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the time. The new science of computers and computational mathematics supplied
concepts that could be applied to the brain as a complex system. Functionalism
was also applying empiricism to a new area, paralleling the method of the huge
advancements made in science in the twentieth century.
One of the benefits of functionalism is that by equating conscious states with
functions of the brain, it (at least in principle) allows for external investigation of
conscious states. What makes this investigation possible is the fact that brain
functions are not private. They can be publicly observed (given the technology)
thus rendering our conscious states public. Some previous theories (such as
Cartesian dualism) had ascribed radical privacy to mental states. This lead to the
problem of other minds whereby owing to privacy it was not possible to compare
mental states between minds, or even know that other minds existed at all! By
providing us with a route to others' experiences, Functionalism solves this issue.
The theory also benefits from the ability to empirically test it: the theory is
independently verifiable, a somewhat unusual position amongst philosophical
theories and of obvious superiority to other theories of mind (such as dualism or
idealist monism).
A further advantage is that in developing behaviourism, the theory offers
progress in our understanding of the mind. It takes the benefits of behaviourism
(solving the issue of other minds, allowing empirical observation of the mind) and
introduces multiple outputs and feedback. This additional complexity solves the
major issues with behaviourism (perceived crudeness, varying outputs from
same input, zombie objection, super Spartan objection, etc)
However, functionalism is far from a panacea to the problems of the philosophy
of mind. The first issue is shared by all materialist theories: it fails to explain the
apparent radical difference between physical and conscious states in our
perceptions. For example I might be the worlds foremost neuroscientist, but even
then I would not understand my experience of eating breakfast in purely physical
terms. I understand a pleasing breakfast by thinking, 'mmm, that bacon has
caused an excitation potential to be reached and thus link the X and Y areas of
my brain', but I might think that it was delicious.
Another criticism is that despite the introduction of additional complexity,
functionalism, like behaviourism, ascibes consciousness in very simple systems
such as computers. This is perhaps the danger of borrowing a concept from
computational mathematics and applying it to consciousness: that this will
equate maths and consciousness as the same thing! If a strict definition of a
function (as any sort of process) is followed then theoretically anything could be
ascribed consciousness.
There are two further 'set-piece' objections. Firstly, Frank Jackson argues in
'Epiphenomenal Qualia' (Philosophical Quarterly, 1982) and later in 'What Mary
Didn't Know' (The Journal of Philosophy, 1986) that it is not possible to ascertain
someone else's experience from direct observation of the physical processes of
the brain. Secondly, the Chinese mind argument argues that a system that
mimics the functionalist explanation of the human brain does not exhibit
consciousness.
Let us first examine the arguments of Frank Jackson. His arguments are two
stories: what Fred knew and Mary didn't:
What Fred knew:
However, whilst this response may answer the accusation of infinite regress it
does not answer the accusation that functionalism merely delegates the central
issue by failing to explain the function.
Therefore, in conclusion to this assessment of functionalism we can say that it
forms a significant and useful theory, and that it is a useful model for
comprehending how the mind might work. However, a model is all it is (i.e. a
device for simplifying comprehension of a complex concept) because it admits of
consciousness in simple systems and does not confine itself to those systems
that are self-aware. It also falls short of solving the problem of privacy of
experience and subjectivity. Thus, it fails to provide a complete picture of the
mind and consciousness.