G.R. No.

L-48840 December 29, 1943

ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
.
ROSARIO GUEVARA and her husband PEDRO BUISON, respondent-appellees
OZAETA, J.:
Ernesto M. Guevarra and Rosario Guevara, ligitimate son and natural daughter,
respectively, of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, are litigating here over their inheritance
from the latter. The action was commenced on November 12, 1937, by Rosario Guevara to
recover from Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her strict ligitime as an acknowledged
natural daughter of the deceased to wit, a portion of 423,492 square meters of a large
parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 51691 of the province of
Pangasinan, issued in the name of Ernesto M. Guervara and to order the latter to pay
her P6,000 plus P2,000 a year as damages for withholding such legitime from her. The
defendant answered the complaint contending that whatever right or rights the plaintiff
might have had, had been barred by the operation of law.
It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will (exhibit A),
apparently with all the formalities of the law, wherein he made the following bequests: To
his stepdaughter Candida Guevara, a pair of earrings worth P150 and a gold chain worth
P40; to his son Ernesto M. Guevara, a gold ring worth P180 and all the furniture, pictures,
statues, and other religious objects found in the residence of the testator in Poblacion Sur,
Bayambang, Pangasinan; "a mi hija Rosario Guevara," a pair of earrings worth P120; to
his stepson Piuo Guevara, a ring worth P120; and to his wife by second marriage, Angustia
Posadas, various pieces of jewelry worth P1,020.
He also made the following devises: "A mis hijos Rosario Guevara y Ernesto M. Guevara y
a mis hijastros, Vivencio, Eduviges, Dionisia, Candida y Pio, apellidados Guevara," a
residential lot with its improvements situate in the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan, having
an area of 960 square meters and assessed at P540; to his wife Angustia Posadas he
confirmed the donation propter nuptias theretofore made by him to her of a portion of 25
hectares of the large parcel of land of 259-odd hectares described in plan Psu-66618. He
also devised to her a portion of 5 hectares of the same parcel of land by way of complete
settlement of her usufructurary right.1awphil.net
He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed of either by him
during his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto M. Guevara in order to pay all his
pending debts and to degray his expenses and those of his family us to the time of his
death.
The remainder of said parcel of land his disposed of in the following manner:
(d). Toda la porcion restante de mi terreno arriba descrito, de la extension
superficial aproximada de ciento veintinueve (129) hectareas setenta (70) areas,

1 | SUCCESSION

y veiticinco (25) centiares, con todas sus mejoras existentes en la misma, dejo y
distribuyo, pro-indiviso, a mis siguientes herederos como sigue:
A mi hijo legitimo, Ernesto M. Guevara, ciento ocho (108) hectareas, ocho (8)
areas y cincuenta y cuatro (54) centiareas, hacia la parte que colinda al Oeste de
las cien (100) hectareas referidas en el inciso (a) de este parrafo del testamento,
como su propiedad absoluta y exclusiva, en la cual extension superficial estan
incluidas cuarenta y tres (43) hectareas, veintitres (23) areas y cuarenta y dos
(42) centiareas que le doy en concepto de mejora.
A mi hija natural reconocida, Rosario Guevara, veintiun (21) hectareas, sesenta y
un (61) areas y setenta y un (71) centiareas, que es la parte restante.
Duodecimo. Nombro por la presente como Albacea Testamentario a mi hijo
Ernesto M. Guevara, con relevacion de fianza. Y una vez legalizado este
testamento, y en cuanto sea posible, es mi deseo, que los herederos y legatarios
aqui nombrados se repartan extrajudicialmente mis bienes de conformidad con
mis disposiciones arriba consignadas.
Subsequently, and on July 12, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra executed whereby he conveyed
to him the southern half of the large parcel of land of which he had theretofore disposed by
the will above mentioned, inconsideration of the sum of P1 and other valuable
considerations, among which were the payment of all his debts and obligations amounting
to not less than P16,500, his maintenance up to his death, and the expenses of his last
illness and funeral expenses. As to the northern half of the same parcel of land, he
declared: "Hago constar tambien que reconozco a mi referido hijo Ernesto M. guevara
como dueo de la mitad norte de la totalidad y conjunto de los referidos terrenos por
haberlos comprado de su propio peculio del Sr. Rafael T. Puzon a quien habia vendido con
anterioridad."
On September 27, 1933, final decree of registration was issued in land registration case
No. 15174 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and pursuant thereto original
certificate of title No. 51691 of the same province was issued on October 12 of the same
year in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara over the whole parcel of land described in the deed of
sale above referred to. The registration proceeding had been commenced on November 1,
1932, by Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara as applicants, with Rosario, among
others, as oppositor; but before the trial of the case Victorino L. Guevara withdrew as
applicant and Rosario Guevara and her co-oppositors also withdrew their opposition,
thereby facilitating the issuance of the title in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara alone.
On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra died. His last will and testament, however,
was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever
been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees mentioned in
the will have received their respective legacies or have even been given due notice of the
execution of said will and of the dispositions therein made in their favor, does not
affirmatively appear from the record of this case. Ever since the death of Victorino L.

Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land
adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions
thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father.

will to the court which has jurisdiction, unless the will has been otherwise
returned to said court, and shall, within such period, signify to the court his
acceptance of the trust, or make known in writing his refusal to accept it.

In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and
testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions
made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter
and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171
hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. But a little over four years after the
testor's demise, she (assisted by her husband) commenced the present action against
Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during
the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it
probated but only to prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her
as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the
inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the
will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made
by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded.
Both the trial court and the Court of appeals sustained that theory.

Sec. 628. Penalty. A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two
proceeding sections, unless he gives a satisfactory excuse to the court, shall be
subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.

Two principal questions are before us for determination: (1) the legality of the procedure
adopted by the plaintiff (respondent herein) Rosario Guevara; and (2) the efficacy of the
deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of title issued to the defendant
(petitioner herein) Ernesto M. Guevara.
I
We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara, it being in
our opinion in violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the
last will and testament of the decedent. The Code of Civil Procedure, which was in force up
to the time this case was decided by the trial court, contains the following pertinent
provisions:
Sec. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No will shall
pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the
Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by
the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
Sec. 626. Custodian of Will to Deliver. The person who has the custody of a
will shall, within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the
will into the court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
Sec. 627. Executor to Present Will and Accept or Refuse Trust. A person
named as executor in a will, shall within thirty days after he knows of the death of
the testor, or within thirty days after he knows that he is named executor, if he
obtained such knowledge after knowing of the death of the testor, present such

2 | SUCCESSION

Sec. 629. Person Retaining Will may be Committed. If a person having

custody of a will after the death of the testator neglects without reasonable cause
to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by the court so to
do, he may be committed to the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the
court, and there kept in close confinement until he delivers the will.
The foregoing provisions are now embodied in Rule 76 of the new Rules of Court, which
took effect on July 1, 1940.
The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the
whole world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator (section 630, C. c. P., and sections 3 and 4, Rule 77). Altho not contested
(section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact that the testator at the time
of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace,
and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only then
may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed
by the judge and attested by the seal of the court; and when the will devises real property,
attested copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register
of deeds of the province in which the land lies. (Section 12, Rule 77, and section 624, C. C.
P.)
It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will to
the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and
indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of will, the law punishes a
person who neglects his duty to present it to the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000,
and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be committed to prision and kept there
until he delivers the will.
The Court of Appeals took express notice of these requirements of the law and held that a
will, unless probated, is ineffective. Nevertheless it sanctioned the procedure adopted by
the respondent for the following reasons:
The majority of the Court is of the opinion that if this case is dismissed ordering
the filing of testate proceedings, it would cause injustice, incovenience, delay,
and much expense to the parties, and that therefore, it is preferable to leave
them in the very status which they themselves have chosen, and to decide their
controversy once and for all, since, in a similar case, the Supreme Court applied
that same criterion (Leao vs. Leao, supra), which is now sanctioned by section

1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Besides, section 6 of Rule 124 provides that, if
the procedure which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is
not specifically pointed out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process or mode
of procedure may be adopted which appears most consistent to the spirit of the
said Rules. Hence, we declare the action instituted by the plaintiff to be in
accordance with law.
Let us look into the validity of these considerations. Section 1 of Rule 74 provides as
follows:
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the
decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors
are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and
should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is
only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by
means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be
presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
administration within two years after the death of the decedent.
That is a modification of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as
follows:
Sec. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings.
Whenever all the heirs of a person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal
capacity and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been
paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not
otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see
fit, without proceedings in court.
The implication is that by the omission of the word "intestate" and the use of the word
"legatees" in section 1 of Rule 74, a summary extrajudicial settlement of a deceased
person's estate, whether he died testate or intestate, may be made under the conditions
specified. Even if we give retroactive effect to section 1 of Rule 74 and apply it here, as the
Court of Appeals did, we do not believe it sanctions the nonpresentation of a will for
probate and much less the nullification of such will thru the failure of its custodian to
present it to the court for probate; for such a result is precisely what Rule 76 sedulously
provides against. Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial
partition of the estate of a decedent "without securing letter of administration." It does not
say that in case the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may divide the estate
among themselves without the necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate. The
petition to probate a will and the petition to issue letters of administration are two different
things, altho both may be made in the same case. the allowance of a will precedes the
issuance of letters testamentary or of administration (section 4, Rule 78). One can have a
will probated without necessarily securing letters testamentary or of administration. We
hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no

3 | SUCCESSION

debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate,
they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance
with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are
contrary to law. Neither may they so away with the presentation of the will to the court for
probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law
enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case.
Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will,
could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might
agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others.
In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present
litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence
and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may
those rights be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to
present it to the court for probate.
Even if the decedent left no debts and nobdy raises any question as to the authenticity and
due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in
accordance with that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court, first,
because the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal estate
unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court"; and, second, because the probate of a
will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any other
proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to
effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and
to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by
law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs
and legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such
an action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the
registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action
for reinvindicacion or partition.
We therefore believe and so hold that section 1 of Rule 74, relied upon by the Court of
Appeals, does not sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent.
The case of Leao vs. Leao (25 Phil., 180), cited by the Court of Appeals, like section 1 of
Rule 74, sanctions the extrajudicial partition by the heirs of the properties left by a
decedent, but not the nonpresentation of a will for probate. In that case one Paulina Ver
executed a will on October 11, 1902, and died on November 1, 1902. Her will was
presented for probate on November 10, 1902, and was approved and allowed by the Court
on August 16, 1904. In the meantime, and on November 10, 1902, the heirs went ahead
and divided the properties among themselves and some of them subsequently sold and
disposed of their shares to third persons. It does not affirmatively appear in the decision in
that case that the partition made by the heirs was not in accordance with the will or that
they in any way disregarded the will. In closing the case by its order dated September 1,

1911, the trial court validated the partition, and one of the heirs, Cunegunda Leao,
appealed. In deciding the appeal this Court said:
The principal assignment of error is that the lower court committed an error in
deciding that the heirs and legatees of the estate of Da. Paulina Ver had
voluntarily divided the estate among themselves.
In resolving that question this Court said:
In view of the positive finding of the judge of the lower court that there had been
a voluntary partition of the estate among the heirs and legatees, and in the
absence of positive proof to the contrary, we must conclude that the lower court
had some evidence to support its conclusion.
Thus it will be seen that as a matter of fact no question of law was raised and decided in
that case. That decision cannot be relied upon as an authority for the unprecedented and
unheard of procedure adopted by the respondent whereby she seeks to prove her status
as an acknowledged natural child of the decedent by his will and attempts to nullify and
circumvent the testamentary dispositions made by him by not presenting the will to the
court for probate and by claiming her legitime as an acknowledged natural child on the
basis of intestacy; and that in the face of express mandatory provisions of the law requiring
her to present the will to the court for probate.
In the subsequent case of Riosa vs. Rocha (1926), 48 Phil. 737, this Court departed from
the procedure sanctioned by the trial court and impliedly approved by this Court in the
Leao case, by holding that an extrajudicial partition is not proper in testate succession. In
the Riosa case the Court, speaking thru Chief Justice Avancea, held:
1. EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION; NOT PROPER IN TESTATE SUCCESSION.
Section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing the heirs of a person who
dies intestate to make extrajudicial partition of the property of the deceased,
without going into any court of justice, makes express reference to intestate
succession, and therefore excludes testate succession.
2. ID.; EFFECTS OF; TESTATE SUCCESSION. In the instant case, which is a
testate succession, the heirs made an extrajudicial partition of the estate and at
the same time instituted proceeding for the probate of the will and the
administration of the estate. When the time came for making the partition, they
submitted to the court the extrajudicial partition previously made by them, which
the court approved. Held: That for the purposes of the reservation and the rights
and obligations created thereby, in connection with the relatives benefited, the
property must not be deemed transmitted to the heirs from the time the
extrajudicial partition was made, but from the time said partition was approved by
the court. (Syllabus.)

4 | SUCCESSION

The Court of Appeals also cites section 6 of Rule 124, which provides that if the procedure
which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed
out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process for mode of proceeding may be adopted
which appears most conformable to the spirit of the said Rules. That provision is not
applicable here for the simple reason that the procedure which the court ought to follow in
the exercise of its jurisdiction is specifically pointed out and prescribed in detail by Rules
74, 76, and 77 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals also said "that if this case is dismissed, ordering the filing of testate
proceedings, it would cause injustice, inconvenience, delay, and much expense to the
parties." We see no injustice in requiring the plaintiff not to violate but to comply with the
law. On the contrary, an injustice might be committed against the other heirs and legatees
mentioned in the will if the attempt of the plaintiff to nullify said will by not presenting it to
the court for probate should be sanctioned. As to the inconvenience, delay, and expense,
the plaintiff herself is to blame because she was the custodian of the will and she violated
the duty imposed upon her by sections 2, 4, and 5 of Rule 76, which command her to
deliver said will to the court on pain of a fine not exceeding P2,000 and of imprisonment for
contempt of court. As for the defendant, he is not complaining of inconvenience, delay, and
expense, but on the contrary he is insisting that the procedure prescribed by law be
followed by the plaintiff.
Our conclusion is that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the action instituted by the
plaintiff to be in accordance with law. It also erred in awarding relief to the plaintiff in this
action on the basis of intestacy of the decedent notwithstanding the proven existence of a
will left by him and solely because said will has not been probated due to the failure of the
plaintiff as custodian thereof to comply with the duty imposed upon her by the law.
It is apparent that the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara, who was named executor in said
will, did not take any step to have it presented to the court for probate and did not signify
his acceptance of the trust or refusal to accept it as required by section 3 of Rule 76
(formerly section 627 of the Code of Civil Procedure), because his contention is that said
will, insofar as the large parcel of land in litigation is concerned, has been superseded by
the deed of sale exhibit 2 and by the subsequent issuance of the Torrens certificate of title
in his favor.
II
This brings us to the consideration of the second question, referring to the efficacy of the
deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of titled issued to the defendant
Ernesto M. Guevara. So that the parties may not have litigated here in vain insofar as that
question is concerned, we deem it proper to decide it now and obviate the necessity of a
new action.
The deed of sale exhibit 2 executed by and between Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M.
Guevara before a notary public on July 12, 1933, may be divided into two parts: (a) insofar
as it disposes of and conveys to Ernesto M. Guevara the southern half of Victorino L.

Guevara's hacienda of 259-odd hectares in consideration of P1 and other valuable

considerations therein mentioned; and (b) insofar as it declares that Ernesto M. Guevara
became the owner of the northern half of the same hacienda by repurchasing it with his
own money from Rafael T. Puzon.
A. As to the conveyance of the southern half of the hacienda to Ernesto M. Guevara in
consideration of the latter's assumption of the obligation to pay all the debts of the
deceased, the Court of Appeals found it to be valid and efficacious because: "(a) it has not
been proven that the charges imposed as a condition is [are] less than the value of the
property; and (b) neither has it been proven that the defendant did not comply with the
conditions imposed upon him in the deed of transfer." As a matter of fact the Court of
Appeals found" "It appears that the defendant has been paying the debts left by his father.
To accomplish this, he had to alienate considerable portions of the above-mentioned land.
And we cannot brand such alienation as anomalous unless it is proven that they have
exceeded the value of what he has acquired by virtue of the deed of July 12, 1933, and
that of his corresponding share in the inheritance." The finding of the Court of Appeals on
this aspect of the case is final and conclusive upon the respondent, who did not appeal
therefrom.
B. With regard to the northern half of the hacienda, the findings of fact and of law made by
the Court of Appeals are as follows:
The defendant has tried to prove that with his own money, he bought from Rafael
Puzon one-half of the land in question, but the Court a quo, after considering the
evidence, found it not proven; we hold that such conclusion is well founded. The
acknowledgment by the deceased, Victorino L. Guevara, of the said transactions,
which was inserted incidentally in the document of July 12, 1933, is clearly belied
by the fact that the money paid to Rafael Puzon came from Silvestre P. Coquia,
to whom Victorino L. Guevara had sold a parcel of land with the right of
repurchase. The defendant, acting for his father, received the money and
delivered it to Rafael Puzon to redeem the land in question, and instead of
executing a deed of redemption in favor of Victorino L. Guevara, the latter
executed a deed of sale in favor of the defendant.
The plaintiff avers that she withdrew her opposition to the registration of the land
in the name of the defendant, because of the latter's promise that after paying all
the debt of their father, he would deliver to her and to the widow their
corresponding shares. As their father then was still alive, there was no reason to
require the delivery of her share and that was why she did not insist on her
opposition, trusting on the reliability and sincerity of her brother's promise. The
evidence shows that such promise was really made. The registration of land
under the Torrens system does not have the effect of altering the laws of
succession, or the rights of partition between coparceners, joint tenants, and
other cotenants nor does it change or affect in any other way any other rights and
liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land (sec. 70, Land
Registration Law). The plaintiff is not, then, in estoppel, nor can the doctrine
of res judicata be invoked against her claim. Under these circumstances, she has

5 | SUCCESSION

the right to compel the defendant to deliver her corresponding share in the estate
left by the deceased, Victorino L. Guevara.
In his tenth to fourteenth assignments of error the petitioner assails the foregoing findings
of the Court of Appeals. But the findings of fact made by said court are final and not
reviewable by us on certiorari. The Court of Appeals found that the money with which the
petitioner repurchased the northern half of the land in question from Rafael Puzon was not
his own but his father's, it being the proceeds of the sale of a parcel of land made by the
latter to Silvestre P. Coquia. Said court also found that the respondent withdrew her
opposition to the registration of the land in the name of the petitioner upon the latter's
promise that after paying all the debts of their father he would deliver to her and to the
widow their corresponding shares. From these facts, it results that the interested parties
consented to the registration of the land in question in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara
alone subject to the implied trust on account of which he is under obligation to deliver and
convey to them their corresponding shares after all the debts of the original owner of said
land had been paid. Such finding does not constitute a reversal of the decision and decree
of registration, which merely confirmed the petitioner's title; and in the absence of any
intervening innocent third party, the petitioner may be compelled to fulfill the promise by
virtue of which he acquired his title. That is authorized by section 70 of the Land
Registration Act, cited by the Court of Appeals, and by the decision of this Court
in Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, and the cases therein cited.
Upon this phase of the litigation, we affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
northern half of the land described in the will exhibit A and in original certificate of title No.
51691 still belongs to the estate of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara. In the event the
petitioner Ernesto M. Guevara has alienated any portion thereof, he is under obligation to
compensate the estate with an equivalent portion from the southern half of said land that
has not yet been sold. In other words, to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara still belongs
one half of the total area of the land described in said original certificate of title, to be taken
from such portions as have not yet been sold by the petitioner, the other half having been
lawfully acquired by the latter in consideration of his assuming the obligation to pay all the
debts of the deceased.
Wherefore, that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which declares in effect that
notwithstanding exhibit 2 and the issuance of original certificate of title No. 51691 in the
name of Ernesto M. Guevara, one half of the land described in said certificate of title
belongs to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara and the other half to Ernesto M. Guevara in
consideration of the latter's assumption of the obligation to pay all the debts of the
deceased, is hereby affirmed; but the judgment of said court insofar as it awards any relief
to the respondent Rosario Guevara in this action is hereby reversed and set aside, and the
parties herein are hereby ordered to present the document exhibit A to the proper court for
probate in accordance with law, without prejudice to such action as the provincial fiscal of
Pangasinan may take against the responsible party or parties under section 4 of Rule 76.
After the said document is approved and allowed by the court as the last will and testament
of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, the heirs and legatees therein named may take
such action, judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to partition the estate of the

testator, taking into consideration the pronouncements made in part II of this opinion. No
finding as to costs in any of the three instances.

Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias, herein private respondent, on the
one hand, and Leonida-Coronado, Felix Bueno, Melania Retizos, Bernardino Buenseda
and Jovita Montefalcon, herein petitioners, on the other hand.

Yulo, C.J., and Hontiveros, 1 J., concur.

Juana Albovias (JUANA, for brevity) claims that the property in question is a portion of a
bigger lot referred to as Parcel G in the last will and testament executed in 1918 by
Melecio Artiaga, grandfather of JUANA. This bigger lot was inherited under that will by
JUANA, her brother Domingo Bueno, and two other grandchildren, namely Bonifacio and
Herminigildo, both surnamed Formentera. Parcel G is described as follows:

[G.R. No. 78778 : December 3, 1990.]

191 SCRA 814
LEONIDA CORONADO, FELIX BUENO, MELANIA RETIZOS, BERNARDINO
BUENASEDA and JOVITA MONTEFALCON, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and JUANA BUENO ALBOVIAS, Respondents.
PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision* of the respondent
appellate court dated March 3, 1987 CA-G.R. CV No. 06911 entitled "Juana (Bueno)
Albovias et al., v. Leonida Coronado, et al.," affirming the decision of the lower court, the
decretal portion of which reads:: nad
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring Leonida Coronado to have no title or interest over the property in
question, hence, has no authority to dispose of the same in favor of her codefendants;
2. Declaring the sales executed by Coronado and subsequent transactions
involving the same property null and void ab initio;
3. Declaring the plaintiff to be the true and legal owner of the subject parcel of
land;
4. Ordering the defendants to vacate the subject premises and to surrender
possession thereof unto the plaintiff;
5. Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay unto the plaintiff the sum
of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages.
Costs against the defendants." (Rollo, p. 17)
As found by the respondent appellate court, the property subject of this case is a parcel of
land situated in Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing 277 square meters, more particularly
described as follows:: nad
"A parcel of land situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of Nagcarlan, province of
Laguna. Bounded on the North, by property of Epifania Irlandez (formerly
Bonifacio Formentera); on the East, by that of Julio Lopez; on the South, by that
of Dalmacio Monterola (formerly Domingo Bueno); and on the West, by C. Lirio
Street. Containing an area of two hundred seventy seven (277) square meters,
more or less. Assessed at P3,320.00 under tax declaration No. 241." (Ibid., p. 15)

6 | SUCCESSION

"Isang lagay na lupa na ang bahagi ay walang tanim na halaman at ang bahagi naman ay
may tanim na saguing, tumatayo sa gawin Canloran ng Calle Avenida Rizal nitong
Nagcarlan, at humahangan sa Ibaba; sa ari cong Testador; sa Silangan, sa cay Enrique
Jovellano; sa Ilaya, sa namatay na Perfecto Nanagas, at sa Canloran, tubig na
pinamamagatang San Cido." (Ibid., p. 16)
JUANA further claims that sometime in 1925 or 1926, C. Lirio Street was created by the
Municipality of Nagcarla traversing said Parcel G and thus dividing it into two portions, one
on the west of C. Lirio St. and the other to the east of said street. Parcel G was divided by
the heirs in the following manner; the land was divided into two portions, the northern
portion of which was adjudicated in favor of the Formenteras and the southern portion was
given to JUANA and Doming Bueno. The southern portion in turn was partitioned between
JUANA and Domingo Bueno, the former getting the northern part adjoining the lot of the
Formenteras, and the latter the southern part which adjoins the lot of Perfecto Nanagas
(not owned by Dalmacio Monterola). The part allocated to Domingo was later sold by him
to Dalmacio Monterola, owner of the adjoining property (Ibid.).: nad
Moreover, JUANA claims that her property was included together with the two parcels of
land owned by Dalmacio Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's successor-in-interest
Leonida Coronado (now married to Felix Bueno) to Melania Retizos on April 18, 1970.
Melania Retizos in turn sold the lots, including that one being claimed by JUANA, to the
spouse Bernardino Buenaseda and Jovita Montefalcon, now the present possessors
thereof, sometime in 1974 (Ibid., pp. 16-17).
On the other hand, Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners (CORONADO, for brevity)
claim that the property in question was bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will
executed by Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof even before
the outbreak of World War II (Ibid., p. 107).
Parenthetically, said will was probated under Sp. Proc. No. SC-283, entitled "Testate
Estate of the Deceased Monterola Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner (Ibid., p. 105). JUANA,
together with her husband, opposed the said probate. Despite their opposition, however,
the Will was allowed by the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Sta. Cruz Branch (Ibid.,
p. 106). On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
40353, entitled "Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner-appellee v. Heirs of Dr. Dalmacio
Monterola, oppositors-appellants" (Ibid.). It is not apparent, however, from the record
whether or not said decision has already become final and executory.
As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question, JUANA filed an action for
quieting of title, declaratory relief and damages against CORONADO in the Regional Trial
Court of the Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, docketed as Civil
Case No. 7345 (Ibid., p. 4).
As adverted to above (first par.), the lower court rendered judgment in favor of JUANA.
Not satisfied with the decision of the lower court, CORONADO elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision appealed from (Ibid., p. 20). Hence, this
petition.:-cralaw

CORONADO raised the following assigned errors:

I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ARRIVING AT A
CONCLUSION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
CASE AND IN NOT APPLYING THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT. (Ibid., p. 108)
II
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION
CLAIMED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS THE SAME PROPERTY ADJUDICATED TO
JUANA BUENO UNDER THE WILL OF THE DECEASED MELECIO ARTIAGA; NEITHER
IS THERE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT SAID WILL HAD BEEN PROBATED. (Ibid., p.
114)
III
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN ESTOPPEL FROM QUESTIONING THE OWNERSHIP OF
THE PETITIONER OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION HAVING FAILED TO RAISE THE
SAME IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING IN THE TRIAL COURT AND EVEN ON APPEAL.
(Ibid., p. 119)
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE
SUBMITTED AND FACTS ADMITTED ON RECORD. IT THEREFORE COMMITTED
GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR. (Ibid., p. 121)
As required by this Court, CORONADO filed their memorandum on May 8, 1989 (Ibid., p.
105); while that of JUANA was filed on October 13, 1989 (Ibid., p. 139).
The petition is devoid of merit.
Under the first assigned error, CORONADO assails the respondent appellate court's
finding that Dr. Dalmacio Monterola could not have acquired the subject land by acquisitive
prescription. Citing Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 41 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, CORONADO claims that JUANA had already foreclosed whatever right or
legal title she had over the property in question, the reason being that Monterola's
continued possession of the said property for over ten years since 1934 ripened into full
and absolute ownership (Ibid., p. 112).
The argument has no factual basis.
Time and again, it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases
brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law
imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of the Supreme
Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing errors of law that might have been committed. Absent, therefore, a showing that
the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, so that they are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand,
for the Supreme Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties (Andres v. Manufacturers Hanover & Trust
Corporation, G.R. 82670, September 15, 1989). There are no convincing reasons in the
instant case to depart from this rule.
As found by the respondent appellate court, Monterola never claimed ownership over the
property in question. As a matter of fact, one of the deeds of donation executed by
Monterola in favor of Leonida Coronado acknowledged that the boundary owner on the

7 | SUCCESSION

property conveyed to her is JUANA. This is precisely the reason why during the lifetime of
the late Dalmacio Monterola, JUANA had always been allowed to enter and reap the
benefits or produce of the said property. It was only after the death of said Monterola in
1970 that Leonida Coronado prohibited JUANA from entering it (Ibid., p. 18).:- nad
Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued possession of the said
property for over ten years since 1934, said possession is insufficient to constitute the
fundamental basis of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de
dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of
possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are
clearly not en concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so
continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription (Manila Electric Company v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 71393, June 28, 1989).
In this case, Monterola, as found by the respondent appellate court and the lower court,
never categorically claimed ownership over the property in question, much less his
possession thereof en concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not have acquired said
property by acquisitive prescription.
Anent the contention of CORONADO that Leonida Coronado could tack her possession to
that of Monterola, so that claim of legal title or ownership over the subject property, even
against the petitioners, the Buenasesas, who are purchasers for value and in good faith, is
a foregone or settled issue, the respondent appellate court aptly answered the same in this
wise:
"It follows that Leonida Coronado could not have derived ownership of the land in question
from her predecessor-in-interest Dalmacio Monterola, whether by prescription or by some
other title. Neither can she claim acquisitive prescription in her own name. It was only in
1970 after the death of Dalmacio Monterola that she asserted her claim of ownership
adverse to that of plaintiff-appellee. Having knowledge that she had no title over the land in
question, she must be deemed to have claimed it in bad faith. Under Article 1137 of the
Civil Code, ownership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or good
faith. And even granting that she had no notice or defect in her title and was, therefore, in
good faith, a period of ten years of possession is necessary for her to acquire the land by
ordinary prescription. (Article 1134, Civil Code). But she can claim to have possessed the
land only in 1968, the year the Monterola lots were donated to her. The period, however,
was interrupted in 1975, or 7 years after, when the complaint below was filed." (Rollo, pp.
18-19)
Under the second assigned error, CORONADO claims that the will under which JUANA
inherited the property in question from her grandfather, Melecio Artiaga, was never
probated; hence, said transfer for ownership was ineffectual considering that under Rule
75, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court (formerly Sec. 125 of Act No. 190, no will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court (Ibid., p. 115).
The contention is without merit.chanrobles virtual law library
While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however, may be
sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the
time said document was executed by Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said article read as
follows:
"Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos,
or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 33 [1986])

In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled to
legitime from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft of any
showing that Leonida Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related to each other.

Sioson ("petitioners") in TCT No. (232252) 1321. The Decision also directed petitioners to
pay respondent moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Under the third assigned error, CORONADO claims that JUANA is estopped from
questioning the ownership of Leonida Coronado over the land in question having failed to
raise the same in the estate proceedings in the trial court and even on appeal (Rollo, p.
119).

The Facts

The contention is likewise without merit.

Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication of a
will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and
the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity
of the wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency
of the provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The question relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et al.,
v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not estopped from
questioning the ownership of the property in question, notwithstanding her having objected
to the probate of the will executed by Monterola under which Leonida Coronado is claiming
title to the said property.:-cralaw
Under the fourth assigned error, it is alleged by CORONADO that JUANA's petition is weak
for want of factual and legal support; the weakness of JUANA's position lies in the fact that
she did not only fail to identify the subject land, but also failed to explain the discrepancy in
the boundary of the property she is claiming to be hers (Rollo, p. 125).
The contention is unavailing.
The fact that JUANA failed to identify the property in question and to explain the
discrepancy in the boundary of said property, assuming they are true, is immaterial, in view
of the findings of the lower court as to the identity of the property in question. Moreover, the
lower court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the property in question
is the same property adjudicated to JUANA under the will of Melecio Artiaga, and that
CORONADO has no right whatsoever to said property (Ibid., p. 20). Such findings are
conclusive upon this Court (Reynolds Philippine Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 169
SCRA 220 [1989]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 115925

August 15, 2003

SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUAL and CONSOLACION SIOSON, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS S. EUGENIO-GINO, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review of the Decision 1 dated 31 January 1994 of the Court of Appeals
ordering the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III, to place TCT No. (232252)
1321 in the name of respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino. The Decision ordered the
Register of Deeds to cancel the names of petitioners Ricardo Pascual and Consolacion

8 | SUCCESSION

Petitioner Consolacion Sioson ("CONSOLACION") and respondent Remedios S. EugenioGino ("REMEDIOS") are the niece and granddaughter, respectively, of the late Canuto
Sioson ("CANUTO"). CANUTO and 11 other individuals, including his sister Catalina
Sioson ("CATALINA") and his brother Victoriano Sioson ("VICTORIANO"), were co-owners
of a parcel of land in Tanza, Navotas, Metro Manila. The property, known as Lot 2 of Plan
Psu 13245, had an area of 9,347 square meters and was covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 4207 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal. CATALINA, CANUTO, and
VICTORIANO each owned an aliquot 10/70 share or 1,335 square meters of Lot 2. 2
On 20 November 1951, CANUTO had Lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into eight lots (Lot
Nos. 2-A to 2-H) through Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 which the Director of Lands
approved on 30 May 1952. Lot No. 2-A, with an area of 670 square meters, and Lot No. 2E, with an area of 2,000 square meters, were placed under CANUTOs name. Three other
individuals took the remaining lots.3
On 26 September 1956, CANUTO and CONSOLACION executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan4("KASULATAN"). Under the KASULATAN, CANUTO sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2
in favor of CONSOLACION forP2,250.00. The KASULATAN, notarized by Notary Public
Jose T. de los Santos of Navotas, provides:
Na ako, CANUTO SIOSON, mamamayang Pilipino, may katampatang gulang,
kasal kay Raymunda San Diego, at naninirahan sa Tanza, Navotas, Rizal, sa
bisa at pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay nagpapatunay at nagpapatibay:
1. Na ako ang lubos at tunay na may-ari ng 10/70 bahaging hindi hati
(10/70 porcion pro-indiviso) ng isang lagay na lupa (Lote No. 2, Plano
Psu-13245), na nasa sa nayon ng Tanza, Municipio ng Navotas,
Provincia ng Rizal, at ang descripcion o pagkakakilanlan ng nasabing
lote ay nakasaad sa Certificado Original, de Titulo No. 4207 ng Oficina
ng Registrador de Titulos ng Rizal, gaya ng sumusunod:
xxxx
2. Na dahil at alang-alang sa halagang Dalawang Libo Dalawang Daan
at Limampung Piso (P2,250.00), salaping Pilipino, na sa akin ay
ibinayad ni CONSOLACION SIOSON, kasal kay Ricardo S. Pascual,
may sapat na gulang, mamamayang Pilipino, at naninirahan sa
Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal at ang pagkakatanggap ng nasabing halaga
ay aking inaamin at pinatutunayan, ay aking ipinagbili, inilipat at isinalin,
sa pamamagitan ng bilihang tuluyan at walang pasubali a favor [sic] sa
nasabing si CONSOLACION SIOSON, sa kanyang tagapagmana at

mapaglilipatan ang lahat ng aking titulo, karapatan at kaparti na

binubuo ng 10/70 bahaging hindi hati (10/70 porcion pro-indiviso) ng
loteng descrito or tinutukoy sa itaas nito. (Emphasis supplied)
CONSOLACION immediately took possession of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. She later
declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding real estate
taxes.5
On 23 October 1968, the surviving children of CANUTO, namely, Felicidad and Beatriz,
executed a joint affidavit6("JOINT AFFIDAVIT") affirming the KASULATAN in favor of
CONSOLACION. They also attested that the lots their father had sold to CONSOLACION
were Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713. The JOINT AFFIDAVIT reads:
KAMING sina FELICIDAD SIOSON at BEATRIZ SIOSON, pawang mga Pilipino,
kapuwa may sapat na gulang at naninirahan, ang una sa Tanza, Navotas at ang
ikalawa sa Concepcion, Malabon, lalawigan ng Rizal, sa ilalim ng isang ganap na
panunumpa alinsunod sa batas, ay malayang nagsasalaysay ng mga
sumusunod:
Na kami ang mga buhay na anak na naiwan ni CANUTO SIOSON na
nagmamay-ari ng 10/70 bahaging hindi hati (10/70 porcion pro-indiviso)
ng isang lagay na lupa (Lote No. 2, plano Psu-13245), na nasa Nayon
ng Tanza, Navotas, Rizal, at ang mga palatandaan nito ay nasasaad sa
Certificado Original de Titulo No. 4207 ng Tanggapan ng Registrador de
Titulos ng Rizal;
Na sa lubos naming kaalaman, ay ipinagbili ng aming Ama na si
Canuto Sioson ang kaniyang buong bahagi na 10/70 sa nasabing Lote
No. 2, kay CONSOLACION SIOSON, may-bahay ni Ricardo S.
Pascual, na taga Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal, sa halagang P2,250.00,
salaping pilipino, noong ika 16 [sic] ng Septiembre, 1956, sa
pamamagitan ng isang KASULATAN NG BILIHANG TULUYAN na
pinagtibay sa harap ng Notario Publico Jose T. de los Santos nang
pechang nabanggit, sa Navotas, Rizal, (Doc. No. 194, Page No. 84;
Book No. IV; Series of 1956);
Na ang nasabing lupa na ipinagbili ng aming Ama kay Consolacion
Sioson ni Pascual, ay nakikilala ngayong mga Lote No. 2-A at Lote 2-E
ng Plano de Subdivision Psd-34713; na pinagtibay ng Assistant
Director of Lands noong Mayo 30, 1952;
Na aming ngayong pinatitibayan ang pagka-pagbili ng bahagi ng aming
Ama kay Consolacion Sioson ni Pascual ng ngayoy nakikilalang Lote
No. 2-A at Lote No. 2-E ng Plano de Subdivision Psd-34713. (Emphasis
supplied)

9 | SUCCESSION

On 28 October 1968, CONSOLACION registered the KASULATAN and the JOINT

AFFIDAVIT with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal ("Register of Deeds"). Based
on these documents, the Register of Deeds issued to CONSOLACION Transfer Certificate
of Title No. (232252) 1321 covering Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713
with a total area of 2,670 square meters.
On 4 February 1988, REMEDIOS filed a complaint against CONSOLACION and her
spouse Ricardo Pascual in the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 165, for
"Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages." REMEDIOS
claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E because CATALINA devised these
lots to her in CATALINAs last will and testament 7 ("LAST WILL") dated 29 May 1964.
REMEDIOS added that CONSOLACION obtained title to these lots through fraudulent
means since the area covered by TCT (232252) 1321 is twice the size of CANUTOs share
in Lot 2. REMEDIOS prayed for the cancellation of CONSOLACIONs title, the issuance of
another title in her name, and the payment to her of damages.
Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners
claimed that the basis of the action is fraud, and REMEDIOS should have filed the action
within four years from the registration of CONSOLACIONs title on 28 October 1968 and
not some 19 years later on 4 February 1988. REMEDIOS opposed the motion, claiming
that she became aware of CONSOLACIONs adverse title only in February 1987.
CONSOLACION maintained that she had timely filed her complaint within the four-year
prescriptive on 4 February 1988.
In its order of 28 April 1988, the trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss. The trial
court held that the reckoning of the prescriptive period for filing REMEDIOS complaint is
evidentiary in nature and must await the presentation of the parties evidence during the
trial. During the pre-trial stage, REMEDIOS clarified that she was claiming only
CATALINAs 10/70 share in Lot 2, or 1,335 square meters, which constitute of the area
of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E.8 The trial of the case then ensued.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 26 November 1990, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case and ordering
REMEDIOS to pay petitioners P10,000 as attorneys fees and the cost of suit. The trial
court held that the action filed by REMEDIOS is based on fraud, covered by the four-year
prescriptive period. The trial court also held that REMEDIOS knew of petitioners adverse
title on 19 November 1982 when REMEDIOS testified against petitioners in an ejectment
suit petitioners had filed against their tenants in Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. Thus, the complaint
of REMEDIOS had already prescribed when she filed it on 4 February 1988.
The trial court further ruled that REMEDIOS has no right of action against petitioners
because CATALINAs LAST WILL from which REMEDIOS claims to derive her title has not
been admitted to probate. Under Article 838 of the Civil Code, no will passes real or
personal property unless it is allowed in probate in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision provides:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and

against plaintiff, ordering:
1. The dismissal of this case;
2. The plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos as and for attorneys fees; and
3. The plaintiff to pay the costs of suit.9
REMEDIOS appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 31 January 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the decision of the
trial court. The appellate court held that what REMEDIOS filed was a suit to enforce an
implied trust allegedly created in her favor when CONSOLACION fraudulently registered
her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. Consequently, the prescriptive period for filing the
complaint is ten years, not four. The Court of Appeals counted this ten-year period from 19
November 1982. Thus, when REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988, the tenyear prescriptive period had not yet expired.
The appellate court held that CATALINAs unprobated LAST WILL does not preclude
REMEDIOS from seeking reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E as the LAST WILL may
subsequently be admitted to probate. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts ruling
provides:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Registry of Deeds of Rizal or Metro Manila, District III, is ordered to place
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (232252) 1321 under the name of Remedios S.
Eugenio-Gino as executor of the will of Catalina Sioson and cancel the names of
the Spouses Ricardo Pascual and Consolacion Sioson inscribed over said title as
owners of the covered lot. Defendants-appellees spouses Ricardo Pascual and
Consolacion Sioson are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Remedios S. EugenioGino moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages
ofP20,000[.00] and attorneys fees of P20,000.00 and P500.00 per appearance.10
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the ruling. However, the Court of Appeals denied their
motion in its order dated 15 June 1994.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners allege the following assignment of errors:

10 | S U C C E S S I O N

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION
WHICH FINDING IS MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT DOES NOT HAVE ANY TITLE AND HAS UTTERLY FAILED TO
PROVE ANY TITLE TO THE LOTS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE, AND IN
ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF
PETITIONERS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION AND IN GROSS VIOLATION OF
THE RULES OF COURT IN ORDERING THE ENTIRE PROPERTY COVERED
BY TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. (232252) 1321 TO BE PLACED IN
THE NAME OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, BECAUSE THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS LIMITED ONLY TO ONE-HALF (1/2) PORTION OF THE
PROPERTY, AND THE OTHER HALF THEREOF UNQUESTIONABLY
BELONGS TO PETITIONERS.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
ACTED FRAUDULENTLY AND IN BAD FAITH IN SECURING THEIR
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE TO THE PROPERTY INVOLVED IN THIS CASE, AND
IN ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MORAL
DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.11
The pivotal questions are: (1) whether prescription bars the action filed by REMEDIOS,
and (2) whether REMEDIOS is a real party-in-interest.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has merit.
The Action is Barred by Prescription
The trial court held that the action filed by REMEDIOS is one based on fraud. REMEDIOS
action seeks to recover real property that petitioners allegedly acquired through fraud.
Consequently, the trial court held that the action prescribes in four years counted from
REMEDIOS actual discovery of petitioners adverse title. The trial court concluded that
REMEDIOS belatedly filed her suit on 4 February 1988 because she actually knew of
petitioners adverse title since 19 November 1982.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals held that what REMEDIOS filed was a suit to
enforce an implied trust. REMEDIOS had ten years counted from actual notice of the
breach of trust, that is, the assertion of adverse title, within which to bring her action. The

appellate court held that REMEDIOS seasonably filed her complaint on 4 February 1988
because she allegedly discovered petitioners adverse title only on 19 November 1982.

the ten-year prescriptive period as the date of the registration of the deed or the issuance
of the title.

What REMEDIOS filed was an action to enforce an implied trust but the same is already
barred by prescription.

The Court of Appeals Reckoning of

Prescriptive Period from Actual Notice

Prescriptive Period is 10 Years Counted

of Adverse Title Not Justified
From Registration of Adverse Title
The four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the trial court applies only if the fraud does
not give rise to an implied trust, and the action is to annul a voidable contract under Article
139012 of the Civil Code. In such a case, the four-year prescriptive period under Article
139113 begins to run from the time of discovery of the mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud.
In the present case, REMEDIOS does not seek to annul the KASULATAN. REMEDIOS
does not assail the KASULATAN as a voidable contract. In fact, REMEDIOS admits the
validity of the sale of 1,335 square meters of land under the KASULATAN. However,
REMEDIOS alleges that the excess area of 1,335 meters is not part of the sale under the
KASULATAN. REMEDIOS seeks the removal of this excess area from TCT No. (232252)
1321 that was issued to CONSOLACION. Consequently, REMEDIOS action is for
"Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages." 14
REMEDIOS action is based on an implied trust under Article 1456 since she claims that
the inclusion of the additional 1,335 square meters in TCT No. (232252) 1321 was without
basis. In effect, REMEDIOS asserts that CONSOLACION acquired the additional 1,335
square meters through mistake or fraud and thus CONSOLACION should be considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the rightful owner of the property. Clearly, the
applicable prescriptive period is ten years under Article 1144 and not four years under
Articles 1389 and 1391.
It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or
mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 15 of the Civil Code, is ten years
pursuant to Article 1144.16 This ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the
adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when the adverse
party registers the land.17
REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988 or more than 19 years after
CONSOLACION registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E on 28 October 1968.
Unquestionably, REMEDIOS filed the complaint late thus warranting its dismissal. As the
Court recently declared in Spouses Alfredo v. Spouses Borras,18
Following Caro,19 we have consistently held that an action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten years. We went further by specifying the reference point of

11 | S U C C E S S I O N

In holding that the action filed by REMEDIOS has not prescribed, the Court of Appeals
invoked this Courts ruling in Adille v. Court of Appeals. 20 In Adille, the Court reckoned the
ten-year prescriptive period for enforcing implied trusts not from registration of the adverse
title but from actual notice of the adverse title by the cestui que trust. However, the Court,
in justifying its deviation from the general rule, explained:
[W]hile actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes (sic) in ten years, reckoned from
the date of the registration of the property, we x x x are not prepared to count the period
from such date in this case. We note the petitioners sub rosa efforts to get hold of the
property exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent misrepresentation in his
unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that he is "the only heir and child of his mother
Feliza["] with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name also . (Emphasis
supplied)
Such commission of specific fraudulent conduct is absent in the present case. Other than
asserting that petitioners are guilty of fraud because they secured title to Lot Nos. 2-A and
2-E with an area twice bigger than what CANUTO allegedly sold to CONSOLACION,
REMEDIOS did not present any other proof of petitioners fraudulent conduct akin
to Adille.
CONSOLACION obtained title to Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E through the KASULATAN executed
by CANUTO and the JOINT AFFIDAVIT executed by his surviving children, one of whom,
Felicidad, is the mother of REMEDIOS. The KASULATAN referred to the sale of
CANUTOs 10/70 share in Lot 2 without specifying the area of the lot sold. The JOINT
AFFIDAVIT referred to the "Plano de Subdivision Psd-34713" without also specifying the
area of the lot sold. However, Subdivision Plan Psd 34713, as certified by the Assistant
Director of Lands on 30 May 1952, showed an area of 2,670 square meters in the name of
CANUTO. Based on these documents, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. (232252)
1321 to CONSOLACION covering an area of 2,670 square meters.
REMEDIOS does not assail the KASULATAN or the JOINT AFFIDAVIT as fictitious or
forged. REMEDIOS even admits the authenticity of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 as
certified by the Assistant Director of Lands. 21 Moreover, REMEDIOS has not contested
petitioners claim that CANUTO doubled his share in Lot 2 by acquiring VICTORIANOs
share.22

Plainly, the increase in the area sold from 1,335 square meters to 2,670 square meters is a
glaring mistake. There is, however, no proof whatsoever that this increase in area was the
result of fraud. Allegations of fraud in actions to enforce implied trusts must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence.23 Adille, which is anchored on fraud, 24 cannot apply to the
present case.
At any rate, even if we apply Adille to this case, prescription still bars REMEDIOS
complaint. As executrix of CATALINAs LAST WILL, REMEDIOS submitted to the then
Court of First Instance of Caloocan in Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 the inventory
of all the property comprising CATALINAs estate, which included Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. In
a motion dated 7 November 1977, CONSOLACION sought the exclusion of these lots from
the inventory, invoking her title over them. REMEDIOS was served a copy of the motion on
8 November 1977 against which she filed an opposition. Nevertheless, the trial court
overruled REMEDIOS objection. In its order of 3 January 1978, the trial court granted
CONSOLACIONs motion and ordered the exclusion of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E from the
estate of CATALINA. REMEDIOS did not appeal from this ruling.
REMEDIOS thus had actual notice of petitioners adverse title on 8 November 1977. Even
if, for the sake of argument, the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run upon actual
notice of the adverse title, still REMEDIOS right to file this suit has prescribed. REMEDIOS
had until 11 November 1987 within which to file her complaint. When she did so on 4
February 1988, the prescriptive period had already lapsed.
Respondent is Not a Real Party-in-Interest
Not only does prescription bar REMEDIOS complaint. REMEDIOS is also not a real partyin-interest who can file the complaint, as the trial court correctly ruled.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure require that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest who is the party who stands to benefit or
suffer from the judgment in the suit. 25 If one who is not a real party-in-interest brings the
action, the suit is dismissible for lack of cause of action. 26
REMEDIOS anchored her claim over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E (or over its one-half portion) on
the devise of these lots to her under CATALINAs LAST WILL. However, the trial court
found that the probate court did not issue any order admitting the LAST WILL to probate.
REMEDIOS does not contest this finding. Indeed, during the trial, REMEDIOS admitted
that Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 is still pending.27
Article 838 of the Civil Code states that "[N]o will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." This Court has
interpreted this provision to mean, "until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever
and no right can be claimed thereunder." 28 REMEDIOS anchors her right in filing this suit
on her being a devisee of CATALINAs LAST WILL. However, since the probate court has
not admitted CATALINAs LAST WILL, REMEDIOS has not acquired any right under the

12 | S U C C E S S I O N

LAST WILL. REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance
of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce an implied trust over these lots.
The appellate court tried to go around this deficiency by ordering the reconveyance of Lot
Nos. 2-A and 2-E to REMEDIOS in her capacity as executrix of CATALINAs LAST WILL.
This is inappropriate because REMEDIOS sued petitioners not in such capacity but as the
alleged owner of the disputed lots. Thus, REMEDIOS alleged in her complaint:
3. The plaintiff is a niece and compulsory heir of the late CATALINA SIOSON who died
single and without any child of her own and who, during her lifetime, was the owner of
those two (2) parcels of land located at Tanza, Navotas, Rizal (now Metro Manila), formerly
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 4207 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province
of Rizal, x x x.
4. The plaintiff, aside from being the compulsory heir of the deceased CATALINA SIOSON,
has sole and exclusive claim of ownership over the above-mentioned two (2) parcels of
land by virtue of a will or "Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya" executed by Catalina Sioson on
May 19, 1964 before Notary Public Efren Y. Angeles at Navotas, Rizal, in which document
the deceased Catalina Sioson specifically and exclusively bequeathed to the plaintiff the
above-mentioned Lots 2-A and 2-E of Psd-34713 approved by the Bureau of Lands on
May 30, 1952. Copy of the "Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya" consisting of four (4) pages is
hereto attached and forms an integral part hereof as Annex "A;"
5. Sometime on or about February, 1987, plaintiff discovered that the above-mentioned
Lots 2-A and 2-E of subdivision plan Psd-34713 are now registered or titled in the name of
the defendants under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (232252) 1321 of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal, now Metro-Manila District III. Copy of the title is hereto attached and forms
an integral part hereof as Annex "B;"
6. Upon further inquiry and investigation, plaintiff discovered that the defendants were able
to obtain title in their name of the said parcels of land by virtue of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan" allegedly executed by Canuto Sioson on September 26, 1956 before Notary
Public Jose [T.] de los Santos of Navotas, Metro-Manila. Copy of the said document is
hereto attached and forms an integral part hereof as Annex "C;"
7. The plaintiff also discovered that although x x x the original sale did not specify the
parcels of land sold by Canuto Sioson, the defendants submitted an alleged Affidavit
executed by Felicidad Sioson and Beatriz Sioson identifying the lots sold by Canuto Sioson
to the defendants as Lots 2-A and 2-E of subdivision plan Psd-34713. Copy of the Affidavit
dated October 3, 1968 on the basis of which the present Transfer Certificate of Title No.
(232252) 1321 was issued to the defendants is hereto attached and forms an integral part
hereof as Annex "D;"
8. The defendants are clearly guilty of fraud in presenting the aforementioned Affidavit
(Annex "D") to the Register of Deeds as the basis of their claim to Lots 2-A and 2-E in view
of the fact that the parcels sold to them by Canuto Sioson, assuming there was such a

sale, were different parcels of land, Lots 2-A and 2-E being the properties of the late
Catalina Sioson who bequeathed the same to the plaintiff.

On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein
she devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan
(Mangulabnan). The pertinent portion of her will reads:

xxxx
12. Because of the defendants fraudulent actuations on this matter, plaintiff suffered and
continious [sic] to suffer moral damages arising from anxiety, shock and wounded feelings.
Defendants should also be assessed exemplary damages by way of a lesson to deter
them from again committing the fraudulent acts, or acts of similar nature, by virtue of which
they were able to obtain title to the parcels of land involved in this case x x x. 29(Emphasis
supplied)

IKALIMA. - Aking inihahayag at ginagawa na tagapagmana, sa aking kusang loob,

ang pinalaki kong APO na si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN, may sapat na gulang,
kasal kay Flora Umagap, at naninirahan sa San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, at anak ng
aking anak na si SIMPLICIA, at sa aking APO na si ANSELMO ay aking ipinagkakaloob
at ipinamamana, sa aking pagkamatay, ang mga sumusunod kong pagaari:
LOT NO. TITLE NO. KINALALAGYAN NABANGGIT SA

Indeed, all throughout the proceedings below and even in her Comment to this petition,
REMEDIOS continued to pursue her claim as the alleged owner of one-half of the disputed
lots.

288-A NT-47089 Sta. Cruz (1) p. 2

Other Matters Raised in the Petition

3349-B 100630 Poblacion (3) p. 2

The Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon the other errors petitioners assigned
concerning the award of damages and attorneys fees to REMEDIOS. Such award
assumes that REMEDIOS is a real party-in-interest and that she timely filed her complaint.
As earlier shown, this is not the case.

xxx[1] (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31
January 1994 and its Resolution dated 15 June 1994 are SET ASIDE. The complaint filed
by respondent Remedios Eugenio-Gino, dated 2 February 1988 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 144915. February 23, 2004]

CAROLINA CAMAYA, FERDINAND CAMAYA, EDGARDO CAMAYA and
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision dated June
19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53757, In re: Petition for the Probate of the Codicil (Will) of
Rufina Reyes; Bernardo Patulandong v. Anselmo Mangulabnan v. Carolina G. Camaya,
Ferdinand Camaya and Edgardo Camaya.

13 | S U C C E S S I O N

3348-A 100629 Poblacion (2) p. 2

The testatrixs son Bernardo Patulandong (Patulandong), respondent herein, was in

the will appointed as the executor.
During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for the probate of her will
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija where it was docketed as Sp.
Pro. No. 128.
By Order[2] of January 11, 1973, the CFI admitted the will to probate.
On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying above-quoted paragraph
five of her will in this wise:
UNA. - Ang Lote No. 288-A na nakalagay sa barrio ng Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
magsukat 36,384 metro cuadrados, at nagtataglay ng TCT No. NT-47089, na aking
ipinamana sa aking apong si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN, sangayon sa Pangkat
IKA-LIMA, pp. 5-6, ng aking HULING HABILIN (Testamento), ay ipinasiya kong
ipagkaloob at ipamana sa aking mga anak na sina BERNARDO, SIMPLICIA,
GUILLERMA at JUAN nagaapellidong PATULANDONG, at sa aking apong si
ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN, sa magkakaparehong bahagi na tig-ikalimang bahagi
bawat isa sa kanila.
IKALAWA. - Na maliban sa pagbabagong ito, ang lahat ng mga tadhana ng aking HULING
HABILIN ay aking pinagtitibay na muli.

x x x[3] (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied) On May 14, 1988, the testatrix
died.

On January 16, 1996, the trial rendered a decision [10] in Sp. Proc. No. 218 admitting
the codicil to probate and disposing as follows:

Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of the title to
Lot 288-A. Patulandong refused to heed the request, however, in view of the codicil which
modified the testators will.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in the following
manner:

Mangulabnan thus filed an action for partition against Patulandong with the Regional
Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, docketed as Civil Case No. 552 (the partition case).
On June 8, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in the partition case, [4] the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court orders the partitioning of the properties and the defendant to
deliver the copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-47089.

1. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750 issued by the Register

of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo Mangulabnan dated
February 7, 1991 and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in
favor of the intervenors Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo, all surnamed
Camaya on February 19, 1991 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT216446 under date March 18, 1991 issued in the names of the abovenamed intervenors as NULL and VOID and of no force and effect; and,

After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily
mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new
will, it would also be allowable of his petition and if he should die before he had a chance
to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the testators death would
be in order.

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of

Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750 and NT-216446 and reissue the
corresponding Certificate of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Filipino,
married to Gorgonia Mariano residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, Juan R. Patulandong, Filipino, widower and residing at San
Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija; Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan of
legal age, Filipino, widow and residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, Simplicia R. Patulandong Mangulabnan, of legal age, widow, and
residing at San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija and her grandson,
Anselmo Mangulabnan with full personal circumstances stated herein
to the extent of one fifth (1/5) each pursuant to the approved codicil
(will) of Rufina Reyes dated June 27, 1973.[11]

The Court also orders that the right of the tenants of the agricultural land in question
should be protected meaning to say that the tenants should not be ejected. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The Camayas who had been allowed to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. 218, and
Mangulabnan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-said decision but it was
denied by Order[12] of February 28,1996.

On July 17, 1989 Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija a
petition[5] for probate of the codicil of the testatrix, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 218.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Camayas and Mangulabnan (hereinafter

referred to as petitioners) raised the following errors:

On December 28, 1989, the probate court issued an Order [6] setting the petition for
hearing and ordering the publication of said order.

1. THERE WERE SERIOUS SUBSTANTIAL DEPARTURES FROM THE

FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY THE RULES, THE LAW, AND THE
AUTHORITY OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SETTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.

However, in view of the case cited by the plaintiff himself, the court holds that the
partition is without prejudice [to]... the probate of the codicil in accordance with the
Rules of Court, [P]alacios vs. Catimbang Palacios cited by the plaintiff:

On February 7, 1991, by virtue of the decision in the partition case, Mangulabnan

caused the cancellation of the title of the testatrix over Lot No. 288-A and TCT No. NT215750[7] was issued in his name.
Mangulabnan later sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot No. 288-A by a Deed of
Sale dated February 19, 1991. [8] TCT No. NT-215750 was thus cancelled and TCT No. NT216446[9]was issued in the name of the Camayas.

14 | S U C C E S S I O N

2. THE OPPOSITOR DID NOT ONLY ACQUIRE LOT NO. 288-A BY WILL BUT
HE ALSO ACQUIRED THE SAME BY PARTITION IN A CIVIL CASE
WHERE THE DECISION HAS ALREADY REACHED ITS FINALITY AND
THEREFORE CAN NO LONGER BE NEGATED BY A QUESTIONABLE
CODICIL.

3. THAT THE SUBJECT LOT 288-A IS NO LONGER WITHIN THE REACHED

(sic) OF THE PETITIONER CONSIDERING THAT THE OPPOSITOR
VENDOR HAD A CLEAN TITLE AND THAT THE INTERVENORSVENDEED HAD ACQUIRED THE SAME BY WAY OF SALE AS
INNOCENT PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.[13]

Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of
third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the
name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the
respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the
property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their
possession and ownership of the property. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By Decision[14] of June 19, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed that of the trial court.
Hence, the present petition for Review on Certiorari proffering the following issues:
1. Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and
void and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners and the deed of
sale; and
2. Whether the final judgment in Civil Case No. 552 bars the allowance of the
codicil.
As to the first issue, petitioners contend that the under the law, the probate court has
no power, authority, and jurisdiction to declare null and void the sale and titles of
petitioners;[15] and that the probate court can only resolve the following issues:
1. Whether or not the instrument which is offered for probate is the last will and
testament of the decedent; in other words, the question is one of identity[;]
2. Whether or not the will has been executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law; in other words, the question is one of due execution[;
and]
3. Whether the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution
of the will; in other words, the question is one of capacity.[16]
In Cuizon v. Ramolete, [17] this Court elucidated on the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court, to wit:
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether
testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that
said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so.
xxx

15 | S U C C E S S I O N

Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared
the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having had the effect of
depriving them possession and ownership of the property.
Moreover, following Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree which reads:
SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law,
petitioners titles cannot, under probate proceedings, be declared null and void.
As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil to probate, it in
effect amended the final judgment in the partition case which is not allowed by law; [18] and
that petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption
that the transfer was lawful.[19]
Petitioners first argument does not persuade.
Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it was
not appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion that the decision was without
prejudice [to] ... the probate of the codicil. The rights of the prevailing parties in said
case were thus subject to the outcome of the probate of the codicil.
The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity of petitioners
titles, there is no longer any necessity to dwell on the merits of petitioners Camayas claim
that they are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption that the
transfer was lawful.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53757
affirming the January 16, 1996 Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The decision allowing the codicil is AFFIRMED, but the 1) declaration as null and
void of Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750 issued on February 7, 1991 by the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo Mangulabnan, the February 19,

1991 Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in favor of the intervenors - herein petitioners
Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo Camaya, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-216446
issued on March 18, 1991 in favor of the petitioners Camayas, and 2) the order for the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750
and NT-216446 and reissue the corresponding Certificate of Titles to Bernardo R.
Patulandong, Juan R. Patulandong, Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan, Simplicia R.
Patulandong Mangulabnan, and Anselmo Mangulabnan to the extent of one-fifth (1/5) each
pursuant to the approved codicil are SET ASIDE, without prejudice to respondent and his
co-heirs ventilation of their right in an appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-46078

May 25, 1939

In the matter of the will of the deceased Mauro Salvacion.

GREGORIA REYNOSO, administratrix-appellant,
vs.
JOSE E. TOLENTINO, guardian ad litem of the minors Maurito and Remedios
Aguila,
JOAQUIN CAMPOSANO, guardian ad litem of the minor Corazon Camposano,
VALERIO SALVACION, NUMERIANO SALVACION, AMADEO SALVACION, and
MARTINA ALLA, legatees-appellants.
AVANCEA, C.J.:
Mauro Salvacion died on June 30, 1932 in the municipality of Lucena, Province of
Tayabas, without leaving any descendant or ascendant. His widow, Gregoria Reynoso,
who survived him, is now the administratrix appointed in this testate proceeding.
The properties left by the deceased are conjugal in nature because they were acquired
during his marriage with his widow. He left a will and a codicil upon his death, wherein he
made a partition of the conjugal properties between him and his widow, and disposed by
way of legacy of the half corresponding to him.
The attorney of the administration of this testate thereafter prepared the partition of the
properties left by the deceased between the widow and the legatees.
The widow opposed the approval of this partition as to the coconut trees, alleging that it is
unequal not only as to the number of trees but also as to the quality thereof. Over this
opposition of the widow, the court, without affording her an opportunity to substantiate her
opposition and present evidence in support thereof, approved the partition. To this
resolution the widow expected.

16 | S U C C E S S I O N

The legatees, on the other hand, also opposed the approval of the partition in so far as it
casts the burden of the widow's usufruct upon one-half of what corresponds to each one.
Moreover, these legatees contend that the allowance received by the widow during the
liquidation of the conjugal properties should be charged against her in so far as it exceeds
the products of the properties allotted to her. The court also overruled this opposition and
approved the partition in this respect.
In so far as it refers to the appeal of the widow, we are of the opinion that the resolution of
the court, approving the partition, is erroneous. The court should have substantiated the
opposition of the widow and should have given her an opportunity to adduce evidence in
its support. However, the court, relying only upon the fact that the partition was made in
accordance with the will of the deceased, approved it. The will, in so far as the the testator
alone made therein a partition of the conjugal properties by assigning to himself those
which he liked and to the wife those which she did not like, is illegal. The conjugal property
is one between husband and wife wherein each one, except as to the administration
thereof, has equal rights. Each one has a right to one-half of these properties and each
one occupies the same position as to its ownership. It is an encroachment upon these
rights of each of the spouses if one of them could designate which and how much these
properties should correspond to him. Any of this spouses is entitled to be heard in the
partition of the conjugal properties in order to defend his or her equal share.
As to the appeal of the legatees, the theory upon which it is based in plainly erroneous.
The usufruct which article 837 of the Civil Code gives to the widow is upon one-half of the
properties of the deceased spouse and not upon the properties of the widow herself, such
as the half of the conjugal properties corresponding to her.
The contention that the allowance received by the widow should be charged against her
share in the conjugal properties in so far as it exceeds the fruits of the properties
corresponding to her, is perfectly legal. But we are precluded from ruling upon this point,
because there is neither showing nor allegation as to the amount of the fruits of the
properties during the liquidation. Without this, we are not in a position to decide whether or
not the widow received by way of allowance more than that corresponding to her from the
fruits of the properties.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is modified in the sense that the court
should permit the widow to substantiate her opposition and to present evidence in support
thereof, and is affirmed in all other respects, with the costs to the defendants as appellants
and legatees. So ordered.
Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-12207

December 24, 1959

JUAN PALACIOS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
MARIA CATIMBANG PALACIOS, oppositor-appellee

.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Juan Palacios executed his last will and testament on June 25, 1946 and availing himself
of the provisions of the new Civil Code, he filed on May 23, 1956 before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas a petition for its approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs
his natural children Antonio C. Palacios and Andrea C. Palacios.
On June 21, 1956, Maria Catimbang filed a opposition to the probate of the will alleging
that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she was completely
ignored in said will thus impairing here legitime.
After the presentation of petitioner's evidence relative to the essential requisites and
formalities provided by law for the validity of a will, the court on July 6, 1956 issued an
order admitting the will to probate. The court, however, set a date for the hearing of the
opposition relative to the intrinsic validity of the will and, after proper hearing concerning
this incident, the court issued another order declaring oppositor to be the natural child of
petitioner and annulling the will insofar as it impairs her legitime, with costs against
petitioner.

the validity or efficiency of the provisions; that may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely
un-affected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated."
On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during the lifetime of a testator, it does
not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before he has had a chance
to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the testator's death would
be in order" (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 53-54).The reason for this comment is
that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent (Article 777, new Civil Code.).
It is clear that the trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling the portion
of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime of the oppositor on the ground that, as it has
found, she is an extraneous matter which should be treshed out in a separate action.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez
David., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-23445

From this last order, petitioner gave notice of his intention to appeal directly to the
Supreme Court, and accordingly, the record was elavated to this Court.
It should be noted that petition instituted the present proceeding in order to secure the
probate of his will availing himself of the provisions of Article 838, paragraph 2, of the new
Civil Code, which permit a testator to petition the proper court during his lifetime for the
allowance of his will, but to such petition on Maria Catimbang filed an opposition alleging
that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she was completely
ignored in the will thus impairing her object to the probate of the will insofar as it due
execution is concerned or on the ground that it has not complied with the formalities
prescribed by law; rather she objects to its intrinsic validity or to the legality of the
provisions of the will.
We hold that such opposition cannot be entertained in this proceeding because its only
purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law, much less if the purpose of the opposition is to show that the
oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly has been ignored in the will for
issue cannot be raised here but in a separate action. This is especially so when the
testator, as in the present case, is still alive and has merely filed a petition for the
allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof after his death.lawphi1.net
This is in line with our ruling in Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., 676, wherein we said: "The
authentication of the will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity
of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge

17 | S U C C E S S I O N

June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo,
Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11
years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that
letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father
and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her
will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as
universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in
the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution
is void.

On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection
thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to
dismiss.1wph1.t
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity
and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and
dismissed the petition without costs.

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a
certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I
may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at
38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November,
nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on
appeal.

The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part,
provides:

1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the
probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law
prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court.
Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or
legacy therein.1

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs
in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...

A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of
whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the
intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the
will has been duly authenticated. 2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and
here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the
record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case
will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the
will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of
the validity of the provisions of the will in question. 3 After all, there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below
that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the
applicable statute.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951

18 | S U C C E S S I O N

Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814
of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments 4 shall be valid,
in so far as they are not inofficious. ...
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a
necessity. On this point Manresa comments:
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le
nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya
heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de los
bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el
testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su
muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la
omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the
problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:

To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342,

343, 204 Pa. 484.6
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of
divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate;
obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A.
2:50 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136
N..J Eq. 132.7
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect;
to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E.
2d. 771, 774.8
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line
her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will
completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they
were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear
case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion
de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of
Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. 9 The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as
the sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein
provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario
Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir,
en todo o en parte? No se aade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el
que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto prejudique a
la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es
completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige
con preferencia al 817. 10
The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:
La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por
pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la
sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la
pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de
herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque
asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como
efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the
conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results
in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir
without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that

19 | S U C C E S S I O N

nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway
for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the
fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal
Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of
interpretation, viz:
... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la
institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la
persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en algun
caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en
Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado,
debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y
consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado
llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de
otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en
legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en
materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con
repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta
voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha exigido para
que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria,
dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya
institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la
voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar
la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los
principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una
cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio
en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo
que el legislador quiere establecer. 12
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment
notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly
given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a
universal heir in a will void because of preterition would give the heir so instituted a
share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such
institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and
separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two
component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution of the
heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests)
"pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion
de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the
entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de
legado, mejora o donacion. 14
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of
petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate
succession ensues.

4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather
than one of preterition". 15From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does
not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between
pretention and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is
a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a
cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima
constituye
la desheredacion. La
privacion
tacita
de
la
misma
se
denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that
disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be
"involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a
legal cause specified in the will itself. 20
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply
omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is
clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from
those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall
annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in
addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective
disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul
the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which
last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in disinheritance the
nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been
illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the
preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the
other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les
corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso.23
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to
receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the
inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24

of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be
absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the
remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of
inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be
absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying
integral provisions of the Civil Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to
distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from
a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only provision
material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of
heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or
betterments. And they are separate and distinct not only because they are
distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they are in
themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property
that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a
particular or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a
legacy. 25
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article
854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however,
that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and
nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby
affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX
BALANAY,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Davao,
Branch
VI;
AVELINA
B.
ANTONIO
and
DELIA
B.
LANABAN, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:

This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in
the Neri case heretofore cited,viz:
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the
children by the second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and,
accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if
adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil
Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of
legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions

20 | S U C C E S S I O N

Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Davao dated February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother,
Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and
ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808).
The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao
City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by

their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B.
Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the
probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In
that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine
conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she
inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should
not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes
should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (Par. IV).
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eightytwo years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she
described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in
that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all
owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal
assets. *
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of
lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged
improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr.
should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix
Balanay, Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the
will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay, Sr.
signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of
Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived
and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. In that same
instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her
death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her
will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
"conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June 18, 1973
"denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to the
affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28, 1973 it appointed
its branch clerk of court as special administrator of the decedent's estate.
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18, 1973 on
the grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the southern
half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the conjugal estate by allocating
portions of the nine lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his counsel,
Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that motion. The lower court denied it in its order of
October 15, 1973.

21 | S U C C E S S I O N

In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaa, Sr., claiming to
be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty. Cabreros),
filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw probate of alleged
will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate
proceeding." In that motion Montaa claimed to be the lawyer not only of the petitioner but
also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B.
Pabaonon.
Montaa in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal
assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the probate
of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into an intestate proceeding.
In another motion of the same date he asked that the corresponding notice to creditors be
issued.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments
dated October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance of a
notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary to law and
that an intestacy be declared.
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaa, assumed that the issuance of a
notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the
view of Attys. Montaa and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order of February 28,
1974 it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an
intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate
proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court did not abrogate its prior
orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to creditors was issued on April 1,
1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of petitioner's motion of
April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion dated
April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of February 28,
1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaa had no authority to withdraw the petition for the
allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was a copy of a letter dated March 27, 1974
addressed to Atty. Montaa and signed by Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina
B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they terminated Montaa's services and
informed him that his withdrawal of the petition for the probate of the will was without their
consent and was contrary to their repeated reminder to him that their mother's will was
"very sacred" to them.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The
lower court denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared the
will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not because
of Atty. Montaa's arguments.
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of
the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of
dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the
lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court
acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had
been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the
issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs.
Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April
30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).1wph1.t
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was
void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding
the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving husband's
conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably
included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not
result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator
would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been
made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others
invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without
defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme,
or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is
contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate
and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion,
38 Phil. 414). But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be
disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her
heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should
be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any
agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail
himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the
legitime of the other children to whom the property is not assigned be
paid in cash. (1056a)

22 | S U C C E S S I O N

The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six
children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal
share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in article
1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other
hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years. So, the provision
that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime would at most be
effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless there are compelling
reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the
conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said renunciation
partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate
(Art. 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750
and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for
his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid
and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair
the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix
Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the
children and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will
and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of
his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in
paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will shall
only pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making the will, should it expressly
appear by the will that such was his intention". Under article 930 of the Civil Code "the
legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously
believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging
to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the
disposition shall take effect."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition
the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she
could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since
the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her
testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming
that the will may be probated.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted as
heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it
preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that

"the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as
they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the
sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted (.Art.
960[2], Civil Code).1wph1.t
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not
produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his
hereditary rights. .
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as
contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where
the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the
formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil
Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).
As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament is in
itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be
distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally
tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected
thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA
538, 565).
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in the
matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554,
561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a testamentary
disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of
the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the
testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the
purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754,
762).
As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the
dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque, L-19573,
June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).
The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will because
any disposition therein is better than that which the law can make (Castro vs. Bustos, L25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).

23 | S U C C E S S I O N

Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to creditors
although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The record reveals that
it appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in order if only a special
administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, in providing
that "immediately after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, the court shall
issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them
in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly contemplates the appointment of an executor
or regular administrator and not that of a special administrator.
It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims against
the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule
88, Rules of Court).
We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of its branch
clerk of court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice because it
might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots
in milking the decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court commit any abuse or
devastavit in the course of his administration, the probate Judge might find it difficult to
hold him to a strict accountability. A court employee should devote his official time to his
official duties and should not have as a sideline the administration of a decedent's estate.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside
and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed. The
lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in
consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO
ANG, CARMELITA JUGO,respondents.

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals (now intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended by
the resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring as null and void the devise in favor of the
petitioner and the resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly
signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and
4 thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leano,

who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of
pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other and the
Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by
the testator and his three attesting witnesses.

On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as
the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until
his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because
on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.

In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno
as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator
was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children,
Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded
wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5,
1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were
married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his
forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his
entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:

The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.

Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my

aforementioned legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and
daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to
be legally and properly entitled to inherit from me; that while I have
been estranged from my above-named wife for so many years, I cannot
deny that I was legally married to her or that we have been separated
up to the present for reasons and justifications known fully well by
them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and wife with one
Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my
love and affection, for all the things which she has done for me, now
and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full
knowledge and consent, did comport and represent myself as her own
husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could
not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my
aforementioned previous marriage;
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an
opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and
improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will,
the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary
should not be issued to her.

On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid
except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in
relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby
question declared valid except the devise in
which is declared null and void. The properties
passed on in intestacy to the appellant in
pronouncement as to cost.

set aside, the will in

favor of the appellant
so devised are instead
equal shares, without

On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for Correction
of Clerical Error" praying that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive
portion of the decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The properties so devised
are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement
as to costs." The motion was granted by the respondent court on August 10, 1982.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by
the respondent court in a resolution dated December 28, 1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased
Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provision in favor of herein petitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be
passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings
because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively as against
everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator
has the mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that even if
the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were
applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be made by the proper court in a
separate action brought by the legal wife for the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration
of the nullity of the testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the person with whom the
testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament
itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the

24 | S U C C E S S I O N

testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of
evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private
respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine enunciated
in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio
Martinez, et al.(G.R. No. L- 39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the
admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put in
issue the legality of the devise. We agree with the respondents.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly
drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in
favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus:

625). The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine

nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity
of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a
certain legacy is void and another one valid. ... (Castaneda v.
Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the
petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of
this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void.
Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions would be superfluous.

xxx xxx xxx

... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles
all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
execution and witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective of
whether
its
provisions
are
valid
and
enforceable
or
otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)
The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of
inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testators
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the
resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is
premature.
xxx xxx xxx
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the
petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the
testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of
the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second
relates to descent and distribution (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA
1369)
xxx xxx xxx
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the
facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and
that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of
the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec.

25 | S U C C E S S I O N

Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v.
Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the
intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal
validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the
will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to
withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to
have been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted
correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its
formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449.
Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135, December 26, 1967,
21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both
parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities
required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will. The
petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court when in resolving
the question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin
Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled:

This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4, Decision,
Annex A of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals'
decision in toto.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the
testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the
will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the record, in
the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that
the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations
that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue
of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1,
Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all,
there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the
proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will,
the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal
offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and
ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may
be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the
donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the
same action.

26 | S U C C E S S I O N

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:

The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter
vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years before
the testator's death on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez
was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many years." He also
declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children. In
Article IV, he stated that he had been living as man and wife with the petitioner since 1952.
Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He stated
that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in truth and in fact, as well
as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony
because of my aforementioned previous marriage.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when
Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo
lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno
contracted a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was
then 51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in
good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private
respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on
its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and
petitioner, the devisee.
Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her
alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led
private respondents to present contrary evidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the
legacy given in the will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the start
of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he
had lived with as man and wife, as already married, was an important
and specific issue brought by the parties before the trial court, and
passed upon by the Court of Appeals.

Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it

was petitioner who opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith
in marrying the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner, TSN of August 1,
1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).

especially so when she was already about 50 years old at the time of
marriage.
THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by
itself conclusive demonstration that she new that the man she had
openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a married man with
already two children.

Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would refute

the testimony of petitioner on the point.
Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at
length on the meretricious relationship of his brother and petitioner.
(TSN of August 18,1975).

FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent

Rufina Gomez, is it possible that she would not have asked Martin Jugo
whether or not they were his illegitimate or legitimate children and by
whom? That is un-Filipino.

Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a
decisive issue right at the inception of the case.

FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of

the deceased testator, is it possible that she would not have known that
the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was
respondent Rufina Gomez, considering that the houses of the parents
of Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years) and that of
respondent Rufina Gomez were just a few meters away?

Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the
question.
When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner
'were deemed guilty of adultery or concubinage', it was a finding that
petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended to be.

Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable.

They are, to say the least, inherently improbable, for they are against
the experience in common life and the ordinary instincts and
promptings of human nature that a woman would not bother at all to
ask the man she was going to marry whether or not he was already
married to another, knowing that her groom had children. It would be a
story that would strain human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not
know that Martin Jugo was already a married man in view of the
irrefutable fact that it was precisely his marriage to respondent Rufina
Gomez that led petitioner to break off with the deceased during their
younger years.

xxx xxx xxx

3. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private
respondents respectfully offer the following analysis:
FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased
testator in a town in Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever
resided. If there was nothing to hide from, why the concealment' ? Of
course, it maybe argued that the marriage of the deceased with private
respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in secrecy. But it should
be remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family way at
that time and it would seem that the parents of Martin Jugo were not in
favor of the marriage so much so that an action in court was brought
concerning the marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August
18, 1975, pp. 29-30)
SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when
they were still both single. That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo
married respondent Rufina Gomez on November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3).
Petitioner married the testator only on December 5, 1952. There was a
space of about 30 years in between. During those 30 years, could it be
believed that she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo did not marry
her nor contact her anymore after November, 1923 - facts that should
impel her to ask her groom before she married him in secrecy,

27 | S U C C E S S I O N

Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a
donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is
the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient
may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator
admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 16763. December 22, 1921. ]

PASCUAL COSO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. FERMINA FERNANDEZ DEZA ET
AL., objectors-appellees.

influence is exercised by a person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless
it is further shown that the influence destroys the testators free agency."cralaw virtua1aw
library
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; UNDUE INFLUENCE. In the absence of fraud or imposition, mere affection,
even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will.
OSTRAND, J. :

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila setting aside a will
on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of a testator
by one Rosario Lopez. The will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to an illegitimate son
had by the testator with said Rosario Lopez, and also provides for the payment to her of
nineteen hundred Spanish duros by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in
taking care of the testator in Barcelona during the years 1909 to 1916, when he is alleged
to
have
suffered
from
severe
illness.
The evidence shows that the testator, a married man and resident of the Philippine Islands,
became acquainted with Rosario Lopez in Spain in 1898 and that he had illicit relations
with her for many years thereafter. After his return to the Philippines she followed him,
arriving in Manila in February, 1918, and remained in close communication with him until
his death in February, 1919. There is no doubt that she exercised some influence over him
and the only question for our determination is whether this influence was of such a
character
as
to
vitiate
the
will
The English and American rule in regard to undue influence is thus stated in 40 Cyc., 11441149.
"Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to
have that effect the influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue
influence has been variously stated, but the substance of the different statements is that,
to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers
and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him
express
the
will
of
another,
rather
than
his
own.
". . . such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the
execution of the will in question, either at the time of the execution of the will,, or so near
thereto as to be still operative, with the object of procuring a will in favor of particular
parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary dispositions which the testator
would
not
otherwise
have
made
.
.
.
". . . and while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercised by one
occupying an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some

28 | S U C C E S S I O N

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence, in the
sense above expressed, existed at the time of its execution and we do not think that this
burden has been carried in the present case. While it is shown that the testator entertained
strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered
and subjugated his mind as to "destroy his free agency and make him express the will of
another rather than his own." He was an intelligent man, a lawyer by profession, appears
to have known his own mind, and may well have been actuated only by a legitimate sense
of duty in making provisions for the welfare of his illegitimate son and by a proper feeling of
gratitude in repaying Rosario Lopez for the sacrifices she had made for him. Mere
affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will. No
imposition
or
fraud
has
been
shown
in
the
present
case.
"Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no
imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal
and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed to his comfort
and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made." (Mackall v. Mackall,
135
U.
S.,
167.)
It may be further observed that under the Civil Law the right of a person with legal heirs to
dispose of his property by will is limited to only a portion of his estate, and that under the
law in force in these Islands before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the only
outside influences affecting the validity of a will were duress, deceit, and fraud. The
present doctrine of undue influence originated in a legal system where the right of the
testator to dispose of his property by will was nearly unlimited. Manifestly. greater
safeguards in. regard to execution of wills may be warranted when the right to so dispose
of property is unlimited than when it is restricted to the extent it is in this jurisdiction There
is, therefore, certainly no reason for giving the doctrine of undue influence a wider scope
here
than
it
enjoys
in
the
United
States.
For the reasons stated, the decision of the lower court disallowing the will of Federico
Gimenez Zoboli is hereby reversed and it is ordered that the will be admitted to probate.
No
costs
will
be
allowed.
So
ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Art. 128 When will shall be allowed
(Ajero vs Court of Appeals)
(Valmonte vs Ortega)