since 12 June 1945;
3. other than himself, there is no other person occupying, or having any interest over the property; and,
4. there are no tenants or agricultural lessees thereon
On 24 February 1988, oppositor-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for brevity), filed its
opposition maintaining, among others, that: (1) petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest have not been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or
prior thereto; (2) the muniment of title and tax declarations as well as tax payments relied upon do not constitute
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land by petitioner-appellee and of his open, continuous
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since 12 June 1945, or prior thereto, and (3) the subject
property pertains to the public domain and is not subject to private appropriation.

On 9 March 1988, after the compliance of the jurisdiction requirements was proved and, on motion, the lower court
issued its order of general default.
Aside from the Republic, there were others who opposed the petition and filed their opposition thereto prior to, or
were allowed to submit their opposition despite, and after, the issuance of the order of general default. They are:
(a) Arsenio Medina who withdrew his opposition on 29 May 1989;
(b) Emilio, Leopoldo and Abraham, all surnamed Borbon; Heirs of Andres Reyes; Maximo Lopez; and,
Marilou Castanares who prayed that the lower court direct petitioner-appellee to see to it that their
respective property, which adjoins the land in question, are not included in the petition;
(c) The Heirs of Santos de la Cruz and the Kadakilaan Estate. Upon their respective motion, the order of
default was set aside as to them and they were allowed to file their opposition.
The Heirs of Santos de la Cruz argue that: (1) their predecessor-in-interest, Santos de la Cruz, is the primitive owner
of the subject lot; and, (2) he, his heirs, and upon their tolerance, some other persons have been in open, peaceful,
notorious and continuous possession of the land in question since time immemorial until the present.
The Kadakilaan Estate contends that: (1) by reason of its Titulo de Propiedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree 014, with approved plans registered under the Torrens System in compliance with, and as a consequence of, P.D. 872,
it is the owner of the subject property; and, (2) petitioner-appellee or his predecessors-in-interest have not been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or
earlier.
(d) the Heirs of Hermogenes Rodriguez. They allege, among others, that by reason of a Titulo de
Propiedad de Terrenos of 1891; Royal Decree No. 01-4, Protocol of 1891; Decree No. 659, approved
Plan of the Bureau of Lands No. 12298 dated 10 September 1963, their predecessor-in-interest is the
owner of the subject property. Despite (sic) that their motion to lift order of default as to them and
admit their opposition, which motion was opposed by petitioner-appellee, does not appear to have
been acted upon by the lower court, they were able to present one (1) witness; and,
(e) Phase II Laong Plaza Settlers Association, Inc. It filed a motion to intervene in the case but the motion
does not appear to have been acted upon by the lower court.
On 13 March 1990, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, West Sector (CENRO-WEST) of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources requested the lower court to furnish it photocopies of the
records of the petition as the property in question was the subject of a request for a Presidential Proclamation
reserving the land in question for Slum Improvement and Resettlement Site (SIR) of the National Housing
Authority.
On 22 June 1990, upon order of the lower court, an ocular inspection was conducted on the subject property by the
court-appointed commissioner who submitted his report on 2 July 1990.
On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was issued by the President of the Republic of the Philippines
withdrawing the subject property from sale or settlement and reserve (the same) for slum improvement and sites and
services program under the administration and disposition of the National Housing Authority in coordination with
the National Capital Region, Department of Environment and Natural Resources subject to actual survey and private
rights if any there be, ... The National Housing Authority was authorized to develop, administer and dispose of the
area in accordance with LOI 555, as amended (by LOI Nos. 686 and 1283), and LOI 557.
On 31 May 1991 petitioner-appellee filed his memorandum. The oppositors did not. Nevertheless, among them, only
the Republic and the Heirs of Santos de la Cruz formally offered their evidence.
On 14 June 1991 the lower court rendered the judgment referred to earlier.

On 8 July 1991, from among the oppositors, only the Republic filed a notice of appeal which was approved on
10 July 1991. By reason of the approval thereof, the motion filed on 23 July 1991 by the Heirs of Hermogenes
Rodriguez for the reconsideration of the judgment was denied on 1 August 1991.
On February 8, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the trial courts judgment.
Hence, this petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines alleging that:
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION, IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW, THE EVIDENCE AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
Petitioner argues that the burden rests on the applicant to show by convincing evidence that he has a registrable
title over the property sought to be titled, which the latter failed to do.
According to petitioner, aside from mere tax declarations all of which are of recent vintage, private respondent
has not established actual possession of the property in question in the manner required by law (Section 14, P.D.
1529) and settled jurisprudence on the matter. Thus, no evidence was adduced that private respondent cultivated
much less, fenced the subject property if only to prove actual possession. The actual fencing of the property was
done only starting 1988 when the actual occupants were forcibly ejected and driven out from their respective abodes
and that its witnesses namely: Elascio Domitita, Manuel Dolom, Bernadette Aguinaldo and Virginia Franco, who
were all actual residents of the questioned area, categorically testified on this score, summarized as follows:
1. In their long stay in the area, the longest staying occupant being Domitita who had been in the premises
for more than thirty (30) years nobody ever claimed ownership over the subject property;
2. It was only in 1988 that they learned that private respondent had filed a petition to have the property
titled in his name;
3. Private respondent had not introduced any improvement nor was there a caretaker assigned by him to
look after the property; and,
4. Aside from them, there were about 200 more families residing in the area but through force,
intimidation and illegal demolitions, were driven out by private respondent from the premises.
We are not persuaded. On this point, the respondent Court correctly found that:
Proof that petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest have acquired and have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property for a period of 30 years under a bona fide claim of
ownership are the tax declarations of petitioner-appellees predecessors-in-interest, the deed of sale, tax payment
receipts and petitioner-appellees tax declarations. The evidence on record reveals that: (1) the predecessors-ininterest of petitioner-appellee have been declaring the property in question in their names in the years 1923, 1927,
1934 and 1960; and, (2) in 1966, petitioner-appellee purchased the same from the Heirs of Gil Alhambra and since
then paid the taxes due thereon and declared the property in his name in 1985.
xxxxxxxxx
x x x Considering the dates of the tax declarations and the realty tax payments, they can hardly be said to be of
recent vintage indicating petitioner-appellees pretended possession of the property. On the contrary, they are strong
evidence of possession in the concept of owner by petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest. Moreover,
the realty tax payment receipts show that petitioner-appellee has been very religious in paying the taxes due on the
property. This is indicative of his honest belief that he is the owner of the subject property. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that petitioner-appellee has proved that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for a period of 30 years since 12
June 1945 and earlier. By operation of law, the property in question has become private property.
Contrary to the representations of the Republic, petitioner-appellee had introduced some improvements on the
subject property from the time he purchased it. His witnesses testified that petitioner-appellee developed the subject

property into a ricefield and planted it with rice, but only for about five years because the return on investment was
not enough to sustain the continued operation of the riceland. Though not in the category of permanent structures,
the preparation of the land into a ricefield and planting it with rice are considered improvements thereon.
Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession . They constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Neither do we find merit in the assertions of petitioners witnesses Elascio Domitita, Manuel Dolom, Bernadette
Aguinaldo and Virginia Franco. As properly stated by the public respondent,
xxx Their alleged possession is not based on any right. Neither do they claim to have any title or interest over the
subject property. As a matter of fact, they did not bother to oppose the petition. The most that can be said of their
alleged possession is that it was only with the tolerance of rightful owners of the property - plaintiff-appellee and his
predecessors-in-interest, hence, is no bar to the granting of the petition. We do not see why we should accept the
bare assertions of the alleged occupants at their face value as against the claim of ownership of plaintiff-appellee
backed up by legal documents, tax declarations, and tax receipts.
Well-settled and oft-repeated is the rule that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive
on the Supreme Court except: 1.) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; 2.) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3.) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; 4.) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5.) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; 6.) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7.) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; and 8.) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based. Concededly, none of the above exceptions obtains in the case at bar.
Petitioner also alleges that the land in question had been withdrawn from the alienable portion of the public
domain pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 679 entitled Reserving for Slum Improvement and Resettlement
(SIR) Sites and Services of the National Housing Authority, A Certain Parcel of Land of the Public Domain Situated
in the Municipality of Las Pinas, Metro Manila, which was issued on January 7, 1991 or almost 6 months prior to
the issuance of the trial courts decision.
The Court of Appeals opined that the issuance of the proclamation did not have any effect on the subject
property as the proclamation only withdrew it from sale or settlement and reserved the same for slum improvement
and sites and services program, but subject to actual survey and existing private rights. The proclamation did not
prohibit the registration of title of one who claims, and proves, to be the owner thereof. We agree. At any rate,
registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do not give the holder
any better title than what he actually has. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land, as it
merely confirms, but does not confer ownership.
Of particular relevance is the finding of the respondent Court of Appeals to the effect that We have found that petitioner-appellee has proven his claim of ownership over the subject property. As provided in
the proclamation itself, his ownership of the subject property must be respected and he cannot be barred from having
the land titled in his name. This does not contravene or negate the intention of the proclamation. Besides, its
implementing Letters of Instruction recognize that there may be lands declared included in the Slum Improvement
Resettlement (SIR) program that are privately owned. Paragraph 10 of LOI No. 555 provides that if the land
declared to be included in the SIR program is privately owned, the concerned local government, upon the approval
by the National Housing Authority of its project plan, shall acquire the property through expropriation. In LOI No.

686 paragraph 3, it is mandated that the NHA, upon request of the local government, expropriate or otherwise
acquire land for the SIR program. Proclamation No. 679 is, therefore, not a valid justification to deny the petition.
x x x At the time the Proclamation was issued, the controversy over the subject property was sub-judice. The
conflicting rights over it had been presented to the court for resolution. That jurisdiction could not be removed from
it by subsequent legislation. The President must have been aware of this. Hence, the inclusion of the cautionary
clause subject to existing private rights.
Over time, Courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is inconvenient or contrary to
reason is not allowed in law - Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege. Undoubtedly,
reason and law find respondent entitled to rights of ownership over the disputed property.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision dated February 8, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition
is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

EDUARDO CUAYCONG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
RAMONA BENEDICTO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Ruperto Montinola and Aurelio Montinola for appellants.
No appearance for appellees.
FISHER, J.:
The issues in this case relate to the right of plaintiffs to make use of two roads existing on the Hacienda Toreno, a
tract of land in the municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental, the property of the defendants, Blasa Benedicto and
Ramona Benedicto. One of these roads is referred to in the proceedings as the Nanca-Victorias road and the other as
the Dacuman Toreno road. The Court of First Instance held that those of the plaintiffs who claimed to be entitled
to make use of the Dacuman Toreno road had failed to establish the asserted right, and dismissed the action as to
them. From this decision they appealed to this court but, their brief not having been filed within the time prescribed
by the rules, their appeal was dismissed, on motion of defendants, by resolution dated February 14, 1916.
Consequently, the issues presented on this appeal are limited to those which relate to the rights of the parties with
respect to the Nanca-Victorias road, and the determination of the correctness of the decision of the court concerning
that part of the controversy submitted to its decision.
The allegations in the complaint with respect to the Nanca-Victorias road are that the appellees, Eduardo Cuaycong,
Lino Cuaycong, and Eulalio Dolor, are the owners of a group of haciendas situated between the southern boundary
of the Hacienda Toreno and the barrio of Nanca, of the municipality of Seravia, and that the appellees Silverio
Ginoo, Gervasio Ascalon, and Juan Ledesma, are the lessees of part of said haciendas; that more than twenty years
the appellees and their predecessors in interest have made use of the Nanca-Victorias road, which crosses the
Hacienda Toreno, openly, publicly, and continuously, with the knowledge of the owners of the said hacienda, for the
purpose of conveying the products of their haciendas to the town of Victorias and to the landing place there situated,
and for the purpose of transporting supplies from those points to their haciendas, making use of the said road by
means of carts, carabaos, and other usual means of transportation; that there is no outlet to a public road from the
hacienda occupied by these plaintiffs, the only road and way by which the products of the plaintiffs' property can be
taken to the town of Victorias and to the landing place there being across the Hacienda Toreno by the road marked
on the plan attached to the complaint; that on the fifteenth day of November, 1912, the defendants closed the road in
question at the point at which it crosses the Hacienda Toreno, and refused to permit plaintiffs to continue using it;

that plaintiffs were about to commence to grind their crop of sugar cane, and that, if prevented from transporting
their sugar across the Hacienda Toreno to their point of embarkation, would suffer damages difficult to estimate.
Upon these averments of fact the plaintiffs prayed for a judgment that they are entitled to use the road in question as
they have been using it in the past, and that a perpetual injunction be issued against plaintiffs restraining them from
impending such use. Upon the filing of the complaint, plaintiffs moved the court to issue a preliminary injunction
restraining defendants from interfering with the use of the road during the pendency of the suit, which motion was
granted by the court.
Defendants in their answer put in issue all the special averments of the complaint, as above set forth, and by way of
counterclaim and special defense, averred that the road crossing the Hacienda Toreno, over which plaintiffs claim
the right of passage, is the private property of defendants; and, further, that they have not refused plaintiffs
permission to pass over this road but have required them to pay toll for the privilege of doing so. Defendants also
claimed damages for the use of the road by plaintiffs during the pendency of the suit, alleging that the preliminary
injunction had been improvidently issued upon false statements contained in the verified complaint filed by
plaintiffs.
The case was tried in July, 1913. The court on December 8, 1913, rendered judgment, dismissing the complaint with
respect to the plaintiffs Felix Suarez, Probo Jereza, Enrique Azcona, and Melecio Pido, these being the plaintiffs
who claimed the right to use the Dacuman Toreno road. With respect to the Nanca-Victorias road, the court held
that it was a public highway over which the public had acquired a right of use by immemorial prescription, and
ordered the issuance of a perpetual injunction against plaintiffs, restraining them from interfering in any manner
with the use of the said road.
The conclusion of the court with respect to the facts affecting the Nanca-Victorias road are as follows:
Turning to a consideration of the evidence relative to the Nanca-Victorias road we find incontestable proof
that it has been in existence for at least forty years. That the hacenderos located in the southwestern section
of Victorias and the public generally passed over it freely and that it was used for all purposes of
transportation of farm produce, animals, etc. and by pedestrians as well as carromatas and other
conveyances without break or interruption until two or three years ago when the defendants announced that
the road was private and that those who wished to pass over it with sugar carts would be obliged to pay a
toll of ten centavos all other vehicles, it appears, were permitted to pass free charge. This arrangement
seems to have existed during the years of 1911 and 1912 and part of 1913, the money being collected
apparently from some hacenderos and not from others. There is some reason to believe from the evidence
presented by defendants themselves that the practice of making these payments to hacienda 'Toreno'
originated in an attempt to raise a fund for the repair of the road. There is no evidence that any other
hacenderos between Nanca and Victorias or any other person made any attempt to close the road or to
collect toll. On the contrary the road appears to have been repaired by the hacenderos when it needed
repairing and everyone used it on equal terms until the defendants in 1910 or 1911 interposed the objection
that the road in dispute was private. This we think is a fair deduction from the evidence and although it is
asserted that toll was collected at an earlier date by the late Leon Montinola, brother of the defendant
Ruperto Montinola, there is no tangible evidence that this was so and that toll has been paid only during the
years of 1911, 1912, and part of 1913.
The question presented by the assignment of error are in effect:
(a) Is the Nanca-Victorias road at the point at which it traverses the Hacienda Toreno a public highway or not?
(b) If it be held that the road in question is not a public highway, have plaintiffs proven their acquisition of an
easement of way over the Hacienda Toreno at the point traversed by the road in question?
The trial judge, in holding that the road in question is public, bases in conclusion upon the fact, which he deems to
have been proven, that the road has been in existence "from time immemorial," and had been "continiously used as a
public road . . . and open to public as such for thirty or forty years . . . until . . . the defendants undertook to claim it

as private and to collect toll for the passage of carts." (Bill of Exceptions, p. 56.) There is no doubt that for the past
thirty or forty years a road has existed between the former site of the town of Victorias and the barrio of Nanca, of
the municipality of Seravia, and that this road crosses defendants' hacienda. It is also true that during this period the
plaintiffs and their predecessors in the ownership of the hacienda now held by them have made use of this road for
the purpose of going and coming from their haciendas to the town of Victorias; but the question is whether this use
was limited to the plaintiffs, and their tenants and employees, or whether it was, as held by the lower court, a use
enjoyed by the public in general. Plaintiffs produced only two witnesses, Segundo de Leon (stet. notes, pp. 21-22)
and Eduardo Cuaycong, (stet. notes, pp. 27-33) to testify as regards the use of the Nanca-Victorias road. Several
other witnesses testified on behalf of plaintiffs, but their testimony relates to the Dacuman Toreno road, which is
not involved in this appeal. We have carefully read the testimony of the witnesses Leon and Cuaycong, given upon
their direct and cross examination, but we have been unable to find that either of them has testified that the road in
question was ever used by the public in general. These witnesses testified with regard to the use of the road by the
present and former owners and occupants of the estates of Bacayan, Esperanza, Alcaigan, Pusot, and Dolores for the
transportation of the products of these estates to the town of Victorias, and of supplies and agricultural implements
from Victorias to the haciendas, but neither of them testified expressly that any other use had been made of said
road. Nevertheless, it may be reasonably inferred from the testimony of these witnesses that all persons having
occasion to travel between Victorias and the haciendas of Bacayan, Esperanza, Alacaigan, Pusot, and Dolores,
whether or not they were owners, tenants, or employees of said estates, made use of the road now in dispute,
crossing the Hacienda Toreno, and to this limited extent it may be said that the public made use of the road, but there
is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the so called public use extended beyond this.
Apart from the fact that there is no direct evidence to support the finding of the court concerning the general public
use of the road in dispute, the record contains data strongly tending to show that when the complaint was filed
plaintiffs did not contend that the road was a public highway, but merely contended that they had acquired by
prescription an easement of way across the Hacienda Toreno. For example, the action is entitled an "action
concerning a right of away." (Bill of Exceptions, pp. 64 and 65.) It is not averred in the complaint that the road in
question was used by the public. On the contrary, it is averred that it was used by the plaintiffs and their
predecessors. The averment in paragraph 8 of the complaint that the plaintiffs have no other "outlet to a public road"
than that which they have been accustomed to used by going across the defendants' hacienda for the purpose of
going to the town of Victorias also shows that when they commenced this action they had in mind the provisions of
articles 564, et seq. of the Civil Code, which relate to the method of establishing the compulsory easement of way.
The owners of an existing easement, as well as those whose properties are adjacent with a public road, have no
occasion to invoke these provisions of the Code, which relate to the creation of new rights, and not the enforcement
of rights already in existence.
It is true in the opening statement made to the court, counsel for plaintiffs, who was not the same attorney by whom
the complaint was signed, stated that plaintiffs contend that the road in question is public, but as no evidence was
introduced tending to establish this contention concerning the Nanca Victorias road, counsel for defendants had
no occasion to object upon the ground that such testimony was not relevant to the averments of the complaint. No
evidence was taken to indicate that at any time since the road in question has been in existence any part of the
expense of its upkeep has been defrayed by the general government, the province, or the municipality. The trial
judge said upon this subject:
It is true that whatever repairs were made on the road were made irregularly. The municipality of Victorias
had no funds to devote to the construction and repair of roads, and the upkeep of the road depending
entirely therefore on the initiative of the persons who used it, was attended to only at such times as repairs
were absolutely necessary. (Bill of Exceptions, p. 49.)
The court also held that it appears from the government grant issued in 1885 to the original owner of the hacienda
adjacent to the Hacienda Toreno on its western boundary, that the Nanca-Victorias road at that time separated that
estate from the Jalbuena Hacienda, and that these facts constitute "circumstantial evidence that the road was in
existence in 1885." We have examined the document to which the court refers, and we agree that the road in
question existed in 1885; but we do not believe that the document in question proves that the road was public
highway.

Another circumstance established by the evidence, and which is some importance in the determination of this issue,
is that although the defendants closed the Nanca-Victorias road in the month of February, 1911, and since that time
have collected toll from persons passing over it with carts loaded with sugar, including those belonging to several of
the plaintiffs, nothing was done by them to prevent the continuation of this restriction until December, 1912, when
this action was commenced. It is natural to assume that if plaintiffs had considered that the road in question was
public, they would have protested immediately against the action of the defendants, and would have either
commenced a civil action, as they subsequently did, or would have brought about a prosecution under section 16 of
Act No. 1511.
Upon the evidence taken and admissions contained in the pleadings and those made during the course of the trial we
consider that the following findings are warranted:
1. The town of Victorias has always been the shipping point of the products of the Hacienda Toreno, and of the
haciendas of appellees, as well as the place from which supplies were brought to those properties.
2. For thirty or forty years before the commencement of the suit a wagon road, herein called the Nanca-Victorias
road, has been in existence, connecting the haciendas of appellees with the town of Victorias, and this road traverses
the property of defendants. Since the removal of the town of Victorias to a new site the Nanca-Victorias road has
been used by appellees in travelling between their properties and the provincial road which crosses the Hacienda
Toreno from east to west.
3. No public funds have at any time been expended on the construction or upkeep of the Nanca-Victorias road, but
from time to time work has been done on it by the laborers employed by the present and former owners of the
Hacienda Toreno and the haciendas owned by the appellees and their predecessors in title.
4. The Nanca-Victorias wagon road, including that part of it which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, has for thirty-five
or forty years been used by the appellees and their predecessors in title for the transportation, by the usual means, of
the products of their estates to their shipping points in or near the town of Victorias, and the transportation to their
estates of all supplies required by them, and has been used by all persons having occasion to travel to and from all or
any of the estates now owned by the appellees.
5. The use of the Nanca-Victorias road in the manner and by the person above mentioned was permitted without
objection by the owners of the Hacienda Toreno until the year 1911, when they closed it, and began charging a toll
of 5 centavos for each cart which passed over the road, including carts belonging to the appellants, until restrained
from continuing to do so by the preliminary injunction granted in this case.
6. The Nanca-Victorias road constitutes the only outlet from the estates of appellants to the nearest public road
which is the provincial road which crosses the Hacienda Toreno from east to west.
Upon these facts the questions of law to be decided are:
(a) Is the Nanca-Victorias road a public highway?
(b) If the Nanca-Victoria road, or that part of it which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, is not a public highway, is it
subject to a private easement of way in favor of the appellees?
The defendants are the owners of the Hacienda Toreno under a Torrens title issued in accordance with the Land
Registration Act, conferring to them its absolute ownership, subject only to the limitations of paragraph four of
section 39 of said Act. It is admitted that there is no annotation on the certificate of title regarding the road here in
question, either as a "public road" or as a "private way established by law," and, therefore, the questions presented
by this appeal are to be determined precisely as they would be had the Hacienda Toreno not been brought under the
operation of the Land Registration Act. The plaintiffs being the owners of the property in question, the presumption
of law is that it is free from any lien or encumbrance whatever, and the burden therefore rests upon plaintiffs to

establish the contrary. As this court said in case of Fabie vs. Lichauco and the children of Francisco L. Roxas (11
Phil. Rep., 14):
It is settled of law that a property is assumed to be free from all encumbrance unless the contrary is proved.
There is admittedly no evidence to show that the land occupied by the road here in question was any time conveyed
to the general government or any of its political subdivisions by the present or any of the former owners of the
Hacienda Toreno. There is no evidence, even remotely, tending to show that the road existed prior to the time when
the property now known as the Hacienda Toreno passed from the State into private ownership. The record fails to
disclose any evidence whatever tending to show that the Government has at any time asserted any right or title in or
to the land occupied by the road, or that it has incurred any expense whatever in its upkeep or construction. The
Civil Code defines as public roads those which are constructed by the State (art. 339), and as provincial and town
roads those "the expense of which is borne by such towns or provinces." (Civil Code, art. 344.) While it is not
contended that this definition is exclusive, it does show that during the Spanish regime, under normal conditions,
roads which were public were maintained at the public expense, and that the fact that at no time was any expense
incurred by the Government with respect to the road here in question tends strongly to support the contention of the
defendants that it is private way.
During the Spanish regime the law required each able to bodied citizen not within one of the exempted classes to
work a certain number of days in each year, his labor to be devoted to "services of general utility" to the
municipality of his residence. (Royal Decree of July 11, 1883, art. 5.) Under this Decree and the Regulations for its
enforcement (Berriz, vol. 11, 258) the greater part of the work on the public road of the Islands was accomplished.
Had the road here in question been a public way, it is reasonable to assume that the polistas of the town of Victorias
would have been employed in maintaining it. It is most significant that no mention is made in the testimony of the
plaintiffs' witnesses of any work of this character having been done on the road at any time, particularly in view of
the fact that their attention was drawn to this point. (Stet. note, pp. 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14.)
The evidence shows that the repairs were made by the owners of the estates benefited by the road, and by their
laborers, as a pure voluntary act for their own convenience and interest. There being no evidence of a direct grant to
the government of the land occupied by the road in question or that any Government funds or labor were expended
upon it, the question presents itself whether the use to which the road has been put was such as to justify the
conclusion of the lower court that it has become public property. There being no evidence that the original use of the
road by plaintiffs' predecessors was based upon any grant of the fee to the road or of an easement of way, or that it
began under the assertion of a right on their part, the presumption must be that the origin of the use was the mere
tolerance or license of the owners of the estates affected.
This being so, has that merely permissive use been converted into a title vested in the public at large, or in the
plaintiffs by reason of their ownership of the land beneficially affected by the use?
Had it been shown that the road had been maintained at the public expense, with the acquiescence of the owners of
the estates crossed by it, this would indicate such adverse possession by the government as in course of time would
ripen into title or warrant the presumption of a grant or of a dedication. But in this case there is no such evidence,
and the claims of plaintiffs, whether regarded as members of the public asserting a right to use the road as such, or
as persons claiming a private easement of way over the land of another must be regarded as resting upon the mere
fact of user.
If the owner of a tract of land, to accommodate his neighbors or the public in general, permits them to cross his
property, it is reasonable to suppose that it is not his intention, in so doing, to divest himself of the ownership of the
land so used, or to establish an easement upon it and that the persons to whom such permission, tacit or express, is
granted, do not regard their privilege of use as being based upon an essentially revocable license. If the use
continues for a long period of time, no change being made in the relations of the parties by any express or implied
agreement, does the owner of the property affected lose his right of revocation? Or, putting the same question in
another form, does the mere permissive use ripen into title by prescription?

It is a fundamental principle of the law in this jurisdiction concerning the possession of real property that such
possession is not affected by acts of a possessory character which are "merely tolerated" by the possessor, or which
are due to his license (Civil Code, arts. 444 and 1942). This principle is applicable not only with respect to the
prescription of the dominium as a whole, but to the prescription of right in rem. In the case of Cortes vs. Palanca Yu
Tibo (2 Phil. Rep., 24, 38), the Court said:
The provision of article 1942 of the Civil Code to the effect that acts which are merely tolerated produce no
effect with respect to possession is applicable as much to the prescription of real rights as to the
prescription of the fee, it being a glaring and self-evident error to affirm the contrary, as does the appellant
in his motion papers. Possession is the fundamental basis of the prescription. Without it no kind of
prescription is possible, not even the extraordinary. Consequently, if acts of mere tolerance produce no
effect with respect to possession, as that article provides, in conformity with article 444 of the same Code,
it is evident that they can produce no effect with respect to prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary.
This is true whether the prescriptive acquisition be of a fee or of real rights, for the same reason holds in
one and the other case; that is, that there has been no true possession in the legal sense of the word. (See
also Ayala de Roxas vs. Maglonso, 8 Phil Rep., 745; Municipality of Nueva Caceres vs. Director of Lands
and Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 24 Phil. Rep., 485.)
Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim
of title (en concepto de dueno), or use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of a
possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de
dueo, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of
prescription.
A similar question was presented in the case of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Roxas (22 Phil. Rep.,
450), in which case it appeared that Roxas, the owner of the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati, claimed a right of way
across the property of the church to Calle Tejeron, a public street of the town of San Pedro Macati. The proof
showed that the road in question had been used by the tenants of the Hacienda de San Pedro Macatifor the passage
of carts in coming and leaving the hacienda "from time immemorial," and further that the road had been used for
time out of mind, not only by the tenants of the hacienda but by many other people in going and coming from a
church half-way between the boundary line of the hacienda and Calle Tejeron. The court held that the facts did not
give rise to a prescriptive right of easement in favor of the owner of the hacienda, upon the ground that such use "is
to be regarded as permissive and under an implied license, and not adverse. Such a use is not inconsistent with the
only use which the proprietor thought fit to make of the land, and until the appellee thinks proper to inclose it, such
use is not adverse and will not preclude it from enclosing the land when other views of its interest render it proper to
do so. And though an adjacent proprietor may make such use of the open land more frequently than another, yet the
same rule will apply unless there be some decisive act indicating a separate and exclusive use under a claim of right.
A different doctrine would have a tendency to destroy all neighborhood accommodations in the way of travel; for if
it were once understood that a man, by allowing his neighbor to pass through his farm without objection over the
pass-way which he used himself, would thereby, after the lapse of time, confer a right on such neighbor to require
the pass-way to be kept open for his benefit and enjoyment, a prohibition against all such travel would immediately
ensue."
The decisions of the supreme court of Louisiana, a State whose jurisdiction is based, as is our own, upon the Roman
Law, and whose Civil Code is taken, as is our own,. very largely from the Code of Napoleon, are particularly
persuasive in matters of this character. In the case of Torres vs. Fargoust (37 La. Ann., 497), cited by appellants in
their brief, in which the issues were very similar to those of the present case, the court held that
The mere fact that for thirty or forty years the public was permitted to pass over this ground would not of
itself constitute the place a locus publicus . . . dedication must be shown by evidence so conclusive as to
exclude all idea of private ownership; . . . such dedication cannot be inferred from ere user alone; . . . no
one is presumed to give away his property. The burden is on him who avers a divestiture of ownership to
prove it clearly.

We are, therefore, of the opinion, and so hold, that upon the facts established by the evidence it does not appear that
the road in question is a public road or way. We are also of the opinion that plaintiffs have failed to show that they
have acquired by prescription a private right of passage over the lands of defendants. The supreme court of Spain
has decided that under the law in force before the enactment of the Civil Code, the easement of way was
discontinous, and that while such an easement might be acquired by prescription, it must be used in good faith, in
the belief of the existence of the right, and such user must have been continuous from time immemorial. (Judgment
of December 15, 1882.) In the appealed decision the court below says that the plaintiffs and their predecessors made
use of the road in question "from time immemorial," but there is no evidence whatever in the record to sup[port this
finding, although it is true that the evidence shows the existence of the road and its use by the plaintiffs and their
predecessors for thirty-five or forty years. Speaking of the evidence required under the present Code of Civil
Procedure to show immemorial use of an easement, this court said in the case of Ayal de Roxas vs. Case (8 Phil.
Rep., 197, 198):
Third Partida in title 31, law 15 . . . says that discontinues servitudes . . . must be proved by usage or a term
so long that men can not remember its commencement. . . . In many judgments the supreme court of Spain
has refused to accept proof of any definite number of years as a satisfaction of this requirement of the law. .
. . We are of the opinion that in order to establish a right of prescription [title of prescription based upon use
from time immemorial] something more required than memory of living witnesses. Whether this something
should be the declaration of persons long dead, repeated by those who testify, as exacted by the Spanish
law, or should be the common reputation of ownership recognized by the Code of Procedure, it is
unnecessary for us to decide. On either theory the appellant has failed in his proof . . . .
The same thing may be said in this case. Witnesses have testified that they have known the road for a certain period
of years, beginning at a time prior to the enactment of the Civil Code, but no evidence has been made to prove
immemorial use by either of the means of proof mentioned in this decision cited, nor is immemorial user averred in
the complaint as the basis of the right. It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user from time immemorial had
been acquired by plaintiffs at the time the Civil Code took effect. Under that Code (art 539) no discontinuous
easement could be acquired by prescription in any event. Assuming, without deciding, that this rule has been
changed by the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure relating to prescription, and that since its
enactment discontinuous easement may be required by prescription, it is clear that this would not avail plaintiffs.
The Code of Civil Procedure went into effect on October 1, 1901. The term of prescription for the acquisition of
rights in real estate is fixed by the Code (sec. 41) at ten years. The evidence shows that in February, 1911, before the
expiration of the term of ten years since the time the Code of Civil Procedure took effect, the defendants interrupted
the use of the road by the plaintiffs by constructing and maintaining a toll gate on it and collecting toll from persons
making use of it with carts and continued to do so until they were enjoined by the granting of the preliminary
injunction by the trial court in December, 1912. Our conclusion is, therefore, that the plaintiffs have not acquired by
prescription a right to an easement of way over the defendant's property; that their use of the Nanca-Victorias road
across the Hacienda Toreno was due merely to the tacit license and tolerance of the defendants and their
predecessors in title; that license was essentially revokable; and that, therefore, the defendants were within their
rights when they closed the road in 1911.
While in the allegations from the plaintiffs' complaint it might be inferred that it was their purpose to seek to impose
upon the defendants the easement to which arts. 564 et seq. of the Civil Code relate, that purpose was evidently
abandoned, and the case was tried upon a wholly different theory. Proof was offered to show that the right of
passage across defendants' land is necessary to enable plaintiffs to get their products to market, but there was no
offer on their part to pay defendants the indemnity required by section 564.
For the reasons stated the judgment of the court below is reversed, the injunction issued against defendants is
allowed on this appeal. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo, Street, Malcolm, and Avancea, JJ., concur.

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ISABEL FAMILIAR, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Hartigan & Rhode for appellants.
Jose Santiago for appellees.
TRACEY, J.:
Since times beyond the memory of the oldest witnesses there stood upon the land in dispute in Uacas, Cavite Viejo,
a Roman Catholic chapel, when in use for religious purposes until September, 1905, when it was destroyed by a
typhoon. Thereafter the defendants, who owned the adjoining land, took possession of it and continued to hold it as
a part of their own property. In May 1906, the plaintiff brought this action in the Court of First Instance to recover
possession of it, and the defendants claim that the land on which the chapel stood originally belonged to their
ancestor and that the ownership of it by him and by them was admitted by the regular annual payment to them by
an hermano mayor of the sum of 50 centavos, and on his ground the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded them
judgment. It is clear that this defense can not prevail for several reasons: First, there is nothing to connect this
plaintiff with the alleged annual payment. there is not a word to prove acofradia, and its existence can not be
inferred from the simple existence of an hermano mayor. (The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church vs. Santos, The
payment of this sum of 50 centavos, while sustained by declarations of two former hermanos mayores, is disputed
by many witnesses in a position to know about it, and its insignificance is hardly consistent with an annual rental. )
Second, the defense necessarily assumes as its basis the existence of the relation of landlord and tenant between the
defendant and the plaintiff or its representatives. If such a relation existed, it could not be terminated arbitrarily by
the act of the defendants; the tenant and the same right to retain possession of the property after the destruction of
the chapel as before that event, until the lease had been put an end to by regular process of law. A landlord may not
summarily enter and dispossess his tenant even for nonpayment of rent; and until the lease terminated the tenant has
the right to the possession and may recover it from the landlord. (Cioco vs. Muro, Bago vs. Garcia, Bishop of
Cebu vs. Mangaron, There is nothing conflicting with this doctrine in the case of Evangelista vs. Ver (there the
plaintiff was defeated because the opinion of the majority of the court he failed to establish the fact of anterior
possession, the proofs in their opinion showing such a relation of the two parties to each other and to their common
superior, the owner, as to preclude the possibility of an exclusive possession in either, the defendant indeed never
having been given up the occupancy of the property, but the plaintiff having in fact and by necessary construction of
his acts abandoned it. Nor was it clear that the plaintiff, in his own showing, had been deprived of possession by
"force, intimidation, strategy, or stealth" (5 Phil. Rep., 74), or by violation of a suitable contract, so as to bring his

action within the scope of section 80, nor it had been so treated by the court below. (Rosco vs. Rebueno, 6 Off. Gaz.,
1463. The principle of the decisions on that section is not affected by that case.
The action appears to be well laid under the statute.
It is only when brought for the possession of land detained by force, or by one of the other means specified in
section 80 of the Code of civil Procedure that it must be commenced within the year in a court of a justice of the
peace, otherwise it may begun in a Court of First Instance. (Ledesma vs,. Marcos, Alonso vs. Municipality of
Placer,
This is a possessory action only and on the proofs the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the property. The
judgment of the court of First Instance in favor of the defendants is reversed, without costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J. Torres, Mapa and Willard, JJ., concur.
Carson, J., reserve his vote.

DOMINADOR DIZON, doing business under the firm name "Pawnshop of Dominador Dizon", petitioner,
vs.
LOURDES G. SUNTAY, respondent.
Andres T. Velarde for petitioner.
Rafael G. Suntay for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:p
In essence there is nothing novel in this petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming a lower
court judgment sustaining the right of an owner of a diamond ring, respondent Lourdes G. Suntay, as against the
claim of petitioner Dominador Dizon, who owns and operates a pawnshop. The diamond ring was turned over to a
certain Clarita R. Sison, for sale on commission, along with other pieces of jewelry of respondent Suntay. It was
then pledged to petitioner. Since what was done was violative of the terms of the agency, there was an attempt on her
part to recover possession thereof from petitioner, who refused. She had to file an action then for its recovery. She
was successful, as noted above, both in the lower court and thereafter in the Court of Appeals. She prevailed as she
had in her favor the protection accorded by Article 559 of the Civil
Code. 1 The matter was then elevated to us by petitioner. Ordinarily, our discretion would have been exercised
against giving due course to such petition for review. The vigorous plea however, grounded on estoppel, by his
counsel, Atty. Andres T. Velarde, persuaded us to act otherwise. After a careful perusal of the respective contentions
of the parties, we fail to perceive any sufficient justification for a departure from the literal language of the
applicable codal provision as uniformly interpreted by this Court in a number of decisions. The invocation of
estoppel is therefore unavailing. We affirm.

The statement of the case as well as the controlling facts may be found in the Court of Appeals decision penned by
Justice Perez. Thus: "Plaintiff is the owner of a three-carat diamond ring valued at P5,500.00. On June 13, 1962, the
plaintiff and Clarita R. Sison entered into a transaction wherein the plaintiff's ring was delivered to Clarita R. Sison
for sale on commission. Upon receiving the ring, Clarita R. Sison executed and delivered to the plaintiff the
receipt ... . The plaintiff had already previously known Clarita R. Sison as the latter is a close friend of the plaintiff's
cousin and they had frequently met each other at the place of the plaintiff's said cousin. In fact, about one year
before their transaction of June 13, 1962 took place, Clarita R. Sison received a piece of jewelry from the plaintiff to
be sold for P500.00, and when it was sold, Clarita R. Sison gave the price to the plaintiff. After the lapse of a
considerable time without Clarita R. Sison having returned to the plaintiff the latter's ring, the plaintiff made
demands on Clarita R. Sison for the return of her ring but the latter could not comply with the demands because,
without the knowledge of the plaintiff, on June 15, 1962 or three days after the ring above-mentioned was received
by Clarita R. Sison from the plaintiff, said ring was pledged by Melia Sison, niece of the husband of Clarita R.
Sison, evidently in connivance with the latter, with the defendant's pawnshop for P2,600.00 ... ." 2 Then came this
portion of the decision under review: "Since the plaintiff insistently demanded from Clarita R. Sison the return of
her ring, the latter finally delivered to the former the pawnshop ticket ... which is the receipt of the pledge with the
defendant's pawnshop of the plaintiff's ring. When the plaintiff found out that Clarita R. Sison pledged, she took
steps to file a case of estafa against the latter with the fiscal's office. Subsequently thereafter, the plaintiff, through
her lawyer, wrote a letter ... dated September 22, 1962, to the defendant asking for the delivery to the plaintiff of her
ring pledged with defendant's pawnshop under pawnshop receipt serial-B No. 65606, dated June 15, 1962 ... . Since
the defendant refused to return the ring, the plaintiff filed the present action with the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the recovery of said ring, with P500.00 as attorney's fees and costs. The plaintiff asked for the provisional
remedy of replevin by the delivery of the ring to her, upon her filing the requisite bond, pending the final
determination of the action. The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by plaintiff and the latter was able
to take possession of the ring during the pendency of the action upon her filing the requisite bond." 3 It was then
noted that the lower court rendered judgment declaring that plaintiff, now respondent Suntay, had the right to the
possession of the ring in question. Petitioner Dizon, as defendant, sought to have the judgment reversed by the Court
of Appeals. It did him no good. The decision of May 19, 1969, now on review, affirmed the decision of the lower
court.
In the light of the facts as thus found by the Court of Appeals, well-nigh conclusive on use, with the applicable law
being what it is, this petition for review cannot prosper. To repeat, the decision of the Court of Appeals stands.
1. There is a fairly recent restatement of the force and effect of the governing codal norm in De Gracia v. Court of
Appeals. 4 Thus: "The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. It reads thus: 'The possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has
been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a
movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the
owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.' Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having
been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de
Garcia who was found in possession of the same. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in
good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the
price. As authoritatively interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati, the right of the owner cannot be defeated even by proof that
there was good faith in the acquisition by the possessor. There is a reiteration of this principle in Aznar v.
Yapdiangco. Thus: 'Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner to recover personal property acquired in
good faith by another, is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle that were
one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party
who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is
covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law principle
and a statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction." " 5

2. It must have been a recognition of the compulsion exerted by the above authoritative precedents that must have
caused petitioner to invoke the principle of estoppel. There is clearly a misapprehension. Such a contention is devoid
of any persuasive force.
Estoppel as known to the Rules of Court 6 and prior to that to the Court of Civil Procedure, 7 has its roots in equity.
Good faith is its basis. 8 It is a response to the demands of moral right and natural justice. 9 For estoppel to exist
though, it is indispensable that there be a declaration, act or omission by the party who is sought to be bound. Nor is
this all. It is equally a requisite that he, who would claim the benefits of such a principle, must have altered his
position, having been so intentionally and deliberately led to comport himself thus, by what was declared or what
was done or failed to be done. If thereafter a litigation arises, the former would not be allowed to disown such act,
declaration or omission. The principle comes into full play. It may successfully be relied upon. A court is to see to it
then that there is no turning back on one's word or a repudiation of one's act. So it has been from our earliest
decisions. As Justice Mapa pointed out in the first case, a 1905 decision, Rodriguez v. Martinez, 10 a party should not
be permitted "to go against his own acts to the prejudice of [another]. Such a holding would be contrary to the most
rudimentary principles of justice and law." 11 He is not, in the language of Justice Torres, in Irlanda v.
Pitargue, 12 promulgated in 1912, "allowed to gainsay [his] own acts or deny rights which [he had] previously
recognized." 13 Some of the later cases are to the effect that an unqualified and unconditional acceptance of an
agreement forecloses a claim for interest not therein provided. 14 Equally so the circumstance that about a month
after the date of the conveyance, one of the parties informed the other of his being a minor, according to Chief
Justice Paras, "is of no moment, because [the former's] previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from
disavowing the contract. 15 It is easily understandable why, under the circumstances disclosed, estoppel is a frail reed
to hang on to. There was clearly the absence of an act or omission, as a result of which a position had been assumed
by petitioner, who if such elements were not lacking, could not thereafter in law be prejudiced by his belief in what
had been misrepresented to him. 16 As was put by Justice Labrador, "a person claimed to be estopped must have
knowledge of the fact that his voluntary acts would deprive him of some rights because said voluntary acts are
inconsistent with said rights."17 To recapitulate, there is this pronouncement not so long ago, from the pen of Justice
Makalintal, who reaffirmed that estoppel "has its origin in equity and, being based on moral right and natural justice,
finds applicability wherever and whenever the special circumstances of a case so demand." 18
How then can petitioner in all seriousness assert that his appeal finds support in the doctrine of estoppel?
Neither the promptings of equity nor the mandates of moral right and natural justice come to his rescue. He is
engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would manifest itself to ascertain whether or not an
individual who is offering a jewelry by way of a pledge is entitled to do so. If no such care be taken, perhaps
because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity for profit, he should be the last to complain if thereafter the right of
the true owner of such jewelry should be recognized. The law for this sound reason accords the latter protection. So
it has always been since Varela v. Finnick, 19
a 1907 decision. According to Justice Torres: "In the present case not only has the ownership and the origin
of the jewels misappropriated been unquestionably proven but also that the accused, acting fraudulently and in bad
faith, disposed of them and pledged them contrary to agreement, with no right of ownership, and to the prejudice of
the injured party, who was thereby illegally deprived of said jewels; therefore, in accordance with the provisions of
article 464, the owner has an absolute right to recover the jewels from the possession of whosoever holds
them, ... ." 20 There have been many other decisions to the same effect since then. At least nine may be cited. 21 Nor
could any other outcome be expected, considering the civil code provisions both in the former Spanish
legislation 22 and in the present Code. 23 Petitioner ought to have been on his guard before accepting the pledge in
question. Evidently there was no such precaution availed of. He therefore, has only himself to blame for the fix he is
now in. It would be to stretch the concept of estoppel to the breaking point if his contention were to prevail.
Moreover, there should have been a realization on his part that courts are not likely to be impressed with a cry of
distress emanating from one who is in a business authorized to impose a higher rate of interest precisely due to the
greater risk assumed by him. A predicament of this nature then does not suffice to call for less than undeviating
adherence to the literal terms of a codal provision. Moreover, while the activity he is engaged in is no doubt legal, it

is not to be lost sight of that it thrives on taking advantage of the necessities precisely of that element of our
population whose lives are blighted by extreme poverty. From whatever angle the question is viewed then, estoppel
certainly cannot be justly invoked.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 19, 1969 is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Castro, J., reserves his vote.
Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando, tracing and confirming the long settled and uniform
jurisprudence since 1905 based on the express statutory provision of article 559 of our Civil Code (formerly article
464 of the old Civil Code) that the owner "who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may
recover it from the person in possession of the same," the only exception expressly provided in the codal article
being that "if the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in
good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor." 1
Senator Tolentino's submittal in his commentaries on the Civil Code "that the better view is to consider 'unlawfully
deprived' as limited to unlawful taking, such as theft or robbery, and should not include disposition through abuse of
confidence. Thus, if the owner has entrusted personal property to a bailee, such as for transportation, pledge, loan or
deposit, without transmitting ownership, and the latter alienates it to a third person who acquires it in good faith, the
owner cannot recover it from such third person, "is, as he himself admits, based on the express provision of the
French Code which allows the true owner of personal property to recover it from the possessor in good faith without
reimbursement only "if it has been stolen from him." He concedes likewise that "our Code, following the Spanish
code, uses broader language than that used in the French code" since our Code provides that the owner who has
been "unlawfully deprived" of personal property may recover it from the possessor without reimbursement, with
the sole exception where the possessor acquired the article in good faith at a public sale. 2
He thus concedes finally that "(T)here are writers who believe that the phrase 'unlawfully deprived' in our Code does
not have the same meaning as stolen in the French code; that it is used in the general sense, and is not used in the
specific sense of deprivation by robbery or theft. Under this view, it extends to all cases where there has been no
valid transmission of ownership, including the case where the proprietor has entrusted the thing to a borrower,
depositary, or lessee who has sold the same. It is believed that the owner in such case is undoubtedly unlawfully
deprived of his property, and may recover the same from a possessor in good faith" (citing De Buen: 2-II Colin &
Capitant 1008; 1 Bonet
234) 3 and cites the long unbroken line of decisions of the Court of Appeals and of this Court upholding the import of
the broader language of the codal article in question.
Indeed, if our legislature had intended to narrow the scope of the term "unlawfully deprived" to "stolen" as
advocated by Tolentino, it certainly would have adopted and used such a narrower term rather than the broad
language of article 464 of the old Spanish Civil Code with its long-established and accepted meaning in accordance
with our jurisprudence.

Petitioner's contentions at bar had long been disposed of in the Court's 1911 decision of Arenas vs. Raymundo, 4per
Mr. Justice Florentino Torres, reiterating the doctrine of the earlier cases and holding that
Even supposing that the defendant Raymundo had acted in good faith in accepting the pledge of
the jewelry in litigation, even then he would not be entitled to retain it until the owner thereof
reimburse him for the amount loaned to the embezzler, since the said owner of the jewelry, the
plaintiff, did not make any contract with the pledgee, that would obligate him to pay the amount
loaned to Perello, and the trial record does not disclose any evidence, even circumstantial, that the
plaintiff Arenas consented to or had knowledge of the pledging of her jewelry in the pawnshop of
the defendant.
For this reason, and because Concepcion Perello was not the legitimate owner of the jewelry
which she pledged to the defendant Raymundo, for a certain sum that she received from the latter
as a loan, the contract of pledge entered into by both, is of course, null and void, and, consequently
the jewelry so pawned can not serve as security for the payment of the sum loaned, nor can the
latter be collected out of the value of the said jewelry.
Article 1857 of the Civil Code prescribes as one of the essential requisites of the contracts of
pledge and of mortgage, that the thing pledged or mortgaged must belong to the person who
pledges or mortgages it. This essential requisite for the contract of pledge between Perello and the
defendant being absent as the former was not the owner of the jewelry given in pledge, the
contract is as devoid of value and force as if it had not been made, and as it was executed with
marked violation of an express provision of the law, it can not confer upon the defendant any
rights in the pledged jewelry, nor impose any obligation toward him on the part of the owner
thereof, since the latter was deprived of her possession by means of the illegal pledging of the said
jewelry, a criminal act.
Between the supposed good faith of the defendant Raymundo and the undisputed good faith of the
plaintiff Arenas, the owner of the jewelry, neither law nor justice permit that the latter, after being
the victim of embezzlement, should have to choose one of the two extremes of a dilemma, both of
which, without legal ground or reason, are injurious and prejudicial to her interests and rights, that
is, she must either lose her jewelry or pay a large sum received by the embezzler as a loan from
the defendant, when the plaintiff Arenas is not related to the latter by any legal or contractual bond
out of which legal obligations arise.
xxx xxx xxx
The business of pawnshops, in exchange for the high and onerous interest which constitutes its
enormous profits, is always exposed to the contingency of receiving in pledge or security for the
loans, jewels and other articles that have been robbed, stolen, or embezzled from their legitimate
owners; and as the owner of the pawnshop accepts the pledging of jewelry from the first bearer
who offers the same and asks for money on it, without assuring himself whether such bearer is or
is not the owner thereof, he can not, by such procedure, expect from the law better and more
preferential protection than the owner of the jewels or other articles, who was deprived thereof by
means of a crime and is entitled to be excused by the courts.
Antonio Matute, the owner of another pawnshop, being convinced that he was wrong, refrained
from appealing from the judgment wherein he was sentenced to return, without redemption, to the
plaintiffs, another jewel of great value which had been pledged to him by the same Perello. He
undoubtedly had in mind some of the previous decisions of this court, one of which was against
himself.

By the same token, the contention that the owner may recover the lost article of which he has been unlawfully
deprived without reimbursement of the sum received by the embezzler from the pawnshop only after a criminal
conviction of the embezzler, is to add a requirement that is not in the codal article and to unduly prejudice the victim
of embezzlement, as pointed out by the Court in Arenas, supra.
The civil action that the owner must resort to for the recovery of his personal property of which he has been
unlawfully deprived as against the possessor (where the latter refuses to honor the claim, presumably on same valid
doubts as to the genuineness of the claim) gives the possessor every adequate protection and opportunity to contest
the owner's claim of recovery. The owner must therein establish by competent evidence his lawful claim, and show
to the court's satisfaction his lawful ownership of the article claimed and that he had been unlawfully deprived
thereof.
I therefore find no reason to set aside the long settled interpretation given by our jurisprudence to article 559
(formerly article 464) of our Civil Code in accordance with its clear and unambiguous language, as reaffirmed in the
case at bar.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando, tracing and confirming the long settled and uniform
jurisprudence since 1905 based on the express statutory provision of article 559 of our Civil Code (formerly article
464 of the old Civil Code) that the owner "who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may
recover it from the person in possession of the same," the only exception expressly provided in the codal article
being that "if the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in
good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor." 1
Senator Tolentino's submittal in his commentaries on the Civil Code "that the better view is to consider 'unlawfully
deprived' as limited to unlawful taking, such as theft or robbery, and should not include disposition through abuse of
confidence. Thus, if the owner has entrusted personal property to a bailee, such as for transportation, pledge, loan or
deposit, without transmitting ownership, and the latter alienates it to a third person who acquires it in good faith, the
owner cannot recover it from such third person, "is, as he himself admits, based on the express provision of the
French Code which allows the true owner of personal property to recover it from the possessor in good faith without
reimbursement only "if it has been stolen from him." He concedes likewise that "our Code, following the Spanish
code, uses broader language than that used in the French code" since our Code provides that the owner who has
been "unlawfully deprived" of personal property may recover it from the possessor without reimbursement, with
the sole exception where the possessor acquired the article in good faith at a public sale. 2
He thus concedes finally that "(T)here are writers who believe that the phrase 'unlawfully deprived' in our Code does
not have the same meaning as stolen in the French code; that it is used in the general sense, and is not used in the
specific sense of deprivation by robbery or theft. Under this view, it extends to all cases where there has been no
valid transmission of ownership, including the case where the proprietor has entrusted the thing to a borrower,
depositary, or lessee who has sold the same. It is believed that the owner in such case is undoubtedly unlawfully
deprived of his property, and may recover the same from a possessor in good faith" (citing De Buen: 2-II Colin &
Capitant 1008; 1 Bonet
234) 3 and cites the long unbroken line of decisions of the Court of Appeals and of this Court upholding the import of
the broader language of the codal article in question.
Indeed, if our legislature had intended to narrow the scope of the term "unlawfully deprived" to "stolen" as
advocated by Tolentino, it certainly would have adopted and used such a narrower term rather than the broad

language of article 464 of the old Spanish Civil Code with its long-established and accepted meaning in accordance
with our jurisprudence.
Petitioner's contentions at bar had long been disposed of in the Court's 1911 decision of Arenas vs. Raymundo, 4per
Mr. Justice Florentino Torres, reiterating the doctrine of the earlier cases and holding that
Even supposing that the defendant Raymundo had acted in good faith in accepting the pledge of
the jewelry in litigation, even then he would not be entitled to retain it until the owner thereof
reimburse him for the amount loaned to the embezzler, since the said owner of the jewelry, the
plaintiff, did not make any contract with the pledgee, that would obligate him to pay the amount
loaned to Perello, and the trial record does not disclose any evidence, even circumstantial, that the
plaintiff Arenas consented to or had knowledge of the pledging of her jewelry in the pawnshop of
the defendant.
For this reason, and because Concepcion Perello was not the legitimate owner of the jewelry
which she pledged to the defendant Raymundo, for a certain sum that she received from the latter
as a loan, the contract of pledge entered into by both, is of course, null and void, and, consequently
the jewelry so pawned can not serve as security for the payment of the sum loaned, nor can the
latter be collected out of the value of the said jewelry.
Article 1857 of the Civil Code prescribes as one of the essential requisites of the contracts of
pledge and of mortgage, that the thing pledged or mortgaged must belong to the person who
pledges or mortgages it. This essential requisite for the contract of pledge between Perello and the
defendant being absent as the former was not the owner of the jewelry given in pledge, the
contract is as devoid of value and force as if it had not been made, and as it was executed with
marked violation of an express provision of the law, it can not confer upon the defendant any
rights in the pledged jewelry, nor impose any obligation toward him on the part of the owner
thereof, since the latter was deprived of her possession by means of the illegal pledging of the said
jewelry, a criminal act.
Between the supposed good faith of the defendant Raymundo and the undisputed good faith of the
plaintiff Arenas, the owner of the jewelry, neither law nor justice permit that the latter, after being
the victim of embezzlement, should have to choose one of the two extremes of a dilemma, both of
which, without legal ground or reason, are injurious and prejudicial to her interests and rights, that
is, she must either lose her jewelry or pay a large sum received by the embezzler as a loan from
the defendant, when the plaintiff Arenas is not related to the latter by any legal or contractual bond
out of which legal obligations arise.
xxx xxx xxx
The business of pawnshops, in exchange for the high and onerous interest which constitutes its
enormous profits, is always exposed to the contingency of receiving in pledge or security for the
loans, jewels and other articles that have been robbed, stolen, or embezzled from their legitimate
owners; and as the owner of the pawnshop accepts the pledging of jewelry from the first bearer
who offers the same and asks for money on it, without assuring himself whether such bearer is or
is not the owner thereof, he can not, by such procedure, expect from the law better and more
preferential protection than the owner of the jewels or other articles, who was deprived thereof by
means of a crime and is entitled to be excused by the courts.
Antonio Matute, the owner of another pawnshop, being convinced that he was wrong, refrained
from appealing from the judgment wherein he was sentenced to return, without redemption, to the

plaintiffs, another jewel of great value which had been pledged to him by the same Perello. He
undoubtedly had in mind some of the previous decisions of this court, one of which was against
himself.
By the same token, the contention that the owner may recover the lost article of which he has been unlawfully
deprived without reimbursement of the sum received by the embezzler from the pawnshop only after a criminal
conviction of the embezzler, is to add a requirement that is not in the codal article and to unduly prejudice the victim
of embezzlement, as pointed out by the Court in Arenas, supra.
The civil action that the owner must resort to for the recovery of his personal property of which he has been
unlawfully deprived as against the possessor (where the latter refuses to honor the claim, presumably on same valid
doubts as to the genuineness of the claim) gives the possessor every adequate protection and opportunity to contest
the owner's claim of recovery. The owner must therein establish by competent evidence his lawful claim, and show
to the court's satisfaction his lawful ownership of the article claimed and that he had been unlawfully deprived
thereof.
I therefore find no reason to set aside the long settled interpretation given by our jurisprudence to article 559
(formerly article 464) of our Civil Code in accordance with its clear and unambiguous language, as reaffirmed in the
case at bar.

IGNACIO WONG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V and
MANUEL MERCADO, respondents.
Rodolfo B. Quiachon for petitioner.
Jose M. Ilagan for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as it involves purely
question of law, seeking the annulment of the September 29, 1978 decision of the then Court of First Instance **of
Davao del Sur, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 1258 which reversed the February 20, 1978 decision of the Municipal
Court of Sta. Maria, *** Davao del Sur in an action for Forcible Entry (Civil Case No. 13) ordering the dismissal of
the complaint as well as the counterclaim.
The undisputed facts of this case, as found by both the trial court and the then Court of First Instance of Davao del
Sur, are as follows:
On the basis of the admission of parties in their respective pleadings, the oral testimonies of all
witnesses for both plaintiff and defendants and the documentary evidence offered and admitted

this Court finds that plaintiff Manuel Mercado acquired his rights to possess the land in litigation,
particularly lot 3 (LRC) Pcs-295, (situated at Colonga, Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur) and which is
particularly described and embraced in Transfer Certificate of title No. (T-4244) T-972 from
William Giger by virtue of a deed of sale with right to repurchase which was executed in 1972 for
a consideration of P3,500.00 (testimony of plaintiff, T.S.N., p. 3, hearing of January 7, 1977).
Then, in 1973, William Giger again asked an additional amount of P2,500.00 from plaintiff and so
he required William Giger to sign a new deed of Pacto de Retro Sale (Exhibit "A") on November
5,1973 at Davao City before Notary Public Gregorio C. Batiller (T.S.N., p. 5, hearing of January 7,
1977). In 1972, plaintiff began harvesting only the coconut fruits and he paid the taxes on the land
(Exhibits B to E) for Mr. Giger. He went periodically to the land to make copra but he never
placed any person on the land in litigation to watch it. Neither did he reside on the land as he is a
businessman and storekeeper by occupation and resides at Lower Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur while
the land in litigation is at Colongan, Sta. Maria. Neither did he put any sign or hut to show that he
is in actual possession (p. 8, T.S.N., p. 7, hearing of January 14, 1978). He knew defendants'
laborers were in the land in suit as early as August, 1976 and that they have a hut there but he did
not do anything to stop them. Instead plaintiff was happy that there were people and a hut on the
land in suit (p. 14, T.S.N., hearing of January 14, 1978).
Before July, 1976, defendant Ignacio Wong went to the land in litigation to find out if there were
other people residing there or claiming it besides the owner and he found none. So, in July, 1976,
defendant Ignacio Wong bought the parcel of land in litigation from William Giger and his wife
Cecilia Valenzuela (Exhibit 5). After the execution of Exhibit 5, defendant Ignacio Wong asked for
the delivery of the title to him and so he has in his possession TCT No. (T-4244) T-974 (Exhibit 6)
in the name of William Giger. Mr. Wong declared the land in suit for taxation purposes in his name
(Exhibit 7). He tried to register the pacto de retro sale with the Register of Deeds by paying the
registration fee (Exhibit 8) but due to some technicalities, the pacto de retro sale could not be
registered. The defendant Wong placed laborers on the land in suit, built a small farm house after
making some clearings and fenced the boundaries. He also placed signboards (T.S.N., pp. 14-15,
hearing of September 15, 1977). On September 27, 1976, plaintiff Manuel Mercado again went to
the land in suit to make copras. That was the time the matter was brought to the attention of the
police of Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur and the incident entered in the police blotter (Exhibit 11).
Then on November 18, 1976, defendant Wong ordered the hooking of the coconuts from the land
in litigation and nobody disturbed him. But on November 29, 1976, defendant received a copy of
plaintiff's complaint for forcible entry with summons to answer which is the case now before the
Court. During the pendency of this instant complaint for forcible entry, spouses William Giger and
Cecilia Valenzuela filed a case for reformation of instrument with the Court of First Instance of
Digos, Davao del Sur against plaintiff Mercado (Exhibit 4). The case pertains to Exhibit "A" of
plaintiff. (pp. 1-3, CA Decision, pp. 82-84,Rollo).
On the basis of the aforestated undisputed facts, the Municipal Court of Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur in its February
20, 1978 Decision found that herein petitioner (defendant Ignacio Wong) had prior, actual and continuous physical
possession of the disputed property and dismissed both the complaint and the counter-claim.
On appeal, the then Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, in its September 29, 1978 Decision drew a completely
different conclusion from the same set of facts and ruled in favor of herein private respondent (plaintiff Manuel
Mercado). The decretal portion of the said decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the plaintiff to have taken possession of the property earlier in
point of time and defendant is an intruder and must, as he is hereby ordered to return, the
possession of the land in question for the plaintiff, paying a monthly rental of P400.00 from
August, 1976, till the property is returned with costs against the defendant. Judgment is reversed.

Petitioner filed the instant petition with the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals, in its March 1, 1979
Resolution **** found that the only issue is a pure question of law the correctness of the conclusion drawn from
the undisputed facts and certified the case to this Court.
In its April 4, 1979 Resolution, the Second Division of this Court docketed the case in this Court and considered it
submitted for decision.
Petitioner alleged two (2) errors committed by respondent judge, to wit:
A) THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY RESPONDENT JUDGE THAT PETITIONER IS AN INTRUDER IS
WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS FOR PURPOSES OF A FORCIBLE ENTRY.
B) THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY RESPONDENT JUDGE THAT PETITIONER MUST PAY A MONTHLY
RENTAL OF P400.00 FROM AUGUST, 1976 TILL THE PROPERTY IS RETURNED HAS NO LEGAL AND
FACTUAL BASIS.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner, in claiming that the private respondent has not established prior possession, argues that private
respondent's periodic visit to the lot to gather coconuts may have been consented to and allowed or tolerated by the
owner thereof for the purposes of paying an obligation that may be due to the person gathering said nuts and that a
person who enters a property to gather coconut fruits and convert the same to copras may only be a hired laborer
who enters the premises every harvest season to comply with the contract of labor with the true owner of the
property.
The argument is untenable.
It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or
by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such
right." (Art. 531, Civil Code; Rizal Cement Co., Inc. vs. Villareal, 135 SCRA 15 [1985]); and that the execution of a
sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary
. . . . If, however, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and
material tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by
another, then delivery has not been effected. (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1989 Ed., p. 400).
Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case, it is clear that possession passed from vendor William
Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro (Exhibit A), and accordingly, the later
sale a retro (Exhibit 5) in favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of the property because there is an
impediment the possession exercised by private respondent. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the
same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the
fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessions, the one longer in
possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the
thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper
proceedings (Art. 538, Civil Code).
As to petitioner's query that "Is the entry of petitioner to the property characterized by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth in order to show that private respondent has had possession so that the case is within the
jurisdiction of the inferior court?" (p. 15, Petition; p. 16, Rollo). The same is answered in the affirmative.

The act of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of
force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Under the rule, entering upon the premises by strategy or
stealth is equally as obnoxious as entering by force. The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of
the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and
exclude another who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the
very eyes of person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants
himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can
unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily
implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party. (Tolentino, Civil Code
of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Ed., pp. 243-244; Drilon vs. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 342 [1987]).
Anent the award of rentals in favor of private respondent, the same is in order. Petitioner's argument that there is no
legal or factual basis for the payment of monthly rentals because bad faith on the part of petitioner was never proved
deserves no merit.
It should be noted that possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully. (Art. 528, Civil Code).
Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessors, by
extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact
from which it can be deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his title or mode of acquisition, it
must be considered sufficient to show bad faith. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 226). Such
interruption takes place upon service of summons (Manotok Realty vs. Judge Tecson, 164 SCRA 587 [1988] citing
Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap (13 SCRA 190 [1965]). In the latter case, this Court held:
. . . Although the bad faith of one party neutralizes that of the other and hence as between
themselves their rights would be as if both of them had acted in good faith at the time of the
transaction, this legal fiction of Yap's good faith ceased when the complaint against him was filed,
and consequently the court's declaration of liability for the rents thereafter is correct and proper. A
possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his possession is not legally
interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon service of judicial summons (Arts. 544 and
1123, Civil Code).
A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner received private respondent's complaint for forcible entry
with summons on November 29, 1976 (Rollo, p. 46). His good faith therefore ceased on November 29,1976.
Accordingly, the computation of the payment of monthly rental should start from December, 1976, instead of
August, 1976.
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the computation of the monthly rental should start from December, 1976
instead of August, 1976, the September 29, 1978 decision of respondent judge is Affirmed in all other respects, with
costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

NICANOR SOMODIO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EBENECER PURISIMA, and FELOMINO AYCO, respondents.
Jose V. Panes for petitioner.
Vencer, Purisima & Associates for private respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the
Decision dated September 29, 1987 and the Resolution dated February 2, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 11602.
I
On October 21, 1974, Jose Ortigas executed an instrument designated as a Transfer of Rights, conveying to Wilfredo
Mabugat the possession of a residential lot situated at Rajah Muda, Bula, General Santos City and described in the
said instrument as:
Lot No. (Unnumbered), bounded on the North by Temporary Road, on the South by Customs Zone
(Sarangani Bay), on the East by Public Land, and on the West by Public Land.
Nicanor Somodio, herein petitioner, contributed one-half of the purchase price. On October 22, 1974, Mabugat
executed an Affidavit of Trust expressly recognizing the right of petitioner over one-half undivided portion of the
lot. Later, petitioner discovered in the District Land Office that the lot was numbered "6328-X, Csd 2281-D."
Thereafter, petitioner and Mabugat partitioned the property into two portions, with petitioner taking the western part.
Immediately after the partition, petitioner took possession of his portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut
trees and other fruit-bearing trees.
In 1976, petitioner began construction of a structure with a dimension of 22-by-18 feet on his lot. His employment,
however, took him to Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and he left the unfinished structure to the case of his uncle. He
would visit the property every three months or on weekened when he had time.
Sometime in October 1977, petitioner allowed respondent Felomino Ayco, to transfer his hut to petitioner's lot.
About six years later, petitioner demanded that Ayco vacate the premises but such demand proved futile. Hence, on
August 23, 1983, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer with damages against respondent Ayco before the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch I, General Santos, docketed as Civil Case No. 2032-II.
Meanwhile, on June 26, 1983, respondent Ebenecer Purisima entered the land and constructed a house thereon. Four
days later, petitioner filed against respondent Purisima a complaint for forcible entry before the same court docketed
as Civil Case No. 2013-I. Said case was later consolidated with Civil Case No. 2032-II.
In his answer, respondent Purisima averred that the lot was a portion of the land subject of his application for
miscellaneous sales patent with the Bureau of Lands. Purisima described the lot in question as:
Lot No. 6328-Y, CSD-2281-D, Bula, General Santos, Cotabato. Bounded on the North by 6328-X;
on the South by Sarangani Bay; on the East by a Municipal Road; and on the West by Lot No.

6328-W, containing an area of 1,095 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 9647
(Rollo, p. 36; Emphasis supplied).
Respondent Purisima contended that his father, a geodetic engineer, had surveyed the parcel of land comprising of
Lots Nos. 6427 and 6328 for the Small Farmers Fishpond Association, Inc. in February 1958, and that his father's
survey plan was approved by the Director of Lands in 1960. Respondent Ayco, on the other hand, did not present
any evidence but merely anchored his right to possess the property on the evidence of Purisima.
On April 30, 1986, the trial court rendered a decision finding that respondent Purisima built his house "almost on the
spot where Somodio's unfinished house" stood "thru stealth and strategy," not knowing that the house was built on
Lot No. 6328-X and not on Lot No. 6328-Y, the lot said respondent was claiming (Rollo, p. 43). The court went on
to state that:
. . . . He (private respondent Purisima) was a frequent visitor in Rajah Muda and had sometimes
stayed with Mrs. Maturan in Judge Purisima's house on the adjoining lots, and could not have
remained unaware of the possession of Somodio. He must have depended on the thought that it
was his father who made the subdivision survey and had fenced an area which he had claimed. He
did not exactly verify that the area fenced by his father had an area of only 1,095 square meters,
which did not include the are Lot No. 6328-X could eventually be standing on his property, for Lot
No. 6328-X is not claimed by him and has not been applied for even by his father. His father has
been abroad and has not taken steps to apply for Lot No. 6328-X. This lot is not declared for
taxation purposes in the name of any claimant-applicant. Unless and until there would be an
administrative proceedings and the title ultimately issued in favor of an applicant, the possession
of the actual claimant and occupant has to be respected and maintained in the interest of public
order . . . (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
The Municipal Trial Court further held that petitioner was the actual possessor of Lot No. 6328-X. The court did not
believe respondent Ayco's claim that the administratrix of the estate of respondent Purisima's father authorized him
to build a hut on Lot No. 6328-X in 1976. At any rate, the court said that respondent Ayco was willing to vacate the
premises provided he be given financial assistance to do so (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
Nothing that the ocular inspection of the area showed that the houses of respondents Purisima and Ayco were "inside
Lot No. 6328-X" and not on Lot No. 6328-Y, the Municipal Trial Court held that the case became one which
entailed mere removal of the houses from the lot in question. Accordingly, the court ordered private respondents to
remove their respective houses, to deliver the land to petitioner, and to pay attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, General Santos City, affirmed in toto the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court. Respondent then elevated the cases on a petition for review to the Court of Appeals, which, in its
decision dated September 27, 1987, set aside the decisions of the two trial courts and ordered the dismissal of the
two complaints filed by petitioner.
The Court of Appeals held that herein petitioner had not "clearly and conclusively established physical, prior
possession over Lot No. 6328-X."
Petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals having been denied, he filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari.
We grant the petition.
II

The procedural issue raised by private respondents should first be resolved. The issue is whether the instant petition
is proper considering that petitioner "merely touch(es) upon questions of fact which had been carefully considered"
by the Court of Appeals (Rollo, p. 92). As a general rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding on
this Court. This rule, however, is not without exceptions, one of which is when the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other. In such a case, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on
record in order to arrive at the correct findings based on the record (Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 1
[1990]; Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 411 [1990]).
Upon a review of the records, we are convinced that petitioner indeed enjoyed priority of possession over Lot No.
6328-X, notwithstanding respondent Purisima's claim to the contrary.
In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. Anyone of them
who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. This rule holds
true regardless of the character of a party's possession, provided, that he has in his favor priority of time which
entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria (De Luna v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 276 [1992]).
Petitioner took possession of the property sometime in 1974 when he planted the property to coconut trees, ipil- ipil
trees and fruit trees. In 1976, he started the construction of a building on the property. It is immaterial that the
building was unfinished and that he left for Kidapawan for employment reasons and visited the property only
intermittently. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter
of ground before it can be said that he is in possession (Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 [1918]). It is
sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will.
Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the
fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right.
Even if the Court of Appeals is correct in its finding that petitioner started introducing improvements on the land
only in 1981, he still enjoyed priority of possession because respondent Purisima entered the premises only in 1983.
It should be emphasized that the Court of Appeals noted that none of the parties had produced tax declarations or
applications as public land claimants. As such, what should have been scrutinized is who between the claimants had
priority of possession.
Moreover, neither is the fact that respondent Purisima's father surveyed the property of help to his cause. As the
Court of Appeals found, respondent Purisima's father surveyed the land for the Small Farmers Fishpond Association,
Inc., not for himself. Although respondent Purisima now claims that Lot No. 6328-X was in payment of his fee for
the services of his father and that he caused the construction of a perimeter wall in the area, these facts do not mean
that respondent Purisima himself had prior possession. He did not present any proof that his father had authorized
him to enter the land as his successor-in-interest. Neither did he present proof that between 1958, when his father
allegedly took possession of the land, and 1983, when said respondent himself entered the land, his father ever
exercised whatever right of possession he should have over the property. Under these circumstances, priority in time
should be the pivotal cog in resolving the issue of possession.
The Court of Appeals opined that petitioner had not properly identified the lot he had occupied. The matter of
identification of the land, however, had been resolved by respondent Purisima's admission in his pleadings, as well
as by two ocular inspections.

In his answer to the complaint, respondent Purisima claimed possession over Lot No. 6328-Y, while petitioner
identified the lot adjacent to it, Lot
NO. 6328-X, as the area where private respondents built their houses. That these two lots are distinct from one
another was resolved by the ocular inspection conducted by a Senior Geodetic Engineer of the Office of the City
Engineer, who found that "south of lot 6328-H across a 10 meter wide road is lot 6328-Y and from thence to the
south is lot 6328-X." On June 13, 1985, the Municipal Trial Court judge himself went to the premises in question
and discovered that aside from the houses of respondents Purisima and Ayco, five other houses had been built on Lot
No. 6328-X.
Petitioner's prior possession over the property, however, is not synonymous with his right of ownership over the
same. As earlier stated, resolution of the issue of possession is far from the resolution of the issue of ownership.
Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate (German Management
& Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 495 [1989]; Manuel v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 603 [1991].
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and that of the trial courts
REINSTATED. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., On official leave.

EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner,

vs.
THE SPOUSES LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the name and style of "SANTOS
BOOKSTORE," and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Emiliano S. Samson, R. Balderrama-Samson, Mary Anne B. Samson for petitioner.
Cendana Santos, Delmundo & Cendana for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The case before us calls for the interpretation of Article 559 of the Civil Code and raises the particular question of
when a person may be deemed to have been "unlawfully deprived" of movable property in the hands of another. The
article runs in full as follows:
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless,
one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has acquired it in
good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
The movable property in this case consists of books, which were bought from the petitioner by an impostor who sold
it to the private respondents. Ownership of the books was recognized in the private respondents by the Municipal
Trial Court, which was sustained by the Regional Trial Court, which was in turn sustained by the Court of
Appeals. The petitioner asks us to declare that all these courts have erred and should be reversed.
This case arose when on October 5, 1981, a person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by
telephone with the petitioner company for 406 books, payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding
invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price of
P8,995.65. On October 7, 1981, Cruz sold 120 of the books to private respondent Leonor Santos who, after
verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him P1,700.00.
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before clearing of his first
check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there
was no such person in its employ. Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with the
Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment check. EDCA then went to the police, which set
a trap and arrested Cruz on October 7, 1981. Investigation disclosed his real name as Tomas de la Pea and his sale
of 120 of the books he had ordered from EDCA to the private respondents.
On the night of the same date, EDCA sought the assistance of the police in Precinct 5 at the UN Avenue, which
forced their way into the store of the private respondents and threatened Leonor Santos with prosecution for buying
stolen property. They seized the 120 books without warrant, loading them in a van belonging to EDCA, and
thereafter turned them over to the petitioner.
Protesting this high-handed action, the private respondents sued for recovery of the books after demand for their
return was rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and the petitioner, after initial refusal,
finally surrendered the books to the private respondents. As previously stated, the petitioner was successively
rebuffed in the three courts below and now hopes to secure relief from us.
To begin with, the Court expresses its disapproval of the arbitrary action of the petitioner in taking the law into its
own hands and forcibly recovering the disputed books from the private respondents. The circumstance that it did so
with the assistance of the police, which should have been the first to uphold legal and peaceful processes, has
compounded the wrong even more deplorably. Questions like the one at bar are decided not by policemen but by
judges and with the use not of brute force but of lawful writs.
Now to the merits
It is the contention of the petitioner that the private respondents have not established their ownership of the disputed
books because they have not even produced a receipt to prove they had bought the stock. This is unacceptable.

Precisely, the first sentence of Article 559 provides that "the possession of movable property acquired in good faith
is equivalent to a title," thus dispensing with further proof.
The argument that the private respondents did not acquire the books in good faith has been dismissed by the lower
courts, and we agree. Leonor Santos first ascertained the ownership of the books from the EDCA invoice showing
that they had been sold to Cruz, who said he was selling them for a discount because he was in financial need.
Private respondents are in the business of buying and selling books and often deal with hard-up sellers who urgently
have to part with their books at reduced prices. To Leonor Santos, Cruz must have been only one of the many such
sellers she was accustomed to dealing with. It is hardly bad faith for anyone in the business of buying and selling
books to buy them at a discount and resell them for a profit.
But the real issue here is whether the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued
by the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored.
In its extended memorandum, EDCA cites numerous cases holding that the owner who has been unlawfully deprived
of personal property is entitled to its recovery except only where the property was purchased at a public sale, in
which event its return is subject to reimbursement of the purchase price. The petitioner is begging the question. It is
putting the cart before the horse. Unlike in the cases invoked, it has yet to be established in the case at bar that
EDCA has been unlawfully deprived of the books.
The petitioner argues that it was, because the impostor acquired no title to the books that he could have validly
transferred to the private respondents. Its reason is that as the payment check bounced for lack of funds, there was a
failure of consideration that nullified the contract of sale between it and Cruz.
The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached between the parties on the subject
matter and the consideration. According to the Civil Code:
Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which
is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law
governing the form of contracts.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery thereof.
Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he has
fully paid the price.
It is clear from the above provisions, particularly the last one quoted, that ownership in the thing sold shall not pass
to the buyer until full payment of the purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that
such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing
sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the
case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer
ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
In Asiatic Commercial Corporation v. Ang, the plaintiff sold some cosmetics to Francisco Ang, who in turn sold
them to Tan Sit Bin. Asiatic not having been paid by Ang, it sued for the recovery of the articles from Tan, who

claimed he had validly bought them from Ang, paying for the same in cash. Finding that there was no conspiracy
between Tan and Ang to deceive Asiatic the Court of Appeals declared:
Yet the defendant invoked Article 464 of the Civil Code providing, among other things that "one who has
been unlawfully deprived of personal property may recover it from any person possessing it." We do not
believe that the plaintiff has been unlawfully deprived of the cartons of Gloco Tonic within the scope of this
legal provision. It has voluntarily parted with them pursuant to a contract of purchase and sale. The
circumstance that the price was not subsequently paid did not render illegal a transaction which was valid
and legal at the beginning.
In Tagatac v. Jimenez, the plaintiff sold her car to Feist, who sold it to Sanchez, who sold it to Jimenez. When the
payment check issued to Tagatac by Feist was dishonored, the plaintiff sued to recover the vehicle from Jimenez on
the ground that she had been unlawfully deprived of it by reason of Feist's deception. In ruling for Jimenez, the
Court of Appeals held:
The point of inquiry is whether plaintiff-appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac has been unlawfully deprived of her
car. At first blush, it would seem that she was unlawfully deprived thereof, considering that she was
induced to part with it by reason of the chicanery practiced on her by Warner L. Feist. Certainly, swindling,
like robbery, is an illegal method of deprivation of property. In a manner of speaking, plaintiff-appellant
was "illegally deprived" of her car, for the way by which Warner L. Feist induced her to part with it is
illegal and is punished by law. But does this "unlawful deprivation" come within the scope of Article 559 of
the New Civil Code?
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . The fraud and deceit practiced by Warner L. Feist earmarks this sale as a voidable contract (Article
1390 N.C.C.). Being a voidable contract, it is susceptible of either ratification or annulment. If the contract
is ratified, the action to annul it is extinguished (Article 1392, N.C.C.) and the contract is cleansed from all
its defects (Article 1396, N.C.C.); if the contract is annulled, the contracting parties are restored to their
respective situations before the contract and mutual restitution follows as a consequence (Article 1398,
N.C.C.).
However, as long as no action is taken by the party entitled, either that of annulment or of ratification, the
contract of sale remains valid and binding. When plaintiff-appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac delivered the car to
Feist by virtue of said voidable contract of sale, the title to the car passed to Feist. Of course, the title that
Feist acquired was defective and voidable. Nevertheless, at the time he sold the car to Felix Sanchez, his
title thereto had not been avoided and he therefore conferred a good title on the latter, provided he bought
the car in good faith, for value and without notice of the defect in Feist's title (Article 1506, N.C.C.). There
being no proof on record that Felix Sanchez acted in bad faith, it is safe to assume that he acted in good
faith.
The above rulings are sound doctrine and reflect our own interpretation of Article 559 as applied to the case before
us.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then
validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between
him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books.
One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase "unlawfully deprived" were to be interpreted in the
manner suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on the seller's title who buys a movable property from him
would have to surrender it to another person claiming to be the original owner who had not yet been paid the
purchase price therefor. The buyer in the second sale would be left holding the bag, so to speak, and would be
compelled to return the thing bought by him in good faith without even the right to reimbursement of the amount he
had paid for it.

It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the books belonged to
Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed her assured her that the books had been
paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious in fact, too trusting in dealing with the impostor.
Although it had never transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books he had ordered (by telephone) and
as readily accepted his personal check in payment. It did not verify his identity although it was easy enough to do
this. It did not wait to clear the check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him,
by the printed terms thereon, that the books had been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting ownership in the buyer.
Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy herself that the books being offered
for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did. Although the title of Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his
mere possession of the books, these being movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more proof
before deciding to buy them.
It would certainly be unfair now to make the private respondents bear the prejudice sustained by EDCA as a result of
its own negligence.1wphi1 We cannot see the justice in transferring EDCA's loss to the Santoses who had acted in
good faith, and with proper care, when they bought the books from Cruz.
While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its remedy is not against the private
respondents but against Tomas de la Pea, who has apparently caused all this trouble. The private respondents have
themselves been unduly inconvenienced, and for merely transacting a customary deal not really unusual in their kind
of business. It is they and not EDCA who have a right to complain.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

CONSUELO S. DE GARCIA and ANASTACIO GARCIA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA D. GUEVARA and JUAN B. GUEVARA, respondents.
Deogracias T. Reyes and Jose M. Luison for petitioners.

Tolentino and Garcia and D.R. Cruz for private respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
This petition for certiorari to review a decision of respondent Court of Appeals was given due course because it was
therein vigorously asserted that legal questions of gravity and of moment, there being allegations of an unwarranted
departure from and a patent misreading of applicable and controlling decisions, called for determination by this
Tribunal. The brief for petitioners-spouses, however, failed to substantiate such imputed failings of respondent
Court. The performance did not live up to the promise. On the basis of the facts as duly found by respondent Court,
which we are not at liberty to disregard, and the governing legal provisions, there is no basis for reversal. We affirm.
The nature of the case presented before the lower court by private respondent Angelina D. Guevara, assisted by her
spouse, Juan B. Guevara, as plaintiffs, was noted in the decision of respondent Court of Appeals thus:
"Plaintiff seeks recovery of `one (1) lady's diamond ring 18 cts. white gold mounting, with one (1) 2.05 cts.
diamond-solitaire, and four (4) brills 0.10 cts. total weight' which she bought on October 27, 1947 from R.
Rebullida, Inc."1 Then came a summary of now respondent Guevara of her evidence: "Plaintiff's evidence tends to
show that around October 11, 1953 plaintiff while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of La Bulakea
restaurant recognized her ring in the finger of Mrs. Garcia and inquired where she bought it, which the defendant
answered from her comadre. Plaintiff explained that that ring was stolen from her house in February, 1952.
Defendant handed the ring to plaintiff and it fitted her finger. Two or three days later, at the request of plaintiff,
plaintiff, her husband Lt. Col. Juan Guevara, Lt. Cementina of Pasay PD, defendant and her attorney proceeded to
the store of Mr. Rebullida to whom they showed the ring in question. Mr. Rebullida examined the ring with the aid
of high power lens and after consulting the stock card thereon, concluded that it was the very ring that plaintiff
bought from him in 1947. The ring was returned to defendant who despite a written request therefor failed to deliver
the ring to plaintiff. Hence, this case. Later on when the sheriff tried to serve the writ of seizure (replevin), defendant
refused to deliver the ring which had been examined by Mr. Rebullida, claiming it was lost."2
How the defendant, Consuelo S. de Garcia, the present petitioner before us, along with her husband Anastacio
Garcia, sought to meet plaintiff's claim was narrated thus: "On the other hand, defendant denied having made any
admission before plaintiff or Mr. Rebullida or the sheriff. Her evidence tends to show that the ring (Exhibit 1) was
purchased by her from Mrs. Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in turn got it from the owner,
Aling Petring, who was boarding in her house; that the ring she bought could be similar to, but not the same ring
plaintiff purchased from Mr. Rebullida which was stolen; that according to a pawn-shop owner the big diamond on
Exhibit 1 was before the trial never dismantled. When dismantled, defendant's diamond was found to weigh 2.57
cts."3
Plaintiff lost in the lower court. She elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals with the judgment of the
lower court being reversed. It is this decision now under review.
These are the facts as found by respondent Court of Appeals: "That the ring brought by the parties for examination
by Rafael Rebullida on December 14, 1953 was the same ring purchased by plaintiff from R. Rebullida, Inc. on
October 27, 1947 and stolen in February, 1952 has been abundantly established by plaintiff's evidence. Before
plaintiff lost the ring, she had been wearing it for six years and became familiar with it. Thus, when she saw the
missing ring in the finger of defendant, she readily and definitely identified it. Her identification was confirmed by
Mr. Rafael Rebullida, whose candid testimony is entitled to great weight, with his 30 years experience behind him in
the jewelry business and being a disinterested witness since both parties are his customers. Indeed, defendant made
no comment when in her presence Rebullida after examining the ring and stock card told plaintiff that that was her

ring, nor did she answer plaintiff's letter of demand, ... asserting ownership. Further confirmation may be found in
the extra-judicial admissions, contained in defendant's original and first amended answers ..."4
These further facts likewise appeal therein: "The foregoing proof is not counter-balanced by the denial on the part of
defendant or the presentation of the ring, Exhibit I, which has a diamond-solitaire 2.57 cts., or much heavier than the
lost diamond weighing 2.05 cts. only. It is noteworthy that defendant gave a rather dubious source of her ring. Aling
Petring from whom the ring supposedly came turned out to be a mysterious and ephemeral figure. Miss Hinahon did
not even know her true and full name, nor her forwarding address. She appeared from nowhere, boarded three
months in the house of Miss Hinahon long enough to sell her diamond ring, disappearing from the scene a week
thereafter. Indeed, the case was terminated without any hearing on the third-party and fourth-party complaints,
which would have shown up the falsity of defendant's theory. Moreover, Mrs. Baldomera Miranda, third-party
defendant, who tried to corroborate defendant on the latter's alleged attempt to exchange the ring defendant bought
through her, is [belied] by her judicial admission in her Answer that appellee `suggested that she would make
alterations to the mounting and structural design of the ring to hide the true identity and appearance of the original
one' (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 45 O.G. 3796). Finally, defendant is refuted by her own extra-judicial admissions ...
although made by defendant's counsel. For an attorney who acts as counsel of record and is permitted to act such,
has the authority to manage the cause, and this includes the authority to make admission for the purpose of the
litigation... Her proffered explanation that her counsel misunderstood her is puerile because the liability to error as to
the identity of the vendor and the exchange of the ring with another ring of the same value, was rather remote." 5
It is in the light of the above facts as well as the finding that the discrepancy as to the weight between the diamondsolitaire in Exhibit I and the lost diamond was due to defendant having "substituted a diamond-solitaire of plaintiff
with a heavier stone" that the decision was rendered, respondent Court reversing the lower court and ordering
defendant, now petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia, to return plaintiff's ring or fact value of P1,000.00 and costs, as
well as to pay plaintiff P1,000.00 as attorney's fee and P1,000.00 as exemplary damages. Hence this appeal.
To repeat, there is no occasion to reverse respondent Court. It correctly applied the law to the facts as found.
1. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. It reads thus: "The possession of movable property
acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of
which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain
its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor." Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having been unlawfully
deprived of the diamond ring in question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was
found in possession of the same. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the
possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price. As
authoritative interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati, 6 the right of the owner cannot be defeated even by proof that there was
good faith by the acquisition by the possessor. There is a reiteration of this principle in Aznar v. Yapdiangco.7Thus:
"Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner to recover personal property acquired in good faith by
another, is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle that where one of two
innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by the another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by
his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an
express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law principle and statutory
provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction."8
2. It is thus immediately apparent that there is no merit to the contention raised in the first assigned error that her
possession in good faith, equivalent to title, sufficed to defeat respondent Guevara's claim. As the above cases
demonstrate, even on that assumption the owner can recover the same once she can show illegal deprivation.
Respondent Court of Appeals was so convinced from the evidence submitted that the owner of the ring in litigation
is such respondent. That is a factual determination to which we must pay heed. Instead of proving any alleged
departure from legal norms by respondent Court, petitioner would stress Article 541 of the Civil Code, which

provides: 'A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just
title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it." She would accord to it a greater legal significance than that to
which under the controlling doctrines it is entitled.lwph1.t The brief for respondents did clearly point out why
petitioner's assertion is lacking in support not only from the cases but even from commentators. Thus: "Actually,
even under the first clause, possession in good faith does not really amount to title, for the reason that Art. 1132 of
the Code provides for a period of acquisitive prescription for movables through `uninterrupted possession for four
years in good faith' (Art. 1955 of the old Spanish Code, which provided a period of three years), so that many
Spanish writers, including Manresa, Sanchez Roman, Scaevola, De Buen, and Ramos, assert that under Art. 464 of
the Spanish Code (Art. 559 of the New Civil Code), the title of the possessor is not that of ownership, but is merely
a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis of acquisitive prescription (II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil. p.
258: IV Manresa, Derecho Civil Espaol, 6th Ed., p. 380). And it is for the very reason that the title established by
the first clause of Art. 559 is only a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription, that
the clause immediately following provides that `one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived
thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.' As stated by the Honorable Justice Jose B. L.
Reyes of this Court in Sotto vs. Enage (C.A.), 43 Off. Gaz. 5075, Dec. 1947: `Article 559 in fact assumes that
possessor is as yet not the owner; for it is obvious that where the possessor has come to acquire indefeasible title by,
let us say, adverse possession for the necessary period, no proof of loss or illegal deprivation could avail the former
owner of the chattel. He would no longer be entitled to recover it under any condition.' "9
The second assigned error is centered on the alleged failure to prove the identity of the diamond ring. Clearly the
question raised is one of the fact. What the Court of Appeals found is conclusive. Again, petitioner could not
demonstrate that in reaching such a conclusion the Court of Appeals acted in an arbitrary manner. As made mention
of in the brief for respondents two disinterested witnesses, Mr. Rafael Rebullida as well as Lt. Col. Reynaldo
Cementina of the Pasay City Police Department, both of whom could not be accused of being biased in favor of
respondent Angelina D. Guevara, did testify as to the identity of the ring.
The third assigned error of petitioners would find fault with respondent Court relying "on the weakness of the title or
evidence" of petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia. It is true, in the decision under review, mention was made of
petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia making no comment when in her presence Rebullida, after examining the ring the
stock card, told respondent Angelina L. Guevara that that was her ring, nor did petitioner answer a letter of the latter
asserting ownership. It was likewise stated in such decision that there were extra-judicial admissions in the original
and first amended answers of petitioner. In the appraisal of her testimony, respondent Court likewise spoke of her
giving a rather dubious source of her ring, the person from whom she allegedly bought it turning out "to be a
mysterious and ephemeral figure." As a matter of fact, as set forth a few pages back, respondent Court did enumerate
the flaws in the version given by petitioner. From the weakness of the testimony offered which, as thus made clear,
petitioner, did not even seek to refute, she would raise the legal question that respondent Court relied on the
"weakness of [her] title or evidence" rather than on the proof justifying respondent Angelina D. Guevara's claim of
ownership. Petitioner here would ignore the finding of fact of respondent Court that such ownership on her part "has
been abundantly established" by her evidence. Again here, in essence, the question raised is one of fact, and there is
no justification for us to reverse respondent Court.
The legal question raised in the fourth assignment of error is that the matter of the substitution of the diamond on the
ring was a question raised for the first time on appeal as it was never put in issue by the pleadings nor the subject of
reception of evidence by both parties and not touched upon in the decision of the lower court. Why no such question
could be raised in the pleadings of respondent Angelina D. Guevara was clarified by the fact that the substitution
came after it was brought for examination to Mr. Rebullida. After the knowledge of such substitution was gained,
however, the issue was raised at the trial according to the said respondent resulting in that portion of the decision
where the lower court reached a negative conclusion. As a result, in the motion for reconsideration, one of the points
raised as to such decision being contrary to the evidence is the finding that there was no substitution. It is not
necessary to state that respondent Court, exercising its appellate power reversed the lower court. What was held by it

is controlling. What is clear is that there is no factual basis for the legal arguments on which the fourth assigned
error is predicated.
What is said takes care of the fifth assigned error that respondent Court was mistaken in its finding that there was
such a substitution. Again petitioner would have us pass on a question of credibility which is left to respondent
Court of Appeals. The sixth assigned error would complain against the reversal of the lower court judgment as well
as petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia being made to pay respondent Angelina D. Guevara exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and costs. The reversal is called for in the light of the appraisal of the evidence of record as
meticulously weighed by respondent Court. As to the attorney's fees and exemplary damages, this is what
respondent Court said in the decision under review: "Likewise, plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's
fees in the sum of P1,000, it being just and equitable under the circumstances, and another P1,000 as exemplary
damages for the public good to discourage litigants from resorting to fraudulent devices to frustrate the ends of
justice, as defendant herein tried to substitute the ring, Exhibit 1, for plaintiff's ring." 10 Considering the
circumstances, the cursory discussion of the sixth assigned error on the matter by petitioner fails to demonstrate that
respondent Court's actuation is blemished by legal defects.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of August 6, 1962 is hereby affirmed. With costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result, Art. 85 of the Code of Commerce not being applicable.