Notes on the Service Delivery Model for Ontario Works

Prepared for Task Force on Modernizing Income Security for

Working Age Adults

December 2004
By
Professor Ernie Lightman, Ph.D,
Andrew Mitchell and Dean Herd, Ph.D
Social Assistance in the New Economy (SANE) Project
University of Toronto

Look at the service delivery model technology and just take one client and time how long it
takes to read through the file and get some clarity on what the major issues are? Is there
abuse? Are there any mental health issues? See how long it takes to do. Instead of having a
narrative, now we have all these rabbit warrens where we put pieces of information. We are
getting better at learning how to streamline it, but there are hundreds of different categories.
Its put a grenade into our understanding of the client: its just bit and pieces. I used to be
able to sit down with a file and figure out what the major issues to be addressed were. Now
its a real barrier to be able to see the client holistically and that has a huge impact on our
practice and our service delivery. I cant emphasize it enough. A systems analyst with a social
work background needs to sit down and critically assess the service delivery model
technology and the impact that it has on our ability to case-manage clients (Worker #1,
Toronto).

Authors Note
The following report was prepared for the Toronto City Summit Alliances Task Force on
Modernizing Income Security for Working Age Adults in December 2004.
As we finalised our report, Deb Matthews, M.P.P and Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister
of Community and Social Services issued a wide-ranging set of recommendations for
reforming social assistance in Ontario. Following this, the provincial government announced
a number of commitments to reform welfare.
As a result, we have added an addendum to our report. The addendum notes both the areas in
which Ms Mathews report concurs with our own recommendations and where the provincial
government has agreed to act. It concludes by noting that while the commitments are
welcome, the heavy-lifting of welfare reform has only just begun.

Introduction

When the provincial Liberal government recently sought to make the first increase to welfare
payments in a decade, the inability of the computer system to implement the increase became
a matter of considerable political debate. Concerns about the new service delivery model for
welfare, however, have been evident for longer and go much deeper than the issue of
payments alone. After providing a brief overview of the new system, as well as noting
previous concerns raised by the provincial auditor, this report highlights the main findings of
research conducted by the Social Assistance in the New Economy (SANE) project with
Ontario Works staff and recipients. While practical failings similar to those exposed by the
auditor have emerged repeatedly, we also believe that there are a number of deeper
philosophical concerns about the suitability of the service delivery model.

Background

In 1997, the Progressive Conservative provincial government entered into a Common Purpose
Procurement (CPP) agreement, known as the Business Transformation Project (BTP), with
Andersen Consulting (now Accenture) to design a new delivery model for social assistance.
The existing delivery system was criticized for using outdated technology, being largely
paper-based and labour intensive and allowing little time for direct staff contact with clients.
Perhaps most importantly from the perspective of government, the lack of common
technology and information sharing was thought to encourage error and fraud. The key aims
therefore were to introduce new business practices and technologies enabling tighter
verification procedures to reduce costs, target fraud and improve program integrity and client
services. The culture associated with these changes was one of ongoing policing and
inspection.
To achieve these aims the Service Delivery Model (SDM) included the following key
features:
A common province-wide database to provide real-time access to case information
and avoid duplication. Information to be available on clients who have moved within
the Province or who are re-applying for assistance.
A two-step intake process, composed of telephone screening followed by a face-toface verification interview, to reduce the number of client interviews and generally
improve client service.
Third Party Interfaces to provide automated verification of client information.
An Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system offering improved access to information
for clients and allowing income to be reported.
A streamlined case management function to reduce staff time on case administration
by reducing and/or automating manual processes to track client information as well as
producing management and field reports.
Automated Support for Employment Assistance to support staff in the complete
delivery (both financial and employment assistance) of Ontario Works.
Since 1998, the provincial auditor has issued a number of reports and special audits with a
specific focus on the proper administration of the agreement between the Ministry and
Accenture, as well as the operation of the technology itself. These inquiries have highlighted

numerous concerns, quite apart from those involving impropriety in the financial relationship
between Accenture and the Government of Ontario.
In terms of system operation, the auditor noted failures to provide necessary information and
that information was provided inaccurately or in a form that was not useful. Staff reported
they found the system complicated to use and in many respects a step back from what had
been available previously. For example, there was great difficulty determining why
overpayments were generated (on one occasion more than 7000 discretionary benefit
payments worth a total of $1.2 million were sent to ineligible individuals) and at times the
system did not permit caseworkers to issue cheques, which necessitated the issuing of manual
cheques, and, at other times, the system did not permit manual cheques to be recorded. This
led to a need for extensive work-arounds that consumed additional time and resources, as well
as the creation of additional local systems. Finally, the auditor noted that although the
Ministry cited decreases in the numbers of people receiving benefits as an indication of the
success of the new model, it had little information as to whether their departures were linked
to positive outcomes or had occurred for other reasons.
Many similar findings emerged from our research, which is funded by two major grants from
the Social Science and Humanties Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). We have
interviewed a number of front-line workers, managers and directors, and are currently
tracking a panel of Ontario Works recipients longitudinally, to see what changes occur in their
lives over a number of years.
Our studies have raised fundamental philosophical concerns about the suitability of certain
application procedures, technologies and business practices that are built into the service
delivery model for the provision of welfare. For example, the agreement between the Ministry
and Accenture granted the private firm a direct financial interest in reducing welfare
caseloads, with no mechanism to link those reductions to successful outcomes (autonomy
and relatively stable employment for clients). Within welfare especially, administrative
practices strongly determine access: the nature of the application process, the amount and
scope of the training staff receive, the degree of personal contact applicants have with staff,
and the nature and kind of documents which must be produced and verified, are all decisions
which have profound effects on applicants and recipients. As we set out below, we have
consistently found that the design of the service delivery model restricts entry and denies
benefits through excessive and inappropriate requests for information, cumbersome and
complicated application processes, deliberately confusing procedures and language and
restricted appeal times.
In our view, this culture of policing and ongoing inspection is pervasive throughout the
delivery system of Ontario Works: without fundamental change in this detailed delivery
system, social assistance in Ontario will serve only to exclude and deny.
We now examine two central and particularly problematic features of the administrative
process for Ontario Works, the two-stage application process and the consolidated verification
process (CVP).

The Two-stage Application Process

The initial application for Ontario Works involves a cumbersome and inaccessible two-stage
application process.
The first stage involves the applicant contacting one of 7 Intake Screening Units (ISUs,
equivalent to call centres) by telephone and completing a preliminary verbal assessment.
Applicants have to answer a range of questions about their asset levels, including bank
balances, investments and vehicle registration; income such as earnings, Employment
Insurance benefits, pensions and child tax credits; and bills such as rent or mortgage, hydro,
water and property taxes. Stage Two is an in-person verification interview that includes the
review of all the information supplied over the telephone and of any additional information
that can be specifically requested. The intention was for fewer ineligible applicants to reach
verification interviews, reducing costs and improving the efficiency and quality of services to
those eligible.
Key findings from our research in this area included the following:
Complicated design and confusing language: After preliminary information has been
collected, an ISU screener can inform applicants that they may not be eligible and could
discontinue. Applicants who continue are either referred to the local Ontario Works office to
complete a full application, or a conclusion of ineligibility is made. Given the word
conclusion, this can easily be understood as a finding of ineligibility. In fact, applicants can
complete a full application. A preliminary finding of ineligibility is transformed into a
decision that cannot be appealed unless the applicant registers an objection. Systemgenerated letters are equally confusing, stating for example that a conclusion cannot be
appealed. However if an applicant disagrees with this conclusion of ineligibility, she/he may
submit a formal objection and If you disagree with the results of the internal review, you
may appeal the decision to the Social Benefits Tribunal within thirty days of the date when
the internal review should have been completed.
The language is more suitable to Catch-22 than to a sophisticated, modern government
program.
Problems of accessibility and suitability: Most participants felt uncomfortable talking on
the phone and disliked the impersonal nature of telephone application. In particular, they felt
it was easier to ask (and answer) questions face-to-face. Indeed, one of the problems of the
initial telephone contact is that the system is not geared to provide information and answer
questions, but simply to gather information. This left some respondents confused and unsure
how to proceed. Many also reported needing to call on numerous occasions to access the
system and being kept on hold for long periods before being connected to a screener. Even
once they access the system, the process can be drawn out and difficult, with the time needed
to complete a telephone application varying from around 20 to 90 minutes. Problems are
compounded for those who do not have regular access to a telephone and who are frequently
the most in need. Alternatives are built in for applicants who would have difficulty with
telephone intake due to crisis, communication barriers or complex personal situations though
applicants are not always made aware of this. Essentially the efficacy of these alternatives

Box 1: Selected Quotes from Ontario Works Recipients

The lines are busy so you have to keep calling back. Sometimes its frustrating: all you can get
is an answering machines and it may take a day or two to talk to a live person (R1#48)
Its frustrating to call and only reach an answering machine, to leave a message and not
receive a call back for several weeks I called all the time but had to leave messages on the
answering machine. They ended up cutting me off every month. They would send me a letter
every month saying that I was being cut off due to lack of information. This happened for
three months. I was sending them all the information that they asked for, but I never knew
whether I would get a cheque at the end of the month or not (R1#39).
I was asked the same questions at the face-to-face interview as on the telephone, but it was
much more invasive and made me feel like a criminal for applying for benefits from a system I
have been paying into longer than most of those people have been alive. It felt like I was
being interrogated for fraud and they were working on the assumption that anyone applying
was trying to commit fraudIts degrading and humiliating and I think its that way on
purpose. It seems as though the system has been adapted to make people feel bad for using it
(R1#117)
What is the real need for this repetitive information? How many times do they need to see the
same divorce paper? How many times do they need to see the same birth certificate? They
already have this on file and this information hasnt changed. Why do they need to see it all
again? (R1#53)
Its dehumanizing having someone go line-by-line through your bank statement, wondering
where you are spending your money and asking you to explain this deposit and that deposit.
Its none of their business if I spend $25 in Shoppers Drug Mart, or if I happen to have a
coffee at Starbucks (R1#69)
I had a review in May and July and then after my child was born, so in July again. Then I
have one next week. Thats four in 6 months. I have to send in all of my updated information
in order to get my cheque. They held my cheque last month because they didnt have some
information so now I have to go and bring them all those things I just sent. I called and asked
them what to bring, but when I got there, there were one or two things that they didnt tell me
to bring. So I had to go back. It makes me feel like a criminal. I feel like they are always
trying to catch me, but Im not doing anything wrong (R1#116).
How many children do you have? Do they live with you? Have you received any support? Do
you have any court orders? Do you have those documents with you? Do you have all your
documents with you? Birth certificate? Health card? Who do you live with? Do you pay rent?
How much is your rent? What are your bills? Who do you owe? They need to see bank
statements for the last 3 months. If I have X amount of dollars then I will not be eligible for
welfare. If I come into any money then I will have to tell them about it. If I move I have to tell

them about it. If I receive money from my ex-husband I have to tell them about it. If I receive
money from anyone. Its endless (R1#23).
boils down to a persons right to make an application in person and whether the applicant is
made aware of it.
Social Distance: By necessity, call centres move to more standardized questions. Under this
one size fits all approach more complex, but legitimate cases risk being turned away. Call
centres may be a suitable business practice, but they raise serious difficulties for many
welfare applicants. In particular, people with poor English language skills, low educational
attainment, and physical and mental health problems often require personal support to
navigate bureaucracy and risk being further marginalized.
Interactive Voice Response: The IVR technology is intended to allow clients to make
enquiries (both general and specific) and to report changes to routine information, such as
income without having to wait to speak to a person. Again, however, the Press 1, 2 or 3type navigation system is unsuitable for situations that cannot be reduced to a standard
enquiry. For example, as recipients must provide a monthly income report whether their status
has changed or not, there is an increased risk of disqualification for unreported or inaccurate
information.

Consolidated Verification Process (CVP)

CVP aims to reduce the number of ineligible claims, increase the accuracy of assistance level
calculations and allow workers to spend more time meeting client needs. Social assistance
recipients are required to provide information about themselves, their family and any other
household members. Typically, this includes information on family size, income, assets, debts
and requires documentary evidence such as divorce papers, immigration papers, bank books
and rent receipts, but other information can be requested.
Prior to CVP, reviews of client files were based on time on the caseload. With CVP, risk
factors are used to determine when cases should be reviewed. These factors raise serious
concerns about the equity of the system. Risk factors include high accommodation costs
(equal to or greater than 75% of participants net revenue), receipt of social assistance for 36
months or more, another person residing at the participants address and a Social Insurance
Number beginning with a 9, indicating permanent resident status.
The key findings of our research in this area were as follows:
Excessive information requests: As social assistance is a non-contributory programme of
last resort, it is not unreasonable to expect rigorous scrutiny to determine eligibility. But in
practice, the array of requirements, and the process by which these requirements are imposed,
can be unfair and exclude people genuinely in need. Policy directives require not just routine
information such as birth certificates, SIN numbers and income, but also information on
receivables, year and make of vehicles, information on roomers and boarders, lease/rental
agreements assets, detailed bank records, records of school attendance etc. In addition,
satisfying a particular requirement such as income verification may mean producing any of
the following: Support Court orders, Divorce settlements, bank records showing deposits, T-4
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or T-5 slips from Revenue Canada, Income Tax Assessments, Child care receipts,
Employment pay stubs, sponsorship agreements, OSAP assessments, Fire insurance

Box 2: Selected Quotes from Ontario Works Staff

You get bogged down with the system and the paperwork and you just dont seem to have the time
to spend one-on-one with the client to deal with the problems that they are having. If we had more
time we could focus more on the client, focus on their need and see how they can get off the system
(Worker #1, Peel)
Its the whole idea of Feeding the BeastI dont think that it has a lot to do with making my job of
caseload management any easier (Worker #1, Ottawa).
You cant judge what we do without taking a really hard look at the tool that we have to use. What
we have to work with. You can see what we do and we can tell you what we do, but you have to
understand it in the context of (high) caseloads (Worker #2, Toronto).
The paper work is unreal ... Every time I walk away from my desk I get a stack of paper and half
the time I dont know what to do with it. (The technology) generates these reports and you spend
your day trying to track somebody down who actually knows what they mean and half the time they
tell you, it doesnt really mean anything (Worker #3, Toronto).
There are no add-ons you can do, so you end up having another system running at the same
time. We probably have 3 systems running. Thats because the technology has not been able
to collect or report on the kinds of information we really need. The hope is that eventually
that will change. But if its a real local need, its never going to be part of the SDMT (Senior
Official #1, Ottawa).
Weve got this mismatch between what the technology can do to support the work and what
people have to modify to accommodate the use of technology (Senior Official #2, Ottawa)
The tracking is all about the activities. Its not about results. The computer system doesnt
allow you to add things on. It isnt focused on employment, but we want our workers to be.
The government is monitoring how many people go back to work by using reports on
terminations. Thats not a good report because three quarters of the time you dont
necessarily know why people leave. Its not a good way of tracking people (Senior Official #3,
Ottawa)
The new service delivery model doesnt function very effectively. It reinforces a residual
financial assistance approach to program delivery (Senior Official #1, Toronto)
The technology to support the caseworkers causes more administrative, time-consuming
work. When it was introduced the intent was to take a lot of that burden away. Our workers
are faced with having to feed the monster all the time and dont have enough time to spend

with their clients. In retrospect, it was designed to feed that administrative need to know
versus the flexibility to allow you to do what you need to do (Senior Official #2, Toronto)
settlement documents, waivers for pursuit of child support including police reports or medical
reports or spouse receiving financial assistance. For many, especially those who are destitute,
homeless, or have health problems or addictions, being able to retain and provide all of this
documentation is simply unrealistic.
Inefficiencies and inappropriate requests: Most contributors had faced requests for
duplicated information and inappropriate requests for information. Time limits were often
imposed and there were costs associated with the retrieval of some documents such as those
from banks and credit card companies. As well as careless administrative errors, there were
also more worrying incidents, such as inappropriate requests of women fleeing abusive
relationships, with pressure to seek child support payments in situations where it would be
dangerous to do so.
Third Party Databases: Accessing third-party databases is also portrayed as leading to a
more efficient and consistent implementation of eligibility criteria. Here again the list of
information that may be accessed about a person is extensive and can include: welfare fraud
database; asset checking services; immigration; Revenue Canada; Managing Enforcement
with Computerized Assistance (MECA); Ministry of Transportation; Equifax (credit history);
Employment Insurance; Canada Pension Plan; Workplace Safety and Insurance Board;
Banks; Landlords; and Employers. Similar concerns of excessive information, delays and
associated costs were reported.

Conclusion

When the new service delivery model was established the stated aims were to introduce new
business practices and technologies enabling tighter verification procedures to reduce costs,
target fraud and improve program integrity and client services. Instead of providing the
promised streamlined, cost-effective and client- and worker-friendly system, however, the
service delivery model has consistently demonstrated a variety of operational shortcomings.
Indeed, the major outcome of the new model has been to introduce a culture of policing, to
tighten eligibility and verification requirements, to the extent that people in genuine need risk
being denied access and face a climate of suspicion and surveillance once in receipt of
welfare.
But even more important than the fiscal and operational issues involved with the current
system are the many concerns of staff and participants that go the heart of the very
design and philosophy of the new model. As such we believe that there is an urgent
need for a full review of the service delivery model, with a view to introducing a new
system in which the Government of Ontario exercises direct ownership and operational
control.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of our research, and our interpretation of the many interviews we
conducted, we have a number of recommendations:
1: Transparency and Accessibility:
At the heart of the new delivery model lie administrative practices that are deliberately
designed to bureaucratically disentitle people who would otherwise be potentially eligible for
welfare. At the very least, therefore, the new model needs to be built upon greater
transparency and streamlined accessibility. Fundamentally, where individuals are not deemed
eligible for assistance this should be based on transparent rules and processes that are easily
understood and clearly communicated. The two-stage application process and ongoing
eligibility reviews, for example, should be eliminated entirely, or at least redesigned to ensure
that all those who seek support are entitled to a fair review of their circumstances; that those
who are eligible can readily access support; and that official communications in each of these
areas are simplified to avoid deliberate misunderstanding and confusion.
We note that Deb Matthews, MPP, in her recent report, called for the Intake Screening Units
(ISUs) to be shut down entirely. This recommendation would have the effect of eliminating
the two-stage process, and it is a recommendation we fully endorse.

2. Simplification: A New Delivery Model

The pervasive culture of policing and continual inspection must be ended. This necessarily
means an end to the current application and delivery system, in which the same information is
demanded repeatedly, without reason, and often without warning. While a system such as
social assistance will always entail close scrutiny of applicants and a measure of ongoing
policing of recipients, the current system goes far beyond anything that can be defended on
grounds of operational necessity or concern for taxpayers dollars. A new delivery model is
urgently required, one that fairly balances the needs of the state to ensure that only qualified
applicants receive assistance, alongside the equally important need to treat applicants and
recipients with respect, dignity and fundamental due process.
Ms Matthews also recommends (p. 25) that upon a review of the rules, consider retiring the
SDMT, a perspective we equally endorse.
3. Appropriate use of technology/practices:
Any review and redesign of the delivery model must recognize that in the context of welfare
there is a limit to the suitability of certain technological innovations and business practices.
The complex circumstances which many welfare recipients face, for example, can often
neither be reduced to a press 1 2 3 telephone response nor an instruction to a worker to
complete box a b c. More thought needs to be given to what technologies are suitable and
where those deemed appropriate fit best within the overall model. In addition, with regard to
the telephone application process, alternative avenues need to be open, not on a limited
discretionary basis but to all that need them. In essence, the decision on what technologies
and practices to use needs to be guided by the desire to provide essential supports to all who
need them.

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4. The Business Transformation Project

we concluded that the Ministryaccepted most if not all of the risk
for the Business Transformation Project while Accenture received a
disproportionate amount of the rewards.
(Annual Report of the Provincial Auditor of Ontario, 2004, p. 356)
Some may argue that given the excessive amounts of money already invested in the
delivery system, it should now be persevered with and adapted as best it can. But as any
student of Economics 100 will readily understand, fixed costs are not relevant to future
decision-making. The money is gone, spent, probably wasted. What matters is future
expenditure, whether the marginal cost of continuing with the current system is greater
or less than the marginal cost of changing. Given that Accenture continues to own the
source code for the current system, it is probable that future involvement with them will
lead to future abuses, similar to those repeatedly identified by the Provincial Auditor.
Arguably, the future cost over time of an alternate system in which the government
owns the source code, and maintains the system in-house, will be demonstrably less
than staying on the current path.
There is nothing wrong with using technology to store huge amounts of information. But it
needs to be supported by human beings who have the discretion to serve people. The
technology introduced by Accenture was designed to reduce the number of workers needed to
operate the system and to lower their skill levels. It is essential that front-line workers recover
some of the discretion that was removed from them with the BTP: the deskilling, the
conversion of the job to one of filling in blanks or ticking boxes on a form, the transformation
of welfare offices to call centres (that could be located anywhere in the world)all of these
serve only to dehumanise the system, to marginalize both worker and client, and to deny
access to those in pressing need of social assistance.
It is our position that any review or redesign of the new system has to move beyond purely
operational and fiscal concerns (significant through they are) to address the core values on
which the system is based: Is it desirable, for example, for a private firm to have a direct or
indirect financial incentive to reduce welfare caseloads (without meaningful accountability)?
Is it fair that while extensive undocumented expense claims described as questionable by the
auditor have been paid to Accenture, welfare recipients navigating the system they designed
face suspension or termination for failing to supply paperwork they may already have
supplied numerous times before?
It is our view, for both symbolic and fiscal reasons, that Accenture must be totally removed
from any role in the delivery of social assistance in Ontario. A new broom is required, and it
must sweep clean.
Essentially the issue is whether the delivery of a system of last resort should be based solely
on business models and practices, driven by caseload reduction targets and profits alone, or
based on human service models that seek to facilitate the provision of a safety net to those in

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need. The current service delivery model developed by Accenture for the Progressive
Conservative provincial government is informed by the former rather than the latter: It wastes
the time, energy and resources of staff and recipients alike; undermines the ability of the
system to focus on employment assistance; and capriciously seeks to restrict entry and
accelerate exit, regardless of need.
While there are significant costs associated with seeking a new model and new approaches, it
is our belief that the human and financial costs of not implementing a more equitable model
undoubtedly must be even greater.

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Addendum: Recently Announced Provincial Government Welfare Reforms

As we finalised our original report, Deb Matthews, M.P.P and Parliamentary Assistant to the
Minister of Community and Social Services issued a wide-ranging set of recommendations
for reforming social assistance in Ontario. At the heart of the numerous proposals for change
was a vision of welfare which contained many positive elements, including:
Moving from the current punitive approach to a supportive, client-centred approach;
Moving from a system mired in labyrinthine rules around financial eligibility, to one
with simple, clear, well-communicated rules focused on helping people improve their
circumstances;
Moving from programs based on ideology to ones based on real client needs; and
Moving from a system that rewards municipalities for meeting activity quotas to one
that rewards lasting results.
More specifically, as we noted in our original recommendations, amongst the detailed
recommendations the Matthews report called for the Two-Step Application process to be
reformed, with the Intake Screening Units shut down entirely and the existing Service
Delivery Model Technology retired.
Subsequently, on December 15, 2004 the provincial government issued two press releases.
Confirming the changed attitude to welfare, Sandra Pupatello, Minister of Community and
Social Services, repeated the call for a new vision for social assistance and pledged to treat
recipients with greater dignity and respect and to make the system work better for clients and
taxpayers by streamlining administration, improving accountability and moving people off
welfare into steady jobs.
The press releases included a number of broadly positive commitments such as restoring
health benefits for Ontario Works recipients transitioning to work, changes to various asset
rules such as allowing recipients to keep registered education savings plan funds to support
their childrens education and ending the practice of placing liens on recipients homes in
order to be eligible for assistance.
Specifically with regard to our recommendations concerning the delivery model the
provincial government committed to simplifying the application process for Ontario Works
recipients by moving to a one stage application process through the removal of the Intake
Screening Units.

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Concluding Remarks
The vision for social assistance set out by the provincial government provides a refreshing
change after a decade of policies that have sought to stigmatize and punish welfare recipients.
Certainly the commitment to close the Intake Screening Units is a positive step in our view,
but much remains to be done if the rhetoric of creating a truly supportive and client-centred
welfare program is to be achieved.
While streamlining the application process, for example, should help ensure more of those
who are eligible for welfare face one less unnecessary hurdle, as we have demonstrated
throughout our report, many more punitive and unnecessary obstacles can emerge within the
face-to-face interview and in subsequent eligibility reviews with repeated demands for
excessive and inappropriate information. Indeed, our recommendation for greater
transparency and simplicity was echoed amongst the central recommendations of the
Matthews report. As Matthews explained:
There was probably nothing I heard about more than the need to simplify the rules.
The current system is very heavily burdened with rules that are enormously timeconsuming to administerThere are now approximately 800 rules and regulations
within the system that must be applied before a clients eligibility and the amount of
their monthly cheque can be determined. Many of those rules are punitive and
designed not to support people, but rather to keep them out of the system.
The sheer scale of rules and regulations means that the heavy-lifting of welfare reform has
only just begun.
Moreover, this mountain of rules, often inefficient and contradictory to the goals of moving
from welfare to work, is no accident. Instead, such burdensome regulations are the result of a
welfare system that, from the guiding ideology to the detailed minutiae of everyday practice,
is focused much less on supporting employment than on monitoring financial assistance with
the ultimate aim of restricting access and accelerating exits, regardless of need.
Consequently, if the new provincial government is to attain its goal of a welfare system that
treats individuals with respect, correctly assesses and meets the needs of those who are unable
to work and genuinely assists those that are able to make sustainable transitions into work,
then a full review of those 800 rules and regulations is clearly necessary but needs to occur in
the context of a different guiding philosophy that seeks to challenge the overall culture of
policing and continual inspection.

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