Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Talisay Silay Milling Co.

G.R. No. 35223, September 17, 1931, 56 Phil. 117

Romualdez, J.
FACTS: On December 22, 1923, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., was indebted to the
Philippine National Bank. To secure the payment of its debt, it succeeded in inducing its
planters, among whom, was Mariano Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage their land to the
creditor bank. And in order to compensate those planters for the risk they were running
with their property under the mortgage, the aforesaid central, by a resolution passed on
that same date, i.e., December 22, 1923, undertook to credit the owners of the plantation
thus mortgaged every year with a sum equal to two per centum of the debt secured
according to yearly balance, the payment of the bonus being made at once, or in part
from time to time, as soon as the central became free of its obligations to the aforesaid
bank, and of those contracted by virtue of the contract of supervision, and had funds
which might be so used, or as soon as it obtained from said bank authority to make such
payment.
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. filed a complaint against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.,
for the delivery of the amount P13,850 or promissory notes or other instruments or credit
for that sum payable on June 30, 1930, as bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma.
The Philippine National Bank filed a third party claim alleging a preferential right to
receive any amount which Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be entitled to from the
Talisay-Silay Milling Co. as bonus, because that would be civil fruits of the land
mortgaged to said bank by said debtor for the benefit of the central referred to, and by
virtue of a deed of assignment, and praying that said central be ordered to delivered
directly to the intervening bank said sum on account of the latter's credit against the
aforesaid Mariano Lacson Ledesma.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bonus in question is civil fruits
HELD: No. The said bonus bears no immediate, but only a remote accidental relation to
the land mentioned, having been granted as compensation for the risk of having
subjected one's land to a lien in favor of the bank, for the benefit of the entity granting
said bonus. If this bonus be income or civil fruits of anything, it is income arising from
said risk, or, if one chooses, from Mariano Lacson Ledesma's generosity in facing the
danger for the protection of the central, but certainly it is not civil fruits or income from
the mortgaged property. Hence, the amount of the bonus, according to the resolution of
the central granting it, is not based upon the value, importance or any other circumstance
of the mortgaged property, but upon the total value of the debt thereby secured,
according to the annual balance, which is something quite distinct from and independent
of the property referred to.
Ignacio v. Hilario
G.R. No. L-175, August 30, 1946, 76 Phil. 605

Moran, C. J.
FACTS: This case concerns the ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and partly
residential. The lower court rendered judgment holding plaintiffs as the legal owners of
the whole property but conceding to defendants the ownership of the houses and
granaries built by them on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good
faith, in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs prayed for an order of execution alleging that since they
chose neither to pay defendants for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot,
said defendants should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense and to

restore plaintiffs in the possession of said lot. Defendants objected to this motion which,
after hearing, was granted by Judge Natividad. Hence, this petition by defendants praying
for (a) a restraint and annulment of the order of execution issued by Judge Natividad; (b)
an order to compel plaintiffs to pay them the sum of P2,000 for the buildings, or sell to
them the residential lot for P45; or (c), a rehearing of the case for a determination of the
rights of the parties upon failure of extra-judicial settlement.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent Court erred in its judgment.
HELD: Yes. The Civil Code provides:
ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or planting, after the
payment of the indemnity stated in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
ART. 453. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until such expenses are made good to him.
Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of
refunding the amount of the expenses or paying the increase in value which the thing
may have acquired in consequence thereof.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to
retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article
453. The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361, either
to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as
respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel
the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to
another motion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to
pay for the same.
The Court holds, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendantspetitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents
only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings not to sell the land, is null
and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is,
furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code.

Ignao v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 72876, January 18, 1991, 193 SCRA 17
Fernan, C. J.
FACTS: Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles Juan Ignao and Isidro Ignao were coowners of a 534sqm land located in Cavite. Pursuant to an action for partition filed by
petitioner, the CFI of Cavite directed the partition of the said land. A total of 133.5 sqm
was allotted to the petitioners uncles while the remaining 266.5 was allotted to the
petitioner. However, when Juan and Isidro built their houses they encroached upon a
portion of land belonging to Florencio. A geodetic engineer surveyed the land and it was
found out that Juan and Isidro occupied a total of 101sqm of Florencios lot.
The trial court which based its decision on Article 448 of the Civil Code, ruled that
Florencio should have the choice to either appropriate to himself that part of the house
standing on his lot or to require Juan and Isidro to pay the price of the land. But since the
first option seems to be impractical, it ordered to sell to Juan and Isidro those portions

occupied by them because it is the workable solution. Upon appeal petitioner contends
that Article 448 cannot be applied because they are co-owners of he subject property.
However, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 448 of the Civil Code is applicable in the case at bar.
HELD: Yes. It is true that Article 448 cannot be applied where a co-owner builds upon a
land owned in common. However, in the case at bar, the co-ownership has already been
terminated by virtue of the partition, thus, Article 448 now applies since the builder is not
anymore considered as an owner of the land where the house was built.
As to the workable solution applied by the lower court, the same cannot be upheld
because Article 448 clearly states that the right of choice belongs to the land owner and
not upon the builder and the courts. Thus, whether it might seem impractical, the
landowner may choose to appropriate the improvements.

Filipinas Colleges, Inc. v. Garcia Timbang, et. al.,

G.R. No. L-12812, September 29, 1989, 164 SCRA 287
Barrera, J.

FACTS: After appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals held, among other things,
that Filipinas Colleges, Inc. are declared to have acquired the rights of the spouses
Timbang in the questioned lots, they are ordered to pay the spouses Timbang in the
amount of P15,807.90 plus such other amount which said spouses might have paid or had
to pay. On the other hand, Maria Gervacio Blas was also declared to be a builder in good
faith of the school building constructed in the lot in question and was entitled to be paid
the amount of P19,000.00 for the same. Also, in case that Filipinas Colleges, Inc. failed
to deposit the value of the land, which after liquidation was fixed at P32,859.34, within
the 90-day period set by the Court, Filipinas Colleges would lose all its rights to the land
and the spouses Timbang would then become the owners thereof. If that is the case, the
Timbangs are ordered to make known to the court their option under Article 448 of the
Civil Code whether they would appropriate the building in question, in which even they
would have to pay Filipinas Colleges, Inc. the sum of P19,000.00, or would compel the
latter to acquire the land and pay the price thereof. Filipinas Colleges, Inc. failed to pay
the sum of P32,859.34 so the spouses Timbang made known to the court their decision
that they had chosen not to appropriate the building but to compel Filipinas Colleges,
Inc., for the payment of the sum of P32,859,34 which was granted by the Court. As a
consequence of which, a writ of execution was issued. Meanwhile, Blas filed a motion
for execution of her judgment representing the unpaid portion of the price of the house
sold to Filipinas which was granted. Levy was made on the house in virtue of the writs of
execution. Then, the Sheriff of Manila sold the building in public auction in favor of the
spouses Timbang, as the highest bidders. Several motion were the subsequently filed
before the lower court wherein the court held that: a) the Sheriff's certificate of sale
covering a school building sold at public auction was null and void unless within 15 days
from notice of said order spouses Timbang shall pay to Blas the sum of P5,750.00 that
the spouses Timbang had bid for the building at the Sheriff's sale; b) that Filipinas is
owner of 245.00/32,859.34 undivided interest in Lot No. 2-a on which the building sold
in the auction sale is situated; and c) that the undivided interest of the Filipinas in the lot
should be sold to satisfy the unpaid portion of the judgment in favor of Blas and against
Filipinas in the amount of P8,200.00 minus the sum of P5,750.00. The spouses Timbang
contends that because the builder in good faith has failed to pay the price of the land after
the owners thereof exercised their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code, the builder
lost his right of retention provided in Article 546 and that by operation of Article 445, the
spouses Timbang as owners of the land automatically became the owners ipso facto of
the school building.

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Timbang automatically become the owners of the building
upon failure of Filipinas to pay the value of the land.
HELD: No. Based on Article 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code, the owner of the land has the
right to choose between appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder of the value
thereof or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his land. Even this second right cannot
be exercised if the value of the land is considerably more than that of the building. In addition to
the right of the builder to be paid the value of his improvement, Article 546 gives him the
corollary right of retention of the property until he is indemnified by the owner of the land. There
is nothing in the language of these two articles, 448 and 546, which would justify the conclusion
of appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is
demanded by the land-owner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement
under Article 445. The case of Bataclan vs Bernardo cannot be applied in this case in the sense
that although it is true it was declared therein that in the event of the failure of the builder to pay
the land after the owner thereof has chosen this alternative, the builder's right of retention
provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless there was nothing said that as a consequence thereof,
the builder loses entirely all rights over his own building. Also, in the present case, the Court of
Appeals has already adjudged that appellee Blas is entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance
of the purchase price of the school building. Blas is actually a lien on the school building are
concerned. The order of the lower court directing the Timbang spouses, as successful bidders, to
pay in cash the amount of their bid in the sum of P5,750.00 is therefore correct.

Manotok Realty v. Tecson

G.R. No. L-47475 August 19, 1988, 164 SCRA 287
Gutierrez Jr., J.
FACTS: Petitioner Manotok Realty filed a complaint against Nilo Madlangawa for
recovery of possession with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila. Said
court rendered judgment declaring Madlangawa as a builder-possessor in good faith;
ordering the company to recognize the right of Madlangawa to remain in Lot 345, Block
1, of the Clara Tambunting Subdivision until after he shall have been reimbursed by the
company the sum of P7,500.00, without pronouncement as to costs.
Not satisfied with the trial courts decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
and upon affirming the trial courts decision, it elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
On July 13, 1977, the Supreme Court issued a resolution denying Manotoks petition for
lack of merit. Petitioner then filed with the trial court (Judge Jose H. Tecson), a motion
for the approval of the companys exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment.
However, Judge Tecson denied the motion for approval. Hence, this petition is filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Tecson can deny petitioners (landowner)
motion to avail of its option.
HELD: No. There is, therefore, no basis for the respondent judge to deny the petitioners
motion to avail of its option to appropriate the improvements made on its property.
Neither can the judge deny the issuance of a writ of execution because the private
respondent was adjudged a builder in good faith or on the ground of peculiar
circumstances which supervened after the institution of this case, like, for instance, the
introduction of certain major repairs of and other substantial improvements because
the option given by law belongs to the owner of the land. Under Article 448 of the Civil
Code, the right to appropriate the works or improvements or to oblige the one who built
or planted to pay the proper price of the land belongs to the owner of the land. The only
right given to the builder in good faith is the right of reimbursement of necessary
expenses for the preservation of the land; the builder cannot compel the landowner to sell
such land to the former.

Bernardo v. Bataclan
G.R. No. L-44606, November 28, 1938, 66 Phil. 598
Laurel, J.
FACTS: Bernardo bought a parcel of land from Samonte which was located in Cavite. In order
that he may take possession and occupy the said land, he filed a case in the CFI for such purpose
and the court rendered a favorable decision for Bernardo. However, when he was supposedly set
in occupying the said land, he found Bataclan. He was within the premises because he was
authorized by the previous owners to clear the land and make the necessary improvements he
deems fit, further claiming that such authorization was granted to him ever since 1922. Since
Bataclan was not a party in the first case, Bernardo filed against him a separate case. Bernardo
was declared owner but the defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith for whom the
work done and improvements made by him should be reimbursed. An appeal to the decision of
the court was filed by both Bernardo and Bataclan. The decision was modified by lowering the
price of the land from P300 to P200 per hectare. Bernardo was given 30 days to exercise his
option, whether to sell the land to Bataclan or to buy the improvements from him. Bernardo
chose the option which would require Bataclan to pay him the value of the land at the rate of
P200 per hectare. However, Bataclan informed the court that he will not be able to pay for the
price of the land. The court then gave Bataclan 30 days to pay the price of the property and after
the lapse of the period, the land shall be sold in a public auction. After 30 days, the land was sold
to Teodoro at a public auction, after failure of Bataclan to pay within the period the purchase
price.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bataclan has the right of retention over the parcel of land in question.
HELD: No. Bataclan no longer has lost the right of retention. The option of the owner was
already exercised where he decided that he will just allow the defendant to purchase the land
such that Bataclan was to comply with the option if he wants to retain the land. From the moment
that he told the courts of his inability to pay for the price of the land, he already lost his right to
retain the land.

Spouses Del Ocampo v. Abesia

G.R. No. L-49219, April 15, 1998, 160 SCRA 379
Gancayco, J.
FACTS: Plaintiffs spouses Concepcion Fernandez and Estanislao Del Campo and
defendant Bernarda Fernandez Abesia are co-owners of parcel of land with an area of 45
square meters and divided in the proportion of 2/3 and 1/3 share each, respectively. A
commissioner, who is appointed by the court, conducted a survey and recommended that
the property be divided into two lots: Lot 1161 A with an area of 30 square meters for
the plaintiffs and Lot 1161 B with an area of 15 square meters for the defendants.
However, it was shown in the sketch plan that the house of the defendant occupied the
portion with an area of 5 square meters of Lot 1161 A of plaintiffs. The parties asked
the court to finally settle and adjudicate who among the parties should take possession of
the 5 square meters of land.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not Article 448 of the Civil Code, the rights of a builder in good faith,
should be applied to the plaintiff-spouses Del Campo.
2.) Whether or not the house of the defendant Abesia should be removed and demolished
at their expense.
HELD: 1.) Yes. Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds,
plants or sows on the land owned in common for then, he did not build, plant or sow
upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The coowner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the
rules of co-ownership. However, when, as in this case, the co-ownership is terminated by
the partition and it appears that the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of

5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built
in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply.
Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply
even when there was co-ownership if good faith has been established.
2.) It depends. Applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have the right to
appropriate said portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to
defendants as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may
oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if
the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house
of defendants built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The
defendant shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiffs upon such terms and
conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms
thereof. Of course, defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at
their own expense, if they so decide.

Pacific Farms Inc. v. Esguerra

G.R. No. L-21783, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 684
Castro, J.
FACTS: On October 1, 1956 to March 2, 1957 the Company sold and delivered lumber
and construction materials to the Insular Farms Inc. which the latter used in the
construction of the si buildings at its compound in Bolinao, Pangasinan, of the total
procurement price of P15,000.00, the sum of P4,710.18 has not been paid. Consequently,
the Company instituted a civil case to recover the unpaid balance and the court sustained
their claim. The defendant sheriff levied th six buildings. The Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a
suit against the Company and the sheriff asserting ownership over the levied buildings
which it had acquired from the Insular Farms by virtue of absolute sale executed on
March 21, 1958. Pacific prays that the judicial sale of the six buildings be declared null
and void. The trial court rendered judgment annulling the levy and the certificate of sale.
However, it denied the plaintiff's claim for actual and exemplary damages on the ground
that it was not "prepared to find there was gross negligence or bad faith on the part of any
defendants".
ISSUE: Whether or not the application by analogy of the rules of accession would suffice
for a just adjudication.
HELD: Article 447 of the Civil Code contemplates a principal and an accessory; the land
being considered the principal, and the plantings, constructions or works, the accessory.
The owner of the land who in good faith - whether personally or through another - makes
constructions or works thereon, using materials belonging to somebody else, becomes the
owner of the said materials with the obligation however of paying for their value. On the
other hand, the owner of the materials is entitled to remove them, provided no substantial
injury is caused to the landowner. Otherwise, he has the right to reimbursement for the
value of his materials,
Applying article 447 by analogy, the Court consider the buildings as the principal and the
lumber and construction materials that went into their construction as the accessory. Thus
the appellee, if it does own the six buildings, must bear the obligation to pay for the
values of the said materials; the appellant which apparently has no desire to remove
the materials, and, even if it were minded to do so, cannot remove them without
necessarily damaging the buildings has the corresponding right to recover the value of
the unpaid lumber and construction materials.
Technogas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 108894, February, 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 5

Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Technogas purchased a parcel of land from Pariz Industries, Inc. In the same
year, Eduardo Uy purchased the land adjacent to it. The following year, Uy bought
another lot adjoining the lot of Technogas. Portions of the buildings and wall bought by
Technogas together with the land from Pariz Industries are occupying a portion of Uys
adjoining land. The knowledge of some encroachment was only made known to both
parties after their parties of their respective parcels of land.
ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not petitioner Technogas Philippines is a possessor in bad

faith.
2.) Whether or not petitioner Technogas Philippines has stepped into the
shoes of the seller.

HELD: 1.) No. Unless one is versed in the science of surveying, no one can determine
the precise extent or location of his property by merely examining his paper title. There
is no question in that when Technogas purchased the land from Pariz Industries, the
buildings and other structures were already in existence. Furthermore, it is not clear as to
who actually built these structures but it can be assumed that the predecessor-in-interest
of Technogas, Pariz Industries, did so. An article 527 of the New Civil Code presumes
good faith. Since no proof exists to show that the builder built the encroaching structures
in bad faith, the structures should be presumed to have been built in good faith. Good
faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his, and his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. Furthermore, possession acquired in good
faith does not lose this character except in case and from the moment facts exist which
show that the possessor is not aware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully. The good faith ceases from the moment the defects in the title are made
known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property of
the true owner.
2.) Yes. Has been shown, contrary as to the good faith of Technogas has not
been overthrown. Similarly, upon delivery of the property to Pariz Industries,
as seller, to Technogas, as buyer, the latter acquired ownership of the
property. Consequently, Technogas is deemed to have stepped into the shoes
of the seller with regard to all the rights of ownership of the property over the
immovable sold, including the right to compel Uy to exercise either of the
two options under Article 448 of the New Civil Code. Thus, the landowners
exercise of his option can only take place after the builder shall have to know
the intrusion in short, when both parties shall have become aware of it.
Only then will the occasion for exercising the option arise, for it is only then
that both parties will have been aware that a problem exists with regard to
their property rights.

Germiniano v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 120303, July 24, 1996, 259 SCRA 344
Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari which has its origins in Civil Case No.
9214 of Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Dagupan City for
unlawful detainer and damages. During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to
confine the issues to: (1) whether there was an implied renewal of the lease which
expired in November 1985; (2) whether the lessees were builders in good faith and
entitled to reimbursement of the value of the house and improvements; and (3) the value
of the house.
On the first issue, the court held that since the petitioners' mother was no longer the

owner of the lot in question at the time the lease contract was executed in 1978, in view
of its acquisition by Maria Lee as early as 1972, there was no lease to speak of, much
less, a renewal thereof. And even if the lease legally existed, its implied renewal was not
for the period stipulated in the original contract, but only on a month-to-month basis
pursuant to Article 1687 of the Civil Code. The refusal of the petitioners' mother to
accept the rentals starting January 1986 was then a clear indication of her desire to
terminate the monthly lease. As regard the petitioners' alleged failed promise to sell to
the private respondents the lot occupied by the house, the court held that such should be
litigated in a proper case before the proper forum, not an ejectment case where the only
issue was physical possession of the property.
The court resolved the second issue in the negative, holding that Articles 448 and 546 of
the Civil Code, which allow possessors in good faith to recover the value of
improvements and retain the premises until reimbursed, did not apply to lessees like the
private respondents, because the latter knew that their occupation of the premises would
continue only during the life of the lease. Besides, the rights of the private respondents
were specifically governed by Article 1678, which allow reimbursement of up to one-half
of the value of the useful improvements, or removal of the improvements should the
lessor refuse to reimburse.
On the third issue, the court deemed as conclusive the private respondents' allegation that
the value of the house and improvements was P180,000.00, there being no controverting
evidence presented.
On appeal by the private respondents, the RTC of Dagupan City reversed the trial court's
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 448 or Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply in the
instant case.
HELD: In this case, both parties admit that the land in question was originally owned by
the petitioners' mother. The land was allegedly acquired later by one Maria Lee by virtue
of an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Lee, however, never sought a writ of
possession in order that she gain possession of the property in question. The petitioners'
mother therefore remained in possession of the lot. It has been said that while the right to
let property is an incident of title and possession, a person may be lessor and occupy the
position of a landlord to the tenant although he is not the owner of the premises let. There
is no need to apply by analogy the provisions of Article 448 on indemnity as was done in
Pecson vs. Court of Appeals, because the situation sought to be avoided and which would
justify the application of that provision, is not present in this case. Suffice it to say, "a
state of forced co-ownership" would not be created between the petitioners and the
private respondents. For, as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the right of the
private respondents as lessees is governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which
allows reimbursement to the extent of one-half of the value of the useful improvements.
It must be stressed, however, that the right to indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil
Code arises only if the lessor opts to appropriate the improvements. Since the petitioners
refused to exercise that option the private respondents cannot compel them to reimburse
the one-half value of the house and improvements. Neither can they retain the premises
until reimbursement is made. The private respondents' sole right then is to remove the
improvements without causing any more impairment upon the property leased than is
necessary.
Pershing Tan Queto v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-35648, March 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 54
Paras, J.

FACTS: Herein private respondent Restituta Tacalinar Guangco de Pombuena received

the questioned lot from her mother Basilides Tacalinar either as a purported donation or
by way of purchase with P50 as the alleged consideration thereof. The donation or sale
was consummated while Restituta was already married to her husband Juan Pombuena.
Juan then filed for himself and his supposed co-owner Resitituta an application for a
Torrens Title over the land which was later on granted pronouncing him (married to
Resitiuta) as the owner of the land.
A contract of lease over the lot was entered into between petitioner, Pershing Tan Queto
and Restituta with the consent of her husband for a period of 10 years. The lease of
contract having expired, Restituta filed for unlawful detainer against Tan Queto. The
unlawful detainer case was won by the spouses in the Municipal Court but on appeal in
the CFI the entire case was dismissed because of a barter agreement whereby Tan Queto
became the owner of the disputed lot and the spouses became the owners of a parcel of
land with the house thereon previously owned before the barter by Tan Queto. After the
barter agreement, Tan Queto constructed on the disputed land a concrete building without
any objection from Restituta. Afterwards Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for
reconveyance of the title over the registered but disputed lot, for annulment of the barter,
and for recovery of the land with damages.
The respondent courts decision which later on was affirmed by the Supreme court led to
the reformation of the Contract of Sale of the disputed lot from Basilides to Restituta
from a sale to a conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary estate of her
parents. Hence, this petition for a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary
estate of her parents was valid hence a paraphernal property.
HELD: No. The court ruled that the land is conjugal, not paraphernal. The oral donation
of the lot cannot be a valid donation intervivos because it was not executed in a public
instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities
of a will were not complied with. The allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to
RESTITUTA of her hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be
sustained for the contractual transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited.
The fact is ownership was acquired by both JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition
(delivery) as a consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00
(then a considerable amount) as the cause or consideration of the transaction. The lot is
therefore conjugal, having been acquired by the spouses thru onerous title (the money
used being presumably conjugal there being no proof that RESTITUTA had paraphernal
funds of her own).
Agustin v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 66075-76, July 5, 1990, 187 SCRA 218
Grino Aquino, J.
FACTS: The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao
on the east in the province of Cagayan. In 1919 the lands of the east of the river were
covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, OCT 5472 was issued for land east of the
Cagayan River owned by Eulogio Agustin. As the years went by, the Cagayan River
moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the west bank. The shifting of the river and
siltation continued until 1968. In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the
Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying lands covered by Solana Cadastre were Pablo
Binayug and Maria Melad. Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the
Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was Agustins Lot 8457,
depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Binayug on the western
bank. However, 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned

to its 1919 bed and in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad,
and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the
eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots they had to cross the
river. In April 1969, while the Melads, Binayug, Urbina and their tenants were planting
corn on their lots located on the easter side of Cagayan River, Agustin, the heirs of
Baldomero Langcay, Juan Langcay, and Arturo Balisi, accompanied by the mayor and
some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the
Melads, Binayug and Urbina from the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not ownership of accretion is lost upon sudden and abrupt change of
the river.
HELD: No. The ownership of the accretion to the lands was not lost upon sudden and
abrupt change of the course of the river (Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted
to its old 1919 bed), and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (eastern
bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation.
Article 459 provides that whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates
from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfer it to another estate, the
owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it,
provided that he removes the same within two years. Article 463 provides that,
whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part
thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a
portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.
Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 73465, September 7, 1989, 177 SCRA 313
Medialdea, J.
FACTS: On November 5, 1982, private respondents Domingo Apostol et al. filed a
complaint for quieting of title against petitioners Leonida Cureg et al. The complaint
alleged that private respondents, except Apostol, are the legal and/or the forced heirs of
the late Domingo Gerardo, and his predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open,
peaceful and continuous possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership of a parcel of
land (referred to as their motherland). Subsequently, the heirs verbally sold the
motherland to Apostol. The motherland showed signs of accretion caused by the
movement of the Cagayan River. When private respondents were about to cultivate their
motherland together with its accretion, they were prevented by the petitioners.
Petitioners alleged that the motherland claimed by the private respondents is nonexistent, that the subject land is an accretion to their registered land, and that
petitioners have been in possession and cultivation of the accretion for many years
now.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the better right of accretion.
HELD: Yes. The petitioners are entitled to the accretion. The subject land is an alluvial
deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article
457 of the New Civil Code: To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
However, the increase in the area of the petitioners land, being an accretion left by the
change of course or the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not
automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion
is covered by a Torrens title. As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the
Torrens system.

Viajar v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 77294, December 12, 1988, 168 SCRA 405

Medialdea, J.
FACTS: The spouses Ricardo and Leonor Ladrido were the owners of Lot 7511. Spouses
Rosendo and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a parcel of land described in their
title as Lot 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan. On 6 September 1973, Rosendo Te,
with the conformity of his wife, sold this lot to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for
P5,000. A Torrens title was later issued in the latters names. Later, Angelica Viajar had
Lot 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the possession of Ricardo Y.
Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido refused. The piece of real
property which used to be Lot 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in
barangay Guibuanogan, Pototan, Iloilo; that at the time of the cadastral survey in 1926,
Lot 7511 and Lot 7340 were separated by the Suague River; that Lot 7340 has been in
the possession of Ladrido; that the area of 14,036 sq.ms., which was formerly the river
bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also been in the possession of
Ladrido; and that the Viajars have never been in actual physical possession of Lot 7340.
On 15 February 1974, Angelica and Celso Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery of
possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido. The trial court rendered its decision
in favor of Ladrido, dismissing the complaint of Angelica and Celso Viajar with costs
against them, declaring the Ladridos are entitled to the possession thereof. Not satisfied
with the decision, the Viajars appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the court. The Viajars filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents are entitled to the land on the ground of accretion.
HELD: Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters." The presumption is that the change in the course of
the river was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion. In the present case, the lower
court correctly found that the evidence introduced by the Viajars to show that the change
in the course of the Suague River was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not
clear and convincing. The Ladridos have sufficiently established that for many years
after 1926 a gradual accretion on the eastern side of Lot 7511 took place by action of the
current of the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial deposit of 29,912 sq.ms. more or
less, had been added to Lot 7511. The established facts indicate that the eastern boundary
of Lot 7511 was the Suague River based on the cadastral plan. For a period of more than
40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River overflowed its banks yearly and the
property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the
current of the river. The consequent increase in the area of Lot 7511 due to alluvion or
accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed and planted the same
with corn and tobacco. The quondam river bed had been filled by accretion through the
years. The land is already plain and there is no indication on the ground of any
abandoned river bed. Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters becomes the property of the owners
of the lands adjoining the banks. Therefore, the accretion to Lot 7511 which consists of
Lots A and B belong to the Ladridos.
Heirs of Navarro v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 68166, February 12, 1997, 268 SCRA 589
Hermosisima, J:
FACTS: On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, filed an application for foreshore lease
covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of
approximately seventeen (17) hectares. Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest,
Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering
twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially,
such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property

formed part of the public domain.

Sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual flied an application to register and
confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in
Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of 146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed that
this land is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan,
and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side
by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the northern side
by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and
meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in
an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor
General, filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-ininterest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the
public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the land sought to be registered is accretion or foreshore land, or,
whether or not said land was formed by the action of the two rivers of Talisay and
Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay.
HELD: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river;
and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. If
the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern
and western boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern portion
thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of
accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which
is adjacent to the river bank.
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what
used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on
the northern side. Applicant Pascual has not presented proofs to convince the Court that
the land he has applied for registration is the result of the settling down on his registered
land of soil, earth or other deposits so as to be rightfully be considered as an accretion
[caused by the action of the two rivers]. Article 457 finds no applicability where the
accretion must have been caused by action of the bay.
The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the aforegoing observation is that
the disputed land is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public
domain. Thus, the disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an
inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain.