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AEISTOTLE
AND THE EAELIER PEEIPATETICS
VOL.

I.

WORKS BY

DR.

PRE-SOCEATIC SCHOOLS

E.

ZELLER.
History of

Greek

Philosophy from tlie Earliest Period to the time of Socrates.


Translated from the German by Sarah F. Allkvxe. 2 vols.

Crown

8vo.

SOCRATES
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AND
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SCHOOLS.

SOCRATIC

German by

0. J.

Rkichel, M.A.

8vo. lOs. Gd.

PLATO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.


from the German by Sarah

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A, Goodwin.

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SCEPTICS.
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HISTORY OF ECLECTICISM IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.


ALU5YNK.

OUTLINES

Translated

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8vo.

OF

THE

PHILOSOPHY.

from the German by Sarah P.


10s. Gd.

HISTORY

OF

Alleyne and Evelyn Abbott.

LONGMANS, GREEN,
39 Paternoster

GREEK

German by Sarah
Crown 8vo. 105.6^'.

Translated from the

&

Eow, London

Kew York and Bombay

CO.

F.

ARISTOTLE
AND

THE BAELIEE PBEIPATETI0S


i

!
"

BEING A TBANSLATION FBOM

ZELLEB'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS


'

BY

COSTELLOE,

B. F. C.

J.

H.

MUIEHEAD,

M.A.

M.A.
'<

\^

IN TWO VOLUMES VOL.

I.

LONGMANS, GEEEN, AND


39

PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON


NEW YORK AND BOMBAY
1897

All

rights reserved

CO.

311
VI

TO

THE MASTER OF BALLIOL

TEAN8LAT0ES' NOTE
The

following translation embraces Part II. Div. II.

of the third edition of Dr.


'

Eduard

The Philosophy of the Greeks

ment.'

It is

Zeller's

work on

in its Historical Develop-

made with Dr.

Zeller's

sanction,

and

completes the series of volumes issued from time to

time

by

Messrs.

Longmans

as

translations

various sections of that exhaustive work.


is

chiefly

notes

up

the

responsible for the translation of text and


to

the

middle of Chapter VII., and

Chapter XIX. to the end


portion.

of

Mr. Costelloe

Mr. Muirhead

for the

for

middle

In most instances, however, both translators

have revised the sheets.


of Gorrige7ida, which

is

In calling attention to the table


longer than might reasonably

be expected in a work of this kind, the editors desire


to explain that,

translator

owing

to an accident for

which the

was not responsible, the sheets of that portion

of the text in

which the greater part of them occur

TRANSLATORS' NOTE

viii

were passed through the press before he had seen them


In dealing with some parts of

in proof.

Zeller's notes

a certain liberty has been taken with the

German

text

with a view to condensing the material where this could


be done without impairing
believed to

its

The

value.

treatise is

be the only work accessible to English

readers which

is

a complete and accurate exposition of

the Aristotelian doctrine.

The student

will find

ample

guidance as to Dr. Zeller's plan in the Table of Contents,

which

is

in fact an index of subject matters

arrangement adopted by Dr. Zeller


clear

that

it

has

not been

is

and the

so logical and

considered necessary to

burden the translation with an exhaustive verbal index.

CONTENTS
OF

THE FIRST VOLUME

CHAPTER

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE


Year of his

birth, his family and j^outh, 2.


Entrance into the
Platonic School, relation to Plato, development of his opinions,
Sojourn in Atarneus, 18.
6.
The Macedonian Court, 21.
Return to Athens, teaching and research, 25.
Coolness of

Alexander,

31.

from

Flight

Athens and

Cha-

death, 33.

racter, 39.

CHAPTER

II

Aristotle's writings
A. Consideration of the particular

The Catalogues,

Works seriatim

Letters and poems, 53. Dialogues and earlier


writings, 55.
Works on Logic, 64. Rhetoric, 72. Metaphysics,
Natural
75.
Philosophy the Material Universe and Inorganic
Nature, 81.
Organic Nature, 87.
Ethics and Politics, 97.
Theory and History of Art, 102.
48.

B. General Questions touching the Aristotelian Writings.


Different classes of Writings, 105.

Exoteric, 106.

CHAPTER

Scientific, 123.

lit

history and order of the works op ARISTOTLE


Fate of Aristotle's Works, 137.

Date and sequence of Works,

154.

ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER IV
STANDPOINT, METHOD, AND DIVISIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY
OF ARISTOTLE
Aristotle

and Plato,

IGl.

Their Agreement, 162.

Their Difference,
Dialectic, 171.
Empiricism, 173.
Formalism, 177. Division of his Philosophy: Theoretic, Practical, Poietic, and their subdivisions, 180.
Logic, Metaphysics,
Physics, Ethics, Theory of Fine Art, 188.
165.

Aristotle's

Method:

CHAPTER V
LOGIC
Scope of Logic, 191. Nature and Origin of Knowledge, 194. Development of Knowledge, 196. Problem of the Science of Knowledge, 211.

Universal elements of Thought: the Concept, 212. Essence and


Accident, Genus, Differentia, Species, 213. Identity and Difference, kinds of Opposition, 223. The Judgment, 229. Affirmation
and Negation, 230. The Quantity of Judgments, 232. Modality,
Conversion, 236. The Syllogism, 236. The Figures, 238.
233.
Rules and Fallacies of Syllogism, 241.
Proof: its problem and conditions, 243. Limits of Proof; Immediate Knowledge, 245. Axioms and Postulates, 248. The Principle of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, 251.
Induction,
Dialectic or Probable Proof, 252. Defects of Aristotelian Induction, 255.
Definition, 265.
Classification, 270.
Sumvia Genera,
271.

^
.,

CHAPTER VI
INTRODUCTORY

INQUIRIES

TOUCHING

ARISTOTLe's

META-

PHYSICS
The Categories what they are and how they are deduced, 274.
The Categories in Detail, 281. Significance of the Theory of
:

the Categories, 288.


First Philosophy as the Science of Being its Problem, 290. Its
Possibility, 292.
Fundamental Questions of Metaphysics, and tlieir treatment by
Earlier Philosophers the chief problem of Metaphysics in Aristotle's time and his mode of presenting it, 295.
Criticism of
previous attempts at its solution: the Pre-Socratics, 297. The
Sophists, Socrates, and the Minor Socratic Schools, 312. Plato,
313. The Ideas, 314.
The Ideas as Numbers, 319. The Ultimate Principles of Things, the One and the original Material,
321. The value of Aristotle's criticisms on Plato, 326.
:

CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME


CHAPTER
METAPHYSICS

xi

VII

continued

The Main Inquiry of Metaphysics


The Individual and the Universal,
substantial, 331.

Form and Matter

329.

The Individual alone

is

Difficulties in this view, 334.

the Actual and the Possible deduction of the


opposition of Matter and Form, 340. More accurate account of
the opposition the Actual and the Possible, 345. Significance
of this doctrine in Aristotle, 351.
The Form in its three different
aspects as Cause, 355. The operation of the Material Cause
Passivity, Natural Necessity, Contingency, 358.
Essential significance of Matter, 365.
Matter and Form in relation to the
principles of Individuality and Substantiality, 368.
Relativity
of Matter and Form, 378.
Motion and the First Cause of Motion, 380. Mover and Moved, 383.
Eternity of Motion, 387. Necessity of a Primum Mobile, 389.
Its Nature, 393.
The operation of God on the World, 402.
;

CHAPTER

VIII

PHYSICS
A. The Idea of Nature

and the most General Conditions of


Natural Existence

Nature as the Cause of Motion, 417. Kinds of Motion, 422. Motion


in Space, 423. The Infinite, 427. Space and Time, 432. Further
discussion of Motion in Space, 437., Qualitative Change: Opposition to Mechanical Theory, 441.-$Qualitative Variety in Matter,
443. Qualitative Transform atioi?, 450. Mixture of Materials,
456.
Final Causes in Nature, 459. The Resistance of Matter
to Form, 465. Nature as a Progressive Series of Forms, 466.

CHAPTER IX
PHYSICS

continued

B. The Universe and the Elements

The Eternity of the World,

469.

The

Terrestrial

and the

Celestial

Universe the ^ther, 472. The Four Elements, 477. The Unity
of the World, 485.
The Shape of the Universe, 487.
Structure of the Heavens Theory of the Spheres, 489. The Number
:

of the Spheres, 499.


Retrogressive Spheres, 501. The circle of
the Fixed Stars, 504. The Planetary Spheres, 505. Earth and
Heaven, 506.
Generation and Destruction in Terrestrial Elements, 508. Meteorology, 512.
Inorganic Nature, 516.

Addenda and
Page

Co7'rigenda.

Zeller adds in a later note that Diog.

74, n. 2.

is not decisive.
adds in a later note, that

No. 78 gives the Rhetoric only

2 books, but this

Zeller

22.

1.

1, col. 1,

188, n.

203, n. 2,

many

of these may be in great part


explained by the supposition that Aristotle did not always write, but
dictated his books.
178, n. 2, for Braniss 7'ead Brandis
129,

1.

12, for

1.

4, insert

210, n. 2, col.

representation 7'ead opinion

199, n. 2

18, delete of

1, 1.

11, 12,/o/' a

and an read the same

224, n. col. 1,

232, 233, /or individual [juilgments] )-ead singular

235, n. col. 2,

249, n. 3, col, 2,

257, n.

1,

288, n.

1,

302, n. 3,

add a further reference to De Cwlo, i. 10 itiit.


col. 2, 11. 18, 21, for equahty read identity
col. 2, 1. 3,/or corresponds with read assimilates to

335, n. 1,

1.

346, n. col. 2,

1.

361, n. col. 1,

1.

364,

1.

11.

30, /or

1.

1.

5,

apodeictic read assertorial

for there

7-ead these

read universal
15 from bottom, after possibility insert

itself

4,/o/- general

16,

comma

omit semicolon

Toustrik {Ifermes, ix.


and suggests that the word 'disturbance' miglit be replaced

Zeller in a later note refers to the criticism of

8.

1875, p. 425),

by 'modification.'

390, n. 3, col. 1,

395, n. col.

400, n.

1,

1.

1.

17,/or Fr. 13 i^ead Fr. 12

after (the atSioi^)

9,

1, col. 2, 1. 11,

404,

1.

1.

add that

it

should be capable of ceasing to

l)e

omit not

word read is
thought read intelligible
do
read are
12, for
18, /or motion read moved

33, after

23, /or object of

405, n.

3, col. 1,

1.

407, n. 2, col. 2,

1.

412, n. col 1,

415,

417,

1.

5,

after klvovv add, absoliitely

read Form
related to them read not only bodies and
for bodies and masses
magnitudes but everything which possesses them or is related to them
427, n. 8, col. 2, 1. 8,/or masses read magnitudes
428, 1. 28, /or after read beliind
441, n. 2, col. 1, 1. 8,/or forcible read forced
454, 1. 11, /or extension read extrusion
459, n. 5, col. 1, 1. 17, for But read Again
479, n. 1, col. 1, 1. 1, after ought add in the converse case
1. 4, after does add not

481, n. 1, col. 2, 1. 24,/or oppositions read opposites.


497, n. 1, col. 2, 1. 3,/or one who stands ... in front of him read in front of the

504, 1.1, /or

510,

1.

1.

16, /or forces


9,

propeller

1.

2,

who
One

stands in the line of the axis


reac?

The

for has raised 7-ead surrounds

AEISTOTLE
AND THE

EAELIBE PEEIPATETIC8
CHAPTER

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

The

lives

and circumstances of the three great

philo-

sophers of Athens show a certain analogy to the character

and scope of their work.

As the

Attic philosophy began

by searching the inner nature of man and went on from


this

beginning to extend

existence, so

was

we

itself

over the whole field of

find that the life of its great masters

at first confined in

narrow

time went on, a wider range.

pure Athenian
to pass

citizen,

and gained, as

limits,

Socrates

but a citizen who

beyond the borders of his

city.

is

not only a

feels

Plato

no desire
is also

an

Athenian, but the love of knowledge takes him to


foreign lands and he is connected by many personal
interests with other cities.
his scientific training

Aristotle owes to Athens


and his sphere of work but he
;

belongs by birth and origin to another part of Greece,

he spends his youth and a considerable part of his manhood out of Athens, chiefly in the rising Macedonian

kingdom

and even when he is in Athens, it is as a


bound up with the political life of the

stranger, not

VOL.

I.

ARISTOTLE
and not hindered by any pergonal

city,

from giving

ties

to his philosophy that purely theoretic and impartial

character which became

its distinctive praise.^

birth of Aristotle

The

falls,

according to the most

probable reckoning, in the first year of the 99th Olympiad,^


1

Ari-

The old accounts of

stotle's life

Diogenes,

now extant
v.

are (1)

1-35 (far the most

copious) (2) DiONYSius of Halicarnassus, Epist. ad Amvumim,


727 sq. (3) 'Apiffr. pios
1. 5, p.
Koi (rvyypdixixara avrov, by the
;

Brandis,
Aristotelia i. 1-188
Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, i. pp. 48-65
Grote's Arist. (1872), i. 1-37,
;

and Grant's

Ai-ist. (1877) pp.


Stahr discusses (p. 5 sqq.)
the lost works of ancient writers

1-29.

Anonymus Menagii; (4) another


sketcii of his life, known to us in
{a) the Bios first
three forms
printed in the Aldine ed. of Arist.
:

Opp.

141)6-1)8

(which

there

is

ascribed to Pldloponus, elsewhere


to Ammonias, but belongs to
the
as
neither), here cited
Pseudo-Ammoidus (o'^Amm.); (h)
the Life published from the Codex
Marcianusby Robbe in 1861 cited
,

as Vita Marciana (or V. Marc.)


(c) the Life cited as the Latin Ammoyiius, preserved in an ancient
;

which approaches
translation,
more closely to the Vita Marciana
the

than to

Pseudo-Ammonius

itself; (5) 'Htrux'ov MiA7?o-Iou ircpl


Tov 'Apia-ToreXovs (6) SUIDAS, sub
;

All of these,
voce 'ApicrroreATis.
except (ih), are to be_ found
in UuHLE, Arist. Oj)]). i. 1-79.
Westermann's appendix to CoVitcs
bet's Diogenes, and his
Scriptorum (at p. 397) also con-

which treated of

Aristotle's life.

We

cannot be sure, as to any of


the sources mentioned, what their
basis or credibility may be.
Rose's view that they one and
all rest only on spurious texts
and fanciful combinations (p.
115) is entirely unproved and
Their value, howimprobable.
ever, beyond

doubt

differs

widely;

we can only test each statement by its inherent probability,


2 According to Apollodorus
apvd
the

DioG.
basis

9
of

no
the

doubt on
statement

DiONYS. and Ammon.)


which may be accepted as the

{ibid. 10,

safest fixed point as to the date


of Aristotle's life, that he died
in the archonship of Philocles
(01. 114, 3), about sixty-three
years old (JtSov rpiwv irov koI
e^rjKovra, or more exactly, as in
Dionys., rpia irphs to7s ^^rjKovTa
Dionysius agrees,
fiiwcras err)).
but erroneously talks of Demo-

Ord. 245), before the publication of (4&), ascribed the archetype of (4) to the younger Olym-

sthenes as three years younger


than Aristotle, whereas he was
born in the same year, or at most
in the year before (in the beginning of 01. 99, 1, or end of 01. 98,

piodorus

4); vide

tain (3)

and (4tf) Robbe, op. cit.


and (4^). Rose {Arist.
;

o-ives (4&)
'Lib.

a guess which

may be

called possible but not proven. Of


later

Arist.

commentaries, cf. Buhle,


Opp. i. 80-104; Stahr,

Stahr

i.

30.

Gellius'

statement (iV.^.xvii. 21, 25) that


Aristotle was born in the seventh
year after the freeing of Rome

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE


Stagira, the city of his birth,

B.C. 384.^

was situated
which was

in that district of Thrace called Chalcidice,^

at that date a thoroughly Hellenic country, with

many

whose people were no doubt in full


Greek culture.^ His father Nicomachus

flourishing cities,

possession of

all

from the Gauls also agrees, since


that event is referred to the year
364 A.U.C., or 390 B.C. So also the
V. Marc. p. 3, and the Ammon.
Latin, p. 12, assert that he was
born under Diotrephes (01. 99, 1)
and died sixty-three years old
under Philocles. An otherwise

unknown

writer,

EUMELUS

(ap.

DiOG. 6), asserts, on the other


hand, that Aristotle lived to be
seventy but there is little reason
;

EosE (p. 116) in preferring this account, since his next


words, tnuv hKovirov ire\evTT]a'eu,
sufficiently show his lack of trustIn fact, as the
worthiness.
manner of Socrates' death is here
transferred to Aristotle, so is his
age also possibly by reason of
the spurious Apologia ascribed
to follow

to

Aristotle

(v.

p.

35,

n.

3,

parallelism with
the Platonic Apologia of Socrates.
But apart from the probability
of this explanation, Eumelus is
completely displaced by the
agreement of all the other testimony, including that of so careful
a chronologist as ApoUodorus.
A reliable tradition as to the age
of their founder must have existed
How
in the Peripatetic School,
could all our witnesses, except
this one unknown and badlyinformed writer, have come to
agree upon a false statement of
it when the truth could have been
easily ascertained ?
'
That he was born in the
first half of the Olympiad, or
infra')

and

its

in 384 B.C., follows from the


accounts as to his death above,
and would also follow from our
information as to his residence
at Athens, if the figures are to
be taken strictly (cf. p. 6, n. 3,

For if, at seventeen, he


to Athens and was with
Plato for twenty years, he must
have been thirty-seven years old
at Plato's death; so that, if
we put his exact age at 36^ and
bring down Plato's death to the
middle of 347 B.C., his birth
would still fall in the latter half
of 384 B.C. It is, however, also
possible that his stay in Athens
did not cover the full twenty years
^ So called because most of
its cities were colonies of Chalcis
in Euboea.
Stagira itself was
originally colonised from Andros,
infra).

came

but perhaps (cf. Djonys. w?5 supra)


received a later contribution of
second founders from Chalcis.
In 348 B.C., it was, with thirtyone other cities of that district,
sacked by Philip, but was after-

wards on Aristotle's intercession


restored (v. p. 24, infra). Vide
Stahr, 23, who discusses also
the form of the name (^ra-y^ipos^
or ^Tor/^ipa. as a neuter plural).
do not know whether Ari-

We

stotle's

family house (mentioned

his will, ap. DiOG. 14) was


spared in the destruction of the
town or was subsequently rebuilt.
3
Bernays (Z>iZ. Arint. ii. 55,
'
134) calls Aristotle a
half

in

Greek,'

but

Grote

(i.

3)

B 2

and

ARISTOTLE
was the body-surgeon and friend of the Macedonian
and it is natural to suppose that the
King Amyntas
long hereditary in the family must
father's profession
^

have influenced the mental character and education of the


son, and that this early connection with the Macedonian
Court prepared the way for the employment of Aristotle
On neither of these
in the same Court at a later time.
points, however,

may

have we any positive information.

also assume that

Nicomachus took

Grant (p. 2) rightly maintain


against him that a Greek family
in a Greek colony in which only
Greek was spoken, could keep
their nationality perfectly pure.
Aristotle was not an Athenian,

though

and

philosopliical

Athens was his


home, traces can

yet be found in him of the fact


that his poHtical sense had its
training elsewhere but he was as
truly a Hellene as Pythagoras,
;

Xenophanes, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Democritus, or the rest.


The un-Greek element whicli
'

'

Bernays

and

W.

von

Hum-

We

his family with

whose surroundings and training


were so closely similar as those of
Schelling and Hegel, or of Baur
and Strauss.
Vide DiOG. i. (quoting Hermippus), DiONYS., Ps. Amm., V.
^larc, Ammon. Latin., and SuiDAS. The family of Nicomachus,
'

according to these authorities,


traced its descent, as did so many
medical families, to Asclepius.
TzETZES, Cliil. X. 727, xii. 638,
gives no ground for doubting
The three recensions of the
this.

Pseudo-Ammonius repeat this


same statement as to the family

of Aristotle's mother,Phaistis, but


for Diogenes tells
erroneoiTsly
us she was a Stagirite by birth,
and Dionysius says that she was
a descendant of one of the
Chalcis.
This
colonists from
connection might account for the
mention of a country house and
garden at Chalcis in the testaThe stateun-Greek as" compared with his ment (DiOG. 14).
own people and time than Ari- ment in Suidas, suh voce NiKdjiiaXos, that a person of that name
stotle, and if the typical writings
of Aristotle appear un-Greek in had written six books of 'larpiKk
comparison with Plato's, still, on and one book of ^vcriKo. refers,
the one hand, this is not true of according to our text, not to the
his Dialogues, and, on the other father of Aristotle (of. Buhle, 83,
hand, equally great divergencies Stahr, 84), but to an ancestor
are to be found between men of the same name; though no

his letter to Wolf,


25) find in Aristotle is
doubtless to be connect ed not so
much with the place of his birth
as with the characteristics of his
generation and his individual
The full-born
bent of mind.
Athenian Socrates exhibits traits
far more singular and seemingly

boldt

(in
Werlie, v.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE


him

to reside near the

king/ but we cannot

old Aristotle then was, or

how long

tell

how

this state of things

what personal relations resulted from it.


knowledge have we as to the early development of his mind, or the circumstances or method of his
education.^
The sole piece of information we have as
lasted,

or

Equally

little

to this section of his

Ammonius ^

life is

the remark of the Pseudo-

that after the death of both his parents,"^ one

Proxenus of Atarneus ^ took over his education, so that


in later

life

the grateful pupil did the like service for

whom he
whom he gave

Proxenus' son Mcanor, of

he was a

child,

in marriage.

and

to

took charge while


his

own daughter

Notwithstanding the untrustworthy cha-

racter of our informant,^ the story seems to be true

doubt the story did refer originally to his father.


The Anon.
Menagii (with V. Marc. 1, and
Ammo7i. Latin. 1) mentions a

etc, cf. BUHLE, 1 sq. (lege Tpo((>rjs


for (p-fifi-ns) 10 sq. Eobbe.
* In his will (Diog. 16) Ari-

brother and sister of Aristotle.


For Diog. 1, following Hermippus, says expressly ffw^^io}
[Ni/cc^jtiaxos] 'AixvvTq, TCf MuKeSSvcov

orders a

'

fia(TL\e7iaTpov Kal (piKov xp^f'O:

He

must therefore have taken up his


residence in Pella and cannot
have
2

left his family in Stagira.


Galen's statement (Anatom.

Administr.

ii.

1, vol.

ii.

280 K)

that the Asclepiad families practised their sons eK Traldwv in reading, writing, and avaT/xviv, does
not help us much, as (apart from
the question whether the information is fully credible) we do
not know how old Aristotle was
at his father's
death.
It is

doubtful

human

p. 89, n.
^

In

whether Galen meant


anatomy; cf.
1/^.

or animal
all

three recensions, p. 43

mentions his mother and


monument to be erected
to her.
Pliny (H. Nat. xxxv.
10, 106) mentions a picture of
her which Aristotle had painted
by Protogenes. There may have
been many reasons why his father
was not mentioned in the will.
^ Apparently a relative who
had emigrated to Stagira, for his
son Nicanor is called 2Ta7eipiT77s
and oIkCios 'ApicrroTeKovs (Sext.
stotle

Math. i. 258).
^ What trust is
in a writer who tells

to

be placed

us, inter alia,

that Aristotle was for three years


a pupil of Socrates and that he

afterwards accompanied Alexander to India ? (Ps. Amnion, p.


44, 50, 48, V. Marc. 2, 5, Ammon.

Lat.U,12,U).
Aristotle in his will(DiOG. 12)
directs that Nicanor is to marry
''

ARISTOTLE
but

it

throws no further light on that which necessarily

interests us most, the history of Aristotle's intellectual

growth.^

His entrance into the Platonic School ^ gives us our


earliest reliable data on the subject.
In his eighteenth
year Aristotle came to Athens
when she is grown
charges him to take care of
lier and her brothers, ws KalTraTrjp
Sov Koi adeX^os he orders that the
portraits of Nicanor, Proxenus,
and Nicanor's motlier, which he
had projected, should be completed,
and that if Nicanor
completed his journey successfully (r. infra), a votive offering he had promised should be
set up in Stagira. These arrangements prove that Nicanor was
adopted by Aristotle, and that
Aristotle owed special gratitude
to Nicanor's mother as well as to
Proxenus, apparently similar to
that he owed his own motlier, of
whom a similar portrait is
ordered. If we assume the truth
of the story in the Pseudo-Ammonius it will most naturally explain the whole. Dionysius notes
that Nicomachus was dead when
his (laughter

up

lie

Aristotle

came

to Plato.
It
might appear that, as Aristotle
died at sixty-three, the son of his
foster-parents would be too old
to marry a daughter not then
grown up
but this does not
follow.
If Aristotle was a child
at his father's death, and Proxe;

nus a young man, the latter


might have left a son twenty or
twenty-five years younger than
Aristotle, and some ten years
younger than Theophrastus (then
at least forty-seven) whom Pythias was to marry in case of

and entered the

circle of

Nicanor's death (DioG. 13).


This
Nicanor is probably the same
Nicanor of Htagira whom Alexander sent from Asia to Greece
to announce his consent to the
return of the exiles at the Olym-

pian games of 324 B.C.(DiNARCH.


Adv. Dem.osth. 81, 103, Diodor.
cf the pseudo-Aristotelian
Rhet. ad Alex, i, 1421, a, 38, and
G ROTE, p. 14). And the vow in
Aristotle's will probably relates
to a journey to Alexander's headquarters where he had given an
account of his mission and been
detained on service in Asia. It is
probably the same Nicanor who
was governor of Cappadocia under
Antipater (Arrian ajmd Phot.

xviii.8

Cod. 92, p. 72, a, 6) and who was


with, in B.C. 318, by
Cassander, for whom he had done
good service on sea and land

made away

(Diodor. xviii. 64 sq. 68, 72, 75).


The dates agree exactly with

what we know

of Pythias, as
see p. 20, n. 3, infra.
know nothing of the
age at which Aristotle came to
Proxenus, nor of the manner or
place of his education, for it
was probably not at Atarneus
see above, p. 5, n. 5.
2 A silly story in Ps. Amm. 44,
V. Marc. 2, and Amman. Latin. 11
relates that he was sent by the
Delphic Oracle.
Apollodor. ap. DioG. 9

to

whom
^

We

''

irapafiaKiTiv

Se

IlKdrwvi,

KoX

Sia-

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE


Plato's scholars, 1 to
avr^

Tpi\pai Trap'

Koi

SeKa

4twv

which he continued to belong

e^Kocriv err), eirra

avcTTavra.

This

testimony seems to be the basis


of the statements of Dionysius
728) that he came to Athens
in his eighteenth year, of Diogenes
6, that he came iTTTOKatSe/ceTrjs,
and of the three recensions of
the Ammonius Life that he came
(p.

iTTTO/caiSeKO

ira>v

yevSixevos.

We

have also the chronology of


Dion} sius, who places his arrival
in the archonship of Polyzelos
(366-7 B.C. 01. 103, 2), while the
statement (F. Marc. 3, Ammon.
Latin. 12) that he came in the
archonship of Nausigenes (01.
103, 1) takes us to the middle
of his seventeenth year instead
Euseof the completion of it.
bius in his ChroniGle knows that
he arrived at seventeen, but
places the event erroneously in
01. 104, 1. The statement of

Eumelus (ajjud DiOG. 6) that he


was thirty years old when he met
Plato is combined by Grote (p.
3 sq.) with the accounts of Epicurus and Timaeus as to his dis-

youth (cf. infra), but


without deciding between the
two accounts. We have already
solute

seen

how

little credit

attaches to

Eumelus' account of Aristotle's


age and manner of death (p. 2,
n. 2) but the two statements are
connected and fall together, for,
;

as Aristotle

composed an elegy

and the Dialogue named Eudemus

memory of a fellow-student,
Eudemus of Cyprus (p. 11, n. 4,
infra), who went to Sicily with

in

Dion in 357 B.C. and was killed


there, it follows that Aristotle, if
he were thirty when he came to
Athens, would have been born
several years before 384. We do

not know, moreover, when

for

Eume-

lus lived, or from whom he got


If, as is possihis information.

he be Eumelus the Peripawhose riepl rris apxaias


KcoficfiSias is quoted by a scholiast
to iEschines' Timarch. (ed. Bekker, Abk. d. Berl. A had. 1836,
Hist.-2}Ml. Kl.230, 39; cf. KosE,
Arist. Lihr. Ord. 113), he would
belong to the Alexandrine, or
possibly even the post-AlexanIn no case, as
drine period.
above shown, can he merit our
As to Epicurus and
confidence.

ble,

tetic,

Timffius vide p.

9, n. \, infra.

The

Vita Maroiana finds it necessary


to refute the story that Aristotle
came to Plato in his fortieth year.
The Latin Ammonius reproduces
this in a still more absurd form,
to which he adapts other parts
of his story for he says that it
was thought by many that Aristotle remained forty years with
Plato.
His translation xl annis
immoratus est sub Platone probably means that the text of the
;

'

'

archetype was

pi ctt? 'ye'yovws iiv

UXdroiVi, or

virh

4rpifiv,

&c.

fj.'

iroov tbv eV5t-

If the latter

be sup-

posed, the mistake might well


have arisen by the dropping out
of &V in the translator's MS.
Plato himself was probably
at the moment absent on his
1

second

Sicilian

journey

(vide

Stahr
(p. 43) suggests that the abovementioned statement that he was
three years with Socrates and
after his death followed Plato (P^.
^ww. 44,50, V. Marc. 2, Ammon.

Zeller, Plato,

p.

32).

Lat. 11, 12, Olympiod. in Gorg.


42) arose from a misunderstanding
of this circumstance. The archetype may have contained the

ARISTOTLE
twenty years until the master died.^ It would have
been of the greatest value if we could have known
in detail something of this long period of preparation,
in which the foundations of his extraordinary learning

and of
been

must have
Unhappily our informants pass over all the

his distinctive philosophical system

laid.

important questions as to the movement and history of


his mental development in absolute silence, and entertain us instead with all
life

he

and character.
first

One

manner

of evil tales as to his

of these writers had heard that

earned his bread as a quack-doctor.^

Another

alleges that he first squandered his patrimony, then in


his distress

went into military

service, afterwards,

being

unsuccessful, took to selling medicines, and finally took

refuge in Plato's school. ^


statement that Aristotle spent
three years in Athens without
hearing Plato, in attending other
Socratic teachers, for whom the
transcriber erroneously inserted
the name of Socrate's himself.
On a similar supposition, we
might guess that the archetype
said that in Plato's absence,
Aristotle was with Xenocrates:
or with Isocrates, whose name is
often confused with Socrates.
It seems more probable, however, that the origin of the error
lay in the remark in a letter to
Philip (whether genuine or spurious) mentioned in the Vita
Marciana and the Latin Ammonium, to the effect that Aristotle

made Plato's acquaintance in his


twentieth year perhaps because
Plato then returned from Sicily,
perhaps because Aristotle had till
then been of the school of

Isocrates,

This gossip, however, was


Cf

'

p. 6, n. 3,

suj)ra

lit

and Dionysius,

a-va-radils

U\dTa}ui.

Xp6vov eiKoa-aerrj Sidrpixpe avp avr^.


or as in A/nm., rovrq} cvveanv
err] tKocri.

Aristocl. ap. Eus.

Lv. XV.

Pnz?/^.

2, 1 TTcDs av ris airoSd^aiTO


Tov Tavpo/LLCviTov \4yovTos
iv Tols IffTopCais,
ado^ov Ovpas
avrhv larpeiov Kal ras rvxovaas
(hiatus) d\p rrjs 7f\iKias /cAeicrat.
:

Ti/A.aiov

The same is more fully cited from


by Polyb. xii. 7, and

Timffius

SUIDAS, sub

V. 'ApiffTOreATis.

oUv

Aristocl. nt supra
ira>s yap
re, KaOdiTip prjalv 'EirlKovpos eV

ry

irepl

rS>v

iTriTrjdevfidrwi/

iin-

arroXy, veov jxkv ovTa KaracpayeTv


avrhv r)]v irarp^av oixriav, eireira
5e iirl rh (TTpareieaOai (Tvveucrdai,
KUKUs 8e Trpdrrovra iv rOvrois iirl
rh (papfxaKoiroiKuv iAOeiu, eTretra
avaTreirrafidj/ov tov IlXdrcovos irepindrov iraffi, irapaXafi^Ty avrhv (leoe,
according to Athen. -Trapa^aAcTv

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE


rightly rejected even

by

Aristocles.^

Greater weight

attaches to the story of the breach between Plato and


his scholar

which is said to have occurred sometime before

the former died.


ourbj/, soil, eis

rhv

So early a writer as Eubulides the

irepliraTOv')

cf.

same

passage quoted in
similar words, apud Athen. viii.
354, ajjud DiOG. x. 8, and less

the

closely a2?ud
1

In the

^LIAN.

V.

H.

first place, it is

v. 9.

with-

out any reliable authority. Even


in antiquity no other testimony
than Epicurus and Timseus is
known, and except these two,
none, as Athenasus expressly remarks, even of Aristotle's bitterest opponents mentioned these
Timaeus's reckless slanstories.
derousness,
however,
is
well
known, and he was embittered
against Aristotle by his state-

ments (historically correct as


they were) as to the low origin
of the Locrians (cf. PoLYB.xii. 7,
Plut. Bio. 36, Nic. \ ;
10
DiODOR. V. 1). So also of Epicurus we know that there was
hardly one of his philosophic
predecessors or contemporaries
;

(not excepting Democritus and


Nausiphanes, to whom he was
under large obligations) whom
he did not attack with calumnies

and depreciatory criticism (cf.


DioG. X. 8, 13 Sext. Math. i.
3 sq. CiC. N. D. 1, 33, 93, 26, 73
Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. I. p. 946, n).
Statements by such men, betraying as they do a tone of hatred,
must be taken with great distrust
and their agreement is no
;

guarantee, for it is possible that


Timseus copied Epicurus, or (as
we may better think) that Epicurus copied him. Not only, however, have we against them the
consensus of many far more

credible writers who say that


Aristotle devoted himself from
his eighteenth year to his studies
at Athens, but the other story is
in itself most improbable.
If
Aristotle were no more than the
(To<pi(Tr)]s dpaavs cv^ep-^s irpoir^T^s
that Timaeus calls him, he might

perhaps have been

oy\iiixaQ)]s

also.

But when we know that apart


from philosophical greatness, he
was the foremost man of learning of his time, and was also
famous as a writer for his graces
of style, we must think it unparalleled and incredible that his
thirst

for learning

should have

arisen at thirty after a wasted


youth, and that he could then

first

have achieved attainments hardly


credible as the work of a long
lifetime. All we know of Aristotle
from his writings or otherwise
impresses us with a sense of personal superiority incompatible
with these tales of his youth
not to speak of the argument
that if he had squandered his
;

property he could hardly have


found means to live at Athens.
Grote (cf. p. 6, n. 3, supra) does
too much honour to Epicurus and
Timseus when he treats their testimony as balancing the other.
They are probably naked and
baseless

lies,

and therefore we

ought not even to infer from


them with Stahr (p. 38 sq.) and

Bemays {Abh.
pMl.

d.

GesellscJiaft,

Brest.
i.

Hist.193), that

probably
Aristotle
practised
medicine in Athens while he was
natural
studying
philosophy.

ARISTOTLE

10
dialectician

of

Aristotle

ingratitude

to

his

Others accuse him of annoying Plato by his

master.^

showy

accused

dress, his overbearing

manner, and his jeering.^

Others relate that even in Plato's lifetime he attacked

and

his doctrines

up a school of his own in oppoand even that on one occasion

set

sition to the Platonic,^

he took advantage of the absence of Xenocrates to drive


the aged master from his accustomed place of resort in

Many, even among the

the Academia.''

Neither Aristocles nor any of the


trustworthy witnesses mention
medical practice, and the two
who do, refer to it in such a way
as only to raise suspicion while
Aristotle apparently reckons himself among tlie
'laymen,' jUt?
rexvlrai, in medicine {Divin. 1,
;

Aristocl. ap. Eus. Pr.

'

XV.

2,

Aws
Tai

iv
.

T^
.

^Elian,

M\

Koi TLvfiovXiSris 5e ttpoStj/car'

avrov

(pdcTKWV

^Lfikicf xpevSe-

TAeUTU>VTL

HAdrojvi /.I?; irapayeveadai. ret re


^L^Kia avTov SiacpOeTpai. Neither
His
of the charges is important.
absence at the time of Plato's
death, if that is true, may have had
an easy explanation Plato, indeed, is said to have died quite
unexpectedly (cf Zellee, Plato,
The injury to Plato's
p. 35).
books, if it means a falsification
of the text, is an obvious and
absurd calumny. If, as is pos;

sible, it refers

to Aristotle's criwe shall

ancients, re-

F.//.iii. 19, describ-

ing Aristotle's style of dress in


detail.

DiOG. 2

eri

a-jrecrrr]

irepiouTOS' ooare

Se

IWdTUPos

(prjalu

^lire^v 'Api(rroTe\T]s rj/nas

t'cuvov
aireAaK-

TLaKa9a'KeplTa7rcti\dpiayevpr]94vTa
TTju fiTfT^pa

^and

so

tEliAN,

and Helladius

iv. 9,

a. 6).

16;},

V. 11.

Phot.

aj).

Similarly
b.
Cur. Gr. Aff. v. 4G,
p. 77, says Aristotle often attacked Plato while he was yet
alive
Philop. Anal. Post. 51 a,
Soltol. in Arist. 228, p. 16, that
he had especially opposed his
and
master's
Ideal Theory
Augustine, Civ. Dei. viii. 12,
that he had established even
then a numerous school.
'
This occurrence is related
by our sole authority (^LIAN,
V. II. iii. 19, cf. iv. 9) in this
way that when Plato was over
eighty, and his memory was failing, Aristotle on one occasion,
279,

CahI.

p. 533,

Theodohet,

Xenocrates

though it is keen and not


always just, is no indication of
any personal misunderstanding,

^Ipeusippus ill, had gone with a


band of his own pupils and
started a debate with Plato, in
which he drove the old man into
a corner with such rude pertinacity that Plato withdrew himself from the halls of the Academy
into his own garden, and it was

see,

it meant only
natural and impersonal polemics.
Besides Aristocles, Diogenes (ii.
also rejects
Eubulides'
109)
charges as a calumny.

since to Aristotle

being

absent and

ticism of Plato, this, as

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

11

ferred to Aristotle the statement of Aristoxenus that

during Plato's Sicilian journey a school was erected

own

opposition to his

in

however,

data,

'

by

strangers.'

All these

very doubtful, and most of the

are

actual statements deserve no credence.^

If the asser-

tion of Aristoxenus were to be understood of Aristotle

not

could

it

reasons in the

be

possibly
first place,^

chronological

for

true,

but also because we possess

undoubted proofs that Aristotle belonged to Plato's


school long after the second Sicilian journey,
his master in the highest honour.'*
only when Xenocrates returned,
three months afterwards, that he
reproached Speusippus for his
cowardice and forced Aristotle to
restore to Plato the disputed
territory.

Aeistocl. apud Eus. Pr. Ev.

XV. 2, 2 ; Tts 5' Uv ireicrdeLT] to7s


vtt' 'ApLffTO^cvov rod jxovffiKov Xeyofievois

iu

(pT]cr\v

fielv

r^

iv

yap

TTj

^(qj

rod HXdrajyos
Kol ry

irKoLvri

iiravicTTaadai Ka)

avTCf Tivas

aTro5r]fA.ia

avroiKoSo-

irepiirarov

^vovs

ovras. oXovrai ovv vioi ravra irepl

'ApiffroTcXovs A^yeiv ai/rhp, Apicrro|eVou Slo. iravrhs ev<p7]iui.ovpTos 'Api-

Among

(TTOTeXTjv.

the

was

euiot

Aelian (iv. 9), who in reference no doubt to the words of


Aristoxenus, says of Aristotle
avTcpKod6fi7}(rev avr^ [Plato] SiaSo also the Vita Marrpifiiiv.
ciana, 3
'Ap.

ovk apa avT(^Ko^6fXT](riv


&s 'Apiaro^euos

(Tx^^Vf'

irpuTOs
crreidrjs

i(rvKo<pdvTif](Te

vampov

koX

rfKoAovOrjcrev

'Api;

re-

AEiSTiDES,i>e q^mtuorv.
ii.
324 sq. (Dind.), who, however, does not refer to Aristotle
by name any more than Aristoxenus, whose account he re-

f erringto

and held

Probably, however.

peats and extends. For Aristides


the Latin Ammonius (11) substitutes Aristocles but the Greek
Pseudo- Ammonius (p 44 sq.)
limits itself to the remark
oh
yap Ti 0VTOS rod UXdroivos
auTCfKoBo/j.'qa'ev avrc^ rh AvKeiou 6
;

'Ap., o&s
2

Tivs

Cf.

refuted

viroXa/xfidvovcri.

Stahr, i. 46 sqq., not


by Hermann, Plat.

Phil. p. 81, 125.


^ When Plato returned
his last journey Aristotle

from

was

under 24 (cf. p. 2, n. 2, sujjra,


and Zeller, Plato, p, 30 sq.) is
it (apart from other questions)
likely that he could so early
head a school against a master
who was then at the height of
;

his

fame 1
The proofs of

this are
(a)
Aristotle published several Platonic essays (cf. infra and Zeller, Plato, p. 26). For many
reasons (especially perhaps because of their notable departure
from the method of teaching
laid down by Plato, cf. Zell.
Plato, p. 517 sq.) it is unlikely
*

that these fall between the second

and third

of

Plato's

Sicilian

ARISTOTLE

12

statement did not

that

refer

to

Aristotle

at

all.^

Elian's story as to driving Plato out of the Academy


stands in contradiction with other and older ^ accounts

which show that Plato at that time had long removed


his school from the open spaces of the Gymnasium of the

Academia

to his

own

gardens.

to Aristotle a kind of behaviour

But besides,

ascribes

it

which we could not be-

man of otherwise noble character except on the


most conclusive proofs whereas here we have nothing
but the testimony of a gossip-grubber, who is known to

lieve of a

repeat without discrimination things that are palpably


untrue.
Against the suggestion that Aristotle had by
journeys,
Aristotle

The Eudemus of
was written

(/y)

infra)

(cf.

on the lines of Plato's Plicedo^


and Aristotle was probably still
in the Platonic School when he
wrote it, wliicli was long after
the third journey, since it is in
memory of a friend who died

352 B.C.
Oorg.

(c)

16G,

Olympiodorus (m
Jahn's Jahrh.

in

xiv.
and
895,
Bbrgk, Lyr. Gr., p. 504) has
preserved some verses of Aristotle's Elegy on Eudemus, which

Supiylement}).

thus describe his relation to Plato


iXdiiiv S' ds KX^ivhv
KeKpOTTLrjs
SdireSou
evcre^ecos

(Teixuris

(pi\ir]s

IBpixraro

their

genuineness

on

but this seems unlikely.


^
Aristocles {ut svjyrd) says
expressly that Aristoxenus always
spoke well of Aristotle, against
which testimony, founded on a
knowledge of his book, the hint
to the contrary in Suidas 'AptorTo|.
is of no weight.
The word Trepiiraros was used of other schools
besides Aristotle's cf Epicurus,
;

avdphs, tv ouS' alveXu roTcri KaKolffi

[Plato]

e^fiisf>s

fiSvos

t)

ivapyws
olKeio)

ws

re

ayados

fiicp

Kal jx^Qo^oktl Xdyoov,

re

Kal evSaificcu a/to


yiverai aurjp.
ov vvv S' eoTTt \afie7v obSevl ravra
TTOrL

Buhle {Arist. 0pp.

i.

55) doubts

and the
where
it is used of Speusippus, and 7,
9,
of Heraclides.
The nvas of
cited p. 8, n. 3, suj^ra,

Index Herculanensis,

TrpwTos dvrjTcoy KareSei^ey

grounds

that are solved by our view of


their application to the Ciiprian
Eudemus and Plato, instead of
to the Rhodian Eudemus and
Aristotle himself.
In the corrupt last line, Bernays {Rh. Mvs.
N. F. xxxiii. 232) reads iiowd^.
He refers dvSp^s, &c., to Socrates;

Aristoxenus

may

6, 5,

have referred

to Heraclides himself; cf. ZelLER, Plato, p. 30, n. As to the


Index Hercul. see ibid. p. 553.
2 In
DiOG. ill. 5, 41
Zeller, Plato, p. 25, n.

cf

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

13

his general behaviour incurred Plato's disapproval

and
been kept at a distance by him,' we could bring
many statements which imply that the relation between
had

so

the two philosophers was of an entirely different kind.^

We

may

allow no weight, therefore, to these accounts,

which in any case are

is

stories,

But we have beyond

apparent.^

and we need
whose inaccuracy

insulBficiently attested,

take no notice of sundry other

this decisive reasons

which negative, not only Elian's story and the other


similar tales, but the whole theory that there was before
Buhle, p. 87, sees a proof
this in the fact that Plato
does not mention Aristotle, to
which circumstance even Stahr,
'

of

58, attached some weight.


But how could he name Aristotle

p.

Socratie

in

dialogues

And

probably all Plato's works, except the Laws, were written before Aristotle

came

to

Athens at

all.

Kovs) and by David (ibid. 20, b,


16), that Aristotle was ashamed to
mount the teacher's chair while
Plato lived, and that this was
the origin of the name ' Peripatetic' There is another theory
(Philopon. 2it supra, 35, b, 2,

David,
ibid.

ibid. 24, a, 6,
b, and the

25,

27

['Ap.] vTrbXiKa.ToivosToaov'Tov

T^s a7xiJ'oias

i]yd(T6r},

ws vovs

ttjs

avTOv irpoaayopeveSiarpifiris
ffdai
and Ps. Ammo7i. 44, says
Plato called Aristotle's house oIkos
vir*

cf.
also Zeller,
Plato, p. 559.
To the same
tradition belong the very doubtful
story cited in Zeller, Plato,
p. 26, n., and the account of the

avayvdocTTOv

with a laudatory
by Aristotle to Plato
onhis death (Anim. 46, Philopon.
i.q.v., Schol. in Amat. 11, b, 29),
which arose, no doubt, out of a
mistranslation of the Elegy to
Eudemus, p. 11, n. 4, mipra.
* Such is the idea mentioned
by Philopo]ms(w?^ svpra, 11, b, 23
sqq., where in 1. 25, lege ^Apiarore-

altar dedicated

inscription

Pseudo-

Ammon. p. 47, V. Marc. 5, Amman.


Latin. 14) that the name of Peripatetics belonged

vi.

Ammon.

originally to

the Platonic school; that

when

and Xenocrates took

Aristotle

over that school after Plato's


death, or rather that of Speusippus, Aristotle's followers were
called Peripatetics of the Lyceum
and the others Peripatetics of the
Academy and that, in the end,
the one school were called Peripatetics only, and the other
Academics.
The
origin
of
this theory is doubtless Antiochus,
in whose name Varro in CiC.
Acad. i. 4, 17 tells an exactly
similar story
which indicates
that the whole is only an invention of that Eclecticism,developed
by Antiochus, which denied that
there was any essential difference
between Plato and Aristotle.
;

ARISTOTLE

14

any breach between him and his

Plato's death

scholar.

Authorities which are beyond any comparison with

^lian and the

rest in their antiquity

and

credibility,

remained with Plato twenty years,


which plainly could not be true if, although he lived for
assert that Aristotle

time in Athens, he had separated himself from

that

Dionysius, indeed, expressly adds

Plato before the end.


that in

this time

all

So even in

and in passages where he

years

later

principles of the

contesting the

is

he founded no school of his own.^


Platonic

School,

Aristotle constantly reckons himself as belonging to

it

^
;

and he uses language as to the founder of that school

and his own personal relation to him such as plainly


shows how little the sentiment of respect and affection
for his great

master had failed in his mind,'' even where


opposition was

philosophic

their

accentuated in the

So also we find that he was treated as a


Platonist by contemporary opponents ;^ for Cephisodorus
sharpest way.

n.

Vide

suina.

p.

6,

n.

Ep. ad Amiii.

YlXdrcopi kuI

(Tvvj]v

irwv

eTTTtt

(TXoAtjs

Koi

3,

and

i.

7,

p.

p.

738

5ieTpi;|/e>'

rpiaKOvra,

riyovfiepos

out'

8,

ISiau

'4us

ovre
7re-

Aristotle often brackets himPlatonists together

and the

cf.

Ka6'

eari ra

ov<i
ei'Syj

V eluai

Tpo-novs SeiKuvfjiev
kuto.

t^v

on

viroXrjrpiv

ras Ideas, and


the like, Metaph. i. 9, 990, b, 8,
11, 16, 23, 992, a, 11, 25, c. 8, 989,
b, 18; iii. 2, 997, b, 3, c. 6, 1002,
b, 14
cf. Alex, and Asclep. on
990, b, 8 and Alex, on 990, b,
16, 991, b, 3, 992, a, 10.
icaO^

(jyafiev

of

oAov fieAriou Xaws

iiriffKeipacrOaL koI

\4yeTai,

irus

SLaTroprjarai.

Kaiirep

irpocravrovs rris roiavrrjs ^rjrrjcreajs

jToiriKws aipeaiv.

self

seems to point to charges which


his logical polemic against Plato
had drawn down upon him,
rh 8e KaOEth. N. 1. 4, init.

In a well-known passage
the
Ethics ^which ^itself

^i^

yivoix4vr]s

elcrayayelu

Xaws

ra

fieKTiov

ye

a(aTr]pLa

ovras-

(plhovs

eJvai

&.v5pas

do^eie

eYSr;.

ttjs

olKe7a avaipelv,
crdcpovs

rh

Koi

aX7]9eias

aWoos re
aix<po7v

S'

5e7u

ti.u

iirl

Kal ra

Kal

(j)i\o-

yap ovroiv

tV

^iXoiv ocriov Trpon/jLau


cL\-f)deiap.
Cf. Zeller, Plato, p. 512; cf.
also Zeller, Ph. d. Gr.\. p. 971,
as to Aristotle's own view of his
duty to a teacher.
^

Numen. apud Eus.

xiv. 6, 8.

Pr. Ev.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

16

the Isocratean, in a book directed against Aristotle,

and particularly the


and Theocritus of Chios accused Aristotle of

attacked the Platonic doctrine


'

Ideas.'

exchanging the Academy

for

established that he stayed in

Macedonia.^

Again,

it is

Athens until Plato's death,

and immediately thereafter left the city for several


presumably for no other reason than that then

years,

time the

for the first

tie that

bound him to the city was


was then for the

dissolved, because his relation to Plato


first

time broken.

Finally,

we

are told

journeyed with him to Atarneus

that Xenocrates

and

it is

probable

from the language in which Aristotle speaks of that


Academic's opinions

that they continued to be friends

But in view of the known loyalty of


Xenocrates and his unbounded reverence for Plato, it is

in later times.

not to be supposed that he would maintain his relations

with Aristotle and keep him company on the


Atarneus,

a disrespectful way, or had,


as

^lian

visit to

the latter had separated from his master in

if

by any such rude conduct

ascribes to him, insulted the aged teacher not

long before his death.


It is of course altogether probable that

so

inde-

pendent a mind as Aristotle's would not give up its


own judgment even in face of a Plato; that as time
^

In the epigram noticed at p.


dhero vaUiu avr^

20, n. 3, infra
^AKa5r]iJ.ias

Bop^opov 4u irpoxoais,

B. being a river near Pella.


2

By Steabo (xiii. 1, 57,


we have no reason

6 1 0), whom
disbelieve.

Aristotle almost never

obviously alluding to him


the cases cited, Zeller,
Plato, p. 364, n. ; and notes on
585, and later passages),
p.
is

(cf.

p.

whereas

to

in

Others have remarked that


mentions
Xenocrates, and that he avoids
his name as if on purpose where
3

he

Speusippus

parallel

cases.

is

named

This

pro-

bably indicates not ill-feeling,


but rather a desire to avoid the
appearance of personal conflict
with one who was teaching
beside him at Athens.

ARISTOTLE

16

went on he began to doubt the unconditional validity of


the Platonic system and to lay the foundations of his

own and that he perhaps even


many of the weak points of his
:

in these days laid bare

teacher with the same

uncompromising criticism which we find him using later


If a certain difference between the two men had
on.^
developed out of such relations, or if Plato had not been

more ready than many others since, to recognise in his


scholar the man who was destined to cany forward and
to correct his own work, it would be nothing wonderful.
Yet that any such difference actually arose cannot be
proved, and cannot even be shown to be very probable ^
while

we have

patent facts to disprove the idea that

Aristotle brought on

intentional offence.

any open breach by ingratitude or


The same facts make it very im-

probable that Aristotle opened any philosophic school of

own during

his

done

so,

his

his first residence in Athens.

If he had

with Plato and the

friendly relations

gone on, and it


would be unintelligible that he should leave Athens

Platonic circle

exactly at the
left

could hardly have

moment when

the death of his great rival

the field free for himself.^

On
Even in the books
Philosophy' {Arist. Fraym. 10,
11. p. 1475), apparently written
'

before

Plato's

death,

he

had

combated the Ideal


openly
Theory, and in the same treatise
{Fragm. 17, 18) had maintained
the eternity of the world.

We

2
have no right to ascribe
to Plato and his circle of friends
the later ideas of school-orthodoxy, in any such sense as to

suppose that the master could not


tolerate the independence of such

a scholar as Aristotle. Besides,


not to mention Heraclides and
Eudoxus, Speusippus
himself
dropped the Ideal Theory,
^ The remark of the PseudoAmmonius that Chabrias and
Timotheus prevented Aristotle
from setting up a new school
against Plato is absurd.
Who
could hinder him, if he chose ?
Chabrias, moreover, died in 358
B.C. and Timotheus was banished
from Athens for life in the followingyear,beingthenavery oldman.
;

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

then, Aristotle was connected with Plato, as one of

If,

from his eighteenth to his thirty-seventh year,


we cannot well over-estimate the influence

his school,
it

17

follows that

of such a relation upon his course of thought.


The effect
of that education on Aristotle's philosophic
system
dis-

closes itself at every point.

The

grateful scholar has

himself 1 commemorated the moral greatness and lofty


principles of the man whom the base have
not even the
'

But the reverence for the master would

right to praise.'

obviously not prevent Aristotle from turning


his attention at the same time to all other sources
which might
carrry him onward and help to satisfy
his insatiable

thirst for

knowledge.

We may safely

assume that he

did in fact employ his long years of


preparation at
Athens in busy acquirement of his marvellous
learning,
and also that he took a keen interest in
researches

in

natural

of secondary importance.

as

it

philosophy, though Plato


It

always treated
is

also possible

that even while


circle

he

breaking

may

he was still a member of Plato's


himself have lectured,^ without thereby

off his relations

up against him

with Plato or setting himself

as the leader of a

comioeting school.
hear, for instance, that Aristotle
taught Ehetoric
in opposition to Isocrates ; ^ but we
know that the great

We
>

See the lines on

J. ffT^^-^'/i-

p. 12 mpra.
!\'\P-

Athens both Plato and

'i^>

Aristotle.

Jrsfoteles,

cum/orere Isocratem

nohihtate

disoipuloi^vm

videret,

...vmtavitrejjentetotamformam
jrrope
d^sc^pl^nce su<e
[which
sounds as if Aristotle had even
then a school of his own, though

VOL.

Cicero seems to be without exact


information] versum.^jue^ll^l

enmi

turpe,

siU ait

esse tacere

Isoeratem pateretur dicere


Ita
ornavU et illustravit docirinam

omnem, rerumnue onaZ'

illavi

cum orcvtiomi ea^'ercTa


Uo.>ieco,mmxit. Neaue rZn I

tionem
fucjit

sajieJssim^ITeglT^^
"''

I.

ARISTOTLE

18

with Plato were no longer good and


We have distinct
philosophers.^
the
attacked
he
that
assign
to this same
to
us
lead
which
indications also
orator's relations

period the
writer

commencement

and the

of Aristotle's activity as a

fact that in the writings of this

time

he imitated his master, both in matter and form,^ shows


clearly how completely he took on the impress of Plato's

and made the Platonic methods his own. In time,


of course, and no doubt even before he left Athens, Aristotle acquired as a writer a more independent position
and it is manifest that he had in reality outgrown the
spirit

position of one of Plato's pupils, long before that relation

came

visibly to an

end by the death of the master.

lipimm, qui hunc Alexandra filio


Again, ihid.
doctorem accierit.
19, 62, Arist. Isocratem ipsum
lacessivit,

ibid. 51, 172, qids

and

quis
Arist. fuit ?
porro Isocrati est adversatvs imIn Tusc. i. 4, 7, Cicero
2)eiu'ms ?
assumes that Aristotle attacked
Isocrates in his lifetime, which
would be possible only in his first
.

acrio?'

residence at Athens, for when he


returned in 335-4 B.C. Isocrates
was many years dead. Cf QuiNEoque {Isocrate\
TiL. iii. 1, 14
.

makes a covert attack on Aristotle, which confirms the story

Panath. 17 can hardly refer to


Aristotle, because of the dates cf
Spengel, Ahh. d. Bayer. Aliad.
Cephisodorus, a pupil
vi. 470 sq.
of Isocrates, wrote a defence of
his master against Aristotle, full
of bitter abuse; v. Dionys. Be
Isocr. c. 18, p. 577; Athen. ii.
Aeistocl.
60, d, cf. iii. 122, b
ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 24, Nu;

MEN.
xxiii.

ihid. xiv. 6, 8,

285,

c.

Themist. Or.

This friction did

jwnieridianis
.
seniore
Arist. j)r(P^W'^'^^ artem
oratoriam coepit, noto qiiidem lllo,

not prevent Aristotle from doing


justice to his opponents in the

ut traditur, versu ex Philocteta


frequenter usus : alffXP^v (Tiwirav

no one so readily as Isocrates,


and twice quotes Cephisodorus

'laoKpdrriv [S'] eav\eyeiu.J)iog.{S)

{Rhet. iii. 10, 1411, a, 5, 23). Cf.


as to the whole subject Stake,
i, 68 sq., ii. 285 sq.
*
Spengel, 'Isokr. und Platon,' Ahh. d. Miinch. Ahad. vii.
731, and Zbllee, Ph. d. Gr. i. 416,
ii. 459, n.
2 See for proof infra.
Of the
Aristotelian writings known to
us the greater part of the Dialogues and some of the rhetorical

jam

'scholis

with

less probability, reads aevo-

KpaT7]v, so misplacing the story


as of the time of the founding of
the Lyceum. Cicero {Offic. i. 1, 4)
speaks clearly of contests between
Aristotle and Isocrates in his
.
life {de Arist. et Isocrate
quorum uterque suo studio delec.

tatus contemsit alterum),and Isocrates- himself, Up. V. ad Alex. 3,

Rhetoric he quotes examples from

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

19

That event opens a new chapter of Aristotle's


So long as Plato led the Academy, Aristotle
would not leave it. When Speusippus took his place,
life.

Aristotle had nothing to keep

him

he does not seem to have at

first

in

Athens; since

contemplated the

foundation of a philosophical school of his own, for

which Athens would naturally have been the fittest


place.
Therefore he accepted, with Xenocrates, an invitation from Hermias, the lord of Atarneus and Assos,^
who had himself at one time belonged to Plato's school.

The prince was the intimate

friend of both,^

remained three years with him.^

went

to Mytilene.6

safety, because

This, Strabo says,

Hermias had

the Persians by treachery


Aristotle

had

left

but wrongly. It is possible


that Plato had a greater personal

prise,

liking for Speusippus than for


Aristotle, or expected from him

a more orthodox continuation of


his teaching.
Speusippus was
a much older man, was Plato's

nephew, had been brought up


by him, had followed him
faithfully for a long period of
years, and was also the legal
heir of Plato's garden near the
\.cademy.
Besides, we do not
Know whether Plato did himself
bequeath the succession or not.
BoECKH, Hermias,' ^JA. d.
Berl. Aliad. 1853, Hist. Phil Kl,
'^

'

p. 133 sq.
3 Strabo, xiii.
1, 57,
Apollodor. aj). DiOG.

p.

610,

9,

and

was

for his

fallen into the

own

power of

probable, however, that

it is

before that event.^

texts
perhaps the
^vvayuy^
H^xpSiv
seem to belong to the
first Athenian period.
'
This choice has caused sur-

and they

Thereafter Aristotle

DiONYS.

Ej).

After the death


ad Amm.

i.

5,

who

agree

that Aristotle went to


Hermias after Plato's death.
The opposite would not follow
from the charge cited from Eubulides on p. 10, n. 1, s%qjra, even if
that were true.
Strabo names

Assosasthe place where Aristotle


lived during this period.
Cf p. ] 7, n. 2, su2Jra. Aristotle s enemies {ajfud DiOG.
3,
Anon. Menag., and Suidas,
.

'A/>.),

suggest that this friendship

was an immoral
impossible;

IS

one,

but this

Boeckh, iUd.

187.
^

Apollodorus, Strabo, Dionyut supra.

sius, etc.,

01.

108.

= 345-4

B.C.,

in

the archonship of Eubulus : see


ApoUod. and Dionys. iUd.
' Boeckh, iUd.
142, refuting
Strabo, has shown this to be
probable, though not certain.
c 2

ARISTOTLE

20
of

pliilosopher married

Hermias the

either the sister or niece of his friend

ing affection for them both he

Pythias,

who was

and of

his last-

more than one

left

memorial.^
'

According to Aristocles

next note) citing a Letter to


Antipater redueoiTos y^p 'Epfi^iuv
(see

dta Tr]v irphs


avT7]v,

e/ceij/oj/

&\X(i}5

evvoiav

eyrj/J-ev

(Tcocppova

fxhu

Kal

arvxova-au fievToi
ovffav,
Tas KaraXafioixTas crvfjicpopas rhv
Strabo (^ut supra)
a5X(phv avrr\s.
says Hermias married her to
Aristotle in his lifetime, which
is negatived by the Letter, if
Aristocl. {ibid. 4, 8)
genuine.
says tliat Aristotle was accused
in his lifetime of having flattered
her brother to win Pythias, and
ayaOT]y

Sm

also that Lyco, the Pythagorean,


told a foolish story of Aristotle
sacrificing to her after her death
I>iog. (v. 4) caps
as Demeter.
the sacrifice
this by placing
immediately after his marriage.
Lucian {Eun. c. 9) talks of sacricf. a like hint
ficing to Hermias
;

in

Athen. XV. 697 a.


^
The Anon. Menag.,

Menag.

as to this are irrecon-

with Demetr.

De Moo.

293). Aristocles ajj. Eus. xv. 2,


8 sq. cites a letter of Aristotle to
Antipater, and a book by Apellicon of Teos relating to Hermias
and Aristotle, and says that

Pythias

was

the

Strabo

(xiii.

and
Hermias.

sister

adopted daughter of

Cf.BOECKH,?Z;<VZ. 140.

TiON, Suid.

s.

v.

HarpocraEtym.

'Epfxias,

and Phot. Lex.,


adopted daughter.

31.,

call

her an

Diog. (6) says he had a mon(whose inscription he


Hermias at
cites) erected to
Delphi.
A contemporary lampoon on this by Theocritus of
Chios (a witty rhetorician of the
Isocratean school and local leader
of ant i- Macedonian politics) is
noticed by DiOG. 11, ARISTOCL.
at supra, and Plut. DeLxil. 10, p.
^

ument

603

;cf.

Muller, Hist.Gr.

and supra,

p. 15, n. 1.

also dedicated

to

ii.

86,

Aristotle

Hermias the

poem preserved in DiOG. 7, and


Athen. xv. 695. As to Pythias,
the will directs that, as she wished,
her remains should be laid beside
his own
as no other burial-place
is named, she was probably first
buried at Athens, and died, therefore, after 01. Ill, 2, but not very
long before Aristotle's death,
since the Pythias who was then
not marriageable was her daughter (cf. Aristocl., Suidas and
the Anon. Menag.). After her
death Aristotle 'married' (eynixe)
a certain Herpyllis of Stagira,
who bore him a son Nicomachus
and
(Aristocl. cf Diog. 14)
though their union was apparently irregular (v. Timseus ap.
Schol. in Hes. "E. k. 'H. v. 375
;

Suidas,

s. V. 'Ap. 'Ep^i'as, and Hesych. call


her his daughter, the untrustworthy Aristippus (apud DiOG. 3)
Both are dishis concubine.
proved by the fact that Hermias
was a eunuch (for the statements of Suid. Hesych. and Anon.

cilable

{ajnid
Demetr. of Magnesia
DiOG. V. 3) daughter or niece.

610) calls her niece,

Hist.

Qr.

i.

Muller, Fragm.
Athen. xiii.
211

589

citing

Hermippus and call-

DiOG.
c,

V. 1.

ap.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE


In the year 343 or 342

B.C.

Aristotle accepted a call to the

(Olymp. 109, 2)/

Macedonian Court ^

to

take charge of the education of the young Alexander,

then thirteen years

him

which before that had not

old,^

The

been in the best hands.'*

invitation probably found

We

have no reliable testimony as to


the special reasons which led Philip to think of Ariin

Mytilene.'""'

Most unfortunately, we are almost

stotle.^

ing her a kraipa; SuiDAS and


the Anon. Menag.), yet he must
have treated her as his wife, and
his will speaks of her with
honour, provides for her, and
begs his friends iTrifieXcTadai
.

fjLuriadevTas
'6ri

ifiov,

kuI

6,K\ci}v

Kol

iav

ut sujjra. The Schol. in Arist. 28


says Aristotle was at Alexander's Court at Plato's death, but
this is obviously wrong.
b, 47,

2 Cf. Geiee, Alexander


Aonst. (Halle, 1856).

'EpTrvAAiSos,

(TTTOuSaia irepl ifie iyev^ro, toov

6.v5pa

jSouATjrat

Diog.

in his

Nicomachus was brought


up by Theophrastus, but died in

will.

youth

(iJ.eipaKL(TKos)

stocl. ap.
V.

29

in battle (Ari-

Eus, XV.

Suidas

s.

2,

v.

10

DiOG.

@6i)p.

and

confirmed by the terms of


Theophrastus' will, apud DiOG. v.
51). The six books of Ethics and
the work on his father's Physics,

NiKd/x,,

ascribed to him by Suidas,


therefore very doubtful.

are

'
This date is given by ApolLOD. ap. DiOG. 10, and Dionys.

which

oversight, for Apollodorus cannot be wrong in such

i.

(cf.

Stahr,

p. 85).

ViAJH. Aleoe.c.v.; Quintil.

SoOfi

phrastus to his friends

says fifteen,

und

must be an

a date

(DiOG. 13). As to Aristotle's daughter we know from


Sext. Math. (i. 258), the Anon.
Menag. and Suidas s. v. 'Ap., that
after Nicanor she had two husbands, Procles of Sparta, and
Metrodorus the physician; by
the former she had two sons who
were scholars under Theophrastus, by the latter a son, Aristoteles, who was commended (being
then probably young) by Theo-

entirely

1, 9.

5 Stahr
(p. 84, 105, A. 2) is
not averse to the view that Aristotle first went back from Mytilene to Athens, but none of our
biographers know anything of
it.
On the contrary, Dionys., ut
sn/pra, expressly says he went
from Mytilene to Philip. Aristotle in a fragment of a letter

Demetr. Be

Eloc. 29, 154,


ew ^ikv ^A6r]v(av els 'S.to.yeipo ^KBov 5i^ Thv fiaffi\4a rhv
fieyav e/c Se '^rayeipwu its 'Ad^,vas
ap.

says

iyitJ

Sm rhv xetyWiij/a rhv fieyav, but


this jocular expression, even if
the letter is genuine, proves nothing, as it is clearly meant, not
as an exact historical statement,
but as a rhetorical antithesis
between the termini of his journeys, leaving out the intermediate points.
* According to a well-known
story, Philip had told Aristotle,

ARISTOTLE

22

without information as to the kind of education he gave


the young and ambitious prince, and the influence he

But we should be forced

had upon him.^

before Alexander's birth, that he


hoped he would make a great
man of him(?r. the letter />. Gell.

but the letter

is certainly
Philip could not
have written in these extravagant terms to a young man of

ix. 3),

spurious,

for

who had

27,

had no

chance

distinguish himself; and,


to
again, if he had destined him
to be his son's instructor from
birth,

he

him

to

109,

2.

would have brought


Macedonia before 01.
But the prince, who

was deeply interested in science


and art, and no doubt well informed of what was going on in
Athens,

may have taken

notice
of Aristotle after he had become
one of the most distinguished of
Plato's
school,
though little
weight attaches to Cicero's statement to that effect {De Oral.
iii. ;>5, 141).
It is also possible
tliat tlirough his father, Aristotle
had relations with the Macedonian court, and he may himself, as Stahr (p. 33) suggests,
have been acquainted in his
youth with Philip, who was the
youngest son of Amyntas and
about his own age.
There was a work, or perhaps a section of a larger work,
On the Education of Alexander,'
by the Macedonian historian
'

'

Marsyas (SuiD.

s.

v.

Mapo-.; cf.

MuLLER,

Script. Alex. M. 40, and


Geier, Alex. Hist. Script. 320

Onesicritus had treated of


also in a chapter of his Me-

sq.).
it

morabilia (Geier, iUd. 11 DiOG.


vi. 84)o Yet the accounts we have
of it are very scanty, and it is
;

to

assume that

not certain that any are trustworthy.


Plutarch \Alex. c. 7
sq.) praises Alexander's thirst
for knowledge, his delight in
books and learned conversation,
and his passion for the poets and
historians of his people.

He

as-

sumes that he was instructed by


Aristotle, not only in ethics and
but in the deeper secrets
of his system, basing this on the

politics,

well-known letter (ji. v. ap. Gell.


5, quoting Andronicus, and ap.
SiMPL. Fliys. 2 b), in which
Alexander chides Aristotle for
XX.

publishing

his aoroamatic docAristotle replies that

trines,

and

those

who had not heard them

would

not understand them.


Plutarch also connects Alexander's
fancy for medicine, which he
sometimes tried personally on
his

friends,

with

Aristotle's

teaching.
These are, however,
more or less probable guesses,

and what appears most important

is least trustworthy, for the


letters turn on the theory of an

acroamatic and esoteric teaching


confined to a few, as to the incorrectness of which

^'.p. 112, inf.


hear of two books which
Aristotle addressed to his pupil,

We

Ilepl fiaaiKeias,

and

'Tirhp 'AiroiKwv,

d.q.v. p. 60, n. 1 inf. Plut.

(Alex. 8)

says Aristotle revised the text of


the 7Zm<^ for Alexander. As fellowpupils of Alexander are named
Marsyas (Suid. Mapa.), CalHsthenes (Justin, xii. 6; cf. Plut.

Alex. 65; DiOG. v. 4 Arrian.


but vide Geier, Alex.
10
Seript. 192 sq.), and perhaps
Cassander (Plut. Alex. 74). At
;

iv.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

23

that influence was important and beneficial, even if we


had less distinct testimony as to the respect of the great

pupil for his teacher, and as to the love of learning

which the philosopher imparted

Alexander

to the king.^

was not only the invincible conqueror, but also a farHe was ambitious
seeing ruler, ripe beyond his years.
arms only,
Grecian
not
of
supremacy,
the
establish
to
but also of the Hellenic culture. He withstood for
years the greatest temptations to overweening pride to

which any
errors, he

man could
still

querors in nobility of

In spite of his later

be exposed.

stands far above


spirit, in

all

other world-con-

purity of morals, in love

And

of humanity, and in personal culture.

for all this

who

the world has in no small degree to thank the tutor

formed his apt intelligence by scientific training and


fortified by sound principles his natural instinct for all
that was great and noble.^

Aristotle himself appears to

have made a kindly use of the influence which his


position gave him, for we hear that he interceded with
the king for individuals and even for whole cities.^
the same time Alexander

met

Theodectes (Plut. Aleiv. 17),


and probably also Theophrastus
(d. q. vide

^LIAN.

V.

H.

iv. 19).

but cf. 52. The


V. 39,
fabulous stories as to Alexander's
youth, preserved by the pseudoCallisthenes, may be ignored.
1
'Apto-ToreATj
Plut. Alex. 8
eavfidCo^v iv apxfi Koi ayaircou ovx
rjTTov, CDS avrhs eAeye, rov irarphs,
&s Sr eKer^/oi/ yuej/ ^ajv, 5i^ rovrov Se
KoAws C^v, varepov Se vTroTrT6Tepov
eax^v [v. infra], ovx ^o'tc iroiricrai
Ti KaKbv, aXX' at (^iKo<ppo(Tvvai t5

DiOG.

arepKTLKhu ovk
avrhv a\KoTpi6Tii]ro5

(TcpoSphu iKeTvo Kal

exovaai

irphs

iyevovro

rcKfiripiov.

<pi\o(To(piav

Opafifievos

6 /xevToi

ott'

apxris

irphs

koI

crvvT-

avrcp

Cv^os

ifiireipvKiDs

ovk i^eppvr] rrjs ypvxvs,


as his relation to Anaxarchus,
Xenocrates, and the Indian phikoX irSdos

losophers Dandamis and Kalanus

showed (notwithstanding Themist. Or.

viii.

106, d.).

That he did not act in practice on Aristotelian principles


(Plut. Virt. Alex. i. 6, p. 329;
^

DeOYSEN,
p. 99, 2
Hellen. i. b, 12 sq.)
proves nothing to the contrary.
' Fs. Amm. 46,
V. Marc. 4,
Jlww. Zif. 13,-^LIAN, F. ^.xii.54.
cf.

StAHE,

GescJi.

d.

ARISTOTLE

24

Of the

latter

we

are told that Stagira (whose refounda-

tion he procured from Philip

had at

different times to

^),

Eresus,^ and Athens,^

thank him

for his advocacy.

When Alexander, at the age of sixteen, was appointed


Regent by

his father,^ Aristotle's teaching

have come to an end.

must naturally

cannot afterwards have been


resumed in any regular way, for in the immediately
It

following years the precocious prince took a most active


So Plut. Alex.

Ammon.

monument was erected to


in consequence on the Acropolis. The story may be suspected
of resting on a spurious letter;
yet Diog. (6) also says ^-qdi 5e

Latin. 13, Plin.

KoX "Epfxiinros eV to7s

c. 7, cf.

Adv.

and

Dio.
Chkysost. Or.2p'n,Or.il,22^B..
On the other hand, DiOG. 4, Ps.
Col.

33,

3,

p.

1126,

47, V. Marc. 4, Ammon.


H. Nat. vii. 29,
^LiAN.
109,
V. IF. iii. 17,xii. 54,
Valer. Max. v. 6, ascribe the re-

storation of Stagira to Alexander.


Plutarch, however, seems on the
whole better informed, and is
confirmed by the expressions of
Aristotle and Theophrastus themselves cf. p. 25, n. 2, infra. Plut.
{Adv. Col. 32, 9) and Diog-. (4) say
that Aristotle also framed laws
for the restored city, which is
hardly credible. Dion (^r. 47) relates that he had to contend with
great difficulties in the restoration,
of which he complains in a letter,
which may or may not be genuine.
His work did not last long, for
;

Dion (^ihid.) and Strabo (vii. f r. 35)


describe Stagira as uninhabited
that it succeeded for the time is
:

clearfromp.25,n.2,& p. 37,n. 3&4.


^ A doubtful story in Ps. Amm.
p.

47,

and

in

V.

Ma/rc.

and

Ammon.

Latin, represents Aristotle as saving Eresus from destruction by Alexander.


^
V. Marc. 4 and Ammon.
Latin. (13) refer to the service
that Aristotle did the Athenians
in his letter to Philip, and add

that a

him

Sri irpefffi^vovTos avrov irphs ^ikiinroy virhp


^ Kdrivaioov
a-xoKapxris iy^vTO ttjs

iv

^KKahriixia

ikOSpTa
vtt'

St)

filois,

a-xo^rjs "EevoKpdTrjs

avrhv koI

&\\(f TTiv (TxoKw

deaadfievou

kK4(Tdai. irepi-

irarou rhv iu Au/ceioD- This cannot


be true as stated, for at Speusippus'
death, 339 B.C., Aristotle had
long been Alexander's tutor, and
at that date there could be Ho
question of embassies to Macedonia. Stahr's theory (p. 67, 72)
of an embassy in Aristotle's first
residence at Athens is untenable.

The story may relate to the two


years between the battle of Chgeronea and Philip's murder, when
already influential at
the Macedonian Court, might by
Aristotle,

his intercession have done some


service to Athens which Hermippus could describe by some such
term as irpea^eveiv. The favour
Alexander showed to the Athenians may have been partly due to
Aristotle's influence (Plut, Alex.
G.

13, 16, 28, 60).

\ 01. 110. 1, = 340 B.c.,theyearof


Philip's campaign against Byzan-

tium. (DiOD.xvi.77; FLVT.Alex.9.)

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE


part in his father's

decisive

campaigns

25

though that

circumstance does not exclude the possibility of some


continuance of their intellectual pursuits in the intervals
of leisure.^

Aristotle seems at this time to have with-

drawn to the city of his birth. ^ At an earlier period he


and his pupil had already left Pella.^ After Alexander
ascended the throne, Aristotle must still have remained
some time in the north. But with the beginning of
the great war with Persia, the reasons that had bound
him to Macedonia came to an end, and there was no
longer anything to keep him away from that city, which
offered at once the

most congenial residence

'*

and the

best field for his teaching work.^


During this period Aristotle
might or might not be called
Alexander's tutor; which accounts

probably for the different stories


as to the length of his tutorship,
given by Dionys. as eight years
(his whole residence in Macedonia), and by Justin (xii. 7) as
five years, which is itself too long.
2 That the last period before
his return to Athens was spent in
Stagira, where his family house

was

(cf. p. 3, n, 2),

is

assumed

fragment quoted p. 21,


n. 5, the genuineness of which
is not beyond doubt.
He must
have treated Stagira as his home,
since in his will (DiOG. 16) he
in the

orders

the votive

offering for
Nicomachus to be erected there.
His second wife was of Stagira
(v. p. 20, n. 3), and Theophrastus
owned land in the city (Dioa. v.
52),

with which he shows himself

to be well acquainted.
Cf Hist.
Plant, iii. 11, 1 ; iv. 16, 3.
.

^ Plut. (^Z^a?. c.
7) says he and
Alexander lived at the Nymph-

seum, near Mieza.


Stahr (104)
takes this to be near Stagira, but
Geier (Alexander und AHstot.
33) shows it to be S.W. of
Pella, in

Emathia.

The fragment quoted p. 21,


n. 5, says it was the Thracian
winter that drove him from Sta*

but this could scarcely be


the chief reason.
^ The Ps.^ww^m. 47, says Aristotle was, after Speusippus' death,
called to Athens by the Athenians,
or, according to V. Marc. 5, by
the Platonic school, the leadership
of which he took over in common
gira,

with Xenocrates

(cf. p. 13, n. 3).

The three recensions of

this bio-

graphy, however, contain at this


point a chaos of fables.
The
Ps. Amnion, says Aristotle taught
after this call in the Lyceum, had
afterwards to fly to Chalcis, went
thence again to Macedonia, accompanied Alexander on his Indian expedition, collected in his
travels his 255 forms of government, returned after Alexander's

ARISTOTLE

26

He returned to Athens^

in

Olymp. 111.2

thirteen years after Plato's death.

work

for his

in that city

(b.c.

335-4)

The time thus

was but twelve

years,^

left

but

what he accomplished in that short interval borders on


Even if we may assume that he had
the incredible.
already in great part completed the preparatory work
for his philosophy,

and that the researches in natural

philosophy and the historical collections which supplied


the materials for his theoretic labours had perhaps been

brought to some kind of conclusion before his return to


Athens,
treatises

it

seems certain that almost

belong entirely to this

death to his native town, and


died there twenty-three years

The Latin. Ammon.


and the Vita Ma^rciana
8) send him with Alexander to

after Plato,
(14, 17)
(5,

Persia collecting his 255 polities,

and returning home after the war,


and after all this they make him
start teaching in the Lyceum,
ily to
Chalcis and die there,
twenty-three years after Plato,

The

collection

of

polities

Alexander's campaigns

in

noticed
also by Ammon, Categ. 5, b;
David, Schol. in An. 24, a, 34
Ps.-PoEPH, ibid. 9, b, 26 Anon.
is

ad Porpk. apud Rose, Ar. xjseud.


393. To seek any grains of truth
in this confusion would be lost
time.

Apollod. apud Diog, 10,


and DiONYS, ut sup., both agree in
'

naming

Ill, 2, but do not


indicate whether Aristotle came
in the first or second half of the
year, i.e. end of 335 or spring of
334.
For the latter it may be
argued that the hostility of Athens
to Alexander was only terminated
9,nd the Macedonian influence
01.

last

all

his systematic

period of his

life.

restored after the destruction of


Thebes in the summer of 335,
and that Alexander did not start
on his march into Asia till the
spring of 334,
For the other
view the calculation of Dionys,
{see next note) may be quoted,
but it is probable that this is

merely his own deduction from


the years given by Apollod.
01. Ill, 2, for the arrival in
Athens; 01. 114, 3, for his death;
therefore, 01. 114, 2, for the
flight to Chalcis.
2

Dionys. ut supra

iaxo^a-

^ev eV AvKeicf xpovov irdv SddeKa


Tq} 5e TpiffKaiSeKOLTcp,
fxera t)}v

'AAe^duSpov reXevTTjv, iirl K(f)i(roSiapov &PXOPTOS, airdpas eh XaXKiSa


v6<r(f reXevTa. As Alexander died
June 323, and Aristotle in autumn

322

(cf. p. 37), this reckoning


will be exact if Aristotle came
to Athens in the autumn of 335
and left in the autumn of 323.
It would also coincide if Aristotle
went to Athens in spring 334 and
to Chalcis in summer 322, which,

however,
as

is

is

shown

otherwise unlikely,
at p. 36, n.

infra.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

27

Parallel with this comprehensive

and strenuous labour


went on his work as a teacher, since he now
began to compete with his great master on a

as a writer
at last

footing of equality as the founder of a

new

school.

The

open spaces of the Lyceum were the resort that he chose


for his hearers.^
He was wont to converse with his

up and down in that gymnasium


between the rows of trees and from this custom his
scholars as he walked

school derived the

name

Peripatetics.' ^
For a
more numerous audience, however, he would naturally

of the

'

have to adopt a different form of teaching.^


'
It was a gymnasium connected with a temple of Apollo
Lykeios, and lay in one of the
suburbs (cf. Suid. HarpocraTiON,and Schol. in Aristoph. Pac.

V. 352.

and 2/cpaTr?s) and Hesych.,


which derives the name from
'Ap.

the nepiTraros of the Lyceum as


the meeting-place of the school
is proved, first, by the form of
the word, which can be derived
only from the verb, and also by
the fact that the word IleptTroTos
in the earliest times was not
confined to the Aristotelians (v.
p. 13, n. 3)

so limited, and they were called


oi e/c (or ttTrb) rov irepiirdrov (or
01 iK tSov wepiiraTwu, StrABO, xiii.
1, 54), as the other schools were
called ol airh rrjs 'A/coStj/uios, or
01 airh TTjs (Troas

Hermippus

ap. Diog. 2,
etc.; Qi\(^. Acad.S..^, 17; Gell.
N. A. XX. 5, 5; Diog. i. 17;
Galen. IT. ijJiil. c. 3 Philop.
in q. V. Schol. in Ar. ii. b, 23 (cf.
in Categ. Schol. 35, a, 41 sq.
Ammon. in q. v. Porph. 25, 6
David, in Categ. 23, b, 42 sq.,
and p.l3,n.3 supra) with David,
Schol. in Ar. 20, b, 16; Simpl.
in Categ. 1 fin. That this derivation is correct rather than the
opposite view of Suidas (s. v.
2

though

later it

was

Therefore,

iii.

181

(v.

Math.

Sext. Pyrrh.
331, 369

vii.

xi. 45, etc.).


^ Gell.
ut supra, says that
Aristotle gave two kinds of instruction the exoteric and the
acroamatic. The former related
to Khetoric, and the latter to
:

Philosophia remotior
( = Metaphysics) with Physics and Dia'

'

The acroamatic instrucwhich was intended only


for those who were tried and
well prepared, occupied the mornlectic.

tion,

ing;

the

exoteric

lectures,

to

which the public was admitted,


the afternoon (cf Quintil. iii. 1,
pomeridianis scholis Ar.
14,
.

jjroieipere

artem oratoriamccepit).

The former was called the

ew-

the latter the ^iiKivhs Trepliraros


utroque enim tempio'e amhulans disserehat.
It is impossible, however, to address a large
audience
therefore
walking
Qivos,

ARISTOTLE

28
as

had already happened more or

with Plato, the

less

Socratic fashion of the dialogue had to give place to that


of a continuous lecture, whenever he was dealing either

with a large number of scholars or with subjects in which

new in form and matter

there was something essentially


to be explained or

with

scientific

wherever these

some inquiry

accuracy of
difficulties

to be carried

On

detail.^

through

the other hand,

did not arise, he did no doubt

retain the habit of philosophic dialogue with his friends

an alternative method. ^

as

In addition to his philo-

sophical teaching he appears also to have revived his


earlier school of Rhetoric,^ in connection

there were exercises in oratory.'*


Diog. (3)
rect,

is

eTreiS^

doubtless more corSe

irAetoi/s

iyeuoyro

with which

It is this,

Diog. iv,
dAAa juV

10,

and not

speaking of Polemo

oi/Se KaQi^cou

^Aeye

irphs

^Stj KOI iKciOicrev.

ras

Such lectures ruust be meant


when Aeistox. {Ilarm. elem. p.

The continuous lecture


on a definite theme is expressed
by irphs deaiv Acyeiv a more cursory treatment by iTrix^ipeiu (cf.

says that Aristotle in his


teaching indicated the objects
and method of his inquiry before
giving the development of individual points. It is, as will be
seen, probable as to many of the
Aristotelian writings that they
were either made up from notes
of lectures, or intended as preparatory notes for lectures and
at the end of the Toy^ica Aristotle
directly addresses his audience
{Soph. El. 34 /w.).
2 This appears
partly from
the nature of the case, since
Aristotle had among his hearers
ripe and notable men like Theophrastus partly from the fact
that at least in earlier years he
used the form of dialogue even
in his writings partly from the
fashion of peripatetic teaching,
which supposes conversation of.
30)

d4(ris, (paal, irepnrarcoi/

Se eTre-

X^'^P^i-

following notes).
^ Diog.
(3) is

not

a good

witness, since what he appears


to state of Aristotle's later time
seems to be taken from a source
relating to the earlier period of
contest with Isocrates (cf. p. 17,
n. 3).
It is
probable,
however, from Aristotle's Rlietorio
itself that in the oral philosophic
teaching rhetoric was not forgotten, and Gell., ut supra,
speaks expressly of rhetorical

teaching in the Lyceum.


^

Diog. 3

eyv/jLva^e

piKws

koX irphs Q^criv crvv-

rovs ixaQyiras ajxa koX ^tjto-

the Oeffis being


a general topic, not a particular
question (cf. CiC. Top. 21, 79,
Up. ad Att. ix. 4 QuiNTlL. iii.
5. 5. X. 5. 11
and Feei, Qucest.
eiraffKcou,

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

29

any popular lectures addressed to large audiences, that


is referred to in tlie story that he received in the morning a small and select circle only and in the afternoon

everyone

At

freely.^

the same time

we must

also

think of the Aristotelian school as a society of friends

many

haviug on

sides a

common

life.

For friendship

its

founder, bred in the intimacy of Plato, always showed


act a tender

by word and

we hear

and beautiful enthusiasm

and

accordingly that, following the fashion of the

Academy, he was wont to gather his scholars about


him at common meals and that he introduced a plan of
definite regulations for these meetings and for the whole
of their

common

life.^

It is said that the aid

and appliances which Aristotle

needed

for his far-reaching labours

him by

the favour of the two

Cic. Orat. 14, 46

150).

In hae Ar.

adolescentes,

morem

pMlosnpJiorum

7wn ad
tenuiter

dissenmdi, sed ad copiam rhetorum in utramque partem, ut


ornatins et uheritis did posset,
Neither says whether
exercuit.
the earlier or the later school of
rhetoric is meant: probably both;
cf.

Gell.

rulers,

for

and

by the princely generosity of Alexander.^

especially

Prot.

were provided

Macedonian

ihid.

i^corepiKo,

dice-

rJietoricas meditationes facultatemque argiitiarum cirAli'iimque rerum notitiam


illas vero exotericonducehant

ad

bantur, quce

cas anditiones exercitiumque dicendi.


'
Cf. p. 27, n. 3,

and Gell.

il)ld.
2

Athen. (i. 3, v, 186 b, cf.


186 e) says he wrote for their

common meals

v6aoi (rvixiroriKoi,

which may refer, however, to the


work mentioned p. 99, n. l,i^r;
and Diog. (4) preserves a hint of
his arrangement for the internal
government of the school by offichanging every ten days. Cf
Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. i. 839, n, 1.
^ According to ^lian
( V. H.
iv. 19), Philip gave him ample
means to pursue his investigacers

tions, ttKovtov dj/ej/Se^, especially

in Natural History Athen. (ix.


398) speaks of Alexander devoting 800 talents to that work ;
and Plin. (H. Nat. viii. 16, 44)
says Alex, placed under his
orders all the hunters, fishers,
and fowlers of the kingdom, and
all overseers of the royal forests,
ponds, and live stock, numbering
many thousands. Pliuy'g story,
;

ARISTOTLE

80

However exaggerated the


on

we may

stories of the ancient writers

may seem

to be, and however wealthy


suppose
Aristotle
fairly
himself to have been by

this subject

inheritance/

it

is

yet clear that the vast scope of his

researches forces us to infer that he possessed advantages

which he probably could not have commanded but for


such kingly assistance. The deep and wide acquaintance
with the writings of his people which his
disclose to

us could

own works ^

hardly be possible without the

and on this head we are expressly


was the first who accumulated a great
Such works, again, as the Politeiai and the
library.^
collection of foreign laws could not be produced without
laborious and no doubt costly investigations. The books
possession of books

told that he

on Natural History especially and the kindred treatises


presuppose researches such as no one could have brought
he had at his disposal or could set
more than the resources of a private
individual.
It was therefore a happy circumstance that
the man whose grasp of mind and rare powers of obto completion unless

in action something

however, is disproved (v. BranDis, p. 117 sq., and Humboldt,


Xosm, ii. 191, 427) by the fact
that with a few exceptions, such
as elephants, Aristotle shows no

studies, implies that he

knowledge of things which would

Besides the extant works,


we know of others concerning
Khetoric, Poetry, and the History
of Philosophy,
^ Strabo, xiii.
1, 54, p. 608
irpwTos wu 'la/xev avvayay^v fiifixia

be discovered in Alexander's expedition.

His will proves nothing as


earlier years, but apart
from the calumnies of his oppo'

to

his

nents, as to his pride and love


of display, all we know of his
way of life, his choice of residence, his marriage, and the
means necessary for his extensive

hampered by poverty.

was not
As to the

worthlessness

tales

of

the

Epicurus and Timgeus,


n. 1

and

of,

of

p. 9,

3.

koI SiSd^as rohs eV Alyvirrcf

Aeas

fii^Xioe^Kr)s

Athen.

i.

3, a.

avuTa^iv.

Gell.

fiaa-i-

Cf.

17, 3)
three Attic ta(iii.

says Aristotle paid


lents for the works of Speusippus.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

81

marked him as the ablest founder of empirical


and of systematic learning, should have been so
favoured by fortune that the needful equipment for his
great calling was not denied him.
servation

science

In the

last years of Aristotle's life the

between him and


philosopher

may

his great pupil

good relations

were disturbed.^

The

many

of the

well have taken offence at

things which Alexander did in the intoxication of success, at

many measures which he found

necessary for

the consolidation of his conquests, but which were re-

pugnant to the Hellenic traditions and to the self-respect


of independent Greeks, and at the harsh and passionate
excess into which the young conqueror was betrayed
when he was surrounded by flatterers, embittered by
personal opposition and made suspicious by treachery .^
There would be no lack of tale-bearers to carry gossip
true and false to the king, for the learned and philosophic

members

of his Court were plotting in their personal

jealousies^ to oust each other,

and even the courtiers and

generals doubtless sought to use the scientific proclivities


of the prince as points in the

As

game

of their ambitions.

the king's relations with Antipater grew more un-

seems he was prejudiced against Aristotle"*


because of the close relations between the philo-

friendly, it
also,

sopher and the general.^

But the

Cf. p. 23, n. 1, su^ra.


The
exchange of letters which is
cited as a proof of their friend'

ship is unreliable, because we do


not know how much is genuine.
2 Plutarch
(cf.
p. 23, n. 2,
supra) says Aristotle was dissatisfied with Alexander's whole
political idea of the fusion of
the Greeks and Orientals,

severest blow to the

For examples v. Plut. Alex,


c. 52, 53, Areian, iv, 9-11.
^ Cf. Plut. Ihid.
74 (though
that is after the death of Calli^

sthenes)

as

Antipater,

to

cf.

Plut. Alex. 39, 49; Areian, vii'.


12 Cuet. x. 31 Diodoe. xvii
;

118.

This friendship is proved


from the fact that Antipater 's
^

ARISTOTLE

32

king's attachment to his tutor

came through the action

of Callisthenes.^

The

stiff-necked opposition of that

philosopher to the

new

Oriental fashions of the Court

the bitter and reckless tone of his diatribes against

them

the pointed

way

which he vaunted

in

his inde-

pendence and drew upon himself the eyes of all the


malcontents of the army the importance he assumed to
;

himself as Alexander's historian, and the arrogant airs

he gave himself accordingly, had long caused the king


This made it
to look on him with anger and mistrust.
the easier for his enemies to persuade the king of his

complicity in the conspiracy of the nobles which had

placed Alexander's

life

Callisthenes lost his

life

in
^

the

gravest danger, and

with the conspirators, though

he was doubtless innocent of their treacherous design.

In the heat of his anger the king's suspicions turned


against Aristotle^ also, for he had brought up Oallison, Cassancler, was a pupil of
Aristotle (PLUT.^te. 74), by the
letters of Aristotle to Antipater
(Aristocl. ajnid Eus. Pr. Ec. xv.
DiOG. 27 Demetr. Eloc.
2, 9
225 Jj^LiAN, V. II. xiv. 1), and
;

especially

by the fact that Anti-

is named as chief executor


in Aristotle's will, (7j;^ DiOG. 11.
The false story of his complicity
based
is
in Alexander's death
on this circumstance (?;. in-

pater

fro).

As to Callisthenes, see
PluT. Alex. 53-55 Sto. rep. 20,
>

6.

p. 1043,

Qu. conv.

i.

6. p.

623

Curt. viii.
Chares ajmd Athen. x.

ArriAN,
18 sq.;

iv,

10-14

Theopheast.

434 d

Tusc.

ill.

10, 21

ap.

ClC.

Seneca, Not.

and of modern
23, 2
Stahr, Arist. 1. 121 sq.
Droysen, Gescfi. Alex. ii. 88
sq.
Grote, Hist, of Greece, xii.
Qu.

vi.

writers,

290

sq., etc.
^

jj;^

jg

highly improbable he

was an accomplice, though w^e


cannot say how far he was to
blame for exciting by reckless
talk his younger friends,
^ Alex, writes
to Antipater
(Pltjt. Alex. 55)
ol fihv iraldes
vTrh T(i/ MaKeSoucou KareAevaOrjaav
top Se (ro(pLar7]v [Callisth.] y<i}
KoAdaco Kal ruvs iifireij.\pai/Tas avrhv
koX tovs inroSexoixfvovs tols TroAeci
tovs ifxol iTn^ov\evovTas. Accord:

ing to Chares

he had at

(ajj.

tirst

Plut.

ihid.),

intended to try

Callisthenes in Aristotle's pres-

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

33

recommended
warned the
young man against imprudence.^ The suspicion

sthenes as a kinsman and had afterwards

him

to the King,^ though, no doubt, he also

reckless

however led to nothing worse than a notable coolness


in his relations with Alexander.^

that Aristotle was

story to the effect

concerned with Antipater in the

alleged poisoning of Alexander was connected with the

death of Callisthenes,"* but the completely groundless


nature of the charge has long ago been proved.^

So

far

indeed was Aristotle from having any cause to desire


princely pupil's

his

death that that event in reality

brought serious dangers upon himself.


The statement of Dio.
Chrys. {Or. 64, p. 338) that Alexence.

ander meant to kill Aristotle and


Antipater is merely a rhetorical
exaggeration.
*
Plut. iUd. Aerian, iv. 10,
1
DiOG. 4 SuiD, KaXKiae.
;

DiOG. ibid.; Valer. Max.


2 Plut. Alex. 54.

vii.

Plutarch says this expressly


n. 1, supra), and the
story in Diog. 10, that Alexander,
to mortify his teacher, took
'

(of. p. 23,

Anaximenes of Lampsacus and


Xenocrates into favour, would
not prove the contrary even if it
were more credible
but it is
unworthy of both Alexander and
Aristotle,
Plutarch, Hid., on the
;

contrary, sees in the king's kindness to Xenocrates, a consequence


of Aristotle's teaching.
Philoponus {a2md Arist. Meteor ol. ed.
Ideler, i. 142) cites a reputed
letter of Alexander to Aristotle
from India, which proves nothing.
* The earliest witness to this
story is a certain Hagnothemis
{apud Vjj^JT.Alex. 77) who is said
to have heard it from King Anti-

VOL.

I.

Arrian (vii. 27) and


I.
Pliny {H. Nat. xxx. 16) mention
it,
but, like Plutarch, treat it
as an invention.
Xiphilinus
(Ixxvii. 7, p. 1293) says the Emperor Caracalla deprived the
Peripatetics in Alexandria of

gonus

their privileges on account of


the alleged guilt of Aristotle.
^ The disproof of the charge (cf.

Stahr, Ar.
SEN,

i.

136

sq.

and Droy-

i. 705 sq,)
apart from its moral impossibility, on these grounds
\a) Plut. ihid. shows expressly
that the suspicion of poisoning
first arose six years after Alexander's death, whenit afforded the
passionate Olympias a welcome
pretext to slake her hatred
against Antipater's family, and
to excite public opinion against
Cassander who was said to have
administered the poison
(Z>)
equal suspicion attaches to the
testimony of Antigonus, which
must belong to the time when he
was at enmity with Cassander,
though we do not know whether
he made any charge against

Gescfi. d. Hellen.

rests,

ARISTOTLE

34

For the unexpected news of the sudden death of


the dreaded conqueror called out in Athens a wild
excitement against the Macedonian rule, which, as
soon as the news was fully confirmed, broke into

open war. Athens put herself at the head of all who


were willing to fight for the freedom of Greece, and
before the Macedonian regent Antipater was fully prepared, he found himself beset by superior forces, which
he only succeeded in mastering after a long and risky

From the first this


struggle in the Lamian War.^
movement threatened, as was to be expected, the prominent members of the Macedonian party. Aristotle
Aristotle;

(c)

it

is

significant

that the bitterest opponents of


Aristotle,

to

whom

no calumny

amiss, such as Epicurus, Tima3us, Demochares, Lyco, etc.,


know nothing of the charge

is

almost all who speak of


(</)
Alexander's poisoning preserve the
story (which was clearly connected
with the first publication of the
rumour and was well fitted to catch
the popular fancy) that it was ac-

complished by water from the


Nonacrian spring i.e. the Styx
a proof that we are not dealing
with history; {i^ the accounts
Arrian and Plutarch give us
from the court chronicles as to

the course of Alexander's illness


do not in any way suggest poison
(/) if Aristotle's motive was the
fate of Callisthenes, that could
hardly have caused in him a
hatred that would lead six years
later to murder, nor could he,
after so long a time, have had

any fear as to
(_^)

own

his

own

safety

probable that Aristotle's


adopted son was in Alex-

it is

ander's

service,

and

intrusted

with important missions (cf p. 5,


the
(It) finally,
n. 7, supra)
rumour of Alexander's poisoning
.

is refuted by the movement of


Alexander's
events afterwards.
death was the signal for an outbreak in Greece, which in the
Lamian war brought Antipater
himself to great straits. Anyone acquainted with the politics
of the day would clearly foresee
such a result. If Antipater were
not as much taken by surprise as
everyone else was by the king's
death, he would have made preparations either to stem or to
head the rising. If he had been
known as the author of that
which the Greeks acclaimed as
the beginning of freedom, they
would not have begun their revolt
by attacking him and if any part
in it had been attributed to
Aristotle, he would not have had
to fly from Athens.
;

For

details, see

Gesoh. d. Hellen.

i.

59

Droysbn,
sq.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE


may

not have played a political role

86

but, in any case,


;
Alexander and his friendship
with Antipater were so well known, his own name was
so famous, and his personal enemies, no doubt, so many,
that he could not escape attack.
The charge brought
^

his relation as tutor to

him

against

of offences against the established religion

in itself baseless

enough

must

a pretext for wreaking political

But

geance.2

the

rising

Aristotle found

storm.^

He

According to Aristocl, ajj.


Eus. Pr. Ev. XV. 2, 3, Demochares
(doubtless Demosthenes' nephew,
de quo cf. Cic. Brut. 83, 286: Be
23, 95
Seneca, De Ira,
2; Plut. Demosth. 30;
Vit.
Orat. viii. 53, p. 847, and
SuiDAS) had alleged that letters
of Aristotle's had been found

Orat.

ii.

23,

which were

hostile to Athens;

that he had betrayed Stagira to


the Macedonians, and that after
the destruction of Olynthus he
had betrayed to Philip the richest
citizens of that city. As the last
two are impossible, the first is
probably untrue, as Aristocles
himself recognised.
^ The charge was brought by
Demophilus on the instigation
of the Hierophant Eurymedon,

related

the deification of
Hermias, and alleged as proofs
the poem noticed (p. 20, n. 3),
and the alleged sacrifice (p. 20,
n. 1) cf. Athen. xv. 696 a, 697 a;
to

DioG.5 Anon. Menag., Suidas,


and Hesych. Origen (<?. Cels.
;

65) suggests, out of his own


fancy, nvh. 56yju.ara rrjs ^i\o(TO(pias
avTov & iuSfiKxau cli/ai aaefirj oi
i.

'Aer}va7oi.

The weakness of the


it was only

charge proves that

best to retire before

escaped to

iii.

it

have been simply


and personal venOhalcis

in

Eu-

a blind, although perhaps the


Hierophant may have hated
the philosopher's liberalism. An
honest charge of atheism in the
Athens of that day was hardly
possible, although the mass of
the people could still be moved
by it. Grote (18 sq.) shows how
in this connection the Athenians
would be impressed by the story
that Aristotle had given heroic
honours to an eunuch who was
first a slave and then a tyrant.
Grote also notices (p. 14) how
mortifying the mission of Aristotle's adopted son was for Hellenic
pride (v. p. 5, n. 7). The further
suggestion of Grote (p. 37. cf.

Geant, p. 24) that the enmity of


the school of Isocrates had to do
with the prosecution of Aristotle
be true, but the fact that
Demophilus was a son of Ephorus,
and. that the latter, and perhaps

may

both, belonged to that school is


not sufficient proof.
have
still less ground to accuse the
Academic school of having any
share in it.
3 His remarks that 'he
would
not give the Athenians a second
chance of sinning against philosophy,' and that ' Athens was the

We

D 2

ARISTOTLE
where he had a country house, to which he had
sometimes retired before,^ and his enemies could only
To Theophrastus ^
inflict on him unimportant insults.^

boea,^

he gave over his teaching work at the Lyceum, as a


But it was not given
substitute during his absence.
place spoken of by
5'

e'Trl

(rvK(f),

Homer where

in allusion to

the

DiOG.9
Origen,%# w^r;

sycophants', are quoted by

iELiAN,

iii.36;

EusTATH.
p.

8;

1573

in

Ammon.

Odyss.
p.

Amman. Latin.

48

120,

V.

Marc.

17, the

last

them in a
letter to Antipater. Favorinus,
apud DiOG. 9, says the Homeric
hne occurred in a written Apologia,
mentioned placing

which is known also to the Anoyi.


Menaq. and to Athen. xv. 697 a,
both of whom doubt its genuine-

One does not see why


ness.
Aristotle, once in safetjs should
write a useless defence. It was no
doubt a rhetorical exercise in imitation of the Socratic Ajwlogia (cf

the fragment given by Athenseus


with Plat. ApoL 26 d sq.).
1
Apollodor. ajmd DiOG. 10 is
made to say that this was in
01. 114, 3, i.e. in the latter half
This is improbof 322 B.C.
able, for Strabo (x. 1, 11) and
Heraclides ap. DiOG. x. 1 speak
as if he lived a considerable time
in Chalcis and besides it is more
likely that the attack on Aristotle
happened in the first uprising
against the Macedonian party
than that it was begun after
Antipater's decisive victories in
Thessaly, and that Aristotle fled
in good time instead of waiting
through the whole of the Lamian
war. Probably, therefore, he left
Athens late in the summer of
323, and Apollodorus only said

what we
ad Amm.

Dionys. Lp.

tind in

that Aristotle

5,

i.

died in 01. 114,

3,

having

fled to

not possible to
assume (with Stahr, i. 147) an
earlier emigration of Aristotle to
Chalcis, on the authority of the
statement of Heraclides that
It is

Chalcis.

Aristotle

was

in Chalcis
to Athens,
^AXe^dvSpov

living

when Epicurus came


8'

TcAeuTi^craj/Tos
lj.eT\de7v

['E-TTiKoupov]

For Aristotle's

(pcova.

eis

KoAo-

flight

was

only to the danger that


threatened him at Athens, which
arose only on Alexander's unexpected death; and he cannot
therefore have gone to Chalcis
before the news reached Athens,
Either
in the middle of 323.
Heraclides or Diogenes must be

due

The Pseudo-Ammonius

inexact.

(cf p. 25, n. 5 su^jra) and David


lSc?ioL in Ar. 26 b. 26) assign im.

possible dates.
2

Cf.

Strabo,

x.

1,

11,

p.

448.
3 In a fragment of a letter to
Antipater probably of this time

(ajj.

^LIAN,

V.

H.

xiv. 1,

Aristotle
Ae\(po7s
tS)v iu

44, n. 4 infra)

mention
e^vTwv

What
ment,

(101.

KoX

S)V

cf.

p.

makes
;|/7j^i(r-

cKpyprjixai

vvv.

whether a monuthis was


proedria, or other honorary

privilege

we do not know.

was given him by Athens,

it

If it

may

be connected with the services


noticed p. 24, n. 3, su^pra.
* DiOG. V. 36 and following
lines, SuiD. s. v. eotpp.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE


to

Aristotle

to

37

In the

enjoy his retirement long.

following year, that

is,

in the

summer

of 322

B.c.^,

he

which he had long suffered.^


two great contemporaries he survived Alexander by less than a year, and
predeceased Demosthenes only by a short interval. His

succumbed
So

it

body

is

to a disease from

chanced that

of his

said to have been taken to Stagira.^

will is preserved to

us,''

and

it is

His

monument

last

of his

1166 b, 11),
does not fit the

12, V. 15 init., ix. 4,

^
Apollod. ap. D10G..IO, V.
Marc. 3, Ammon. Latin. 12,
and Dion. Mp. ad Amm. i. 5, give

circumstances, for in EubcEa he

was

was in no danger. The tale (found

01. 114, 3 as the year.

It

and because

it

about the time of Demosthenes' only in JElias Cretensis, p.


death (Apollod. ibid.'), but a 507 d) that he threw himself into
the Euripus because he could not
little earlier (Gell. N. A. xvii.
As that date is given discover the causes of his visions,
21, 35).
by Plut. (^Dem. 30) as the IGth and the variant of the same in
of Pyanepsion 01. 114, 3 = Oct. 14, Justin, cohort. 36, Greg. Naz.
Or. iv. 112, or Procop. Be Bello
322, Aristotle must have died between July and Sept. of that year. Goth. iv. 579, that his fruitless
2 That he died by illness is
meditations on a vision wore him
stated by Apollod. and Dionys. out with worry and fatigue, need
ut supra; cf. Gell. xiii. 5, 1. no refutation, though Bayle (art.
Aristotle, n. Z) thinks the latter a
Censorin. {Bi. Nat. 14, 16) adds
fitting end
cf Stahr, i. 155.
liwiw ferunt naturalem, stomacM
3 Related only by
V. Marc.
injirmita^tem crebrasque morhidi
4 and Ammon. Latin. 13, and
corjyoris offensiones adeo virtute
animi diu sustentasse, ut magis with the addition that an altar
mirum sit ad annos sexaginia tres was built on his grave and the
eumi vitam protulisse, quam ultra council meetings held there and
The statement that a festival (^ApiffTOTeKeia) was
Tion pertulisse.
of Eumelus ap. DiOG. 6 (de quo instituted and a month named
after him. The evidence is not
V. p. 2, n. 2, p. 6, n. 3 supra) followed by the Anon. Menag. and good but as he was not only the
Suidas, that he poisoned himself most illustrious citizen but also
with hemlock, or (as Hesych, has the re-founder of Stagira (cf Dio.
Or. 47, 224, who says that Aristotle
it) that he was condemned to
drink hemlock, is probably a con- alone had the fortune to be ttjs
fusion with the death of Demo- irarpiSos o'lKKTr^s) the story is not
sthenes or of Socrates. It cannot wholly improbable.
* Apud
DiOG. 11 sq
be historic, because the best
proevidence is against it, because it bably (cf V. 64) taken, like the
wills of Theophrastus, Strato,
is contrary to Aristotle's own
and Lyco, from Aristo, a noted
principles (^^. iV. ii. 11, 1116 a,
;

ARISTOTLE

88

attacliment and careful provision for

faithful

were connected with him, including his


200-250

Kelos),

who

(lege
will be

mentioned in his

place.

Herm-

Peripatetic
'ApiffToov 6

circ.

ippus {circ. 200-220) cited the


same record (v. Athen. xiii.
589 fl.)' which according to V.
Ma7'c. 8, and Amnion. Latin. 17

was also quoted by Andronicns


and Ptolemaius for the catalogues
of Aristotle's writings, de q. infra.
V. Marc, says Aristotle left a
SiaOrjKTi
^ (ppTai Trapd re 'Aj/.

dpOVLKCf Koi TlTOX^fiaicf


7rj/a/c[wv]

Twu avTOv

/JLeTO, \_Twv']

(rvyypafxfidr(i)v

{Amnion. Latin, 'cum voluminibus suorum tractatuum ;' cf.


IIEITZ, Verl. Schr. d. Ar. 34).
The external evidence for the
the more
will is therefore good
because it is likely that the wills
of Aristotle and his followers
would be carefully preserved by
the Peripatetic school (for which
those of Theoph., Strato, and
Lyco were a kind of foundation
charter), and because Aristo was
himself the immediate successor
of Lyco. The document has also
all internal signs of genuineness,
and the objections which have
been urged against it (cf. (tRANT,
It is objected
26) prove little.
that it mentions neither a house
in Athens nor a library, both
;

A
of which Aristotle possessed.
never
forger, however, would
have omitted the

latter,

which

was the thing of chief

interest
is very pos-

for the school but it


sible that Aristotle had already
;

made

arrangements

which did not require

about it,
to be re-

peated in the extant will, that


being rather a set of directions
to friends than, like the three

all

who

Theo-

slaves.

others quoted, a regular disposition of his whole property. Grant


thinks it unlikely that Pythias
was not yet marriageable or that
Nicomachus was a lad but this
Why may not Ariis not so.
stotle's
wife Pythias, perhaps
after the death of older children,
have borne him a daughter ten
years after their marriage ? or
why might Aristotle not have by
a second wife, for whose remarriage he provides, a son who
would be a lad when his father
Besides, we
was sixty-three?
know from other sources that the
;

education of Nicomachus was


taken over by Theophrastus. The
naming of Antipater arouses
in Grant a suspicion that the

him

forger inserted

name

but

it

is

as a historic
clearly natural

that Aristotle might appoint him


in order to place the carrying
out of his directions for the
benefit of those depending on
him under the protection of his

powerful friend.

And

meant when he

this is all

named

that

is

first

in the honorary position of

iwiTpoTTos

irdvrcav,

carrying

out

of

is

whereas
the

the
business

provisions of the will is left to


Theophrastus and the other eViObjection is taken to
fieX-nrai.
the provisions for four statues of
animals which Aristotle is said
to have vowed to Zeus Soter
and Athene the Preserver, for
Nicanor's safety (DiOG. 16), as
being an imitation of the Socratic
for Asclepios
offering
votive
(Plat. Phcsd. 118, A). This,
however, is far-fetched and the
point is unimportant. Little as

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE


phrastus

him he

lie

named

89

and

as the chief of his school,^

to

the best part of his inheritance, his books.

left

We are but poorly informed as to the personal traits of


Excepting a few

Aristotle's character.

details as to his

personal appearance,^ almost the only statements


possess are the attacks of his enemies.

charges have already been shown to be worthless


those concerning

as

such

with Plato, with

relations

his

we

Most of these

Hermias, with his two wives, and with Alexander, his


alleged misconduct in youth, and the political turpitude

of his later

What

years."^

remains of the stories told

Aristotle believed in vows or in


the mythic personalities of Zeus

Menag., Suid., Plut. Aud.

and

Pausanias (vi. 4, 5) mentions a


statue said to be of Aristotle as to
others, v. Stahr, i. 161 sq, and as
to those exl ant, especially the lifesize sitting statue in the Palazzo

Athene, yet it is quite


natural that he should erect a
monument of his love for his
adopted son in their common
home, Stagira (to which the
statues were to be sent), in a
fashion which accorded with
Greek custom. He himself in
Etiiics iv, 5 reckons votive monuments and offerings among the
forms in which the virtue of

shows

lxya\o'!rpTreia

itself.

The pretty story as to the


way in which he expressed his
'

choice
iV.

A.

is
xiii.

well

known (Gell.
Eudemus

where

5,

must be substituted for Menedemus '). It is quite credible,


and not unlike Aristotle.
2 Steabo, xiii. 1, 54, p. 608
Plut. Sulla, c. 26 Athen. i. 3, a,
with which cf. DiOG-. v. 52.
'

DiOGt. 2

calls

him

laxvo-

and fxiKpSfi/iiaros, and an


abusive epigram in the Anthology
(iii. 167, Jac), which deserves no
weight, (TfxiKphs, (paXaKphs, and
(TKeX^s

nrpoydffTcop.

We

pronouncing

R,

word rpavXhs

(op.

hear of a lisp in
to which the

DiOG.

2,

Anon.

8,-p.26,and Adidat.

9, p.

Poet.
53) reiers.
;

Spada

Rome,

at

v.

Schuster,

Erhalt. Portr. d. griech. PMlos.


Leipz. 1876, p. 16, where they
are photographed.
The sitting
statue has a lean face, earnest
and thoughtful, showing the
lines of severe mental labour,

and with a

delicate,

clear-cut

impresses us with its


life-like truth to nature, and the
workmanship is so excellent that
it may well be an original work
dating from the time of Aristotle

profile.

It

or
his
immediate
successor.
Directions are given in Theophrastus' will (DiOG. v. 51) that

the

Mou(re?oj/

be finished

begun by him should


eTreira

Te\ovs cIkSvu Tcdrivai


KalraXoLira avaQ^fxara

r))v 'Apia-roels

t5 Uphp

'6ffa

irpSTepov

T(^ t^PVy which proto be understood of a


statue already erected.
* Cf. p. 8
sq.
19, n. 4 ; 20,
n. 1,2; 33, n. 4 ; 35, n. 1, 5,

vTTTJpx^v

bably

1/

is

ARISTOTLE

40

by

many enemies^

his

Nor do

probability.^

any right to lay


little-minded

shrewdness,

greed for fame.^

concerns

charges

the accounts

we have

little

give us

to Aristotle's charge either a self-

of

sort

seeking

has for the most part

chiefly

his

or

The

and

jealous
first

relations

of

these

with

the

Macedonian rulers. The second refers to the criticisms he allows himself to make in writing of his
But it- cannot be
cotemporaries and his forerunners.
proved that he ever sought the favour of Philip and
Another calumny is TerAr. familiarem suum
Jlermiam tiirpiter loco excedere
fecit {A2whget. 46), which in the
context can only mean he betrayed
him, a tale so senseless and wicked

sujira.

tullian's

that it required a Tertullian to


invent it. The story of Philo of
Byblos ap. SuiD. UaKaicp., as to
immoral relations with the historian Palffiphatus of Abydos is
equally baseless.
Themist. Orat. xxiii. 285
>

a (XTparhs

talks of
stotle's

'6Xos

of Ari-

By him,
Eus. xv. 2) and

calumniators.

Aristocl.

{ap.

Diogenes

(11, 16) the following


Epicurus, Timffius,

named

are

Eubulides, Alexinus, Cephisodorus, Lyco, Theocritus of Chios,


Demochares, and Dicsearchus,
within a generation of Aristotle.
2 Such as the accusations to
be found in Aristocl. and DiOG.,
ut supra Sum. 'Apirrr. Athen.
Plin. ff. A^.
viii. 342, xiii. 566
XXXV. 16, 2; ^iLlAN, V. H. iii.
Theodoret, Our. Gr. Aff.
19
xii. 51, p. 173; LuciAN, Dial.
Mort. 13, 5, and Paras. 36;
that Aristotle was a glutton, and
for that reason went to the
;

Macedonian Court and flattered


Alexander, and that at his death
75 (or even 300) dishes were
found in his house
or that
:

he was immoral in relation to


Pythias and Herpyllis, and was
also enamoured of Theodectes of
Phaselis and again that he was
so effeminate that he bathed in
warm oil (doubtless for medical
reasons, cf. DiOG. 16 and p. 37,
:

n. 2, supra'),

and

he sold the

oil

so miserly that
afterwards
or
that in his youth he was too
fashionable for a philosopher
(which, as he was rich and brought
:

and
up at Court, is possible)
that he was impudent and sneerIf there were any facts
ing.
:

underlying these stories, we may


conclude from the character of
the narrators that they were in
trivial
and we can see
in the passages of Lucian and
Thcodoret and his quotation from
Atticus how Aristotle's own statements as to wealth and pleasure
were twisted to support these
suspicions.
3 Even Stahr (i. 173 sq) pays
too much attention to these

any case

charges.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE


Alexander by unworthy means,

and

41

was not

to be

expected that he should applaud or imitate the

follies

To impute

of a Callisthenes.

it

to

it

him

as

an

offence,

that he attached himself to the Macedonian party,

is

to

apply to him an erroneous and inapplicable standard.

By

and training he was a Greek. But while all


him to the royal house to
which he and his father owed so much, no one can say
birth

his personal ties attached

that the consideration of the general position of politics

ought necessarily to have turned him against their

So

policy.

satisfied

was Plato of the untenable character

of the existing political relations, that he had advocated

sweeping changes.

Plato's follower could the less evade

the same conviction, since he had a keener insight into

men and
ditions

things,

and had clearly detected the convitality of States and forms of

on which the

government depends.

With

his

practical

acumen he

could not put his trust in the Platonic ideal of a State

he was forced to seek the materials


construction from

among

the political relations as they

were and the powers already existing.


^

sounds like
Aristotle writes to
(Arist. Fragm. No.

Stalir thinks it

flattery

when

Alexander

611, apud iELiAN, V.


54) b Ovfjihs Koi 7) opyi]
iffovs

Rose
Tohs
ovSels

(1.

^ffffovs

and
'[(Tos,

but

aXXb.

yivcrai,
if

xii.

ov irphs

with Rutgers,

Heitz)

KpeiTTOvas

H.

crol

for a political re-

irphs

5e

this is genuine

Aristotle said no more than the


truth, and he wrote, according to
^llan, in order to appease

Alexander's wrath against certain


persons, for which purpose he
tells him that one cannot be

At

that day no

angry with inferiors, and that he


stood above all men, which was
surely true of the conqueror of
the Persian Empire. We cannot
tell whether the letter is genuine.
Heitz {Verlor. Schr. d. Arist. 287)
suggests that this fragment does
not agree with that in Plut.

{Tranqu. An.

Arist.
13, p. 472
614, 1581, b) in which
Aristotle is made to compare
;

Fragm.

himself with Alexander, but the


letter is much the more doubtful
of the two.

ARISTOTLE

42

new foundation
kingdom,

conld be found except in the Macedonian

Greek States were no longer able at

for the

once tomaintain their independence against the foreigner

and to reform their inner

The whole course of

life.

history so far had proved this so conclusively, that even

a Phocion was forced to say, in the

Lamian War, that


were altered

conditions of Greece

unless the moral

there was nothing to be expected from an

come

armed

rising

Doubtless such a conviction would

against Macedon.^

far less readily to

an Athenian statesman than to


who was a citizen

a friend of the Macedonian kings,

of a small city like Stagira, once destroyed

by Philip,

Can
and then reorganised as a Macedonian town.
we blame him if he accepted that view, and, with a
of the

just appreciation

attached

situation,

political

himself to that party which alone had a future, and

from which alone,

if

from any, Greece could

salvation from the dissension


loss of

power

condemn him

face

to

he

if

the Greek cities must

enemy without

the

felt

find

still

and decay within, and the

Can we

that the old independence of

come

to

an end, when

its basis

was gone ? Can we


object if he believed that in his pupil Alexander was
fulfilled the
condition under which he held that
monarchy was natural and just ^ where one man stands

in the civic virtue of their citizens

out so clearly beyond

all

him impossible ?
see the hegemony

their equality with


if

he preferred to

the hands of such a

king of Persia,
'

for

Plut. Phoc.

make
Can we complain

others in efficiency as to

man

of Hellas rather in

than in those of the

whose favour the Greek

23.

pgiit^

iii,

'

great

cities
13

fin^

had

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

48

been bidding against each other ever since the Peloponnesian War, and hoped that he would give the
Hellenes the only thing they lacked to become the
rulers of the world

As

for the

political unity ?

charge of jealousy of others' fame,

it

is

true that his philosophical polemics are often cutting and

sometimes unfair. But they never take on any personal


and it would be impossible to prove that they ever

colour,
rest

on any other motive than the desire to make his point


and establish it as completely as possible.

as sharply,

If he does sometimes give us the impression of insisting

on his own

discoveries,

we ought

to set off against this

the conscientiousness with which he seeks out every


seed of truth, even the remotest, in the work of his
predecessors

and remembering

that remains

all

is

we

this,

shall find that

but a very intelligible and very

pardonable self-appreciation.
Still

less

to pass over

minor matters ^

need we

attach any importance to the allegation that Aristotle

hoped soon to see philosophy completed.^ If he did, it


would have been only the same self-deception of which
many other thinkers have been guilty, including some
who have not been, as he was, the teachers of mankind

>
Polit. vii. 7, 1327 b, 29,
reckoning the merits of the
Greek race SiJirep iXevOepdv re
:

StoreAeT Kal fiiXricTTa iroXiTevSfjievov KoX Svudficvov &px^i-v iravTOiv

Tvyxdvop TroXireias.
Like the tale told by Valer.
Max, viii. 14, 3, as a proof of
Aristotle's sitis
in capessenda

ixias

laude, which is plainly an idle


invention based on a misunder-

standing of the Rliet. ad Alex.


Rhet. Hi. d, 1^10 h, 2).
qiq Tusc. iii. 28, 69
Aristoteles veteres philosopjios accnsans
qui existimavissent pMlosopMam
suis ingeniis esse perfectam, ait
eos ant stultissimos ant gloriosissia. \ fin. {ci.

mos fuisse

sed se videre, quod

paucis annis magna accessio facta


esset, brevi tempore philosophiam
plane ahsolutamfore.

ARISTOTLE

44

of centuries.

for tens

In

the remark seems to

fact,

have occurred in an early'work of Aristotle's,^ and to


have related not to his own system but to Plato's,

which professed to open out a prospect of an early completion of

So

all science.2

far

as

Aristotle's

philosophical

writings,

the

scanty fragments of his letters, the provisions of his

and our incomplete accounts of his life afford


any picture of his personality, we cannot but
Nobility of principles, a just moral
honour him.

will,

us

keen judgment, a susceptibility to all beauty,


lively feeling for family life and friendship,

sense, a

warm and

gratitude towards

benefactors, affection for

relatives,

benevolence to slaves and those in need,^ a loyal love for


his wife,

and a

lofty conception of

marriage

scending the traditional theories of Greece


the traits that

we can

They

see.

all

far tran-

such

are

carry us back to

that faculty of moral tact to which in his Ethics he

reduced

all virtue,

knowledge

bound

of

backed as

men and by

manner
*

was in him by a wide


reflection.

We

are

to suppose that the principles he asserts in his

Ethics were the guides of his


all

it

deep

of one-sidedness

In the dialogue nepl

(piXo-

own

life,'^

the recoil from

and excess, and the orderly


personally served

him should be

which it is rightly sold, and that several should be


referred by Rose (Ar. Ft. No. 1) freed and even started in life,
As to the latter, cf. his saying,
and Heitz {Ar. Fr. p. 33).
2 As
Bywater {Journ. of ap. DiOG. 17, ov rhv rp6irov, dAAa
(ro<pias,

to

In
Philol. vii. G9) also says.
Aristotle's extant works he often
refers to the need of further
investigation.
' As to
the former, cf. his
will, which provides inter alia
that none of those who had

rhv

&vQp(joirov r{X4r)<ra.

Cf his expressions in the


Letter to Antipater, ap. ^lian,
V. H. xiv. 1 and ap. DiOG. 18.
In the former fragment he says
as to the withdrawal of former
honours {de q. v. p. 36, n. 3,

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE

45

appreciation of things which despises nothing that has

human

its roots in

nature, but attributes an absolute

value only to the spiritual and moral factors of

And

if his character, so far as

we know it,
may have

of any little weaknesses which


it,

seems to us

and

his powers

lofty

and honourable,

life.

spite

attached to

still

more are

achievements altogether

intellectual

Never have

astounding.

and in

know-

so great a wealth of

ledge, so careful powers of observation,

and so untiring

a zeal for acquisition, been found in combination with

such keenness and power of


philosophic

insight

so

with a

scientific thinking,

capable of piercing

into the

essence of things, with a width of view so fully capable


of at

once seeing the unity and coherence of

ledge, and embracing and subordinating

all its

all

know-

branches.

In poetic swing, in richness of fancy, in the insight of


genius, he cannot compete with Plato.

His powers lay

wholly on the side of knowledge, not of

That

art.^

fascinating witchery of speech with which Plato holds

us

is

hardly ever to be found in the extant works of the

Stagirite,

though many of those that are

lost are praised,

doubtless with justice, for their literary grace. ^

he outstrips his master in

mark the

full

supra) ovTws

manhood of

science

us /j-iire /xoi
avrwu fi-fire jxoi
in the latter, as to
exco,

<T(p6Spa jx4\iiv virep


jUTjSev fieKeiv

one who had reviled him behind


hishack: airdura fie Kttl jj-affTiyovTco,

The few poetic attempts we


have show no great gift. On the
other hand his wit was noted

(Demetr. De Eloc. 128), and


apophthegms {ap. DiOG.

the

those

all

17

qualities

in width and

sq)

But
which

solidity

and the fragments of

DeMETR. 29, 233)


give proof of it. That it went
with a tendency to banter and
sauciness of speech (&Kaipos crrwfivXia), as ^lian (V. IT. iii. 19)
tells us of him in his youth, is
possible, though not proved by
the existing testimony,
^ Be quo infra.
letters

(/;.

ARISTOTLE

46

of research, in purity of scientific method, in ripeness


of judgment, in wary discrimination, in his compact

brevity and inimitable keenness of statement, and in

the definite use and comprehensive development of a


scientific

He

terminology.

cannot inspire us, lay hold

and the moral


His
energies, at all in the same way as Plato does.
work is drier, more professional, more closely confined
But
to the field of cognition than Plato's had been.
of our hearts, weld in one the scientific

within these lines he has, so far as one

man

might,

For thousands of years he showed

achieved success.

philosophy her way.

For the Greeks he inaugurated

the age of learning.

In every

field of

knowledge then

open to him he enriched the sciences by original in-

and advanced them by new conceptions.

vestigations,

Even

if

we put

at their highest possible

measure the

help he derived from his forerunners, and the assistance

he obtained from scholars and friends, and perhaps also


from trained
still

slaves,^

the range

of his achievements

all,

common standard, that we


how one man in a short life
especially since we know that

to

wring from a weakly body the

runs so far beyond the

can scarcely understand


could accomplish
his restless soul

it

had

needful vitality for this gigantic work.^


fulfilled his historic

task

it

set him, as scarce

he was as a

Aristotle has

vocation and solved the philosophic

any other ever

man we know

*
Callisthenes of Babylon is
said to have sent him information of astronomical observations
there (Simpl. Be Coelo, Schol.
503, a, 26, following Porph.), but

did.

unhappily too

Of what
but we

little,

the story is suspicious because of


the addition that these observations went back 31,000 years,
^

16.

Qf p 37^ ^

2,

and DiOG.

v.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE


have no reason to believe the attacks of his
to refuse to accord to

47
foes, or

him that favourable judgment

which his own Ethics with many subsidiary indications

must demand.

48

ARISTOTLE

CHAPTER

II

Aristotle's writings

K. Consideration
The

seriatim
of the particular ivorks

the outset
literary activity of Aristotle startles us at

both by

its

which we

extent and

The works

manysidedness.

its

have under

name

his

extend

over

all

branches of philosophy, and they exhibit a vast


Yet
wealth of wide observation and historical learning.
great
a
add
catalogues
to these extant works the ancient

number of others, of which only the titles or slight fragments now remain. Two of these catalogues we have
:

21 sqq.),
the first in two recensions, that by Diogenes (V.
other
the
Menagii'
Anonymus
and that called the
in
contains,
list
first
The
in certain Arabic texts.^
^
Anonymus
^
Diogenes, 146 titles, most of which the
'

'

'

has preserved, leaving out^ a few


eight

new

ones.

An appendix

'

and adding seven or

adds forty-seven titles-

many of which,'^ however, are only repetitions or variants


Pseudepigrapha.
those already entered and ten
of

See both in the Arist.


Fraoni. of Rose and Heitz (Ar.
0,Z V. 1463, Berlin ed., iv. b,
lsq.,Parised.)
According to the earlier

"^

by

According to Rose's
bable conTectu^re Ur, Mbr. Ord.
3

who

132.
pro-

text 111, but as completed

Rosefroman Ambrosian^S.

was Hesychius of Miletus,


lived about 500.
^ As
to the possible grounds
Heitz.
omission cf
oi this
Verlor. Schr. Artst. ip. 15

48) he

14byonetext,27bytheother.
If our count - right there

are 9, ^.e. Nos. 147, 151, lo4, 155,


167, 171, 172, 174, 182, repeating

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

49

Both the sources agree in putting the total number of


books at nearly 400.i The author of the first catalogue
cannot be (as Kose imagines

Andro-

identified with

2)

nicus of Khodes, the well-known editor and arranger of


Aristotle's works,^ though it is not to be doubted that
that Peripatetic did compile a catalogue of Aristotle's

For even

writings.^

Andronicus

is

if

we could

set aside the fact that

said to have given the total

number

at

1,000 books,^ and the circumstance that the extant


index includes Hhe liepl spfirjvsLas, which he rejected/

remains clear that we should look to find in Androthose writings above all that are included in our extant Corpus Aristotelicum, which is
derived, speaking broadly, from his own.
This is far
it

nicus's edition

from being true of the extant catalogues, for many


important parts of the extant Corpus are either altogether absent or at least are not to be traced under
^^'

^^'

^^' 1^'
o^^' \^h ^i H^'
39 and 11 of the main list.
DiOG. 34, and the Anon,
MENAG. at the beginning of his
list. The titles mDiog. (reckoning
the Letters as one book for each
correspondent named and the
UoKiTiiai as a single book) give
375 books those in the Anon, as
completed by Rose, 391.

^^^^h ^id not at all correspond


with his own work. A similar
catalogue of the writings of
Theophrastus is ascribed to him
by the Scholia at the end of his
Metaphijsics and at the beginning
of the seventh book of the ^^6^. ^/
Plants.
^

^'''^'''^1^' 8 sq.
Ot. SELLER, Ph. d. Gt.

iff

in. a, 549,

(ct. p. 37, n. 4,

""^

V.

Pt.

^^"*-

Marc. 8

supra) and David,

^*'

^^.-

^^ ^' """^

ott^^^'i\
credible
that Andronicus merely
adopted the catalogue of Hermippus

VOL.

(v.

a
'

'

This is the more remarkable


because we gather from Dioa 34
that the catalogue was to include
only works recognised as ^e6

from the above-

P''^^^^''
;^c"//Tpw
O^j/ZZa, 26) from the

SgJwI. in At. 24

3 (2nd edition).

1 his IS clear

David,

19.

Heitz, Ar. Fr. 12)

nuine. Bernays(i>mZ.^.^,..l34)
therefore
supposes that the
book was inserted in the cata^^" ^ Andronicus by a later

hand.
^

Alex, in Anal, Pri

5'>
'

'

ARISTOTLE

50
their later

names and

verse theory

only those

contain

The con-

in their later form.^

that the

was meant to

in Diogenes

list

writings which were

tived by the fact that the

contains

list

and that

sections of the Coriius,

it

out of

left

Andronicus's collection of the didactic works,

is

nega-

many important

distinctly claims to

For
be a complete review of the philosopher's works.^
it can owe
that
impossible
equally
is
it
similar reasons
Nicolaus of Damascus,^ or any other to

origin to

its

following: Nos. 141, The Cate(prics; 142, n. kp^t]vdas\ 49,


50, 'AmA.
Uporepwu avaXvriKwv
;

bfXTipc^v

n.

102,

Cy'wi/,

1)

books

(meaning no doubt the UUtory of


AnimaU, he spurious tenth book
of which is afterwards, No. 107,
t

128,
called 'Tirep toD ^urj yevvav)
75, UoKitlkvs aKpodMrjxa-viKwv a
23, OlKovofiiKhs a
ffiujs 8 books
78,

names,
n.
n.

of.

(pvcreois

/3'

dix adds

Kiv7]<Tws

119,

and probably also


under two dilferent

Also Nos. 90,


infra.
a j8' y' , and 45 (115),

book iv.
or
Meteor.')', 70, eVeis iinx^ipw<^of
TiKoi Ke' (no doubt a recension
the ProUems) 36, n. rwv -rroaathe treaXoos XeyojjLevav (doubtless
that
tise, often cited by Ar. under
name, which is now book v. of the
C(vlo,

Metaphysics)', and 38, 'He^Kwi/


(only 5 books). Even assummg
that all the suggested correspondences are correct, the list still

(as 3 books); 157, n.


(only 3 books) 158,
yv4aoos (also 3 books) ;

(^(vcvv fiopiccv

IJe

a'-K). His appen148, ^vaiKi] uKpSaais,


17]'
149, IT. y^via^ws koX
{lege t]
(pOopas
150, IT. /uLeredipcov, S' 155,
156, n. Ccf(}v
n. C4^^ la-Topias i'

'HOiKctiv k' (lege

(which are
a
Kivhcr^ois
probably parts of the Physics)
y'
and No. 39, n. (rroix^itav a fi'
probably the two
(meaning
books n. yeve<TQ}s with our book
iii.

our

of

pr)TopiK^<f

Tex^ns

UoL-nriKwu a
the Topics,

parts

Corpus. The Anon. Menag. adds


the Topics under that name (his
No. 52) and the Metaphysics, to
which he gives 20 books (if the
text is right, de quo infra). The
First Analytic is his 134, with
2 books, and the Mhics is 89,

;^

important

omits

Of the books contained in


Corpus AristoteUcum Diogenes' list mentions only the
'

our

n. C^'wj'
174, n. TfOiKwv

'NiKOfiax^'ioji^-

Of Bernays, Pial. Ar. 133,


and Rose, ut supra cf on the
Verlor.
opposite side, Heitz,
2

Schr. p. 19.
^

2ui/e7pai|/c

'

fii^Kia

air^p

viroypdxpai

5e

Tr&fnrXcKTTa

aKdXovOov

5ia

r^v

7)yT)(rdix7]v

irepl

rrdvTas

Xoyovs ravdphs aper^rjj/,' are the


introductory words in DiOG. v. 21,
but that does not mean that he
would exclude the main philosophical treatises. The same is
clear from 34, where Aristotle's
power of work is said to be proved
e/c

roov
*

Trpoyeypafx/x^voou

avyypafx-

numbering nearly 400.


For his works on Aristotle

fidroov,

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

whom

61

the edition of Andronicus was already known.

must have been a scholar of the AlexanHermippus ^ and he must


either not have had the means or not have taken the
trouble to give us more than a list of the manuscripts
which were to be found ^ in a library accessible to him,
Its compiler

>

drine period, most probably

presumably that of Alexandria.


be impossible

for

him

which can, as we

Otherwise

it

to have omitted important

shall see,

would
works

be clearly proved to have

been in use during the two centuries preceding the date


I

The

'of Andronicus.''

catalogue, therefore, only

first

shows us what writings appeared under Aristotle's name

m the Library of
Of

Alexandria.

far later date is the other catalogue of Aristotelian

two Arabic writers of the thirteenth


century^ copied from a certain Ptolemy' probably a
writings, which

Peripatetic of the second century a.d., mentioned also

by Greek

His

writers.^

list

cf Zellee, Ph. d. Or. Pt. iii. a.


556, 2nd ed., and Heitz, Verlor.
'Schr. 38.
:

So Heitz, 46 sq., followed


by Geote, i. 48, Susemihl, Ar.
'

seems to have reached the


Heitz, ibid. 49, Ar. Fr. 11).
Through what channel it came
to the knowledge of Diogenes,
we do not know.
Brandis {Gr.-rom. Phil. ii.
81) has shown that this
probably true of both the
catalogues of Aristotle and Theophrastus given by Diogenes.
*
Diogenes himself elsewhere
cites works of Aristotle which are
not in his list (Beandis, iUd.;
Heitz, 17), but this only proves
that these references were taken
from other sources than those
from which he got the Cata^

mclifk. 19, At. Pol. xliii,,


Nietzsche, Rhein. Mus. xxiv.
181 sq.
' We are not expressly told that
this scholar and Peripatetic, who
wrote about 200 B.C., catalogued
the works of Aristotle but it is
hardly to be doubted, seeing that
he wrote a biography of Aristotle
in at least two books which Diogenes used (cf. DiOG. V. 1, 2, and

b,

Athbn.

logue.

a. d.

xiii.

589, xv. 696),

and

that his 'Afaypacp^ rSov eocppdcrrov


fiifi\ia)v is mentioned in the Scholia
cited,

p.

49,

n.

4,

supra

(cf.

1,

is

De

q.

V.

Rose, Ar.

0pp.,

p. 1469.

One

of these Arabic writers

E 2

ARISTOTLE

52

Arabic copyists in an incomplete form.


Aristotle's

total of

Ptolemy put

tlie

Books, their

lists

comprise only

For while

works at 1,000

so^e 100

treatises,

Of the component parts of


counting about 550 Books.^
their
our extant Corpis only a few are wanting, and
absence

may be

(Ibn el Kifti, d. 12-18, aj), Kose,


ibid.) says this Ptolemy was an

admirer of Aristotle, who wrote


a book, Histories Ar. et Ifortis
ejuset Scriptorum Ordo, addressed
to Aa^las (or AHlas) the other
:

(Ibn Abi Oseibia, d. 1269, ihid.')


also speaks of his Liher ad
Galas de vita Ar. et eximiajnetate testament I ejus et indiee
scriptorvm ejus notorum. Both
copy from him bio<i:rapliical details as well as the Catalogue, but

seem to know no more of him


than that he lived

Rum

'

(i.e.

the

'

in prorincia

Roman Empire),

and that he was a different person from the author of the AlWhat they say, howmofjest.
exactly with
in Ar. 22, a,
10 (after Proclus, cf. 1. 23), says
of a Ptolemy who reckoned the
ever,

corresponds

what David,

Scliol.

total of Aristotle's books (as did


Andronicus, cf. p. 49, n. 5) at
1,000, avaypacp^v avTwu Troir}adixepos
Kol rhv fiiov avrov kol ttjj/ SidOeaiv
:

and with the remark in J'.Marc.S,


as to the same, that to his list of
Aristotle's works he added his
David takes this Ptolemy
be Ptolemajus Philadelphus,
but this merely proves the ignowill.

to

rance of David, or the pupil who


recorded his lectures; though we
know that Ptolemasus Philadelphus himself was a collector of

works (Athen. i. 3,
David, and Ammon. Schol. in Ar.
28, a, 13, 43), and was a pupil of
Aristotle's

Some

partly accidental.^

others are

Strato(DiOG.v.58). The fact that


the Ptolemy who compiled the

Catalogue came after Andronicus


clear from the mention of
is
Andronicus at No. 90, and of
Of the
Apellicon at No. 86.
writers of that name knovirn to
Rose (Ar. Lihr. Ord. 45) suggests as the same the Neoplatonist Ptolemasus, named by Jambl.
ap. Stob. Eel. i. 904, and by
us.

Proclus In Tim. 7. Another was


a contemporary of Longinus, but
he is said (by Porph. V. Plot. 20)
no scientific
to have written
works. The most probable identification would be with the Peripatetic Ptolemy, whose attack
on a definition of grammar by
Dionysius Thrax is quoted by
Sext. Math. i. 60, and by the
Schol. in Bekker's Aneed. ii. 730,
and whose date therefore must
lie somewhere between Dionysius
and Sextus (70-220 B.C.).
An exact reckoning is not
possible without going into the
variations of the numbering in
the different texts. If the 171 Polities were counted separately,
they would raise the total to
about 720.
2 The most important omissions are the Ethics and the
(Economics besides which there
are the Rhetoric, ad Alex., the
book upon Melissus, &c.; and the
'

tracts n, aKovffTuv, Ti. avatrvo'ns,


n. ivvirviwv, IT. jxavTiKris ttjs eV
TOis virvois, n. yeorrjTOS Koi yf]pc}S,

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
named

The

twice over.

fact that this

was taken from a Greek original


Greek

Arabic catalogue

is

proved by the

hopelessly miswritten, which are

often

titles,

63

most of the items.

set against

It is obvious that catalogues of

and origin

offer

no

such a character

sufficient security either

for the

completeness of their reckoning or for the authenticity


of the writings they include.

Nothing but a

full

and

accurate inquiry into the merits of each case can enable

us to decide as to the claims of those texts or fragments

which are handed down to us under

Aristotle's name.
Such an inquiry cannot here be fully carried out but
it will not be out of place to combine with a complete
;

review of

all

the writings ascribed to Aristotle a concise

appreciation of the points to be considered in passing

judgment on their authenticity.^


To begin at the point where the old catalogues end,
we may distinguish from the philosophical treatises
those writings which dealt with personal matters the
Their number is
letters, poems, and occasional pieces.
relatively small and if we exclude those whose genuine-

n.

Koi iyp-nySpcreus,

'^TTvov

and

Xp<cfji.dTO}v,theU. KSfffjiov,!!.

IT.

apeTuu

Kal KUKiwv, n. Oavfiaffiuv aKova^id-

and the

Twj/,

*i'(rto7i'W;U(/c']fj.

But

as No. 40 includes the De Memoria


et Somno, so it may be that others
of the small scientific tracts
are bracketed in the list under

one

title
*

by

As

and number.
works known only

to the

or fragments,

titles

cf.

the

thorough inquiry of Heitz(Fe?'Zor.


Schrift.

De

Ar.

Ar.,

d.

Val. Rose,

1865), refuting

whose learned essays,


Lihrorum Ordine et

Auetoritate, 1854,

and Ar. Pseud-

ejnffrajjhus, 1863, rejected too


summarily all the lost and several

The writings
of the extant books.
named in the ancient Catalogues
will be cited in this chapter by
Kose's numbers (p. 48, n. 1) ; of
the Catalogues themselves, that of
Diogenes will be cited as D.,that
of the Anonymus Menagii as An.,
and the Ptolemy of the Arabic
Ar. Fr. will be
texts as Pt.
used for the collection of the
fragments by Rose in Ar. Oj)p. v.
1463 sq., Berlin ed.; and Fr. Hz.

ahistotle

54

doubtful or which are certainly forged, there

ness

is

very

little left.

is

few poems and poetic fragments/

and perhaps some part of the matter said to be cited


from his Letters,'^ may stand. The so-called Apologia
of Aristotle,^ and the Orations in praise of Plato and
Alexander,'^

must be

rhetorical inventions of later date.

for that of Heitz in Ar. Opp. iv, b,


1 sq. of the Didot edition.
"
For these, with the notices
relating to them, v. BERGHK,Zyr.
Gr. 504 sq.,K0SE, Ar. Pseud. 598
sq., Ar. Fr. 621 sq., p. 1583, and

The most imFr. Hz. 333 sq.


portant are those above cited
(p. 12, n. 4, p. 20, n.

3),

whose

genuineness we have no reason


to doubt. D. 145 mentions %-k7i and
iyKciofxia ^
i\ey7a, and An. 138
v/j-povs appear in An. Ajjj). 180.
;

2 The
Letters of Aristotle,
praised by Demetr. Floe. 230,
SiMPL. Categ. 2 7, Scliol. in Ar.
27, a, 43, and others (cf. Rose,
Ar. Ps. 587, Heitz, Verl. Schr.
285, and Ar. Fr. 604-620, p.
1579, Fr. Hz. 321 sq.) as the high-

water mark of epistolary style,


were collected in eight books by
one Artemon, otherwise unknown

Demete. EloG. 223,


(??.
Schol. in Ar. 24, a, 26,

David,
and Pt.

No. 87). Andronicus is said to


have reckoned twenty books (Pt.
No. 90, cf. Gell. XX. 5, 10), but
perhaps it was only twenty letters,
which is the number in An.
144 names letters
D.
137.
to Philip, letters to the Selybrians, four letters to Alexander
Demetr. Eloc. 234, Ps.
(cf.
Amm. 47), nine to Antipater, and
seven to others. The letters of
v. Simpl.
120),mentionedbyPHlLOP.
Be An. K. 2, are not in D. All

or to Diares (de quo


P/iys.

extant Fragments seem to come


from the editions of Artemon and
Andronicus. It is difficult to say if
any are genuine, since some are
certainly not. Not only Rose (Ar.
Ps. 585, Ar. Libr. Ord. 113) but
also Heitz (Verl Schr. 280, Fr.
Hz. 321) considers all the letters
That the six now exforged.
tant
(aj). Stahr, Ar. ii. 169,
and Fr. Hz. 329) are so is
clear, and Heitz holds that they
could not even have been in
Artemon's collection.
* Cf
Ar.
p. 35, n. 3, su2)ra
Fr. 601, p. 1578 Fr. Ilz. 320.
.

An

^Y.yKdofxiov

YiXaTuvos is
Gorg.

quoted by Olympiod.

Jahrl. f. Philol., Suppl.,


xiv. 395, and.lr. Fr. 603, Fr. Hz.
319); but it is more than suspi166

(v.

no one used what


would have been the best source

cious, since

of Platonic biography. A Panegyric on Alexander aj). Themist.


Or. iii. 55 (Ar. Fr. 602, Fr. Hz.
319) is condemned by the Fr.
a^). RuTiL. Lupus, De Fig. Sent.
i.
18, if that belongs to it, Bernays' theory of another Alexander
(Dial. Ar. 156) being very improbable. An 'EyKXTja-ia 'AKe^duSpov is named by An. (No. 193) as
spurious. Books n. 'AAe|cij/5pou are
ascribed by Eustath. ajj. Dionys.
Per. V. 1140, and An. Apjj. 176,
to Aristotle through some confusion between his name and
Cf. Hbitz, Verl. Schr.
Arrian's.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

65

may

include those

second section of the writings

which dealt with

essentially distinct in

form from

namely, the Dialogues.


that

use

questions,

scientific

We

all

the extant treatises,

have repeated proofs

dialogue.

of

Dialogues differed from

It

is

of Plato

those

own

291,

and Muller,

Alex. pref.
*

Script,

d.

the three

and the four books On Jusrer.

v.

Cf Bernays, Dialoge

his
fact

Of the

hands.'*

of this kind, the Eudemus^

Oyi Fhilosoj^hy^

in the

that the author kept the

lead of the conversation in his

books

that

coe versing was

that the individuality of the persons

not carried through,^ and

said

make

in one class of his works, did

Aristotle,

of the form

known works

but were yet

Ar.

(1863), Heitz, Verl. Schr. 141221, Rose, Ar. Pseud. 23 sq.


2 Cf. Cic. Ad Att. xiii. 19, 4,
Basil. Ep. 185 (167) ap. Rose,
Ar. Ps. 24, Plut. Adv. Col. 14, 4,
Dio Chrys. Or. 53, p. 274, Alex.
ap. David, SgIioI. in Ar. 24, b,

q. V. Bernays, 21, 148 etc.,


and Rhe'in. Mus. xvi. 286 sq..
Rose, Ar. Ps. 52 sq., Ar. Fr. 82-

{de

48, p. 1479,
EijS7]fxos

Fr. Hz. 47)

is

called

(Themist. Be An. 197,

and

cf. quotations in Ar. Fr.


41), or nepl \l,vxvs (D. 13, An. 13,
Plut. Pio 22), or EvS-nfjLos ^ v.

David, iUd. 24, b, 10 sq., 26,


35; Philop. ihld. 85, b, 41,
and De An. E. 2 Peocl. ap.
Philop. ^tern. M. 2, 2 (cf.
Ar. Er. 10) and In Tim. 338 d;

(Plut. Cons, ad Apol. 27,


115, and Simpl. ap. Ar. Fr.
learn from Plut. Pio
42).
22, and Cic. Pivin. 1, 25, 53,
that it was dedicated to Aristotle's
friend, Eudemus, who died in
Sicily 352 B.C. (cf.p. lln. 4 supra),

Ammon.

and

33,

b,

Cateff. 6,

(ap.

Stake,

Ar. ii. 255) Simpl. Phys. 2, b


Priscian, Solut. Prooim. p. 553 b.
3 Basil.
Ep. 135 (167) ap.
Rose, Ar. Pseud. 24. Ar. Fr. 1474.
Heitz, 146.
;

Ad Quint.
Cic. ut supra.
5 does not refer to Dialogues. ' Aristotelius mos,' in Cic.
Ad Earn. i. 9, 23, has a wider sense;
and refers to the in ntramque
partem disputare,' cf Pe Orat. iii.
21, 80 but see Heitz, 149.
* This remarkable
Dialoj^ue
*

Fr.

iii.

'

rl/vxvs

p.

We

it

was probably written soon

after (Krische, Forsch.

i.

16).

Of the Fragmients ascribed to it by


Rose, more probable places will be
indicated infra for Fr. 36, 38, and
48. Aristotle himself seems, in

An.

Pe

to refer to a discussion in the Eudemus, cf. Ar. Fr. 41


D.
An. 3 (who by
3,
i.

4, init.

oversight

Bernays,

gives

four

books),

Rose, Ar. Ps.


27, Ar. Fr. 1-21, p. 1474, Heitz,
Verl. Schr. 179 sq., Fr. Hz. 30 sq.,
Bywatee, 'Aristotle's Dialogue
47, 95,

ARISTOTLE

66
tice

seem to have been the most important.

The first two

are of particular interest, because they stand in such close


relation, not only

to the

work of

when

Aristotle

by their form but by their

Plato, that there is

subjects,

much

to be said for
the conjecture that they were written in the period

scholars,

belonged to the circle of Plato's

still

and had not yet

independe//- position.^
on Philosophy,' Journ. of
64 sq.

vii.

fully passed over to his later

There are certain other works

Philol.

Priscian tells us the

work was a dialogue {Solut.


Proceni. p. 553), and it is confirmed by the statement (Plut.
Adf.

Philop.

Col. 14, 4, Procl. ap.

^m. M. 2, 2; V. Ar. Fr. 10)


that Aristotle had in his Dialogues attacked and renounced
the IdeHl Theory; of. At. Fr.
11 from the second book n.
(piXoa. arguing against the Ideal
Numbers.
These three books
are referred to (besides D.) by
Philodem. n. eva-eBdas, col. 22,
and following him, by Cic. iV. I>.
i. 1 8, H'6.
The apparent reference
in Arist. P%.s-. ii. 2, 194, a, 35
yap
rd ov ej/eKa' etp-qrai 5'
(Stx^s
eV TOis irepl <piXo(ro<pias) is as Heitz
says (^Verl. Schr. 180) Yary suspicious, since Aristotle
else cites his Dialogues

nowhere

but on
the other hand the reference will
not apply either to the Book on
the Good (which could not be
;

called n. (pi\o(T., cf. p. 61, n. 1,


infra), nor to Ifetaph. xii. 7,
1072, b, 2, since as Aristotle left

that book unfinished he could


not quote it in the Physics.
Kose's rejection of the n. (piKoa.
is followed by Susemihl, Genet.
Fnt. d. plat. Phil. ii. 534 but
the arguments are insufficient.
D. 1, An. 1, Pt. 3, At. Fr.
;

71-77,

p.

1487,

Bernays,

48,

Rose, Ar. Ps. 87, Heitz, Verl.


Schr. 169, Fr. Hz. 19. CiC. Pep.
iii.
8, 12, mentions
this as a
comprehensive
work in four
books.
According to Plut. Sto.
rep. 15, 6, it was attacked by
Chrysippus ('Ap. Trepi ^iKaioavviis
'

'

auriypd(pooi^)

and the attacks

of

Carneades mentioned by LacTANT. Fpit. 55 (ap. CiC. Pep. iii.)


seem to have been also specially
directed to this work. Dpjmetr.
Floo. 28 cites a passage from it.
We are not told that it was a
Dialogue, but that is inferred
from its position at the head of D.
which begins (Bernays, p. 132)
with the Dialogues arranged according to number of books. It
is, however, true
that in the
midst of the Dialogues (as No.
12) the Protrepticus comes in,
which probably was not a Dialogue.
Neither probably were
Nos. 17-19.
It is a question,
therefore, whether the Anon, has
not here preserved the original
order
so
that the Dialogues
really include only the first thirteen numbers of An., together
with the Sj/mposlon which was
misplaced in that list by reason
:

of the textual error(?7.p. 58, n. 1).


2 This is specially true of the
Eudemus. All the fragments of

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
whicli are supposed

to

67

have been dialogues, mainly

by reason of the place assigned them in the catalogues


but some of them are only distantly connected with
this dialogue prove that it was
built on the lines of the Phcsdo.
They have in common not only
their subject, the Immortality of
the Soul, but also the artistic

and philosophic method

in which
treated.
Like the PJiccdo
(60 E), the JEudenms was introit is

duced {Fr. 32) by a revelation in


a dream, the direct prototype of
which is to be found in the other
Dial, relating to the last days of
Socrates {Crito, 44 A). As Plato
concludes his work (108 D sq.)
with an imaginative myth, so the
Eudemus had also its mythic
ornament (cf. Fr. 40, where
the words of Silenus, ^aiixovos
etc., remind us also of
617 D, and Fr. 37, which
must be taken in a mystical
sense).
As the Phcedo (69 c)
refers to the doctrines of the
Mysteries, so Fr. 30 of the
Eudemus recognises the validity
of the customary honours to the
dead. But the most remarkable
resemblance between the two
Dialogues is in their philosophical contents.
Aristotle in the
Eudemus insisted .not only on
Immortality, but also on Preexistence and Transmigration,
defending in his own way the
theory that the soul in its
entrance into this life forgot
the Ideas {Fr. 34, 35). As the
Ph(sdo based the decisive argument for immortality on the
relation of the soul to the idea
of life (105 c sq.), so the Eudemus
also called
the soul ein6s n
(Fr. 42). As Plato worked up to
this argument by a detailed refuiiriirouov,

Rejj. X.

tation of the theory that the soul


was the harmony of its body,
here also Aristotle followed him
(Fr, 41).
Exactly on Plato's
lines is likewise Fr. 36, where the
misery of the soul tied to the body
is imaged in a striking comparison ; and even if By water (Journ.
of Phil. ii. 60) and Hirzel
(Hermes, x. 94) are right in referring this Fr. to the Protrejjticus,
still
this also seems to have
been on the same lines as the
Eudemus (cf. p. 60, n. 1, infra).
Aristotle took a more independent position against Plato in
the books On Philosophy. It is
true that the Frs. in which he
defends the belief in the gods,
the unity of God, and the rational
nature of the stars (Fr. 14, 13,
16,

19, 20, 21,

N.D.
Brandis,
Cic.

ii.
ii.

and the Fr.

ap.

49, 125, de q. v.
b, 1, 84; Heitz,

228, refuting Kose, Ar. Ps. 285),


read like Plato, and that Fr. 15
(de q. V. Bern AYS, 110, and Fr.
Hz. 37) is evidently modelled on
Bep. ii. 380 d.
Nevertheless,
Aristotle decisively declared himself in this work (Fr. 10, 11, cf.
p. 55, n. 6) against the theory of
the Ideas and Ideal Numbers,
declared the world to be not only,
as Plato said, unending, but also
beginningless (v. Frs. 17, 18,

with which Bywater, 80, well


compares Plut. Tranqu. An. 20,
p. 477) and gave in Book T. (v.
Bywater's reconstruction thereof
from Philop. in Nieom. Isag
Cic. Tusc. iii. 28, 69; Procl. in
EuCL. p. 28 cf. Ar. Fr. 2-9) a
;

general theory of the develop-

ARISTOTLE

58

system,^

the philosophic

and others are of doubtful

authenticity.^
of humanity to culture and
philosophy, which, although it
connects with Plato by the remark {a}). Thilop.) that the
spiritual and divine principle, in

ment

spite of its own light, appears


to us dark 5ia 'Tr]v iTrLKeifx^vrjv

rod adiixaros dxAuj/, and by the


theory of periodic floods whereby
humanity was thrown back into
savagery (cf. Plato, Tim. 22 D,
Laws, iii. 677 A, 681 e), indicates
clearly an independent view of
history which goes beyond Plato
not only in relation to tlie eternity
of the World {Meteor, i. 14, 352 b,
16; Polit. vii. 9, 1329 b, 25;
Metaph. xii. 8, 1074 a, 38; of.
Bern AYS, TheopliT. il. d. Frommiglt. 42), but to the process of
spiritual develojjinent {Metaph. i.
1, 981 b, 13, and 2, 982 b, 11 sq.).
Aristotle's interest in scholarly
inquiries appears in the passages
of this work on the Magi, on

Orpheus, on the Seven Wise Men,


and on the development of philosophy from their time to his own
and his critical sense is shown in
his discussion of the story of
Orpheus in Fr. 9. Taking all
this into consideration, the books
On Pliilosopliy show, as compared
with the Fudemus, a remarkable advance in independence of
thought, leading to the suggestion
that they were written later, perhaps at the end of Plato's life.
Krische (Forsch. i. 265) sought to
identify the 3 bks. n. ^i\o<r. with
Metaph. i., xi., xii. but this is
now untenable (cf. Heitz, 179,
;

and

infra, p. 76 sq.).

It is

more

probable that they were used for


various passages of Metaph. i.,
xii., and for the bk. n. ovpavov

(v.

p.

Blass, Rliein. Mus. xxx. 1875,


There must be, how481).

ever,

much

variation,

and

Blass'

view that certain passages are


taken verbally from the n. (piXocr.
is

improbable.

To this class belong the


3 bks. n. TTotTjTwj/ (D. 2, AN. 2,
'

Pt. 6; Bernays, 10 sq., 60, 139;


Rose, Ar. Ps. 77; Ar. Fr. 5969, p. 1485; Heitz, V.S. 174 sq.
Fr. Hz. 23). That this work was a
;

Dialogue is doubted by Muller,


Fr. Hist. ii. 185 but it is proved
not only by its place in the
Catalogues, but also by an express
statement in V. Marc. p. 2, and
by the form of Fr. 61. It was
probably used as a genuine work
by Eratosthenes
of
Aristotle
and Apollodorus, but we cannot
be sure that their references
{Fr. 60 ap. DiOG. viii. 51) may
not point to another work, posAristotle,
sibly the Politeiai.
however, himself refers at the
end of Poet. 15 to a discussion
in the iKS^do/jLcyoi \6yoL, which it
is most natural to apply to the
n. iroL-qruv, as in the Rhetoric
(which EosE, Ar. Ps. 79, suggests)
there is no corresponding passage. The few references we have,
which are mostly historical notes,
show nothing that throws doubt
on the genuineness of the work.
Fr. 66 contains statements as to
Homer, evidently from a tradition
current in los, which (notwithstanding NiTZSCH, Hist. Horn.
ii. 87,
Muller, ut supra, and
Rose, Ar. Ps. 79) do not prove
the spuriousness of the book,
since they might well have been
introduced in the Dial, without being believed by the author.
;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
With

the Dialogues

set of writings,

connected

be

another

which did not take that form, but were

For thetitlen.TTotijTci);/ we find also


(Fr.QB, 66, 69 cf. Spengbl,^&A.
d. Miinchn. Akad. ii. 213 Hitter,
Ar. Poet. X. Heitz, V. S. 175)
that of n. Troir)TiKrjs, which, unless
it is a mere confusion, indicates
that the work was not purely
historical, but contained discussions on the Art of Poetry as well
as information about the poets.
After the Dialogues, which made
several books, there follows in
the lists the UoKiriKhs, which
consisted, according to D. 4, of
2 books, according to An. 4, of
one (Fr. 70, p. 1487 Rose, Ar.
Ps. 80; Bernays, 153; Heitz,
V.S. 189, Fr. Hz. 41) and thereafter the following, in one book
each IT. ^rjTopiKrjs ^ TpvWos (D. 5,
the addition of y is
An. 5
obviously a false reading, though
Pt. 2 b, ap. Ibn abi Oseibia
has Be Arte Rituri iii.' Cf. Ar.
Fr. 57 sq. p. 1485; Rose, Ar.
Ps. 76 Bernays, 62, 157; Heitz,
Fr.
Hz. 41); the
V.S. 189,
ROSE, Ar.
N-fipiveos (D. 6, An. 6
Fr. 53, p. 1484, Ar. Ps. 73;
Bernays, 84; Heitz, V.S. 190,
Fr. Hz. 42), doubtless the same
as the Sid\oyos Kopivdios, of which
Themist. Or. 33, p. 356 speaks
the 2o(()i(TT^s (D. 7 An. 8 Pt. 2
Ar. Fr. 54-56, p. 1484 Ar. Ps.
75 Fr. Hz. 42), of which nothing
remains except a few remarks on
Empedocles, Zeno, and Protagoras the Mej/e^epos (D. 8, An.
10), of which there are no fragments the 'EpcoriKhs (D. 9 An.
12; Ar. Fr. 90-93, p. 1492; Ar.
Ps. 105; Heitz, V.S. 191, Fr.
Hz. 43); the Svfnrdffiov (D. 10;
An. 19, where avWoyia-fMoy is a
;

'

may

59

Fr.
miswriting; Ar.
p. 1495; Ar. Ps. 119;

107 sq.
Fr. Hz.

44; cf. Heitz, V.S. 192, who


rightly questions the application
of Plut. JV. p. Suav. V. 13, 4 to
this Dialogue)
the n. ttXovtov
;

An. 7; Ar. Fr. 86-89,


p. 1491; Ar. Ps. 101; Heitz,
V. S. 195, Fr. Hz. 45) probably
attacked by the early Epicurean,
(D. 11;

Metrodorus,
in

the proper reading

if

Philodem. De

Virt. et Vit. ix.

be (as seems probable

col. 22,

Spengel, Ahli. d. Munclm.


V. 449, and Heitz, I.e.') not

cf.

AMd,

n. iroXmlas, but

11.

the

ttXovtov

Dial, is nowhere quoted


and of the fragments

by name,
reckoned

as belonging to it Heitz rightly


rejects Fr. 88 and the n. evxns
(D. 14; An. 9; Ar. Fr. 44-46,
Ar. Ps. 67 Fr. Hz. 56
p. 1483
Bernays, 122), to which we possess only one reference that can
be identified with certainty, i.e.
Fr. 46, which is too closely related to Plat. Rejj. vi. 508 e
to permit its rejection,
If we could say absolutely
that the Dial. IT. evyevelas (D. 15;
AN. 11; Pt. 5; Ar. Fr. 82-85,
p. 1490; Ar. Ps. 96; Bernays,
;

'^

140; Heitz, V. S. 202; Fr. Hz.


which was already questioned by Plut. Arist. 27, is not
genuine, it would follow (as Heitz
suggests) that the stoiy that
Socrates was accused of bigamy
misrests upon some
in it
This, however,
understanding.
seems hardly probable, because
the story in question appears so
frequently and so early in the
Aristotelian School. As to the
genuineness of the Dialogues
55),

ARISTOTLE

60

yet distinguished, as

by

treatises

These are
same period of
To that period must also belong

work.*

Aristotle's

seems, from the strictly scientific

ascribable

in part)

least

(at

it

their popular style of treatment.

to the

form an approximate judgment


but there do not seem to be decisive grounds for rejecting any

a couple of conversational remarks, which may therefore as


properly be called irpoTpcirriKhs
as Menexenns with its longer concould be
versational preface

of them.

called

To the same period with the


Eudemns belongs also the Pro-

Ar. Phet. iii. 14, p. 1415, b, 30).


If Cicero used it as a model for

named

in the previous note, there


are very few as to which we can

trejftims (D.

where

it is

12

An. 14

Pt.

probably transposed

with the n. (piXocr. and is therefore said to have three books.

Ar. Ft. 47-50, p. 1483 Fr. llz.


According to Teles, circa
46).
250 B.C., it was addressed to the
Cyprian prince Themiso, and was
;

known

to

Crates

(t.

Zeno and to his teacher


Stob. i-^/wvi. 95,21).

]tOSE,ylr. Ps. G8 (with n,fortassc\


Bywater, Journ. of PMl. ii. 55,

and USENEii, Rhcin. Mus. xxviii.


372, suppose it to have been a
Dial., and Beenays, IIG, gives
no opinion but Heitz, V. S. 196,
and HiRZEL, Hermes, x. 61, seem
to be right in saying that it was
a continuous essay. The reasons
;

are

(1)

that

irpoTpeTTTiKhv
G(jivo.

says

'A/>.

^ypa^pe irphs

e/jLi-

Teles

tip

and although a Dial, like


may be dedicated to a

a drama

man,

yet it cananyone, 'jrp6s


(2) that all other

Tiv\ irpoa"Yp6.(j)iv,

not be written
riva ypd(peip

to

that we know were


essays and not dialogues even
the pseudo- Platonic Clitojjhon,
which got an unsuitable second
irpoTpeTTTiKol

title
aj?.

of

DiOG.

UpoTpcTTTiKhs (Thrasyll.
iii,

60), is

no exception
a dialogue,

to this, for it is not

but a speech introduced only by

iiriTacpios

(Thras.

ibid.

his Ilortensivs (Scrij^t. Hist. Aiig.


V. Sal. Gallieni, c. 2), it may still
be questioned whether the dialogue form was part of the imi-

As Usener, ut sujfra,
shows, Cicero also used it for
the Somnium Sci^rionls, Rep. vi.,
and, mediately or immediately,
Censorinus, D. Nat. 18, 11. Bywater, lit siipra^ has also shown
(but cf. Hirzel) that Jamblicus
used it for his own Protreyticus.
Of a kindred nature apparently
was the TI. TraiSetas (D. 19 AN.
10; Pt. 4; Ar.Fr. 51, p. 1484;
Ar. Ps. 72; Heitz, V. S. 307,
Fr. Hz. 61). As no fragments
are preserved, we cannot tell
whether the 11. rjSovTJs (D. 16, cf.
66; An. 15; Pt. 16; Heitz,
V. S. 203; Fr. Hz. 59) was a
The book
dialogue or not.
n. fia<n\ias (D. 18; An. 16;
Pt. 7 Ar. Fr. 78, 79, probably
also 81, p. 1489; Fr. Hz. 59),
which was addressed to Alexander, and apparently referred to by
Eratosthenes {op. Strabo, i. 4,
9, p. 66), was more probably an
essay (v. Heitz, V. S. 204) than
a dial. (Rose, Ar. Ps. 93,*' and
On the other
Beenays, 56).
hand, the title *A\4^av5pos ^ vvfp
(irepi) airoiKwv [-KtcDj/], if the text
tation.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
the treatise

On

the

Good}

It

was an account of the

substance of Plato's lectures,^ and what

from or of

it

gives no reason to doubt

be correct, rather suggests a dial.


(D. 17 Ar. Fr. 80 Bernays, 56
Fr. Hz. 61. Heitz, V. S. 204, 207,
;

suggests
Kal

TTphs 'AAe|.

fiaa-iXeias.

IT.

virlp airo'iKuv

conjecture would be,


IT.

fiaaiXeias a').

vir.

preferable
airoiKwu

a'.

Other fragments

which Rose places among the


Dials, will be referred to infra.
The n. TayaBov consisted,
'

according to D. 20, of three books


An. 20, one book; Pt. 8, five books:
Alex, ad Metayli. iv. 2, 1003
b, 36, 1004 b, 34, 1005 a, 2 repeatedly quotes Book II., and
the regular form of citation is eV
Totj TT. Tay. Apart from the Catalogues, we never hear of this
work except in the Aristotelian

notices
Commentators, whose
are collected and discussed by
Brandis, *Perd. Ar. Libr. de
IdeisetdeBono,' Gr.-rmn. Phil. ii.
Krische, Forsch. i.263
b, 1, 84
Rose, Ar. Ps. 46, Ar. Fr. 22-26,
p. 1477, and Heitz, V. S. 209,
Fr. Hz. 79. Brandis {ihid.) has
shown that none of them except
Alexander possessed the work
Heitz, p. 203, doubts this
itself.
even as to Alex., because he in one
place (p. 206, 19) distinguishes
the eK\oyi] rwv ivavrioov noticed
Ar. Metaph. iv. 2, 1004 a, 2 {de q.
;

infra) from the second book II.


rayaQov, and in another place
(p. 218, 10, 14) identifies them.

These passages seem, however,


only to show that Alexander
knew of no e/c\. t. iv. as a separate book, but saw in the second
book n. Tay. a discussion to
which, as far as the sense went,
Aristotle might be referring, so

61

little is

its

recorded

genuineness.^

that he was not sure whether Aristotle's reference referred to the


n. ray. or to a special work.
If
so, this makes rather for than
against Alexander's knowledge
of the n. Tuyddov.
Simpl. Be
An. 6, b, Philop. Be An. C. 2
(cf. Ar. Fr. p 1477 b, 35), Suid.
'Ayad. p. 35, b, believe that the

words

iv To7s irepl <pi\ocro<pLas Ae-

yofxivois in

Ar. Be An. i. 2, 404,


work, whereas

b, 18, refer to this

they

really

writings

But

refer

to

Platonic

(cf. Zeller, II. a. 636, 4).

this proves only that these


knew the n. rayadov at

writers

second hand.

Rose's view that

work was a Dial, is


futed by Heitz, V.S.2V1.
this

re-

We

cannot tell whether Aristotle


published in his lifetime his
notes upon the lectures of Plato,
or whether they became public
after his death.
If the cKAoy^ r.
ivavr., cited by himself, formed
part of them, the former would
of course be true.
It is clear
that the book was in use before
the end of the third century B.C.,
and certainly before the time of
Andronicus, because of the mention of it in Diog.'s list; cf.
p. 48 sq. supra.
2 Referred to by Aristoxenus

and

others, cf. Zeller, Plato, 26.


(P7iy.9. 32, b, 104, b, Schol.
334, b, 25, 362, a, 8) mentions,
besides
Aristotle,
Speusippus,

Simpl.

Xenocrates, Heraclides and Hesas having published the


Platonic lectures.
3 This is pro ved, against S USE

tiffius

MIHL, Genet. Entw.

d. 2)lat. Pliil.

2, 533, in Zeller's Plato,

ad

loo.

ARISTOTLE

62

There

is

more doubt about the date of the work On

the Ideas,^

which Aristotle apparently refers to in the


The
and which Alexander possessed.^

Metaphysics^^

from some of Plato's writings and the monographs on earlier and cotemporary philosophers^
'*

JExtracts

Tliis work is named in D.


and An. 45 (which give it
one book only) n. ttjs Ideas or
n. Ideas. We have references,
however, by Alex. inMetaph. 564,
b, 15 to the 1st book n. Idewv, in
573, a, 12 to the 2nd, and in 566,

An. 85 Simpl. Be
Tov; D. 94
Cwlfl, Schol. 491, b, 37 <rvvoxpiy^
Tifiaiov ypdcpeiv ovk
iTTi.rofjL'^v TOV

the 4th (but in the last case


well read A for A, with
Rose, Ar. Ps. 191, Ar. Fr. 1509,

apea-KduTwu
Schol. 492,

54,

b, 16 to

we may
b, 36).

Syrian, In

3Ietaj)h. 901,

942, b, 21 speaks of a work


The
eiSwj/ in two books.
same is meant in Pt. 14 by the
three books De imar/inihus, ntrum
existant an own but the Arabic
title \fari aiduln'' indicates that
their Greek text read not 11. etSaJj/,
but n. etSwAcov cf. RoSB, At. Ps.
a, 19,

n.

Tcoj/

185; Ar. Fr. 180-184 p. 1508;


Fr. Hz. 86 sq.
we have
I. 990 b, 8 sq.
not only Alexander's statement
that this passage refers to the
work on Ideas, but it seems to be
the natural inference from Aristotle's text itself that ho is re;

ferring to some more detailed


discussion of the Ideal Theoiy
which is already known to his

Kose {Ar. Ps. 186) doubts


bat Alexander's own statements (cited in Ar. Fr. 183 Jin.,
184 /?<-.) indicate as much.
* Ta eK rujv vSfxcov UT^drwvos (D.
21, as 3 Bks., An. 23 as 2). Ta e/c
rris iroXirdas a jS' (D. 22. PrOCL.
Ar. Fr.^ 176,
in Benip. 350
Ta eK Tov Tifiaiov Kal
p. 1507).
rwv ^Apx^TCLcov (alias Ka\ 'Apxv3

this,

cf. Fr. Hz. 79.


aw-n^iwae)
^ n. rcov Ilvdayopeiwv, D. 101
An. 88 no doubt the same as is
named 'l^waycoy^ rSov TLvOayopelois
;

by SiMPL. De Ccelo,
a, 26 and b, 41 sq.

UvdayopiKa {ihid. 505, a, 24, 35)


UvOayopiKhsl-ov ?] (Theo. Arithm.
SJ^tjs
n. T7JS HvdayopiKwv
5)
(Alex. Metaph. 560, b, 25), and
n, TTjs TlvQayopiKris (pi\o(ro<plas
;

V. Pyth. 31). Probably


separate title Uphs rohs
UvOayopeiovs, D. 97, is only a part
of the same work, as D. gives
each of them one book only,
Simpl.
while Alexander and

(Jambl.

the

quote from book 2. The reference in DiOG. viii. 34, cf. 19,
probably belongs to this treatise
(whether we there read eV r^ ire pi
or tt. Kvdfxwp only, cf.
Other notices of the
Cobet).
work are collected by Rose, Ar.
Ps. 193, Ar. Fr. 185-200, p. 1510
find also three
Fr. Hz. 68.
books n. rrjs ''Apx^reiov [-tou ?1
(piAo(To(pias in D. 92, An. 83, Pt,
cf. Ar. Ps. 211, and Fr. Hz.
9
Also Uphs
77, and cf. last note.
Kvaixcav,

We

TO,

'AAKfialwvos,

D. 96, An. 87;

ruv

A-n/JLOKpirov, 7
2) books, D. 124, An. 116 (cf.
Ar. Ps. 213, Ar. Fr. 202 p. 1514,
Fr. Hz. 77 ;) Uphs rh M\la<Tov, D.

Ylpo^Xriixara

e/c

(?

An. 86
An. 89

ra Topyiov, D.
ra "Seuocpdvovs,
l-Kpdrovs in MSS.] D. 99 Dp. t^

95,
98,

lip.

Up.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
so far as these

were genuine

must,

63

however, have

been mostly compiled during Aristotle's

first

residence

in Athens, or at least before his return from Macedonia.

of

collection

Platonic Divisions

ascribed

to

him

was no doubt a forgery.^


Far above all these in historic importance stand the
works which set out the peculiar system of the Master in
Speaking broadly, it is these
strict philosophical form.
first century A.D., and have
which
have
survived
the
alone
De

Melisso, &c., to which, besides the


lost section as to Zeno, another
cited at second hand by Philop.
Phys. B. 9 as Tip. r))V UapixeviSov
dd^av seems to have belonged.
know that this work was used
by Simplicius (cf Zeller,i.474 sq.).

view of the character of our


informants it is very possible
that tliey presented ^s history
what lie had only stated as a
Pythagorean tradition. Similarly
the meanings of the Pythagorean
symbols {Fr. 190 sq.) and the
contents of Fr. 188, which Isidor.

There was also the Uepl

ajp.

Z-i]vo}vos,

D. 100

otir treatise

We

iirirov

ttjs STreuo--

Kal aevoKparovsl^cpLXocrocpias'],

9.3, An. 84.


We cannot judge as to the
genuineness of several, of which
we have the titles only. It is

D.

not impossible that Aristotle

have

left,

extracts and
philosophic

may

among

his papers,
criticisms on various

systems

written

down
and

in the course of his studies,


that recensions of these were

It is also possible
published.
that similar collections may have

passed themselves off under his


name. That the latter was the
case with the tracts in our Corpses
on the Eleatic School is proved
in Zeller, Ph. d. Or. i. 465 sq.
It is more difficult to decide as
to the authenticity of the work on
the Pythagoreans. If all the fables
(see Zeller, Pli. d. Gr. i. 285)
which appear in Ft. 186, were
related as historic fact, the book
could not be Aristotle's, but in

Clement.

Strom,

641

vi.

falsely

attributes to Aristotle
himself, are merely references to
Pythagorean theories. The rest
of the passages cited from this
book as to the Pythagorean
system give no reason to reject
it.
The apparent contradiction

between Fr. 200

{ap. Simpl. De
Schol. 492, b, 39 sq.) and
Coelo ii. 2, 285, b, 25 is
quite reconcileable, without following Alexander in assuming a
falsa lectio, for which, however,
Fr. 195, ap. Simpl. iUd. 492, a,
18, gives some ground.
2 This is named in the existing lists only by Pt. 53, as Divisio Platonis^ (formerly mistranslated \jusjura7idum or tesCoelo,

Ar. Be

'

'

tamentum PV). It was, perhaps,


the same as the Aristotelian 5mipeVets (v. p. 75, n. 2, infra) else-

where mentioned.
A similar
work, obviously a later recension
of the Pseudo -Aristotelian text

ABISTOTLE

64

thereby transmitted to medioeval and modern times a

knowledge of the Aristotelian philosophy.


is no doubt primarily due to
that it was in them that that philosophy was

first-hand

Their preservation itself


the fact
first

expounded in the systematic maturity in which he

set it forth

If

during the years of his teaching at Athens.

we take what

now

is

extant or otherwise

to us of this class of works, that


is

which

first

known

meets us

the important set of treatises which laid the founda-

tion for all later logic

the Categories ^^

used for the account given of


Plato by DiOG. iii. 80, is printed
by RoSK, Ar. Ps. 677-61)5 (and
after him by J^r. Hz. 91), under
the title, Aiaipdaeis 'ApiarordAovs,
deq. V. ZeIjL., Pk.d. Gr. ii. a. ;)82.

The

title

of this

work by

common (and probably correct) account is KaTrjyopiai but


we tind it also named as n. rcov
KaTTjyopioov, KaTr^yopiai Sewa, n.
T civ 5e/ca Karrfyopicov, U. rwv SeKa
yevwv, n. Tuu yeycou rod ovtos,
KaTTjyopiai ^toi tt. rwv SeKa yeviiccordTccu yevwv,
n. rwu KaQoXov
\6y(i)i>, Ylph Toou roiriKuu (or tottccu)
Waitz, Arist. Org. i. 81,
cf.
ISIMPL. in Cat. 4, )8, and David,
Sahol. in Ar. 80, a, 8.
The title
Ta irph twv roircav was known to
Andronicus according to Simpl.
ibid. 95 C, Schol. 81, a, 27, and
to Boethius, In Prccd. iv. p. 191
(who obviously got his knowledge
irom the same source as Simpl.,
the

Porphyry). Herminus, circa


160 A.D., preferred it to the ordinary name.
David, however,
(^Schol. 81, b, 25), D. 59, and
An. 57 name a book called Ta
7rpi> Twj/ Tt^TTcoj/, besides the Karrjyopiai, which is D. 141, An. 132,
Pt. 25 b and do not ajjpear to
i.e.

the book on

think them the same.


Andronicus was probably right {ap.
Simpl. nt supra, Schol. 81, a, 27)
in identifying the title of To
Kph T. tSttccu with the spurious
appendix of the so-called Post'

pr;^:idicamcnta

'

and

it

may have

been invented either, as he supposes, by the writer of that tract,


or by some later editor who found
the original name, Karrjyopiai,
too limited for the treatise as
enlarged by the spurious addition.
Aristotle himself refers to
his theory of the Categories (Be
i.
An.
], 5, 402 a, 28, ^410 a, 14,
Anal. Pri. i. 37, cf. the quotations, infra, p.

189, n. 2, q. v.)
to his readers, and he
this in
other places
also, which seems to indicate
that he had dealt with it in a

as

known

assumes

published work. There

is

a more

definite reference in Mh. JV. ii.


1 init. to Cateff. c. 8 (cf. TrenDELENB. IRsi. Beitr. i. 174).
That in Eth. Eud. i. 8, 1217,

b 27, may possibly refer not to


the Categ. but to some work of
Eudemus, and those in Top. ix.,
(Soph.
5,

El.-) 4. 22.

166, b, 14. 178, a,

no doubt refer to the passage

as to categories in Toj).

i.

9, init.t

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
which, however,

so brief

is itself

and undeveloped that it presupposes an early and better account.


Simpl. {Categ. 4 C> Schol. 30, b,
36) and David {Schol. 30, a, 24)
say that Aristotle had also referred to this work in another
place not now extant under
the title of KaTqyopiai or Ae/ca
Kar.
We are told also that, fol-

lowing Aristotle's example, Eudemus, Theophrastus, and Phanias, wrote not only Analytica,'
and works n. ep^rji/etas,' but
'

also Kar-nyoplai

(Ammon.

SoJiol.

28, a, 40, and in q. v. Porph. 15 m,


David, Schol. 19, a, 84, 30, a, 5,

Anon.

ibid. 82, b, 32, 94, b, 14

but Brandis in the Rhein. 3his.

i.

1827, p. 270, rightly denies this as


to Theophrastus, and doubts it as
to Eudemus). The references in
Simpl. Cat. 106, a, 107, a, sq.,
Schnl. 89, a, 37, 90, a, 12 do not
prove that Strato referred to Ari-

On the other
stotle's Categories.
hand, the ancient critics never
doubted the genuineness of the
extant book, although they rejected a second recension {v.
Simpl. Catcg. 4 f, Schol. 39, a,
36 Anon. ibid. 33, b, 30 Philop.
ibid. 39, a, 19, 142, b, 38 Ammon.
;

I.

saying that its compiler might


be found 'in any master of a
peripatetic school of the age
following Chrysippus' (p. 207).
Their critical positions, however,
Prantl
are not all tenable.
Qibld.) takes exception to the
number 10 but in the Toj). i.
9, the same ten Categories are
given, and we know from Dexipp.
lln Categ. 40, Schol. 48, a, 46)
and Simpl. {ibid. 47, b, 40) that
Aristotle named these ten in
other works also. It is true that
Aristotle generally uses a less
number but that may only mean
either that he here adduces all
the ten because his object was
logical completeness, or that he
counted more Categories at an
earlier time than he did later.
He never assumed, as will be
shown later, a fixed number of
them. Again, it is objected that
the KaTTjy. speaks of Sevrepai.
ova-lat but we find as parallels to
this not only irpSbrai ovalai (e.g.
;

Metaph.

vii. 7, 18,
1032, b, 2,
1038, b, 10), but also rp'nai ovaiai
(ibid. vii. 2, 1028, b, 20, 1043,
The words of KarTjy.
a, 18, 28).
cIkStws
29
b,
0.
5, 2,

fiSva

Cat. 13, 17, and Boeth. In


Freed. 113, all following Adrastus, a noted critic circa 100
A. D.; cf. Fr. Hz. 114). The only
doubts suggested are by Schol.
33, a, 28 sq., and these apparently were not derived from
Andronicus. The internal characteristics of the book, however, are in many ways open
Spengel
to criticisms, which
{Miinchn. Gel. Anz. 1845, 41 sq.),
Rose {Ar. Libr. Ord. 232 sq.),
and Prantl {Oesch. d. Logih, i.
90, 5, 204 sq. 243) have used to
combat its genuineness, the latter

VOL.

65

Tct

elfSTj

Koi

to,

y4ur}

SevT^pcu ovaiai Xeyovrai, are not


to be translated < the term Seur.
ova-, is used for genera and species
and rightly so,' since it was not
commonly so used before Aristotle, but rather, there is reason
to treat as a second class of substances only genera and species.'
Again, when it is remarked in
Karvy. c. 7, 8, a, 31, 39, that,
inspeaking, irpSs
strictly
cludes those things only which
not merely stand in a definite
relation to some other thing, but
have their essence in such a reols rh clvai ravrSv icrri
lation
*

AMISTOTLB

66

parts

the

and

kinds

of

"' ^^^^^'^ ^^ ^^
t45 irp6s ri irm ex^
need to suspect here any trace
influence, since the
exetf appears also
in Ae. Toj}. vi. c. 4, 142, a, 29,
vii. 3,247,
c. 8, 164, b, 4; Phys.
a, 2, b, 3, and Mh. ^'. i. 12, 1]01,
of

Stoic

jrpos

Ti

TTws

that

It is trvie, however,
b, 13.
all the objections cannot easily
be set aside. Nevertheless, the

treatise bears in general a decisively Aristotelian impress it is


closely related to the Tojncs in
tone and contents, and the external evidence is heavily in its
;

favour.

The

seems to

best

conclusion

be, not that the

whole

spurious, but that the seemingly un- Aristotelian elements are


is

to* be explained by the assumption that the genuine body of


the work extends to c. 9, 11, b,
7 only, but that what followed
has dropped out of the recension
possess, and is replaced only
by the short note, c. 9, 11, b,
8-14. The so-called 'Postprnadicamenta' (c. 10-15) were suspected as early as Andronicus

we

(SiMPL. ut supra, Schol.


27;

Ammon.

Unci.

81,

81, a,
b, 37),

and Brandis has now proved they


are added by another hand ('U.
d. Reihenfolge d. Biicher d. Ar.
Org.,' Ahlt. d. Berl. Aliad. Hist,
phil. Kl. 1833, 267, and Gr.-r6m.

another
compiled
from Aristotelian fragmeats,as he
suggests. The concluding para-

FMl.

ii.

b, 406).

question whether

It is

k was

graph, at c. 9, 11, b, 8-14, reads


exactly as if it came in the place
of further discussions which the
editor cut out, justifying himself
by the remark that there was
nothing in them which did not
appear in the earlier part. In

propositions/

on

those

the body of the work it is probable also that passages have


been left out and others added
but much of
in this recension
the inconsequence of exposition
and language may as easily be
due simply to the fact that the
Categ. were the earliest of the
logical writings, and were written
probably many years earlier than
the Analytics.
This book, n. kpjx7]viias, w^as
in ancient times rejected as not
genuine by Andronicus (so Alex.
Anal. pri. 52 a, and Sclwl. in Ar.
161 b, 40; Ammon. De Interpr.
Boeth.
6 a, and Schol. 97 b, 13
Anon. iUd. 94 a,
ihid. 97 a, 28
;

21

Philop. De An.

13,

4),

followed recently by Gumposch


{Log. Schr. d. Ar., Leipz. 1839)
and Hose (Ar. Ps. 232;. Brandis
(.1/;^. d. Berl. Akad. 263 sq., cf.
I)AVID, Schol. in Ar. 24 b, 5)
takes it to be an incomplete
sketch of the work, to which c.
14 (rejected as early as

Ammonius

and passed over by Porphyry

Ammon. De

cf

201 b
Schol. 135 b) has probably been
added by a later hand. The external evidence for the work is
good enough. Not only do all
three lists agree in naming it (D.
152, An. 133, Pt. 2), but we are
told that Theophrastus referred
to it in his essay IT. KaTacpdcreoos
KOL aTTOcpdaeas (BlOG. v. 44; ALEX.
A7ial. pri. 124, Scfwl. 183 b, 1
more explicitly, after Alexander,
Boeth. iMd. 97, a, 38; Anon.
cf. the
Schol. in Ar. 94, b, 13
Schol. ap. Waitz, Ar. Org. i. 40,
Interpr.

who, on De Interpr. 17,


remarks irphs tovto (pT}(nv
:

(ppaa-Tos,

etc.;

cf.

b,
b

16,

@6-

Ammon. De

l7iterpr. 73, a, 122, b).

It

seems

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
conclusions and scientific
also

that

Eudemus

(Alex. Anal. pri.


Metapli. 63, 15;

Ae'lecos

IT.

Top. 38,
Schol. in

6, b,

Anon.

24) may have been


an imitation of this book (not,
as Sclwl. 84, b, 15, wrongly suggests, of the Categories cf the
quotation from Ammon. in preceding note). This last suggestion, however, is uncertain, and
the notices as to Theophrastus
are not absolutely clear, for the
texts show that he did not name
the n. hpii.t\v. at all. Alexander
thought he saw, from the way in
which Theophrastus dealt with
the subject (thema) in his own
book, reason to infer that he had

Ar. 146,

a,

Aristotle in mind but whether


he was right in that inference or
not, we cannot judge. The Schol.
/;. Waitz has nothing to show
that the reference there quoted
from Theophrastus referred to a
passage in this book, and was not
;

rather a general reference to the


frequently recurring Aristotelian
law of the excluded middle.
On the other hand, it is singular that while the n. epfirjv.
referred to
is never cited or
in any of Aristotle's books (cf.
BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 102, a, 27),
only the First
it
cites not
Analytic (c. 10, 19, b, 31 Anal.
46, 51, 6, 36) and the To2ncs
(c. 11, 20, 6, 26: Top. ix. 17,
175, b, 39), but also the n. ypvxvs
(c. 1, 16, a, 8), and that for a
proposition which neither the
ancient opponents of Andronicus
nor modern scholars have been
able to find in it (cf. Bonitz,
Ind. Ar. 97, b, 49, whose suggestion, however, is not satisfactory). Its remarks on Khetoric
:

and Poetry

(c.

4,

17, a, 5)

have

67

method in general/ on the


no relation to the corresponding
It should
treatises of Aristotle.
be added that the work accords
throughout with Aristotle's line
of thought, but frequently enlarges in a didactic way on the
most elementary points in a
fashion which one would suppose
Aristotle would not have found
necessary at the date at which

must have been written, if by


him. The question, therefore, is
not only whether it is by Aristotle or by another, but whether
it may not, as Grant suggests
(A 7'. 57), have been written out
by one of his scholars from oj-al
lectures in which the difficulties
of beginners would naturally be
kept in view.
Syllogisms are dealt with
by the 'Ava\vTiKa irpdnpa in two
books, and scientific method by
the'Aj/aA. ricrr^pa, also in two. The
fact that D. 49 and An. 46
give nine books to the 'AvaA.
irpdr, (though An.
134 repeats
the title with two only) points
probably only to a different division;
but it is also possible
that other tracts are included,
for the Anon. ScJiol.
in Ar.
33, b, 32 (cf. David, ibid. 30,
it

'

b,

4,

Philop. ibid. 39, a, 19,


and Simpl. Categ. 4

142, b, 38,

says that Adrastus knew of forty


books of Analytics, of which only
the four which are extant were
counted genuine.
That these
are genuine is proved beyond
doubt, both by internal evidence,

by Aristotle's own references,


and by the fact that his earliest
pupils wrote works modelled on
them (cf p. 65, suj^ra, and BeanDis, Rhein. Mus. Niebuhr and
Thus we know
Br. i. 267),
.

f2

ARISTOTLE

68

and their
proof by probability/ and on fallacies

other references ap. Bonitz,


It is
Ind. Arist. 102, a, 30 sq).
therefore the original title, and
has always remained in common
use, notwithstanding that Aristotle cites certain passages of
the First Analytic with the word
iv rois irepl avWoyKr/xov (^Anal.

by Eudemus
and we have
book i. of the

(cf.

Analytic

an

of

(Alex. Top.

70),

references to
UpSr^pa ava\. of Theophrastus
(Alex. Anal. pri. 39, b, 51, a,
b, 9,
131, b, Sclwl. 158, b, 8, 161,
Scliol.
184, b, 36 Simpl. Dc Cado,
Alexander, in his
509, a, 6).
;

commentary, quotes from both on


numerous points in which they
developed or improved Aristotle's
'Aua\.

(cf.

Trpor.

post.

242,
aj). EusTRAT. ibid.
ibid.
17), through Themist.
Philop.
199, b, 46, and through
an
ibid. 205, a, 46, and through
Anon. Schol. ibid. 248, a, 24, of

and

a,

Eudemus,

Analt/tio.

all

of

to refer to the Second


know as to Theo-

PI.

ii.

vol.

2,

v.

and

213,

Nat. i. 26) that he did


it
write a Second Analytic, and
that, as
is probable that in
the text, he followed Aristotle.
himself cites both
Aristotle
Anah/tics under that name Top.
b, 32
viii. *11, 13, 162, a, 11,
Ehet.i.
SopJi. Fl. 2, 16.5, b, 8;

A LEX.

Qii.

1357, a, 29, b, 24,


12; Metaph. vii.
b,
12 init. Fth. N. vi. 3, 1139,
b,
26, 32 also Be Tnterpr. 10, 19,
b, 25
31 31. Mor. ii. 6, 1201,
Mil. Fud. i. 6, 1217, a, 17, ii. 6,
1222, b, 38, c. 10, 1227, a, 10
2,

1356, b,
1403,

ii. 25,

Analytic

airo-

(Z><?

and evenly worked out than the

We

phrastus, not only from the form


-n-porepa,
of the title of the'Aj/a\.
but also from express testimony
Hippocr.
(r DiOG.v.42; GALEN,
et

Second

or that Galen

the references are less


copious but we know of passages
Alexanof Theophrastus through
der (Anon. Schol. in Ar. 240, b,

which seem

11, 73, a, 14, 77, a, 33),

Puis.
De Libr.
iv, fin., vol. viii. 765
Propr. vol. xix. 41) chooses to
substitute, as he says, for the
common titles, the names n.
(rv\\oyi(TiJ.ov and n. a7ro5ei|ews
nor have we any right to name
them on internal grounds (with
GuMPOSCH, Toy. Ar. 115) n.
avKXoyKTixov and Me0o5iKa. Brandis justly remarks {Ue. d. Ar.
Ory. 261 sq.; Gr.-rdm. Phil. ii.
b, 1, 224, 275) that the First
Analytic is far more carefully
SejKTJKrj,

lytic

a remark of

3,

the

call

Wimmer], p. 177 sq. 229;


Eudcm. Fr. [ed. Spengel], p.
144 sq.). For the Second Ana[ed.

2,

i.

or that Alexander {Metaph. 437,


12, 488, 11, 718, 4) and Pt. 28

Ft.

Tlicophr.

dis-

9,

a, 5,

can
Aristotle
Second (which
hardly have considered as complete), and that the two books of
the First Analytic do not appear
to have been written together,
but with an interval.
Aristotle dealt with this
several books, no
in
doubt in connection with his
still
rhetorical teaching.
have the Topica in eight books,
'

subject

We

of which, however, the last, and


perhaps the third and seventh
also, seem to have been worked
out long after the others (v.
Brandis, Ue. d. Ar. Ory. 255

Gr.-rom. Phil.

ii.

b, 330).

The

genuineness of the work and of

its

name

tions in

by

cita-

Aristotle himself

{Be

is

established

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

Besides these, whicli are the component parts

proof.^

of our Organon,'

we have

Interj)r. 11, 20, b, 26; Anal. 2>r.


i.
11, 24, b. 12; ii. 15, 17, 64, a,
Rhet. i. 1, 1355, a,
37, 65, b, 16
28, c. 2, 1356, b, 11, 1358, a, 29
;

22, 1396, b, 4, c. 23, 1398, a,


28, 1399, a, 6, c. 25, 1402, a, 36,
ii.

iii. 18, J419, a,


26, 1403, a, 32
For the art of proof hj
24).

c.

probabilities Aristotle uses the


Dialectic' (jTo/^. init., Rhet.
init., etc.), and he refers to the
Topics in a similar way as irpay-

term

'

fxaTeia

tt.

t^u

StaAe/cTiK^jj/ (^Anal.

It is probable, therefore, that by fte0o5t/cck


(Rhet. i. 2, 1356, b, 19) he meant
the Topics, which in the opening
words announce as their object,
fieOoSov vpe7u, etc., and in which
viii. 2 i7iit.)
(i. 12, 105, a, 16
the relative passage is to be
found, rather than, as Heitz
(p. 81 sq., Fr. Hz. 117) suggests, a lost work: cf. KOSE,
Ar. Libr. Ord. 120; Vahlen,

pri.

i.

30, 46, a, 30).

Wien.

Aliatl. xxxviii.

99

Bonitz,

Ztschr.
Oesterr.
Gymn. 1866,
It seems, also, that
11, 774.
in several MSS. the Topics were

headed with the title M60o5/co,


so that
an idea arose that
they were distinct works. This
idea has been attributed to Dionys.
{Ep. I. ad Amm. 6, p. 729, on
Rhet. i. 2), but he speaks only of
auaXvTiKi) Ka\ fiedoSiK^ irpayfiareia,

and does not specially include the


Topics in the latter. But D. 52
inserts MeeoSiKo. in eight books,
and An. 49, the like title in-

cluding seven books, although


both know the Topics as well.
So Diog. (v. 29) distinguishes to
Te TOiriKa Koi fiedodiKoi and Simpl.
;

(Cat. 16

69

a,

Schol 47,

b, 40), after

names of a great

also the

Porphyry, appears to regard the


as belonging, and the
former as not belonging, to the
In
Hypomnematic writings.
D. 81 we even find a second
The theory
entry of MeOoBiKhv a'.
of Spengel (Ahh. d. Miinchn.
Aliad. vi. 497) that our text of
the Topics contains grave lacunce
does not seem to be proved by
the passages he quotes (Rhet. i.
2, 1356, b, 10; ii. 25, 1402. a,
As to the former, which
34).
refers to the Topics only for the
latter
'

'

difference between cvWoyia^hs


and e7ra7co77; (cf. Brandis, 'Ue. d.

Khet. Ar.' ap. Philologus,


it

is

As

to

iv.

13),

by To2). i. 1, 12,
the second, which does not
satisfied

apply to Top. viii. 10, 161, a,


9 sq., the words KaOdirep koL iv
To7s roTTiKOLs, etc., need not be
taken as referring to a particular
passage, but may be taken as

meaning of objections there are


in Khetoric, as in Topics, many
kinds,' i.e. in oratorical use as
opposed to disputation, a remark
'

that might well be made even if


these distinctions were not taken
in the earlier book.
For similar
uses of Sxrirep eV ToTs tottikoTs,
etc., cf. Bonitz, Ind. Ar. 101 b,
44 sq., 52 sq., and Vahlen, tit
supra, 140 (where the phrase in
Rhet. ii. 25 is explained as meaning Instances are here used in
the same way as in Topics, and
those of four kinds,' etc.).
'

The n. ao^iffTiKoiv iKeyxcou,


Alex. Schol. 296, a, 12,
29, and Boeth. in his transla-

or
21,

(as

have it) Soc^to-r. eAeyxoi.


Waitz(^r. Org. ii. 528), followed
by Bonitz (Bid. Ar. 102, a, 49),
tion

ARISTOTLE

70

number
and

of kindred writings

on Knowledge

treatises

on

on Definition,^

Opinion,^

by

Classification

Genera and Species,^ on Opposition and Difference,^


on Particular Kinds of Conceptions,^ on Expression
in Speech,^ on Affirmation and Negation,^ on Syllogshows that Aristotle in the De
Interpr. c. 11, 20, b, 26, and
Anal.jjri. ii. 17, 65, b, 16, refers
to passages of this work (i.e.
c. 17, 175, b, 39, c. 30, and c. 5,
167, b, 21), under the name eV
ToTs

ToiriKols

that he reckons

knowledge of fallacies as part of


Dialectic (Soph. El. c. 9 fin.,
cf. Top. i. 1, 100, b,
ch. 11 fin.
23) aiid that c. 34 is the epilogue not only for these but for
Topics.'
the whole science of
'

'

titles in Pt.: i.e.

11
cf. BRANDTS, (ri:rom. Phil. ii. b, 118) to distinguish the two, in a way, however,
which proves, not that the two
were not meant to form a whole,
but that the treatise on fallacies
was composed later than the
The lists of
rest of the TojAcs.

1359,

b,

do not name the


that reading in An.
125 is, as Rose shows, wrong),
and yet give the MefloStKa only
eight books, whereas Pt. 29,
separates them from the Tojnes
possibly, however, in
(26 b)
D. 27, n. ipia-TLKwu two books,

D. and An.
'Zo(p.

eX. (for

tions
^

and divisions, cf infra.


n. iiZwv k:j.\ y^voiv, D. 31

etSoji/,

An.

IT.

unknown.

28, otherwise

^ As
to the opposition of
concepts there was a book 11,
Twv avTiKiLfMevcav, doubtless the
same as IT. ^vavriuv (D. 30, An.

Simplicius, in his

32).

comment-

Ar. Fr. 115Fr. Hz. 119),


121, p. 1497, sq.
gives us some further informa-

ary on the Categ.

(v.
;

tion as to this book and its


casuistical discussions. Rose (Ar.
Ps. 130) refers it to the age
of Theophrastus.
Pt. 12 has n.
Zia^opas, four books.
^ De Relato (IT. tov irpds rt),
six books (Pt. 84).
^

and An. 27, n. ipia-riKwu xSyuv


two books, are the same as our

'OpiffTiKa,

'

Again, liowever, Aristotle seems


cf. Rliet. i. 3,
(in c. 2, 165 b, 8

No. 60,

four books (cf DiOG. v. 50, for the


same title inthelistof Theophrastus' works) 63, on the objects of
Definition, two books
63 b, De
Contradictione Befinitionum, 63 c,
De Arte Definiendi 64, Il/jbs tovs
dpKTiJLohs, two books (cf. the same
from Theophr., DiOG. v. 45),
translated De Tabula Definiendi.
As to the collections of defini-

its

De

Itun^

Pt. 78
given as ' Garam-

Significatione,

Greek title

is

i.e. rpafi/jLariKhv

or -wv.

As

another related title, TI.


to
Xe^eus, cf infra. Pt. 54, Partitio
Conditionmn quce statuuntur in
race et ponnntur, four books, may
also have been a grammatical
.

'

n.

(TTTjyUwv,

D. 40 IT. iiriD. 26, An. 25 n. S6^vs,

iTTLa-r-fjiJ.'qs,

An. Ap2>. 162. The genuineness


of the work is doubtful, because
it is nowhere else referred to.
2 To this subject refer several

treatise.
^

a,

Alex. Metaph.

26,

cites

this

286, 23, 680,

simply as

eV

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
on subjects belonging

and

isms,^

Topics and
T(f

KaTa(pd(T(i}s

IT.

probably, how-

sphere

the

to

books of "Opoi irph rdv r6ir(ov that


The
the text of D. is wrong.
An. gives instead two titles 51,

should be (like the corresponding, or possibly identical,


work of Theophrastus, named by

"Opwj/

44) n. KaTa(poi(rew5 Kal

Here

it

2-8.

We conjecture,

ever,

it

DiOG.

V.

airo<paff^(i}S.
1

An.

'%vXXoyi(TaS)V a' ^' (T>. 56,

54); ^vWoyiffTiKhv Kolopoi (D, 57


An. 55 -kSov 'dpoov') ^vXhoyLafiol
;

a'

(D. 48).

this category belong in


the first place the treatises placed
next to the MeOooiKo. in the lists
Ta irph rSiu roirav (D. 59, An. 57)
"Opoi TTph Tuv roTTiKoiv, 7 books
(D. 55) ToTTiKuv irphs tovs '6povs
-

To

a'

)8'

(D. 60, An. 59, Pt. 62 as

named Tabula defini-

three books

quae

tiomtm
Tojnca,

in

adli'ibentuT

Tlphs '6povs tottlkoou)

i.e.

De Defniendo

Topico

(i.e.

'

On

Definition in Topics,' Pt. 61);


11. ipwrrja-eus
n. IBicau (D. 32)
Kol airoKpicrecos (D. 44, An. 44).
Brandis, however, believes (ut
supra) that these names indicate
only particular parts of our
Tojnea. He takes Ta irph rwv
Tdiruv (elsewhere used for the
cf. p. 64, n. 1) to be the
Categ.
first book, which in fact we know
to have been so called by some
(Anon. Schol. hi Ar. 252, a, 46)
the "Opos tSov tSttcov [as Br. reads
Tott. irphs
it] to be books 2-8
TOVS opovs, books 6-7 n. ISlmv,
book 5 and n. ipcor. k. airoKp.
book 8, as to which we learn from
Alex. Schol. 292, a, 14, that many
named it so, and others again,
with a reference to its first words,
n, Ta|ecos K. airoKplffecas. These
suggestions seem to commend
except that it is
themselves
easier to suppose as to the seven
;

of

however, the most

Probably,

Eristics.^

71

52, Toitikcov

Cnatural to refer the


"Opoi to book 1, the first half of
which (c. 1-11) consists in definitions and their explanation,
and the seven Topica to books
fiifiXiov

is

therefore, in

view of the fact that both lists


have the number seven, that in
D. also the "Opoi was originally
distinct from the Topica, and that
his text read "Opoi irph ruv ro:

iriKcav a'

ToiriKccv o'-f'.

An. 62 name also


a'

33

)8'

D. 65 and

'Y^irix^ip-nixdruv

(Pt. 55, 39, B, 83,

1,

B)

D.

An.

33, "TiTOfxvi][xara eirix^ipr]jxaTiKh, 3 B


D. 70, An. 65, eVets
;

iirix^LpriiJ.aTiKal

Progymn.

/ce';

cf.

alsoTHEON,

W.

(Rhet. ed.
Sp. il, 69), who ascribes to Aristotle and Theophrastus iroXXh
fiifiXia

p.

165

diffewu iiriypacpdixeua,

scribed by

Alex.

de-

Toj). 16, ScJiol.

tV

ets toi
254, b, 10, as containing
avTiKclfieva St' evdd^wv iinx^ip7](nv.
(Uphs dcffiv iirix^ip7v means *to
develop the pro and con of a
given proposition,' v. Ind. Ar.
282, b, 57, 283, a, 6: Oea-eis
therefore
are
iirix^iprifxariKal
themes for dialectic development
or dialectical exercises with an
introduction to the way of working them out.) The 'ETTtxeip Vara
are no doubt identical with the

AoyiKo. iirixeip. the

second book

of which is quoted by
Schol. 227, a, 46, and the

Philop.
'Tirofivftfi.

iirix^ip. with that which is cited


simply as "Tiro/xv-fiinarahy'D'ElxiFF.

Cat. 40, Schol. 48, a, 4, andSiMPL.


Schol. 47, b, 39 following Por.

ARISTOTLE

72

ancient of these tracts were in reality productions of

the Peripatetic school at dates subsequent to Aristotle's


death.

Next

Works.

Some

these

of

before the Tojiics in order of time

wards and

or

were

written

others only after-

Of the many books

long interval.

at a

of Aristotelian

come the

Topics in order of subjects

to the

Rhetorical

alleged Aristotelian

which

origin

dealt with the theory of skilled speaking,^ or treated


phxay. Pt. g-ives three entries of

umsmata

ancients

(cf.

Ar. Fr.

11 3, p.

1496

book.

PtOSE, Ar. Ps. 128; Fr. Hz. 116).


It dealt probably (cf Soph. El. 4)
with the fallacies Trapa t\\v Xi^iv.

The references in Athen. iv. 173,


and xiv. C^r>i to "Ap. ^ Qeocppacrros

An. 196 names among the Pseudepigrapha a work Ile/Ji iJ.665ov.

amusmata

'

or

'

No.

vTro/j.v'fi/j.ara), i.e.

S2, IG

books

if

and

69, 2
82, b,

'

books
1

iv rots vTroixvi]ixa(n are not to a


defined book so named, but are
vao^ue and not to be i(1enti-

Wliat relation

fied.

tlic ITporao-eis

71) = 3B[?2a]
80 = 31 [? 7]
books) bear to the eVeis eTrix-

named

in Pt. (No.

books,

and No.

we cannot

say,

but

we

also find

two entries in D. (46 and 47),


and one in An. (38) of nporacreis a.
The 'ETnx^ipr)iuLaTiKo\ xSyoi, cited
by Aristotle in the opening of
c' 2.

n.

work

(cf.

the

first

itself

not a separate
Them. 97, a, p. 241), but
chapter of the work

/XJ/77/A.

(449,

is

b,

13

sq.,

450,

a,

"'

Cf.

B/iet.

i,

init.

c.

2,

25 Soj)Jt. El. 34, 184, a, 8.


two extant
Besides the
works, this class includes primarily the Theodectean Ehetoric:
i.e. D. 82 and An. 74, T4xvt]s ttjs
QeoSeKTOu (rvvaycvy^ [? etVayoj'y^]
The exin one or three books.
tant Rhetoric alludes (iii. 9 fin.')
1356,

a,

'^

to

an enumeration

eV rols 0eo5e/c-

must mean a work of


and proves, even if

reiois, wdiicli

Aristotle,

iii. be spurious, the existence of this book in early times.


The compiler of the Rhet. ad
Alex. 1. 1421, b, 1 makes Aristo-

Rliet.

30 sq., 450, b, 11 sq. cf. BONITZ,


Tnd. Ar. 99, a, 38). Under the
head of Topics fall also tlie 'Ej/<TT6.<ris, D. 35, An. 36, Pt. 55, b
the YlpoTacT^is ipiariKol 5', D, 47,
An. 44 Auceis ipiariKal S', D. 28,
An. 29 and Aiaipeo-eis ffocpiariKOLi,
S',
D. 29, An. 31. As to the

ference also must be


anterior to Andronicus.
The
words leave it doubtful whether
the writer meant a Rhetoric dedicated to Theodectes, or one
written by Aristotle but published

'Epio-TtKol x6yoi, cf p. 68, n.

by Theodectes

1 fin.

Ae'liv, named by
tract Uapa
SiMPL. SaJwl. 47, b, 40, was
doubted, as he says, even by the

tV

tle

speak of rais

vir

0eo5e/cT7? ypacpeiaais

I^ater

i/xov

T^xvais

and

this reat least

in his own name.


classical writers several

times attribute to the name


Rhetoric of Theodectes' the
'

ARISTOTLE'S WitITINGS
the

of

history

of

atter meaning, in itself

probable

Anon,

rhetoric/
most im-

0eoSe/cTfjfoi rexvai.

(of.

in Ar. Fr. 125, p. 1499,

Ft. Hz.

125

Quintilian,

ii.

gives
this
explanation with an ^ut creditum est':
Valee. Max. viii. 14, 3 gives it
more distinctly) or else they
name Theodectes directly as the
author (Cic. Orat. 51, 172, 57,
15,

10,

194

QuiNTiL.iv.

2,

63 and later
:

writers ap. Rose, Ar. Ps. 141,


Ar. Fr. 123 Fr. Hz 124 sq. compare the similar treatment of
the title JS'icomachean Etldos by
Cicero and others, de quo p. 97
or else they ascribe to Ariinf.
stotle and Theodectes the opinions they find in this book
(DiONYS. Comp. Verb. 2, p. 8, Be
Vi Demos. 48, p. 1101
Quintil.
i.
Ar. Fr. 126). If it is
4. 18
genuine, which the Fr. at least
give no reason to doubt, we
should consider it certainly not
as a work written Z>y Theodectes
;

and published by

Aristotle after
his death, but as a work of Aristotle dedicated to Theodectes, in

which view, since that orator did


not survive the date of Alexander's Eastern expedition, and

had become known

to Alexander
through Aristotle (Plut. Alex,
fioi.), it would have been composed during the years of Aristotle's residence in Macedonia.
The name Texvat (in the Rhet. ad
Alex.; cf. Rose, Ar. Ps. 139)
seems to indicate that it had
more than one book, though the

or

set

73

out rhetorical

the TexJ'r?[s] a' of D. 79, An. 73


probably meant the extant Rhet.
ad Alex. In D. 80 the MSS.
vary between &X\t] r4xvr} and
&XK7\ rexyoov crvuaycoyfi.
If the
former is right it would mean a
second recension of our Rhetoric
if the latter, a recension of the
Texvwj/ (Tvvaycoy^

in neither case

would it imply separate works.


Of the special tracts, the TpvWos
has been mentioned p. 58, n. 1
supra probably An. Aj)^. 153,
:

n. priTopiKTis is merely a duplicate


of it.
In the title, n. Ae|ecos a' fi'
(D. 87, An. 79, n. Ae|. KaOapas cf
on a similar book by Eudemus,
p. 698, n. 3) Brandis in the
Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, 1. 79 detects
book 3 of our Rhetoric, whose
:

first twelve chapters deal with


that subject. This is the more
probable that D. 78 gives the
Rhetoric only two books, although An. 72 has three books.
The others, i.e. D. 85, An. 77,
n. fieyedovs a' (de quo cf. Rhet. i.
3, 1359, a, 16, ii. 18 sq. 1391, b,
31, 1393, a, 5)
D. 88, An. 80,
n. (TvjxfiovXias \_-ris] a (v. Ar. Fr.
136, p. 1501, Ar. Ps. 148, Fr. Hz.
126): An. App. 177, n. ^^ropos
;

An. App. 178, Texv-rj


were doubtless all
spurious, as was also the Murj/novikIv (D. 117, An. 109) which
would be dealt with as an aid to
fl

ToKiTiKov

iyKcofiiaariKT),

Rhetoric.

Pt.

68, UapayyeXinaTa

seems to be the same

For

as the
Uapayy. p-nropiKrjs attributed to
Theophrastus by DiOG. v. 47, but
was in any case not by Aristotle.
An exposition of all the

further details v. Rose, Ar. Ps.


135 sq., and Heitz, 85 sq.
As to the remaining titles in our
lists which relate to Rhetoric,

rhetorical theories (r4xvai) down


to Aristotle's own time was given
in the T^xvoiv (rwaycoy^ (D. 77,
as two books: An. 71, and Pt.

plural

0eo8e/cTm {Rhet.

would not necessarily do

iii.

so.

9)

ARISTOTLE

74

examples/ we have only one preserved to us,^ in wliich,


however, we possess without doubt the most mature state-

ment of his

rhetorical doctrine.

Alexander

is

now

one book), D. 89, ^waywand D. 80, "AA-Atj t^x^^v


avvaywy^ (if tliat is the right
reading) seem to be duplicates
only. "We hear of it in CiC Be
)8',

Invent,

6,

2,

ii.

Be

Orat.

ii.

38,

Ar. Fr.
1500; Ar. Ps. 145;

160, Brnt. 12, 48, etc.

180-135, p.
Fr. JT~. 122.

EJietoric addressed to

universally admitted to be spurious.^

24, as
yris a!

The

v.

The same work or

an abstract of it seems to be
meant by Deraetr. Magn. (jip.
DiOG. ii. i04) by the title 'ETrtro^^

'EyKw/JLiov

and ^EyKw^Lov

x6yov

counted as pseudepiThe
grapha in An. 190, 194.
and apophvarious proverbs
thegms quoted from Aristotle
(Rose, Ar. Ps. 606 sq.; Fr. Hz.
337 sq.) are collected from difirXovrov, are

ferent sources.
2 I.e. the three books of the
The date of its comlihetorlc.
position must be the last residence of Aristotle at Athens;
cf. Brandis in Ar. Rhet.' Pkllol.
That it has suffered interiv. 8.
polations and transpositions {e.g.
in book ii. c. 18-26 ought to pre'

84,

'EvOvfirjixara prjTopLKO.

An. 7G

diaipeffds a

and

a',

D.

'Eudv/j.-niJ.dTwu

(D. 84; Ax. 88, mis-

written 'Eu6. KOI alpeafcou). To


the same class belonged Ax. 127,
but I. Uapoifxiwu, as
npooi/xicov a'
in D. 138. With these should be
reckoned the XpeTat a collection
of striking remarks, like Plu-

cede

483,

vi.

tarch's Apophthegms, quoted by


Stob. Floril. 5, 83, 7, 30, 31 29, 70,
90,43, 140,57, 12, 93, 38, 116, 47,
118, 29. But as a saying of Zeno
the Stoic is quoted from it (57,
credit
1 2), and as w^e can hardly
Aristotle with such a collection
of anecdotes, it must either be a
forgery or else the work of a
,

c.

'

Fr.

aj).

its

Rose, Ar. Ps. 611, and

Fr, Hz. 335,The two orations.

Wie7i.

book iii. has been qiiestioned


bv Sauppe, Bionys. u. Ar., Gott.
Rose, Ar. Ps. 137
1863, p. 32
Heitz, p. 85, 89 SCHAARn.
SCiiMJDT, Samml.Plat. Schr. 108,
whose view has been followed in
Zeller, Plato, p. 55.
3 This
work was known to
;

the
(v.

author of our earliest list


D. 79, but its authenticity
be thought of.
not
to

chapters,

See

Vahlen,

Akad.
The genuineness

Schr.'

of

The same book seems to be what


is meant in Stob. (38, 37, 45, 21)
by the citation iK rwp koivuv
:

iMunclin.Aliad.

followed by

xxxviii. 92,121.

is

diarpi^wv.

J-Z/A. d.

Z. Krit. Ar.

later writer of the same name,


like the grammarian mentioned
Rose believes
aj?. DioG. V. 35.
(Ar. Ps. 611) that 'hpiffror^^ovs
is a misreading for 'Apiaruvos.

'ApiffTOTeXovs

proved by

1-17) was

Spengel,

SpeNGEL
Anaxim.
ix.
it,

182,
rex"Prolog,
sq.) attributes

(2^07.

Ars

Rliet.

99
cf.
sq.,
excepting the

first

and

last

to Aristotle's contemporary An aximenes of Lampsacus.

This suggestion, however, is very


questionable cf Rose, Ar. Lib.
Ord. 100 Kampe, in the Philol.
For, apart
ix. 106 sq. 279 sq.
;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Of the writings devoted
philosophic system, the
of Definitions

first

from the arbitrariness

of the
separation of the part attributed
to Anaximenes from the rest, the
influence of the school of Aristotle betrays itself throughout,
not only in the persistence of a
method of didactic definitions

and divisions, but also in the


tenor of particular passages. Cf.,
e.g., c. 2 init. (with Rhet. 1. 3)
c. 3, 1424, a, 12-19 {Polit. vi. 4,
1318, b, 27-38) c. 5, 1427, a, 30
(^Eth. N. V. 10, 1135, b, 11 sqq.,
Rhet. i. 13, 1374, b, 6) c. 8, 1428,
a, 19 sqq. {Rhet. ii. 25, 1402, b,
12 sqq.) c. 8, 1428, a, 25 {Anal,
pr. ii. 27 init.); c. 9 init. (Rhet.i. 2, 1357, b, 28)
c. 12 init. (Rhet.
ii. 21, 1394, a, 22); and the dis;

tinction of evOvfx.'niJ.a and yvcafxri in


c. 11 sq., though differently put,
is of Aristotelian origin (cf Rhet.
ii, 21, 1394, a, 26)
c. 17 (Rhet. i.
c. 28 iriit.
15, 1376, b, 31 sq.)
29 init. (Rhet. iii. 9, 1410, a, 23).

D. 64, An. 61, 'Opia/jLol, 13


"Opoi, 10 books,
books
Pt. 59
was certainly a later work of the
School, analogous to the Platonic
As to the other
Defijiitiones.
title. An. bl,''Opu)v ^i^Kiov a', cf.
p. 71, n, 2, supra.
2 Besides the ' Platonic Divisions mentioned p. '63, n. 2, the
lists name the following of this
.

'

class: D. 42, AtotpeVets i{' [An.


41, n. Stotpeo-e&jj/l ; D. 43, An. 42,

AiaiperiKuv a [Kose leg. -Kbv, as


in the duphcate title D. 62] Pt.
52 gives the Aiaip^treis (which
might extend to any length according to the subjects chosen),
;

26 books. Whether the work was


different

to the development of his

place

and Divisions

from or

identical

(as

75

is

given to collections

regarded

as

aids

to

seems more probable) with the


Platonic Aiaipeaeis, it cannot be
genuine. The quotation in Alex.
Tojh 126, Schol. 274, a, 42, from
Aristotle, iv rrj roov ayaOiav Siai-

(At. Fr.'llO, p. 1496

p4(Ti

Hz. 119),

is satisfied

i<V.

by M. Mar. i.

1183, b, 20 sq., cf. Eth. N. i. 12,


1101, b, 11, but may have found
its way from that source into the
Aiaipeoreis also. Aristotle himself
names an 'EK\oy^ roov evavTiatv, in
Metaph. iv. 2, 1004, a, 1, where,
after the remark that all oppositions finally go back to that
of the %v or ov and its oppo2,

he adds

site,

reOewp'fja-da}

5' tj/jlIv

ravra iv rfj K\oyf} rcov ivauriuv


in the parallel passage, xi. 3,
1061. a, 15, it is only ea-Twcrav yap
:

avrai

re^ecopTj/xeVat

1004, b,
avaySfieva
(paiverai els rh ev Kal rh ttXtjOos
elK^ipda} yap t) auaycoy^ r]fuv.
To
the same refers also x. 3, 1054, a,
(TTi 5e Tov fifv uhs, &(nrep
29

33, TTOLVTa Se Kol

cf.

raWa

'

Kal

iu rf)

5iaip4(ri

rwv

ivavri(av

ravrh Kal '6ixoiov


Kal X(Tov, etc.
and the rainhv and
'61X010V were themselves given in
Metaph. iv. 2, 1003, b, 35, as
examples of the e^Sr? rov cvhs
treated of in the 'EK\oy^ r. iv.
cf. also X. c. 4 ad Jin.
But in
3Iet. xii, 7, 1072, b, 2 the words
Siaipeais StjAo? refer, not to a
T]
treatise, but to the division of
two kinds of ov 'iveKa given just
before.
Whether the reference
to the 'EKhoy^ r. iv. indicates a
separate treatise or a section of
the work
On the Good,' even
Alexander did not know (cf, p.
61, n. 1); but since the subject
5iypd\paiHV, rh
;

ARISTOTLE

76

appear to have been genuine.


fore, is

the treatise

On

but none of these


Most important, there-

correct appreciation of tlie subject

the First Pliilosojphy

a torso

bound up ^ with a number of


which is
other fragments, some genuine, some spurious, to form

now

our
on

arbitrarily

Aristotle

wliicli

the

cites

seems to have been dealt


in the second book IT,

'Ek:Ao7^

with

rayaOov,
Aristotle

is

it

that

probable

had only that book

in

This is the name by which


the work was originally cited
'

De Motu Anim. G, 700, b, 8.


That Aristotle himself so named
it, is probable from Metaj)h. vi. 1,
V.

1020, a, 15, 24, 30, xi. 4, 1001, b,


19; Phys. i. 9, 192. a, 35, ii. 2
fn. De Coelo, i. 8, 277, b, 10 Gen.
Corr. 1. 3, 318, a, 0; De An. i.
for irpdoTr] (piKoa-ocpia
1, 403, b, 10
we also find (piXoaocpla alone
{Metaph. xi. 3, 4, 1001, b, 5, 25),
e^oKoyiK)) {Mctapli. vi. 1, 1020, a,
19, xi. 7, 1004, b, 3), t) irepl ra
6e7a (piXocrocpia {Part. An. i. 5,
045, a, 4), ao<pia (JSIetapli. i. 1, 2),
;

and

fxeOodos

Trepl

rrjs

apxri^

t^^

Trpc^TTjs (Phys. viii. 1, 251, a, 7),


as Aristotle's expression for the
subject of the book and accordingly the book itself is also
spoken of as a-ocpia, (piXocrocp'.a,
eeoXoyia (ASCLEP. Schol. in At.
519, b, 19, 31). Cf BONITZ, v. 5,
Arist. Metaph. ii. 3 sq.
first
find the name
/xerd TO (pvaiKO. in Nicolaus of
Damascus, who (ace. to the
Schol. to Theoph. Metaph. p.
323, Brand.) wrote a Gewpia tu>u
;

We

'Ap.

the

genuine

a younger contemporary of Andronicus, the title (which never


appears before, and is permanent
after that date) may safely be
referred to Andronicus himself,
collection of Aristotle's
writings alone explains it for it
means, not as SiMPL. Phys. 1,

whose

view.

however,

Probably,

Metaiihysics.^

^erd

to.

(l>v<riKd

afterwards

in Plut. Alex. 7, and since then


constantly. As this Nicolaus was

and theNeoplatonist Herennius


(ap. BONITZ, Ar. Metaph. ii. 5)
supposed, the Supernatural, but
.that which in the order of doctrinal development, and of the
works as collected, followed after
the books on the Natural Sciences
(cf. Alex. Metaph. 127, 21; Asclep. Schol. 519, b, 19). It is
named in the lists by An. Ill,
An. App. 154, and Ft. 49. The
latter has the usual Greek reckoning of thirteen books; the former
which
has at 111 k', at 154
leaves it uncertain whether the
editions referred to were incomplete, the one having only A-K,
and the other A-I, or whether
K and I are corruptions of N,
t'

i.e.

A-'N.

The question of the arrangeof our Metaphydcs has


been so far established by Bran^

ment

dis in

Ar. Met.', Abh. d. Berl.


Phil. Kl. p.
Gr.-ram. Phil. ii. b. 1,

Akad. 1834, Hist.

63-87,
541 sq., and by Bonitz {Ar. Met.
ii. 3-35), that it is sufficient to
earlier
for
reader
refer the
theories to the comprehensive
account given by Bonitz at p. 30.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

77

portions were brought into this connection immediately


The main body of the work,
begun but not finished by Aristotle, is made up of books i., iii.
(B), iv., vi.-ix.
In these, after
the critical and historical introduction in book i., one and the
same inquiry, that as to Being as
such, is methodically carried on,
although it is neither brought to
a conclusion, nor in parts submitted to final revision. Book x.
seems to have been intended for
a somewhat further advanced
section of the same inquiry (cf.

passages of the Metapli.

{e.g. x. 4,

1056, a, 23, with which cf. v. 10,


1018, a, 25, and x. 6, 1054, b. 34,
cf. V. 15, 1021, a. 25)
and a discussion reserved in v. 7 ad Jin.
for another place is to be found
in ix. c. 7.
The tract n. tov
;

TToaaxcas,

however, cannot have

formed part of the


work On the First Philosophy.'

originally
'

It niust

have been written much

as

vii. 13),

shown by the citaPhys. and in the


and as an aid to
the exact use and understanding
of philosophic terms
and as
such it appears in D. 36, and in

by

An. 37 with the special addition

2 init. with iii. 4, 1001, a,


4 sq., and x. 2, 1053, b, 16 with

X.

but as it is not brought


Aristotle into any express

connection with book ix., it has


almost the appearance of a
separate treatise.

Between these

connected books there is inserted, in book v., an inquiry


into the different meanings of
thirty philosophical conceptions

and terms, which stands in no


connection with either the preceding or the following book.
The Aristotelian authorship of this
section is beyond doubt.
Aristotle
himself quotes it (in

earlier

is

tions in the
Gen. et Corr.

n.

X4y. ^ Twj/ Kara irpoaNevertheless, Ar. Met.


vi. 2 imt.y alludes unmistakably
to V. 7, 1017, a, 7, 22 sq., 31, in the
words
aAA' eVei ri Iv airXoos
Xeyofxevov \4yeTai TroAAax&is, wv
%v /xku ^v Th Kara avju^e^-qKhs, etc.,
T.

TTOff.

Biffiv.

in a

way which

d. Plat. Pliil. ii. 536) that these


citations are not satisfied by our

indicates, by the
the discussion had
already come under the reader's
notice.
It appears, therefore,
that Aristotle actually intended
to incorporate our book v. or the
contents of it in this part of his
work, but never was able to finish
the literary connection. As to
book xi., the second half (c. 8,
1065, a, 26 sq.), is a compilation
from the Physics, obviously not
genuine. The first half exactly
corresponds in
content with

book v., and that it is an unAristotelian tract which has taken


the place of a genuine book with
similar contents, is as decisively
disproved as that of Rose {Ar.
lAhr. Ord. 154) that the book is
entirely unworthy of Aristotle.
The book is alluded to in other

therefore either an early sketch


argument afterwards expanded in them, or else, as Kose
{Ar. Lihr. Ord. 156) supposes, a
later abstract of them.
A point
in favour of the latter view is
the
objectionable
recurrence,

Metaph.

vii.

init.,

x.

,1

cf.

Gen. et Corr. ii. 10, 336, b, 29,


Phys. i. 8, 191, b 29), with the
words eV rots ircpl rod Trocap^ws or
TT.

Tov

TToa.

Xeyerai (KaffTou.

The

view of Susemihl {Genet. Entiv.

word

^v, that

books
of the

iii.,

iv.,

and

vi.

and

is

ARISTOTLE

78

seven times, of the particle ye


which is otherwise unknown
in Aristotle's writing (Eucken,
De Ar. Die. Rat. i. 10; Ind.
In view,
Ar. 147, a, 44 sq.)
however, of the arguments from
tlie contents of the book themselves adduced in support of the
other view by Bonitz (Ar. 3Iet.
ii. 15, 451), this peculiarity is not
decisive, especially as the general
style of the book has Aristotle's
IX7]V,

characteristics, and as similar


phenomena as to particles are

re
found elsewhere. [Thus re
occurs in Aristotle almost exclusively in the Ethics and Politics
(Eucken, 16); 5e 76 almost exclusively in the Physics (ibid. 33),
.

in which also jx^vroi, Kairoi, and


Toivvu are much commoner than
in the other works (ibid. 35, 51)
&pa recurs oftencr in the later
:

books of the Mctaph. than


(ibid.

earlier

50):

in the

and among

the ten books of tlie Ethics,


there are many variants as between the three last and the sections i.-iv. or v.-vii., which again
vary from one another in diction
In this first half
(ibid. 75 sq.).
of book xi. five of the seven cases
Besides,
of 76 ix)]v occur in c. 2.
76 is so often inserted by the
copyists that it is always possible
some early scribe is partly reBook xii. appears as
sponsible.]

an independent treatise, which


refers to none of the preceding
books, but seems to allude to the
10 (esp. 267, b, 17 sq.)
1073, a, 5, and in c. 8,
1073, a, 32, to Phys. viii. 8 sq.,
and also to the De Ccelo ii. 3 sq.
It is remarkable that while c.
6-10 develop in some detail the
views of Aristotle as to the Godhead and other eternal Essences,
c. 1-5 on the contrary give us

Phys.

viii.

in c. 7,

the doctrine of changeable substances and their causes only in

narrow compass, and in a style


condensed often to the point of
This, with the fact
obscurity.
that in these chapters the formula jJL^TOL ravra [a'C. AeKreovl on
occurs twice (i.e. 3 init., and 1070,
a. 4) indicates that it was not a
book published by Aristotle, but
a set of notes intended as a basis
wiiich many
for lectures, in
points were only hinted at in the
the briefest way, with the knowledge that they would be made
The
plain by oral development.
main theme of the lectures consisted of the points which in the
second half of book xi. are
treated with special care while
the more general metaphysical
inquiries which were to serve as
an introduction or basis for them
were only lightly sketched. The
matter the lectures dealt with
;

was no doubt intended to be


included in the work on the
First Philosophy; and c. 6-10
as far as matter is concerned, exactly fitted to be the
conclusion of it. C. 1-5, on the
nothing
hand, include
other
which is not contained in the
The polemic of
earlier books.
Eose (Ar. Lihr. Ord. 160) against
are,

which, as will be seen


this book
in the next note, is specially well
fortified with external evidence
has no value as against its

Aristotelian authorship, but only


as to its connection with our
The relation of the
Metaph.
remaining two books to the rest
but there is no
is not clear;
reason to hold with Rose (p, 157)
that only xiv. is genuine. Aristotle must have originally meant
to include them in the same
book, for xiii. 2, 1076, a, 39, refers

ARISTOTLE'S WHITINGS
other writings

tlie

men-

tioned which would have stood in close relation with


to

998, a, 7 sq., xiii. 2, 1076,


to iii. 2, 997, b, 12 sq.,
xiii.
10, 1086, b, 14 to iii. 6.
1003, a, 6 sq., and in viii. i. 1062,
b,

iii.

2,

39,

22 he contemplates a treatment of Mathematics and the


Ideas, which, as appears by xiii.
init., was intended to serve as an
introduction to Theology (cf,
Brandis, 542, 413 a). On the
other hand, in xiv. 1, the obvious
reference to x. 1 is not noticed,
and vii. and viii. are not referred
a,

to at all in

W'

-r,

xiii.

and

xiv.

(Bonitz,

inconceivable that
Aristotle would have repeated a
considerable section almost word
for word, as is the case with the
present text of i. 6, 9, and xiii.
But book i., as a whole,
4, 5.
must, as well as book iii., which
p. 26).

^
a|

'.

Of

after Aristotle's death.^

79

It is

cites it (iii. 2, 996, b, 8, cf. i. 2,


982, a, 16, b, 4, and 997, b, 3,
cf. i. 6 sq.) be older than book
xiii.
It seems to me, therefore,

the most probable conjecture


that the argument in i. 9, which
is apparently more mature than
that in book xiii., w^as inserted
on a second revision of book i.,
after Aristotle had decided to
exclude books xiii. and xiv. from
the scope of his main work on
Metaphysics.
Book ii. (a), a
collection of three small essays,
written as an introduction to Physics rather than to Metaphysics
(v. c. 3 ScJwl.), is certainly not by
Aristotle.
The majority of the

ancient commentators {oi irXelovs)


attributed it to a nephew of

Eudemus, Pasicles of Khodes


(Schol. ap. J r. Opp. 993, a, 29
the soSchol. in Ar. 589, a. 41
[Bekkek's
called
Philoponus
;

Athon.

Urbin.'] in the Introd. to

where the name is Pasicrates


and Asclep. Scliol. 520 a, 6, exa,

cept that he has erroneously


transferred the story from a to
A). That it was inserted after
the other books were collected is
clear, not only from its designa-

but from the way in which


breaks the connection of the
closely consecutive books A and
B, for which reason man}^ of the
ancients wished to make it a
preface to the Physics, or at least
to book i. of the MetapU. {Schol.
tion,

it

Syrian {ap.
3) mentions that
some critics proposed to reject A.
These, like Asclepius, probabl}^
confused it with o if not, Syrian
was right in thinking their sug589,

b,

Schol. 849,

sq.)

a,

gestion laughable.
*
This seems probable (cf.
Zeller, Ahh. d. Berl. Akad.
1877, Hist. Phil. Kl. 145) because
of the circumstance that most of
the genuine books of our Metajfhysics were in use at the date
of the oldest peripatetic books or

fragments which

we

possess,

and

that they seem to have been


gathered together in the same
series of books with the rest at a
very early date.
Book i., as
above stated, was not only the

model

for Theophrastus in book


of his History of Physics, but
has also left clear traces in what
we know of Eudemus, and is the
source of the point of view taken
by the author of the treatise on
Melissus, &c.
Books iii. (B) and
iv. are referred to by Eudemus,
i.

the fourth by Theophrastus also

book

vi.

by Theophrastus; book

ARISTOTLE

80

the Metaphysics, only a few can be considered to be


by Eudemns; book ix. by
book xii. by Theophrastus, Eudemus, the writer of
the Matjna Moralia, and the

vii.

Theophrastus

writer of the n. ^4^^

Kivhcredos

by Eudemus book xiv.


apparently by Tlieophrastus and

book

xiii.

rod
n.
tract
cf.
TTocraxaJs X^ySfievou, by Strato
the following: (1) Metaj>h. 1,
J)81, a, 12 sq., Eudem. Fr. 2,
Speng.
(2) i. 3, 988, b, 20,

the

the

fifth,

KLV-fjo-ews

(c.

Theopitr. Fr. 40; (3)


30,

EUD. Fr. 117;


18

1),

etc., sec vol.


1.

21 sq.,

ihid.

(4)
Melissa,

De

1.

i.

ihid.

i.

468, 484; (5) ihid.


(6)
43,

EUD. Fr. 11, S. 21, 7 (7)


Theophr. Fr. 48 (8) i. 6,
b, 32, EuD. Fr. 11, S. 22, 7,
;

i.

Fr. 46

8,

989,

986,

5,

Xeno]ih.

Theophr. Fr. 45
27, Theophr. Fr.

44,

(9)

1.

a,

i,

6,

987,
8p.

Theophr.

30,

(10) iii. 2, 990, b, 26, iv.


1005, a, 19, EuD. Fr. 4; (11)
iii. y, 999, a, 6, Ftli. Fud. i. 8,
1218, a, 1; (12) iv. 2,1009, b, 12,
21, Theophr. Fr. 42; (13) iv.
6, 1011, a, 12, c. 7. 1012, a, 20,
;

3,

Theophr. Fr. 12, 26 (14) v. 11


Strato apvd Simpl. Cafeg. Scliol.
;

12-46

in AHst. 90, a,
(15) vi. 1,
1026, a, 13-16, Theophr. Fr. 12,
1
(16) vii. 1, 1028, a, 10, 20,
EuD. Fr. 5 (17) ix. 9, 1051, b,
24, Theophr. Fr. 12, 25; (18)
xii. 7 init., cf. c. 8, 1073, a, 22,
DeMotn An. 6, 700, b, 7; (19)
xii. 7. 1072, a, 20, Theophr. Fr.
12, 5; (20) xii. 7, 1072, b, 24, c.
9, 1074, b, 21, 33, Etli. Eud. vii.
12, 1245, b, 16, M. Mor. ii. 15,
1213, a, 1
(21) xii. 10, 1075, b,
34, Theophr. Fr. 12, 2; (22)
xiii. 1, 1076, a, 28, Eth. Fud. i. 8,
1217, b, 22; (23) xiv. 3, 1090,
b, 13, Theophr. Fr. 12, 2. Since,
our
parts
of
therefore, the
;

book

Mriapli., like

which

xii.,

did not in fact belong to the


main treatise, are in use as commonly and at as early a date as
those parts which did, it must be
conjectured that the whole was
put together in the period immediately
Aristotle's
following
death. This theory receives remarkable confirmation from the
fact that already in the n. C^'wi/
700, b. 8),

6,

which

belongs undoubtedl}' to the third


century B.C., book xii. itself is
quoted by the title reserved by
Aristotle for his

Metaph.
TrpdoTTjs

main
eV

i.e.

(piKoaocpias

Ind. Ar. 100,

a,

47

treatise

to7s

irepi

BONITZ,

(cf.

sq.

on
rrjs

the sus-

picion thrown on the passage by


Krtsche, Forseh. 267, 3. and
Heitz, V. S. 182, is groundless).
"We may assume, then, with some
probability that immediately after
Aristotle's death
the finished
sections of the work on First

Philosophy (i.e. books i., iii., iv.,


vi.-x.) were bound up with the
other sketches and notes of a

by him (i.e.
and xiv.),
and that at the same time book v.
was inserted between iv. and vi.
but that book a, and the second
half of xi., were first attached by
Andronicus to this work, with
which they were not connected
either by origin or contents.
like character left

xi. first part, xii., xiii.,

Naturally,
taintj'-

we cannot with

cer-

by whom the

first

affirm

redaction was undertaken. But


the statement of Alex. (ap.
Metaph. 760, b, 11 sq.), that it
was Eudemus, deserves all consideration
while the different
story told by Asclep. (Scliol. in
Ar. 519, b, 38 sq.) is open to the
;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

81

genuine, and these must have belonged to Aristotle's


earlier period.^

The works on Natural Philosophy form the


bulk of

We

Aristotle's productions.

all

largest

have

first

important investigations which Aristotle himself connected together.


They deal with the general
series of

and conditions of the material universe, of the


earth and the heavenly bodies, of the elements with
basis

and relations, and of meteorological


These are the Physics, ^ the two con-

properties

their

phenomena.

gravest doubts. Cf. further, p.


155 sqq.
Besides the Books on Philosophy (p. 55, n. 5, and 57), on the
Good, and on the Ideas (p. 61, n.
1, 62, n. 1), the Uepl evxvs was
'

probably genuine

(v. p. 58, n.

1,

The three books n. rvxris


(An, Aj)2). 152) and the MayiKhs
were not. The latter is named bj'
Diog. (i. 1. 8, ii. 45), and was also
evidently used by Plin. {H. JV.
tin,).

XXX. 1, 2) as Aristotle's, but it is


reckoned by An. (191) among
the Pseudepigrapha,and we know
from Suidas ('Aj/Tto-e.) that it was
attributed sometimes to the Socratic Antisthenes, sometimes to

the Antisthenes
patetic of

who was a

Ehodes

ci^'ca

Peri-

180 B,c,

by Bernhardy's happy con-

(le^e,

jecture, 'VoSica for "PSScovl).


On
this book, vide Aj'. Fr 27-30, p.

1479

Fr. Hz.

294, 8
siders

Rose,

A r.

Heitz,

Ps. 50,

V. S.

who con-

it to be a Dialogue. Of
the QeoAoyovfieva, which was ascribed to Aristotle by Macrob,
(Sat. i. 18), the Theogony mentioned by Schol, Eur. *Rhes. (28),
and the reAeral spoken of by
Schol. Laur. in Apoll. Rhod. iv.
973 (v. these and other quotations
'

VOL.

I.

'

Rose, Ar. Ps. 615 Fr. Hz.


347) seem to have formed part.
It is referred by Rose to* the
hand of Aristocles of Rhodes, a
contemporary of Strato but this
seems unlikely cf. Heitz, V. S.
294.
It cannot, however, have
been a genuine work of Aristotle,
and itseems tohave contained, not
philosophical inquiries as to the
Godhead, but collections and probably explanations of myths and
ajj.

religious usages.
The n. hpxh^^
from its position in the list of
D. 41, seems rather to have been
a metaphysical or physical tract
than a political one, but we know
nothing of it. As to a 'Theology of Aristotle,' which originated
in
the
Neoplatonic

and

School

is

preserved

to

an Arabic translation,
DiETERCI,
Alh.
d.
D.

us

in

V.

morgeid.

GesellscU,

1877,

1,

117.
^vctik}) a.Kp6a<ns in 8 books
AN. 148, leg. r( for ii?'), as its
own MSS and those of Simpl.
Phys. init.. An. 148, Pt. 34, &c.,
name the treatise. Aristotle him2

(in

self

commonly

books

<pv(riKb.

(Phys.

viii.

1,

calls

only the

first

or tA irepl <(>vcr(i)s
251, a, 8, cf. iii. 1,

ARISTOTLE

82

On

nected works

Heavens and On Growth and

the

3, 253, b, 7, cf. ii. 1, 192, b,


20, viii. 10, 267, b, 20, cf. iii. 4 ;
Metaph. i. 3, 983, a, 33, c, 4, 985,

cluded book
with which it

a, 12, c, 7, 988, a, 22, c, 10, xi. 1,

o-ecos.

viii.

1059,
i.

34,

a,

Metai)li.

i.

5,

xiii. 1,

Phys.

i.).

visually

(Metaj)h.

Phys.

cf. Phys. ii. 3, 7;


986, b, 30, cf. i%.5.
c, 9, 1086, a, 23, cf.
The later books he

ra

calls
ix.

viii., vi.

Kipv.afus

Trepl

36, cf.

1049, b,

8,
;

Be

Qt'lo

i.

5, 7,

272, a, 30, 275, b, 21, cf Phys. vi.


7, 238, a, 20, c, 2. 233, a, 31, viii.
10 Be Co'lo iii. 1, 299, a, 10, cf.
Gen. et
Phys. vi. 2, 233, b, 15
.

Corr.

i.

318, a,

3,

Be Sensu

3,

cf.

Phys.

445, b, 19, cf,


Anal. post. ii. 12,95,
Pltys. vi. 1
But in Phys. viii. 5,^ 257,
b, 10).

viii.

c, 6,

V.

with book

nected, under the

name

Adrastus

(ajj.

SiMPL.

4, Be Ccelo i. 6, 274, a, 21,


TOLS irepl ras apx^s, B. iv. 12,
vi. 1, Be Ca'lo iii. 4, 303, a, 23,
iii.

Trepl XP^^^ '^"^ KLvr}(rws, and see


IND. Arist. 102, b, 18 sqq.
D. 90, 45 (115) names a IT.
(pvcrecos and a n. Kiv^a^ws, but the
former with three books only,and
the latter with one (cf. p. 50,n. 1).

SiMPL.(P%s. 190, a, 216, a, 258,


and 320, a) says that Aristotle
and his kraipoi {i.e. Theophrastus
and Eudemus) spoke of the first

b,

5 books

as ^vaiKa or n. apxa>v

and
No doubt
viii. as n. Kiwfjffeus.
Porphyry, however, was right
(av. SiMPL. 190, a) when he in<pv(riKoov

and of books

vii.

a)
n.

\_(pv<TiKu>v'], as others named


the whole, while vi.-viii. bore the
title n. Kivriaecos under which

Andronicus (Simpl. 216, a) also


cited them, yet it cannot be

shown that

this

earliest period.

was

so in the

When

Theophr.

as e/c tuv <pv(riKu>v


he may easily have meant not
only this whole treatise but
and cf
others also Qut supra
Simpl. 216, a). When Damasus
the biographer and follower of

cited

book

v.

Trpayfxareias rrjs *Ap.

eV

2,

i.-v.

apx^v

1073, 32, the phrase to tt. (pva^cas


refers not merely to the whole of
the Physlca, but also to other

B,

16,

many may have named

Eudemus

works on Natural Science (cf.


BoNiTZ and Schwegler arZZoc).
For more general references see

II. kiv}]-

For though in the time of

a, 34 eV Tols KaOoKov -rrepl (pvaeoos


refers to B. vi. 1, 4, MetajjJi. viii.
in
to B. v. 1
1, and (pvcriKo.
Metaph. i. 8, 989, a, 24, xii. 8,
;

vi.,

so closely con-

is

Simpl. 216, a,
[aj?.
where it is impossible to read
Neoplatonist)
the
Bamascius
speaks of

eK

t^s

-n-epl

<|)U(rea)S

tuv nepl Kivfi'


a-ews Tpia, it does not follow that
he means vi., vii., viii., and not
rather v., vi., viii. (cf. KoSE,
Ar. Libr. Ord. 198 Brandis, ii.
Indeed book vii. gave
b, 782).
even ancient critics the impression of a section not properly
fitted into the general connection,
and Simpl. {Phys. 242, a) tells
us that Eudemus passed it over
in his revision of the whole work.
It need not on that account V e
classed as spurious (with Eose,
199), but rather (with Brandis,
ii. b, 893 sq.) as a collection of
preliminary notes which do not
belong to the Treatise on Physics.
The text has taken on many in;

terpolations and alterations from


a paraphrase, known even in the
time of Alexander and Simplicius
(y. Simpl. 245, a, b, 253, b, and
cf.

Spengel, Ahh.

d,

MuncUn.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Decay

and the

83

Connected with these

Meteorology.'^

leading works (so far as they are not to be classed


as sections of

Akad.

313

iii.

them under
sq.),

but

special names, or as spurious),

the

Ar. Meteorol.

i.

415,

ii.

199 (nor

original text is to be found in the


smaller edition of Bekker and in
that of Prantl. The Aristotelian
origin of B. vi. c, 9, 10 is rightly

Plac. v. 20) infer that the n.


ovpavov was originally more complete or existed in a recension

maintained by Brandis

different

(ii. b, 889)
against Weisse.
* The n. ovpavov in
4, and the
n. 76j/eo-ecos KoL ^dopas in two
books. The current division of
these books, however, can hardly
be derived from Aristotle, for
books iii. and iv. of the IT. ovpavov
are more nearly connected with
the other treatise than are the
earlier books.
Aristotle recognises both by a short reference
to their contents in the beginning
of the Meteorol., and by citing

Be

7 in Meteorol. i. 3
rhv &V(a roirov
iv
Tols irepl rod iroi^lv Koi Tracxetj/
^uapiffixevois
to the Gen. et Corr.
i. 10 (not Metew. iv.) Be Sensu
C, 3, 440, b, 3, 12 (eV toTs Trepi
jui^ecos) ; to the Gen. et Corr. ii.
2, Be An. ii. 11, 423, b, 29, Be
Sensu, c, 4, 441, b, 12 (eV ro7sTrp\
ffToix^icav).
A work n. ovpavov is
ascribed by SiMF.(Be Ccelo, Schol.
in Ar. 468, a, 11, 498, b, 9, 42,
502, a, 43) also to Theophrastus,
who is said to have followed the
lines of Aristotle's book.
With
this exception the earliest witnesses to the existence of the
work are Xenarchus and Nicolaus
of Damascus (t>. Brandis, Gr.rbm. Phil ii. b, 952), but there is
no doubt of the authenticity
either of these books or of the
.

Ccelo

ii.

irepX

n. yep^aeus.
From Stob. Eel. i.
486, 536 we cannot, with Idelee

from Cic. N. B.

ii.

15,

and Plut.

from ours.
An. Apj). 150, MerecDpoAo-

yiKa

Pt. 37, IT. fMeredopcuv 5' ^ /t;


TcwpoffKOTTid ; Pt. 76 do. with two

books only.

This work, as above


places itself, in its
opening chapter, in immediate
connection with the works last
discussed and its genuineness is
beyond doubt. Aristotle himself
does not name it (for Be Plant.
ii. 2,
822, b, 32 is a spurious
book), but he frequently recalls
its doctrines; cf. Bonitz, Ind.
Ar. 102, b, 49. According to
Alex. Meteor. 91 and Olympiod.
ap. Idelee, Ar. Meteor, i. 137,
222, 286, Theophrastus in his
fx.iTap(rioXoyLKa(T)iOG.v. 44) seems
to have imitated it. Ideler {iMd.
i.
vii. sq.) shows that it was
known to Aratus, Philochorus,
Agathemerus, Polybius, and Posidonius. Eratosthenes, however,
observed,

seems not to have known it cf.


i. 462.
Of the four books,
the last seems from its contents
not to have originally belonged
;

ihid.

to the saijie
treatise.
Alex.
{Meteor. 126, a) and Ammon.
(ap. Olympiod. in Idelee, Ar.
Meteor, i. 133) prefer to connect
it with the IT. yevca-em
but it
is not adapted to
that work
either.
Since it has all the appearance of being Aristotelian,
and is cited by Aristotle (Part.
An. ii. 2, 649, a, 33 ; cf. Meteor,
;

o 2

ARISTOTLE

84

pliilosopliyJ
are a variety of other treatises on natural
Gen. An.

743, a, 6
9, 384, a,
an
33), it must be taken to be
isolated section, which was not
contemplated, in this form, when

iv. 10,

cf Mcieor.
.

iv. 6,

ii.

6,

383, b,

the Meteorology was begun (v.


Meteor, i. 1 ad fin.'), but which
in the end took the place of the
further matter that remained
to be dealt with at the end of
book iii., which obviously does
not itself bring the treatise to a
As P.onitz (^Ind. Ar. 1)8,
close.
b, 53) notices in criticising Heitz,
this book (c. 8, 384, b, 33) cites
iii. 077, 378, a, 15 (cf. on
this subject Ideler,77>/yZ. ii. 347-

3feteor.

360

SrENGEL,

Ueb.

'

d.

Keihen-

folge d. naturwissensch. Schrif ten


d. Arist,,'

AhUandl.

d.

Munelm.

T.RANDIS, Gr.Aliad. V. 150 s(i.


rom. Phil. ii. b, 1073, 1076;
Rose, Arist. Lihr. Ord. 1J)7).
;

Tlie doubts alluded to by Olympiod. ihid. i. 131, as to book i.


the reasons
are unsupported
given by Ideler (i. xii. sq.) for
holding that two recensions of
the Meteor, existed in antiquity
;

The points
which he supposed to have been
found in another edition of this,
are for the most part referable to
other works, and where that is

are not convincing.

not so (Sen. Qu. Nat. vii. 28, 1


our
cf. Meteor, i. 7, 344, b, 18)
informant m ay be in error. But it
may
is possible that these points
have come from an edition that
later
had been expanded by a
;

hand or largely added to


Brandts, p. 1075.
The Physios have the^
;

cf
fol-

lowing titles n. apxS>v ^ (pixrews


a' (An. 21), iv ro7s rr. tv dpx^"
rrjs oAtjs (pvaca^s (ThEMIST. Pe
rwv
J.n. ii. 71, 76), iv to7s tt.
:

apxoov (ibid. 93), IT, KivrjtTcas (D.


Pt. 17,
45, 115; An. 102, 1 B
the same again as Auscid8 B
and
tatio 2)^iysica, at No. 84
perhaps also as n. apxvs at D. 41).
In what relation the same work
stands to the titles: 11. (pva^ws
(D. 90 as three books, An. 81, as
one); <PvaiKhv a' (D. 91); or n.
;

(An. 82) is not clear.


An. Ap2J. 170, Ft. 85 n. xP"''ou
might also be only an extract
including PJ/ys. iv. 10- 14, though
it is preferable to think of it as
a special treatise by some of the

(pvaiKwi/ a'

Aristotle himself
Peripatetics.
refers with the words iv ro7s ir.
aroix^iuiv in the Be An. ii. 11,
423, b, 28, and the De Sensv, 4,
441, a, 12, to the Gen. et Corr.
2 sqq. Whether in D. 39,
ii.
An. 35, the title n. (rroix^icov 7'
only refers to this work (possibly
in connection

with

De

(Joelo

iii.

or with
31etror. iv., cf. Fr. Pfz. 156), or
whether it means a special collection of several Aristotelian tracts
the elements, or
relating to

and

50,

iv., cf. p.

n.

there was a separate


(which could not be considered genuine) must remain an
open question. 80, again, as to
the book n. tov Trdcrx^i-v ^ ireirovOevat (D. 25) Aristotle in Be An.

whether
treatise

41 7, a, 1, and in Gen. Anirn.


iv. 3, 768, b, 23 refers by the
formula, iv to?s it. rod ttoi^Iv koI
Trdax^Lv, to Gen. et Corr. i. 7 sq.,

ii. 5,

a leference doubted by Trendelenburg (De An. ibid.) and by


Heitz (V. S. 80), but which it
seems impossible, on comparison of the passages, to reject
(cf. with Gen. An. p. 324, a, 30
with De An. 416, b, 35, and
sq.
323, a, 10 sq. with De An. 417
;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Another
a, 1,

class of writings, less directly akin, are the

Tovro 8e ttus Svvarhy

varov,

dp-f}Ka/xGv,

fj

and

etc.,

a5v-

325,

b, 25, TTus Se eVSe'xeTOt tovto crvfiIt


^alvcLU, irdXiv \4ya>iji.eu, etc.).

suggests

itself, therefore, either


to apply the title in DiOG.
to this section only or to the
whole of book i. If, however, a
is meant, then
seems more likely that it was

title

Ar.

ap.

cr-n/uLciuu),

Oj)jj.

n.

973,

ii.

which

for the Fr. of

v.

Fr. 11%.
Ar. Fr. 237 sq. 1521
157 Ar, Ps. 243 sq. The n. ttoTafMoou (Ps.-Plut. He Fluv. c. 25
ad fin. Heitz, V. S. 297 Fr.
Hz. 349) seems to have been a
;

Of much

separate treatise

late compilation.

it

(according to Rose,
either by Theophrastus or of his
time) is An. App. 159 Pt. 22,
n. ttJs rov 'NciKov avafidaews, de
q.v. R0SE,^r. Ps. 239 sq. Ar. Fr,
The
Fq'.
Hz. 211.
p. 1520;

analogous to the Gen.

Corr.

et

Trend.

than that (as

Gesch.

Kategor., 130, supposes) it


treated generally of the categories of Action and Passion.
With Physics also was connected
the tract De qua^stionibus hylicis,
Pt. 50, and perhaps also Pt. 75,
Be accidentlMis unirersiSy both
without doubt spurious. So must
be also An. A^jj^. 184, n. KdcTfxov
d.

which cannot have


been written by Aristotle, who
so decisively combats the idea
of a beginning of the world.
The book n. kSctixov (which is not
even known to our three lists) was
yevea-ecos,

written at the earliest 50-1 B.C.


of. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. iii. a, 558.
The so-called quotation from a

work n. /Ai|ecos, given by Minoides


Mynas, in his edition of Gennadius against Pletho {Fr. Hz. 157),
belongs perhaps to the Siaipiffeis
spoken of p. 75, n. 2. Many
of the books we hear of as related to the subject of tbe Meteor.

seem to
A work

have
n.

been

avefiooy

spurious.

(ACHILL.

Tat. in Ar. c. 33, 158 A; Fr.


Hz. 350 Rose, Ar. Ps. 622) was
ascribed to Aristotle, probably
by a confusion between him and
Theophrastus {de q. v. DiOG. v.
;

42; Alex. Meteor. 101, b, 106, a,


etc.)
and so with the 'S.-nixila
;

X^i-P-<^vo}v

(D. 112, or

a2).

An.

99,

lier

ear-

date

treatises

De

H\t.mior%bus

and He

Siccitate, ap. Pt. 73, 74,

cannot

genuine, as they are mentioned nowhere else. As to the


n. xpco^oTcoi/, well founded objections have been raised by Prantl
(/Ir. ii. d: FarVen, Miinch., 1849,
cf. 107, 115, 142, etc.).
p. 82
Alex, in Meteor. 98, b, and Olympiod. in Meteor. 36,a(/AlDELER,
Ar. Meteor, i. 287 sq.) allege that

be

Aristotle wrote a

book

IT.

x^H-<^^t

but neither seems to have known


it.
So Michael of Ephesus, He
Vita et M. 175, b, remarks that
Aristotle's n. ^vrav kuI x^^^^
was lost, so that it was necessary
Arito rely on Theophrastus.
stotle himself alludes in Meteor.
ii.

3,

359, b, 20,

to

some more

extended inquiry into the qualithings relating to the


sense of taste and since in tbe
late He Sensu, c. iv. ad fin.^ further inquiries on the same subject are projected as part of the
work on Plants, it is a question
whether we should refer the
allusion in Meteor, ii. to a separate book n. xw^Vy and not
consider it rather as a later interpolation referring to He Sensu"ties of

AMISTOTLE

mechanical,

mathematical,

and astronomical

optical,

tracts.^

nxidiDeAn. ii. 10. Aristotle


contemplates at the end of Meteor, iii. a work on Metals, and
the commen*^ators mention a
jneTaWwv.
TT.
See
fxovofiifiXos
SiMPL. PInjs. 1, a; Be Ccelo,
c. 4,

Damasc.
Schol. in Ar. 408, b, 25
De 6'a?Zfl,ibid. 454, a, 22; Philop.
;

Phys. a, 1, m. (who, however, on


the Meteorologia,\. 135 id., speaks
as if he did not know such a
tract)

Olympiod.

in Meteor,

i.

Some, with more reason,


attribute the book to Theophrastus (Pollux, Onomast. vii. 90,
X. 149; cf. DioG. V.44; Theophr.
Alex. Meteor.
J)e Lapid. init.
183

id.

126,

a,

ii.

161

and

Id.;

KOSE, Arist. Pit. 254


sq.
Ar. Fr. 242 sq.

see

261
>S.
1523;
Against the idea

i'V. JIz. 161).

sq.,

that Meteor,

iv.
iii. 7, 378, b, 5
384, b, 34, refers to the n. ^er.
(on which see Heitz, p. 68), see
;

8,

BONITZ, Ind. Ar.

know nothing

(Hadschi

fodinis

We

98, b, 53.

of the

De

metalli

Khalfa,

Wenrich, Be Auct. Gr.


Aral).

160).

The

tract

aj).

Vers.

on the

IMagnet (n. ttjs Xidov, D. 125;


An. 117; Rose, Ar. Ps. 242;
P?'. H. 215) was probably spuri-

That De lajndlhus, which


was much used by the Arabs

ous.

(Hadschi Kh. loc. clt. 159 see


Meyer, Nicol. Damaso. De iilan;

tis,

Rose, Ar. Lihr.


Ar. P.v. 255 sq.),

praef. p. xi.

Ord. 181

sq.,

was certainly

so.
a'

n.

To7s

53),

TTJs

eV

An.

ixad7]jxa(nv

(An. Apj?. 160), IT. fiovaSos


(D. Ill; An. 100), n. fxcy^dovs
(D. 85 An. 77, unless this was
a Rhetorical tract; see p. 72, 2
;

aTSfKov rpafi/j-wu

(Ar. 0pp. ii. 968 sq.), which in


our lists is only named by Pt.
10, and never cited by Aristotle
himself, was also ascribed with
much likelihood to Theophrastus

by Simpl. De Ccelo, Schol. in


Ar. 510, b,10, and Philop. Gen.et,
Corr. 8 b, whereas Philop. ad
Gen. et Corr. 37, a, and ad Phijs.
ra. 8, treats it simply as by AriIts genuineness is doubted
by Rose (Ar.Libr. Ord.Wii).
The reference in EuTOC. ad ArcMni. de Circ. Dlmens. prooim,.
stotle.

also

does not mean that Aristotle


wrote a book on squaring the
the allusion is merel}'' to
Soph. El. 11, 174, b, 14 or Phys. i.
Without further
2, 185, a, 16.
explanation Simpl. {Categ. 1
circle

names

Aristotle's y^oofx^rpiKa re Koi

lxTi]xo.viKa fiifixia

but the extant

M7]xaviKa (in D. 123; AN. 114,


called iJL-(]xaviKbv [-coi'], but more
correctly ap. Pt, 18, Mtjx. t/jo)3A^ftaTa) are certainly not from
the hand of Aristotle cf Rose,
Ar. Lihr. Ord. 192. D. 114,
;

^OiTTiKbv

An.

a'

103,

David

[-av, sc. trpo^XrijxaToiv]


'Otttlko.

fiifiXia;

cf.

Categ Schol. 25, a, 36


Proleg. in Metapli. ap.
Rose, Ar. Ps. 377, and Fr. IIz. 215
'OTTTi/ca Trpo^A-fjiJ.., V. Marc. p. 2 and
p. 8. It is clear from a reference
in a Latin translation of Hero's
KaTOTTTpiKo. (clrc. 230 B.C.) ap.
Rose, Ar. Ps. 378 Ar. Fr. 1534
Fr. Hz. 216, and from the Pseud.
Ar. Prohlems, xvi. 1 ad fin.., that
iyi

Anon.

(D. 63

MaOf] fiariKhv

0'j<rlas

The n.

ad Jin.).

such a book had currency under


Aristotle's
Its

name

genuineness

assured, though

at an early date,
is not,
it

is

however,
very pro-

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

87

Next to the Physics and the related treatises come


the numerous and important works dealing with life.
Some of these are descriptive, others are inquiries. To the
and the
former class belong the History of Animals
*

bable that among Aristotle's


genuine Problems there were
some in Optics The Be Speculo,
attributed by Arabic and Christian Middle-Age writers to Aristotle, appears to be only Euclid's
KoTOTTTpi/ca (Rose, Ar. Ps. 376).
An. 101, report an
D. 113
'AarpovofxiKhu and Aristotle himself refers to such a work in
3Ieteor. i. 3, 339, b, 7 (^Stj yhp
S)TTTai Sia Tuv acrrpoKoyiKuv deioprjfidrcov riiJuv), ibid. c. 8, 345, b, 1
;

Se'iKwrai

(^Kaddnep

aarpoXoylav
Ccelo,
T7JS

ii.

toTs

deoop-fjixatriv),

10,

Tctlecos

eV

291, a, 29
avTcov

irepl

and De
(Trepl

etc.

e/c

5e

ruv

AeaarpoXoyiav deoipeiTOci}
7eTat yap iKavcos) ; SiMPL. on the
De Ccelo, Schol. 497, a, 8, appears to have the same in his
mind.
The existence of the
book is accepted, of modern

irepl

scholars, by Bonitz (^Ind. Ar.


104, a, 17 sq.) and Prantl (ad
n. ovp. p. 303) ; while Heitz (S. V.

17) thinks it probable, though


in Fr. Hz. 160 he refuses to decide.
Blass {Rliein. Mus. xxx.
504) applies the references to
writings by other hands. Ideler
(Ar. Metayli. i. 415) assumes a
varying recension of the Be Ccelo,
which has no probability. It
p.

does

not

seem

probable

that

this Astronomical or as Aristotle would have called it (v.

Heitz,

ibid.) Astrological

work

took the form of Problems, since


Aristotle repeatedly speaks of
Qi<i3pi]ixara.
Not to it, but to
late interpolated tracts, are the

to be referred which are


mentioned by Hadschi Khalfa

titles

Be sideruvi arcanis.
sideribus eorwnique arcanis,
stellis lahentibus, and Mille
verba de astrologia judiciaria.
As to the accuracy of the other
mathematical and related writ(p.

159-161)

Be
Be

we can decide nothing. The


attempt of Rose (Ar. Libr. Ord.
192) to prove that none of them
does not
can be Aristotle's
ings,

succeed.
'
n. TO

^(fa iaropla

IffTopias

An,

(TI. ^4^v
the
155
same is meant by D. 102 and
An. 91, n. C^'^Vf nine books, and
by Pt. 42). The Arabic writers
count ten, fifteen, or nineteen
books, and had no doubt expanded the extant text by
various added tracts cf. Wenrich, Be Auct. Grcec. Vers. 148.
Aristotle quotes it by various
names Icropiai [-ta] t. to ^<^a
(Part. Anim. iii. 14, 674, b, 16
i'.

A2J2J-

Gen. An.

i.

iv. 8

ad

Jin. ; iv.
iv. 13, 696, b, 14 ;

680, a, 1
10, 689, a, 18

iv, 5,

4, 717, a,

728, b, 13; Resjnr.

c.

33

i.

20,

16, init.)

(Part. Anim.
Gen.
660, b, 2
ii. 1, init. c. 17,
Anim, i. 3, 716, b, 31 ; Respir. c.
12, 477, a, 6), tu^'iK)] Iffropia (Part.
IffTopiai

IT.

ra>v C^oou

Anim.

iii.

5, Jin.),

iffropia ^vctik^

(Part. Anim. ii. 3, 650, a, 31


Ingr. An. c. 1, Jin.), and simply
la-Topiai or Iffropia (Be Resjnr. 1 6,
Gen. Anim. i. 11, 719,
478, b, 1
a, 10; ii. 4, 740, a, 23; c. 7, 746,
a, 14; iii. 1,750, b, 31; c. 2,753,
b, 17 c. ^Jin. c. \Ofn. c. 11 Jin.
;

ARISTOTLE

88

its contents, however, it is


rather a Comparative Anatomy
and Physiology than a description of animals. As to the plan
of it, cf. J.
B. Meyer, Ar.
Its genuineness
TJiierk. 114 sq.
is beyond question, though as to
the tenth book, it must be taken
to be, not merely with Spengel
{Be Ar, Lihro
Hist. Anim.
Heidelb. 18-12), a retranslation of
a Latin translation of a section
written by Aristotle to follow
book vii., but wholly- spurious
with Sci.neider (iv, 262, i. xiii.),
Kose {Ar. Lihr. Ord. 171), and
Brandis (^Gr.-r'6m. Phil. ii. 6,
1257). Apart from any thing else
the un-Aristotelian assumption
of a female semen would prove

In

this

of

book

No doubt

itself.

the

is

same

D. 107, An. 90,

as that

v-n^p

[Trepi]

rq)

ZcoiKwv,

ir.

^ {kuI]

cites
IT.

T^

'IxOvCOV, iv

Kal 'Ixdvcov, iv TCf

at the

ry

tt.

iv rcf

tt.

Z(fCt}v

Z(i}'iKWV

TT.

^l^Qvuv

but

same time he curiously

our Hist. An.

v.,

as v4ixtttov
notes of

((pwv fxopiwv (see the

Schweighauser on the passages


in question e.g. ii. 63, b iii. 88
c. vii. 281 sq., 286, b
and the
Index, and see Rose, Ar. Ps
276 sq.: Ar. Fr. Nr. 277 sq.;
;

tions it, distinguishing it expressly from the extant Hist. An.


(n. Cywj'). Parts of this lost work
are probably indicated by the

names

IT.

Catasterismi,

drjpiwv
c.

41,

(Eratosth.
and there-

from the Scholion in GermanICUS, Aratea Phoimm. v. 427,


Arat.

Buhle,

ed.

88); 'TTrep

ii.

Toiv iivOoXoyovfiivwv C^uiv (D. 106;


An. 95); uTrep tQv (rvj'OiTwv (cf^^

105; An. 92); n. rwv <pw\v6vTa)v (Ptol. 23, ^/aj-i tv/u-

(D.

DiOG.

lin').

V.

44 attributes a

which come the Fragm. 176-178,

the names eV t^ it. Zcfwu, iv ro7s


IT.
Z. (Rose, Ar. Ps. 277, and
Heitz, 224, unnecessarily read
iiriypa(poiJ.iv(f ZcfiKqi, iv

Fr. Hz. 172). So

in

tov

ZwiKwv), iv

tliis

As

yepuav.

sq.

Clemens, Pcedag. ii. 150, C (cf.


Athen. vii. 315, e) seems to
refer to the same lost work, and
Apollonius {Mirahil. c. 27) men-

treatise of that name, doubtless


the same, to Theophrastus, from

to Alexander's reported assistance for the whole


work, cf. p. 29 sq. snjrm and as
to the sources used by Aristotle,
cf. Rose, Ar. Lihr. Ord. 206 sq.
Besides this History of Animals,
there were know^n to the ancients
various similar works. Athenfeus,
for example, uses one work different (as is clear from his own
words) from our Jlist.A/i., xmder:
fiT)

Heitz, 224

Wimm.

aj^ud Athen. ii. 63


105 d; vii. 314, b. To it
also refers tlie notice in Plut.
Qu. Conv. 8, 9, 3, which Rose,
Ar.
Fr. 38, refers to
the
c.

iii.

Dialogue Eudemus,' and Heitz,


Fragm. Ar. 217, to the larpiKa.
The citations from this and similar works, sometimes under the
'

name

of Aristotle, sometimes of

Theophrastus, will be found in


Rose, Ar. Ps. 276-372; Ar. Fr.
257-334, p. 1525 sq.
Fr. Hz.
171 sq.
Plin. (^H. Nat. viii. 16,
44) says Aristotle wrote about
fifty, and Antigonus (Mlrab. c.
60 IQ6']) says about seventy books
on Animals. Of all these it is
clear that none but the first nine
of our Hist. An. were genuine.
The work which Athen. used
(which is not Aristotle's style, to
judge by the Fr.) seems to have
been a compilation from them
and other sources, belonging, in
view of the passage quoted from
Antigonus,to the third century B.C.
;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Anatomical Descriptions.^
the three books O71 the
anthropological
'

The

tracts

Soul^'^

'Auaroixal (seven books,

We

iv.

1,

525, a, 8,

Gen. An.

An. iv.

ii.

7,

i.

17, 497, a, 31,

vi. 11, 566, a, 15


746, a, 14
Part.
;

680, a, 1 and BeResjnr.


16, 478, a, 35, that the 'Auarofial
5,

were furnished with drawings,


which were perhaps the principal
point of the work. The Schol. on
Ingr. An. 178, b (after Simpl. Be
Am7/ia), can hardly have cited
the work from his own knowledge.
Apuleius (Be Mag. c. 36,
40) talks of a work of Aristotle,
n. ^(fwv auaTOfirjs, as universally

known

latter class

but it is seldom mentioned elsewhere, and Apuleius


himself possibly meant the n.
Ctfwv ixopicau.
The extract from
the work K\oy^ avaro/nuj/, D.
104, An. 94, Apollon. Mirah. c.
39 was certainly not by Aristotle.
Heitz {Fr. 171) rightly
rejects Rose's opinion {Ar. Ps.
276) that the avaroiJial were one
work with the Cv'^Ka. An. 187
;

begin with

on which several other

The

follow.^

in D. 103, An. 93) are very often


cited by Aristotle (of. Bonitz,
Ind. Ar. 104, a, 4, and Fr. Hz.
160), and it is not possible with
Rose {Ar. Lihr. Orel. 188) to explain these references away.

know from H. An.

The

89

a. 30,

Be

further

Interpr.

i.

investi-

16, a, 8,

Motu An. c. 6 init. and c.


fin., and must therefore be

11

Be
ad,

earlier

than these books.

Ideler {Ar.
Meteor, ii. S60) is not correct in
saying that the reverse follows
from the end of Meteor, i. 1. The
words in the Ingr. An. c. 19 ad
fin. which name this book as only
projected and the n. ^4^v jxopicoi/
as in existence, are (with Brandis
ii. 6, 1078) to be considered as a
gloss only. Of its three books the
first two seem in a more complete state than the third,
Torstrik, in the preface to his edition
of 1862, has shown that there are
preserved traces of a second recension of book ii., and that
confusing repetitions have crept
into the present text of book iii.,

through a combination of two

made before the date


of Alexander of Aphrodisias and
the same appears to be true of
book i. also. Singularly enough

recensions

D. and An. do not mention the


work but Pt. 38 has it whereas
D. 73 and An. 68 give eVety
;

IT. ypvxvs a'.


also to be

stotle's

The Eudemus ought

reckoned with
psychology
see
:

Ari-

the

gives an auaro/j.}] avQpooirov among


the P.^eudeingr.
Aristotle did

accounts of

no human anatomy

To this class belong the following extant treatises, which all

iii.

3,

see

513,

a,

12,

i.

H. An.
16 init. and
(cf.

Lewes, Aristotle).
The n. y\ivxfis is often

'^

Aristotle in the lesser treatises presently to be mentioned


J/Z. Ar. 102, b, 60 sq.),
in the Gen. An. ii. 3, v. 1, 7,
736. a, 37, 779, b, 23, 786, b, 25,
288, b, 1, Part. An. iii. 10, 673,

and

at pp. 55, n. 4, 56,

supra.

the Koivk adifxaros koL


epya {Be An. iii. 10, 433,
20) : (1) n. aladrjcrecos koI alaOrtruv. Its proper name probably
was n. alff9'f)(recio5 only (cf.
Ideler, Ar. Meteor, i. 650, ii.
358) and it is cited by Aristotle
in the n. C l^opiwu and the IT. Crelate to

cited

by

(BONITZ,

n. 2,

it

\|/ux^s

ARISTOTLE

90

all the
anthropological treatises which
are introduced by 11. alad. 1 init.,
The
as by a common preface.
same explanation will account
for the statement in Parf. An.
ii.
7, 653, a, 19 that Aristode

y^vea^m (BONITZ, Ind. ArAQ^,


a, 8 sq.), De Mcmor. c. 1, inlt..
Be Somno 2, 456, a, 2 (Be 3Iofu
Anim. c. Wfin.), and announced
as coming in the Meteor, i. B, 841,
a, 14. TEENDELENBURG.Z'eylM.
118 (106) sq. (contra EoSE, .4r.
<7r^. 219, 226; Brandis,
iifc'r.

wide sense, as including

Gr.-rbm. Phil. ii. b, 2, 1191,


284 BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 99, b, 54,
100, b, 30, 40) believes that the
n. alad. is mutilated, and that it
is a separated section of it which
is preserved as the e/c rov ircpl

Kal

would speak

ev t ro7s

ir.

al<Td'f](rws

It

of the
causes and effects of sleep. The
subject is to be found only Be
Somno, 2, 8, 458, a, 18 sq, and no
fitting place for its introduction
can be found in our n. alaQ.
Probably it did not occur in the

certain that some of the references in later writings cannot


be satisfactorily verified in our
present text. According to the
Gen. An. v. 2, 781, a, 20, and
PaH. An. ii. 10, 65G, a, 27, it was

original text either and we are


to understand the referetce as
indicating by n. al<re. the general,
and by IT. v-kvov the particular
description of one and the same
treatise (in which view re should

explained

perhaps be dropped). So finally


in Gen. An. v. 7, 786, b, 23, 788,
a, 84 there are allusions to investigations as to the voice eV rols
These
IT. Tpvxvs and ir. al(Tdi}(recos.
are to be referred chiefly to Be

oLKovarccv,

Ar. Opp.

ii.

800

sq.

is

eV 7o?s Trepl aladrjo-ews

that the canals of the organs of


sense started from the heart
but, on the contrary, in the only
applicable passage of the extant
treatise (c. 2, 438, b, 25) we are
told that the organs of smell and
sight are seated near the brain,
out of which they are formed,
but those of taste and touch in
the heart. It is not until the Be
Vita et M. c. 3, 469, a, 10 that he
adds that the heart is the
seat of perception for the other
senses also (only not cpavepws as
and here 1. 22 sq.
for these)
refers to the passage of the n.
alad. just cited (for it is only
there, and not in the Part. An. ii.
10, as cited Ind. Ar. 99, b, 5, that
the different positions are assigned to the organs of sense).
From these fact sit does not follow
that a section dealing with this
point is omitted in our text, but
rather that the words eV to7s tt.
alaO. in Gen. An. v, 2 and Part.
An. ii. 10 are to be taken in a
;

TT.

vTTvov

Sicapifffievois

ii. 8, and secondarily to c. 1,


487, a, 3 sq., 446, b, 2 sq., and 12 sq.
whereas the beginning of c. 4 of

An.

the Be An. itself tells us that it was


beyond the plan of that treatise
to give any detailed account of
voice and tone, such as we find
TI.
the
extant fragment
in

The last-named work


never cited by Aristotle, and

aKovcrrwu.
is

contains no express references to


any of his books. In fact its own
broad and sketchy methods of
exposition show it to be the work

not of the founder, but of a later


scholar of ;:he Peripatetic school,

probably however of one of


earliest generations.
yUTjs

Kal

avafjLvfiffeus,

its

(2) n. fivi}Pt. 40, is

quoted in the Be Motu An. c. 11,


ad fin. and by the Commentators.
The book of Mnemonics noticed

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
p. 72, n. 2 Jin. supra,

to

do with

has nothing

(3) n. virvov kuI


iyprjySpareus cited Be Longit. V.,
Part. An., Gen. An., Motu An.,
and announced as in contemplation (Ind. Ar. 103, a, 16 sq) by Be
An. iii. 9, 432, b, 11, Be Sensu,
c. 1, 436, a, 12 sq.
It is freit.

quently connected with (2) (but


clearly for external reasons only)
as if they were one treatise, n.
fjLvfjIiirjs

KOL virpov

(Gell.

vi.

6,

Alex. Top.
copied

279, Schol 296, b, 1,


SuiD. /avf^fiT], Alex. Be

Sensu, 125, b, Michael, in Arist


Be Mem. 127, a, Ptol. 4). It is,
however, clear from Arist. Bivin.
in Somn. c. 2, Jin., that it was in
fact bracketed with (4) n. 'TLvvirviav and (5) n. ttJs ro0' "'^irvov
fiavTiKTJs. (4) is also in the Be

Somno,

2,

456, a, 27,

announced

as in preparation.
fiidrriTos /cot

(6) IT. fxaKpofipaxv^idrriTos, cited,

not by name, Part.

An

iii.

10,

and by name Athen.


viii. 353, a, Pt. 46, and perhaps
also An. App. 141.
(7) n. (wtis
Kol QavoLTov: to which (8) n.
673,

a, 30,

view so
closely related that they form
one whole {Be Vita et 31. c. 1
avairvorts, is in Aristotle's

init. 467, b, 11,

486, b, 21).

Be

Respir.

c.

21,

There was a third


/col yfipws, spoken

tract, n. ve6Tr]Tos

of by Aristotle (467, b, 6, 10), to


which our editors ascribe the
lirst two chapters of the IT. (wijs
Koi Oavdrov, but clearly without
reason, for it seems more probable
either that Aristotle never wrote
the tract or that it was lost at a
very early date (cf. Beandis,
1191, BoNiTZ, Ind. Ar. 103, a,
26 sq, Heitz, p. 58). Inasmuch

as the Be Vita et Morte, c. 3, 468,


b, 31 (cf. Be Bespir. c. 7, 473, a,
27) mentions the Essay on the
Parts of Animals as already exist-

ing

91

Rose, Ar. lAhr. Ord.,


refers to Hist. An.
iii. 3, 513, a, 21), and as the Essay
on Life and Death is spoken of
(cf.

who wrongly

in the Be Longit. V. c. 6, 467,


b, 6 as the conclusion of
the
inquiries concerning
animals,

Brandis (1192 sq.) suggests that


only the first half of the so-called
Parva Naturalia' (Nos. 1-5) was
composed immediately after the
Be Anima and that the rest of
these (which in Ptolemy's catalogue stand at No. 46 sq. divided
from the books on Sense, Sleep,
and Memory by the books on
Zoology) were not written until
after the works on the Parts, the
Movement, and the Generation
of Animals, though projected
earlier.
And it is true that in
the Be Generat. Anim. iv. 10,
777, b, 8, we hear that inquiries
into the reason of the varying
duration of life are projected,
and these are not further dealt
with in that work. But on the
other hand the Part. An. iii. 6,
'

669. a, 4 refers to

Be

Respir.

c.

10, 16, and the same iv. 13, 696,


b, 1, and 697, a, 22, to Be Respir.
c.

a,

10, 13; and Gen. An. v. 2, 781,


20, as already observed, to Be

Vita et Morte,

3,

469, a, 10, sq.

Ar. 103, a, 23, 34, sq.,


where the other references are
more problematical). If Brandis
(cf.

is

I7id.

right, these

references

must

have been added, as does sometimes happen, to works previously


completed. As to the genuineness
of the writings already named, it
is guaranteed not only by internal evidence, but by the references referred to. Another

projected tract,
(las

(Be Sensu

Long.
c.

IT.

v6(Tov kuI vyi-

c.

1,

436, a, 17,

Vit. c. 1, 464, b, 32,

21, 480, b, 22, Pa^-t.

Respir.

An.

ii.

7,

ARISTOTLE

92

gations

On

the Parts of Animals,^

on

Generation

essays

the

653, a, 8), was probably never


written (thougli Heitz, p. 58 and
Fr.Ar. 169, thinks otherwise). It
is

unknown

to

Alexander,

J)e

Sensu, 94, and therefore it is likely


that the Be Sanitate et Morho
known by the Arabic writers
(lladschi Khalf a />?/ Weneicii,
Two books IT.
1 (;0) was a forgery.
u\pews (Ax. Aj}p. 173) and one n.
hardly
(poouT]^ (ihid. 164) could

be

o-oiiuine (cf. p. 80, n.

1).

book n. TpofpriK seems to be referred to as existing in the J)e


Som/io, c. 3, 456, h, 5 (the reference in Meteor, iv. 3, 381, b,
13 being too uncertain), and it is
spoken of as a project in JJe An.
ii. 4 Jin., Gen. An. v. 4, 784, b, 2,
Pari. An. ii. 3, 650, b, 10, and c.
7, 653, b, 14, and c. 14, 674 a, 20,
and iv. 4, 678, a, 19. The reference in Be J/otu An. 10,703,
a, 10 (cf. Michael Kphes. ad lac.
p. 156, a) is not to a IT. rpocpris,
but to the n. TTv^vixaros for the
words ris /J-ff oiv 7) actiTTjpia rov
:

(TvjxcpvTov TTvevixaros

e'lprjTai

iv 'aA-

to the words
rod ifj.(pvrov Trv^vixaros 5ia/j.ouri ;
(n. TTj/eu. init.). (So BONITZ, Ind.
uir. 100, a, 52 but Rose, Ar. Lihr.
Ord. 167 makes them refer to the
n. ^(f. KLvr)(T. itself, and Heitz,
Fr. Ar. 168 to the n. Tpo(t>ris.) The
work is named in Pt. No. 20,
where it is wrongly given three
books. It dealt with food and other
matters in an aphoristic style;
and that it is later than Aristotle
is clear from the fact that it
recognised the distinction of
veins and arteries, which was
AoLs clearly relate
Tis

7)

unknown

to him (cf. Ind. Ar.


109, b, 22, sq.). In any case it is

and

with the connected

Movement

the

of

Peripatetic cf. further ajj. EOSE,


Ar. Lihr. Ord. 167, sq., and
Brandis, p. 1 203, who both with
Bonitz reject the book.
n. C4^^ jxopiuu four books
(in An, App. 157, three books)
cited in the Be Gen. An.., Infjr.
An., Motn An. (cf. Ind. Ar. 1()3,
a, 55 sq), and the Be Vita et M.
and Be Ilesjrlr. {de q. v. p. 91,
supra) but the Be Somno, 3, 457,
b, 28 might be referred to Be
Sensu, 2,' 438, b, 28, though Be
Somno, c. 2, 455, b, 34 may be
better paralleled by Part. An.
iii. 3, 665, a, 10 sq., than by Be
Seinu, 2, 438, b, 25 sq. It is
spoken of as projected in Meteor.
Hist. An. ii.
i. I, 339, a, 7, and
;

'

The

17, 507, a, 25.

tirst

book

is

a kind of introduction to the


zoological works, including the
treatises on the Soul, and the
activities and conditions of life,
and it cannot well have been
originally meant for this place
On the order of
(cf. 8PENGEL,
Aristotle's books on Natural Phi'

losophy,' Ahh. d.
the
iv. 159, and

Mdnch.

AMd.

others

there

cited).

n. ((fup yVae(>}s, five books


An. App. 158, three books,
Pt. No. 44, five books, ibid.
No. 77, the same work in two
books the errors are of no signi-

(in

It is often referred to
ficance).
by Aristotle, but only in the
future (cf. Ind. Ar. 108, b, 8 sq.).

DiOG. omits it but its genuineness is beyond doubt. Book v.,


however, seems not to belong to
it, but to be an appendix to the
works on the Parts and Generation of Animals, just as the
;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Animals/ complete

his

zoological

93

system.

Later in

date, but earlier in their place in his teaching, were the


lost

books

On Plants}

Other treatises touching this

Parva Naturalia are to the De


For summaries of the
Anima.
'

contents of the Part. An. and


the Geiierat. Anim. see Meyer,
Arist. Thierk. 128 sq,,and Lewes,
Ar. c. 16 sq. The tract De Coitu
(Hadschi Khalfa, aj). Wenrich,
159) was spurious: for it
p.
cannot be referred, as Wenrich
it, to the title n. fxi^ecos in
Sensu, c. 3 (cf. p. 83, n. 1,
supra). As to the book n. tov
fir] yevv^v, v. p. 88, sujjra.
n. Cv'^^ TTopeias, cited bj'
that name in Part. An. iv. 11,
690, b, 15 and 692, a, 17, as the
n. TTopeias Kal Kivijcrecas rwu C^cav
in Part. An. iv. 13, 696, a, 12,
and as 11. roHu C4^^ Kiv-f^ffews in
the De Ca>lo, ii. 2, 284, b, 13, cf.
Ingr. An. c. 4, 5, c. 2, 704, b, 18;
yet it itself cites (c. 5, 706, b, 2)
the Part. An. iv. 9, 684, a, 14,34,
According
as an earlier work.
to its concluding words in c. 19
(which, as already suggested at
p. 89, n. 2, may be spurious) it is
later than the n. Cv^^ fiopicoy, to
which also its introductory words
seem to refer back; and yet it is
frequently cited in that work,
and at its close (PaH. An. 697,
b, 29) there is no hint of an
essay on Movement as still to
come. Probably it was, in fact,
composed while the larger work
was in progress. The tract II.

refers

De

'

can hardly be
Kiv7](Tcos
^^)<t>p
authentic among other reasons,
because it cites the n. irvev/xaTos
Rose (Ar.
(cf. p. 89, n. 3 Jin.).
Lihr. Ord. 163 sq.) and Brandis
(ii. b, 1, p. 1271, 482) declare it
spurious Barthelemy St. Hilaire
;

{Psyck. d'Arist. 237) accepts it


as genuine.
Of the Indices, An.
Ajjjj. No. 156, and Pt. No. 41,
have the n. (cfcov Kivfiffeus, and
Pt. No. 45, IT. Cv^^ -jropdas.
2 n. (pvTcov
fi' (D. 108, An. 96,
Pt. 48). Promised by Aristotle
in Meteor, i. 1, 839, a, 7, Be Sensu
c. 4, 442, b, 25, Long. Vitce, 6,
467, b, 4, De Vita 2, 468, a, 31,
Part. An. ii. 10, 656, a, 3, Gen.
An. i. 1, 716, a, 1, v. 3, 783, b, 20,
and cited in H. An. v. 1, 589, a,
20, Gen. An. i. 23, 731, a, 29 (in
the last, it is wrong to change
the perfect tense into the future
in the words of citation). Though
both
these
references
must
have been inserted after the
books were complete, it is possible that Aristotle
may have
inserted them. Alex. p. 183, on
De Sensu, I.e., remarks that a
book on Plants by Theophrastus
was extant, but none by Aristotle.

So

Michael Ephes, on

Be

Vita et M. 175 b, Simplicius


Philop. &c. {apud Rose, At. Ps.
261, Heitz, Pt. Ar. 163) say the
contrary, but we need not suppose they spoke from personal
knowledge of the IT. (pvroov.
Quintil. (xii. 11, 22) proves nothing for, and Cic. (Fin. v. 4, 10)
nothing against, their genuine-

What Athen. (xiv. 652 a,


653 d, &c.) cites from them (Ar.
Fr. 250-4) may as probably be
taken from a false as from a
genuine book. The two Aristoness.

telian references

mentioned make

however, overwhelmingly probable that Aristotle did write


two books on Plants, which were
it,

ARISTOTLE

94

Hermippus,

what Aristotle elsewhere says, or


promises to discuss in his n,

Goxus

we know how conthe earlier Peripatetics


adopted the teaching and the
very words of Aristotle.
On
the other hand, the only passage
cited verbally from Aristotle's
books (Athen. xiv. 652 a, ap.
Ar. Fr. 250) is not in those of
Theophrastus, so far as we have
them and the latter contain no
direct reference to any of the
Aristotelian writings a circumstance which would be incredible
in a work so extensive which
touched at so many points the

in the time of
though they were
afterwards displaced by the more
elaborate work of Theophrastus
(so Heitz, Ar. Fr. 250, and
Verl. Sclirift. 61, though Rose,
Ar. Ps. 261, thinks the books by
Theophrastus were ascribed to
Aristotle).
According to Antistill

extant

{Mirahil.

c.

169, cf. 129,

Ar. Fr. 253, Fr. Hz. 223)


Callimachus as well as Theophrastus seems to have borrowed
from these two books.
So did
the compiler of the <^vTiKa, as to
which Pollux, x. 170 {ap. Ar. Fr.
252, Fr. Hz. 224) could not say
whether they belonged to Theophrastus or to Aristotle, but
which no doubt, like the ^wi'/ca
ap.

mentioned at p. 88, svpra, were


compiled by a later disciple for
lexicographical purposes.

In like
other
similar collectors also used these
books (cf. Rose and Heitz,
ibid.)
and they sometimes distinguish between the phrases
used by Aristotle and by Theophrastus {Ar.
Fr. 254, Fr.
Hz. 225).
The two extant
books n. (pvTuu are emphatically
un- Aristotelian.
In the older
Latin text they have passed
already through the hands of
two or three translators. Mej^er

manner,

Athemeus

and

(Pref. to NicoL. Dam. Be Planed. 1841) ascribes them in


their original form to Nicolaus of
tis, ii.

Damascus, though possibly they


are only an extract from his book,

worked over by a

later hand.
Jessen's suggestion (Bhnn. Mvs.
1859, vol. xiv. 88) that Aristotle's
genuine work is contained in the
work of Theophrastus is in no
way supported by the fact that
the latter closely agrees with

<pvrS)v

for

stantly

earlier Aristotelian treatises.

The

very passage {Cavs. PI. vi. 4, 1)


in which Jessen finds one main
proof of his theory points to
several later modifications of an
Aristotelian doctrine which had
arisen in the School after his
death.
Theophrastus, in contrast with Aristotle's view, speaks
of male and female plants (cf.
Cans. PI. i. 22, 1, Hist. iii. 9, 2,
&c.). But a decisive argument is
to be found in the fact that not
only does the text of Theophrastus speak of Alexander and
his Indian expedition in a way
{Hist. iv.

4, 1, 5, 9, Cans. viii. 4,
5) which would be hardly possible in Aristotle's lifetime, but it
also refers to what happened in
the time of King Antigonus
{Hist. iv. 8, 4) and the Archons
Archippus, B.C. 321 or 318 {Hist.
iv. 14, 11) and Nicodorus, B.C.

314 {Cavs. i. 19, 5). It would


likewise be clear on a full comparison that the diction and
manner of statement in the Theophrastic books makes it impossible to attribute them to Aristotle.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

work, such as the Anthropology,^ the Physiogno-

field of

mies,^ the
n.

named

works on Medicine,-^ Agriculture,'' and Hunt-

^Avdpd>irov

in

An.

(pvffecos,

Aj?jj.

only

There

183.

are a few items which seem to


have belonged to this tract, apud
KoSB, Ar. Ps. 379, Ar. Ft. 257264, p. 1525, Fr. Hz. 189 sq.
2 '^vGio'^voiyioviKa. (Bekker, 805),
\-Kbv a' in D. 109, but -wa )8' in
An extended recenAn. 97].
sion of this work is indicated by
numerous references to
the
physiognomic theories not to be
found in our text, which occur in
a treatise on Physiognomy writ-

ten probably by Apuleius {apud


Rose, Anecd. Gr. 61 sq. cf Fr.
Hz. 191, and R0SE,^r. Ps. 696 sq.).
^ D. mentions two
books of
^larpiKoi the Anon, two books 11.
larpiKrjs
ibid, APP. 167, seven
books n. larpiKTis: Pt. 70 five
books of npo^\'f]iJi.aTa larpiKa (from
which it appears that the larpiKci.
in the list of Diog. were also
problems, book i. of our extant
Problems being made up of such
medical questions and answ<3rs)
Vita Marc. p. 2 R, UpofiX-fjixaTa
iarpiKo.
Pt. 71 IT. SiaiTrjs
ibid.
ibid. 92, one
74 b, Be Pulsu
;

book
a^).

95

larpiKhs:

Wenrich,

Hadschi Khalfa
p. 159, Pe San-

guinis Profusione Co el. Aurel.


Celer. Pass. ii. 13, one book Pe
Adjutoriis (perhaps a mistake
in the name). Galen in Hippocr.
Pe Nat. Horn. i. 1, vol. xv. 25 K,
knows of an 'larpiK^ cwaywy^ in
several books, bearing Aristotle's
name, which was nevertheless
recognised as being the work of
his pupil, Meno; and this is possibly identical with the ^Zwaywy)]
in two books named by Diog. 89
(as Wenrich, p. 158, suggests).
:

For the little that remains of it,


see Rose, Ar. Ps. 384 sq., Ar. Fr.
335-341, p. 1534; Fr. Hz. 216,
but on Fr. 362 cf. p. 88, supra.
The genuineness of these writings, or at least of some of them,
cannot be maintained. That Aristotle held that medical subjects
should be treated in a technical
way, and not from the point of
view of natural science, is evident from his own declaration

which he makes,

p. 9, 1 fin. (cf.

Pe

Sensu, i. 1, 436, a, 17 Longit.


V. 464, b, 32
Pe Pespir. c. 21,
Part. An. ii. 7, 653, a, 8),
iin.
and such an indefinite statement
as that of ^lian ( V. H. ix. 22)
cannot prove the contrary. As
to the composition IT, v6(tov koX
vyidas see p. 91 fin. Galen (as
Heitz ibid, justly remarks) can
have known no composition of
Aristotle on medical science,
since he never mentions any
such, although he quotes the
;

philosopher more than six hundred times.


An. 189 mentions the TewpyiKa
amongst the Pseudepigrapba.
Pt. 72, on the other hand, gives 15
(or 10) books Pe Agricultura as
genuine, and the statement in
Geopon. iii. 3, 4 (Ar. Fr. 255
sq. p. 1525) on the manuring
of almond-trees seems to have
been taken from this, and not
from the treatise on plants.
Rose (Ar. Ps. 268 sq. Hz. Fr.
165 sq.) mentions other things
which may perhaps have come
*

from

this source.

That Aristotle

did not write about agriculture


or

similar

from PoUt.

i.

subjects
11, 1258,

is

clear

a, 33, 39.

ARISTOTLE

06

ing,^ are,without exception,

The

spurious.

are no doubt based on Aristotelian materials

extant collection under that

ol

Ptolemy,

Hadsclu Khalfa gives


I)e Anl(n. rwv (p(i}Xv6vT(t}v^
malium Cojdura, nee nan de
:

delit'jscunt,

deversantur atque

i.

With regard to this treatise


the exhaustive article by
Prantl Ueb. d. Probl. d. Arist.'
among the Ahh. d. Munch.
'^

see

'

Altad. vi. 341-377; KOSE, Arist.


Ar. Ps. 215
Lihr. Ord. 199 sqq.
HEITZ, Verl Schr. 103
sqq.
s(iq., Fr. At. 191 sqq.
^ Aristotle
in seven
refers
places to the Upo^X-nixara or
;

Upo^K-nixariKa (I'EANTL, iUd. 361


Ind. Ar. 103, b, 17 sqq.),
sq.
but only one of these quotations
;

to a certain extent the


and the same
extant Problems
is true (PR. ibid. 367 sqq.) of the
majority of the later references.
Prantl, 'iZ/wZ. has abundantly
proved this, and he has also
shown {Miincli. Gel. Anz. 1858,
No. 25) that among the 262 further problems which are given by
Bassemaker in vol. iv. of the
suits

'

'

"'

Didot edition of Aristotle, and


some of which were at one
time erroneously ascribed to
Alexander of Aphrodisias (cf.
USENER, Alex. Aphr. ProU., Lib.
iii.,

iv.,

there

is

Berl. 1859, p. ix. sqq.),

probably nothing written

The same is true


of those which Rose {Ar. Ps.
666 sqq.) takes from a Latin MS.

by

Aristotle.

but our

described

and unequally developed


school, which must

other forms parallel to our own.''

23,

Loois, quihus

Peripatetic

many

In the Index

'

No.

name can only be

as a set of gradually gathered

productions of the

have existed in

Problems'^

of the 10th century.


The character ascribed in the text to the
collection of
Problems
may
also explain the many varying
statements as to its title and the
number of books it included.
In the ]M8S. they are sometimes
called UpofiXr^/jLaTa, sometimes
'

^vaiKo.

'

TTpo^Kri[xara,

times with

and some-

addition
Kar'
elSos (Twayui'yris Q arranged
in
accordance with the matter').
Gellius generally says, Prohlemata (xix. 4), Proh. i^hyslca (xx.
ITpo4, (juoting Prohl. xxx. 10)
iyKVKXia
fiX-n/jLUTa
Apul. (JJe
Mar/m, c. 51) has Prohlemata;
Athen^eus and Apollonius {vid.
Indices and Prantl, 390 sq.) althe

ways npoi8AT7^aTo

(pvaLKa;

Macrob.

12) Physical qufsstiones.


To collections of problems are
also referable the titles ^vctikQv
Xt]' Kara arcix^lov (D.
120, An.
110 asto the words k. crTotX;the
explanation of which in Rose,
Ar. Ps. 215, is not clear, they are
to be understood of the arrangement of the different books in
the alphabetical order of their
headings) UpoffX-fi/xaTa (68 or 28
B, Pt. 65)
'ETTLTedea/xevwu irpofiX-nfxdTcvv fi' (D. 121, An. 112);
'EyKVKXiuv fi' (D. 122, An. 113,
Upo^X7)iJt.aTa ijKvKX. 4 bks., Pt.
67) Physica Prohle-mata, Adsjiec(Ammon. Latin.
tiva Prohl.
(D.
p. 58); "AraKTu
127,
[a]5toTa/CTa)i/ i/8' An. 119).
PrcB'
(Sat.

vii.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

97

Turning to Ethics and Politics, we have on the


former subject three comprehensive works,' of which,
missa Qiioistionihus (Pt. &&, says
the Greek title is hrhimatu hrua-

and then again

grawa,'' i.e. llpofi\t)ixdrct}v


irpoypa(p^, or Upoavaypatpii)
^Zvixixik-

(which seems to be an
extract from the same work) Pt.
30 sq. the Great Ethics in two
books, the Eudemian Ethics in
eight. Aristotle himself quotes
{Metaph. i. 1, 981, b, 25, and
in six passages of the Politics)
the ^QiKd, meaning doubtless the
Nicomachean Ethics (cf. BenDiXEN in PMlologus x. 203,

'

ruv QrjTiqfxdTbov o^' (AN. &Q with


the additional clause <bs (f)7](riv EijKttipos 6 aKovar^is auTov^
David
(ScJiol. in Ar. 24, b, 8) also speaks
of 70 books n. (rvfiuiKTcou ^Tirtifidrwu, and the Vita Marc. p. 2, R of
^vaiKo, wpo^X'fjuaTa in 70 books
'E^rjyvfJL^va (or 'E^rtrao-inet/a) Kara
y4pos iS' (D. 128, An. 121). With
regard to the Upo^X-fifxara ixt]xaviKa,
:

86, n. 1, and
The spurious composition n. TrpofiXrjfidTcov, to which beoTTTiKCL, larpiKa, cf. p.

95, n. 3.

sides D. 51 (and also An. 48,


although the irepl is here wanting)
Alex. To2}. 34, Schol. in Ar. 258, a,
16, also refers, seems to have contained a theory as to setting and
answering problems. See Rose,
Ar. Ps. 126, Fraffm. 109, p. 1496,
Fr. Hz. 115. On the other hand,
book XXX. of our Problems cannot
well be meant (as Heitz, 122, believes) by the iyKvKXia, JEth. N. 1,
3, 1096, a, 3.
Aristotle seems
rather to indicate what he calls
in

other places i^on^piKol \6yoi,

and De

CopIo, i. 9, 279, a, 30 Ha
eyKVK\La <l>i\o<ro(pi\ixara.
Cf BerNAYS, Dial, of Arist. 85, 93 sqq.
171 BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 105, a, 27
.

More on this infra.


'UdiKa 'NiKOfidxeia
10 B.,
'KOiKa Ev5iiij.ia 7 B., 'HdiKa /xeydha
2 B.
Of our catalogues D. 38

sqq.

only names 'UdiKwu e' al. S' (although DiOG. elsewhere {Vita,
21) cites the seventh book of the
Ethics in connection with Eth.
End. vii. 12, 1245, b, 20); An.
39 has 'WdiKuv K {e.g. the Eth.
Nic.^ the last book of which is k),
;

VOL.

T.

174

n.

7]6(iov

in the Appendix
{-iKuv) N iKo/j.ax^iccj/

vTroOijKas

290

Ind. Ar. 103, b, 46


101, b, 19 sqq.). Cic.
{FlQi. V. 5, 12) believes that the
Lihri de Morihus of Nicomaclras
are ascribed to Aristotle, inasmuch as the son would write
very much like his father. Diogenes also (viii. 88) quotes Eth.
N. X. 2 with the words
(^rjcl Se
NiKofiaxos 6 'ApicTTOTeXovs. On the
other hand Atticus {ajmd Bus,
Pr. Ev. XV. 4, 6) gives all three
Ethics with their present names
as Aristotelian; likewise Simpl.
sq.

sqq.,

and

in Cat. 1, C 43, e and Schol. Porphyr. Schol. in Ar. 9, b, 22, who


says the Eudemian Ethics were
addressed to Eudemus, the MeydXa
NiKo/xdxia {31. Mor.) to Nicomachus the father, and the MiKpa
NtKOjuaxta (Eth. JV.) to Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle.
The
same story is told by David,
Schol. in A r. 25, a, 40. Eustrat.
{in Eth. N. 141, a cf. Arist. Eth.
End. vii. 4 init. c. 10, 1242, b, 2)
speaks of the Eudemian Ethics
as the work of Eudemus, that is
to say, he repeats this statement
after one of the earlier writers
;

whom

he used

(cf. p. 72, b),

who was, it would seem,

and

not altogether unlearned


on the other
hand, on his own supposition, or
:

ARISTOTLE

98

however,

one

only

the

Nicomachean

directly Aristotelian authorship.^


following an equally worthless
authority (1, b, m), he represents
as dedicated to a certain
Mh.
Nicomachus, and Mh. Eud. to a
certain Eudemus. A Scholion also
which is attributed to ASPASIUS
Qvid. Spengel' On the EthicalWritings under the name of Aristotle,'
in the Ahh. d. Mil/ich. Akad. iii.
439-551, p. 520, of. Schol. in Ar.
Eth.' Class. Journal, vol. xxix.
117) inu>t suppose Eudemus to
be the author of the Eudemian
Ethics, since on this supposition
alone can he attribute the treatise on Pleasure to him, Eth. N.
The Commentaries
vii. 12 sqq.
known to us (by Aspasius, Alexander, Porphyry, Eustratius) are
concerned only with the NicoFor further
machean Ethics.
materials, cf. Spengel, iUd. 445

sqq.

Schleiermacher (' On the


Ethical Works of Aristotle,' for
1817, W. W. Z. Philos. iii. 306
sqq.) gave it as his opinion that,
of the three ethical works, the
so-called Great Ethics is the
and the Nicomachean
oldest,
Ethics the latest, but the treatise
of iSpengel already cited makes
the opposite view clear, viz. that
'

the genuine work of Aristotle


is the Nicomachean Ethics, that
the Eudemian Ethics is a supple-

mentary work by Eudemus, and


that the Great Ethics is an extract taken directly from the EuBut the position of
demian.
which are
the three books
common to the Nicomachean and

Eudemian Ethics
Eud.

iv.-vi.)

is

{Nic.
still

v.-vii.,

moot

Spengel (480 sqq.) bepoint.


lieves that they belong originally
to the Nicomachean Eth., but

Ethics

is

of

mass of smaller

that, after the corresponding sections of the Eudemian Eth. were

an early period, they were


employed to fill up the blanks in
the Eudemian Eth.; he is inclined to look upon the treatise
on pleasure, Nic. vii. 12 sqq.,
which Aspasius also attributes to

lost at

Eudemus
Jin.'),

(see preceding note,


as a fragment of the Eude-

(p, 518 sqq.), but


without wishing to exclude the
possibility of its being a sketch
intended by Aristotle for the
Nicomachean Eth., and later on
replaced by x. 1 sqq. In his Arist.
Stud. i. 20 (against which Walter
argues in Die Lehre v. d. inald.

mian Ethics

Vermiuft, 88 sqq.) Me. vi. 13 is


On
also attributed to Eudemus.

the other hand Fischer (i><? Ethicis

Eudem. et Mcom. P)Onn, 1847),


and with him also Fritzsche
{Arist. Eth. Eud. 1851, Prolegg.
xxxiv.) refer orAj Nic. v. 1-14 to
the Nicomachean, and Nic. v. 15,
vi., vii., to the Eudemian Ethics.
Grant {Ethics of Aristot. i. 49
sqq.) refers the whole of these
three books to the Eudemian
whilst Bendixen(PMZoZ{7^?/s, x.l99
sqq., 263 sqq.) on the contrary, for
reasons worthy of note, defends
the Aristotelian origin of the
12-15.
including vii.
whole,
Brandis (6^r.-rom. Phil.ii. b, 1555
sq.), Prantl {D. dianoct. Tvgenden
d. A?'. Miinch. 1852, p. 5 sqq.),
and in the main also Ueberweg
( Gesch. d. Phil i. 177 sq. 5th ed.),

and Rassow (Forsch.

iib.

d. niliom.

Ethih, 26 sqq. cf. 15 sqq.) agree


with the conclusions of Spengel
the last-named with this modi-

much to
Nic. v.-vii.,
though essentially Aristotelian,
fication,

which

support

it,

that

has

ARISTOTLE'S WHITINGS

99

named/ but probably few of- them were


Of the sociological writings only one the

tracts is also

genuine.

has been submitted to the afterwork of another pen, and has


perhaps, in consequence of a
mutilation, been supplied from

Eudemian Ethics.

the

59

sq., n. SiKaioavvrjs, ^EpwriKhs,


n. irAovTOv, n. vyfvias and H,
TidovTjs), the following
the small
composition,
still
extant,
n.
apTU)v Kal KaKidv (^AHst. Oj)j).
1249-1251), which is the work of
a half -Academic, half-Peripatetic
Eclectic, hardly earlier than the
first century before Christ
Ilpordffeis IT. aperris (D. 34, An. 342) ;
:

(AN. AjJjJ. 163); 11. SiKaiwv

dperrjs

(D. 76, An. 64 Pt. 11, 4 B.) ;


n. Tov fieXriovos a' (D. 53, An.
50) ; n, cKOvaiov (-iuv) a' (D. 68,
An. 58) IT. rod alperov Kal tov
IT. atperov
ffvfifiefirjKdTOS a' (D. 58
j8'

Kal (TVfjLfiaivovros,

An.

It is

56).

not probable that Aristotle composed a treatise n. iiridvfxias


In the beginning of the Be Sensu,
he proposes future researches into
the faculty of desire, but we do
not hear that they were carried
out what we find in Seneca (^De
:

Ira,

i.

does not sound

title

the 'EpwTi/cbs mentioned on p. 59),


'EpwTiKa (An. Aj/jf- 181 Pt. 13, 3
B.) and 4 B. of &faeis ipwriKal
(D. 71, An. 66 Pt. 56, 1 B.) are
mentioned, both of them doubtless equally spurious.
An. 162
reckons n. cw^poo-vj/Tjs among the
Pseudepigrapha.
IT.
(t>i\ias
a'
(D. 24, An. 24, Pt. 25) is supposed not to be a copy from Fth.
A', viii. ix., but a special treatise,
which can hardly be genuine.
;

Such are (besides the Dialogues mentioned on p. 56, n. 1,


'

IT.

and the

Aristotelian.
D. 61, An. 60 have
also TiaQf] a'. Further (besides

3. 9, 2, 17, 1, iii. 3,

l)may

more probably have been contained in the writing n. iraQu>v


(or -ovs) opyrjs (D. 37, An. 30),
the supposed remnants of which
Eose (Ar. Is. 109 sqq., Ar. Fr.
94-97, No.
1492) and Heitz
{Fr. 151 sq.) have put together.
Whether it was a dialogue (Rose)
or a treatise (Heitz) cannot with
certainty be determined
the
latter seems the more probable
opinion. Its genuineness is, to
say the least, undemonstrable,
;

Still
less can Aristotle have
been the author of Seaeis (piXiKal
(D. 72, An. 67).
fi'
Of the
two writings n. ffv/x^idoffeus avSpds
Kal yvvaiKds (AN.
yl;;^;.
165)

and

Nofxovs (-oi) avSpos Kal ya/xe166), the former is mentioned by other writers several
rrjs (ibid.

(e.g. by Clemens, Olympioand David in the passages


given by Rose, Ar. Ps. 180 sq.,
Ar. Fr. 178 sq., p. 1507). Rose (Be

times
dor.,

Ar. lAbr. Ord. 60 sqq.) has pointed


out two Latin translations of these
(or the writing n. cru/u^Sjcotr.,
if both are not merely different
titles of the same book) which
profess to be the second book
of the Economics see Ar. Psciid.
644 sqq. Fr. Hz. 153 sqq. Plutarch, Athen^us, and others
quote from a writing n. jue^r/s,
perhaps a dialogue
cf. Rose,
Ar. Ps. 116 sqq., Ar. Fr. 98-106,
p. 1493 sq. Fr. Hz. 64 sq. It was
certainly not genuine
it may
have been identical with the
writing of the same name by
Theophrastus (Heitz, ibid.), only
in that case Athenaeus, who,
T<i6ixoi

H2

ARISTOTLE

100

eight books of the Politics


it

contains some

work

it

is

unhappily

The
Of all the

left,

genuine.^

rest

in addition to these two, quotes


a third by Chaniaeleon, must
liave been indebted for his quotations to various writers, to whom
it was known by different names
^anot very probable supposition.
What is quoted from it is con-

cerned, partly with historical,


partly with physiolo.oical discussions whether dnnikcnness was
regarded also from a moral point
;

we do not know. Nor do v/e


know any more as to the contents
of view

(in the
MSS., of D. 139, Nofios avaraTiKhs,
of An. 130 No/nwu ava-TUTLKwu a',

of the

'kofxoi

(Tva(rtTiKo\

the circumstance of the


Platonic republic beingmentioned
in it (Procl. in licvij). 350, Ar.
Fr. 177, p. 1507) gives us no
hence we cannot
indication
determine whether Ptose {Ar.
Ps. 179) is right in supposing
that there was a discussion in it
on the arrangement of, and good
behaviour at symposia, or Heitz
(Ar. Fr. 807), 'in believing that

for

contained a collection of
customs relating to them,
(TvcTaiTLOov ^ (TVfXTroa-ioov (AN.
App. 161) is identical with it
not so, however, the three books

it

the
n.

the title of which makes us think


not so much of questions with
regard to meals, as of questicns
such as are proposed at a meal,
like Plutarch's ^vnTroaiaKa irpoFor the UapayyeXfiaTa
^X-fjfxara.
cf.

like the

p. 72, n. 2 fin.

but though

admirable

Metapliysics,

un-

cannot

be

considered

we have

lost

everything

(Economics

finished.2

preserved

is

of his most mature and

Aristotle puts this work in


the closest connection with the
Ethics, by treating the latter as
auxiliary to politics (Fth. JV.
i.
1, 1094 a, 26 sqq., 1095, a,
1

c. 13, 1102, a, 5,
12 init.;met. i. 2, 1356, a,
He expects from politics
realisation of the principles
down by Ethics (iUd. x. 10).

2, c. 2 init.

vii.

26).

the
laid

But

he does not mean both to be


merely two parts of one composition

(cf.

PolU.

vii.

1,

39, c. 13, 1332, a, 7, 21,

1323, b,
1, 1261,

ii.

30, iii. 9, 1280, a, 18. c. 12,


Even apart from
1282, b, 19).
the citation Bhet. i. 8 fin., and the
mention of it in the catalogue (D.
75, An. 70), its geniiineness can-

a,

not be doubted, however seldom


it is named by ancient writers
(see the remarks of Spengel,
Ueb. d. Pohtik d. Arist.,' Ahh.
d. Milnclin. AMd. v. 44 infra).
2 For further information, see
the section on the political philosophy of Aristotle, ch. xiii., infra.
3 Of the
second book (as to
the beginning of which see EoSE,
Arid. Lihr. Ord. 59 sq.) this has
long been admitted, but Gottling
{Arist. (Econ. p. vii. xvii.) considers the first to be a section of
a genuine Aristotelian writing
it seems more probable that it is
the work of a later writer based
on Polit. i. (See end of ch. xxi.,
infra.') D. 23, An. 17 name OIkovoJJLIK65 (or -ov) a'. Cf p. 99 supra on
another pretended second book.
'

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

Among them

except a few fragments.^


1
Thepolitical writings named,
besides those quoted, are the
following: (1) lioXmlai, a collection of facts with regard to 158
states (D. 145, An. 135, the text
of which Bernays, Rh. Mus.
vii. 289, with the approval
of
KosE, Aq'. Ps. 394, has evidently

improved), which, according to


the fragments and the statements
of Cic. Fl7b. V. 4, 11, and
N. P. Su. V. 10, 4 (who

Plut.
names

the work /crt'o-ets koI iroAtTetot)


not only treated of the constitution, but also of the usages,
customs, situation of the towns,
the history of their foundation,
their local traditions, &c.
Pt. 81
gives the number of cities as 171
(or 191, according to the view
of Herbelot, Bibl.
Ammon. V. Ar. 48
Ammon. Lat. p. 56,

Or. 971, a)
gives 255:
Ps.-Porphyr.

in Ar. 9, b, 26, and


David, ihid. 24, a, 34, say 250,
and Philop. ihid. 35, b, 19, about
250, but the increase does not
seem to be founded on any later
extension of the collection, but
merely on clerical mistakes (cf
KosE, Ar. Ps. 394). Simpl. ( 6fe^d^.
2, y. SchoL 27, a, 43) seems by the
Seliol.

words

eV Tttis yvqcrlais avTov ttoXi-

reiais to point to the

existence of
spurious Polities; pvn' (158) instead of yvr](Tiais may be the true
reading (Heitz, Ar. Fr. 219),
though Ideler, Ar. Meteor, i.,
xii. 40 can hardly be right in substituting ^TTio-ToAats for

The

numerous

iroXireiais').

fragments of
are found

the large collection

in MtJLLER, Fragm. Hist. ii. 102


sqq. (cf BoURNOT, in Philolog. iv.
2B6 sqq.) RoSE, Ar. Ps. 402 sqq.
Ar. Fr. 34.3-560, p. 1535 sqq.;
Fr. Hz. 218 sqq. The genuine.

101

the loss of

ness of the work, which Rose


(^Ar. Lihr. Ord. 56 sq., At. Ps.
395 sq.) disputes, has no weighty
arguments against it (as Heitz,

246 sqq. shows) and even if


the external evidence, of which
that of TiM^us {a^md Polyb.
xii. 5, 11) is the oldest producible,
did not utterly exclude
Rose's supposition that the work
was published and circulated in
his name soon after Aristotle's
death, nevertheless the internal
improbability
of that theory
would be much strengthened by it.
The declarations of David, ihid.,
and the Schol. to Porphyry's Isagoge (vid. Rose, Ar. Ps. 399, Ar.
Fr. 1535) favour the supposition
that the different states in the
Polities are taken in alphabetical
order; and this explains why the
Athenians (according to Fr. 378,
where, however, the reading is
uncertain) are treated in the 1st
book, and the Ithacans in the
42nd {Fr. 466).
The circumstance that the numerous fragments all contain merely isolated
notes, without reference to a
p.

uniform complete treatise, will


not (as Rose, Ar. Ps. 395
holds) serve as a proof of the
spuriousness of the work; but,
in conjunction with the fact tliat
the Aristotelian writings nowhere
refer to the work in question
(for even Eth. N. x. 10, 1181, b, 17,
refers to the Politics cf Heitz,
231 sq.), it supports the view
(Heitz, 233 sq.) that the Polities was not a literary
completed whole, but a collection by
Aristotle, for his own use, of
;

which he had gathered


by personal observation
and inquiries, and partly from
facts
partly

ARISTOTLE

102

Aristotle's collection of forms of

Poetics

writings.

only a fragment

is

be

If this

copies
would only be circulated after
A chapter out of the
his death.
UoKiTfla 'A6r]vaiu>u may have given
rise to the title IT. twu So'Awvos
a^ovwv (An. Apj). liO cf. MiJLLER, ibid., 109, 12). A similar
collection was (2) the NSfxifia
^ap^apiKu, which are quoted under
so,

by Appollon. 3lirabil.
Varro, i. 1 vii. 70 An. App.

this title

11

18G

(yoixljxoiv

(Tvvayuyr])

fiap^.

this title also the designations Nd/xoi a' iS' y' 5' (D. 140),

(An. 131), seem to have

been wrongly

transcribed.
'

them the

'Pwimaiuv

vojxiixa

App. 185) and the


(Atiien.

To
(An.

v6^iixaTvppif]vS:v

23, d)

i.

probably be-

Among the few fragments

longed.

UoKiTiKhs

but not even so

cf. p.

57; on

IT.

^affiXeias

and 'TTrep airo'iKcou, p. 60, sub Jin.


on n. f)T]Topos ^ -KoKiriKov, p. 72,
n. 2, towards the end on n. apxh^t
p. 81, n. 1, fin.; on a bunglingforgery of the Middle Ages, Se;

cretnm secretortim

(or, Aristotelis

ad Alexandruvi rcffemdemoribus
rege

dk/nis),

cf.

nnd Alex. 234

sq;

Geier, Arist.
Rose, Arist.

Libr. Ord. 183 sq, Ar. Ps. 583 sq.


Since this was written the
'

',

from

vofiifxwu 8'

in various

simply irreparable.^

cities, is

Our

government

{apud MuLLER, ibid. 178 sqq..


Rose, Ar. Ps. 537 sqq., Ar. Fr.
561-568, p. 1570, Fr. IIz. 297 sq.),
Nos. 562, 563 and 564 can only be
attributed to Aristotle under the
supposition that he did not give
their contents in his own name,

Athenian noAtrem has been

re-

covered.
This writing, in our editions,
is entitled
IT. Trotr/Tt/cTjs. Aristot.
himself mentions it in the Politics
(viii. 7, 1341, b, 38), as a future
work in the Rhetoric (i. II fin.
iii. 1, 1404, a, 38, c. 2, 1404, b, 7,
28, 1405, a, 5, c. 18, 1419, b, 5,
with which cf p. 74, n. 1), as already existing, with these words
eV To7s Trepl nonjTiKrjs, or (1404, b,
28) eV T. TT. TToiriffeoos. The Indices
'^

name

TIpayfiaTeias Te;^vrjs

iroit]-

Marc. p. 2, R) seem
have dealt with quarrels
between the Hellenic states and
their settlement
they are also

(D. 83), t4xvvs ttoitit. fi'


(An. 75), Re arte iioetica secufidum. disciplifiayn Pythagorcs, Pt.
Fr. (this addition is caused by
the combination of two different
titles: cf. Rose, Ar. Ps. 194).
Ps.-Alex. Soph. El. Schol. in
Ar. 299, b, 44, has eV rqS ir. ttoitjt.
likewise Herm. in PTicedr. Ill,

named more

and AsT,

but

as
current.

Twv

The

Ai/cajw/iara

(Ammon.

irdAeoji/

Vocal).

somewhere

traditions

(3)
NTjey)

or Aik.

Rifi'er.

'EAAtji/iScov

-TrdAewj/ ( V.

to

(D. 129, An.

briefly

120,

AiKaKo/xara

Harpocrat.

(4) The @
(An. G9 the same

Apu/ids).

e(T IS TTo Kit iKal

is the right
reading in D. 74) were in any case
j3'

spurious.

the

The Anon.

name IT.

5 applies
ttoXitikvs to the Grjd-

but that must be a mistake


(see above, p. 59).
On the

los,

TiKTis

/8'

h t^

tt. it.

SiMPL. Cat.

Schol. 43, a, 13, 27: iv rep


David, ibid. 25, b, 19, rh

ir.

-ir.

ir.

ir.

on the other hand Ammon. Re


interpr. Schol. 99, a, 12, iu toTs
IT. iroi.',
BoETH. Re interpr. 290,

in libris quos
scripsit.

thorities

de

arte poetica

The more ancient auare acquainted with two

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

much

103

as this remains of Aristotle's other contributions

to the theory

on the

and history of Art or of

Nor

poets.^

is

there

much

his dissertations

of the other

left

come after chap. 18), which sufis mentioned only in the quotations ficiently prove that we only p' sgiven on p. 58, n. 1, with regard sess Aristotle's work in a mutito the writing IT. ttolt^tcov), the lated and hopelessly corrupt condition.
We cannot here inquire
more modern only with one
except in so far as they copy how its present condition may be
more ancient writers, as we must explained (Susemihl, ibid., p. 3
suppose was the case with Am- sq., gives an enumeration of the
From ditferent, and in part widely dimonius and Boethius.
this alone we might suppose that verging attempts at explanation).
the writing in question originally It may be true, as Susemihl
had a greater extension than it concludes, that the carelessness
now has, but this becomes cert ain of the writing, the caprice of
from the references to such the copyists, and the freaks of
parts of it as are missing in our accident account for most of the
recension, as for instance the mischief but we cannot make
discussion on the Catharsis pro- these factors responsible for the
mised in Polit. viii. 7, 1341, b, 38, interpolations, except in so far as
which would naturally have come they may have rendered possible
the introduction of some marin the section on Tragedy, and,
as we learn from sure traces, ginal notes into the text.
Of the Dialogue n. toivtwu
actually did occur there (cf.
Bernays, Grundz. d. Abh. d. y we have already spoken on p.
Besides this An. 115 gives
58.
Arist. lib. d. Wirkung d. Trag.'
Abh. d. hist.-jyhil. Ges. in Breslau, KvkXov it. TTOirtrCov, likewise in
160 sqq., 197 sq. SusEMlHL, p. three books. This title may have
12; Vahlen, p. 81 sq. of his arisen, by duplication and coredition, and others) the exam- ruption, from that of the Diaination of Comedy, promised logue, or it may (according to
Poet. c. 6 init., and quoted Heitz, 178) designate a work
Rhet. i. 11 Jin., of which Bernays distinct from it but the kvkXov
{Rh. Mtis. viii. 561 sqq.) has may also have sprung from the
books on Poetry (a third

'

'

'

pointed out valuable remnants in


Cramer's Anecd. Paris., vol. i. app.
(now in Susemihl, p. 208 sq., Vahlen, 76 sq.) and the discussion on
Synonyms, which Simpl. men-

(yKvKXiov' (or -iav) which is


found in No. 113. Allied to it, it
would seem, are n. TpaycpSiwv a'
(D. 136, An. 128) and Ku/j-ikoI
(Erotian, Uxj?. Voc. Hi2)])ocr. s.

tions, Categ. Schol. 43, a, 13, 27.

v.

In other places also our text


shows many greater or smaller

Gr. ii. 82), though not rightly,


takes the AidaaKaAiai (D. 137
An. 129 Kose, Ar. Ps. 550 sq..
At. Fr. 575-587, p. 1572 sq.
Heitz, 255, Fr. Hz. 302 sq.),
seemingly a chronological cat a-

gaps, as also interpolations (as c.


12 and many smaller ones), and
inversions (the most considerable
that of chap. 15, which ought to

'Hpo/c\. v6(Tov).

Miiller

{Hist.

AMIStOTLE

104

books named to

which dealt with subjects outside

us^

the main lines of the Aristotelian system;


logue based on the existing- inscriptions of the tragedies performed in Athens as a part of
the book on tragedies.
Further, a series of writings relating
to poets is named, wliich took
the form of problems 'Airopvindrcav iroiriTiKwv a' (An. A pp. 145)

where

Klriai TToi-qriKai (ihid. 1-iG,

ahiaL seems to indicate the form


of treatment which is proper to
the airoprifxara or irpo^KriixaTa, viz.
that the hia. ri is sought, and 1he
reply consists in giving tlie SrWi
or the aiTia) ^ATropTj/ndTODV 'O/jltjpiKuu C (L>- 318; An. lOG C;
;

Heitz, 258 sq,, Fr. Ih. 129;


Rose, Ar. Ps. 148 sq., Ar. Fr.

and among

Hist. ii. 188 sqq.) cannot be


maintained. More ancient seems
to be the book n. fMova-iKrjs, which
both DiOG. (116, 132) and An.
(104, 124) give us in two places,
and which is identical with the
musical problems noticed by
Labbeus, BiM. nova, 116 (see
liRANDis, ii. b, 94) but it is no
more genuine
than the IT.
KaXov (D. 69, An. 63, n. Kd\;

Xovs).

To these belong certain minor,


mostly historical works, 'OAvfiinovlKai a' (D. 130, An. 122); Uv'

Qlovikwv eXcyxoi a' (D. 134 and


probably also An. 125); Uv9iov7Kai
a (D. 131, An. 123, with the

137-175, p. 1501 sq.) or, as the


Vita Marc. p. 2. names it, 'O^.

strange

(r]T7]iJ.aTa

a (D. 133), possibly only a different title for the same writing
N?/cat Aiovva-iaKoi a (D. 135, An.

Kuv

Ylpofi\-r]pi.drwv

(An.

'OfXT]pi-

Ptol.
147
1)1
Ammon. V. Ar. 44 Amm.
Lat. 54, probably a duplication
ot:
the aTvop7]ixara)
'A7ropi)iiiaTa
'Haiodou a'
(An. App. 14i5)
I

A2)2).

'ATTOp,

EvpiTiSovs,

'Apx'-^o'xou,

To these

XoipiAov y' (ibid. 144).

the

'ATToprnxaTa

seem
tise

(Ax. 107)

Oela

also to belong.
The treaEl 5e TTore "O/uiTjpos iiroir](Tiv

'HAiou fiovs ; (AN. Aj)p. 142),


no doubt only one of the Homeric problems. -Of these writings
the ones which are more likely
to have an Aristotelian origin
are the Querie\S on Homer but
even these may have had later
additions made to them.
On the
other hand the genuineness of
the neVAos (An. 105 An. App.
169 Rose, Ar. Ps. 563 sqq., Ar.
Fr. 594-600, p. 1574 sq.
Fr.
Hz. 309 sqq.; cf. Bergk, Lyr.
Gr. 505 sqq. Muller, Fra'gm.
roLs

is

eV

title,

TlvdioviKas

'M.ivaixfJ-ov iv'iK-qaev)

fii^Xiov

IlvQiKus

126, 'NiKMU Aiou. aa-TiKwv Kcd


vaioiv

a).

\r)-

About these writings

Hose, Ar. Ps. 545 sqq., Ar.


Fr. 572-574, p. 187; Heitz, 254
sq., Fr. Hz. 300 sq.
MiJLLER,
J/ist. Gr. ii. 182 sq. Further
n. vp7]iJidTcov (Clemens, Strom.
i. 308, A, where, however, an Aristotelian work with this title
which could not be genuine
seems to be designated notes
which may have come from the
work are given by Muller, ihid.
cf.

181

n. QavfjLaaluvaKovaixdTwv

sq.).^

quoted by Athen.
oK/i.

d/c. c.

(xii.

541

cf.

96) and, with the title

eV davfxaaioLs, perhaps also by AnTIGON. 3Iirabil. c. 25 (cf. av/n.


aKova-fx. c. 30), a
collection of
strange phenomena,' the genuineness of which cannot be admitted.
For further information on this
'

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
these also there

have crept
B.

105

no doubt that many spurious

is

titles

in.

General Questions touching the Aristotelian


Writings.

On

works which are preserved

a general survey of the

known

or

to us as Aristotelian,

apart from the letters and


kinds.

The

stotelicum

it is

poems

evident that they

were of two

different

component parts of our Corpus

Ari-

are without exception didactic treatises in

And

scientific form.^

be called genuine

almost

are,

as

of these which can

all

be seen, connected

will

together by express references in a

way

that

is

only to

be explained by the theory that they were addressed to

one

circle of readers as the

connected and mutually ex-

planatory parts of one whole.

It is quite different in

the case of the writings which were afterwards styled


'

hypomnematic

'

notes,

work see Westbrmann, Uapa^ol6ypa.<^oi, p, XXV. sqq., and espeRose, Ar. Libr. Ord. 54
Ar. Pseud. 279 sq., who
refers the main body of the
work, consisting of chaps. 1-114,

that

to

is

Aristotelian

sq.,

We

made by

sq.
Fragm. 219) is
doubtful whether there was an

Schr. 163

cially

130-137, 115-129, 138-181, to


the middle of the third century,
An enlarged treatment of this, or
a more extensive specimen of the
same sort of work, is perhaps the
no/jaSo|o, from the second book of
which Plut. {Parall. Gr. et Rom.
c. 29, p. 312) quotes something
which is not found in our au/x.
o-K.
UapoLfxiai a' (D. 138; cf. An.
127), a collection of proverbs, the
existence of which seems to be
proved, inter alia, by Athen. ii.
60 d, although Heitz (Verl.

say,
;

work on this

subject,

prove whether the


references in Eustath. in Od.
N 408 and Synes. Enc. CalvAt.
c. 22 (^Ar. Fr. No. 454, No. 2)
belong to this or to other works.
In addition to
these there

cannot

are two titles which are so


indefinite that they furnish no
safe clue to the contents of the
writings to which they correspond: napo)3oA.al(D.126); "Araw:ra (to which irpofix-fi/xara or v-rro-

may

fivTjfxara

127

be supplied)

ifi'

(D.

cf p. 96, foot),
.

The' wonderful stories' are


perhaps the only exceptions, but
they are not Aristotelian.
*

ARISTOTLE

106

own use, and therefore not


thrown by him into any such literary form and unity
None of the
as the works designed for publication.^
this
class,^ but
of
genuine
is
extant works which are
several of those which are lost seem to have belonged
Aristotle merely for his

to

From these two

it.^

is to

classes of works, however, there

Cicero, Quintilian,

be distinguished a third.

and

Dionysius of Halicarnassus praise Aristotle not only for


scientific greatness, but equally for the grace and richof

ness

exposition

his

the

This must have

speech.'''

referred to

^
Simpl. {in Caterj. Schol. in
viroiJ.ur]fjLaTiKa oaa
Ar. 24, a, 42)
:

olKtiav Kol -KK^lova

irphs viru^vriCTiu

avkfTa^^v 6 (piXocrocpos
these writings cannot, however,
be taken as iravrri cnrovSris &^ia,
and hence we may not draw from
tliem any proofs for the Aristotelian doctrine: 6 fiivroi 'AAe|avhpos TO. vTroixvr)/J.ariKa avfXTr^cpvpfidaavov

^liva

(prjalv

Kol

elvai

ava(p4padai,

(TKoirhv

fii]

eVa

Trphs

and

for

tliis

very reason the others are distinguished from them as awrayDavid (ScJtol. 24, a, 38)
fxariKa.
:

vTro/xur]/j.aTiKa

/jl^u

Xiyovrai iu

ois

air e-ypdcpv or av
iTTiAoyuu Kal
TTJs fcp^irovaris eKSoarecriv airayye\ias.
Cf. Heitz, Verl. Schr. 24

fjLova

Si'xa

TO.

K(pdKaia

TTpooi/jLiuu

golden stream of

'

Koi

Sq.

his

works designed

our Corpus were intended to serve


as the basis for lectures, or were
compiled from them, they would
not on that account be merely
'

hypomnematical

writings.'

mentioned on
and perhaps also the
whether the
Polities (p. 101)
riepl TayaQov is also one (as al=*

E.g.,

those

p. 62, n. 4, 5,

ready noted on
seems doubtful.

p. 61, n.

2 fn.'),

Cic. Toj). 1,3: the works


of Aristotle are not only recommended by their contents, sed
(licendi quoque incredihili quadarn cum copia turn etiam suariBe Invent, ii. 2, 6 (on the
tate.
Aristotle has
2u^'o7co77? T^x^uv)
left the old orators suaritate et
hrevitate dicendi far behind. JJe
Orat. i. 11, 49 si item Aristoteles,
si Tkeoplirastus, si Carneades
eloquentes et in dicendo snares
atque ornatifuere. Be Fin. i. 5,
14 (on Epicurus) qicod ista PlaTheophrasti
AHstotelis
tonis
^

The Problems, which might

occur as an instance, cannot have


been written down for his own use
alone, since Aristotle often quotes
them (see above, p. 96), thereby
implying that they are known to
his readers. Other instances, such
as the Melissus, etc., cannot be

supposed genuine.

Even

if it

be

true that particular portions of

orationis

Acad.

ii.

orationis

ornamenta

neglexerit.

38, 119: reniet

Jiimen

aurenm fundens Ari-

QuiNTiL. Inst. xi. 83


quid Aristotelem ? Quern dubito

stoteles.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
by him

It is not applicable to

for publication.

now

those which are

107

extant

and of

any of

these, indeed, the

two Latin writers probably knew but a small part.^


We are driven to suppose, therefore, that it was to other
works, lost to us, that they ascribed this kind of excelThe critic who judges of literary form by purely
lence.

much

scientific criteria will find, it is true,

our extant Aristotle.


crimination of

and

He

will

to praise in

acknowledge the apt

his ideas, the inimitable

all

compactness of his

diction,

and

dis-

precision

masterly

his

But of the

handling of an established terminology.

which Cicero emphasises, or any graceful movement of a rich and rolling eloquence, he will find even
qualities

in the

most popular of the extant books but little trace

while in other parts the dry methods of treatment, the

rough brevity of statement, the involved construction


of long sentences, often broken by anacolutha and
parentheses, stand

We

description.

in plain contradiction to Cicero's

can, however, gather for

even from the scanty fragments of the

some of these were written


rerum an scrvptorum
an eloqnendi snavitate

ourselves,

lost books, that

in a style far

more

rich

and

clarlorem putem.
Dionys. Be
Verb. Cop. 24 of the philosophers, Democritus, Plato, and
Aristotle are the best as to style,
Be Cens. Vet. Sc7'i2)t. 4: irapa-

books. Of the others, however,


Cicero used several of' the writings mentioned on p. 55 sqq., the
books on Philosophy, the Eudemus, the Protrepticiis, perhaps
also the noAirt/cSs, n. fiacriKclas
and n. irXovrov; cf. Fin. ii. 13,

XTjTTTeW

40

sclentia
co2)ia

IJ,ilJ.7)(Tiv

5e
rrjs

5eti/oT7jTos

Tov

KoX

re

/col

'ApifrrorfXr]

irepl

rrjs

t^v

els

(pfirtveiav

aacprfveias

Koi

r}54os Koi iroKvfjLaOovs.

Except the Topics and Rhewe have no reason for supposing that any of them knew
by personal reading the extant
'

toric,

Acad.

ii.

JV.
38, 119
37, 96, 49,
;

B.

ii.

125
Birifi. i. 25, 53
Fragm. Hort.
aptid Augustine c. Jul. iv. 78
Fin. v. 4, 11 Ad Quint. Fr. iii.
15, 42, 16, 44,

Ad

Off.
n. 1.

ii.

Att.

xii. 40, 2, xiii.

16, 56

and above,

28, 2

p. 60,

ARISTOTLE

108
ornate,

and approached

graces

of

the

This difference

is

more

closely to the literary

Dialogues, than any of

now contained

treatises

scientific

far

Platonic

in

to be explained, not

earlier date of the writings in question,

fact

our

merely by the
but also by the

that they were not intended to serve

purpose as the others,

the

Corpus}

nor designed for

the same
the

same

audiences. 2
Aristotle himself occasionally refers to certain state-

ments of

his doctrine, published

common

use,

by him, or then in
which seem to imply that a

in terms

portion of his writings

which the references

(including these writings

the same sense given to the public.^

On

what is pre12-14,
17 sq.,
32, 30, 40, 48, 49, 71, 72 of the
Fragments (Academy edition)
from the J^itdcwus, Profrejjtieus,
n. (j)i\oao(pias, U. 5iKaioavi>r]s, and
above, p. 56, n. 2.
- We
shall discuss this immediately.
^ Poet. 15, 1154, b,
17: erprjrai
'

this point see

served in

Nos.

Se Trepl avroov eV to7s eKSedo/xevois

^oyois iKavws.

Pe

ui fi. i. 4 init.:
ho^a irapaSeSoTai

Koi

oAAtj Se

Trepl

\puxvs, TriOav^ /xhu 7roA,Ao?s

TLs

Adyovs wcTTrep S' evOvpas (for which


Uernays, Pial. d. Ar. 15 sqq,
erasing Xoyovs, reads:
Sxrircp
euOvvas Se)

SeSco/cuia

Kal

in

question occur) were not in

in

rois iv

Koivcf yiyvofxivois \6yois' apjxoviav

yap Tiva avrijv x4yov(n, &c.


In
the first of these places, Bernays
says
(ihid.
that
'pub13)
lished' here means the same as
'already published' (the same
explanation of the words is given
by KosE, Ar. Ps. 79), yet one

And

from his

may well doubt whether this gloss


is

The predicate e/cwould certainly not be

allowable.

SedoijLeuoi

there without a purpose, but is


meant to distinguish the \6yoi
K5eSo(iieVot from certain
other

Neither can we translate


in such a way as
to make ' the writings published
by me a mere periphrasis for my
writings
partly because such a
turn of phrase is not found in
Aristotle. When he refers, without indicating a particular work,
to something
that
has gone
before, he is accustomed to say
merely, iv &Wois, eV erepots or
irpdrepov. Again the fact that he
does not say utt' i/uLov iKSedofievoi
shows that the emphasis falls on
e/cSeSo^eVoj, as such, and that the
K6yoi.

iKS^SoficuoL

'

'

; '

\6yoi iKSeSo/neuoi are meant as an


antithesis to fii) e/cSeSo/ueVot. Only
we have no right to assume
that things n^ iKdeSofievoi mean
things published later. The anti-

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

109

commentators we further learn that one of the points


thesis to ' published is not later
published,' but 'not published;'
'

'

and from the perfect iKSeSo/jLeuoi


to read such as had already been
*

published at the time of the


writing of the Poetics, and so were
earlier than that work,' is shown
to be impossible by the reflection
of Ueberweg on this passage
(Ainst. ah. d. BicMTi.^ p. 75) that
every author puts himself, in
regard to the reader, in the time
at which his work will be in the
reader's hands.
Hence, if the
Poetics were to be laid before the
whole reading world, i.e. published, just like the x6yoi to which
they referred, they would not be
designated in contradistinction to
the latter, by the predicate e'/cSeSofievoi, since each of them would
to their reader,
equally a \6yos e/cSeSoyueVos, Eose
wished to refer the K6yoi e'/cSeS.,
first to former passages in the
Poetics (Ar. Libr. Ord.
130),
and later (yl?*. Pseud. 79) to the
Rhetoric, but he was subsequently
(Ar. Ps. 714) right in withdrawing both, since the discussion for
which the Poetics refer to the
\6yoi iKSeS. is found neither in
the Rhetoric nor in the Poetics
(cf. Beenays, ibid. 138): and,
even apart from this, the latter could never have been so
indicated.
Nor can we on the
other hand (as KosB, Ar. Ps. 717,
maintains) refer the expression
to writings on Poetry by the Platonic school, for we clearly must
confine it to Aristotelian writings:
and in the second passage, De An.
i. 4, the \6yoi iv Koivcf yiyvd/xevoi

be, in relation

cannot be understood (as ToRSTmK,Arist. de An. 123 supposes,


he being perhaps preceded by the

authors of the variant X^yoixivois


instead of yiyvoix.') of conversations, such as would occur in
educated circles, or (as Kose, Ar.
Ps. 717, thinks) of expressions of
opinion coming from the Platonic
school for the evOvuas SeSw/cuta re;

fers to some criticism, known to


the reader, of the supposition that

the soul is the harmony of its


bod}^ and cannot mean vague
conversations of third persons
(cf. also Bernays, ibid., 18 sq.).
Neither can one refer them to
oral statements made by Aristotle to his pupils (Philop. see
following note), partly because
Aristotle never elsewhere refers
to such statements, and in a
treatise which, though perhaps
primarily intended as a textbook for his school, yet gives
no indication anywhere of being
meant only for his personal
pupils, he could not well appeal
to them
partly because the
Philosopher had really inserted
the criticism referred to in
one of his own writings (cf. fol:

lowing note).
The latter fact
indicates that it is wrong (as
SiMPL. does see following note)
to refer the \6yoi iv koiv^ yiyv. to
the Platonic Phcedo, for which
this expression would not be a
sufficient indication, nor would
;

correspond (cf. Bernays, p. 20)


with the manner in which it is
in other places mentioned (cf.

it

Meteorol. ii. 2, 35.5,


b,
32).
Finally, though Ueberweg ( Gesch
d. Phil. 1. 173, 5th ed.) understands by the \6yoi iv k. yiyv.

(extending the explanation of


Philoponus) discussions which
occurred in actual conversations,
or in writings arranged in the

ARISTOTLE

110

was to be found in the T^udemus}


We find other and more frequent references of his to
the Exoteric Discourses as the place where he had
Opinions, howdealt with such and such a subject.^
ever, differ as to the meaning of that name and the
to

which he

so refers

'

'

form of dialogues, it seems clear


that the latter could not be so
named, and that there was here
no reason for mentioning the
dialogue form of such discussions.
From the point of view of grammar, owing to the present tense of
yiyvoixivois (to

which BONITZ, Iiid.

46, rightly calls


attention), they cannot be ex' the
speeches subplained as

AHst. 105,

a,

mitted (i.e. which have been


submitted) to publication,' for in
that case it would have been
It can only mean, as
yvoiJ.4vois.
Bernays translates it in his
Dial. d. Arlst. 20, 'the discourses existing in a state of
publication, available for the use
of all,' taking the eV Koivif here in
the same sense as in the exprestV Koiv^ KaTariOeaOat, iv
sions
Koiv^ acpicvai (in medio rellnqnere, Metapli. i. 6, 987, b, 14).
A similar meaning to that of the
A0701 eV KOiv(f yiyvSixevoi seems to
be attached to iyKVKXia or 4yKvof
which
(piko<TO(pi)ixaTa,
K\ia
mention is made in MJi. 1. 3, 1096,
:

a,

'iKavcos

Trepl fiev tovtuv akis'


yap Kol iu toTs iyKVK\iois

(kuI

elpTjTai irepl avrSov)

9, 279, a,

30

(/col

and De

Coelo,

i.

yap KaOdirep iv

To7s iyKvKXioLs (t)iXocro(pr}ixa(n irepl


TO, de7a iroWoLKis trpocpaiverai to7s

x6yoi5 '6ti t6 6e7ov afieTdfiXrjTov


hvayKalov ehai, &C.). 'EyKvK\ios
can, just as well as 4v Koivip
yiyv6/xeuos, mean in medio j^ositvs
Bernays' rendering, Dial. d.

Ar. 124,

'

strain,' is

phrase
cius(in

is

writings in the

common

not so appropriate. The


so explained by Simpli-

De

Ccelo, Schol. 487, a, 3:

where he says that Aristotle uses


signify ra Kara
apxqs rols iroWo7s
irpoTideixeua, i.e.
the t^corepiKo).
We also see from Ar. Fr. 77, 1488,
b, 36 sqq., and Fr. 15, 1476, b, 21,
that the matter for which Aristotle refers to the iyKVKKia, was
actually treated in two of his
Dialogues. Cf. Bernays, ibid.
84 sqq., 93 sq., 110 sqq.
It is shown by the passages
quoted in Kose, Ar. Fr. 41, p.
1481 sq., and Heitz, Ar. Fr. 73,
p. 51, from Philoponus, Simplicius, Themistius, and Olympiodorus (the common source for
whom may have been Alexander),
that Arist. in the Fudemvs, after
following the Fhofdo, devoted
a searching examination to the
theory that the soul is the harmony of its body, the principal

iyKVKk.

TTJj'

(piK.

rd^iv

to

e'l

heads of which examination are


Hence the pasgiven by them.
sages in question must refer to
this dialogue, although Philopo-

nus (De An. E, 2) leaves us the


choice between it and the &ypavpds robs eraipovs,
Simplicius {De An. 14,
with
it
the
connects
a)
Pho'do.
2 All the passages are quote i
below.
(poi

and

avvov(riai

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
of these

relation

tant

Corpus.

always referred
works,

Exoteric Discourses

by a

from

strict

less

the

and Strabo

technical

scientific

But

method of treatment.^

among themselves

differ

our ex-

to

'

The ancients who mentioned them


to them as a separate class of Aristotle's

distinguished

treatises

they

'

111

Cicero

as to details.

speak of the exoteric works in general

The former, however,


terms as popular statements.''
Dialogues,^
is unmistakeably thinking only of the
which we

also find described as

According

late

to Gellius,

The only exceptions are two


Byzantine and altogether

untrustworthy interpreters of the


Eustratius (90, a) and
the Pseudo-Andronicus (Helio-

Ethics,

dorus, circ. 1367, cf. p. 69, n. 1),


the former of whom understands

by

^^coreptKol x6'yoi.

common

the

'

exoteric

in Plutarch.^

'

the treatises which dealt with

opinion, the latter, oral instruction.

about the
Fin. V. 5, 12
highest good, Aristotle and Theophrastus have written duo genera lihrorum, ununi jyopulariter
"^

the Aristotelian writings are


divided into acroamatic and
exoteric, oTa ra IcrropiKa koI ra
SiaXoyiKo. Koi '6\(os rh /i^ &Kpas

De An.
ii.

E, 2 {ap.

261)
wv

fiara,

ra

elai

PhiLOP.
Stahe, AHst.

(ppovri^ovra.

OLKpi^eias

i^MTepiKo.

a-vyypdfjL-

koI oi SiaKoyoi

TOVTO i^cvTepiKO. KCKXrjTai


OTi ov irphs robs yvrjffiovs UKpoaras

aiTip Sto

yeypa/xfieva.

the

Ad Att. iv. 16, 2 quoin singulis libris [of the


discourse on the
State]
ntor
jjrowmiis, ut Aristoteles in lis
qua; i^tarepiKovs vocat. In contradistinction to the Dialogues, the
strictly scientific works are called
(see preceding note) commentarii,
continuous
expositions,
corresponding to the avTOTrpSa-Mira or
aKpQariKo, of the Greek interpre-

liappened

ters (see p. 112, n.l,andll3, n. 2).


Adv.
Col. 14, 4, p. 1115
Aristotle everywhere attacks the
Ideas: iv roTs i}0iKo7s virojULvii/iaaiv

scriptivni,

quod

i^iorepiKht' ajjjjel-

labant, altei'uvi limatius [d/cpijSe<rr4pci)s, in a more severe style],


quod in conimentariis reliquerunt^
but in essentials they both
agree.
3

XIII.

1, 54, p.

609

because

TheoPeripatetics, after
phrastus, had not his works and
those of Aristotle, ttAV oxiywv
Koi yiiKKTTa ruv i^urepiKuv, they
^TjSei/

irpayfiariKcos

Ixetj/ (f)i\o(To(pe7v

[going deeply into

the subject, scientific]

aWh deaeis

Cf.

nlo/ni

(synonymous with Cicero's commentarii

see preceding note), iv

Tols (pvaiKoTs,
*

Likewise Simpl. Phys.

2, b:

Sia\6y<t}V,

5ia

tuv i^ayrepiKuv

ARISTOTLE

112

named

Ehetoric, Topics, and Politics were

exoteric,'

'

and those which related to Metaphysics, Physics, and


Dialectics

'

acroatic,'

the reason being that the former,

Galen explained, were meant

as

for

everyone

in a letter which appears in

Andronicus/

is

supposed to

complain to his master of the publication of the


writings

but inasmuch as Aristotle

is

the

Alexander,

latter only for the philosopher's scholars.^

'

acroatic

expressly stated

to have published them, the notion that he objected to

mind of the
we do find this

their publication cannot have been in the

writer of that fragment.

At

a later time

assumption also,'* and we find connected with

it

the further

theory that Aristotle purposely adopted in his


N.

'

A.

XX.

5:

Aristotle's

lectures and writings were divided into two classes, the e^co'E|wTeTepiKo. and the aKpoariKa.
piKacl'icchantuT (pur ad rltetoricas
nicditationcx fdcvltatemqve argvi'larum ciriliuniqve rcrnm, noaKpoariKa.
('onducchant,
t'ltiam

aidem vocahantnr in qnihusj)hilosvhtiUorqve ar/'ifahatur quccque ad natura; condisceptaii ones que


temp latlones
In the
d'lalecticas peH'inehant.
Lyceum the morning was devoted to the latter, the evening
to the former (cf. p. 27, n. 8).
Lihrosquoque S2(os, earuni omnium

sopliia rcmotior

covimeoitarios, seorsiim dlvisit, ut alii exoteriei dicerentnr,


2)artim aoroatici.
2 De Suhst. Fao. Nat. vol, iv.
'ApiffroT^Xovs ^ Qeocppaffrov
758
ra p.\v ToTs iroXXois yeypacpOTcav,

rernm

Tas Se aKpodaeis to7s eraipois.


3

Cf.

Gell.

ibid.

Plut.

Alex. 7; vide sui)ra, p. 22, n.

The wording

1.

ovk opBoi)S iirol-na-as


eKdovs rohs UKpoariKOVs ruv Xdyu^v,
:

'

acroatic

'

shows that the distinction between the \6yoi aKpoariKol and


i^wrepiKol must have been known
to the author of the letter.
''

Thus Plut.

^oiKe
7]QiKbv

Alex.

c.

7:

'AXe^auSpos ov ix6vov rhu

S'

KoX

iroXiTiKhv

irapaXafielv

Xoyou, aXXa Koi ru>v airopp'f}TU}v Koi


fiapvTfpwv l^aOvT.] SiSaaKaXioiv, &s
ol avSpes
ISius aKpoajxar iKas Koi
iTTOTTTiKas [as in mysteries] irpoffayopevovTS ovk i^ecpfpov els iroX-

CLEMENS, Strom.
not only the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, but
all schools have secret doctrines
and secret writings Xeyovffi Se
Xovs,fxeTa(Tx^^^-

V.

575,

KOi ol 'ApiCTTOTcXOVS TO. fikv eVojTepiKO. (Jvai

Twv (TvyypafiixoLTcav avrccv

TO 8e KOivd T Kal e^wrepiKa


On the same theory, in the Rhet.
ad Alex. c. 1, 1421, a, 26 sq., Aristotle is requested by Alexander
to observe the strictest secrecy
with regard to this work, while
Aristotle, on his part, lays a reciprocal duty of silence on Alexan[-ov]

der.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

113

works a form of exposition which must make them uninany but his scholars
while at the same
time it is said that it was here only that he disclosed his
telligible to

views in their
the

exoteric

'

'

full logical

On

connection. ^

this theory

writings were broadly distinguished from

by the fact that they were intended


wider public, and that they were therefore put in
a more popular form, did not cover the more difficult
the

'

acroatic,' just

for a

classes

and substituted for a severe and


method of proof one more accommodated to

of inquiry,

scientific

general comprehension.^
This idea is expressed in
the answer of Aristotle to Alex^

ander (see Gell. ibid.'), when he


replies to the reproach of the
latter with regard tothe aKpoariKol
\6yoi XaQi oZv aurovs Kal e/cSeSo:

fxeuovs Kal

fx)}

CKSeSoiiievovs

|uj/eToi

yap elffi fiSvots ro7s t]/xuv aKoixraaiv.


See also Themist. Or. xxvi. 319,
A sq., where it is said that Aristotle did not find the same discourses suitable for the masses
as for the philosophers, and therefore withdrew the highest secrets
of his teaching (the reAeo tepa,
the fivffTiKhp) from the former by
using obscure language. Simpl.
jP%. 2, b, referring to the letters
just mentioned, says
eV rols
:

aKpoafiaTiKoh affdcpeiav eTreTTrjSeuo-e,


&c. For the same view see Categ.
Schol. 27, a, 38, David, Categ.
Schol. 22, a, 20 27, a, 18 sq. In
;

the

same sense LuciAN,

V. Auct.
26, calls Aristotle SittAoDs, 6.K\os
ixhv 6 eKTOffOev (paiv6/xvos &\\05 Se
c.

6 (PToadeu,
-

exoteric

and

esoteric.

Alexander remarks,

Tojj. 52,

that Aristotle speaks at one time


XoyiKws in order to unfold the
truth as such, at another SmAe/c-

VOL.

I.

TiKws irphs So^au. He instances the


Tonnes, the p-nropiKa and the e|wrepiKa.
Kal yctp eV iKcivois ifMlcrra
'

rwv ijdiKuv Kal


(pvaiKwu iuSd^ws Xiy^rai.^
example of the Tonnes
Kal

Trepl

irepl rSov

But the
and the
Rhetoric shows that this only
refers to the basis of the opinions
laid down in these writings, the
argument from the universally
acknowledged (the

ej/5o|oi/),

and

not to the teaching as such. The


later writers, as a rule, express
themselves in the same sense

thus Simpl. Phys. 164, a: e|&)repiKo.


54 iffTL to koivo. Kal 5t'
euSd^wu irepaiySfieva aWa fi^ airo-

As to
see follow-

SeiKTiKO. (UTjSe aKpoafxariKa.

Ammon. and David,

and cf. Philop. Phys.


the other hand David,
in
ScJwh
Ar. 24, b, 33, changes
the statement of
Alexander
(which he quotes in order to reing note

p. 4.

On

fute it) into on eV fxhi/ to7s aKpoaSoKOvvra avrdp \eyei. Kal


:

fiariKo'is TO,

TO

aXrjdrj,

iu 5e to7s Sia\oyiKo7s

&A\ois SoKovuTa, TO

tA

xf/evSrj.

Besides the testimony already adduced, the statements


found in the Neoplatonic com3

ARISTOTLE

114

The theory just mentioned can be traced


as Andronicus, perhaps even farther

not put

correctness beyond question.

its

confirmed in the main, even

if it

as far back

but this does

'

It

is,

however,

requires correction in

point or another, by the utterances of Aristotle

o:ie

himself as to the

'

It is true that

Exoteric Discourses.'

in a general sense he

may

describe as

'

exoteric

'

any

topic which does not belong to the inquiry immediately


mentators

go to establish this
point. Thus the so-called Ammon.
in Catcg. B,b sqq. (see also Stahr,
AristoteUa, ii. 255 sqq.), who,
after some other divisions of the
the Aristotelian writings, among
syntagmatic ones distinguishes
'

'

avTOTrpocrcoTra

koL aKpoap-ariKO.

and

SiahoyiKa Kal i^wrepLKa. The former are written -rrphs yvrjaiovs


b.Kpoaras, the latter irphs t)]V twv
TToWwu a}(pf\(iav in the former
own
his
Aristotle
expresses
;

opinion with a strictly scientific


argument, in the latter ra 5oKovvra avTc^, aW' ov 5t' airoSeiKriKwv iirix^LprjixaTiov, Kcd oh oToi re
eicriv ot iroWol iTraKo\ov9^7v. Simigreater length,
larly, only at
David, Schol. 24, a, 20 sqq., who
likewise divides the avurayfjiaTLKa
into avToirpSacoTra or aKpoaixartKa
and diaXoyiKa h. Koi i^coTepiKO. Acyovrai and considers the former
to have been written irphs rovs
(piKoffocpia,

the

latter Trphs aveTrinqbeiovs Trphs

(pi.\o-

iiTLTrjSeLOvs

(Tocpiav,

T-p

and hence the former

avayKacFTiKoov
5ia TTidauMv.

\6y(av,

St'

the latter

Cf. p. 111, n. 4.

In proof of this statement


we cannot attach so much importance to the passage just
given from David as Heitz does
The fact
IVerl. Sehr. 25 sq.).
'

that David (24, b, 5) expressly


appeals to Animonius (n. epfi-nveias) and to the commentary on
theCatef/orics passing under Animonius' name (which, although in
form it does not
its present
come from Ammonius, yet seems
to have originated in one written
by him), indicates that Ammonius
was David's proximate authority

and though he (Ammonius)

cer-

tainly made use of earlier writers


(and principally Alexander, whom
David at 24, b, 33 attacks, and
from whom his quotation of the
Aristotelian Eudenivs is probably
taken, Uke that in Philop. Dc
An. E, 2 sq. Ar. Fr. p. 1481,
;

we do not know
has been added to
On the other
their testimony.
hand we must trace the state-

No. 41),

still

how much

in Cicero, Strabo, and


Ge\\.mB{vide sitpra, p. Ill, n. 2-6,
112, n. 1), to Tyrannic and Andronicus, and the letters mentioned on p. 112, n. 3 etc., prove
that the latter was aware of the
distinction between exoteric and
acroatic writings, and of the suggestion that the last mentioned

ments

were only intended to be understood by the pupils of the


philosopher.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
in liand,^ or

any discussion which does not go very deeply


It is also true that the title does not

into the subject.^

always

and

have every reason to refer


Polit.

rauTa

denote a distinct

necessarily

Nevertheless there

writings.^

i.

fxhv

5,

it

aWk
1254, a, 33
i^MTepiKwrepas
Similarly, ibid. ii.
;

Iffus

irrrl (TKe^ews.

in the Rejmblio
1264, b, 39
Plato has only imperfectly treated
of legislation, ra 5' aK\a ro7s
f^ctidev \6yois TreirKrjpwKc rhv KoyovJ
The term ' e^codev Koyoi covers in
this case writings of the most
In like
speculative character.
manner Eudemus Fr. 6 (Simpl.
Phys. 18, b), where instead of the
6,

'

'

e^ei

S' cLTToplav

....

'((Tws

5e ov irphs

rhv \6yov of Aristotle {Phys. i. 2,


6%^* 2* "^'''^
185, b, 11) we read
TovTo airoplau i^urepiKriv.
:

Phys. iv. 10, init. wpwTou


Ka\ws ex^' SiaTroprjaaiirepl avrov
\_Tov xpovov] Kal 5ta twv i^wrepiKwu
\6yoov.
The e|ajT. K6yoi here
mean the discussion which follows immediately, and which is
called exoteric (in the same way
as Aristotle, in other places, puts
the logical in opposition to the
'^

8e

physical, rid. infra, p. 174, n. 2),

a
it does not aim at
and adequate notion of
time (the ii Icnv b xpoj/os, 218, a,

class

of

are passages where

we

to such a class

as for the passage

^ Thus,
besides the passae'e
given in the preceding note from
the PhysicSy the Eudemian Eth.
ii. 1, 1218, b, 33, introduces the
division of possessions into the
external and the spiritual with the

remark

Kadair^p SiaipovfieOa
kv rots i^coTpiKo7s \6yoL5.
In

on interesting subjects which

Kal

the

parallel passage, Eth. N. i. 8,


1098, b, 10, Aristotle says: he
wishes to speak about happiness
KoL e/c TWV X^yofiivuv ire pi aifTrjs,
by which, according to the context, only the prevailing views

concerning
meant. It

must

in question,

p. 218, a, 30.

that the

only takes into consideration certain preliminary properThe question is not


ties of it.
but
here of exoteric writings
Prantl is none the less wrong
(Arist. Physih, 501, 32) in maintaining that by the exoteric discourses we are to understand, not
only in the present instance but
everywhere, only those conversa-

and that

such a rendering is forbidden by


the strictly dialectical and genuinely Aristotelian style of the
discussions from p. 217, b, 32 to

strict

31), but

"*

at that time were everywhere in


vogue even at social gatherings.
That this does not fit other passages will be shown immediately;

because

tions

115

can

happiness

Eudemus

i^car. x6yoi of
also refer.

This

be

is to these, therefore,

true especially of
1323, a, 21
vo/j.iaavTus oZv LKavSos TToAAa \4ye(rdai Kol
rwv iv To7s i^o^TepLKoTs XSyois
irepl rrjs apicrTTjs C^rjs Kal vvv
XPVareov avTo7s.
That by this lie
does not mean mere oral expressions of opinion in the conversations of daily life is clearly

Pollt. vii.

is

i,

shown by what immediately

fol-

lows. For Aristotle continues ws


clAtjOms yhp irpSs ye /xiav Siaipeaiv
:

ARISTOTLE

116

writings referred to were of a more popular type

tlie

than our extant Aristotelian

texts

is

made probable

ibid. 32
His avaKvTiKols Aeyofxei/
etc
aii(pi(r^-nry](rii:V,
from oaa &A\a irpoarhiopi^dixiQa iv Tois
point may be stated thus
And, on the other
the arguments in the i^wrfpiKol avaXvTiKOLS.
hand, the vvv xp^fTfov avTois is
\6yoi, it will be univei sally recognised that the conditions of adverse to this explanation. That
hai)piness include not only exter- is meant to designate what folnal and bodily good things but also lows as something extracted from
and pre-eminently spiritual good the exoteric discourses but Arithings although it is true that in stotle would be far more likely to
common life we are wont to content use such a formula if he was quotourselves with far too small a pro- ing something from a former work
portion of such s])iritual good.' than if he was merely repeating
This line of reasoning necessarily in writing what he had already
implies that the i^wrepiKol \6yoL orally delivered. This latter, from
the nature of the case, he must
in qucstion,witli which the current
opinion of society is said to be in have had occasion to do as often
as a modern university teacher
})artial agreement, are not the
same as any form of expression does it. The fact, tlien, that he
expressly mentions that he is
of that current opinion (cf. BerKAYS, Dial. d. Arist. 40). Then, 'making an extract from the e|wTpiKo\ Koyoi,^ points, as in the
again, the words irp6s ye fiiav ZiPe Cwlo, ii. 13, 295, a, 2, and
aipeffLV ovSels au.(pL(T&r)TT]aeiev point
Jlcti'or. iii. 2, 372, b, 10 (where
to definite explanations, set down
some of the writings which we
in writing, not merely existing
in the intangible medium of oral possess are quoted with the same
conversation. It would be easier Xpr](TT4ov) to an existing written
And an Aristotelian writto connect them with oral dis- work.
courses of Aristotle himself (as ing must be meant, since that
OXCKEN does in Staatd. d. Arid. which follows out of the i^corepWe cannot, however, iKoi \6yoi sounds perfectly Aristoi. 44-59).
base this view on the present telian, and forms a whole with
what Aristotle gives in his own
Keyofiev (together with the Stopi-

oi/Seh

'

C6iJiea, Pol. iii. G, 1278, b, 32),


since Aristotle not only quotes
the writings of others very frequently in this way, but not unfrequently even his own; cf.
(/JOAtej/ Se
Pol. vii. 13, 1332, a, 8
:

Pliys. viii. 1,
(pafieu 5^, etc. (PJii/s.
Cado, i. 7, 275, b, 21
Tje LKo7s

Koi iv To7s

251, a,
iii.

1)

Xoyos

5);

Pe

5'

61/

Tols

irepl

Kivrjcews

(iaTLu) Metaph. v. ?>0 fin.; \6yos


Mil. vi. 3,
Se TOVTOV iv erepois
1139, b, 26; utnrep /cot iv roh
;

name

(jiiiels

Se

ipov/jLev,

38).

1.

something similar to that which is here quoted


x6yoi
is found in
from the i^wr.
some passages of the Ethics (i.
6 sqq. x. 6 sqq.), which Zeller,
Lastly,

although

in his second edition, brought


into connection with this quonow concedes
tation, yet he
cf.
to Bernays {ibid. 71 sq.
Oncken, ihid. 43, 5; Vahlen,
Arist. Aufs. ii. 6) that Aristotle
;

would not by the designation

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
both by the express distinction that
i^oDTepiKol

Xoyoi have mentioned

the Ethics, which in the Politics


he repeatedly quotes as 7)BiKa, and
puts in tlie closest connection

with them
Zeller's

2nd

{vid.

of
Bernays' the127, n.

p.

ed.).

2,

ory (73 sqq.), that the first chapter


of the seventh book of the Politics
strikingly diverges from the usual
style of his scientific works, and
bears distinct traces of having
been extracted from a dialogue

can scarcely be supposed after


Vahlen's
forcible
objections
{Arist. Avfs. ii.)to be established;
Zeller, however, feels bound to

agree with Bernays that by the


exoteric discourses in this passage is meant a written work of
the philosopher's which is lost to
us, and which Aristotle here seems
to follow pretty closely, for which
very reason he refers to it, and
not to the Ethics, though the
parallel passages in the latter
were closely connected with it
in meaning.
Less convincing
with regard to this, in spite of
what Bernays says to the contrary (iii{. 38, 51 sqq.), appears
to be Polit. iii. 6, 1278, b, 30
aWa iXT]v Koi rris apxHS tovs
'

'

\eyoijL4vovs rpdirovs [the Se(nroreia,

the oIkqvoixik)], and the ttoMtik)]


apxh} ^dSiov 5i6A.etf koI yap 4vto7s

i^corepLKoTs XSyois 5iopi^6/xc6a irepl

avTuv iroXXaKis.
These words,
looked at in themselves, might
refer not only (as Oncken, ibid.,
suggests) to oral disquisitions,
but also (by taking the 5topf^(^/ie0o
as the collective we ') to conver'

sations not connected with the


School or even with scientific
philosophy. That Aristotle here
* refers to the e|a>T.
x6yoi, not for
the existence' (more correctly

is

117

drawn between

distinction ') of different kinds


of dominion, but for the exact
limitation of their difference
'

'

(as Bernays, p. 38 asserts), cannot be inferred from the ^iopi^6/xeda, since this expression designates not only the exact distinction, the carefully- weighed logical antithesis,' but an]/ kind of
distinction whatever.
If
we
compare with it the perfectly
analogous use of Xeyo/neu, diopi(6fxeda, &c., in the passages given
above (p. 115), we shall be prepared to give the same meaning
to the Siopi^ofieda here, and when
*

we h-ave persuaded ourselves,


from other passages, that Aristotle
names

certain writings \6yoi

e|&)-

the passage appears to


this interpretation.
(And
there are certainly some among
the lost Aristotelian writings iti
which
the
distinction
here
TpiKol,
fit

touched upon may have been


given particularly the iroXiTiKhs
;

and
n. 1,

n. fiaffiXeias

and

60, n.

true of Eth.
S'

eVrl

iroirjais

v.

supra, p. 58,

1). The

vi.

4 init.

koI Trpa^is

like is
erepou
TricTTev-

avrwy Kol to7s i^wrepiThe connection here


unquestionably allows us to suppose that the words refer to
0/j.ev

Se irepl

Ko?s \6yois.

discussions in Aristotelian writings of a character different from


that of the scientific works which
we possess, as for instance the
Dialogue on the Poets or Gryllos
but that it forbids any other supposition Bernays (p. 39, 57 sqq.)
;

has not made out. If anybody


wished to give to the passage,
instead of the narrow meaning
assumed by Bernays, the broader
one, 'this has already been proved
in

my

othei* writings,' neither

the

ARISTOTLE

118

meaning of i^urepiKhs nor the


context would stand in his way,

words

since the rendering of the former


would be analogous to the examples quoted on p. 115, n. 1,
and as regards the latter the
question whether Aristotle here
refers to scientific or popular

x6yois apKovvTws ^via /col XP'')^'''^^^


avTols. diov TO fihv &\oyou avTrjs
For
ehai rh 5e \6yov exou.
though it is by no means so
incredible as Bernays, p. 36,
believes, that the distinction be-

on

tween the rational and the irrational in the soul may have made
its way from the Platonic school
into wider circles (Epicharmus,
at a much later period, comes
ver}'' near to it with his vovs dpa,
&c.), and though it could scarcely
be said to be an actual impossibility to interpret the words i^car.

writings,

is

indifferent.

If,

the other hand, we wished to understand the e^wT. x6yoi of the


said by others
\ey6ixiva what
we could parallel the expresis

'

sion by an appeal to Eudemus


Bernays,
(see preceding note).
referring to this, finds it impossible to believe that we are te
draw the explanation of such a
corner-stone of tlie Peripatetic
system as the connection of ttoi-

from the common


well educated
so, he ought to
iind it no less absurd to draw
from the Very same source an
7}(Tiy

and

-rrpa^is,

conversation of
but if
persons
:

exi)lanation of the centre of


gravity of all Ethics, the notion
of EvhaL/xovia. And yet we find
in Mh. i. 8, init. incontestably
(TKeTTTeou

8);

irepi

auT^s

Koi

This
may not mean that we are to seek
the scicnHfie defimtion of happiness in the conversation of the
educated but neither would this
be affirmed in Eth. vi. 4 init.
about that of -rroiriaLS and irpa^is,
if we were to understand the
f^ccT. x6yoi in this passage of the
The appeal to uniXey6fi(va.
versal conviction would be to
establish a general distinction of
e/f

Twv Keyo/xevcov

irepl auTTjy.

'

TToiriais

'

from

Aristotle's

and

rep

yap

irpa^is

way

this

is

aXrjde?

iravra (TwdSei. ra virdpxovra (^Eth.


Much more definitely may
8).

i.

we

discern in Eth. i. 13, 1102, a,


26 an intention of appealing to
some Aristotelian writings in the

T^s

A76Tot Sc inpl avrris [sc.

i\ivxns] Koi

eV Tols i^corpiKo7s

\6yoi as referring to opinions


current outside the school, yet the
introductory words here too much
resemble those given above from
Polit. vii. 1, and the Xeyerai
apKovvTws ^via Kai vvv XPV^^'''^'^^
avToh liere points too obviously
to written discussions, for us to
be able to refer this quotation

mere X^ySfxeva. If it refers


an Aristotelian work, this
must be one of the lost writings most probably the Eudemus for the quotation does not
to
to

agree with IT. i/^fx^s iii. 9, 432, a,


22 sqq., and this work would not
be cited by such a reference, but,
as always in other places, by eV
Neither in
Tols irepl xpvxvs.^
Metaph. xiii. 1, 1076, a, 28 (on
the Ideas as such he will only
'

speak aTTAws Koi '6aov v6iiov x-P^v


TidpvXXriTai yap rcif iroXXa Kal virh
ruv ^ct}TpiKa)V xSyuv") can we
understand by the c^mt. x6yoi
It
oral discussions of others.
must mean the work of Arialone
stotle himself, since this
could dispense him from a fuller
criticism of the doctrine of Ideas
and that we are to look for
such work neither in the philo;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

119

the exoteric and the scientific treatises,^ and by the terms


It is not to

that are used in describing the former.^

be

sopher's doctrinal discussions nor


in his strictly scientific writings
is suggested not only by the designation 6|a>T. \6yoi, but also

solution, in the Dialogae on Philosophy,


Y.^carepiKhs in Aristotle means
(1) that which exists outside,

by the Koi (koL vith r. i^. A.),


by which the i^oT. \6yoi are distinguished from other not exoStill more clearly
teric \6yoi.
does this appear from Eudemus,
when the latter, probably remem-

the

bering this passage, in th. i. 8,


1217, b, 22 says likewise of the
Ideas iireaKeTrrai Se Tro\\o7s irepj
:

ai/rov rpdirois Koi iu to7s i^corepiKols

\6yois Kol iv

roils

Kara

<piXo(ro<piav.

Cf following note.
This is indicated by the express statement in the passages
quoted in the preceding note,
especially from Polit. vii. 1, Eth.
i. 13, Metaph. xiii. 1, that certain
points have been suflBciently explained even in the exoteric disthat is, inasmuch as we
courses
should less expect such discusEudemus puts it
sions in them.
more definitely, by putting the
i^wrcpiKol \6yoi (see preceding
note, Jin.) in opposition to the
Since the
\6yoi Karci. <f)i\o<ro(j>lau.
.

'

'

'

are scientific inquiries,


the former can only be popular
discourses and, since (as we have
seen) writings are meant by
them, they can only be popuNow it might inlar writings.
deed appear that the criticism
of the doctrine of Ideas, to which

'^

Mh. End.

and Metaph. xiii.


refer, would of all
1, loc. clt.
things have been least suited for
popular writings; but we have
already seen on p. 76, n. 3, 5G,
n. 2 vied, that he opposed this
i.

8,

doctrine, with

the greatest re-

out,

ffoes

and

(2) that
refers to the

The word has the


meaning when for in-

external.

former

stance a foreign province

an

is

apxh (Polit.

i^MrepiK-i]

called
ii.

10,

1272, b, 19), or when hand and


foot are styled i^wnpiKh fieprj
(Gen. An. v. 6, 786, a, 26); to
these uses cf the i^carepiKo. ayada,
Pol. vii. 1, 1323, a, 25.
In the
second meaning the expression
is
used in the combination
i^iorepiKoi irpd^eis (Pol.
vii. 3,
If now, in the
1325, b, 22, 29).
phrase i^cor. \6yoi, we propose to
give it thefirst meaning, we cannot, by exoteric discourses, in
those passages where Aristotelian
writings of a particular class or
the inquiries contained in them
are meant, understand such discourses as lie outside the discussion in which they are referred
to as * other discourses' (like the
i^wrepiKwrepa CTKer^is and the e^co.

dep \6yoi, p. 115, n. 1

latter

external

which

and

3)

nor

yet (as Bernays thinks in I>ial. d.


Ar. 92 sq.) such as do not enter
into the essence of a thing, but
are external to it (as p. 115, n. 2).

The

latter

suit, partly

meaning would not


because this would

be a strange way of speaking of


popular treatises,' partly because
it would not fit those cases in
which Aristotle again takes up in
later works, as being suitable and
adequate, what he had said in
'

the ^^(anpiKol \6yot (as in the


passages of the Politics] Mhics^

ARISTOTLE

120
inferred either from
selveSj or

tlie

words s^corspiKol \6yoi, them-

from the surrounding

Dialogues alone were meant.

facts,

There

that Aristotle's

may have been, and

in fact there appear to have been, other

works also which


were adapted to the understanding of the general public.^

As

to the later theories, the idea that the

Master did

not intend his strictly scientific work for publication at


is

all

refuted by the contemporary record of the complaints

were made because he published them ^ and the


idea that he designedly chose for them a style obscure

tliat

and unintelligible
visible

truth

mind

to the lay

characteristics of the

is that,

them as mere sets of notes


manner of trouble to aid the

strictly devised scientific

tions,

disproved by the

The
we ought to confor his own use, he takes
themselves.

except in cases where

sider
all

is

texts

reader,

by the use of a

terminology, by clear defini-

by explanations and

illustrations,

by methodical

processes of thought, and by warnings against possible


obscurities, ambiguities or misconceptions.

nevertheless that there occur


^nd Metaphysics given on p. 115,
Such writings could only

n, 4).

be called exoteric, in this use


of the word, in the sense that
they were known and in use even
outside the Aristotelian school.
But it comes to very much the
same thing- also if we start (as
Zeller prefers to do), with the
second meaning of i^corepiKhs, and
understand the i^cor. xSyoi to signify such w^orks as were intended
for outsiders or for the general
public, the same, in fact, as are
included in the terms xSyoi K:5eSofxevoi or
4v KOiv^ "yiyvoix^voi.

That such writings were of amore

many

If

it

be true

particular points of

popular character was implied in


the designation, but not directly
expressed in the adjective e|coTeas such.

piKbs

When Eudemus

puts the Koyoi e|wT. in opposition to those Kara (piKoaocpiav


(see preceding note), we might
understand the latter to mean
such as were intended to serve
for scientific instruction
but at
the same time there is nothing
against the translation both in
those intended for the general
public and in the scientific trea'

'

tises.'
'

Cf. p. 60, n. 1.
Cf. p. 22, n. 1, 112, n. 3,

ARISTOTLWS WRITINGS
difficulty,

121

the reasons are to be found anywhere rather

than in the writer's intention.

Besides,

it

is

obvious

that any such theory attributes to the philosopher a

very childish sort of mystification, wholly destitute of

any reasonable motive.


It does seem, however, to be true that it

was only a

portion of his writings which Aristotle published, in the


sense of

making express provision for

to a wide circle of general readers.

more

their dissemination

Others which were

closely connected with his oral teaching

seem to

have been designed primarily for the use of his scholars


as classbooks.^

It

was in the case of the former only that

he took pains to cultivate that eloquence and

artistic

completeness and that popular style of exposition for

works were famous. The sole aim


of the second set of texts was scientific investigation for
its own sake, and they were therefore distinguished by a
which his exoteric
'

'

and a less artistic dress. It seems that of


by far the greater part, if not the whole,
consisted of those writings which Aristotle wrote before
the opening of the Peripatetic School at Athens, and
of
chiefly while he was still one of the Platonic circle
all of which nothing remains but a few fragments.^ On
stricter logic

the former class

But without our having to


suppose that they were forbidden
'

to

communicate them to

others.

In this sense', says Prof,


Zeller, I had already expressed
myself in the second edition,
p. 98, as to the probable state of
facts with regard to the distinc2

'

tion between exoteric and esoteric writings.


On the other
hand, I then believed that, in the
Aristotelian passages which men-

tion the i^urepiKol Xoyoi, I could


everywhere translate that phrase
as meaning such discussions as
do not belong to the sphere of
the inquiry actually under investigation. (Thus also Schweglee, Gescli. d.griech. Phil. 194.)
I have now rejected this opinion, and think that the general
meaning of i^airepiKhs, to designate something external, or relating to the external, is mor

122

ARISTOTLE

such a theory there "may have been a great difference in

form between the 'exoteric' and the*' acroatic' texts,


appropriate. It follows that even
in the combination i^wTepiKol a6yoi this expression will apply not
only to such discussions as lie
outside a specified subject (as
p. 115, n. 1), or are concerned only
with what is external to it (p.
115, n. 2), but also to such as
are current outside a particular
circle (p. 115, n. 3), or such as
are intended for outsiders (p. 115,
n. 4).
According- as we begin
from this or that passage in
Aristotle, and extend the meaning of the expression in that
particular passage to all the other
cases, we get this or that rendering of the e|wT. x6yoi. This is
the explanation of the fact that
even now there are the most
diverse opinions on the matter.
Of these, the farthest removed
from the explanation which has
prevailed since the time of Andronicus, which understands by
tliis expression a particular class
of Aristotelian writings, is the
supposition of Madvig (Exc. vii.
on CiC. Be Fin.), Prantl (Arist.
Physik, p. 501, 32), Spengel
(' Arist. Studien,' Ahlt.
d. hayr.
Akad. x. 181 sq.), Forchhamm'er

{Arist. nnd, die exoter. Reden^


cf. particularly pp. 15, 04), and
SUSEMIHL {Philol. Anc. v. 074

that only the conversations


are
designated by the e|coT. x6yoi.
Rather nearer to it are Ravais-

sq.),

of non-philosophical circles

SON (JSIetaph. d' Arist. i. 209 sq.)


and Thurot (Etudes sur Aristote,
209 sq.), who understand by them
such dialectic discussions (in contradistinction to the strictly scientific), as proceed by arguments
TTphs SJ|oj/, occurring either in

Aristotelian writings, or in the


oral disputations of the school.
These, in their view, may be
called exoteric, either because
they always have to deal with
something foreign to the matter
(cf. the e|a> and cco) \6yos, Anal. i.
10, 76, b, 24), or because they
always treat the subject externally. Grote {Aristotle, 03 sqq.)

agrees with them, except that,


besides the Aristotelian Dialogues and some extracts from
the acroamatic works, he thinks
conversations outside the school
are referred to. In like manner
(though with the exclusion of
conversations outside the school)
Ueberweg {Gesch. d. Phil. i.
143, 5th ed.). Oncken {Staatsl.
d. Arist. i. 43 sq.) refers the term
to oral discussions, allied to the
scientific lectures in which the
e|a>T. \6yoi are mentioned, but
of a different class from them.
On the other hand Ritter ( Geseh.
d. Pliil. iii. 21 sqq.) holds more
closely to the statements of the
ancient writers about the two
classes of Aristotelian pupils and
writings, in assuming (p. 29)
that all the strictly scientific
works were only written by Aristotle as a help to his lectures
and were only published, at a
later period, by himself or his
pupils, and perhaps at first only
for the latter
whereas the remaining writings (which are lost
to us), were designed for the use
of cultured persons and might, together with any corresponding lee
tures, be called exoteric. A like
position is held, in the main, by
Bernays {Dial. d. Arist.), who
by the exoteric discourses under;

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

123

and it may be very true that the matter of the former was
advanced than the systematic doctrine of the Master,
but it is entirely
as we have it from his riper years

less

beside the

mark

to suggest that he sought in either the

one case or the other to conceal his opinions or to with-

draw them from the

reader's eye.

between
and the others,

It is not only, however, the distinction noted

these

published

'

which points

'

or 'exoteric' books

to the conclusion that the extant, closely

reasoned writings of Aristotle were written primarily for

In the texts themwhich it is hard to


reconcile with the idea that they were really puhlished,
his scholars, as classbooks only.
selves there are

many

indications

in the full sense of the word, during Aristotle's lifetime.

In the
stance

place there

that a book which

stands

such

Heitz

( F(?7'Z.

sqq.)>

first

is

lectures chiefly,
Schr. d. A7'. 122

though agreeing with him

in substance, prefers to give the


expression (with reference to
Fhys. iv. 10 init.) the broader
meaning, and to make it imply a
point of view farther removed
from true science. Bonitz (Bid.
Arist. 104, b, 44 sqq. ZeitsGhriften fur ostr. Gymn. 18(56, 776
sq.) takes a similar view. Stahr
;

ii.
239 sqq., cf
{Aristotelia^
especially 275 sq.), and Brandis
(Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, 101 sqq.)
express themselves less decidedly

the

former believing that by

the exoteric writings are meant


partly those in which something
was treated merely in passing,
partly
and principally those
which did not essentially belong
to the systematic connection of

is

the remarkable circum-

cited in another nevertheless


philosophical writings, such
as the Dialogues, partly a special
manner of philosophising the
latter broadly identifying the
exoteric writings with the popular ones, but abstaining from
further definition of them or
*' exoteric
of the expression
discourses." Thomas (De Arist.
e|cDT. xSyois') stands quite isolated
with his strange whim of looking
for Aristotle's exoteric discourses
in the greater EtJiics. Space does

tlie

not permit me a more searching


examination of these various
suppositions
the principles on
which it would be based are
contained in what has been said
;

above.
Stahr, ibid., gives all
the earlier references Which bear
upon the question.'
Ritter (iii. 29) and BranDis (ii. b, 113) have already
'

ARISTOTLE

124
cites that other

book

itself:

or that an earlier treatise

speaks of an inquiry as already completed, and yet a


later treatise says

it

Analytics,^

may

and yet

These

in contemplation only.

is

The

cases are not rare.

Topics

frequently cited in the

is

cites the latter four times.

'-^

All four

belong to a later-written portion of the Topics, but

any rate they cannot be later than the Analytics, in


which these same books are cited as well as the earlier
at

When

ones.^

it

the FJiysics refers us back to discussions

we know them,

which, as

exist only in the Metaphysics,

might be said that the reference

to a section

is

which

existed as a separate treatise before the Metaphysics

compiled

but

^
;

it

noted this and explained in a


similar way.
Cf.

'

p.

Arist.

(Itid.

n.

67,

BONITZ

1.

102 sq.) jyives the

passages on which tlie followingexplanation is based, so far as


they have not been expressly
cited here.
2 VIT. 8,

a,

24

eV

rtVcoj/

Se Se? Kara(rKevd^LU [sc.

avWoyia-

jxou opov^

iv kripois

SidpLffTaL

aKpifiecn^pov

(cf.

/j.eu

Anal. Post.

ii.

la), viii. 11, 162, a, 11: cpavephu


8' e/c

2),

ra>u

viii.

apxv

avaXvTiKwp (Anal. Pr.

ii.

13, 162, b, 32:


"^^^ alr^7rai 6

eV

-rh

5'

kpcoTwv,

Kar' a.\r}9iav jxlv iv ro7s avaKvriKo7s


[Anal. Pr. ii. 16] dprirai, Kara

ho^av 5e vvv Ae/creoj/, ix. 2 (Sq/)h.


Trepi jj-hv ovv tu>v
165, b, 8

JiJL),

airoSeiKTiKcov [sc. (rvWoyio-fiiiiv^ iu

Tots avaXvTiKols
3

A7ial. Pr.

e'iprjrai.
ii.

15,

64, a,

36

6.W(av ipccrrffxaToov ffv\XoyictaffQai ddrepov ^ ws iv to7s


TOTTLKols i\4xOv A-ajSeTi') refers to
Toj). viii. and Anal. Pr. ii. 17, 65,
b, 15 (oTrep ^'ipTjraf. Kcd iv TOty
(e<TTt 5e bi

TOTriKo7s) to
4,

the passage Tojk

ix.

with which what


also closely connected.

b, 21,

167,

follows

is

In

Pliys. i. 8, 191, b, 2
Aristotle remarks, after a discussion on the possibility of comingfTs /xfv d}] rpSiros
into existence
*

ovTOS, &\\os

ma,

was

cannot be doubted that the zoological

5'

OTi ei/Se'xeTai

Kara t^v

Ae-yejj/

Svpa/XLV

Tavra

Kal TrjV

iuipyeiav tovto 5' iv &Woii SiwpiThis


arai St' uKpifi^ias fj.aA\ov.
reference is most probably to a
passage in the 3Ietaphysic8 (for
to refer it to one of the lost
'

writings is forbidden by the fact


that Aristotle is not accustomed
in other places to quote these
latter, as he cites the dogmatic
simple iv
writings, -with the
In the
&\Kois cf p. 108, n. 3).
;

however, it not only


agrees with ix. 6 sqq., but also
with V. 7, 1017, a, 35 sqq., i.e.
the treatise ITepi rov iroa-axois,
The .same is true
of. p. 76, n. 3.
of Gen. et Corr. ii. 10, 336, b,
29, as compared with Meta^h.
Meta^jh.,

V. 7.

AHISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Be

tract cited in the

Goelo

The Meteorology

work. 2
yet in

was written

it

than that

later

Be Sensu

refers to the

own preamble

its

125

and

described itself as the close

of the series of investigations as to inorganic nature, after

which the works on Animals and Plants were to be taken

The Natural History quotes the book on

up.

which

spoken of

is

as being
is

in texts that are

unwritten.

still

referred to in an

"^

The

to come.^

De Somno

lost

Generation of Animals,

There

and in a

book on Food
it is

on Plants

treatise

early section of the

Us pi

^(pwv

one as yet

later

quoted in the

is

the later works on

in

demonstrably later

The same

r/svsascos as already existing,

Plants,

the

Parts and

promised as in the

future."^

a similar relation of cross reference between

is

these same tracts and one of the lesser physiological

Be Coelo, ii. 2, 284, b, 13


the world had a right and left
side, it would also be obliged to
have an above and below, a before

if

and behind

SicoptCTat

rovTWV iv Tols

^jl^v

ovv

irepl

ras toov ^((xav


Kivi](T^is (Jngr. An. 2, 704, b, 18,
sqq., ihid. c, 4 sq.) Si^ t^ ttjs
irepl

^ucews oXk^Io. ttjs iKeivoov eJuai.


- This is proved not only from
MeteoTol. i. Ifin. but also because
the History of Animals and n,
Cv^v jxopioiv are quoted see Ind.
Arist. 100, a, 55 sq.
;

III.

TovTwv

fi?i.

eoTTOj

TiQ^wp'nixivou

T)ixiv

5e ircpliv ToTs

(iffirep

eijpTjTai

(pvTwv.

On

composition, as has been shown

on

1, is first promised
works which on their part

p. 93, n.

in

quote in many places the History


of Animals, De Vita et 31., Fart.
An., and Gen. An.
' I. 23, 731, a. 29
a\\h Trepl
:

fxhv

(pvTU)v iv

On

the other hand

dAAa

and

must we,

clearly

Meteor, ii.
the lpr]Tai

3,

in
359, b, 21, refer
6,Wois to
De

iv

Sensic, 4.
*

//.

/I.

V.

1,

539,

a,

20:

Trepi

fxtv

Trepl

more

eTreV/ceTTTat.

v.

(De

Still

kripois

3, 783, b,
tovtoov (the
falling of the leaves in winter)
iv &\\ois rh aXriov \KT0v (cf i.
Trepl fihv odv (pvTWv,
1, 716, a, 1
avra Kad^ avra x^P^^ eVttrKeTrTe'oj',

23

Seiisu, 3) 5ib Ttt fxkv Aeyccfxcv, to7s


5' ws virdpxova'i xp7j(rcc/ie0a avrwu.

Jrepi Ttts ai(Tdr}(TLs deiKuvfxevois

iv rfj decopia rfi Trepl

the other hand this

p. 93, n. 1).

C. 3, 456, b, 6
erprjTa: 5e
TOVTcov iv to7s Trepl Tpo(prjs.
:

Cf. p. 92, and on the chronological relation of the writings


n. VTTVOV, n. (cpOOV flOploiV, n. ((^WV
7ei/eVecos, see BoNiTZ, Ind. Arist.
103, a, 16 sqq., 55 sqq.
^

ARISTOTLE

126
texts, ^

making it impossible to say which comes before


The tract on the Parts of Animals is cited

the other.

once in that on the Motion of Animals, which


three times

How

it cites

itself.^

are

we

to treat this peculiarity ?

pervert the formulae of reference in

all

Are we

so to

these cases as to

read what ostensibly refers to an earlier writing as

if it

were only an indication of something intended in a

later

one

This would be negatived by the number of cases in

which the phenomenon recurs

itself a notable fact

also by the circumstance that in several cases the

and

assump-

tion of the later treatise as a thing already in existence is

too intimately interwoven with the tenor of the passage


to allow the change.^

The

like reasons stand equally

against the theory that these abnormal references crept


into the text after Aristotle's death.'*
n.

'

^oir^s /cal

0ai/aTou,

with the connected n.

together
avatrvoris,

of. p. 91 sq.

An. 5, 700, a, 33
many animals have the front and
hind parts near one another, olou
Ingr.

TO.

re jxaKaKia

KoL to

crTpo/jL^wSr}

Tcov ocTTpaKoSepiuLoov. eXpr]rai 5e Trepl

rovrwv irpdrcpov

iv kr^pois [Part.

684, b, 10 sqq., 34, where


is said of the jxaXaKid
re Ka\ crTpofxfiwSrf twv oarpaKoSfp-

An.

iv. 9,

the same
ixu>v).

An.
tJjs

On

the other hand, Part.


690, b, 14: t] 6' alria
ai/Twu (of snakes)
ctTToSias

iv. 11,

eiprjTOi iv rols TrepI rrjs iropeias

tuv

^(fwv (c. 8, 708, a, 9 sqq.) Biupia-jueVots.


Ibid. 692, a, 16: irepl 5e
TTJs
irepl

Twv

KUfMirvXcov Kdix\\/ws iv TO?S

iropeias (c. 7, 707, b, 7, sqq.)

irporepov

iiriffKciTTai

KOivfj

rrepl

With reference to the


same passage, iv. 13, 696, a, 11

irdvrwv.

tJ> 8'

But there

is

a far

atriov iv to7s Trepl iropeias Kal

KiV7}(rews T(av {cfcov etpi]Tai.


3 Thus
Tojj. vii. 3,
153, a,
where two lines would have to
be thrown out in order to remove
the reference, and Metem'ol. iii.
2 fin. (p. 125, n.
3), where

24,

virdpxovai,
Sos
the
XP'^I'^^H-^^"'plainly shows that the reference
exposition.
is not to a future
Still
more violent than the
changes of text here contested is
the resource {Ar. Lihr. Ord. 118
sq.) of giving to efpTjrot, when
necessary, the meaning of ^tj^tj(rerat,
and of denying the
reference to the future in expressions like els iKe7vov rbv Kaiphv
airoKeiadca.

Besides the passages given


preceding note, this
the
suggestion seems especially objectionable in De Ccelo, ii. 2 {vid.
*

in

ABISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
simpler explanation,

if it

be true that he did not at once

publish those books in which

we

find references to later

texts as already written, but used

among

his

scholars

127

them

for a

time only

and in connection with

his oral

lectures.

In such manuscripts addenda would be in-

troduced

and among them references to works written

would come in from time to time. If the author


was never able to give to such a work any final revision
for the purpose of publication, it might well happen
that in one place a reference would stand in its originally correct form, as to a future work, though in another
passage of the same or an earlier text a note might
have been incorporated which spoke of the same work
The same theory will explain the
as already written.
which we have every reason to
fact that the Politics
consider as a book never finished by Aristotle, and
later

published in its unfinished form after his death


in the Rhetoric, along with the Poetics,'^

spoken of by the
is

which

Politics in the future tense.

is

is

cited
itself

The

fact

that Aristotle had written a part of the Politics before

he wrote the Rhetoric and


call

Poetics.

Therefore he could

the Poetics a future book in the Politics, and yet

quote a passage of the Politics in the Rhetoric.


supra, p. 125, n. 1)
8e Set Kal

t^

since the

ovpavif, kc.

corresponds with

the

(line 18)
Siupia-Tai

fih odv (line 13). The whole passage from ^lupiarai to eijXoyov

avr^ (line 20), could


be dispensed with, and it would
all have to be taken as a postvirapx^iv eV

Aristotelian interpolation.
Cf. infra, ch. xiii.
2 The Politics
i.
8, 1366, a,
21 {StriKpifiwTai yhp iv to7s ttoKlti'

If he

ko7s irepl rovrwv'), the Poetics frequently, vid. supra p. 102, n. 1.


^ VIII. 7, 1341, b, 39: on the
'
catharsis pvv fxkv airXois, irdKiv S'
'

iu

rols

irepl

iroirjTiK^s

which,

ipovfi^v

as Bernays
{Ahh. d. hist. phil.
Ges. in
Breslau, p. 139) rightly supposes,
probably refers to a lost section
of our Poetics, and not to one of
the Politics (Heitz, Verl. Schr.
(Ta.<p4(mpov,

100

sq.).

ARISTOTLE

128

had published the Rhetoric he could not in it have


referred as he did to the unpublished Politics.^
The closing words of the Tojncs ^ seem to indicate
that Aristotle's treatises were meant primarily for his
,

scholars.

Addressing his readers, he bespeaks their

indulgence or their thanks for the theory he has un-

who have

folded to them,^ referring specially to those

This does not imply that our Topics

heard his lectures.

are only the lecture notes of the Master, or the note-

book of one of his hearers. Such a view is negatived


both by the wording of the passage,^ and by the fact
that

in later writings

himself'^ in

he often refers to the Topics

words which cannot be explained away as

relatinsr either to a lost

book of his own or

to another

Such an address would be out of place in a


work which was tendered to an unlimited circle of
readers by formal publication, but it is entirely natural
if the Topics was then issued only to Aristotle's scholars

author.

It is more difficult to explain the strange fact that Hhef.


iii. 1, 1404, b, 22 speaks of the
actor Theodoras as if he were
living- and acting, whilst
still
Polit. viii.' 17, 1336, b, 27 treats
him as one belonging to the jiast.
'

But here the question arises,


whether we possess, in the third
book of FJu'toric, the work of
Aristotle himself, or the work of
a later writer, who, in this passage, which seems to be in the
genuine style of Aristotle, may
have used one of his earlier
works. Cf. p. 72, n. 2.
- Soph. El. 33
Aristotle
fin.
had no predecessor for his theory
Se
ei
<palvTai
of demonstration
:

6ea(Tau.4voisviJUU

ex^tv

t]

/x4do5os

hWas

iKavoos irapa ras

TrpajfJ-areias

TrapaSocews rju^rjixevas, Aoiirhv


hv efrj irdvTwv v/xuv 7) twv i]Kpoa~
jx^voiv epyou rd7s /xku irapaAeAet^/xeTttse/c

yois rrjs iJ.e66Sov


evpr}fMvois
^

v/juv

Some
and

avyyvcliiui.'qu

to7s

5'

TroWrjv ^X^^^ X'^P^^MSS. read, instead of

v/iicov, rf/xiu

and

ri/jLuv

but

Aristotle could not possibly have

himself among those


he thanks, and to whom

included

whom

he apologises.
distinguishes among
readers the * i^Kpoafievoi
from the rest only by striking
out the ^ before rwv iiKpoafievcav
could we get a simple address
to listeners, but the MSS. all have
*

Which

'

the

it.
^

l7id. Arist. 102, a,

40 sqq.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
as a

129

memorial of the contents of his lectures or as an


That this was true of some of his

auxiliary to them.^

books,

must be inferred from other passages

synopsis of varying meanings of words, which

The

also.

now forms

book of the Metaphysics, could never have


been published by Aristotle in its present form as a

the

fifth

glossary without beginning or end.


It can only have
been placed in the hands of his scholars simply as an
aid to his

Yet he often

teaching.

refers to

it,

that even in texts earlier than the Metaphysics?

and
The

same argument applies to the often-cited anatomical


texts, ^ which must have been limited to a narrow circle
because of the drawings which were an essential part of
them.

If

it

be true, however, that writings which

Aristotle cites were published only to his scholars,

it

same must be true of those in which


these citations occur for no one could in a published
book refer to an unpublished one, or say that a subject
not gone into was fully explained in an inaccessible

follows that the

tract.

The same theory by which we explain the group of


peculiarities already noticed, will explain others also.

The

trick of carelessness in style which is so often remarked, the repetitions which surprise us in an exposition otherwise compact, the insertions which upset a

naturally well-ordered

explained most easily

movement of thought are all


we suppose that the author

if

never put the finishing touches to the writings in question, and that various matters were at the time of the

As Stahr, iUd.t has supposed.


2 Cf.
pp. 76, n. 8, 124, n. 4.

VOL.

I.

'

About

which

see

p.

n. 1.

89,

ARISTOTLE

130

posthumous publication added to the original text either


from parallel copies or from the author's notes.^ This
theory becomes extremely probable

books On the

Soid,'^

we

when, as in the

find throughout considerable

sections clear traces of a double recension, without

reason to say that either recension

is

any

not Aristotle's.^

The same kind of argument would apply also to the


rolitics and Metaphysics^ but as to these we have
independent grounds
unfinished,

for the belief that

and were only published

If this be so, a further inference

must conclude that

if

is

forced on us

a certain book

all which refer to


that
they
follow it in the
show
to

publication only,

been issued in Aristotle's


even if we could apply

for

we

was a posthumous
it

in such a

series

way

as

cannot have

This line of argument,

life.

it

they remained

after his death.'*

with high probability to

nothing more than the Be Anima, would take us a long

way

for that

work

is

cited in

many

of the books on

natural philosophy.^

The scope and the modifications of this theory as to


the way in which the Aristotelian books were produced,
can only be settled by a detailed examination of the indi'

A supposition which a number

of scholars have been led to adopt,


with various particular modifications thus Bitter, iii, 29 (rid.
Beansujjra, p. 121, n. 2 mid.)
Dis, ii. b, 113 Ueberweg, GescJi.
d. Phil. i. 174, eighth ed., SusEMIHL, Arist. Poet. p. 1 sq., BerNAYS, Arist. Politik, 212. It is also
probable that Aristotle, instead of
writing, usually dictated: which
would account for many of the irregularities of style, such as the
:

lengthy and involved anacolutha.

Cf. p. 89, n. 2.

It

may be

otherwise with the repetitions


and disarrangements of the connection in the Etidcs, especially
bks. 5-7. Cf. p. 97, n. 1.
^ As in Bk. vii, of the
Physics,

on which Spengel has written in


Ahh. d. Milnch. Ahad. iii. 2, 305
sqq. Cf Prantl, Arist. Phys. 337.
* Cf
p. 76, n. 3, and infra, Ch.
.

xiii., init.
5

Vid. supra, p. 93, n. 2


b, 60 sqq.

Ar. 102,

Ind.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
vidual

texfcs.

But the

131

peculiarities above referred to,

the reference to a class of published or

'

exoteric

works,

'

the habit of citing later books in earlier ones, the tricks


of repetition and disorder which indicate the absence of

the author's final revision

all

these extend through

From this and


though the Topics and the De Anima

almost the whole of the extant Corpus.

from the

fact that,

were apparently written only

for

Aristotle's

yet they are frequently cited by later treatises,^

pupils,
it

seems

very probable that the whole of our Corpus, so far as it


is genuine, consists of books which were produced in
connection with the teaching in the Lyceum, were
intended at

made

first

for Aristotle's pupils only,

and were

generally accessible by formal publication

after the master's death.

only

Of the great majority of them

it may also be assumed, not only from their contents,


but also from their express internal correlation that

Aristotle

them working up in writing what he ha,d


way of oral lectures,^ though
likely that when they came to be published

is

in

already given his pupils by


it is

also

by third parties explanations were added and whole


passages interpolated from Aristotle's papers or his
other lectures.^ A few of the texts may have served him
as aids in his teaching, without

of lecturing.4

on
to

Cf. p. 129

and

One

in the Metajjhijsics

130.

Cf what has been remarked


with regard
128 sq.
p.
the closing words of the
.

As,

said
on
7G and
pp.
seems to have been the

Dp,

Anima.
*

rod

Like the composition Uepl

irocraxois (cf . p. 76, n. 3,

at p.

130,

case

at p. 78.

77).

from what has

and the

One is inclined to think


the same of the 'Avarofiai.
* The twelfth, cf. same
note,

'lojnos.
3

being themselves matter

of the books of the Metaphysics

been

ARISTOTLE

132

seems to have been a plan


not intended, in

This, however, cannot well be true of

to his pupils.

That theory

any great portion of the extant writings.


is

though

for a lecture course,

present shape, for communication

its

excluded in the

by the all-pervading

place

first

system of cross references, which both in number and


in manner go far beyond anything that Aristotle

Again

could have wanted for himself.^

by the

in spite of

fact that,

works are from a

referred to, these

view

more

far

have been

own

if

carefully

negatived

it is

the defects already

all

literary point of

worked up than they would

they were merely sketches for the lecturer's

Then again, the unusual recurrence of formula9

use.

of introduction, transition and conclusion, shows that

the author

is

writing, not for himself, but for others.

Bk. xii. of the Metapliy&ws


has in the first half none at all,
and in the second, which is
worked out much more fully
(since the SeSej/crat, c. 7, 1073,
a, 5, relates to c. 6, 1071, b, 20), a
single reference (c. 8, 1073, a, 32
^

Se'Set/crai

to?s

ev

S'

<j>v(riKo7s

irepl

It is otherwise in most
rovTwv).
Still more
of the other works.
decisive, however, is the form of
the references. No one uses for
the
expressions like
himself
<|)a/i.ei/ mentioned in p. 115, n. 4, or
circumstantial formulas, like ck

T6

Icrropias

rrjs

Kal

(pavephv

v<mpov

rrjs

roov

Xex^'hc^TO'i'

irepl

ra ^^a

avaTOjxSsv

"'

'''oh

koX
Trp\

(Part. An. iv. 10, 689,


like (the Ind. Ar.
97, b, sqq. furnishes examples), or
like those quoted on p. 115.
2 To this
class belongs the
conclusion of the Topics (see p.
the vvy 5e Xeyco/xev
128, n. 2)
yevea-ecos
a, 18),

and the

(Soj)h. El. c. 2, fin.; Metaph. vii.


12, init., xiii. 10, 1080, b, 16 and
cStrirep
Sxnrep
supra),
X^yojxfv,
i\4yoiJ.u

26,

(Uth.

Metaph.

^^.

iv. 5,

vi.

1139, b,

3,

1010,

Ehet.

a, 4,

28 and

supra),
Kaddirep iir^Adofxev (Meta2)h. x. 2,
init., xiii. 2, 1076, b, 39), Kaedir^p

i.

1,

1055,

(Metaph.

ZiciXdixiQa

&

ra

a,

iv

dioipiffafjifv,

Zi(api(Tp.4va Tjfuv

985, a, 11,

vi.

4), StjAoj/ T]tuv


9,

1357,

a,

oh

vii.

init.),

(Metaph.

4,/w., i.
(Rhet. i.

29),

1,

SiupiffdiiieOa,

7,
2,

i.

4,

1028, a,
1356, b,

rededopriTai

Tjfiiv

avruv (Metaph. i. 3,
cf. also those sen983, a, 33)
tences in which what has been
discussed before is summed up,
and what is going to be treated
is announced (e.g. Metaph. xiii. 9,
1086, a, 18 sqq., Rhet. i. 2, 1356,
b, 10 sqq.
So2)h. El. c. 33, 183,
a,
33 sqq.
Meteorol. init.).
Oncken (Staatsl. d. Ar., i. 58)
cites, from the Nicom. Ethics and
'iKavois

irepl

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Another unlikely theory^

which suggests

that

is

133

that the whole or a great part of our Corpus consists of

which

transcripts in

Aristotle's pupils

We

contents of his lectures.

had

set

down the

have seen that they are

in all probability closely connected with

the lecture

But whether they are a mere transcript of


these, or a free working-up of the same matter, whether
they were designed to repeat as correctly as might be
courses. 2

the words of the master, or to leave us a spiritual re-

production of his thoughts, whether in fine they were


written by his pupils or by himself,
question.

that

it

The note-theory may

'

writings.
2

Oncken,' in proof of

this,

besides other
passages (p. 59 sq.), to those
passages of the Ethics in which
an audience is spoken of Eth. i.
5tb rrjy TroAiTt/cTjs
1, 1095, a, 2, 11
appeals,

ovK

ecTTt oIkio5

iTfpl [x\v

OLKpoaT^s 6 v4os

cLKpoarov

Toa-avra.

is

a very different

on the suggestion

would explain the carelessness of the methods of

the P^Zt^i^s alone, thirty- two passages with such formulas. No one
will believe that Aristotle would
have had to write down ail such
expressions in his lecture-book,
like a man beginning- to teach,
who is not sure of a single
word.
Oncken, ibid. 48 sqq. following ScALiGER.
O. there remarks (62 sq.) that he thinks
he has only made this supposition
probable with regard to the
Ethics and Politics, but his
reasons would hold equally for
the majority of our Aristotelian

rightly

rely

Ibid.

c.

irecppoifiidaOoo

2,

1095, b, 4

Sib Se? To7s edeffiy ^ix^ai KaAccs

rhv

Trepl

rwv iroKiriKwv aKovaS/xevov.

(Eth. X. 10, 1079, b, 23, 27 vii.


5, 1147, b, 9, are not relevant
here and Pol. vii. 1, 1323, b, 39
T4pas yap iariv ipyov crx''^^'^^
'
Tuvra, only means
this beinquiry.')
another
longs to
Oncken further proves that, in
referring on any point to other
works, only such expressions are
used as are suited to a person
who is sjjealdng, such as dp-qTai,
KeKreov, &\\os \6yo5, Sec.
but
such language was certainly used
in referring to writings (like the
Problems and the i^corepiKol \6yoi,
see above, p. 96, and p. 115, n. 4),
and is often so used in our own
days. He also refers to the title
;

TToAtTt/c^

aKp6a<Tis

{ap.

DiOG.

v.

24) (pvcriK^ aKpSams is likewise


universally used for the Physics
;

(vid. supr. p. 81, n. 2)

we do
titles

but since

know with whom these


originate, not much can be
not

inferred from them.

ARISTOTLE

134

statement.^

comes

But on closer inquiry, this argument


For it is not here a question of any
as commonly arise in the redaction of

to nothing.

such defects

well-ordered lectures badly reported, through omissions

and repetitions and the erroneous piecing together of


the broken argument.
It is more a question of peculiarities of style not restrained by the writer, which are
too characteristic and too constant in their character to
allow us to

make chance and the

answerable

for

errors of third persons

Such an origin might be thought


possible if they appeared in some books and not in
others.
But as they in fact extend, though in varying
them.^

degrees, through the whole, they can only be ascribed

The very

to Aristotle himself
'

And

this

is

the

chief

ground on which Oncken bases


his
opinion.
The defects of
our texts are most easily explained from tlie natural defects
of
a peripatetic monologue
'

(he says, p. 62), 'hastily copied


and badly edited from the
note-books of the audience.'
2 With
these
must
be
reckoned the formation of the
sentences
(searchingly
inv^estigated by Bonitz, Arist. Stud.
ii.
3 sqq.) especially the explanations, often of considerable length, which are parenthetically introduced, and the anacolutha consequent on this the
frequent use or absence of certain
in

particles (proofs of

which are

to

be found in EucKEN, Be Arist.


Dicendi Ratione^ and in Bonitz's
notice of this

work

in the Ztschr.
1866, 804 sqq.),
and similar points. The same is
the true view as to the questions

f. d.

Mr. Gymn.

style

and form of the

occurring so often in all Aristotelian writings, which are put at


one time in simple form, at
another (as in De An. i. 1, 403,
b, 7 sqq.. Gen. et Corr. ii. 11,337,
b, o, and in the passages explained by Bonitz, Arist. Stiid.
ii. 16 sq., ibid. 6, 333, b, 30) in a
disjunctive

form, but are not


answered. That such unanswered
questions could not have occurred
in a composition (Oncken, ihid.
cannot allow
61), one
how
many, for instance, are found,
only to mention one modern
writer, in Lessing
Neither can
one admit the supposition {ibid.
59), that they were answered, in
oral discourse, by the audience or
the teacher.
They seem to be,
both in Aristotle and Lessing, a
very natural diversion of an
acute and lively Dialectic, which

would have been more likely to


be removed than retained by any
reporter.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

135

writings therefore afford a strong indication that not

only their contents but their language

is

A like conclusion

have seen

follows also (as

the series of cross references

might allude

to one or

we

Aristotle's

for in a lecture a

two past

courses, but

own.
from

^)

man
could

hardly refer to a whole series of lectures widely distant


in date, as to which he could not assume that the details

were in the memory of his present audience.^


moreover that in

many

cases, as in the

It

seems

Natural Philo-

sophy, the matter of the various treatises goes too closely

Such

into detail for the purposes of oral teaching.

would have taxed the attention and memory of


the most zealous hearer, and it is difficult to see how
lectures

they could have been transcribed so perfectly.^

Yet

these treatises stand on no different footing from the


rest.

We

learn that Theophrastus and

Analytics followed

Eudemus

Aristotle, not only in

in their

the general

and we can bring proof that these


word for word several passages of the

plan, but in details,'*

followers adopted

extant Meta/pliysics.^

Eudemus adopted

See pp. ]28, 131.


Note, in relation to this
point, how one and the same
composition is frequently ref erred to in the most remote
places, and how, on the other
hand, the most widely differing
texts are cited in the same treatise.
Thus the Physics, De Calo, Gen.
^

'^

Corr., Meteor., Be Anima, Be


Sensu, Part. An., are quoted in
many passages of the Jf6;f<z/7%sics
and in the Ethics the books on
Generation and Corruptlonin the
Meteorology,
Metaphysics,
Be

et

the Ethics of

Anima, Be Sensu, Part. An.,


GeJi. An. the Metapliyncs quote
the Analytics, Physics, Be Coclo,
Ethics, the 4K\oy^ rSov ^vavriuiv
inthe Rhetoric, the Tojncs,Analytics. Politics, Poetics,
and the
eoSe/creia are quoted,
^ The notion
of formal dictation can hardly be suggested,
but if it were, it would imply
that our Aristotelian writings
were the work of Aristotle him;

self
*
*

and not

his pupils' notes.


Cf. p. 67.
Cf. p. 78, n. 1.

ARISTOTLE

136

and

Aristotle,

into his

more the

still

Physics,^ often verbally,

own corresponding texts. We actually possess


which Eudemus consults Theophrastus as to

letters in

the text of a particular passage and receives his answer.^

These

facts clearly justify Brandis' remark.^ that the

fashion

in

which

Aristotle's

followers

clung to the

master's writings presupposes that they were dealing

As

with his actual words.

to the Tojncs in particular,

has been already proved that

it is not a mere tranby another hand, but that on the contrary it


bears to be and must have been the work of Aristotle

it

script

(see p. 128).

If
stotle

it

be true that the philosophical works of Ari-

had not yet passed

at his death

beyond the

of his personal hearers, this circumstance would

circle

make

also intelligible that they might for a long time,


even after his death, have been withheld from general
publicity, or that they might even by an unlucky acciit

dent have been

lost

to the Peripatetic School.

And,

according to a curious and well-known story, such an


accident was said to have occurred, involving, as was
supposed, the

loss

for

two centuries of the texts of

Aristotle.
*

See the section dealing with

Eudemus, etc., infra, Ch.


and notes thereon.
'

These

have

reference

xix.,

to

Phi/s. v.

2,

226,

b, 14,

and are

found in Simpl. Phys. 216


Schol 404, b, 10,
^

^r.-rom. Phil.

ii.

b, 114.

a,

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

CHAPTEK

137

III

HISTORY AND ORDER OF THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

Strabo and Plutarch say that the works of Aristotle


and Theophrastus passed, at the death of the latter,
to his heir, Neleus of Scepsis, and that they were
stowed away in a cellar by the heirs of Neleus, discovered only in the early part of the last century B.C.

by Apellico of Teos in a decayed condition, brought by


him to Athens and thence by Sulla as spoils of war to
Kome, where they were afterwards used and republished
by Tyrannio and Andronicus..^
writers

named argue

that

to

From

this

story the

the Peripatetics

who

followed Theophrastus, not only the master's chief works,

but also his true philosophical system was unknown,

but they do not

tell

us whether this allegation

grounded on their own opinion, or on

The date of this edition must


have fallen somewhere about
the middle of the last century
B.C.
For as Tyrannio was in B.C.
71 taken prisoner in Amisus and
released by Muraena (cf. Zeller,
Ph. d. Or., pt. iii. a, 550, 1), he
could hardly have settled in

Rome
Rome

before Lucullus' return to


(66 B.C.). We know that

he was even at the time of his


capture a scholar of renown,
that he was instructing in B.C.
67 the sons of Cicero, and had
some intercourse with the latter

is

definite evidence,

and Atticus (Cic. Ad Qu. Fr. ii. 5,


His work at
Att. iv. 4, 8).

Ad

Rome could not, therefore, have


extended very far beyond the
middle of the century, even
though he perhaps lived on into
the last third of it. (He died according to Suid. s. v. ynpaihs, in
the third year of an Olympiad
the number of which has unbeen miswritten.)
fortunately

About Andronicus
Ph.

d. Gr., pt.

iii.

above, p. 49, n.

6.

a,

cf.

Zeller,
and

549, 3,

ARISTOTLE

138

what the nature of the evidence might be.^


found in the tale a welcome explanation of
and irregularities of the existing
incompleteness
the
If in truth the case were exactly as Strabo
Corpus.^
and Plutarch say, we should not only not wonder at the
and

if so,

Later

critics

existing defects, but

we should

rather have expected a

wider and more hopeless corruption than appears in


For if it were true of the most important
fact to exist.

far

'

Our

authorities

the

for

ro7s fjXv irdXai tois fiera

above narrative are, as we have


remarked, Strabo (xiii. 1, 54, p.

TOV OVK

XOV(riv

irKriv oK'fyojv,

608) and Phitarch (^tiUa, 26),


for Suid 'XvWas only copies I'luThe latter, however, untarch.
doubtedly gets his information

u)TpLK(Jou,

5'

ro7s

Tuvra

irporiAdfv,

(pi\oao(pe1v

tained copies of the Aristotelian


works through Tyrannio, published them, and wrote the robs

d/xapTLu>u.

vvu

(pepofjLepovs irivaKas.

Plut.

ov to $ifi\ia
fJLev iKeivwu

&fmvov

But we can only suppose this to have been taken from


Andronicus, if we limit the
{to7s
Peripatetics'
'younger
S'
va-repov, &c.) to those predecessors of Andronicus who
were able to use the editions
of Apellico and Tyrannio, and
it is very questionable whether
anyone could attribute to these

may

for an incident
Sulla's residence at Athens).

O^aeis \r}Kvdi(iv'
d(p'

Kal
apiaroreXi^eiP,
to.
iroAAo
duayKa^eadai.
ixfuroi
et/cora K^yeiv Sid rh irArjdos rcov

have added this from what he


knew from other sources, or also
supposes in Arist.
(as Stahr
Strabo's historical
ii. 23) from
work (made use of immediately
afterguards

fii^Ala

e;^et^ <pi\o(ro<piv

dWa

vaTepov,

The only thing


from Strabo.
which the latter does not give is
the remark that Andronicus ob-

QeocppaffTO,

Koi fjaKicrra roov e|-

yur/Sej/

TTpay/xaTiicuis

oAws

in

We

have no right to suppose (Heitz,


Yerl. Schr. 10) a source for his
information about Apellico'sdiscoverj'- of books, independent of

Hence our only stable


witness for this item is Strabo.
But we do not know to whom the
latter was indebted for his information; the supposition that
it was Andronicus is very unsafe.
Strabo, after the statements as
to the purchase of the AristoteStrabo.

lian books by Apellico, and as to


his faulty editing of them, says
avvi^T] Se toIs ck rSov TrepnrdTcov,
:

men, who are qiiite unknown to


us, an improvement of the Peripatetic doctrine, and a closer
insight into

Aristotle,

such

as

might with reason be ascribed to


Andronicus.
As little can we
assume Tyrannio or Boethus

whom

Grote ascribes it, Ari54) as Strabo's source of


information, since the former
(to

stotle,

i.

would have taken a different view


of his own edition, and the latter
of the younger Peripatetics.
2 Thus BuHLE, Allff. UncyM.
Sect. i. vol. V. 278 sq., and lately
Heitz; see next page, n. 2.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

139

works that the only source of our extant text was to be


found in these MSS., which rotted

more in the

cellar of Scepsis,

till

for a

century and

Apellico found

them

worm-eaten, ruined by damp, and tossed into a disordered heap

if it

be true that he, as Strabo says,

supplied unskilfully

missing portions,

the

and that

Tyrannio and Andronicus also had no further manuscripts they could collate
who then could guarantee

that in any

number

of cases there would not have been

foreign matter, found

among

MSS., adopted

Neleus'

into Aristotle's text, or connected parts

of his

own

works separated, and other portions blunderingly bound


together, or lacunae great and small filled up by the
editor's fancy ?

Modern

criticism has, however, raised doubts about

Strabo's story

which even

defenders cannot alto-

its

gether silence.2

That Theophrastus bequeathed his


library to Neleus is beyond doubt.^
That the MSS. of
1
After the isolated and disregarded voice of a learned
Frenchman, about the beginning
of the eighteenth century, had
raised doubts as to this narration
(see what Stahr fjives in Arist.
ii. 163 sq. from the Journal des
AS^-aj'ttw^of the year 1717, p. 655
sqq., as to the anonymous composition Les Amhiitcz de la
Critique), Brandis (' Ueb. die

Schicksale
llhein.

d.

Mus.

arist.
v.

Biicher.'

Niebuhr

and

Brandis, i. 236 sqq 259 sqq. cf.


Gr.-rdm. Phil. ii. b, 66 sqq.) was
the first to deal with it seriously,
Kopp {Rhein. 3fus. iii. 93 sqq.)
,

supplemented his criticism, and

Stahr

has discussed the


question with exhaustive partifinally

cularity (Arisfotelia, il 1-166, cf.

294 sq.).
Later scholars have
mostly followed them,
2 Heitz,
Verl. Schr. d. Ar.
9 sqq., 20, 29 sqq.
Grote, Aristotle, i. 50 sqq.
Grant, Ethics
;

of Ar. i. 5 sqq., Aristotle, 3 sqq.


Certain errors in Strabo's and
Plutarch's representation are indeed admitted by these scholars.
but in the main it is said to be
correct.
It is impossible here to
examine in detail the reasons
given for this opinion, but the
grounds for its rejection are
fully dealt with in the text.

Theophrastus' will, apvd


v. 52
cf. Athen. i. 3,
it is added that Ptolemy
Philadelphus bought the whole
^

DiOG.
where

ARISTOTLE

140

and Theophrastus belonging to that library

Aristotle

passed to tbe heirs of Neleus and were by them hidden


escape a royal book-collector

to

in a canal or cellar

and were afterwards found by Apellico


condition, there is no need to doubt.^

in a desperate

All the facts

may

therefore be
beyond question that
Andronicus' edition of the Aristotelian text-books was

which Strabo

relates as to the matter

correct enough.

And

it

is

also

of epoch-making importance both for the study of the

however, it be maintained that these writings were


nowhere to be found outside the Scepsis cellar and were

system and

unknown

for the preservation of the text.

If,

therefore to the Peripatetic School after the

death of Theophrastus, there are the strongest arguments


against any such theory.

In the

first place,

it

is

almost incredible that an

event so singularly notable as the discovery of the lost


masterpieces of Aristotle should never have been even
alluded to by any of those who, since that time, have

concerned themselves with Aristotle, as critics or as


Cicero says not a word, though he had

philosophers.

abundant occasion,

for

he lived at

Rome

at the very

time when Tyrannio was working among the literary


booty of Sulla, and was, in

with Tyrannio himself.

nothing

fact, in active

Alexander,

'

intercourse

the Exegete,' says

nor does any one of the Greek critics

the very works of Andronicus, either at


collection of Neleus and had it
brought to Alexandria.
For when Athenseus, or
the epitomiser of his introduc'

tion, iUd., asserts that the rvTwle


library of Neleus was taken to

first

who used

or at second

Alexandria, this may easily be


an inexact expression, just as
the opposite
it is inexact, in

way, when, in v 214, he makes


Apellico possess not the works,
but the library of Aristotle.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

'

141

Andronicus himself seems to have ascribed to

hand.

Apellico's discovery so little importance that he based

neither the inquiry into the genuineness of a tract nor

the discussion of a various reading upon any reference


to the

way

MSS.

feel

of Neleus.^

Strabo were right,

On

Later editors did not in any

themselves bound
it

by

his

text,^

though

if

could be the only authentic one.

the other hand, the theory that by the loss of

the works of Aristotle, the followers of Theophrastus


strayed from the original teachings of their school and
lost

themselves in mere rhetorical developments,

obvious contradiction of the

facts.

It

may be

the Peripatetics of the third century strayed

an

is

true that

away

as

time went on from the study of natural philosophy and


metaphysics, but this change took place not on the
death of Theophrastus, but at the earliest on the death

So

of his successor Strato.

far

was he from confining

himself to ethics and rhetoric, that he devoted himself,

on the contrary, with a one-sided preference to physics,


though he by no means neglected logic and metaphysics.

He

frequently

that could not be

contradicted

Aristotle;

but

by ignorance of the Aristotelian system,

because he attacked

it

expressly.^

With regard to the first,


the account given on p. 66, n.l.
as to his doubts about the
'Ep;ur?i/etas
n.
with respect to
the second point, cf. Dexipp.
In Arist. Categ. p. 25, Speng.
(Schol. in Ar. 42, a, 30)
irpSiTov

cf.

ovK iv
Jkiraai
rois
avriypd^ois rh " 6
\6yos rris oixrias"
irp6(TKeiTai, us Koi BorjOhs fjLvr]fio-

likv

vivii
KoX 'Av8p6uiKos
it is not
said that he has settled the dis-

It does not appear

pute by means of Sulla's MSS.


(or, if he had not access to the
latter, at least by means of the
copies of Tyrannio, which, according to Plutarch, he used). It
seems, therefore, that these MSS.
were not the only copies nor
even the original ones of the

works in question. Cf. Beandis,


Rhein. Mus. i. 241.
2 Qf
SiMPL. Ph]/s. 101, a.
'
The proofs will be given,

'

ARISTOTLE

142

that the scientific activity of the School came at once


to

an end, even

The theory that

after Strato's death.^

the falling away of the later Peripatetics from Aristotle


to the loss of his writings from

was due

way

every

correlate

which

it

unnatural.

to the parallel

nevertheless

Athens

is

in

much more reasonable to


movement in the Academy,

It is

was

at

no

loss

for

texts

of

Plato.

But who can

believe that the most important works

of the great philosopher were not extant at the date of


his successor's death

lifetime,

any other MSS. than those

in

which Neleus inherited

or that not only in Aristotle's

but also in the nine Olympiads between his

death and that of Theophrastus, not one of his


followers had ever been willing

many

and able to possess

himself of the most important sources of the Peripatetic


teaching? Who can think that Eudemus, the most
loyal of the Aristotelian circle, or Strato, the shrewdest

of the Peripatetics, would have done without the Master's

books

or that Demetrius

them

in his zeal for collecting learned

of Phalerus did not include

works

or that

Ptolemy Philadelphus bought other books of Aristotle


and Theophrastus for his Library of Alexandria, but
omitted to obtain copies of their essential texts ?
The story also supposes that the possessors of the

manuscripts objected to such uses of them that Arikept his writings closely under lock and key, and
:

stotle

that Theophrastus, for no apparent reason, kept up this


in part, in the following piges.
They will also be found in
the section on Strato, infra,
Ch. XX., and notes thereon.

See, at end of vol. ii., the


section on the Pseudo-Aristotelian texts (infra, Ch. xxi.).
'

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
secrecy,

and

laid it as a

duty on

Ms

143

heirs.

All this

too absurd to need serious refutation.

We

are

not

left,

is

however, wholly to conjecture.

The materials are very scanty for the history of a time


whose philosophic literature by an unhappy accident
we have almost wholly lost but we can still prove, as
;

to a great part of Aristotle's books, that they were not


unknown to the learned men of the two centuries that

elapsed between Theophrastus' death and the occupation


of Athens

by Sulla. Whether Aristotle did or did not


him^oii jpuUish his strictly scientific treatises, they were
in any case destined to be the text-books of the School,
and to be used by its members. Even those numerous
passages in which they refer one to the other offer us a
palpable proof that, in the view of the writer, they were
not only to be read by his scholars, but closely studied
and compared, and, by consequence, that copies were to
be kept and multiplied.
That this was done is clear,
not only from the notices which

we find of particular
books, but from certain general considerations also.
If it is true that the Peripatetics lost the genuine
Aristotelianism

when

the

library

Theophrastus

of

must be because the sources of that


teaching were nowhere else to be found. But we hear
disappeared,

it

not only of Theophrastus but of


imitated Aristotle

Eudemus

not only in the

titles

also,

that he

but also in the

contents of his books; and how close was the imitation


both in wording and in the line of thought, we can see
for ourselves

'

^^^

in the

MUcs

For references see pp. 65


^^'

and Physics of Eudemus.^


2

Cf.pJ48,n.4,andinthesec-

tion on Euderaus at Ch. xix., inf.

ARISTOTLE

144

Eademus must have

To do

this,

texts

especially

them

possessed Aristotle's

as a reliable story tells us,^ he used

time when he was not living at Athens.^


beyond doubt that the Alexandrian Library

at a

Again,

if,

it is

included a large

number

of Aristotle's works. ^

who

writers of philosophy,

may have had

compilers of the Alexandrine Canon,

among the model

view the more careful style of his exoteric

chiefly in

writings

^
;

The

place Aristotle

but in the foundation of that great collection

it is not possible that the scientific works of Aristotle


can have been left out of account. If the Catalogue of

Diogenes ^ comes from the Alexandrine Library, it is


proof positive that they were there but even if that
:

conjecture (in itself extremely probable) were erroneous,

the Catalogue
1

Vide supra,

Heitz

still

proves in any case that the compiler of

p. 130, n. 3.

Sckr. 13) indeed thinks that if the Aristotelian works had been universally known and published, it
would be incomprehensible that
Eudemus in his Physics (and
2

( Verl.

Ethics) should have imitated the

words

of

Aristotle

so

exactly.

if
that
Eudemus had hesitated to do
this with regard to published
works, a plagiarism on unpublished ones must have seemed
much more unlawful to hira.
It is impossible, however, to re-

It

seems,

however,

gard his conduct in this light


at all, and he himself probably
never so regarded it. His Ethics
and Physics were never intended to be anything but elaborations of the Aristotelian works
universally known in the Peripatetic School, adapted to the
needs of his own tuition.

3 Besides
what has been
remarked on p. 142, we have the
fact that Ptolemy Philadelphus
busied himself zealously about
Aristotelian
books, paid high
prices for them, and thus gave

occasion to the forgery of such


texts (Ammon. Schol. in Arist.
David, iUd., 1. 14
28, a, 43
And such
SiMPL. Categ. 2, e).
accounts as those noticed at p.
;

64, n. 1 and 67, n. 1, about the


two books of the Categories and
the forty of the Analytics which
Adrastus found in old libraries,
must refer especially to the
Alexandrian Library. But it is

to be supposed

not

that

the

latter obtained only substituted

works, and did not possess the


genuine ones, by reference to
which the forgeries were proved.
*
See Stake, ibid. 65 sq. on
this point.
"^

For which see

p. 48 sqq.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
who

146

lived later than Theophrastus

and earlier than


Andronicus, had before him a great part of our extant
Corpus Aristotelicum}
Its probable author, Hermippus, was acquainted with the works of Theophrastus
it,

(which according to Strabo and Plutarch were buried in


Scepsis along with those of Aristotle), as is clear from
his catalogue of them, preserved, apparently,

That he at

genes.2

all

by Dio-

knew nothing of the


writings, may probably

events

disappearance of the Aristotelian

be inferred from the silence of Diogenes on that subject.^


Another strong evidence of the use of the Aristotelian
books in the third century B.C. is to be found in the
Stoic teaching, which in its most systematic exposition
by Chrysippus follows both in logic and in physics
more closely on the Aristotelian than could be possible
if

the Aristotelian text-books were unknown.

indeed,

There
some express evidence that Chrysippus had

is,

in

fact these texts in view.'*

SI*

P- ^^' - 1-

Cf.thescholionattheendof

the Metaphysics of Theophrastus


TovTo rh fiifixiov 'AvBpoviKos fih
Koi "Ep^tTTTTos ayvoovffiv

ovde yhp
iv t^
waypatp^ ruv (dio<ppdaTov ^ifi\iwu.
From the same list evidently is
taken the scholion at the beginmng of the seventh book of the
History of Plants {apud Usenee,
Atml. Theophr. 2^)
o<(>pd(TTov
fiv^iav

ahrov '6\ws

TreTroLrjrai

^epi <pvTa>v iffTopias t5

r;'.

"Epfxiinros

Sejepl (ppvyaviKHv Kol iroiwSuv, 'AvSpdvLKos Se irepl (pvTuv Iffropias.

originated with Hermippus, is


the more probable since that
writer is mentioned immediately
before in v. 45.
3 For, on
the one hand, it is
not to be supposed that Hermippus in his copious work on
Aristotle (mentioned on p. 51, n. 2)
would not have mentioned this circumstance, if he had been aware
of it and, on the other hand, it
;

very improbable that the author


to whom Diogenes is indebted for
his many quotations from Hermippus would have passed over this
information. Diogenes, to whose
is

DiOG. (ii. 55) names a book by


Hermippus on Theophrastus, of
which It probably formed a part,

literary tastes

That the

upon

lists in

at least in part

VOL.

I.

Diog.

and

v.

46 sqq.,

indirectly,

mended
*

must have recomwould have seized

it

itself,

he found it.
For even if we were not

it, if

ARISTOTLE

146

If the works of Aristotle were first unearthed

by

Apellico and first fully known through Tyrannio and


Andronicus, how could it be said of Oritolaus that he

imitated the old masters of his school Aristotle, that


^
or how of Herillus the Stoic
is, and Theophrastus ?
that he based himself upon them,^ or of Pana3tius that
he was always quoting them?^ How could we have

mention of the constant tendency of Posidonius towards

How

Aristotle?'*

could Cicero's teacher,

Antiochus,

have explained the Aristotelian teaching as one with


and
the Academic, and attempted their complete
^ or where could oppo?
amalgamation
thorough-going
nents such as Stilpo and Hermarchus have found the
^
So again, since
material for their attacks on Aristotle ?
which Alexin
letter
Andronicus gives us the alleged

ander complains to Aristotle about the publication of


that date
his doctrine,"^ it follows that long before
which
those
of
some
including
Aristotle,
of
writings

were afterwards reckoned

'

exoteric,'

must have

in fact

been public property.


Scanty as are the sources open to us, we can ourAndronicus,
selves demonstrate -the public use before
not only of many of the lost works, which, being
inclined to attach much importance to the polemic against one
of the discourses mentioned on
p 56 n 1 yet the expression in
Plut Sto. Bep. 24, p. 1045, sup-

with

acquaintance

poses

Ari-

stotle's dialectical writings.


1
Q^Q ^^^ V 5 14.
V. 25,' 73.

Ibid.

Ibid iv 28, 79

Ph.

d.

Gr. pt.

iii.

a,

cf.

503, 3,

Zbll.,

2nd

ed.

Ihid. iii. a, 514, 2.


tUd.
particulars,
Fuller
535 sqq.
Stilpo wrote, according to
DiOG. ii. 120, an 'ApiaroreWs,
Hermarchus (ibid. x. 25) -rrphs
From the expres'AptcrTore'Arjv.
sion of Colotes ajmd Plut. Adv.
Col 14, 1, p. 1115, we can, however, conclude nothing.
^

'

See pp. 22,

n. 1,

and

112, n.

3.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

147

hypomnematic/ are not here in point, but


also of the majority of the scientific treatises
themselves.
exoteric or

In the case of the Analytics we show this by the


Catalogue of Diogenes and by the notices as to the use
made of them by Theophrastus and Eudemus.^ For the
Categories and the Uspl spfn^vslas, we have the
Catalogue.3
As to the former, Andronicus found in his

MS.

the spurious Post-prsedicamenta added to them,


and was acquainted with several recensions, having
varying titles and different readings.^ It follows,
there'

'

that the Categories

must have been long before


day in the hands of transcribers.^ The Tojpics are

fore,

his

in the Catalogue of Diogenes,^ and Theophrastus

The

vide
supra
the four books, IT.
p. 64, n. 2.
StKoioo-vvTjs (p. 56, n. 1), taken into
consideration
by Chrysippus,
*

letters,

Demetrius (n, kpfi-qv.), probably also by Carneades


the
ProtrejMcus, which is known even
to Crates, Zeno. and Teles (p. 60,
n. 1), the Eudemus (p. 56, n. 2),
which at any rate Cicero used
the discourses on Philosophy
Teles,

(p. 55, n. 6)
58, n. 1 end),

and on Wealth

(p.

which, before him,


Philodemus, and also Metrodorus,
pupil of Epicurus, made
use of the ipu>TiKbs, which, according to Athen. XV. 674, b,
Aristoof Ceos knew; the dialogue
n.7roti7Tc5j/(p.58, n. 1), which Eratosthenes and Apollodorus seem
to have used
the '0\vfnriov7Kai,
which Eratosthenes (ajmd DiOG.
viii. 51), quotes
the DidascaUcs,
which Didymus quotes in the
Scholiasts to Aristoph. J?;. 1379
(cf. Heitz, Verl. ScJir. Z^^); the
Uapoi/xlai, on account of which
Aristotle (according to Athen.
;

and

60, d) was attacked by Cephisodorus; in short (as has been


shown at p. 48 s^q.), all the
compositions given in the Catalogue of Diogenes, not to mention the spurious but much-used
composition n. evyeveias (p. 59,
n. 2).
The writings on ancient
ii.

philosophers,

among which

is in-

cluded our extant tract onMelissus, &c., are

found a2?ud Diog


No. 92-101 (see p. 62, n. 2, siwra).
2 See
p. 67, n. 1.
^ See
pp. 64, n. J, 66, n. 1.
* See
pp. 64 and 66,-p. 141, n.l.
*

from

The

same

the

would

statement

Cateff., ScJwl. 79, a, 1),

follow

(Simpl.
that An-

dronicus followed pretty closely


the Categories of Archytas, since
the latter at any rate are imitations of the Aristotelian; Simplicius,
however, bases what
is here said merely on his
false
supposition of their genuineness.
^

Cf. p. 68, n. 1,

Of

and

Theophrastus

71, n. 2.

this

L 2

is

ARISTOTLE

148
his follower Strabo

The

had used them.

Rhetoric

imitated and referred to in writings which in

is

all likeli-

hood are themselves earlier than Andronicus;^ and


the same is true of the Theodectine Rhetoric.^ The
worked over by Theophrastus and
Physics were

Eudemus, and the


that he

is

various

clear
p. 5,

actually cited in support of the correctness of

One

reading."^

from Alexander In Top.


m. (of. 68. 72, 31), In Me-

taph. 342, 30, 373, 2 (705, b, 30,


See Simpl. Categ.
719, b, 27).
Schol. in Ar. 89, a, 15.
infra
Toj).,
Alex.
Cf.
(Schol. 281, b, 2). Among Strabo's
writings is found apitd DiOG. v.
>

same author In Categ. Schol. 92,


b, 20 sq., with Themist. Phys. 54,
b

(Schol. 409, b,

a,6,b, 28),

and Brandis,

b, 55, a,

8, 411,
Rliein.

Mus. i. 282 thereon about Eudemus, Simpl. P%s. 18, b(^risf.


;

Phys.
2, 185, b, 11);^ also 29,
a b YJj^twxQs rep 'ApttrTOTeAet irdvra
i.

is

ad Alex, (vide supra, p. 74,


which Diogenes (No. 79)
knows (cf. p. 72, n. 2) as well
as cur Bhetorio (about which see
the latter
p. 72, n. 2, ad /in.)
apud Demetrius, Be Elociitione
quotations from our Rhetoric are
found here, c. 38, 41 ( Rhet. iii.

b,

1409, a, 1); c. 11, 34 {Rhet.


c. 81
iii. 9, 1409, a, 35, b, 16)
(Rhet. iii. 11, init.y, to it ihid.
c 34 refers, which is earlier than

Eudemus

where

120, b,

remarked on Phys.

The former in the Nhetoric

n. 3),

Eude-

scholars of

of the

KaraKoKovdwu

59, a,T6ir(cv irpooifiia.


-

so closely

latter followed the text

iii.

it

208,

8,

KdKXiov yap, olfiai, rh " e|a)


18
rov i.(TTiws " ovTois aKoveiv, ws 6
:

Eijd-nixos ivoTiffe

&c.

so 121,

apTiypdcpois']

rarov
b ev
:

KaO-nye/JiSvos,
ricri

rod

avrl

*'

dh [sc.
"
Koivij

8,

the author Archedemus, who was


probably the Stoic of that name,
circa 140 B.C.
(as shown at p. 72,
likewise given in Diogenes, and is named by the Rhetoric ad Alex.
*
get these facts, apart
from other proof, from the exceedingly numerous references to
for
the Physics in Simplicius
Theophrastus,
instance, about
cf. Simpl. Phys. 141, a and b,
and 187, a, 201, b, and the
3

n.

2)

Which
is

We

"TrpwTTj. "
EijS-n/xos;

TOLS

Kal ovro)

128,

Kot

ypdcp^i

Etjhrjixos 5e

rov-

&C.
178, b
in Phyx. iv.
not Udpuv but

TrapaKoXovOoov,

writes,

222, b, 18,
iv rols
E(;5.
201, b
eavTov (pvaiKols irapacppd^wv ra rov
Eude'Apia-ToreXovs;
216, a:
13,

irapwv

mus immediately connects with


what is found in Aristotle at the
end of the fifth book, the be223,
ginning of the sixth
in Aristotle an eVl raSe rea
peated in a diiferent context
;

(Phys. vi. 3, 234, a, 1) gives an


ambiguity in expression, and so

Eudemus puts "

iircKeiva "

instead

of the second eVl raSe; 242, a


(beginning of the seventh book)
Ei5. /uc'xpi rovSe SArjy (Tx^^^v irpayKe^aXaiois b.Ko\ovQi](Tas^
fiareias

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

mus

cited from

tlie

149

Physics of Aristotle the three books

on Movement.' It can also be proved that the same work


was known to Strabo,^ and Posidonius the Stoic showed

'

no

acquaintance with

less

it.^

The De

cannot

Ccelo

be shown with certainty to have been known to any

It

Andronicus except Theophrastus."*

than

writer older

however, very unlikely that this work disap-

is,

peared after his time when


ysvsaseos

(\>9opas

/cal

Diogenes,^ and

its

continuation

appears

when the

the

Hepl

in the Catalogue of

Meteorology

which

connected with both the one and the other,

is closely
is

known

been used by many writers of that period.^

to have

Posidonius, for example, appropriated from

it

the theory

of the elements,^ and Strabo disputed its account of the

The

heaviness and lightness of bodies.^

(spurious)

and the Astronomy, are named in the list


The Natural History was adapted not
in Diogenes.
only by Theophrastus,^^ but also by the Alexandrine
That it was not
writer Aristophanes of Byzantium.*^
Mechanics^

toCto
iv

ws Trepirrhv

Trap\dci}v

T^

/iCTTjA^e

279, a:

irapa<ppd(oi}U

(r^eS^i'

^ApiarroreXovs

to

iirl

^i^Xitp Ke<j>d\aia

re\evTai(f>

ye

Ei;5.

avrhs to

'6

/col

Kal

koI

ridricn

ravra

ffwrSfxcos
294, b
shows that the first
motor must be immovable to
which Eudemus adds rh irpwrtas
Kivovv Kad' eKdffTTjv Kivqffiv.
For

TO

Tfx-fiixaTa

Aristotle

further details see ch. xix. infra,

and
^

p. 136,

Damasus

2.
:

Simplicius remarks that it is


based on Aristotle (Phys. ii. 2).

Vide supra,

That

is,

(rroix^iwu a'

j8'

p. S3, n. 1.

No. 39,
y\ refers to
if

n.
it

about which see p. 50, n. 1


* Vide sujyra, p. 83, n. 1.
^ Simpl.
De Ccelo, Schol. in
Ar. 517, a, 31.
SiMPL. iMd. 486, a, 5.
* The
former No. 123, the
latter 113 vide supra, p. 86, n. 1.
*" DiOG. v. 49 names as his
**

vide supra, p. 82.

2 Cf.
Simpl. Phys. 153, a
(155, b), 154, b, 168, a, 187, a,
sqq., 189, b (cf. Phys. iv. 10),
214, a.
3 In
fragment
the
ajnid
Simpl. Phys. 64, b of which
:

'ETriTo/iwi/ 'Apta-TOT6Aovs

n.

Z^Jwi/ r'.

" According
to
Hierocl.
Hippiatr. Prtef. p. 4, this grammarian had written an 'EiriToyu^ of
it,

which Artemidor.

oit.

ii.

14 calls

Oneiro-

virofivfifiara

e/y

ARISTOTLE

150

unknown during

the Alexandrine period

also

is

shown

by the Catalogue of Diogenes (No. 102), and by the


existence of a popular compilation from

much

The Be Anima was

in use.^

Movement
who used also the spurious treatise
As to the Problems,* it is more

phrastus,^ by the author of the book on the

of Living Creatures,'
Ilspl

iTvsvfJLaros?

which was

it

used, after Theo'

than improbable that the working up of that book for


the Peripatetic School began later than the time of
Andronicus.
seen,'^

The

was used, as we have

Meiarpliyncs

not only by Theophrastus and Eudemus, but after

them by Strabo and other Peripatetics. It was prothough some sections of


])ably published by Kudemus
;

it

do seem to have been

first

introduced by Andronicus

into the then extant Aristotelian treatise on the First

Philosophy.

Of the

EtJdcs,

obvious that

it is

it

could not

have existed only in Tlieophrastus's MS. so as to be lost


with it, for if so it could not have been worked over
either

by Eudemus or

The

at a later date

we

by the author of

by

Magna

Moralia.

the

of Diogenes, was to be found in the Library of

list

Politics, if

Alexandria,*" along with the first


(see Schneider in
Demetrius
edition i. xix ).
also, Be Elomit. 97, 157 (cf. H.
An. ii. 1, 497, b, 28 ix. 2. 32,
610, a, 27, 619, a, 16), or perhaps
the earher writer used by him,
'ApicrroTekrjv

his

knows
'

this epitome.

Aboutwhichseep.87,n.

l,^rf

book of our Economics,

For the present purpose it is of


no importance whether they are
mediate or immediate witnesses
for the use of Aristotle's work.
^ Upon
which see ThemiSTOCLES in De An. 89, b, 91, a
Philop. De An. C. 4. Cf. p. 89,

n.l, supra,

From this compilation also


the many quotations from the

Ar'\stote\\aiVL History of Animals in


Antigonus' Mirabilia (c. 16, 22,
27-113, 115) are perhaps taken,

fin.

are to judge

Cf. p. 89, n. 2 ad fin.


As to which cf. p. 96.

See p. 79, n.
Vide snpra,

p. 100, n. 8,

1.

p.

100, n.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

151

by Philodemus.i It is obvious that


before him
the author of that book 2 had the Folitics
the notices
by
indicated
is
also
it
knew
that DicEearchus
which

is also

cited

of his Tripoliticus.^
is

it in the Magna Moralia


cannot tell to what
we
and

The use

of

not so well proven,'^


owed the parts of

source Cicero

own

works

political

but

it

which he used

it
is

for his

not doubtful that

it

must have been accessible to learned persons after the


death of Theophrastus. The same is true of the
UoXiTStai, for the use of which in the Alexandrine
period
1

we have abundant

De

col. 7, 38,
it is
2

Vit. ix. ( Vol Here, ii.)


47, col. 27, 15, where

ascribed to Theophrastus.
Whom we have rather to

seek in

Eudemus

or one of his

Peripatetic contemporaries than


In Aristotle see ch. xxi. infra.^
s
On which see infra, ch. xix.
:

ad fin.
* Although happiness
i.

4,

1184, b,

3.S

is

here,

sqq., defined as

ivepyna Koi XP^o''^ '^'^^ aperrjs, this


has certainly a greater resemblance to Polit. vii. 13, 1332, a,
7 (a passage to which Nickes, Be
Polit. Zibr. 87 sq. calls
attention) than to Mh. JV. i. 6,
X. 6, 7, Und. ii. 1, since happiness
is here certainly called ivcpyeia
kot' apcT^v (or t^s ap6T77s),but the
conjunction of the ivepyeia and

Arist.

Then the
XpVffts is wanting.
XP^o-is is also spoken of in IJnd.
1219, a, 12 sqq. 23, Mc. i. 9.
1098, b, 31, and thus it is quite
possible that only these passages
were in the mind of the author
of the Great Ethics.
*

Zeller had already proved

in his 2nd ed., that in Cicero's


political writings many things are

That the Poetics

proofs.^

taken from the Aristotelian Pociting Cic.

litics,

Bep.

i.

25

Leg.

(cf. Polit.

iii.

iii.

9,

6.,

1280,

6, 1278, b, 8, 19, i. 2,
1253, a, 2) Rej). i. 26 (Pol. iii.
c.
1, 1274, b, 36, c. 6, 1278, b, 8,
i. 27
7, 1279, a, 25 sqq.); Rej).
(Pol. iii. 9, 1280, a, 11, c. 10, 11,
1281, a, 28 sqq., b, 28, c. 16, 1287,
Rej). i. 29 (Pol. iv.
a, 8 sqq.)
Susemihl (Arist. Pol.
8, 11).
xliv. 81) also agrees with this.
But since Cicero does not name
Aristotle in the Rejntblic, and
Leg. iii. 6 only refers to him in
very indefinite expressions, he

6, 29, c,

seems not to have drawn immediately on Aristotle, and the


question arises where did he get
this Aristotelian doctrine from ?
Susemihl, p. xlv, thinks, from
Tyrannic, but we might also pre:

sume Dicaearchus, whom Cicero


was fond of using.
6 The oldest witness for this
is Timaeus, ajmd PoLYB.xii. 5-11,
and the latter author himself.
There is also, besides Diog.
(Hermipjms) No.l45,the Scholiast
of Aristophanes, who (according
to a good Alexandrine authority)

ARISTOTLE

152

was

also known to the Alexandrine grammaria,ns


placed beyond doubt by recent research.^

is

We may sum up the case by saying that of the


genuine portions of the extant Corpus, there are only
the works on the Parts, Genesis, and Movement

of

Animals, and the minor anthropological tracts, as to


which we cannot show either express proof or high
probability for the assertion that they were in use after
the disappearance of Theophrastus's library from Athens.
Even as to these we have no reason to doubt it only

we cannot positively prove it and that, when we remember the fragmentary character of our knowledge of
;

the philosophic literature of the period in question,

nothing strange.

The

is

and Plutarch
that the scientific writings of Aristotle were after
the
death of Theophrastus all but wholly withdrawn from
access is therefore decisively negatived by the facts.
A
belief of Strabo

few of these writings may possibly have suffered the


fate which they ascribe to the whole.
One book or
another

may have been

lost to the School at Athens


the library of Theophrastus, and may
have been again published by Andronicus from the

when they

lost

damaged MSS.

of Sulla's

happened to any or
reasons

all

collection.

But that

of the important books

antecedently improbable.

this

is for all

There must have

quoted the noAiTe?ai very often; see


Anst. Ft. ed. Rose, Nos. 352, 355-

stophanes

^Sn'^I^'^^'^'^^^'^^^'^l-^^esq.,
470 485, 498 sq., 525, 583.
Iheir presence in the Alexandrian hbrary is clear from the
Catalogue of Diog. (No. 83), and
their having been used by Ari-

Susemihl has collected at p.


20 sq., of his edition (following
Trendelenburg, Granmiat. Grac.

of

Byzantium and
proofs which

Didymus from the

de AHe Trag. Judic. Rel^ from


the Introductions and Scholia to
Sophocles and Euripides

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS

153

been copies of the important text-books made during


life of Theophrastus.
He who cared so well

the long

way, by providing for


them gardens and houses and a museum and the means
of maintaining it, could never have deprived them of
his most precious and most indispensable possession
his own and his master's texts
if a sufficient substitute
for them were not at hand.
Any theory, therefore, as
to an individual book of our collection, that its text
rests solely on a MS. from Apellico's library, ought
to rest entirely on the internal evidence of the book
itself; for Strabo's and Plutarch's suggestion of a general
for his scholars in every other

disappearance of the texts could give


It is not, however, to

it

no support.

be denied that

many

of the

books show signs leading to the conclusion that in their


present form other hands than the author's have been
at work.
We find corruptions of the text, lacunae in
the logical movement, displacement of whole sections,
additions that could be
additions which

made only by

are Aristotelian

designed for some other


we should not expect in

later hands, other

but were originally

context,

repetitions

which

so condensed a

style, and
which yet can hardly be late interpolations.^ Strabo's
story, however, does not serve for the explanation of
these phenomena, for the reason, among others, that

such peculiarities are to be found equally in those texts


Cf. with regard to this, not
mention other points, what has
been said before as to the Gate'

to

yoi-ies

(p. 64, n. 1), n. epi^nveias


(p. 66, n. 1), the Rheto^-ie (p. 72,
n. 2), the 3fetaphysies (p. 76, n.
3),

the seventh book of the Physics


n. 2 ad fin.), the fourth

(p. 81,

book of the Meteorology (p. 83,


n. 2), the tenth book of the History
of Animals (p. 87, n. 1), n. ^vxris
(p. 89, n. 2), bk. v. Be Gen. An.
(p.92,n. 2),theMJucs (p. 98, n.l),
and thePoetics (p. 102, n. 2); and
the remarks in ch. xiii. infra upon
the state of the Politics,

ARISTOTLE

154

which we can prove to have been current before ApelWe must explain them really as arising in part
lico.
from the circumstances under which these treatises
were written and

were used

issued,^ in part

from the way they

teaching purposes,^ in part from the

for

and the many accidents to


exposed.
was
which
If we pass to the discussion of the time and sequence
in which the writings of Aristotle were produced, we
carelessness of transcribers

each transcript

this is of far less

importance than

in the case of the writings of Plato.

It is clear that

must remember that


Aristotle
first

commenced

his career as a writer during his

residence at Athens,^ and

it

is

probable that he

continued his literary activity in Atarneus,

and Macedonia.

The extant

Mitylene

writings, however,

seem

much

belong to the second Athenian period, although


preparation may probably have been made for

them

before.

all to

The proof

of this lies partly in certain

traces of the dates of their production, which control

not only those books in which they occur, but also all
that are later ^ and partly in the common references
:

1
'^

Cf. p. 108 sqq.


easily, by this

How

means,

explanations and repetitions may


find their way into the text, and
greater or smaller sections may
come to be repeated, is perfectly
plain, and is proved on a large
scale by the parallel case of the
Eudemian Physics and Ethics.
3 See
p. 56 sqq. He left Athens in

345-4 and returned in 335-4.


Thus Meteor, i. 7, 345, a, 1,
mentions a comet which was visible whenNicomachus(01. 109, 4,
B.C. 341) was Archon in Athens, its
B.C.
*

course and position being accurately described as from subseThe


quent personal inquiry.
Politics refer to tlie Holy War
as an event in the past (v. 4,
1304, a, 10), and to the expedition
of Phalascus to Crete, which took
place at its conclusion about 01.
108, 3 (DiODORUS, xvi. 62), with
a j/eoxTTi (ii. 10, /m.)> but the same
book refers to the assassination
of Philip (B.C. 336) in v. 10, 1311,
b, 1, without the least indication
of its having been a very recent
The Bhetoric in ii. 23,
event.

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
which even the

earliest of

to the place itself

them contain

155

view already indicated

Athens and

to

where Aristotle taught.^

If,

then, the

as to the destination of these

texts for his scholars, their connection with his teaching,

and the character of their cross references be

right, it

crates' Philippus (B.C. 315) ; of


the Rhetoric also Brandis shows
{Philologvs, iv. 10 sqq.) that the

son of the indefiniteness of that


particle.
Just as little does
it
follow from Anal. Pri. ii.
24, that Thebes was not yet
destroyed at that time we might
rather gather the contrary, with
regard to this work, from Polit.

many

iii.

1397, b, 31,

refers

1399, b, 12,

without doubt to past events


of the years B.C. 338-336 in iii.
17, 1418, b, 27 it mentions Iso;

Attic orators quoted in it


Poetics who were
younger than Demosthenes, could

and in the

by no means belong to a time


prior to Aristotle's

first

departure

from Athens, and the same is


true of the numerous works of
Theodectes which are used both
here and in the Poetics.
In
Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 1, xii. 8,
1073, b, 17, 32, Eudoxus and the
still younger Callippus, and in
Eth. N. vii. 14, 11.53, b, 5, x. 2,
init., Speusippus and Eudoxus
are spoken of as if they were no
longer living, Eose (Arist. Lihr.
Ord. 212 sqq.) has shown with
regard to the History of Animals^
from viii. 9, ii. 5. init., and other
passages, that it was only written
(or at least completed), some
time after the battle of Arbela,

which the Macedonians saw


elephants for the first time, and
probably not before the Indian
expedition. The fact that even
nmch earlier events are introduced with a vvv as inMeteor. iii,
1, 371, a, 30, the burning of the
temple of Ephesus (01, 106, 1,
in

ii.

1278,

5,

Cf.

'

a, 25.

Brandis,

Gr.-r'6m. Phil.

We may give

b, 116.

here a

few further

instances, besides
those already noted. Categ. 4, 2,
ttou, oXov iv AvKelcp.
a, 1, c, 9 fin.
Anal. Pri. ii. 24
Athens and
Thebes, as examples of neighbours. Likewise in Phys. iii. 3,
202, b, 13; iMd. iv. 11, 219, b, 20:
rh eV AvKcicf) elvai. Meta2)h. V. 5,
rh
30, 1015,^ a, 25, 1025, a, 25
irXevffai ety A^yivav, as an example
of a commercial journey.
Ibid.
V. 2i, fi7i.
the Athenian festivals
Dionysia and Thargelia (Aristotle also uses the Attic months
e.g. Hist. An. v. 11, &c. ; but it
is not fair to attach any importance to this),
R7iet. ii, 7, 1385,
a, 28 ^ eV AvKelq) rhv <popfji.hu Sovs.
Ibid. in. 2, 1404, b, 22, Polit. vii.
17, 1336, b, 27: the actor Theodorus.
Very frequent mention
is also made of Athens and the
:

Athenians (Ind. Ar. 12, b, 34


sqq.).
Again the observation on
the corona borealis (Meteor, ii. 5,

and in Polit. v. 10, 1312,


Dion's expedition (01, 105,
4 sq.) proves nothing, by rea-

362, b, 9) suits the latitude of


Athens, as Ideler (i. 567), on this
passage, shows.
2 P. 108 sqq.
especially p.
123 sq. and p. 128 sq.

B.C. 356),
b, 19,

ARISTOTLE

166

raust

have been composed during

his final sojourn in Athens.

Equally decisive, on this

follows that all of

head,

is

them

the observation that throughout the whole of so

comprehensive a collection, there is hardly to be found


a single notable alteration of teaching or terminology.
All

is

ripe

and ready. All

in exact correspondence. All

is

the important writings are woven closely together, not


only by express cross reference, but also by their whole

There are no scattered products of the


We can only look upon them
different periods of a life.
as the ordered execution of a work planned when the

character.

author, having

come

to a full understanding with himself,

had gathered together the philosophic fruit of a lifetime.


Even the earlier works which he proposed to connect
with his later writing, he revised on a comprehensive
Therefore, for our use of these texts, it is no
plan.
great matter whether

a particular book

sooner or later than any other.

must be

was written

The problem, however,

dealt with nevertheless.

caused by the use of cross references already noticed.^ As such cases are, after all, only
exceptions in the general run of the citations, the value
certain difficulty

is

of these as an indication of sequence

has been supposed. There

is

are, in fact,

not so slight as

but few instances

which our judgment as to the order of the writings is


placed in doubt by the occurrence of references both ways.
Of the extant books, so far as they are open to this
classification, 2 the logical treatises, excepting the tract on
in

124 sqq.
however, is always
the case except with writings
the genuineness of which can be
^

Cf. p.

This,

opposed on other grounds. Not


only are none of these quoted
in the genuine works, and only
a single one in a spurious compo-

ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS
Propositions,^

may be

itself natural

and accords with

considered to come

167
It is in

first.

Aristotle's methodical

plan of exposition, that he should preface the material

development of his system by the formal inquiries which


were designed to establish the rules and conditions of
all

scientific thinking.

his

own citations that

But

it is

made

also

evident by

the Logic did precede the Natural

Philosophy, the Metaphysics^ the Ethics and Rhetoric.^

Of the

logical tracts themselves, the Categories

be the

first.

cies,

The

came next, and then the two Analytics

but only very few of them


On the
other hand, there is not one
among the works which we consider as genuine, which does
not quote the others, or is not
quoted by them, or, at least,
sition,

refer to other writings.

implied, whilst in most of them


examples of all three connections
To explain more fully:
occur.
I.
Of the decidedly spurious
works
(a) the following are
neither quoted nor do they quote
n. kSct/xov, n. xpco/iicTa>/,
others
n, aKovarrwv, ^vffioyvwjxoviKii, H.
<pvru>y (see p. 93), n. dav/xaaicov
aKovfffidTwv, MTJxai/t/ca, n. arofiwu
ypafxfji.wv, 'AvffjLoov Oeaeis, H. aepo(pdvovs &C., 'H0tKo fieyd\a, 11.
aperwv Koi kukiuv, OiKovo/xiKd,
'PTjToptK); irphs 'A\4^avSpov.
(b)
n. TTVivfiaros quotes no other, but
is quoted in the spurious treatise
n. C(f(t}v Kivi\ffi(i}s.
(c) On the
contrary, the latter itself is never
quoted. But it names some other
writings as does also the Eiidemian Ethics, supposing that
its quotations refer to Aristotelian
works. II. Among the remaining
:

seems to

book on Falla-

Topics, including the

the treatise

the Categories is the


only work which quotes no other,
and neither is it directly quoted
(but cf p.64). The n. ep/LL-nvcias. U.
T. Kad' virvov fiauTiKTis and the
Rlietoric quote others, but are
not quoted n. C'^wj/ yevicreus has
many quotations, but is only once
cited, as a book planned for the
future of the MetajjJiysics only
bk, V. is quoted or used (cf pp. 76,
n.3, and 79, n.l) in genuine works,
bks, i,, xii., and xiii. in spurious
ones
and the 3Ietaph. itself
quotes the Analytics, the Physics,
Be Ccelo, and the Ethics.
writings,

on

On which

Besides the arguments given

p.

n.

67,

we have
:

1,

p.

68,

n.

1,

the

decisive passage
Post. ii. 12, 95, b,

Anal.
10
fxaWov

in

see p. 66, n. 1.

Se

(pavepws

iu

rols

Ka66\ov irepl Kiu-fiffecos 5e7 A;^0^vat


TTepl avTwv. Tlie Physics, however,
is the earliest of the works on
Natural Science. A negative line
of proof also is found in the fact
that in the Categories, the Analytics, and the Topics, none of
the other writings are quoted.

ARISTOTLE

158

on Propositions was added afterwards.^

Later than the

Analytics but earlier than the Physics

may

now forms

the treatise which


Meta.i)liysics?

be placed

book of the

fifth

The Natural Philosophy came next.

that section the Physics comes

the Analytics and


Metaijhysics

the

the

is

In

It is projected in

first.

referred to in the fifth

book of

or

presup-

but the latter

is

cited

the metaphysical and

works
posed not only in
but also in the majority of the other tracts concerning
Natural Philosophy, while it on the other hand neither
cites

ethical

nor presupposes any one of them.^ That the Be


the treatise on Growth and Decay, and the

Ccjelo,^

Meteorology,

very

is

follow

expressly

the

Physics

stated

in

Whether the Natural History


next

is

not settled.

work, extensive as
but completed after
connect those lesser

With

'^

Be

Gen. et Corr. {vide supra, p.


and, on the
1, p. 124, n. 4)
other, it seems in c. 30 fin. to referto^vittZ. Posf.i. 6,75,a,18sqq.,
28 sqq. though the latter point
;

not certain.
3
Vide supra, p. 81 sqq., Ind.
Arlst. 102, a, 53 sqq., 98, a, 27
sqq.

De Anima came

is,

it.^

Seepp. 64,n. l,p. 67,n. l,p.


and the treatise of Brandis
quoted in the first-cited note,
which (p. 256 sqq.), by a comparison of the Anahjtics with the
Topics, establishes the earlier
date of the latter.
For, on the one hand, it
is mentioned in the Physics and

is

or the

was begun before the other


the De Anima we must
tracts which point back to it some-

it

sq.,

76, n.

given,
itself^

It is very possible that the former

68

the order
Meteorology

in

the

Which we

cannot,

like

Mus. xxx. 498,


hypomnemati505), consider a
cal writing, not merely because

Blass

(Jihein.

'

of the references

made

on other grounds

also.

to

it,

but

^ Meteor,
i.
1, whereon cf.
further p. 83, n. 1, Ind. Arist.
98, a, 44 sqq., and the quotation
of the tract n. (cfoov iropeias in
the De Ccelo, ii. 2, given p.

125.
8 That the completion of the
History of Animals should not
be put too early is clear from
what has been said on p. 154,

n.4.

ARISTOTLE S WRITINGS
times expressly
contents.

and always by the nature of their

Some

159

of these were no doubt composed after

or with the writings on the Parts, the Movement,

the

Genesis

undoubtedly

later

Anima, and the

On

That group of

of Animals.^

and

tracts

is

than the Natural History, the De

which followed

treatises

the other hand,

it

upon

it.^

probably earlier than the

is

Mhics and

Politics, inasmuch as it can hardly be supposed that Aristotle would have broken in upon his

studies in Natural Philosophy

works lying in a wholly


be

less difficult to

by undertaking extended
It would

different direction.

"^

suppose that the ethical writings as

a whole came before the physical.^

This view

is

not

excluded by any express internal references, excepting


the reference to the Physics in the Ethics.^

We

must,

nevertheless, decide in favour of the earlier construction of the Natural Philosophy texts, for a thinker

was

so clearly convinced

as

Aristotle

student of ethics must have a knowledge of the


soul,^

must be supposed

to

who

was that the

human

have put his inquiry into

the soul before his researches into the moral activities

and

relations.

There

are, indeed,

in the Ethics

very

unmistakable traces of his theory of the soul and of


the treatise thereon.^

Immediately

^
Thus n. oiV0rj(recos, n, iJirj/ou,
n. ivvTTuiuv, n. avaTTuorjs {Ind.Ar.

102, b, 60 sqq.).

Vide siijyra^ p. 89 sqq.


See pp. 89, n. 2, 89, n. 3,87,
n. 1
Ind. Arist. 99, b, 30 sqq.
* The
further question of
the relative order of the three
writings named has been already
^

the Ethics

* Thus RoSE, ^lm#. Libr. Ord.


122 sqq.
Eth. x.
3, 1174, b, 2.
Cf.
Phys. vi.-viii.
'^

discussed on p. 91 sq.

after

Eth.

i.

13, 1102, a, 23.

Though

Aristotle

in

Mh.

26 sqq. refers, not


to De An. iii. 9, 432, a, 22 sqq.
ii. 3, but to the i^wrepiKol \6yoi,
yet ii, 2 init. seems to presuppose
i.

13, 1102, a,

ARISTOTLE

160

Judging by the internal

comes the

Politics}

ences, the

Rhetoric should be

the

Poetics

be

should

later

later

than

This, however,

before the Rhetoric.

only of a part of the Politics

or

refer-

than both, and


the
is

Politics

but

probably true

rather only of those

parts which Aristotle himself published, for his death

seems to have intervened before he had completed that


So, again, in our so-called Meta-

text as a whole. ^

we have

probability a work which


and with which several other
fragments, some genuine, some spurious, have been
amalgamated since.^

2)Jiijsics,

in

all

Aristotle left incomplete,

the bulk of

tlie

theoretical writ-

But that there are not


many more of such traces may
perhaps be explained by the fact
ings.

that Aristotle did not wish to


interfere with the practical aim
of an ethical work {Eth. i. 1,
1095, a, 4, ii. 2, mit.) by any discussions which were not indis-

pensable to

its

purpose

cf.

i.

13,

1102, a, 23.
1

See
See

ch. xiii.

p. 100, n. 1.
p.

127 supra, and i7ifra,


if this supposition

And

go to make
improbable that the Ethics, so
closely allied with the Politics,
should have been written before
tlie works on natural science.
is

it

correct, it would also

3 Cf.
and with
p. 76 sqq.,
regard to citations of the lleta-

physics, see p. 156, n. 2.


Eose's
supposition (Arist. Lihr. Ord.
135 sqq. 186 sq.) that the 3Ietaphysics preceded all the writings
on natural science, or at any rate
the zoological ones, makes the
actual condition of that work an
inexplicable puzzle.
But there
is also the fact that the Physics,
as well as the Be Ccelo, are quoted
in numerous passages of the
Metaphysics {Ind. Ar. 101, a, 7
sqq.) as already existing, while
the Metaphysics are referred to
in Phys.i. 9, 192, a, 35, as merely
in the future.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

161

CHAPTER IV
THE STANDPOINT, METHOD, AND DIVISIONS OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

As

Plato connects directly with Socrates, so Aristotle

with Plato.
earlier

Yet he made a comprehensive use of the


well.
He was better versed

philosophies as

than any of the


writings

of his

favourite

method

earlier teachers in

forerunners,

and

to preface his

retrospect of earlier opinions.

it

own

He

is

the theories and


is

with

him a

inquiries with a

wont

designate the problems to be dealt with.

to let

them

He

eager

is

to refute their errors, to resolve their doubts, to bring

out the truth which underlay their views.


influence of the pre-Socratic systems
far less

than

it

upon

But the

Aristotle

is

apparent in the general structure of his system


is in the treatment of special points.
In prin-

Plato had refuted them all. Aristotle is not


under the same necessity to distinguish his position
accurately from theirs.^
He does not, at least in any

ciple,

of the extant writings, devote

any space to such proby which Plato established


the claims of philosophy and the true meaning of knowpaideutic efforts as those

Even in Metapli. i. 8 their


principles are merelj^ criticised
briefly from an Aristotelian point
of view, and the Eleatics and
'

VOL.

I.

Heraclitus, about whom Plato


busied himself so much, are
passed over altogether,

ahistotle

1X32

]edo-e, as

against

'

the ordinary consciousness

on the

'

one hand, and the Sophists on the other. Aristotle


presupposes throughout that general point of view which
characterised the Socratico-Pl atonic Philosophy of Ideas.
His task is to work out, on these general lines, a more

by a more exact definition


a stricter accuracy ot
by
of the leading
improvement of all
and
extension
method, and by an

perfect system of knowledge,


principles,

the scientific data? It is true that in his own writings


the rare expressions of agreement with his teacher are
almost lost sight of by comparison with his keen and
constant polemic

against Platonic

Yet

views.^

in

reality aud in the whole his agreement with Plato is


far greater than his divergence,^ and his whole system

cannot truly be understood until we treat

it

as a develop-

ment and evolution of that of Plato and as the completion of that very Philosophy of Ideas which Socrates
founded and Plato carried on.
In the first place, he agrees

for the

most part with

Plato in his general views as to the meaning and office


To him, as to Plato, the object of
of Philosophy itself.

AVe shall deal later on with


this polemic, especially as it was
directed against the doctrine of

Ideas in Metajjh.
Only a few
&c.

i.

9, xiii., xiv.

passages are

found in which Aristotle expressly


declares his agreement with Plato,
Besides the passages noted on

12,

JV:

i.

2,

and

p.

1095,

An

U,
a,

32

n. 4, see
;

ii. 2,

Eth.

1104, b,

iii.
4, 429, a, 27;
1265, a, 10.
2
Cf. also the valuable remarks of Strumpell, Gesch. d.
Aritheor. Phil. d. Gr. 177.

li- De
Pokt. ii.

6,

stotle, as

we have shown on

p.

not unfrequently includes


himself in the first person along
with the rest of the Platonic
14, n. 3,

school.

But

his

such a relation

way
is

of treating
opposite

the

Whilst Plato
to that of Plato.
puts his own view, even where
contradicts the original one
it
of Socrates, into the mouth of
his teacher, Aristotle not unfrequently attacks his teacher
the
even where they agree
main point, and only differ in
opinion as to secondary matters.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE


Philosophy can be only Being as such,^

163

Essence, or,

i.e.

to speak more accurately, the universal Essence of that


which is actual. 2
Philosophy treats solely of the

and basis of things,^ and in fact of their


and most universal basis, or, in the last
resort, of that which presupposes nothing.'*
For the
like reasons he ascribes to the philosopher in a
certain sense a knowledge of everything, thinking,
causes

highest

of course, of the point of unity where

As

converges,^

which

as the cognition of that

Aoial. Post.

^K

5'

ifMircipias

ii.
.

19, 100, a, 6

Texvvs o-pxh

ihv (xhv irepl yeueaiv,


t4xvvs, iav 5e ircpl rh hy, 4Tri(TT^,fXT]s.
Metaph. iv. 2, 1004, b, 15 t(?
ovTi ^ tv (rri Tivii, IfSto, Kal tovt'
Kal

iiriaT'fjiJ.'qs,

((TtI

irepl

rov

S}v

(pi\o(r6<pov cTrt-

Ibid. 1005, a,
1005, b, 10.
2 Metajyh. iii.
2, 996, b, 14
sqq.
rh clSevai 'dKaarov
.
t6t'
(TK4\^/a(rdai TaXrjdes.

2, c. 3,

ol6fi6a

8toi/ uSoi/xeu ri

virdpx^tv,

i<TTiv, &c. ; vii. 1, 1028, a, 36 etSeVot


tot' oiSfxiQa Ka(TTOv juaAtoTo, orau
rl icrriu 6 &v9puiros yvcfj/xev ^ rb
:

fxaKkov ^ rh iroihv ^ t^ irotrhv


^ rh TToD, &c. c. 6, 1031, b, 20 t^
iiriaratrdai eKacrrov rovr6 iffri rh ri
^u dvai iiriffraffOai, and cf 1. 6
ibid. xiii. 9, 1086, b, 5: the
determination of the notion of

rrvp,

the thing is indispensable, &vev


yap rov KaB6\ov ovk earriu

fihy

Xafielv;

iTTia-r'n/j.rjv

b,

33

iTTiarrtfiTj

c.

10,

1086,

rwv KaQ6\ov

init.,ii. 19, 100, a, 6,

^u enl irdvrwv

xi.l,1059,b, 25.

ibid, a, 28, b, 1

Anal.Post.i.U

i.

24, 85, b, 13

(TKeiv

Kal

5e

i.

init.

iiri-

eKaarou

oiSfied^

rr,v t' alriav olcafieda yiyvJ}-

'6rav

Th vpayfxd iariv . .
ivdcxeadai rovr' &\\us
Ibid. c. ] 4, 79, a, 23, ii. 11

5t'

ixi)

IX"".

Eth. N. yi.
Metaph. i. 1, 981,
init.

7, 1141, a, 17.
a, 28, 982, a, 1,
a,
982,
2,
12, 982, b, 2 sqq.,
vi.
init.
Cf. Schweglee,
1,
Arist. Metaph. iii. 9.
c.

Phys.

yhp

i.

olSfxeda

%rav

rh.

Kol

rhs

1,

184, a, 12

yivaxrKeiv

alria yuMpiaw/nev

ras

apxas

rwv

tJt6

cKaffrov,

ra irpwra

irpcaras

Kal

Ibid. ii. 3
jMetaph. i. 2, 982, b, 9
56? yap ravrriv [that science which
is to deserve the name co^to] rwv
irpwruu d.px(ii}V Kal alriwv eJvai
dwpririK'f]V
rSre yhp
c. 3 init.
fi^xpi

(xroixeiwu.

init.

(iBfvai

iv. 3,

rt ^<rrai

Anal. Post.

(TraaQai

iii.

fir)

knowledge,'

and Mh. JV. vi. 6 init., x. 10, 1180,


b, 15.
More infra, in cliapter v.

iiriffraa-Oai irws f<rrai, ct

'

Eternal and Necessary,

is

6 Jin. KadoXov at ixiffrrnxai


irdvrwv; iii. 4, 999, b, 26: t^

lii.

knowledge

all

Plato had distinguished

'Kp(l}r7]v

(pajxlv

airiav

eKacrrov,
oicojmfda

2, 996, b, 13, iv. 2,


s

iv. 2,

'6rav

r^u

yvwpi^etv

1003, b, 16,

1005, b, 5 sqq.

Metaph.

i.

2,

982, a, 8, 21,

1004, a, 35.

ARISTOTLE

164

from Fancy or

'

Opinion,' whose sphere

is

the contin-

To him, as to Plato, knowgent, so also Aristotle.


ledge arises out of wonder, out of the bewilderment of
To him, its
the common consciousness with itself.^
object

is

exclusively that

which

universal and neces-

is

contingent cannot be

sary; for the

hioiuii,

but only

an opinion, when we believe that a thing


opined.
might be otherwise it is knowledge, when we recogSo far
nise the impossibility of its being otherwise.
It is

from

Opinion

'

'

and

'

Knowledge

being

'

the same,

all

rather true, as Aristotle holds, that it is utterly


impossible to know and to opine about the same subject

it is

at the

same

again,

So,

time.^

'

Knowledge

'

cannot

consist in Perception, for that tells us only of individual

things, not of the universal, only of facts, not of causes.'

In like manner Aristotle distinguishes 'Knowledge'


from mere Experience by the test that the latter gives
That,'' while the former gives
us in any matter only a
^ which is the very mark that Plato
also
Why
us a
used to distinguish Knowledge from True Opinion.'
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

Metaph. i. 2, 982, b, 12 5io


yap rh OavixdC^iv ol S-vOpQiTroi Kol vvv
1

KoX rh irpwTov iip^avro <pi\o(ro(p^'iv,


Ibid. 988, a, 12. Cf. Zellbr,

&c.

PA.

<^.

6 pn.
tank.

div. l,p. 511, 4.


cf iMcl c.
i. 33
3Ie8, init. c. 30 sqq.

6^r.,pt.

ii.

Anal. Post.
c.

y\\.

15,

vi.

2,

1026, b, 2

Eth.N.Vi. 3, 1139, b, 18,


sqq.
To this line of thought
c. 6 init.
belongs the refutation of the principle,thatforeveryonethatistrue
which seems true to him, which is
dealt with in Meta2)li. iv. 5, 6, much
as it is treated in Plato's T^^?Mw.
' Anal.
ou5e St'
Post. i. 31
:

ala6i,(reus

'

iariv

itrlffTatrOai.

For

perception has always to do with


individuals (more on this subject
rb 5 K^edXov koX iirl
infra),
alaQdv^ffQai, Sec.
iratnu aZvvaTov
Even though we could see that
the angles of a triangle are equal
to two right angles, or that in an
eclipse of the moon the earth
stands between the sun and the
moon, yet this would be no knowledge, so long as the universal
reasons of these phenomena re-

mained unknown to
*

Metaj?7i.

i.

1,

us.

981, a, 28.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

165

Finally, Aristotle is at one with Plato also in this, that

both of them proclaim Philosophy to be the mistress of


other sciences, and Science in general to be the

all

man can

highest and best that

and the most

reach,

essential element of his happiness.*

Nevertheless,

also true that the Aristotelian

it is

notion of Philosophy does not completely coincide with

To

the Platonic.
content,

Plato, Philosophy, regarded as to its

which includes

a term

is

moral perfection, and

practical as well as the theoretic side

regarded as to

See Metaph.

2, 982, b,

i.

apxi'KcoTdrT] Se tcov iinffTTiixwu, Koi

fiaWou

apx^Kij rrjs virrjpfTOvarjs,

'YV<api(ov<ra rivos

Kr4ov eKaffrov

raya-

5' iffrl

But that science

which investigates the


highest reasons and causes, since
'the highest
*the good' and
end are inchided among these.
one

'

Ibid.

kripav, aAA'

4\fv6epos

&KKov

Sib

avTOv

i)v,

ovTO)

roiv

ovcra

yap avT^

avTTj

avTTJs

t(,v

7]

ovk

t6 diiov (pdovephu

elvai,

Xph

oAA.'

ivS^x^Tai

o()r rrjs TOiavrrjs SAAtjj/

vo/xi^eiv

Tnunayrepav

"

BdOTdTT} Kal TiixiwrdrT]


jxkv
olv iracrai
.

Kai6Tpai

iariv

avdpwTrlvr]

KTrjais

oifre

fx.))

fidutf

iiriartiixuv

ouTrjy eVc/ceV

Kal SiKaiws

vofjii^ono

(()afiv

Kal

(EvcKa

KotX

5t'

XP^'**''

^vSpwirds

SIxTirep

&

i\vd4pa
fidvi)

ws

SjjXop odv,
24
avr^v ^rirovfi^u

1.

ovSeixiav

r]
.

and

life

yet,

it

aficivwv

24

human
off

while,

S'

it

when
very

activity.

more

strictly

on the other

oi/Sefxia

xii. 7,

1072,

dewpia rh i^Skttov Kal


&pi<rTov.
In Mli. jV. x. 7 theoria
is the most essential ingredient
of perfect happiness
cf. e.ff.
1117, b, 30: 6t 5^ Oelov 6 vovs

b,

rj

r]

irpa-

eVe/ceV ecTTt

tovto

'

6hv iv cKdffrois.
is

of

on the contrary, marks

Aristotle,

from the practical side of

and

distinguishes

every other form

from

sharply

essence, he

its

spiritual

all

comprehends therefore the

it

yap
avay-

Taurrjy,

'

rhv ^vOpuirov, Kal d /cara


TovTOv fiios d7os TTphs rhv avQp(i}Tnvov
ov xph Se Kara rovs irapaifiiov
vovvras avQp(ainva (ppovelv dudpuirov
bvra ovSe 6vr}ra. rbv dvrjrhv, dAA'
</)'
(iffov ivSex^Tai adavari^eiv Kal
iravra iroiilv irphs rh ^v Kark rh
KpariCTOv ra>u iv avrcf . . tJ) oIk7ov
(pvan Kpariffrov Kal
eKaarcp rfj
TTpbs

'

^jSKfTdv iariv kKaartf

'

Kal t^J av-

5^ 6 Karb. rhv vovv ^los,


[xaKiffTa
ciircp
TOVTO
^vOpwiros
ovTos &pa Kal evSai/xoveffTaros
C.
1178, b, 28: ey '6<rov 5^ 5to8,
Bpd)TT(f

'

reivei

7]

Oewpia, Kal

Cf.

c.

vii.

15 fin.

xii.,

9,

infra.

t]

evZaijxovia.

Eth. End.
See further in chapter

1179,

a,

22,

ARISTOTLE

166

hand, he brings

it

into

exclusively an

affair

tinguishes from
(Tr/oafts-),

it

with the

relation

closer

His view

experimental sciences.

is

that Philosophy

of the theoretic faculty.

He

is

dis-

very sharply the practical activities

which have their end in that which they produce


and which

(not, like Philosophy, in the activity itself),

belong not purely to thought but also to opinion and


the

'

unreasoning part of the

also the

artistic

creative

He

soul.'

effort

distinguishes

(iroirja-Ls)

likewise directed to something outside

which

is

With

itself.^

Experience, on the other hand, he connects Philosophy


more closely. Plato had banished all dealings with
the sphere of change and becoming out of the realm
of

'Knowledge'

Even

into that of 'Opinion.'

as to

the passage from the former to the latter, he had only


the negative doctrine that the contradictions of opinion
and fancy ought to lead us to go further and to pass
to the pure treatment of Ideas.

Aristotle, as

we

shall

Experience a more positive


The latter, with him, proceeds

presently see, allows

to

relation to Thought.

out of the former by an affirmative

movement

that,

namely, in which the data given in Experience are

brought together into a unity.


Furthermore, we find that Plato was but
^

little

interested in the descent from the treatment of the Idea


to the individual things of the world of appearance

the phenomena.

To him, the pure Ideas

Besides the passage just


given, see Eth. N. vi. 2, c. 5,
1140, a, 28, b, 25; x. 8, 1178, b,
20; vi. 1, 1025, b, 18 sqq. xi. 7
pe An. iii. 10, 433, a, 14; and
;

Z)^ CteZo,

same

iii.

7,

are the one

306, a,

6.

The

repeated by Eudemus
^ fin., and by the author

is

Eth. i
of Metapli.

ii. 1,

993, b, 20.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE


of philosopliic knowledge.

essential object

167

Aristotle

concedes that scientific knowledge kas to do only with


the universal essence of things yet he does not stop
;

at that point, for he regards it as the peculiar task of

>

Philosophy to deduce the Individual from the Universal


Science has to begin with
(as in a7ro8sfcft9, vide infra).
the Universal, the Indeterminate

It

must pass on

it

It has to explain the data, the

to the Determinate.^

phenomena.^

but

must

not,

think

therefore,

of

little

anything, however insignificant, for even there inexhaust-

knowledge must

ible treasures of possible

like reason

for a

makes

that Aristotle

for scientific

He

thought itself rules less strict than Plato's.


1
MetapJi. xiii. 10, 1087, a, 10
rh 5e T^v i-rrKTT'fjiJL-nv elvai KaQoXov
:

e^ei fikv
ra>v X-)(^d4vro}v, oh

TTuffav

ws aXrides rh

fiev

ws ovK
S>v

rh

fj.U

aX-qdes

rb

Koi

Sxnrep

fJ.v

[x)]v

aXX^

7]

yap

iiXr]

odaa Ka\ a6pi(rros


Ka06Xov
KaOSXov Ka\ aoplcrrov icrriv,
ivfpyeia

wpiafievT}

Kal

T(i)V
Kttl

'

t]

[toC]

rod

Part. An.

SAws 8

Zvvaixiv

roiv

ffo<pias irepl

(pavepuv rh aXriov, rovro /xev


(ov6ev yap Xeyo/xev irepl

T^s alrias '6dv 7] apxh "t^s jueraBe Cop.lo, iii. 7, 306,


/3o\^s) &c.
riXos Se ry\% ixkv iroif\riKT\s
a, 16
iiri(Tr'f]/xr}s rh epyov, tt/s Se (pvffiKrjs
rh <l>aiv6(Xvov ael Kvp'ws Kara
Be An. i. 1, 402, a, IG
oiffQ-nffiv.
%oiK 5' oh ix6vov rd ri iari yvwvai
XP'ho'^fJ'-OV elvai irpos rh OewpTjorat ras

Kara

tV
:

airias
Qvcriais

rS)v
.

(rv/xfie^-nKSrcov

aAAa

raU

Kal avdiraXiy

rk

fi-fire
'

ro7s

yvupi^eiv Kal
irepl

n^

roSv

(TKeypiv

'

arifxSrepov

Q^opiau

<f>vais

irope'xet

645,

5,

(coXktjs

fx-ffre

(i/xws

els

rim-

Srifxiovpyf}-

rjSovas

aixT}xdvovs
SvvafJLevois

ras

alr'tas

<t)vaei (piXo(r6(pois

Suo-xepaivetj/ iraiSiKoSs

r^v

Cv^^ ^''"''
ydp ro7s (pvaiKols

arificorepuiv

ev iraffi

evecrri ri dav/xaffrov, &C.


ii.

5:

a,

(pvffeois

Kal yap iv rols /x^ Kexapia-ahruv irp6s r)]V atcrdficriv

tV

ffa<ra

hib Set

Kevus

Ka\

irapaXiirSvras

jurjSei/

(irepou
fxevois

i.

rrjs

irepl

elirelv,

fldKaficv

tp7\vrai

Cf. C. 5, 409, b, 11 sq.

'dnavTes

wpifffieuov

Xoiirhp

rrjs

avfifiefiriKi'

irdvTOOv ^ rwu irK^icTTUv, t6t


irepl TTJs ovfflas e|o;uej/ X4yeiv
fj

rdSf ri odcra rovSe rivos.


2 Metaph. i. 9, 992, a, 24 (attacking the doctrine of Ideas)
(-nrova-ns

'

airoSiSduai /carci

rwv

(pavrafflav irepl

SiaXcKTiKcSs

S'

ri

excu/U.ej'

iffriv

KaXKiffra' irdffTjs yap airo^ei^eMS


apx^ TO ri icrriv, S)(rre Kaff oaovs
rwv bpiffuQv iM^ (TviJL^a'vei ret (TvfiSrjAov on
^cfirjKora yvwpi^nv

Bnrhv,

rh Se ivepyeia
CDS

5'

iTTKTriif/.'n,

iiriffraa-dai,

dvvdfxei

T^v

icrri

ean

yap

iireihav

airopiav

Xeyd/j-evou,

SvvafjLLS

o'iv

fidXicrr''

fieya

rd etSeVai t6 ti

irpds

fXfpos

takes

(rv/x^dWeTai

(ru/ii8e)3T7K(JTO

It is

lie.^

12, 291, b, 25.

Be

Ccelo,

ARISTOTLE

168

the content of

'

Knowledge,' and of

scientific proof, to

include not only the Necessary, but also the Usual {to
o)9 sttI to iroXv).^
He deems it a sign of philosophic

man

crudity that a

demand

should

the same logical

strictness of all kinds of investigation,^

when

in fact

depends on the nature of the subject matter what


amount of exactitude can be attained in each of the
it

^^

Where

sciences.3

coercive proof

Anal. Post. i. 80, iii. 12 Jin.


Part. An. iii. 2, 663, b, 27. Metaph. vi. 2, 1027, a, 20, xi. 8,
1064, b, sqq.
Eth. N. i. 1, 1094,

b, 19.

Eth. N.

1094, b, 11-27,
2, 1104, a, 1,
vii. I fin. ix. 1, 1165, a, 12 {Polit.
vii. 7 fin. is not in point here).
It is chiefly as regards the ethical
discussions that Aristotle here denies the claim they liave to a thorough accuracy, because the nature of the subject does not allow
of any such result for in judging
of men and the issues of human
action, much rests on estimates
which are correct only in the
main and as a rule.'
^ According to Aiial. Post.i.
27, that science is more exact
(aKpifiea-Tepa), which besides the Uti
settles the diSn
that which has
to deal with purely scientific questions, not with their application
to some given case (v /j.^ nad'
c.

1098,

7,

a,

1,

i.

26,

ii.

'

'

'

fails

example

him, he

being

is

content

adduced). The
(Metaph.

latter is thus expressed

S^
(that
according to its notion
ture, is earlier, or stands
to the first principles
xiii. 3,

1078, a, 9)

TTpOTfpwp

Ty

Sffcp

\6ycf)

tip irepl

which,
or nanearer
cf

p.

330 sqq.) kuI airXovarrepwv roarovT(f jxaWov exet ruKpifffs. From


this

naturally follows, that the


philosophy, according to
Aristotle,
is
capable
of
the
greatest accuracy (cf. Metapli. i.
2, 982, a, 25
aKpi^ea-rarai Se rcSy
it

first

(Tri(rTT)fxv

(lai),

at fioAKTra

tQv

irpdorup

and that every other science

capable of so much the less


according as it descends more
and more to the world of sensible
things (cf. iUd. 1078, a, 11 sq.)
for in the latter noWii r] rod aopiarov (pixris ivvirdpx^i {Metaph. iv.

is

5, 1010, a, 3; further infra, in


ch. vii. sec. 2). Therefore the natural sciences are necessarily less

which

accurate than those which are concerned with what is constant, like
the first Philosophy, pure Mathematics, and the doctrine of souls

from a smaller
assumptions (e.ff.
Arithmetic as compared with
Geometry), or in other words the

which De An. i. 1 init. extols


cLKpifieia); and those which
have the transient as their object
are less exact than Astronomy (il/e-

more abstract

taph. 1078, a, 11 sqq.). Kampe


(Erkenntnisstheorie d. Ar. 254)
says, that in the scale of aKpi^eia

viTOKiix4vov [d/cpt^Seo-TepaJ

\moKiiix4vov, oiov
viKrjs),

and

deduces

that

ap/io-

of

(^ i^ iXaTrSvuv rrjs
as is also said in
2, 982, a, 26, the same

Trpoadea-eus,

Metajjh.

apid/j.r}TiK^

lastly

its results

number

iK

t^s Ka0'

i.

(of

the

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

169

up with arguments possible and probable, and


more definite decision until a further

to put

to postpone a

analysis can be had.^


It is not, however, the essential
problems of philosophy which Aristotle so treats, but
always special questions of ethics or natural philosophy,

which Plato himself had relaxed the strictness of


and put probability in the

for

his dialectical procedure,

place of scientific proof.

them

is

only

The

between

real difference

this, that Aristotle

includes this kindred

branch of knowledge in Philosophy; whereas Plato


on treating everything except the pure Science

insists

of Ideas as merely matter of intellectual discourse, or


as a condescension of the philosopher to the pressure of

Why,

practical needs.^

man who

the

asks Aristotle rightly, should

knowledge not seek to learn

thirsts after

at least a little, even

where he cannot establish

all ? ^

Aristotle cannot be justly accused of having

promised the unity of


the science of
lowest place
rather, as has
preceding note,
:

and

all

nature takes the


but this would
been said in the
be true of Ethics

Politics.

De

CceU,

ii.

5,

287,

b,

on the reproduction of bees he


adds the remark ov fx^v ilK-niTTai
:

(TvufiaiuovTa Uavois, a\\' idv

TO,

TTore

\r](J)dfj,

fia\\ov
ro7s

rore

Tuv \6yo}U

\6yois^
^

leiKviwcrnois

iav

rfj

al<rdT}(Ti

iriarevreov, Kal

bfioXoyovfieva

<paivoixevois.

rhv

H. An.

^1 fin. c. 42, 629, a, 22,27.


Metapli. xii. 8, 1073, b, 10 sqq.
1074, a, 15.
Meteor, i. 79, init.
irepl
ruv atpauuu rfj
alaO-fiaci
vofii^ofiev UavoSs aTroSeSer^^"' 'f'^
ix.

\6yov,

4av

els

5 ward v

rb

Cf EUCKEN, Meth.
d. Arist. Forsch. 125 sq.
See
further on this subject in the
next chapter.
avaydycofjiev.

28

sqq. c. 12 init. Gen. An. iii. 10,


7G0, b, 27, where to a discussion

comby dividing

spiritual effort

^^^^

511, b, sq.

^i.

vii.

519,

e; Tim. 29, B,sq.


and alib. Cf Zeller, PA. d. Gr.,
Pt. i pp. 490, 516, 536 sq.
c, sqq.; PI. 173,
.

Be Ccelo, \\.\2inU. weipareov


\4yeiv t6 (paivdfJLevov, alSovs d|iov
dvai
vofii^ovTas
ri]V
Trpodv/jLiav

fiaWoy ^
to

dpdffovs (it

does not occur

him that he himself might be

accused rather of an unphilosophicalmodesty), erTsStaT^<^iAo(ro<|)/as


Zi-^^v
irepl

kuI fiiKpas

av ras

ei/iropias

ayair^

fjifyla-Tas ex^^fiev airopias

Ct. ibid. 292, a,

P^rt. An. l

5,

U,

c.

5,287, h, 31

644, b, 31.

AUISTOTLE

170

That

theoretic from the practical activities.^

off the

distinction

undeniably justified to the

is

note of unity

ment by the

full

but the

expressly preserved in Aristotle's treat-

is

he presents Ectopia as the

fact that while

practical activity as

human

life, he also represents the


an indispensable element therein,

completion of the true

an indispensable condition
precedent of ethical knowledge.^ If it be true that
this shutting back of Theory upon itself, this exclusion
from the notion of Philosophy of all practical need and
as a moral upbringing is

'

'

'

effort

(as

becomes apparent,

it

for

example, in the

Aristotelian sketch of the Divine Life) did in fact pre-

pare the

way

for the later

withdrawal of the Wise

Man

from practical usefulness, nevertheless we should not


overlook the fact that even here Aristotle only followed
in the direction indicated before
'

Philosopher

'

would

'theory' alone,

also,

if left

who

criticise

for Plato's

to himself,

and only take part in the

Eepublic on compulsion.
with those

by Plato

Least of

all

live

life

for

of the

can one agree

Aristotle because he conceived

Philosophy, not from the point of view of an


ideal humanly unattainable, but in a way that could
be carried out in the actual world,^ or with those who
office of

the

attack

him by praising Plato

for distinguishing

between

the ideal of knowledge and the scientific attainment of


If such a view of the relation of the ideal to
men.'*
actuality were in itself and in Aristotle's view well
founded, it would only follow that he had sought, as
1

x. 10, 1179, b,

b,

KiTTEE,<9^s.<Z.PA.iii.50sqq.
Besides the passages to be
cited infra, on the inquiry into
the highest good/ cf Eth. N.
'

20 sqq.

i.

1,

1094,

27 sqq.

Eittbr, iUd. and


Ibid- ii. 222 sqq.

p.

56

sq.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

171

every philosopher should, not abstract ideals, but the


actual essence of things.

To

than the truth.

Even

reach out beyond the phenomena


realised in

not

is

it

however,

this,

it

is

not entirely

any individual phenomenal thing, although


Aristotle
an unactual ideal even so.

He

recognised both sides with equal clearness.

the goal of knowledge

thafc

is set

reached by everyone

very high

that

be

best

can only be imperfectly attained.^

never content to

call it

sees

that

it

even by the

cannot
it

is less-*

Aristotle the Idea does in truth

Yet he

is

wholly unattainable or to limit

the demands he makes upon Philosophy (as such) by the

weakness of humanity. Indeed, the whole course of


this account must have already shown how complete
his

is

agreement with Plato on just

real

this very

point.

In his philosophic method Aristotle likewise follows


all essentials the lines which Socrates and Plato

out in

opened

His method

out.

is

indeed he himself carried to

the dialectic method, which

highest perfection.

its

With

it he combines the observational method of the student


and even though it be true that he does not
of nature
;

succeed in getting a true equilibrium between the two,

them was one of

yet the mere fact that he combined

the highest services rendered to philosophy

Greeks.

Bv

that advance he

made

among

the

sfood the one-sided-

ness of the Philosophy of Ideas, so far

as that was

possible without a complete restatement of its principles.

Socrates and Plato always began by asking for the

As

7,

Metaph.

1072, b, 24

i.
;

2,

982, b, 28, xii.


vi. 7, 1141,

Eth. N.

2 sqq., x.
1178, b, 25

b,

7,

cf.

1177, b, 30,
iU^. yil 1,

c.

8,

ARISTOTLE

172
'

idea

'

of each thing they dealt with, and set this kind

of cognition as the basis of

other knowledge, so also

all

does Aristotle delight to begin with an inquiry into


the 'idea' of whatever his subject for the time being

may

be.^

As

Socrates and Plato

commonly

with the simplest questions

such inquiries

taken from everyday

set out

commonly accepted

life,

on

examples
beliefs,

arguments from uses of words and ways of speech so


too is Aristotle wont to find his starting-point for the
definition of such ideas in prevalent opinions, in the

and particularly in the


common use on the

views of earlier philosophers,

expressions and names which are in


subject and in the

meaning

of words. ^

Socrates sought

to correct the uncertainty of such beginnings

of a

dialectical

comparison

experiences gathered from


this process is far

more

explicit

view.

As

of various

all

sides.

But

more complete and

consciousness to

a rule, he

is

by means

opinions and
in

Aristotle

directed with

the scientific ends in

commences every important inquiry

with an accurate investigation as to the various points


of view from which the matter in hand can be treated,
as to the difiiculties and contradictions which arise
from the different views that might be taken, and as to

the reasons which

make

for or against

each view

the task which he sets before the philosopher

is

and

simply

that of finding, by a more accurate definition of the


Thus, for instance, in Phys.
iii. ],
iv. 1 sqq. iv. 10 sq.
the notions of Nature, Motion,
Space and Time are investigated
in De An. i. 1 sqq., ii. 1 sq. the
notion of the Soul in Eth. N. ii.
in
4 sq. the notion of Virtue
^

ii.

1,

Polit. iii, 1 sqq. the


the State, and so on.

notion of

It will be shown later what


significance universal opinion and
'^

the probable arguments deduced


it, had with Aristotle as a
foundation for induction.

from

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

173

ideas involved, the solution of the difficulties disclosed.^


Aristotle

thus working in truth wholly on the ground

is

and along the

lines of the Socratico-Platonic

He

dialectic.

method of

developed the Socratic Induction into a

conscious technical device, and he completed

by the

it

theory of the syllogism which he invented and by

all

In his own writings he


us a most perfect example of a dialectical in-

the related logical inquiries.


has

left

vestigation carried through with keen and strict fidelity

from

of the subject.

all sides

before,

we should

we

If

did not

know

it

recognise at once in Aristotle's philo-

sophic method the work of a scholar of Plato.

With

this dialectical process he combines at the

same time a mastery in


of facts, and a passion

that concerns the observation

all

for the physical explanation of

them, which are not to be found in Socrates nor in Plato

To

either.

idea

On

'

Aristotle the

this also

more

definite

information will be given

Be An.

rd

fidvov

vvp

rwv

ii.

oh yap
2 init.
rdv bpicrriK^v

later.

Set

'6ri

\6yov 5r]Aovv

ivvirapx^iv

atViaj/

ctAAa

ilaiv

rpayu}Vi<Tix6s ;

'

t^u

koI

Kal ificpalveadai.

5' wtTirep ffviiTTCpafffiaO'' ol


'6pa}v

most perfect

oiov

ri

rb taov

\6yoi

icrri

re-

erepofi'f]Ki

opdoycoviou eJvai, laoirAevpov 6 Sh


roiovros opos \6yos rov (rvixirepda[xaros
6 5e Keycav on earlv 6
rerpayuvKTfiSs fx.e(T7]s evpeais, rov
Trpdyfiaros Keyei rd aXriov,
Anal.
'

'

every inquiry
deals vi^ith four points, the STi,the
Si6ri,
the t lo-rt, the ri iariv.
These may, however, be reduced
to the two questions el ecrri ixeaov
and ri eari^ rb fiecov rb fxeu yap
ii.

definition of

an

that which exhibits the causes of the thing,^ for

is

1.

sq.

'

t6 neaov, ev airaffi 5e rovro


And after quoting some
examples
eV airaa-i yhp rovrois
(pavcpdv icrrip oti to avro iffri rd ri
iffri Koi Sia ri iariv, &c.
Ihid. c.

aXriov

Qtir^'hai.

3 init. c. 8 init. ibid. i. 31, 88, a,


5 rd Se Ka96\ov rijxiov Sti StjAo? rd
atriov.
J/i^to^^/i. vi. 1, 1025, b, 17:
dia r6 rrjs avrrjs etvai Siavoias r6 re
ri lari ZriKov iroielv koX el effriu.
;

Ibid, vii, 17, 1041, a, 27


(pavepou
roiuvv '6ri (rjrel rd aXriov
rovro S'
ecrrX rb ri i^v elvai, ws eiire7p \oyikcSs
h tTr' evioou jxev eari rivos
eVe/ca,
eV eviuv 5e ri eKipria-e
:

'

Cf

irpurov.

Anal. Post.

ii.

init.:l'rTe\^eeiri(rra<rdaiol6neda'6rau
r)}v

elScSfiev

rapes

airiav, alriai

ira<rai

SeiKvvvrai.

avrai

Siot

Se rir-

rov

fieffov

ARISTOTLE

174

There-

philosophy ought to explain the phenomena.^


fore, in his

view

(as

we

ought to

shall see presently), it

take account not only of the idea and the final cause of
a thing, but of the efficient and the material causes

Holding as decisively as we shall see he does


that a thing is to be explained by its own causes, he
could not well be content with a method which should
Idea gives, and
look only to the Universal which the
neglect the immediate definiteness of the things themalso.

'

This

selves. ^

is

the reason of that careful regard for

Vid. snj?r. p. 167.

In this sense Aristotle not


unfreqiiently contrasts the logical
consideration of a subject {i.e.
that which is only concerned with
what is universal in its concept), either with the analytical,
which enters more deeply into
the peculiarity of the given case,
(and which he also calls ^k twv
K^ijxivwv), or with the pliys'ical
research which draws its result
not from the concept of a phenomenon merely, but from its
concrete conditions. The former,
for instance, Anal. Post. i. 21 fn.,
-

c 23, 84,

a, 7, cf . c. 24, 8G, a, 22, c,

19, 30; Metajjh. vii. 4,


1029, b, 12, 1030, a, 25, c. 17,
The latter, Phys. iii.
1041, a, 28.
5, 204, b, 4, 10 (cf. a, 34, Metaph.
xi. 10, lOGG, b, 21), c. 3, 202, a,
21; De Ccelo, i. 7, 27o, b, 12;
Metaph. xii. 1, 10G9, a, 27, xiv. 1,
1087, b, 20 (similarly (pvaiKxs and
Kae6\ov, De Cwlo, i." 10 /in. c. 12,
But here he takes
283, b, 17).
the logical to be so much the
more imperfect, the further re-

32, 88, a,

moved

it

is

from the

viii.

&v Tis

COS

ovToi

Kal

olKeiois iriffTfixTfic \6yois^

ToiovToi

ficiv

Tiv4s

'

Khv eK Tcoj/Se
So|t6 T(f} rainh rovro avfi^aiv^iv.
Gen. An. ii. 8, 747, b, 28 Ae^eoSe
XoyiK)}v [oTr^Setltj/] 5ia toGto oti
o(T(f KaQoXov jxaXKov TToppccTepw rwv

\oyiKws

S' iirKTKOirovcri

oiKficov

icrrlv dpx(>}v.

And

after a

proof such as this has been brought


forward, he adds (748, a, 7): oinos
fxev ovv 6 \6yo5 Kad6\ov Xiav koX
Kv6s. ol yap fi^ iK tu>v olKeiuv
apxoov \6yoi Keuoi, Sec. (similarly
Zfe An. i. 1, 403, a, 2: 5ia\KTiKot)s
Kal Kvws
Mh. Micd. i. 8, 1217, b,
21 XoyiKws Kal Kevus). Hence in
such cases he much prefers the
physical treatment to the logical
;

(e.g. Gen. et Corr. i. 2, 316, a, 10:


1^01 5' 6.V ris Kal iK tovtwv, oaov
Siaipepovcriv

ol

(pvaiKws Kal \oyiKa>s

(TKOTTovvTes, &c., see


d.

Gr. ,-pt.i.

Zelleb, Ph.
whereas in

p. 869, 1),

metaphysical researches on Ideas


(3Ietajjh. xiii. 5 Jin.) he thinks the
AoyiKcorepoi \6yoi are the aKpi^4<TTpoi. See further, Waitz, Arist.
BONITZ, Arist.
Org.ii. 353 sq.
Metaph. ii. 187; Ind. Arist. 432, b,
concrete 5 seq. Rassow, Arist. de not. def.

Cf.
of the object.
oh fiev oZv
8, 264, a, 7

definiteness

Phys.

'

doctr. 19 sq.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF APISTOTLE

175

which has drawn down on him often enough the


reproach of an unphilosophic empiricism.^
He was

facts

not only one of the highest speculative thinkers

he

was also one of the most accurate and untiring observers,


and one of the most erudite men of learning that the
world knows. As in his general theory he conceived
of experience as the condition precedent of thought,

and of perception as the matter out of which thoughts


forth, so in practice he did not fail to provide for

come

own system

his

a broad substructure of experiential

knowledge, and to base his philosophic dicta upon an


all-round appreciation of the data of fact.

Especially

any theory of nature he insists that we


know the phenomena and then look about

in regard to

should

first

for their causes. ^

We

could not, of course, expect to

him the sureness and accuracy of method which


empirical science has in modern times attained.
In
Aristotle's day it was only in its infancy, and it suffered

find in

from the complete lack of the proper aids to observation

and of the support of a developed mathematics.

We

SCHLEIERMACHER,

and appears to be in every way un-

Gesch. d. Phil. p. 120, says of


Aristotle: *
cannot deny that
there is a great want of speculative genius,' &c., and on p. 110

bent made him more suited for


the collective comprehension of

'

Thus

We

he contrasts the older Academics


with him, as being more speculative' but he sets out with aprinciple, according to which Aristotle
must certainly come off badly:
Never has one who first went
through a great mass of empirical
work become a true philosopher.'
'

tenable

that

Aristotle's general

and

empirical

historical

data,

than for the solving of metaphysical difficulties.'

also SrRUMPELL, Theoret.


Phil. d. Gr. 156, who delivers

- Thus Part.
An. i. 1, 639, b,
7 sqq., 640, a, 14.; Hist. An. i.
7, 491, a, 9 sq. ; Meteor, iii. 2,
371, b, 21
Anal. Pr. i. 30, 46, a,
17 sqq. Aristotle appeals here (as
in PaH.An. 639, b, 7) especiaUy
to the progress of astronomy
about which see infra, ch. ix.

the judgment

(middle).

'

Thus

which, however,
can scarcely be reconciled with his
own observations on pp. 184 sqq..

d.x\.rist.

Cf.

Eucken, Methode

Forsch.Yll

^c^.

ARISTOTLE

176

also notice that in Aristotle the empirical effort is still

often crossed by the speculative and dialectic


methods which he took over directly from Platonism.

too

Indeed, so far as natural science goes,

him with

just to charge

But

too

little

it

would be more

empiricism than too

would be far truer to say simply that


he carried both methods as far as could be expected of
The science of the Greeks began with specuhis day.
much.^

it

The empirical

any
and largely by the
efforts of Aristotle himself.
Therefore it was natural
that the dialectical method of Socrates and Plato, with
its logical dissections and connections of ideas, guided by
lation.

sort of

sciences only attained to

development at a

late date,

current opinions and the indications of language, should

take precedence of any strict empirical rules.

Aristotle

stood in a close relation to the dialectical movement, and

brought
to

it

in theory

completion.

It

and practice, as we have just said,


was not to be expected that the

art of empirical investigation should find in

him an

equally complete exponent, and therefore an accurate


discrimination between the two methods was as yet far

That could only come after the

off.

of the empirical sciences

fuller development
and the direct investigation

of the theory of knowledge, which the

have brought to pass.

All the greater

due to Aristotle that


instinct led

'

him even

his

This charge has been

made

91, 97)

and, through

the credit

is

wide and direct

so soon to turn to the

by Bacon, and, since the above


was first wTitten, by Lewes {Aristotle^

modern centuries
scientific

methods

of

a one-sidedness not uncommon


with him, by Lange, Gesch. d,
Mater. 1. 61 sqq.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE


observation and to connect

them

as

177

well as he then

could with the dialectical treatment of ideas.

That Aristotle's dialectic had to do with a far more


extensive range of empirical data than Plato had to deal
with is the reason why Aristotle's methods of exposition
are distinguishable at a glance from Plato's by that air
of formal logic which they wear. Aristotle does not limit

himself to that unfolding of pure ideas which Plato expected of the philosopher,^ though his own attempts at it
were in truth but rare and partial. The ideal processes
are for ever interrupted, in Aristotle, by references to
experience, by examinations of ambiguous terms, by
criticism of other views.
The more extensive is the

matter which he has to bring under the yoke of science


is he to see that every step in his
far-

the more eager

reaching investigations should be assured on the one


hand by a copious induction, and on the other by a
careful observance of the rules of logic.
His manner
of presenting his work seems often dry and tedious
as
compared with Plato's; for the texts we now possess
yield us but rare
for

which

master's.

examples of that richness and charm


were praised no less than his

his writings

We

miss wholly the dramatic life, the


the fine mythical presentment which
us love the Dialogues.^ But the Corpus Aristo-

artistic finish,

make

telicum exhibits the peculiar qualities of a


philosophic
style in so high a degree that we ought
not only
'
For fuller information on
the methodological principles of
Aristotle and their application,see
the next chapter and Etjcken,
;

Die Methode

VOL.

d. Arist.

(1872);

cf.

esoecially

sqq. 122 sqq. 152 sqq


^ g^e
Zeller's Plato,
^ Cf.
p. 106 sq.

pp. 29

passim

Forschung

I.

j^

ARISTOTLE

178

him a bad

not to call

him
is

'

writer,'

but ought rather to

in this respect far above his great forerunner.

accused of

'

set

He

formalism,' though where the discussion

grows more concrete, as in his physics or ethics, this


but it will not be regarded as a blemish by
falls away
those who remember how needful even in Plato's view
how much bewilderment
this strict logical effort was
;

among

ideas

must have been cured by keen

distinctions

how many fallacies will have


in the meanings of words
analysis of the syllogism.
exact
the
been avoided by
Rather has Aristotle done the world immortal service
in that he established a fixed basis for all scientific

and won

procedure,

whose value

to us

grown too used


If,

again,

this point

we

to

for

thought thereby a security


overlook because we have

we only

it

to

remember that

we endeavour

can, the standpoint

we can
On the one

the universe which


find

two things.

it is

great.

to appreciate, so far as at

and general view of

call A'ristotelian,

we

shall

hand, no one can overlook

the basis he inherited from Socrates and Plato. Yet,


on the other hand, there is an element of originality

and so sustained as to make us stigmatise


the notion that Aristotle was a kind of dependent
follower of Plato who did nothing but formally work

so notable

up and complete

his

master's thought,

as

an error

utterly unjust.^

>

Aristotle adheres not only to the Socratic proposition that Science has to do with the idea of things, but
also to the further consequence which takes us into the

heart of Plato's system, that that which


*

EiTTEE, iii. 28.


Braniss, Gesch,

d. Phil.

see

Kant,

i.

is

truly actual

179 sqq. 207

sq.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

a thing

is

and that

only

its

179

essence as thought in the idea of

is
actual only in so far as it
partakes of that ideal essentiality. Yet, whereas to
Plato this Essential Being was a thing existing by
it,

all

else

'

'

'

'

which he relegated to a separate ideal world


beyond the world of experience, his follower recognises
itself,

the truth that the Idea, as the essence of things, could**


not stand separate from the things themselves. Therefore

he seeks to present the Idea, not as a Universal

common essence of
things indwelling in the particular things themselves.
In lieu of the negative relation to which the sundering
existing for itself apart, but as a

of ideas and

phenomena had

led with Plato,

he posits

rather the positive relation of each to the other and

mutual dependence. Therefore he calls the senelement the Matter, and the insensible essence the
Form. He puts it that it is one and the same Being, I
here developed into actuality, there undeveloped and
their
sible

lying as a mere basis.

So it comes that, for him,


Matter must, by an inner necessity, strive upward to
Form, and Form equally must present itself in Matter.
In this transformation of Plato's metaphysic,
to

recognise

whose aim

is

the

realism

it is

easy

of the natural philosopher

the explanation of the actual.

Just this

and ever recurrent charge against the


Ideal Theory, that it leaves the world of phenomena,
the things of Becoming and Change, unexplained. For
his own part, he finds the very root-definitions of his
is

his strongest

metaphysic in his treatment of those processes wherein


is

the secret of

nature or by

all

genesis and

all

change, whether by

art.

N 2

ARISTOTLE

180

Yet

Aristotle, too,

is

barred from completing his


by just that dualism of

philosophy in these directions

Plato.
the philosophy of Ideas which he inherited from
together,
Matter
Hard as he tries to bring Form and
the last they always remain two principles, of
to

still

which he can neither deduce one from the other, nor


Fully as they are worked out
both from a third.
finite things, still the highest
of
range
through the
left outside
entity of all is nothing but the pure Spirit,
in man is
the world, thinking in itself as the highest
and
without,
from
that Reason which enters into him

which never comes into any true unity with the indiviis at
dual side of his being. In this way, Aristotle
of
Idealism
the
of
ending
the
and
perfection
once the
Socrates and Plato

its

perfection, because

it

is

the

whole
most thorough effort to carry it throughout the
phenoof
world
realm of actuality and to explain the
but
menal things from the standpoint of the Idea
'

'

also its

ending, since in

it

there comes to light the im-

and the
possibility of ever holding together the Idea
once
have
we
after
unity,
real
Phenomenon in any
basis of the
posited, in our definition of the ultimate

world, an original opposition between them,


principles
If we follow out the development of these

that purpose to
in the Aristotelian system, and seek for
we are
take a general view of the divisions he adopted,

met

that, neither
at once with the unfortunate difficulty

writings nor in any trustworthy account of


on that point
his method, is any satisfactory information
if ^e should trust the later Peripatetics
to be found.i

in his

own

Cf for what follows


.

Kitter,

iii.

57 sqq.

Bkandis,

ii.

b,

130

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE


and the
divided

Neo-Platonic commentators,
philosophy into

all

office

had

Aristotle

and

Theoretic

assigning to the former the

181

Practical^

of perfecting the

cognitive part of the soul, and to the latter that of

perfecting the

appetitive.

In Theoretic Philosophy,

they say, he again distinguished three parts

Physics,

Mathematics, and Theology, also called First Philosophy


Practical Philosophy likewise

or Metaphysics.
is

into three

said,

Ethics, Economics,

and

fell,

it

Politics.^

There are not wanting indications in the Aristotelian


writings which serve to support this statement.

Ari-

opposes to each other the theoretical and

stotle often

He distinguishes between inwhich are directed to Cognition, and those

the practical reason.^


quiries

Teichmuliek,

we

Accordingly

which are directed to Action.^

find.

into Geometry, Astronomy, Music,


and Arithmetic), and after him

part as ah instrument of
Philosophy), practical philosophy
into Ethics and Politics, and
Politics into the science of ibhe
State and the science of the
household.
Alex. To2y. 17,
gives as philosophical sciences,
Physics, Ethics, Logic and Metaphysics but as to Logic cf below

David,

p. 187, n. 2.

sqq.

ForscJi.

ii.

Die Lehre

sqq.

v. d.

Arist.

Waltbe,

prakt. Vern. 537

sqq.

Thus Ammon. in Qu. voc.


7, a, sqq. (who adds the
fourfold division of Mathematics
'

Porpli.

Pkys.

Scliol.

25,

init. Categ.
Schol. in Ar. 36, a,

a,
i.

1
e

Simpl.
Philop.

Phys. init.
Fabric Bihl. iii.
6,

Anatol. in
462 H.; EUSTRAT. in Mh. N.
init. Anon. Schol. in Arist. 9, a,
31. The division into theoretical
and practical philosophy had already been given by Alex, i/i
Anal. PH. init. and DiOG. v. 28.
.

Further, the latter, in part divergfrom the others, divides


theoretical philosophy into Phy-

ing

and Logic (which, however,


he does not consider so much a
sics

real

Pe An.

432, b, 26, c.
1139, a,
13 vers. fin. Polit. vii.

10, 433, a, 14
6,

cf.

i.

iii.

9,

Fth.

vi. 2,
;

For further in1333, a, 24.


formation see chap. xi.
3
iira^ rh
i. 1, 1095, a, 5
r4\os [ttjs TToAtTt/cfjs] iffrlv oh ypSxTis
14,

ML

aWa

irpa^is.

Likewise, ibid. x.

1179, a, 35, ii. 2, init.: iirel


oZv 7) irapovaa Trpayfxareia ov d^upias
fveKd irrriv Sxrirep at &\\ai (ov yap
iV flSw/aev Ti icrriv rj aperi) (TKiirrSluLcOa, ciAA.' /i/' ayaOol yevdficda, ^irel
oi/Shv &i/ ^v 6<f>e\os ovttjs), &c.
10,

ARISTOTLE

182

an early date in his School a division of Science

at

and practical.^ He himself, however, is


accustomed to add a third the poietic science ^
because he distinguishes TroLrjais or production from
irpa^Ls or action, both by its source and by its end,
into theoretic

'

saying that the former originates in the artistic faculty,

and that production has its


work to be brought into
being, but action has its end in the activity of the
the latter in the

end

Metaph.

'

19

opBus

will,^

outside itself in the

5'

993, b,

(a), 1,

ii.

ex**

"^"^

'''^

Koki'lffQai

speaks merely of an
of a

eVto-T^yu?;

(not

and irotrjthese passages would justify

<f>i\offO(pia)

irpaKTiK^

TT/v (piKocrocpiav iTricniifxtiv ttjs olAtj-

tik}),

0eias. dwpT]TiKT]s fifv yap (wherein,


however, the whole of philosopliy
is here inchided) tcAos dAr,eeia,

our using the latter expression,

TrpaKTiKTJs S' ipyov.

1214,

],

ttoWSjv

8:

a,

Etli.

End.

i.

ovtwv

5'

avrSiu <tvuT;'j/et irphs rh yuwvai fx6vov, to. Se


Koi TTCpl Ttts KTr}(rcLS Koi irfpl ras
6(t}pr]iJi6.TCt)v

TO, {x\v

irpd^ds rov irpdyfiaros.

'6(Ta /xev

ovv

xei <pi\o<To<piav jxovov OewpriTiK'fiv,

&C.

MetapU.

18 sq.

vi

1025,

1,

b,

iroiTfTiKr]

1026,

signifies not

synonymous

is

when

iiria-T'fifxr]

the latter

merely knowledge in

general, but science in the special


sense of the term. And since in
Metaph. vi. 1 {vid. inf. 183, n. 3)
he gives three (pi\o(ro(plai OewpririKal,
this undoubtedly supposes
that there is a non-theoretical, i.e.
a practical or poietic philosophy.
But one cannot believe that by

.... Soare cl iraffa Sidvoia


^ TTOirjTiK}] ^ dewprjTiK^, t]
tis hv

the trpa^is and iroi-qaris itself, namely

iwiffTTj/xri

<Pv(Tik)]

irpaKTiK)]

(pvcriK^

<piXo(ro(pia

with

is meant,
not that
science which treats of irpa^is and
iroiTjais (Ethics, Politics, and the
science of Art), but the faculty of

71

StjAoj/ (in oijT TrpaKTiK-f] eVrxj/ oijre

since

OewprjTtKTj

b,

(xi.

7)

efrj

c. 2,

the latter

ovdefxiS.

yap

^pSvrja-is

and

avrov

[so.

Lehre

rixvi)

(WALTER,

irpaKTiK^

'^i\o(TO(pla

prald. Ve^rn.h^Q sq.).


never has this meaning,

oUre 60Dpr}TiKf}. The


same division of iiriffri^fxr] in
Top. vi. 6, 145, a, 15; viii. 1, 157,

and even

iiricrr-finri

iTri(rTT}ixr)

rov

i-mfxeXes

(TvixfiffirjKOTOs]

irepl

oiire

oijTc iroiriTiKfj

a,

10.

Further

cf.

EtJt.

N.

vi.

1139, a, 27, x. 8, 1718,


difference
theoretic
science in De Coelo, iii. 7, 306, a,
16 Metaph. xii. 9, 1075, a, 1, cf.
ix. 2, 1046, b, 2, and Bonitz on this
passage. Though Aristotle here
3-5,

c. 2,

and on the
between poietic and
b,

20,

v. d.

cannot have

it

in this context. So again since cer-

tain branches are distinguished


as practical and poietic from
Physics, Mathematics and Metaphysics, which are the theoretic
sciences, the former must likeAnd
wise be really sciences.

what other place would be


for Ethics, &c.
3

Metaph.

left

vi. 1,

1025, b, 22

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE


The two

actor. ^

however,

coincide,

t he the oretic activity in this, that

183

as opposed

they have to do with

way

the determination of that which can be either one


another, whereas

or

to

Knowledge has

do with the

to

determination of that which cannot be any otherwise

than as

it

Aristotle

is.^

theoretic Sciences, the

movable and

are

does also speak of

corjporeal,

three

concerning things which

first

second referring

the

to

things unmoved though corporeal, the third dealing with

which

that

incorporeal

is

and unmoved

these being

Physics, Mathematics, and the First Philosophy,^ which


yap iroiTjriKcov iv rcf) iroiapxh ^ ''oCs ^ r^xvn ^ Svya/xis

rSiV fxev

X(i}pi(Tra S' iffois, oAA.'

ovvTi

5e

r)

eV

ris, Twi' 8e trpaKTiKoov

ry

irpdr-

TovTi T) Trpoaipecris. Hence L^th. vi.


in the province of
5, 1140, b, 22
art it is better to err voluntarily
in that of morals involuntarily.
'
erepou S'
EtJi. vi. 4 init.
:

C. 5, 1140,
rh y4vos trpd^eus Kal

iffrl Tro'njffis Koi irpa^is

b,

&Wo

iroii^iffews

....

rrjs fxev

yap

iroi-fjcreoos

Tpov rh reXos, rrjs Se Trpo|ea)s ovk


tiv

'[r}

'

7^p

lo-Tt

'

Ibid.

r4\os.

Eth.

47ciffri]p.7]

<pavp6u

aifT^

t}

evirpa^ia

1 init.

i.

1139, b, 18:
3,
oZv ri iffriv iurevOfv

vi.

fikv

....

irdvTs

yap

viroAafi-

jx)] ivS^x^ffGai
&W<i}s ^x^i-v c. 4 init. rov S' ^vSeXOfiepov &\\cas ^x^i^v ^ffri ri Kal
Cf. C. 2,
TTOiTfrhv Kal vpaKTou, &c.
1139, a, 2 sqq. Ue 6te/o,iii. 7, 306,

i^dvofxiv, h iiria-rd/Jifda

p 167, n. 2 Part. An.


640, a, 3 ^ yap apxh to7s fiev
[the theorists] rh iv, toIs 5h [the
technicists] rh ia-Sixevov.
Metaph. vi. 1 (xi. 7) where
among other things 1026, a, 13

i.

vid.suj)r.

I,

'

71 IJLfv

dW

TiKTis

yhp (pvaiK^
OVK

rrepl ax(t>pi<J'Ta fJLcu

ctKiV/jra,

evia

irepl

ttjs

Se jxaOtifia-

aKivrjra

/x^v

ov

TrpcoTTj

[sc.

X<*>ptCTa Kal aKivrjra

hv ejev

ws eV

ri\ri.

7]

Kal irept

^jA-OfTot^m]

(iffre Tp7s

(pi\o(To<p'ai decoprjTiKal, /jLadrj'

fxariKi),

(pvaiK^, deoKoyiK'f].

Simi-

1096, a, 30, c, 6 init.


De Ah.L I, 403, b, 7 sqq. About
the name of the first philosophy,
cf also p. 76, supra. As to Mathematics as the science of numbers
and quantity, and the abstraction
peculiar to it, whereby it does not
consider a body according to its
physical properties, but only from
the point of view of magnitude in
larly xii.

1,

space, and, in determining number and quantity, disregards the


of that in
intrinsic condition
which they occur, see Phys. ii. 2,
Anal. Pout. i. 10,
193, b, 31 sqq.
Anal.
76, b, 3, c. 13, 79 a, 7
Metaph. xi.
Pri. i. 41, 49, b, 35
;

4,

c.

1036,
9 to c. 3/w.,
997, b, 20, iUd. 996, a, 29

3,

106J, a, 28,

vii. 10,

a, 9, xiii. 2, 1077, a,
iii. 2,

De An.

Detached statements on Mathematics are found


iii.

IJin.

in many places, e.g. Metaph. i. 2,


982, a, 26 De Coelo, iii. 1, 299, a,
15, c. 7, 306, a, 26; Be An. i. 1,
Cf. Brandis, p. 135
402, b, 16.
;

ARISTOTLE

184

he names also Theology, and treats as the pinnacle of


all knowledge.^
If,

however,

we attempt

to apply the

suggested

division to the contents of the Aristotelian books,^

The contradiction which

sqq.

RiTTER,

73 sq., finds in Aristotle, viz, that a sensible subtratum is first denied and afterwards attributed to Mathematics,
and that its object is now designated as removed, now as not
removed, from what is sensible, is
partly solved by the distinction
of the purely mathematical from
the applied sciences, and partly
and chiefly by the remark that
Aristotle nowhere says that the
object of Mathematics is a x'^P*(TThv, but only that it is considered
as such, i.e. by abstracting from its
sensible nature in Metaph. xii. 8,
1073, b, 3, moreover, Astronomy
according to the common reading
is not called 'the truest philosophy,' but the oiKeioTctTTj, the
most important of the mathematical sciences for the discussion in hand still Bonitz is right
in reading
t^s otKeioTctTTjs <pi\o(ro<pia Twv fxadrjuiariKuv iiTi<m}fxS}v.
iii.

'

Meta2)n.

vi.

1,

1026,

a,

21

(and almost the same in xi. 7,


1064, b, 1), after what is given in
the preceding note tV tiihuto.:

5e7 Trepl rh ri/niu)-

TTjj/ [eVio-TT^/xTji/]

rarov yivos ehai.


in 1064, b, 5
e/cctcTTTj

(For, as is said
fieKriwv Koi xe/pcoi'

Keyerai Kara rh olKe7op 4itiat fjicv ovv dewprjriKai t(2v

(TttjtSv.)

&\X(t3V eViO'TTJyUCOf alpT(VTpai, aVTT}

Se Tcoi/ 6((i}pr]TiK(2v.
He discusses
at length in Metapli. i. 2, why the
first philosophy
especially deserves the name ao^ta because,
as perceiving the most universal,
it gives the most comprehensive
:

knowledge

because

it

we

investi-

gates what is most difficult to be


known because the science of
the last reasons is the most accurate (o/cpijSeo-TaTr;) and gives the
most perfect instruction as to
causes because, more than any
other, it pursues knowledge for
its own sake and because, as the
science of principles, and hence
;

also of final ends, it must govern


all others.
In Top. viii. 1, 157, a,
9, the following is given as an
example of a division Uri eVt:

^fXriwv ^ T(j5 aKpi^ t^ fieKriSvcov.

(TTTfiJ.'q iiriffT'fffi'rjs

efvot

fieffrepa

Aristotle in Metaph. xii. 9, 1074,


b, 29 sq. also supposes that the
value of knowledge is proportioned to that of its object. The
universal pre-eminence of the
theoretical over the practical
and poietic sciences does not,
however, rest on this, nor on their
greater exactness, for some of
them (the zoological and psychological sciences) have
no superiority over Ethics in either
respect but primarily on the fact
that knowledge is here an end in
itself; cf. Metaph. i. 1, 981, b,
17 sqq. 982, a, I.
* Thus Ravaisson
(Essai siir
;

la Metaphysique d'Aristote,
i.
244 sqq.). who wishes to subdivide theoretical
philosophy
into Theology, Mathematics and
Physics, practical philosophy into

Ethics, Economics and Politics,


poietic
philosophy
into
Poetics, Rhetoric and Dialectics.

and

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE


run at once into manifold troubles.
stotle wrote, the
'

poietic science

gates the
that

Of

all

only thing which would


the Poetics

is

'

Rhetoric to

for

185

that Arifall

under

he himself rele-

another section by indicating

a side-branch of Dialectics and Politics,^ and

it is

Dialectics cannot

be disconnected from Analytics or

Logic. ^
If

we were

to conclude

division into two groups

from this

difficulty that

theoretic and

practical

the

was

preferable to the division into three, we should thereby


be cutting ourselves loose from the statements of Aristotle himself.

It further appears that in the presenta-

tion of his system he took no account of the existence

The one mathematical work to which


he gives a reference, and which can with certainty be
taken to be genuine the tract on Astronomy belongs,
of Mathematics.

according

to

/jJAt^f. i.

'

2,

the

classification

1356, a, 25

Sxtt^

(Tvfifialvei^T^v pTjTopiK^jp oiov trapa4>ues Tt TTJs Sia\KTiKris clvai koI ttjs

TO

ifepl

ijdrj irpayfiardas, ^v SikuiSv


irpoa-ayopevfw iroXiriK-fiv. c. 3,

ia-Ti

1359, b, 8

(iirep

yap koX irpSrcpov

iip'r\K6Tis TvyxdvofjLev a\Tjehs iffriv,

Sxt

T}^

irepl
TO.

p-qTOpiKT)

ava\vTiK7Js

rris

rh

ijdrj

fifv

T?)

<ro(pi(niKo'ts

b,

avyKurai

fxkv ck

iiri(TT'fiiuLr]s

re

Koi ttjs

TroXiriKrjs, SfjLo'a S' iffrl

rh Sh

Sia\KTiKf)

\6yois. ^i^A.

i.

1,

rots

1094,

6pfii/ Se Kal riis ivTi/jLordras

'rwv Svvdfifwv inrh ravTf\v

AitjkV]

oijcras,

oTov

oiKovofiiKTiv, ^TjropiK'fiV

[r^v

iro-

aTpari]yiKT)v,

xP^M-^^V^ ^^

ravrris Ta7s Koiirais rdiu

irpaKriKcSv

&c. These expressions


seem to have a direct reference
to the passage cited from the
Mhetorie. Aristotle sees in it an
application of Dialectics for the
iiria-Trfnuv,

above

indicated,

to

purposes of Politics and since the


character of a science depends
on its purpose, he includes it in
the practical section.
Hence,
although in itself an artistic
science, and designated as such
;

by

Aristotle (e.g. MJiet. i. 1354, a,


11 sq. b, 21, J 355, a, 4, 33, b, 11,
c. 2, 1356, b, 26 sqq.
rhetorical
theories are also called rexvai,
cf. supra,
72, 2,
73,
p.
1),
still he does not seem to give
Rhetoric an independent place in
the system, as Brandis does (ii.
b, 147), and still more decidedly
Boring (Xnnstl. d. Arist. 78).
;

So in Top. i. 1 init. c. 2,
plainly designated as an
auxiliary science to philosophy in
general, and especially to the
theoretical investigations,
'^

it

is

ARISTOTLE

186

Of the

Physics.

others, they are

either

of doubtful

authenticity or, in any case, the absence of any refer-

ences leaves us to suspect that these were not considered

an
'

part of the connected

essential

The

system.^
second,'

again,

Physics^

not the third, philosophy

exposition of his

spoken of as the

is

as

if

there were

no thought of Mathematics standing between it and


and Aristotle himself refers
First Philosophy
the
:

'

'

Mathematical

the

Axioms

the

to

'First

Philoso-

phy.'3

As
later

regards Practical Philosophy, Aristotle does not

Economics and Politics ^ like the


commentators'^ who were misled in that matter by

divide

it

into Ethics,

He

the spurious Economics.


place
call

'

''

main Ethical Science

the

Politics

'

mics, Military
'

Politics
'

'

from the
Tactics,

and Rhetoric ^

these

writings

cf.

and then in

Metaph.

1037, a, 14
devTfpas <pi\o(ro-

vii. 11,

KoX

as the three parts of practical


science this division must consequently belong to the oldest

Peripatetics.
^

<}>ias.

he desires to

he distinguishes that section which treats of

About

TTjs (pvffiKr^s

which

first

auxiliary sciences of Econo-

p. 86, n. 1, siqna.
^

distinguishes in the

Metaph.

iv.

3 init. (xi. 4).

Aristotle in Eth. vi. 9, 1142,


a, 9, besides <pp6vr](ns which relates to individual action, certainly names otKoj/o/t^oandTroA.tTeio
also: but in 1141, b, 31 he has
divided Politics [i.e. the science of
the life in society with the exclusion of Ethics) into olKovouia,
vonodea-ia, Tro\iTiK^, so that, according to this, Economics forms a
part of Politics, Still more definitely Eudemus in Mfi. Eud. i.
13, combines the
8, 1218, b.
*

icoKitik)] koL olKovo/xiKrj Kol ^p6u7}(ns

With whom, besides KavaisRiTTER,

302, also agrees.


1094, a, 18 sqq.,
vi. 9, 1141, b, 23 sqq.
"
Eth. i. 1, ibid., and 1095,
a, 2, i. 2 i7iit. and Jin,., ii. 2, 1105,
a, 12, vii. I2i7iit., cf. i. 13, 1102, a,
23. Hhet. i. 2, 3, vid. sujfr. p. 185,
son,

Eth.

i.

iii.

1,

n. 1.
Eth.i. 1, ]094,b, 2;Ehet.\.
Also in the first
1356, a, 25.
book of the Politics, Economics,
as far as Aristotle has treated the
subject, is taken to belong to the;
science of the State.

2,

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE


the moral

action

187

of the individual from that which

treats of the State.

remember that

It is also important to
div^ision,

there

is

whether we take

no place

it

for Logic.

The

over this difficulty by the theory


controversy between

in the above

to be twofold or threefold,
later Peripatetics get

which

them and the

is

Stoics

a point of

that

Logic

not a part of Philosophy, but only an instrument

is

for

it.^

tion,^

Aristotle himself never hints at this distinc-

although he does, of course, treat Logic as a

Nor

Methodology.''

will the suggestion help us

much

had worked out his Logic with such


must have had some definite place in

for since Aristotle


scientific care, it

his system.^

subdivision,

The only conclusion is that the scheme of


which we deduce from the above-quoted

remarks of Aristotle, seems to be in part too wide and


in part too

narrow

for

the matter which his

books

contain.

'
Eth. i. 1 1094, b, 7. So also
in the lengthy discussion, x. 10.
DiOG. V. 28 Alex, in Pri.
,

'^

philosophy,
the point.

in

init., ScJtol.

Top.

41,

m,

141, a, 19, b, 25,

Ammon.

ajnid

Waitz,' Arist. Org. i. 44 vied.


SiMPL. Categ. 1, ^, Schol. 39, b,
and Philop. in Categ. Schol. in
Ar. 36, a, 6, 12, 37, b, 46. The
same in Anal. Pri. ibid. 143, a, 3.
Anon. ibid. 140, a, 45 sqq.
;

David, in Categ. Schol. 25, a, 1,


where there are also further
fragmentary subdivisions of Logic
and the logical writings.
' That in Toj). i.
18 /w., and
viii.

14, 163, b, 9,
logical readiness as

bespeaks of
an organ of

is

built

of course beside

Stipra, p. 91 sq.

No more

Anal,

might be

different subdivision of the system

is

Ra-

ci^.

252,

trustworthy

vaisson's statement

(Z(?<7.

264 sq,), that Analytics is no


special science, but the form of
all science.
It is much rather
the ^?wwZe</^e of this form, which
constitutes a particular branch
just as much as Metaphysics,
which is the knowledge of the
universal grounds of all Being,
Marbach, Gesch. d. Phil. i. 247,
even thinks that here can be no
doubt that the "Mathematics"
which forms a part of philosophy
is what is now called Logic'
'

ARISTOTLE

188

on the

otlier

remark, that

all

propositions and problems


or

physical,

are either ethical,

Under the

logical.^

logical head, however, Aristotle here

comprehends both

formal Logic and the First Philosophy or Metaphysics,^

and this alone would prove that he could not here have
meant to indicate a scheme for the presentation of his
system, in which these two departments are kept so
obviously distinct.

we are forced to give up the attempt


own isolated remarks any key to the plan

then,

If,

find in his

work

his

which

corresponds with

to

of

construction

the

nothing remains but to gather from the actual

itself,

work

we have

as

it,

the method of the work he designed.

Abstracting from those of his writings which are in-

tended only as preliminary essays, or devoted to historical materials or collections

or taken

among
are

concerning natural history,

up with philosophic

criticism,

Aristotle's writings four

his

investigations

of

Logic,

Natural History, and of Ethics.

o>s

Toj). i. 14, 104, b, 19: %(ni S'


Txmcp TrfpiXafifTv rwv irpoTaaoiv

Ka\

Tuv

irpofi\r}ixa.Tuv

liihv

yap

TidiKoi Trporda-cis (tcrlv, at 5e

XoyiKai

....

jSATj/xaro
<TO(piav

d/JLoiccs

....

Korr^

iJ-fprj rp'ia.

5e Koi

ra

at

iro-

oZv <piXoalroSv
a.\i]Q(iav irepi
irphs fihv

irpayfiaTCvrfov, SiaXcKTiKcSs 5e irphs


So^ap.

It is of

no importance as

against this, that, in dealing with


the difference between knowledge and representation, Aristotle remarks in Anal. Post. i. 33
TO 8e \onrh iroSs Sel SiaveTfxai
Jin.
:

iri

T Siavolas Koi vov koI

Kal

t4xvvs Kal

iirKTr-fifMrfS

(ppoviiffius koX aocpias

distinguish

These

of Metaphysics, of
fifth

Ttt /JLev (pvffiKris

fxaWov

we

main masses.

would be the

ra 5e

iidiKrjs

dewpias

iffTiv.

As an instance of logical
propositions Toj). ubi auj). mentions the principle, which belongs
equally to Methodology or Analytics and to Metaphysics (cf.
Metaph. iv. 2, 1004, a, 9 sqq.,
1005, a, 2), that opposites fall
2

under the same science. Again,


in the instances given on p. 174,
n. 2, giqjra, \oyiKhs at one time
stands for logical, at another foi
metaphysical inquiries for the]
latter also in Eth. Eud. i. 8, 1217,
;

b, 16.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

189

Philosophy of Art, except that Aristotle did not work


out any part of

it

have forgotten to

He

except the Poetics,

seems to

deduce these various branches

of

work from the idea and problem of philosophy as a


whole, or to reduce them to any simpler plan of diviOf these five, the section of Logic and Methodosion.
logy ought to come first, not only in the time order of
the important texts, ^ but also in the order of exposition

for Aristotle

tic for all

himself describes

'

as a propaideu-

After the investigation of

other inquiries.^

method, the

scientific

it

First Philosophy

must come.

'

For, although the connected exposition of

it

belongs in

time to the close of Aristotle's work,^ nevertheless it


contains the key to the philosophical understanding of
the Physics and the Ethics and

it

obtain

all

is

from

the definitions, without which

we

we must

it

could take

not a step in either of these sciences such as the


definitions of the

Four Causes, of Form and Matter, of

the different senses of Being, of Substance and Accident, of the


^

8(ra

Tivh

Mover and the Moved, &c.

See s?/^m, p. 156 seq.


Metaph. iv. 3, 1005, b, 2:
8'
iyx^tpovffi rwv \y6uTMV
-TTcpl

rris aX-ndeias,

Sc? a7ro5ex6(r0ot,

Si'

tv rp6irov

aTTaiSevffiav

twv

avaKvTiKoSv tovto Spuffiv 6? yap


vepl TovTwv ^Kiu irpocTTKrrafjLevovs,
aWk fx^ oLKovovras ClTeTv. It is
much the same for the ques-

tion in hand, whether the rovruv


is referred to avoKvTiKcSv, or more
correctly to the investigations indicated in the words irepl rrjs
from the
dX-qOfias &c., since
nature of the thing it comes to
the same, whether he says, One
'

must be acquainted with Ana-

The very

or 'One must be acquainted with what Analytics has

lytics,'

to

discuss.'

Inadmissible,

on

the other hand, is Prantl's explanation {Gesch. d. Log. i. 137),


which refers the tovtodp, not to
the words with which it is immediately connected, but to the

about which Aristotle


has spoken above. As a consequence of this translation, Prantl
thinks it monstrous that this
passage should be used as a
proof of the precedence of tlie

d^idixaTa,

Analytics.
^

Vid. supr. p. 76

p. 160, n.

sqq.,

and

ARISTOTLE

190

name

of the

'

First Philosophy

the logical

in

order

expresses the fact that

'

precedes

it

all

other

material

investigations, as being concerned with the discussion

most universal of all presuppositions.^ The


Physics follow on after the First Philosophy,' and the
of the

'

Ethics follow

because the latter

the Physics,

is

pre-

The Rhetoric must be taken


The philosophy of Art, on the
as belonging to Ethics.^
other hand, forms a section by itself, which is not
brought into any definite connection with the rest.
We can only treat it, therefore, as an appendix. To a
like position we must relegate also Aristotle's occasional
supposed in the former.^

utterances as to Religion
in the true sense,
'

Still

for a

more plainly than by

the superlative
this

Philosophy of Religion,

was not within his view.

irpwr-n <l)i\o(ro<pia is

shown by the comparative

tiktis),

'^

(pi\o(ro(pia'jvpoTfpa{(f)V(riKrjs, /j.a6r]ixa-

Metaph.

vi. 1,

1026, a, 13,

30, Gen. et Corr. i. 318, a, 5.


Vid. supQ'a, p. 159.
^ See snj)ra,
p. 185, n. 1.

LOGIC

191

CHAPTER V
LOGIC

From

of old, Aristotle has been renowned as the founder

We

of Logic, and he has deserved his fame.

must

not,

however, overlook the fact that he treated Logic, not as

an independent science, but only from the point of view


of Methodology, as the

technique

'

In dealing with

investigations.

'

it,

not contemplate by any means a

of his philosophic

he does

therefore,

and uniform

full

account of the powers of thought as a whole, but rather


a simple inquiry into the forms and laws of scientific

Of the

proof.

first

half of his Logic

section

the

Analytics

it

references which assign to

of Science,^ partly
aforesaid,

of the

the Topicshe

Of the other and more important

admits this himself.^

it

follows partly from

single

the place of a Propaideutic

from the analogy of the

Topics

but more especially from the whole treatment

Of the two Analytics

subject.

masterpieces of Aristotle, the

first is

the

logical

concerned with

Only
and only in so

Syllogisms, the second with the laws of Proof.^


in connection with these investigations,
Toj).

'

i.

1 init.

r/

/xev irp66(Tis

rrjs irpay/xareias fieOoSov evpe7u,

<rv\\oyi(ff6ai

Svur)(r6iJ.0a

?is

d<|)'

ircpl

iravThs tov irporeOevTos TTpo^Kr,fxaros


i^ ivSS^CDV Kal avrol
fiTtOfv ipovfifv

C.

K6yov virexofres

vircvavTiov.

f^o^ify 5e

r(\4ws

Cf

c. 2.

tV fJi-fOohoy,

orav

b^ioius

^TjTopiKris Koi

^xt^fJi-fV

ovtcov Swoifxeuv
t/c

eVI

Slxrirep

laTpiKrjs Kal rcSv toi'

rovro

twv ivdexofMevuv

S' icrrl

iroi^Lv

&

rh

irpo-

aipovfieda.
"^

'

Vid. supra, p. 189, n. 2.

The common theme of both

ARISTOTLE

192
far as

may be

necessary thereto, did he stay to consider


It was not until a later
he extended these hints into a

the theory of Propositions.^


period,^ (if at all) that

separate treatise in the Wspl ipfirjvsias. In the same way,

from the consideration of the Syllogism that he

it is

led to the logical treatment of Notions.

He

is

touches on

Definition in the Analytics ^^ merely as a matter con-

nected with Proof; and, in

the logical properties

fact,

of Notions as a whole are only taken up as incidental

The theory

to the Syllogism.^

of the Categories, on the

hand, belongs more to

other

Logic, because

it is

Metaphysics

than to

not deduced from the logical form

of the Notion as such, or from the process of thought

involved in

construction, but

its

is

derived rather from

the natural division of those real relations, to which


the Categories, according to their content, are referred.^

The very name


is

of

'

Analytica

thus designated in Anal.

init.

irpwrov /nkv

rivos ecrrlv
Set|tJ/

KoX

7]

(lirc^u

crK\pis, '6ti

ilTKTT'flfJLVS

PH.

ncpl ri Kal
irepl

0.11:6-

aTToBciKTlKrjS.

Likewise at end of Anal. Post.


19

init.

Ko.\

Trepl fxev

airodei^eoos, ri

Kol

ii.

ovv crvWoyKT/xov
re iKarcpdv icTTi

irws yiveTai, (pauephu, a/xa 5e koX

irepl iincrT'fjfXT]s aTroSeiKTiKrjs

yap

Tavrhv

Post.

AnMl.
i.

PH.

i.

1-3.

Anal.

2, 72, b, 7.

Vid. supr. p. 66, n. 1.


Anal. Post. ii. 3 sqq. and cf.
especially c. 10.
* The little that has
to be
mentioned with regard to this
will be adduced later. The definition of the '6pos in AtmI. Pri. i.
'^

24, b, 16 alone shows ('6pov 5e


kol\u is tv StoAverot r] irp6Ta(ris)

1,

indicates that in the

that Aristotle

is

analytical method,

he proceeds from

going by an

and just as
syllogisms to

propositions, so in like

manner

he passes from propositions to


notions.
Both are merely considered as factors in the syllogism.
^ Some other writings on
Concepts,

iffriv.

'^

which were mentioned on

supra, seem to have had a


purely logical character; but
probably not one of them was
the work of Aristotle.
Aristotle not only calls
both
the principal logical writings
'Ava\vTiKd (see p. 67, n. 1 ), but
p. 70,

(vid. supr. p. 189, n. 2,

and p.

185,

he uses the same designation for the science of which they


n. I)

treat.

LOGIC
investigations which
Logic,' Aristotle

193

we should

was

class

under 'Formal

chiefly concerned

determine

to

the conditions of scientific procedure, and


especially of
scientific processes of proof.
Socrates had revealed the

method of forming ConPlato had added that of Division Aristotle


was the discoverer of the theory of Proof
This is to
him so clearly the one important point, that
he
ceptions

re-

solves into

the whole

it

follows, then, that

science of Methodology.

It

when

the later Peripatetics described


Logic 2 as an 'instrument' of philosophy,^
and when
accordingly the logical writings of Aristotle
were
in

the end published together under the


name of the
'Organon,''' this was in no way contrary
to the
'Ava\viv means to reduce a
given thing to the parts of which
'

composed, or to investigate
the conditions through which it
is brought about.
In this sense
it is

Aristotle
uses auaKvais
and
avaXiiiv regularly for the reduction of syllogisms to the three
figures, e.g.

Anal. Pri.

32

i.

init.

... Tovs yeyivnix4vovs [(Tv\Xoyi(rfiovs] avakvoifieu ets to irpoeip-q^iva


(Tx-fifJ-ara, for which was written
^i

immediately before
^ofiev

ttws

TOVS <rv\\oyi(rfjLovs

eipr]fieva crxrinaTa.

els

Cf.

8'

aud-

ra

irpo-

BONITZ,

Ind. Arist. 48, b, 16. And since


every investigation consists in
tracing out the component parts
and conditions of that with
which it is concerned, avaXveiv
together with Cnre'iv stands for
investigate.'
Thus Eth. N. iii.
5, 1112, b, 15: {^ovKeverai ....
ov8eh irepl
tov t4\ovs ) a\\^
OJ/J-evoi reXos ri, irws Kal dia t'ivoov
eo-Ttti

(TKOTTovai.

VOL.

I.

ecus

tt.v

tKduaiv

Th

eVl

TrpS>Tov

vp4crei eaxaroi^

atriou, t

iariv

\v6fiei/os eoiKe (-nreTv

rhy

iv

rij

yap fiovKal avaMeiy


6

elp'r]^4vov

ypafJ-fia.

TpSirov Sxnrep Sid(pa'veraiS'T] fiev ('ffrriaisov

iraaa ehaifiov\v<ns,oTov at /nadrj/xa7) Se fiovKcvais iraffa (-fiTTicns,

riKal,

"'^^

'^"'K

lo-Xf^Tov

irpuTOv ehai

iv

rrj

avahvaei

eV tt} yeueaei.

Trendelenburg,
Arist. p. 47 sq.)

Mem.

The waAvriK}}

(Cf.

Log.
eVt-

(Ilhet.i.4:,

1359,b, 10) designates accordingly the art of scientific inquiry, or the introduction
to it, which is scientific method(TT-fifXT)

ology

and similarly to. avaXvTiKh.


means 'that which deals with
;

scientific inquiry,' i.e. the theory


it as in MetapTi. iv. 3, 1005, b,
2.
2 On this designation,
proved
to have existed since the time of

of

Cicero, cf. Prantl, Gesch. d. Log.


i. 514, 27, 535.
^
Vid. supr. p. 187, n. 2.
* This
name is not used by
any of the Greek commentators

ARISTOTLE

194

The further theory that Logic, as


view.^
Organon of philosophy, could not be also
a iDcirt of philosophy, 2 he would hardly have approved.
In order rightly to comprehend this Science of
Method, it will first be necessary for us to go more
closely into Aristotle's views concerning the nature and

Master's

own

being the

origin

'

'

For

Knowledge.

of

it

is

the

conception of

Knowledge which determines the aim and the


of the procedure of Science

direction

and the natural develop-

ment of Knowledge in the mind of man must point


the way for its systematic development in Science also.
All Knowledge relates to the Essence of Things

the

to

Universal

properties

with themselves in
Causes of

all

that

all

is

actual.^

true that the Universal

is

is

the sixth century, as applied to


the writings it only came to this
use later (cf. Waitz, Arist. Org.ii.
293 sq.). On the other hand, the
texts are, before that time, called
by them opyaviKa, because they
refer to the vpyavov (or bpyauiKhv
cf. SiMPL. in
jxipos^ (piKo(To<pias

till

Categ. 1,
Schol. 36, a,

Philop. in

7,

15;

Cat.

T>A^YlJi, ibid,

25^ a, 3.
'

Prantl,

6^e5c/i. <Z.Xo^. i. 136,


respect unreasonable,
when he denounces the schoolmasters of later antiquity,' who,
*
infected with the folly of the
Stoic philosophy,' wished at any
price to represent Logic as the
tool of knowledge. This is really
1

is in

which remain identical

individual things, and to the

this

'

the position and meaning which


Aristotle gives it. The theory that
in the same sense as Physics

Conversely, however,

it

known through

only to be

and Ethics it has its own end in


itself
and its own object, or
that it is meant to be a philosophically established presentment
of the activity of human thought
and nothing else (ibid. p. 138
sq,), is a supposition which can
neither be proved from any definite
statements of Aristotle, nor from
the construction of his logical
writings. The ' real-metaphysical
side of the Aristotelian logic,'

however, need not on this account


be disregarded. Even if it is regarded as the Science of Method,
it may have its foundations in
Metaphysics and even though it
precede the latter, yet it may be;

come necessary,

in the end, to reduce it to metaphysical principles.


gypj.^ p. igy, n. 2.

y^ff^^

"

Fi^.s?^^?/-.

pp.163

sq.,

173 sq.

LOGIC

196

the Individuals, the Essence only through Appearances,

the Causes only through their Effects.


part from Aristotle's metaphysical

This follows in

propositions about

the relation of the individual to the universal, which


will meet us hereafter ; for if it is individual existence
alone which can be

called originally actual

Universals exist, not independently as

Ideas

'

in attachment to individual things as

'

the

if

but only

properties

'

it

follows that the experiential

knowledge of Individuals
must necessarily precede the scientific knowledge of

<.

Universals.^ Quite as directly, to Aristotle, will the same


conclusion follow from the nature of man's powers of
knowledge. For while he unhesitatingly admits that

the soul must bear within itself the ground-principle


of its knowledge, he is equally positive that it is not
possible to attain

of experience.

any

knowledge except by means

real

All learning presupposes,

of course,

some present knowledge, to which it joins on.^ Out of


this axiom there arises the doubt, which had given
the earlier thinkers so
bility of learning
^
^

at

much

Aristotle himself points out

this connection of his doctrine of

perception with his metaphysics


in I)e ATI. iii. 8,^432, a, 2
iirel dh
ouSe irpayfxa ovd4v iffri irapa ra
fj-eycdr}, us Sok7, to. afV^TjTa /cexcu:

pia-fievov, eV ro7s etSecri to7s alaeriTois

voriTd jffTi (cf. c. 4, 430, a, 6


eV Se To7s exova-iy vkr]v Swd/xei %Ka-

TO.

<tt6v

iari

acpaipea-ei.

trouble,^ about the possi-

For

all.

rwv voi]T(av) rd re eV
A^ydfieva [abstract no-

tions] Kal o<ja tcSu aiaerjTcov e'lets


/col Trddv.
Kal Sid tovto oijre ix)j
aiadavd/xevos ij.7]9(u ovOeu hv ixdQoi
ov5e ^uj/etTj
orav re ^ewpp, dvdyKT}

either, as it seems,

a^ia (pavTaff/id

ri OecopeTp

rh y^p

(pavrdaixara (hair^p alad^/aaTd iari


'
irK^iv &vcv vX-qs.
2

j^^^i p^^^_ ^ ^^^^


^.^^
5i5a(TKa\la Kal iraffa fxder}<ns diavor]t:/c^

e'/c

TrpovirapxoixrTjs

ylverai

yvdjaewsv^hiGh he immediately
proceeds to prove as to the diff erent sciences, both as regards
syllogistic and inductive proof.

The

like in

30;

Mh.
3

996,

Metaph.

vi. 8,

i.

9,

992, b*

1139, b, 26.

ggg Zell., Ph. d. Gr.

and

pt.

ii.

a, 696,

02

we

'

pt.

'

i.

<-

> /

ARISTOTLE

196

knowledge from which


which is not in fact true
all the rest is to be deduced
in which case the said
or else we have still to acquire it,
knowaxiom does not hold for that which is the highest
to
sought
Plato
that
difficulty
this
all.i
was
It
ledge of
recollatent
'the
Anamnesis
of
avoid by his doctrine
of that

must already be possessed

'

But apart from all the


lection of a prior knowledge.
against the preother objections wbich he finds to lie
unable to reconcile
him unhimself with this theory, because it seems to
without
thinkable that we should have in its a hiowledge
^ not to speak of all the various absurdities
Imowing it

existence of the

soul,'^

Aristotle

is

to

which a

closer analysis of the notion of the existence

His
lead.^
of the Ideas in the soul would obviously
of
means
by
solution lies rather in that conception
of
questions
answered so many of the

which he has
of
metaphysics and natural philosophy in the notion
Development 'in the distinction between the groundThe
work of potentiality and the completed actuality.
'

soul,

sense
I

he

must certainly bear within itself in some


knowledge. For if even our Sense Perception

says,

its

Anal. Post.

ii.

19, 99, b,

20

Every knowledge by argument


supposes acquaintance with the
principles

highest
&,a(Toi,

vld.lnf.y.

(the

tc2j/ 5'

apx^i

a^eVcov Tr,v

SLairopi)(TLV av tls
yuwcTiv
Koi TrSrepov ovk iuovcrai al ^ei5 [the
.

yvucTL-i

of the

apxa^ iyyivovrai

-ti

'

ttcos

&v yua3pi(oLfiev

Koi fiaudduoiixev eK fi^ TTpovTrapxovcnis


yvtixrews aUvarov yap . (pauephv
.

on

out' ex^i-V oT6v re, oyr

ayvoovcri. Kal (jL-qSe/xiav exovffiv

e^iv

iyy[vcrdai.
'^

CL the section

tion of soul

as to the relainfra, ch. x.

and body,

iuovaai XeK-fidaaiv. el /xev 87? exfM^"


(Tvix^aivei yap aKpiavras, &TOTrov
PcrTpas exovras yvaxreis airo^ei^ews
Xaix&avop.ev n^
\avedviv. el de

exovres irporepou,

Toivvv,

Anal. Post.

loo.

cit.,

and

992, b, 33.
if ideas
^ To]}, ii.7, 113, a, 25
were in us they would have also
Still Arito move with us, &c.
himself would scarcely
stotle
have laid much stress on this
merely dialectical line of attack.

Metapli.

i.

9,

LOGIC

197

to be regarded, not as a passive reception of things

is

given, but rather as an activity for which such reception

is

the occasion,^ then the same must a fortiori be

true of Thought, 2 which has no outward object at

Because our pure thought

not

is

things thought,^ therefore there

lies in its

all.

from the

different

nature as such

knowing with an immediate knowledge


those highest principles, which are presupposed by all
derivative and mediate knowledge as its condition and
starting-point/
So far, then, the soul may be dethe possibility of

'
De An. ii. 5, 417, b, 2 sqq.
Aristotle here says that neither

consciousness nor thought ought


to be called a irdcrx^iv and an
aWoiaxris, unless we distinguish
two kinds of suffering and
change r-fju re eVl ras (TrepriTiKas
Sia64(reis /xcTafioX^v koI ttjv eVi ras
^i5 Kal rriv (pvffiv. Similarly in iii.
5, 429, b, 22 sqq., iii. 7, 431, a, 6.
2 Be An. ii. 417, b, 18
koX rh
KOT ivepyeiav [al(rddve(r0ai]
Se
:

38

b,

^ eV

irpayfia;

iirl

Anal. Post.

ii. 19, 100, b, 8


ovdhv iiTi(Tri\ixris aKpifiecrrepov &Wo yevos t) vovs, al 5'

eVei Se

ctpxcd rcov airodei^ecov yvoopi/xdorepai,

Etll. vi. 6

5'

S'

i'KKrT'fjju.r)

eV ai/rfj

Trios

^vxf}. Sih yo7}(Tai fxkv eV


^ovX-qrai, ataddvcaBai S'
avrc^' avayKoiou yap virdp-

avT^ orav

eV

ovK

X^iv rh
3

alffQifiTov.

De An. iii.

at 430, a, 2 (following the passage to be cited


presently on p. 199, n. 2), he says
192, 3 Kal avrhs Se [o j/oCs] potjtos
iariu SxTirep to. vorjrd. iirl fikv yap
Twv &j/ev v\7]s rh avrS iari rh voovv
Kal rh voovfxcvov t] yap iirtariifxr] t]
Qfii}pr\riK)] Kal rh ovrocs iiriffrrirhv rh
avrS ear IV. Ibid. iii. 7 init. rh S'
avr6 ear IV t] Kar'' ivepyeiav iin(rrij/j.7]
:

T^

Trpdyfiari.

Metajj/i. xii. 7, 1074,

/iierci,

\6yov

ecrri,

apxSov iTrKxr^ifxri (jl\v ovk Uv e^Tj,


eVei S' ovZkv aKT}d4(rrpov eVSe'^erai

ivepyeiau

7}

airaaa

iirKTriifiT) S'
rooti

ivai

ravTa

rS}v apxoov

rh

ovffia Kal rh ri ^v elvai,


7]
5e rcuv Oeo^pT^riKwv 6 x6yos r6
TTpayjxa Kal 7} v67]ais.

Aeyerai r^ decope7v Siacpepei


tov fxlu ra. iroi'QTLKb. ttjs
ivepyelas (^oc0ev, rh 6par6v etc.
aXriov S' on rS)V KaO' eKaarov fj Kar^
ataQ-ncns,

eTriCT^^Tj

iirl

Se, '6ti

iffTi rfi

rj

vArjs

dfiolufs

r&v KaBoXov

ivicov

fikv rcov TTOirjriKciv 6.vv

^iTiffri\ixii]s

Trap'

^ vovv, vovs Uv
ei

iTTicrr'fjiiirjv

eiVj

ovv /xridev &A\o


y4vos
exofiev

a\7]0s, vovs hvetrj iTnari]fi7]s apx^].


:

ry]s

oijr'

tt,v

ovre

(ppdvrjo'is

apxvs rev

CTTio-rij/iiT]

....

eirt (Tttjtoi/

oijre

eirj

rex^V

XeiTr^rai vovv

ehai rcov apxa>v. c. 7, 1141, a, 17,


b, 2, c. 9, 1142, a, 25
(5
fikv yhp
vovs rcov opcov, cov ovk ecrri \6yos.
:

1143, a, 35 (with

c. 12,

which

cf.

Teendblbnbueg, Histor. Beitr.


ii. 375 sqq.
Waltee, Die Lehre
;

V.

])raM.

d.

sqq.)

aficporepa

Vernunft, etc., 38
rcov iaxdrcov 4ir'
Kal yap rcov irpdorcov '6prov

vovs

Kal rcov icTxdrcov vovs iari Kal oh


X6yos, Kal S fxfv Kara ras aTroSd^eis
rcov aKivfircov '6pcov Kal Trpdorcov, 6 S'
ej/ rals TrpaKriKa7s rod i^xdrov Kal
iv5exoiJ.4vov etc.
(More will be

ARISTOTLE

198
scribed as the

'

place of the Ideas,'

of the faculty of

Thought that

said as to the latter, in ch. xi.


and xii. infra.') This recognition of principles is an immediate knowledge (&fi^(rov), for the
root principles of all argument
cannot, in their turn, be proved
(cf Anal. Post. i. 2, 3, 72, a, 7, b,
18 sqq. c, 22, 84, a, 30; ii. 9
i7iit.c. 10, 9-4, a, 9 ar\d3fetaj)h. iv.
more
4, 1006, a, 6, 1011, a, 13
fully later).
But on this very-

De Interpr.
8,

i.

h ovK
Kot t5

ravra ovk
aAA' ^ vo^lv ^ fi-ff
rh
rd Se aKr]dhs rh voeiv avrd
Se x|/eGSos OVK iariv, ouS' airdri],
According to these
aAA' ayvoia.

passages we should understand


by the irpordaeis ^jxiffoi, which express the ultimate principles {An.
i. 2, 23, 33, 72, a, 7, 84, b, 39,
88, b, 36), only those propositions

Post.

which the predicate is already


contained in the subject, not
those in which it attaches to a

in

subject different from itself or


in other words, only analytical
:

prlo7'i

In like
judgments.
bpifffxhs rwv ajxiffoav
10, 94, a, 9) is a diffis

manner the
{iUd. ii.
rod ri iariv

'

rh Tpevdos

effTL

ecrriv aiTarT]Brivai

TTcpl

rh

Kal

'

TOvTOis

ctATjfles
(ixrirep

fj

eJvai ri Kal ivepyeia, Trepi

12

a,

16,

432, a, 11)

immediate knowledge, on the other


hand, is concerned with pure
conceptions relating to no subject
distinct from themselves, which
we can only know or not know,
but as to which we cannot be
deceived
De An. iii. 6 init.
Twv aSiaipTCi}V vSrjcris iv
7] ixkv odu
iii.

airarrjdrjvai yap irepl


QLyydveiv
rd ri iariv ovk iariv dAA.' t) Kara
icrnv 'Sirep
'6cra Stj
avXfiefirjKos

account it is always true. For


error only consists in a false conjunction of perceptions, and hence
arises only in the Proposition by
reason of the conjunction of the
Predicate with a Subject {Cater/.
;

to

Kal
.

fiT]

fioi.

said

ovdh rh
a\r]des iwl rovruv rh avrh, ovrois
ou5e rh clvai, ctW' ecrrt rh fjiev
aXrjdh rh 5e \pevSos, rh fxev 6iye7v
rd 5' ayvo^tv
Kal (pdvai a\r}6hs

\pev5os ;

Dc An.

may be

it

in itself all that is

elvai

/j.^

and

'

it is

aj/a7rJ5et/CTOS,in

which

affirmed as to the
existence or non-existence of a
aA.770es, a-vvO^ais tls ^Stj vorjixdrwv
conception, nor of its connection
us v ovTwv and ibid, at the end
Lastly,
ecTTi 5' 7] fiev (pdcris tI Kara tlvos,
with a stated subject.
Socrirep t] Kardcpacris, Koi a\7}97]S ^
when the principle of contradic6 St vovs ov iras, aAA.'
\|/eu5r?s Traaa
tion (in Metaph. iv. 3 sq. 1005,
6 Tov tI iffri Kara rb tI riv lvai,
b, 11, 1006, a, 3) is designated
aXA' as the fiefiaiordrr] ap^V iraffwv Trepi
aKr]9^s, Kal ov rl /cara rivos
cocnrep rh dpav tov iBiov aXrjdhs, et
%v Sia^tvcrBrivai. aSvvarov, here also
6 &v6pcairo5 rb XcvKhv ^ fiT], ovk
only the fundamental principle
of all analytical judgments is
aXrfdes ael, oiirws ^X^'' '^^'^ &vev
eVei Se
in question the formal identity
v\t]s. 3fetaph. ix. 10
itrX twv
rh
of every conception with itself.
aKriBls ^ t|/6D5os .
1
Be An. iii. 4, 429, a, 27 koL
Trpayfxdrwv icrrl rcf ffvyKelffdai ^
eS S^ ol \4yovre5 r^v ^vxh'' elvai
TTt^r' iarlv fj ovk etrri
SiripTJffdai
roTTov etScSv (see on this Zeller's
rh ahrjOes XeySfxevov ^ xl/evSos
Trepi Sk S^ TO. aaivB^ra rl rh elvai. ^
Plato), irKi\v ^ri oUre SArj aAA'
iv

oh

Se

Koi

i/zeCSos

nothing

t(>

is

'

LOGIC

199

This contained knowledge, however, can


only become actual knowledge in the active exercise of

thinkable.^

cognition.
ence,

It follows, therefore, that, prior to experi-

cannot be in the soul except in the way of a

it

and a basis

possibility

and

so,

according to him,

it is,

in virtue of the fact that the soul has the faculty of

forming

notions out of itself by

its

its

own

inherent

activity.^
ovre

vor}TiK^,

71

rh

Svvd/xei

De An.

^vxns

irepi

iii.

TO.

<pa\ai(a(TavTs

8'

7]

5'

irdos

iirKTT'fifn] fikv to.


a^a-drja-is

5/w.

iii.

aWh

rd

vvv 5e
(TvyKe-

irdKiv

on

iffri irdvra.

rh ovra

'yap al(rdr]Ta

7]

8 init.

XexOepra

f^Trca/iifv

ovra

TO.

\l/vx^

evreAexeto

cfSr;.

Nous

vo-qrh, effri

rj

iirKrrTjTd

aladrjrd.

ircos,

(Cf

ii.

7 init.)

De An.

airaOes

rj

iii.
4, 429, a, 15
&pa Se? ehai [before the
experiences the effect of
:

the voTjThv, it must be without


vdOos cf. BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 72, a,
36 sqq.], Scktikov Se tov eWovs
;

Koi

roiovrov [sc. olov rh


/ni]
tovto, Kal bjxoioos

SvvdfjLei

dAAa

elSos]

rh aiadrjTiKhv irphs rd
ovtw rdv vovv irpds rd

yet learned nothing, but possesses


the capacity for learning something, but also when he knows

something, but has not at a


given moment this knowledge
actually present to his mind.
It
was in the latter sense that
Plato conceived of innate knowledge,whereas Aristotle conceived
of it under the former analogy.
This is the meaning of his comparison of the soul with the book
that is not yet written on and it
was a misapprehension when this
comparison was understood in
the sense of the later Sensation-theory of knowledge. (Cf.
Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 342
:

Trendelenbueg, on

ex^i'V, (iiCTT^p

sq.;

ai(rdr]Td,

passage, p.

vofjTd

dpa KaAovuei/os

^vxvs vovs.

rrjs

ovQiv iariu evepyda

ru)V OVT03V trpXv voe7v

Kal v

5)j

etc. (vid. sujjr. p. 198, n.l). Ihid.


b, 30
Swd/iei irds icrri rd vo7]rd 6
:

vovs,
tt,v

aAA' epreXcx^ia ovSeu,


Se?

vofj.

ypa/x/jLaTeici}

S'

ovTcos

firjOev

irplv

^o'lrep

iv

inrdpx^i- ^vre-

Aexefos ycypa/x/xevov. Hirep av/xfiaipei

TOV vov. Here (b, 5) and in


417, a, 21 sqq. a still more
accurate distinction is made
between two meanings of the
4ir\

ii.

5,

dvvdfjLci

we can

iiTKTT'fjfji.uv

call a

man Swdfiei

not only when he has as

485 sq.)

this
Aristotle

only wants to illustrate by it the


difference between the Svydfiet
and ivcpyeia.. He does not here
go on to inform us in what way
potential

knowledge

becomes

But, according to what


has gone before (429, a, 15), it is
not the alad-nrd but the vo-nrd by
whose action the tablet of the
VOVS, blank in itself, is written
upon, so that we have to deal
in fact with a theory far removed from the Sensationphilosophy.
actual.

ARISTOTLE

200

Tlirougliout his whole treatment of this question,

there runs a certain obscurity, the grounds of which

can of course indicate, but which

we cannot

we

altogether

remove without doing violence to the statements of the


Master himself. On the one ha^nd, Aristotle contests
the possibility of any innate knowledge, and insists that

On the other
hand, he speaks of an immediate knowledge of those
our notions arise out of perception.^

all

truths on which

others depend,^ and allows that all

all

the knowledge which in the course of our lives


lay

in

our soul from

course^ this last view

the soul, prior to


said

is

we gain
Of

beginning in germ.^

not to be taken to imply that

all

experience, carried in itself the

knowledge in so

far as the content thereof is con-

cerned, or

that the

merely to cause
'

the

it

Cf. pp. 195 sq.,


p. 197, n. 4.

function of such experience was

to be brought out into consciousness.'*

205

sq.

Cf. pp. 196, n. 1, 197, n. 2,


198, n. 1, and 199, n. 1.
*
There is no necessity to interpret in that sense the passages
given above.
On the contrary,
when he says in Be An. iii. 8
{sujjra, p. 199, n. 1) that the soul
is in a certain sense everything,'
'

he immediately explains this


phrase by adding (431, b, 28)
audyKY] 5' ^ avTa
ra e^Sr? ehai.
avTO. jxlv yap St] ov oh yap 6 KiQos
eV T^ ^vXVi o.KKa t6 eI5os
uare rj
Ka\ yap
^pvxh oocnrep t] xeip eVrtj/
:

-fj

'

xetp opyavov iariv opyduoop, Ka\


6 uovs eldos elBwv Kal r, a^aOrjcns

T]

eWos at(T6r]ruu. Since the hand


indeed forms and uses the tools,
but still can only form them from
some given material, this comparison does not carry us further

than the thought that the soul is


everything inasmuch as it is
capable of having the forms (or
images) of all things within
itself.
That it produces them out
of itself is not stated. On the contrary, as the power of perception
is called eldos alaOrjruu, because
it receives into itself the forms
of the al(rdr}Td, so the vovs may,
in the same sense, be called elSos
t5wv, inasmuch as it is the faculty
to receive the insensible forms
and rdiros eldwv (p. 198, n. 1) may
be taken in the same sense. The

statement that universals are in


the soul itself (in Be An. ii. 5,
cited at p. 197,n. 2), occurs in a
passage which has no reference to
the growth of knowledge in itself, but where Aristotle is endeavouring to illustrate the progress
from the power of perception to
'

'

LOGIC
For

this

201

would take us back again to the theory of


which Aristotle so decidedly rejects.

innate ideas

would be equally wrong, however, to make him a


Empiricist, and attribute to him the view that

It

pure

the Universal,

'

without any limitation, comes to the

soul from the external world.' ^

If this were his view, he


could not possibly have derived the highest concepts
of all
the 'prind^ia of all knowledge
from that
faculty of immediate cognition by which the Ilous is,

according to him, distinguished from

thinking activity .^

all

other forms of

which
by an ascent from individuals to
universals, cannot be the data of any immediate kind of
knowledge, but must be data of that kind of knowledge
which is the most entirely mediate of all. Our cognitive

we can only come

faculties,

he

at these

prmdjpia

I'or it is plain that concepts

at

asserts, do, in fact,

take this

way

to arrive

but he cannot have regarded the

-,

thoughts in which these prindjoia come for us into


consciousness as the mere precipitate of a progressively
refined experience, or the act

by which we present them

to ourselves as only the last of these successive geneactual perception by the relation
of eVio-TTj/iTj^to the d^wptlv (p. 417,
b, 5 6ecopovv yap ylyverai rh exov
tV eTTiffT-fifi-np). Finally, in Anal,
Post. ii. 19 (cited at p. 197, n. 4,,9wpro) Aristotle says it is impossible to believe that we should
come to the knowledge of the
highest principles, without possessing previous knowledge but he
looks for that previous knowledge
not in any ideas innate in the
soul prior to all experience, but
simply in the inductive process.
:

Of, infra, ch. v.

ad pi.

As Kampe {ErTienntnisstheorie d. Arist. p. 192) objects,


not without reason, though his
citation of Metaph. i. 9, 993, a,
7 sqq. is not in point.
'

2 gQ Kampe, ibid.
but it is
hard to reconcile with this exposition his attempt in the next
following pages to reduce that
true perception which is, for Aristotle, the basis of all knowledge
to some kind of Intuitive Thought,
essentially differing both from
;

Knowledge and Opinion.


3

Onthisseep.l97,n.4,sj^j7m.

ARISTOTLE

202

upon a matter given in experience. Each


of these generalisations consists in an induction,^ the
result of which can only be expressed as a judgment
and a conclusion, and which therefore is, like all
ralisations

judgments, either

on the other

But,

or true.

false

by him
mediate cognition, and what we
attain by it is not judgments but ideas
not that which
may be either false or true, but that which is always
that which we may either have or not have, but
true

hand, the activity of the Nous in knowledge


distinguished from

is

all

as to which, if

we have

again, as

induction starts from perception, which

all

it,

has relation to that which

Matter and

sensible,

is

tingency, the

all

that

So,

compounded of Form and


and as the quality of conbeing and not-being,

is

Matter, ^ therefore by induc-

is

we can never

deceived.^

is

possibility of

inseparable from
tion alone

we cannot be

attain to anything

which

is

For those ideas which rest


entirely on experience can have no higher certainty
than that on which they rest. But of the knowledge
of the ^rincijpia^ Aristotle holds that it is of all knowledge the most certain,'' and he will allow nothing to
rank among the jprincipia except what is necessarily
unconditionally necessary.

It follows, then, that the

true.^

immediate knowledge

referred to can only be an intuition

and

that

it

only be a spiritual intuition, as contrasted with


sensible

perception.

these ideas innate in


'

But the
itself.

Cf. p. 197, n. 4.
^ Cf infra in the second part
of eh. vii., and the notes there
on these points.
.

man

has

all

not;

Therefore, the intuition by

About which seech. v.i^r.

spirit of

can

Anal. Post.
25 sqq. ;

72, a,

2,

i.

ii.

71, b, 19,
100, b,

19,

9.
^

Anal. Post.

i.

6 init.

LOGIC

203

them cannot consist in any self-intuition


making us conscious of the
principia as of a truth already within us.^
It must be
something whereby certain thoughts and ideas arise
through an action of that which is thought upon the
spirit thinking it, in some way analogous to that in
which

finds

it

or act of introspection,

which perception
is

arises

through an action of that which

And

perceived upon the percipient.

Aristotle does,

in fact, base himself on this very analogy

that the Nous

the perceivable
it

touches

'

'

it

or that

when he

related to the thinkable as sense

is

it

says
is

to

knows the thinkable because


must be

or that as perception in itself

always true, so must thought be, in so far as

relates

it

to ideas as such."^

In

this

moment

way we

intelligible

questions remain

get a theory which

and

consistent.

wholly unanswered

the

for

is

But the further

What

this,

is

which we get the principia of all


mediate knowledge and the most universal of all ideas
and axioms ? What kind of being belongs to it ? In

by the

intuition of

what way does

it

act

upon our

Of what

spirit ?

Do

sort

are these principia which

we

This was Zeller's


his second edition.

doubtless, the
first
of
these
passages, Theophrastus also says
in Fr. 12 (Metaj)h.) 25
'If we
begin with observation we can,
up to a certain point, explain
things from their causes: oTav Se
eir' avrci ra &Kpa ficTaBaivcD/jLev ovk4ri dvvd/neda, either because these
have no causes, or because our

Be An.

see p.

iii.

4,

view in

429, a, 15

Metaph. ix. 10, 1051, b, 24


(vid. supr. p. 197, n. 4): inpercep3

tion of the aavvOera is rh fihv


Qvyelv KoX (pdvai aXriQis ... rh 5'
ayvoeTv /x^ Qiyyaveiv ; xii. 7, 1072,
b, 20: avrhv 5e voe? & vovs [the
divine vovs] Karh fji.erd\r)^iv tov
vo7\Tov
[by taking itself as a
vo'r]T6v]
voriros
yhp
yiyveTai
Qiyydvuv Kal voccu. Eemembering,

so

attain ?

all

of

eye cannot see in a full light, tc^xo


5' eKeTvo a\T]d4(rTpov &s avr^ r^ v^
^

deoopia Biyovri koI oTou


*

De An.

iii.

si^r. p. 197, n. 4.

a\pa/j.4vcf}.''

6 Jin.

cited

ARISTOTLE

204

them merely express the formal laws of thought

(as

does the law of contradiction), or are there also metaphysical ideas which are so given, such as the ideas of

Being, of Cause, of

God ?

This might prove to be a

natural conclusion from the theory of Aristotle

but it
would take us very near to the Platonic teaching as to
the

intuition

Aristotle the

the

of
'

Forms

Ideas,
'

except

that,

since

for

of things could not belong to

another world, the intuition of them would necessarily

be transferred also from the future to the present.

The

explanation of Aristotle's want of clear-

final

ness on this subject

is,

however, to be found in the fact

that he had only half emancipated himself, as


see,

we

from Plato's tendency to hypostatise ideas.

'Forms' had

for

shall

The

him, as the 'Ideas' had for Plato, a

metaphysical existence of their own, as conditioning


individual

And

things.

all

keenly as he followed the

growth of ideas out of experience,

it is

none the

less

true that these ideas, especially at the point where they


are farthest

perception,

removed from experience and immediate


metamorphosed in the end from a

are

human thought into an immediate


presentment of a supersensible world, and the object,
logical

product of

in that sense, of an intellectual intuition.

Plato conceived that the picture of the Ideas which

slumbers within us could only awake to any sensible


intuition

by

an

actual

spiritual eye could only

light of the

So

with

Ideas by

Aristotle

is

recollection,

accustom

and

that

itself to receive

the

the

a long course of preparation.


it

self-evident

that

at

the

beginning of our spiritual development we are at the

LOGIC

ii05

farthest possible distance from that

knowledge which is
and that consequently our ascent to knowledge can only come by a gradual approximation to
that goal, through a progressive deepening of our
goal

its

comprehension, advancing from particulars to universals,

from phenomena to the essence, from

effects to causes.

Knowledge, which we neither possess as a perfect gift


of nature nor derive as a consequence from something
higher than itself, must issue out of that which is
lower: that

is,

time of our ideas

in

therefore exactly the inverse of

is

That which

their logical order.

relatively to

The development

out of Perception.^

us last;

is

absolutely

first

and whereas by virtue of

nature the universal has

is

its

than the

greater certainty

and the principle than the deductions which


depend upon it, yet individuals and things of sense have
more of certainty for us.^ And in like manner we find/

particular,

Anal. Post. ii. 19, 100, a,


ovr^ 5^ iuvTrdpxovffiv acpoopiffjueVat at e|eis(?i<:^.swy;r. 196, n. 1),
out' ott' &XK(jt)v
e^eup
yivovrai
yvuxTTiKocrepooy, aAA' aird alaO'fi

10

o-ecos.

S'

ttjs
yvwpifxwrepa rot iyyvrepov
alad-fjcrecvs, ottAws 5e irpdrepa Kol
yvctipifidiirepa rcL iroppdirepov ecTTt
be iroppuiT(xrw jxev rcL KaOoAov fidXiara, iyyvrdrco 5e rci, KaO' eKacrTa.
Phys. i. 1, 184, a, 16 Tre'^uKC Se
:

6/c

Koi

5 fin.

a,

23

Cf.

Metaph.

2, 982,
29 sqq.
1029, b, 4 sqq.; ix. 8,
1050, a, 4 Toj?. vi. 4, 141, b, 3,
De An. ii. 2 iniL, iii. 7,
22
init.
Eth. i. 2, 1095, b, 2. (Still
more forcibly, referring rather,
however, to PLATO, Pep. vii.
init. than to Aristotle, is it expressed in MetapJi. ii. 1, 993, b,
i).)
The apparent contradiclion
in PIli/s. i. 1
ecTt 5' rjfui/ Trpurou brjka koI (racprj rci avyKexv/iifua

vii.

i.

v. 11, 1018, b,

4,

Anal. Post.

i. 2, 71, h, 33: It p6iarl Kalyvci}pifjidiTepa5ix(>}s'


ou yd,p ravTov trpSTepov rfj (pvaei
Koi TTpds Tj/LLas TTpoTepov ou5e Yt-copijxwnpov Kal rjfiiu yuccpifidorepov
\4yoi 5e irpos rjfxas (jlIv irpdrepa Kctl

Tepa

i.

Tuv

yvcopi/xwrdpcav rjfuu

(Tacpea-rfpoov

T77 (j)v<Ti

iirl

r]

65o's

TCi (xacpeffTcpa

Kal yvwpifjLcaTepa

oi)

ydp

Tavrci 7]fuv re yvdipifxa koX ornXSts

fxaWov
^jai

'

vcrrepou

yvdopi^a

rd.

5' e/c

tovtoov yiv-

(rroix^^a

Kal

ai

apxcu SiaLpovffi ravra.


Sid e/c ruv
Ka96\ov iirl to. KaO' eKacrra 5e7
irpo'Uvai. rh ydp
'6\ov Kara r7,v
aiadficnv yuapi/jLcarepov, rh 5e KaO6Xov '6\ov rl eariv
iroWh yap
TrepiXafifidvei cos /xepr} rh Ka66\ov, is
only a verbal ambiguity. For (as
'

ARISTOTLE

206

that the kind of proof which proceeds from the particular

than a deduction from the general.^


which actual knowledge is evolved from
the rudimentary possibilities of knowledge is this. The
first stage is always, as we have remarked, sensible
is

to us

more

The way

clear

in

Without this we can have no actual thought.^

perception.

The man who is deprived of one of the organs of sense


must of necessity also lack all the corresponding knowaxioms of every kind of science

ledge, for the general

can only
rests

be discovered by induction, and induction

Now

upon perception.^

particular things are the

proper objects of perception ^ but inasmuch as a


universal, although it may be as yet undistinguished,
;

is

contained in every particular, therefore perception

with universals.^

is also conversant mediately

speak more

accurately,

Or, to

what the senses perceive

not

is,

the individual substance of the particular as such, but


rather certain of

These again are re-

properties.

its

lated to the particular substance after the


universal, for they are not a

Tkendblenburg on
An.

p. 338,

De

Arist.

and Eitter,

05,
it is not the logical,
iii.

definite presentation of
as when, for instance,

ele-

Anal. Pr.

ii.

of a

such

ovv TrpSrepos Kal yi/copifKarepos


Tov fi4crov avKXoyKTixhs, ijfuv
ivapy4(TTcpos 6 Slo, rrjs iirayoDyrjs.

6 Sia
S'

fi^ fier' ata-drjcreajs ovra.

object,
repreas such,

1078, a, 9.
23 fin.: (pvcH

c. 3,

'

an

however, the simple

1076, b, 18,

manner

(johs) but a

we

ments are always prior to that


which is made up of them Be
Metaph.
Ccelo, ii. 3, 286, b, 16
xiii. 2,

'

2 De An. iii. 8, 432, a, 4


(vid.
supr. p. 195, n. 1). De Sensu, c. 6,
445, b, 16 ouSe vo^'id vovs rh eKrhs

sent to ourselves a body


before we clearly distinguish its
themIn
constituent parts.
selves,

this

fiev

etc. remark)
but the sensihle universal which is
here dealt with the as yet_ in-

'

3
*

An. Post. i.
An. Post. i.

Kad' '^KUffTov

7}

18.

18, 81, b, 6

aXixdrja-is.

roJv

The same

idea recurs frequently, e.g. An.


Post. i. 2 (vid. supr. p. 205, n. 2),
c. 31 (vide p. 207, n. 1), Phys. i. 5

Be An.

Jin.,

MetapTi.
^

i.

1,

Be An.

417, b, 22, 27,


981, a, 15.
iii. 8, as at p. 196, n. 1.
iii. 5,

LOGIC

207

{roLovhs)
and although in perception they never come
under our intuition in the form of a universal, but
always as belonging to this or that thing, and in a
;

definite individual instance, yet still they are virtually

and out of our perception of them the

universals,

thought of the universal can be developed.^ Now the


way in which it is developed is this. In sensible perception itself the several sensible properties,
fore also the relative universals,

vidual substance, are discriminated.^


tion

is

An. Post.

eariu

31, init.

i.

iiriffracrdai.

ouSe
et

5i'

ykp

%(mv 7] aXffdrjiTis rod roiovSe


TovSe T IV s [only the rSSe,
however, is an individual subKoi

Koifi^

stance

ovdhv (Ttifiaiv^i tSov Koivrj


KOTtiyopov^^vciv rdSe ri aWa toiSpSe; Metaph. vii. 13, 1039, a, 1 of
which more infrd], aA.A' alaQdveadal ye avayKoiov rJSe rt k(iL tcov
Ka\ vvv. rh Se KadSXov /col iirl iraffiv
aSvuaTOv atcrOdveaOai. ov yap rc^Se
ouSe vvv. ov yap hv ^v KadoXov
iirel oZv at fihv O7ro56t|ets
.
KadShov, ravra 5' ovk ecrriv aladdv:

ecrdai,
Si'

<f)avephv

alffd^ffeus

100,
KaB''

a,

ov

17:

'6ri

ouS' iirlaraffdai

eoTTiv.
So in ii. 1 9,
alcrddveTai jxkv rh

fKuaTov, ^

KadoXov

S'

aXaQriffis

KaWia

rov

avOpdirov, aAA'

icrrlv, oJov

avdpccirov

i. e.

Percep-

has, it is true, a definite


individual Kallias for its immediate object; but what it gives
us is the image of a man with
these definite properties, and the
circumstance of this man's being
Kallias has no influence upon the
content of our perception. Cf.
tion,

further
sqq.;

Out of such percep-

next developed by the help of

alffd-ffo-eas

De An.

ii.

and Ph7/s. i. 5,

12,

424, a, 21

189, a,

5.

What

and there-

which inhere in the indi-

memory

a general

is said in the text will establish


the agreement of these passages
with the general doctrine of
Aristotle, about which Heider

{Vergl. d. Aristotel. imd HegeVscJien DialeMiTi, i. 160, sqq.)

makes too much difficulty.


does Metaph. xiii. 10, 1087,

Nor

15
contradict it, as Kampe
believes {ErTtenntnissth. d. Ar.
It is there said that know85).
ledge as Zvvaixis is tov KaddXov
a,

sqq.

Kal aopicTOv, t] 5' ivepyeia upifffievrf


Koi ODpifffievov rdSe ri odaa, rovS4

All that this states is that


the capability of knowing extends
to everything that is knowable,
but that every actual perception
is the perception of a definite
object; and whether this object
is an individual or a universal
conception does not enter into the
question.
KadSXov here signifies
the indefinite,' as to which cf
xii. 4, 1070, a, 32
Gen. An. ii. 8,
748, a, 7 Mh. ii. 7, 1107, a, 29.
Tivos.

'

De An.

Hence the
ii.

iii. 2,

a'ia-dvais

19, 99, b, 35, cf.

428,

a,

S{/vafiis

426, b, 8 sqq.
in An. Post.

De An.

iii.

3,

9 init., is called a
avfKpvTos KpiriK-fj.
4,

c.

ARISTOTLE

208

representation, for that which has steadily recurred in


several perceptions

Thus

and retained by the mind.

fixed

is

arise in the first place experience,

and next, when

several experiences have condensed into general princi-

and science

ples, art

also, until at last

universal principles of

all

comprehension

a scientific

is

only to be gained by a

same process

farther methodical repetition of the

other words, by induction.

The

result

may

in

be put

sought to get at the Idea by turning

Plato

thus.

we reach the most


like manner

and of these in

from the phenomenal world, on


most that was to be seen
was a reflection of the idea and not the idea itAristotle's theory of the ascent to knowledge rests
self.
it, on the contrary, rather upon a striving after the

the mental eye awaij

which,

view, the

in his

universal element in appearances as such.

words, while both

and

abstraction from the

reflection

To Plato the

different.

k^yofxev,

e'/c

KaKis Tov avTuv


at

Se ^vi^ix-qs ivoK-

yivo/j.vr)S e/xTreipta.

yap ttoWoI

/xurjixai

to)

apiOfjiw

i/jLireipia fxia iffTiv. e/c 5' ifXTreipias

fj

Travrhs 7}peiJ.i,aavTos tov KaOoXov


iv T?7 4"^X??' '^^^ ^vhs 7rapaT(i TToAAa,
h h.u eV airaaiv ev ivrj (Keivoif rh
efc

Kal

cvTh, TfX^VS

apxh

iku fxev

yevecriv,

-Trepi

e7rj(7T'i';|Ui?s,

Tex^V^j

^^^

5e Trepl rh ov, eTTicTTTjjUTjs. Metajtli.


yiyuerai 5' e/c ttjs
1, 980, b, 28
jUJ/7;|U7js ejximpia tols avQpwirois' at
i.

yap rroXXal

ixv9\jxai

from the given

abstraction

A7ial. Post. ii. 19, 100, a, 2


iK jxev oZv alcrOrjcreciis jiueTai uuxfxr},
1

uiO-irep

imme-

on the underlying universal,


the relation between the two elements is quite

diate data
still

demand

In other

tov avTOv irpay-

fxaTOS fuas ^jxiveipias hvvaixiv attoTiKoixriv .... aiTofiaivii 5' iiTLffT'fjfJ.'q

Kal

avdpcvTTOis

oTav

Sia tt]s

re'xJ'Tj

e/c

....

ifnreipias

yiveTai Se

toIs

Texj/77,

iroWctiu Trjs efXTreiplas eufor}-

fiaTcov fiia

Ka06\ov yevr]Tai irepl twv


rb /xu yap ^x^iv

ojiioicov inr6\ri\pts.

vTToXriypLV oti

T^j/

v6(Tov

KaAA.ia KaixvovTi ttj/'SI


To52
(rvi'ijVeyKe
Kal

^wKpaT^i Kal
KaOeKaaTou ovtw
TToAAots, i/LLireipias iffTiv Th 5' oti
jraai

toIs

war'

TOLo7a-Se

a<popL<T97ai,

Kdfxvovcn

elSo^
tt/j/SI

eu

tV

v6(rou, crvfTiveyKev,
Texvns. In
the same passages is also found
more to the like purpose. In
Phys. vii. 3, 247, b, we have, /c
yap TTjy KaTa juepos ifiweipias rrjv
KaQoKov Kafjifidvouev TTi(TTi)(xT]v.
.

LOGIC
is

the

and only on the presupposition

thing,

first

20d

of such abstraction will he recognise the possibility of

coming to any knowledge of universal essence at all. To


mind upon the common
essence of the empirical data is the main point, and it
is only as an inevitable consequence of this that abstracAristotle the direction of the

tion

from the particulars of sense comes

like

reason,

Aristotle

For a

in.

defends the truth of the

also

knowledge derived by sensation against the objectors


he shows that, notwithstanding the contradictions
and deceptions of the senses, a true perception is still
for

and that the actuality of what we perceive is


beyond doubt, although its value is relative in a word,
possible,

that the doubts attaching to sensible perception^ are due


solely to

He

want of caution

us astray, and that it


judgments that we are

the use

Cf.

7' atcrdrjais at/ri]

eavrrjs iffriv,

we make
itself

of

it.^

never leads

our imaginations and our

is in
first

Metaph. iv. 5, 6, 1010, b,


sqq., where, among other things
(1010, b, 30 sqq.), it is stated
that although we might say in a
certain sense that without a perceiving being there would be no
atVflijTck as such, still it is impossible to say that without the
ou(rQif](ns the viroKelixei/a & Trotei t^v
oh -yap
ai<TQr]<Tiv could not exist
1

in^

even maintains that perception of

exposed to error.
yap auaipeOeuros aXaQriais mev avaipeirai,
ffai/xa,

5e

alffdTirhv
dcpfxhv,

raWa oaa

earrai,

yXvKi),

iriKphu

oTov
Kal

icrrlv alo'drjrd.

To this refer Metaph. iv. 5,


1010, b, 3 sqq., 14 sqq.; xi. 6,
1062, b, 13 sqq.
3 De A71. iii. 3. 427, b,
11: ^
2

yap

fxeu

a\r]97)s

dtadrjais

Kal

ru>v

iraaiv

ISiwu

vtrapx^i-

del

roTs

C^ois, SiauoeTadai

5'

oAA.'

^pevSais Kal ohSevl

virdpx^i'

oX(tQt]<tiv,

\6yos.
Ibid. 428, a, 11
al jxhv
[the al(rdi\(reis'\ aXr]9e7s aUl, al 5k
(papraaiai
yivovrai
al
ttK^iovs

h)]

r}

eCTt ri koX ercpov Trapa Tr]U


% avdyKT] irpOTepov e?j/ai
rrjs aladija-ews' rh yap kiuovv rov
Kiuovfievov TTporepSu iffri. Likewise
Cat. c. 7, 7, b, 36 t^ yhp aiadr]Thu
TrpoTepop rrjs alo'O'fja'eccs Sokc? eJvai.
rh ixhy yap alcdrjThv dj/aipcdkv ffvu:

ai/atpelrV aiadrjaiy,
aladr^rhv

VOL.

oh
I.

r)

5e a^ffdrjcns rh

awavaipil

^(^ov

eV5e;;^6Taj

/J.^

Kal
Kal

li^euSeTs.

Similarly

418, a, 11
1010, b,
7] aiadrjcris ^evS^s rov iSiov
iarlv, oAA' t] (pavratria ov ravrhp

sqq.

rp

ii. 6,

and in Metaxjh. iv.

oh'S

alad-f](rei.

5,

ARISTOTLE

210

He

sliows in fact that simple-minded confidence in

the truth of sensible perceptions which

This

every uncritical consciousness.

is

is

natural to

in

notion as the other Greeks of


into the part

construction

making any

who

attributed so high a value to

and the naturalist who required

sufficient account of the attacks

senses.2

which some of his pre-

had made upon


Of course he does not seek

See the account of Aristotle's


theory of sensation, infra, ch. x.

ad fin.
It

so wide a

be expected to take

the trastworthiness of the

'

simply

while, on the other

basis of empirical facts, could hardly

decessors

it

upon us whereby they

impress their images upon the soul

observation,

close inquiry

experience, and refers

to an operation of the objects

hand, the philosopher

little

activity plays in the

which a subjective
of our

case

his

the more easy to understand because he has as

has been shown at

p. 209,

n.l, how Aristotle, in Cat. 7, treats

as given objectively even those


sensible properties which Democritus had already shown to be
merely subjective (Zell. Ph. d.
Gr. i. 772, 1. 783, 2). Similarly
in Phys. viii. 3, in combating the
opinion (of Parmenides), irdvra
7ip/xe7u, he f ollow^s up the striking
remark (254, a, 30) that such
a view could not explain 5d|a
and (pavTaffia as movements of

the soul (it would have been more


exact to say of the changing series of mental images') with the
sweeping observation that to investigate such a view is Qn'^^lv
x6yov &u fisXTiou exo/Jt-ev ^ Xoyou
deTadai, and kukus Kpiveiv rh iriaThv
Koi rhfii] TTLffrhu Koi apxhv Koi fx)) apxhv. The same objection holds, in
his opinion against the theories
'

to

deny the delu-

that everything is always being


moved, or that one thing is always
moved and another never, -nphs
airaura yap ravra Ikuvt] fiia Tricrris
opw/xep yap evia orh /jlcv Kivo^fxeua
'

ore 5' rfpe/j-ovvTa. IMd. 258, a, 33,


in opposing the doctrine iravr
r]pfxe7i^,

he

Sciji>,rovTOv ^rjrelu

X6yov

a(pvras rT]V alcrQ-qaiv, appcjcrria ris

iari Siavoias, and such speculations

seem to
natural.

him abnormal and non-

All such questions as


are
are
in our sound senses, &c., Aristotle
considers altogether misleading

how we know whether we


awake or asleep, whether we

yap \6yov a^iovaiv ovtoi


\6yov yap (rjTova-iv wv
x6yos' airodei^ews yap
ecTTt

TTOLVTccv

elvai
oiiK

apxn ovK

airobei^ls i(TTi.

[Metajjh.

below, p.
247, u, 2). He thinks it a self-evident proposition that we can only
decide upon the sensible properas upon the good
ties of things
ard the evil, the beautiful and the
iv. 6,

1011, a, 8 sqq.

cf.

LOGIC

211

sions of sense, but he believes that our sensations, as

are not to blame.

such,

He

holds that each sense

represents to us always, or almost always, with truth


the special colour, sound, etc., which it perceives, but
that illusion

arises in the referring of these pro-

first

perties to definite objects,

of that which
that which

is

and in the discriminating

immediately given in perception from


only got by abstraction therefrom.^
is

To these

views, then, as to the nature or origin of


knowledge, the arrangement of Aristotle's theory of

knowledge

scientific

his Analytics

corresponds.

It is

the function of Science to explain the phenomena by

which must be sought


and Laws. The deduction,

their principles,

for in the

versal Causes

therefore, of the

in

a normal state of the


senses and the mind.
In this sense Aristotle him-

ugly
'

self illustrates

De An.
rwv

iii.

his principle in
428, b, 18 -^ aUe-^ffis

3,

iSiav a\7]di,s

fjLeu

icTTiv

fj

'6ti

oXiyKTrov exovaa rb xl/evSos. 5evrepov Se rod (TUyU^eySTjKeVot ToCra"


Kal ivTuvda ^5i] ivSex^rai 5iai|/eu-

yap \VKhu, ov
tovto rb K^VKhv,
fj
&\\o Ti [whether the white
thing is, e.g., a cloth or a wall],
|/euS6Tat. (So also at the end of
OTi

SfcrOai'

//eu5eTot,

C.

eTTO/ieVcoi/

virdpx^i
Kivriais

kKacrrt]

iv

aur^)

rtf

XpofCf wepl rh avro ouSeTrore


a/xa ovrca Kal
ovx ovtois

aAA' ouS' iv irdpcp xpov(f

dXXa

<pi](riv

^x^'-^'
irepl rh

irdOos

^ (TvfifiifirjKe rh irdOos. The same


wine may taste to us at one

Se

twv

kqivSov

aviJ.^efir}K6(riu,

\4y(a

'iSia'

Kal /j-eycOos,

&

5'

a-KaT7]0rivai

r^v

Karb.

(About these

'r]jjL(\)i(Tfii,T7](T^v,

ovSeTTdoTTOTe fieTifiaAev,

devi

a'(<T-

rh

oh

^'Stj

irepl

time sweet, at another not dAA'


ov t6 ye y\vKv oT6v i<TTiv (irav ^,

Kal
olov

(rv/x04fiT]Ke

ToTs al(rdr]TO?s Tcepl & ixdhiara


eerrtv

\aX(TQi\(mav\

Se

Toh
TO.

We

1010, b, 14.
can only
trust the deliverance of each
sense with regard to its own
particular objects, those of sight
with regard to colour, &c. wv
5,

fji^v

rpirov

6.)

Uni-

irepl

oAA' dei dAr;avrov Kal eariv e| av-

dyK-qs rh icrofxevov

y\vKv roiovrov.
Perception shows us primarily
(as has been already said on
pp. 206-7) only certain sets of

see
De Sensu, c. i. 437, a, 8.)
Sensu, iv. 442, b, 8 irepi (x(v
TovTuv [the Koiva just mentioned]
aTTUTUi'Tai, Trepi 5e ruu iSicov ouk
airaTuvTai, olov o\pis nepl xP^^o-tos

Ihe subjects to which


these qualities belong are not
immediately and exclusively determined by perception nor are
those other properties which are
only inferred from what we per-

kjX

ceive.

B7](Tiv.

Koivh

also

De

olko)] Iff pi \^6(p(av.

Metai^Ti. iv.

qualities.

p 2

ARISTOTLE

212

and of effects from causes,


word Bemonstration^ forms the task of Science

particular from the universal

or in one
for in

such deduction, according to Aristotle, consists

all

The premises, however, from which these deducmust start cannot be themselves deduced by
Nor are they immediately given
the same method.
in any innate kind of knowledge. It is only by working
upwards from phenomena that we can reach the principles
only from particulars that we can
that underlie them
rise to universals. To do this scientifically is the business
of Induction. Demonstration and Induction are accordingly the two component parts of the scientific process,
Both,
and the essential subjects of Methodology.
Proof.

tive proofs

however, presuppose the general elements of Thought,

and cannot be explained without a knowledge of them.


Aristotle, therefore, prefaces his theory of

an examination of the Syllogism

Proof with

and in connection

with this he finds himself compelled to go more closely


into the nature of the

Judgment and the

Proposition, as

being the component parts of the Syllogism.


not

till

a later period of his

work

(as

plained) that he went on to treat

even then this part of


undeveloped.

liis

we have

them

It

was

already ex-

separately,

and

Logic remained distinctly

The same remark

applies

strongly to his doctrine of Concepts.^

still

more

Nevertheless,

it is

with these last that we must begin, in order to proceed


thereafter to the theory of judgments, and lastly to the

Syllogism

inasmuch

as certain

definite

presupposed by

concepts are always

discussion of Syllogistic Logic.


'

Cf pp. 192 sqq.


.

views as to

Aristotle in his

LOGIC

213

was the searcli for general concepts which gave


philosophy under Socrates that new direction which
It

to

not only

Plato

essentials.

As

but

generally

Aristotle,

also

Aristotle

followed

a natural result of this,

speaking,

we

in

all

find that

takes for granted the

Socratico-Platonic theory of the nature of concepts and

the problem of abstract thought.^

him

But

as

we

shall find

in his metaphysics contradicting Plato's doctrine

of the independent reality of the Universal which we


think in the Concept, so also in the matter of the
logical handling of concepts he feels it necessary in

connection with this criticism to obtain more accurate


and definite conclusions on many points.^ Plato had
required that in conceptual definition attention should

be restricted to the essential as opposed to the accidental


properties of things

exalted

all

and yet

same time he had

at the

general notions to an absolute independence

any further distinction between conceptions of property and substance.^


This distinction
as Ideas, without

Aristotle introduces, for to him, as

vidual thing alone

is

we

shall see, the indi-

But he does not merely

Substance.

He

separate the accidental from the essential.^


and 172

Cf. pp. 162 sq.

For the following, besides

Prantl

{Gesch.

sq.

Log. 1. 210
other general
KUHN, De Notionis
d.

cf.

Anal. Post.

Top.
7,

5,

i.

c.

i.

c.

34 sqq,

Metajph. v.
18, 1002, a, 24

102, b, 4

init.,

goes on

4, 73, a,
;

sqq.),

and the

sqq., c. 30, 1025, a, 14, 28, c. 6

works,

cf.

init.

Bvfinitione qual. Arist. constituerit, Halle, 1844


Rassow, Arist.
de JVotionis Definitione Doctrina,
Berl. 1843.
* See Zell. P/i. d. Gr.
pt. i.
;

p.

518

sq.

584 sqq.
* As to the distinction of the
iTvfAfiefi-qKhs from the
Kad' avrh
/Ji<?.

Waitz,

in Categ.

6, b,

16

Anal. Post. 71, b, 10. According


to these passages everything belongs to any object KaQ^ avro'
which is, mediately or immediately, contained in the concept
'

and all is /caro


which does not follow
from the concept. To be a biped
belongs to any man ko0' avrh,
of that object;
o-w^iSeiSTj/fbs'

'

ARISTOTLE

214
to

make

a further subdivision of the latter head

by

dis-

tinguishing the Universal from the Genus, and both

from the Concept or conceptual Essence of things.^


Universal

everything that appertains

is

common, not merely by

objects in

If this

virtue of their nature.^

to

several

by

accident, but

common element

is

some other

qualification of the essence derived from

more general, then the Universal is a property-concept,


and indicates an essential property.^ If it is of the
essence of the things in question, then the Universal

becomes a Genus.
for every

man, as

To be educated

(rviJ.^^7}K6s.

(T^^;. ibid.)

is

to

a biped,

him

/cara

vTcdpx^i-v.

Tw auTO} Koi
Hence, what is said

thin<j^ Ka9'

aJT^

bTojovv

kv\

is

(Tv/xfie^r^Khs

ifSsx^Tai virdpx^i-v

'o

Koi

1X7]

of a
true of all things
which fall under the same conbut what is said k. (tvjxcept
^^7]k6s is only true in particular
cases and therefore all universal determinations are Koff avr6.
Metaph. v. 9, 1017, b, 35: rh yhp
KaQoXov Kad' avra virdpx^^, to. Sh
(XvjxBefiriKora ov KaO' avra ctAA' iirl
is

Kad'

rcou

^KacTTa

Cf. note 2, below.

common

If to the

'^

sucli, is

airXcos

Xeyerai.

For more about


see the second

the (rvfM!3^r)Kds,
part of eh. vii., infra.
Thus Metapli. vii. 3 in\t. ohaia in common usage means many
different things rh ri ijv elvai koX
Kol
rh KadSXov Koi rh yevos
rirapTov rovrcov rh viroKeijuevov.
2 Anal. Post. i. 4, 73, b, 26
Ka96Kov Se Xiyu} % Uv Karh iravrSs
'

avdyKrjS

virdpx^f-

tois irpdyfiacnu

Part. All. i. 4, 644, a, 24 ra 5e


Kad6\ov KOLvd
TO.
yap irXeioaiu
vTrdpxovra KaOoXov Xeyo/xfV. (Like:

'

b, 11.)

^ Such
an essential quality
Aristotle calls a Kafl' aur^ u7rcpx'oi'
a iraOos ko.Q'' avTh, or a (rvfi^iPr]Khs
Kad' avrh, understanding- in the
last
case by a-vfifiefirtKhs (the
term being used in a sense diff erent
from
that
discussed

above) broadly that


rivl, i.e. a quality
cf
30 fin. c. 7, 1017, a,

h (rvfi^aiv^i

Metajili. v.
12,

iii,

1,

997, a, 25
iv. 1,
iv.
b, 5,
2, 1004,
vi. 1, 1025, b, 12, vii. 4, 1029, b,
13; Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, b, 11,

995,
sqq.

b,

18,

25, c.

2,

19, c. 4, 73, b, 5, c. 6, 75, a, 18, c.


42 Phi/s. i. 3, 186, b, 18,
ii. 2, 193, b, 26, c. 3, 195, b, 13,
7, 75, a,

4, 203, b, 33; Be An. 1. 1,


402, b, 16 Bhet. i. 2, 1355, b, 30
Waitz, on Anal. Post. 71, b, 10
iii.

Tbendelenburg, Be An.
sq.

T inrdpx'p Koi KaB' avrh ku) fi ahrS.


(pavephv &pa on '6cra KaOSkov e|

distinguishing

wise Metapli. vii. 13, 1038,


Cf. last note but one.

iarrl

twv

189

BONITZ, on Metapli. 1025,

a,

Top. i. 5, 102, a, 31
y^vos 5'
rh Kara irXeiSuwv Kal Zia<pcp6v:

rep e^Se/

povfievov.

yope7crdai

iv

4v r(f ri i<TTi Karrjyor^ ri cctti Se Karrf-

ra roiavra X^yiaQo},

'6ffa

ipuTiqOcvTa rt
iffri rh irpoKclfj.evov.^e.ff. in a man
r( ecrri ; C^ov).
Metaph. V. 28,
ap/xSTrci

airodovvai

LOGIC

215

Genus are added

qualities included in the notion of the

other marks which are again essential with reference to


a certain part of the whole class, and by which such
part

is

distinguished from the rest of the same Genus,

then we arrive at the Species, which, accordingly,

made up

of the

Genus and the

1024, a, 36 sqq., where, among


different meanings of yevos, the

following are given

rh

viroKeifie-

vov Tous Zia^opous, rh irp&rov ej/virdpxov & Aeyerai eV rtp ri iffri


ov 5io0opai XeyouTai at ttoiSttj.

Ts (that these

two descriptions

apply to the same meaning of


y4uo5 is shown by Bonitz on this
passage). Ibid. x. 3, 1054, b, 30
XeyeTUi Se y4vos t &iJ.(pco ravrh
Keyovrai Korh. r^v oxxriav ra Sid'
rh yap
<popa
X. 8, 1057, b, 37
roiovTOv y4vos kuXcc, ^ djucpw ev
ravrh \4yerai, fiij Kara (Tv^fie^it]Kh5
ixov Sia<popdt'. Top. vii. 2, 153, a,
17 Karriyop^lrai 5' 4v r^ rl iari
:

r&

yevri

KaX

al

8ia<\>opal.

Every

consequently a Ka66kov,
but not every Ka96\ov a yevos cf
Metaph. iii. 3, 998, b, 17, 999, a,
21, xii. L, 1069, a, 27, &c., with
yivos

is

i.

9,

16,

992, b, 12,

25

sq.

vii.

and

1038, b,

13,

Bonitz

on

To the dis299 sqq.


between genus and property is also partly referable the
statement in Categ. c. 2, 1, a, 20
sqq. c. 5, that everything either
Metapli.
tinction

(1) KaB^ vTroKifivov riuhs Xiyerai,


4v vTroKifjLvci} 5e oiidevi eamv, or (2)
iu

inroKeLfxei/ff} pi.iv icrri KaB''

vnoKeLfie-

vov Se ovSevhs \4yerai, or (3) /ca0'


v-noKCilxivov re Xeyerai Kal eV viroKijxivcp iffriv,

or (4) out' iu

inroKeifjLevcp

iffrlu oijre KaB' inroKeifx^vov Xiyerai.

Of

these divisions, the fourth


comprises particular things the
first refers to genera and (c. 5,
:

3,

21)

a,

is
If,

specific differences}

differences

specific

the second to properties, activities and conditions


in fact, the
avixfi^if]K6ra. To the first belongs
the term man,' to the second the
term grammar, 'and to the fourth
the term Socrates.' But the uncertainty of the whole division
immediately appears in the description of the third class, for if
there are notions which are predicated both KaB' viroKeifieuov and

'

'

eV

viroKeifievcp

i.e.

which are at

once genera and properties (the


example Aristotle gives is the
concept of science,' which is in
the soul as its inroKeifievov, and is
also predicated of each of the
particular sciences) then
the
genera and properties cannot be
'

distinct and co-ordinate classes


of universals.
undefined

How

was
'

boundary between a
genus and a property will be
the
'

'

'

seen also in his treatment of Substance (on which see the first part
of ch. Yii., infra).
1
eV
Metajih. x. 7, 1057, b, 7
yhp rov yevovs Kol rS)v Sia<pop(av rh
etSr] (for
instance, the specific
concepts ' black and * white are
made up of the generic notion
distinguishing
Xp^iJ-a and the
qualities SiaKpiriKhs and avyKpinKos white is the XP^f^"- StaKpiriKhv^
black is the xpw/ia <rvyKpiriK6v).
Set yap rh
Top. vi. 3, 140, a, 28
fxev yevos airh ruv dWuv x^piC^*)"
[the generic concept distinguishes
:

'

'

ARISTOTLE

216
finally,

an object

is

in this way, by the aggregate of its

distinctive marks, so defined that the definition as a

whole

is

applicable to no other object, then

The

Concept}

(what belongs
every other],

object of the Concept


from

to a genus

rr]v Se Siacpopav arr6

iv rc^ avTCf yivei.


Ibid. vi.
143, b, 8,19. (Further instances
of the manner of using Siacpopa
are given by Waitz, Arist. Org.

Tivos
6,

i.

279

BONITZ, Ind. Ar. 192,

a,

23.) These distinguishing marks

of species, Aristotle calls diacpupa


dSoTTOLhs (Toj). vi. 6, 143, b, 7;
JSth. X. 3, 1174, b, 5).
From

other properties he distinguishes


them by their being able to be
predicated of a subject (kuO' v-koKei/xeuov \4yovTai), but not being
in a subject (eV viroKeifxiucf ovk
fieri)
i.e. they do not subsist in a
subject which would exist before
themselves, or which might be
conceived independently of them,
but in one which bj/ them alone
is this definite subject (Cat. 5, 3,
cf. c. 2, 1, a, 24 sq );
a, 21 sq.
they are not accidental but
essential
determinations (Afetaph. vii. 4, 1029, b, 14, 1030, a,
14
Toj). vi. 6, 144, a, 24
ovZ^'/ia
yap SiacpopoL ruu Kara (rvfj.fil3T)Khs
viTapx^v'T<>iv eVrl, Kaddirep ovSe rh
oh yap iudex^rai r^u Siacpoyevos

'

pav vTvdpx^LV Tivl Kai, [xt) virdpx^i-v)


they belong to the concept of the
which they are
subject
of
affirmed, and hence everything
that is implied in them is also true
of the species and of the individuals to which they belong ( Cat.
c. 5, 3, a, 21 sqq. b, 5).
It can
hence be said of them, that they
;

(together with the genus) form


the substance {Metaph. vii. 12,
1038, b, 19 cf following note)
'

'

we have

its

therefore the

is

and that they express something


substantial {Top. vii. 2, vid. mpr.
and yet, looked at in
p. 214, n. 4
'

'

themselves, they are not substances but qualities, for they express not a Tt, but a troiSv ri (Top.
iv. 2,
6,

122, b, 16, c. 6, 128, a, 26, vi.


144, a, 18,21 Pki/s.v. 2, 226, a,
;

27 Mctaph. v. 14 init.). The apparent contradiction between Ari;

stotle's different statements on


the subject (brought out by Tren-

DELENBURG,Zrr^t Beitr. z. Phil. i.


56 sqq., and BoNiTZ,on Metaph. v.
14) may be solved in the manner
indicated cf. Waitz, ut mpra.
;

Anal.

Vost.

ii.

13, 96, a, 24.

Many

properties of things are


also accidental to other things
which fall under the same genus.
Ta 5^ Toiavra ATjTrreoj/ [in the determination of concepts] fx^xpi
TovTov, eoos Tocravra \r](p6f] irpoorov,

uv cKacTTov fj.\v
[is
accidental

ewl irXeTov virdp^ei

also
to
other
things], airavra 5e /i^ eVi irXiov.
ravTr]u yap avdyKT) ovcriav clvai rod
which will be further
illustrated below.
Ibid. 97, a,
Tvpdyixaros

18

we

get the concept (x6yos


of a given object
by dividing the genus into its
species, and then the species to
which our object belongs into its
sub-species, and thus proceeding
:

Trjs

ova-Las)

till

we arrive

ia-rl

at a

8ia(popa, i.e.

group wv ix-qKeTt.
that which

is

indivisible into any farther sets


of opposed species, to one or
other of which the object in

question would belong (but about


the actual tenableness of this

LOGIC

217

Substance, or more accurately the determinate Substance


or peculiar Essence of the things in question
theory, cf. BONITZ, Arist. Metaph. ii. 346, 1).
So also MetaijTi.
vii. 12, 1037, b, 29 ovQlv yhp ercpdu
iffTiu iv r^ dpicr/j.^, irX^v t6 re
irpS)TOV XeySfievov
yevos /cal at
diacpopai (or as it stands 1038, a,
:

ianv 6
A.070S).
The

opKr/uSs

(()opcov

e/c

tcov Sia-

genus

is

divided into

its species, the latter


into their sub-species, and this
is

continued

ecas

eXdr]

tip

ds rh

and

since in
this series every subsequent differa8ia.<popa(ihid.

1.

15);

entia includes the preceding one


the Siirovv includes the
(e.g.
xnr6irovv), therefore the intermediate terms which fall between

the genus and the lowest specific


difference do not need to be repeated in the definition (cf. also
Part. An. i. 2 init.). So it follows (Met. ibid. 1038, a, 28) '6ri
T\evTaia Sia(popa 7} ovala rod
7]
:

irpdy/xaTos e<TTai Kal 6

dpicrfj-os

in
to

which, however, we have


understand by the rekevTaia 5ia(poph, not only the last specific
difference as such, but the specific
concept as determined by it,
which embraces the higher species and the genus.
For the designation of that
which is thought of in the concept, Aristotle
makes use of
various expressions. Besides oiiala
'

and eJSos (of which we shall have


more to say in dealing with the
Metaphysics), we have to notice
in this connection his

way

of

marking out the idea which a


word expresses by placing a 'direp
before it, as '6irp tv, or Sirep ev
(Phys. 3, 186, a, 32 sqq.), for
Being, as such,' or ' One, as
such (cf BoNiTZ, Ind. Arist.
533, b, 86 sqq.); and also liis
:

'

'

special use of

elj/ot

^
;

and the

with a dative

annexed (for instance, rh

avQp<}iT(^

rb adiaipdrcf
iffrlv elmi, Metaph. x. 1, 1052, b,
16
op ydp iffTt rh aol elvai rh
fiovffiKcp ehai, ibid. vii. 4, 1029, b,
14, cf. Ind. Ar. 221, a, 34); and
the phrase rh ri ?iv clvai. In the
second of these expressions the
dative must (according to Trendelenburg, Rh. Mus. 1828, 481
elvai, &CC.,

rh

cvl eJvai

SCHWEGLER,

Ar.

Metaph.

iv.

371) be taken possessively, so


that avOpuTTCf eJvai is equivalent
to elvai rovro 8 iariv avOpdnrc}}
= to be that which belongs to
man
and so rh apdpdoirq) elpai
designates the manner of being
that is peculiar to man = Man's
'

'

'

Being

'

whereas ^vOpwirov

elvai

only signifies the condition of


one who is a man, or the actual
participation in human nature.
For the proof of this explanation
such passages as the following
will serve
rh eluai avr^ erepou,
rh ^fjv ro7s Coiffi rb elvai iarriv
(BONITZ, l7id. Ar. 221, a, 42, 54
sq., Arist. Stnd. iv. 377).
The
fact that the article is never put
before the dative (for Aristotle
does not say rh r(p avOpdoTrcfi
ehai) does not stand in the way
for the r^ in this case after rh
would be very awkward as a
matter of diction and moreover
this very omission of the article
makes it clearer that in the
avOpdcircf} eluai we are dealing with
that
being which belongs t(^
man as such. The rl ^v elyai is
also, as a rule, construed with the
dative of the object (rh ri ^y elvai
cf Ind. Ar. 764, a,
iKd(rr(fi, Sec.
60 sq.) for it is (as Alex. says,
in Schol. 256, b, 14 on To^. 24 m.)
:

'

'

ARISTOTLE

218

Concept

itself is

nothing else but the thought of

equivalent to 6 ti ^ctti rh civai


avTw SrjA&Ji/ K6yos. But to this
account must be added the explanation of the force of the
peculiar imperfect, which is meant
to designate that in things which
does not belong to the moment,
but which throughout the wliole
course of their existence has
represented their proper esse,
i.e. the essential as distinguished
from the contingent and transi-

Plato,

(Cf.

tory.

Tl/eo't.

150,

the Heracliteans maintain ws


rh irav Kivqcris ^u Koi &\Xo oi5f v,
examples
apitd
other
and
SCHWEGLER, ut sKjjra, 373 sq.).
Hence rd rl ^v ehai auOpuircf
properly means, that which in
a man was his proper esse,' the
true being of man, that belonging to him which is also called
the TrpcoTTj ovffia '(Slos kKacrrco
{Metaph. vii. 13, 1038, b, 10;
:

'

'

vii. 7, vid.

'

inf.

vii. 5 fin.')

But

this is simply his Ideal 13eing, that


of which we think, when we
abstract from what is contingent
to the phenomenal man before

and from the material element


on which that contingency rests
us,

Metaph.

vii. 4, 1029, b, 19
^pa ixT] iuearai X6ya) avrd,
AeyoPTL avTO. ovtos 6 X6yos tov tI
ijv dvai iKoia-rcf}.
So ch. 7, 1032, b,
14 \4yco 5' ovffiav avv vKr]s rb t(
Ibid. xii. 9, 107o, a, 1
?iu elvai.
eTrl /iej/ rcou iroiriTiKoiv
dvev vXrjs
ovaia Koi rh Tt ^v efj/at [sc. rh
7]
And ch. 8, 1074, a,
irpayixd i(rrC\.
35 rh Se ri -fjv ehai ovk Ix^' vXt]v
TO irpuTOV evreXcx^tayap. The t/
?iu eJvai, therefore, goes with the
eldos.
Metaxjh. vii. 7, 1032, b, 1
iihos Se K4yu) rh ri ^v eJvai kKaffTOV
KoX T^v TTpcaTrjv ovffiav. Ibid. ch. 10,
e?5os 5e Ae^w rb ti
1035, b, 32

cf.
ej'

(^

^j/

PTiys.

elvai.

ii.

this

194, a,

2,

20

In
TOV e^Sovs Koi rov tI 'fjv elvai.
Phys. ii. 3, 194, b, 26 one of the
Kal
rh
irapdrb
eJSos
four causes is
Seiyfxa' tovto S' iarlv 6 xSyos 6
TOV ri '^v elvai Koi to. tovtov yht\
this being what Aristotle, in Me:

tapli.

i.

983, a, 27, calls

3,

tV ovo'iav

but immediately
afterwards Thv \6yov also. In fact,
Kol Th

t'i

ehai,

?iv

all these expressions are constantly interchanged by him. Compare, for example, the Be An. ii.
1, 412, b, 10, where ovcrla t] Kara
rhu x6yov is explained by rb ri ^u
ehai; Metaph. vi. 1, 1025, b, 28:
Th Ti ?iv eivai KoX Thv \6yov vii. 5,
rh ri ^v eJuai Koi 6
1 030, b, 26
opi(rix6s (similarly Part. An. i. 1,
;

Phys. ii. 2,ut supra)


1107, a, 6 KaTo. fieu
ova'iav KoX rhv x6yov rhv t'i ^p
The ti ^v elvat
eJvai XiyovTa.
stands to the simple tl <tti. as
the particular and definite to the
universal and indefinite. Whilst
only designates the
tI ^v luai
form or peculiar being of a
;
thing, the question, rl ia-Tiv
may be answered by giving either
the matter only or that which
()42, a, 25, cf
]'Jt](. ii.

6,

tV

'

'

'

includes both matter and form,


or even by giving merely a property; and even when it is
answered by giving; the ideal
form, the answer need not embrace the whole concept of the
thing, but may be confined to the
genus, or the specific difference
(the proof of this is given by

ScHWEGLEB,

Arist. Metaph. iv.


The ti ?iv eJvai is,
375 sqq.).
consequently, a definite species
of the ri ia-Ti (hence Pe An. iii.
tov tl icTTi Kara rh
6, 430, b, 28
:

Tl ?iv elvai

= Being on

tial side

')

and thus,

its essenas very com-

LOGIC

219

And this is arrived at by the process of


making the Universal of the Genus determinate bymeans of the aggregate of distinguishing marks.^ But
Essence.^

monly happens

in Aristotle, the
used in the
narrower meaning of the rl ^u
latter

may

be

ehai, whereas the other phrase


never has the looser sense of the
Tt ((TTi, so as to designate merely
the matter of the thing or a
mere property, or a generic universal without the specific differ-

ences. The like relation exists


between elvai with the dative and
the accusative: rh
elvai with
XevKcp elvai designates the idea of

what is white rh XcvKhv elvai, the


Cf.
property of being white.
SCHWEGLER, loo. cit. p. 370 Phys.
:

204, a, 23, et alibi.

iii. 5,

Aristotle

undoubtedly introduced the

mula rh

ri

^v

eJuai.

for-

Even if
Zeller,

Stilpo really used it (see


Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 223, 3), he probably took it from Aristotle.
Again, Antisthenes could hardly
have used the mere ri -^v to designate the concept at least, this
does not follow from the references in Zell. ibid. p. 252, n.
1.
The following writers treat
at length of the rl ^v clvai and
the allied phrases Trendelenburg (who was the first to
examine this subject thoroughly),
Rhein. Mus. v. NiebnTir und
Brandis, ii. (1828), 457 sqq. Be
Anima, 192 sqq., 471 sqq. Hist.
:

Beitr. i. 34 sqq.; Schwegler,


ut supra, 369 sqq. (who cites other
authors); Hertling, Mat. n.
Form. b. Arist. 47 sq.

Anal. Post. ii. 3, 90, b,^30,


Spifffihs ixkv yhp rov ri
91, a, 1
:

Kol ovaias

fcrri

bpifffxhs ri i(rri drjXoT.

init.

opiajxhs

\6yos rov ri

4(rri.

6 fjikv oZv
Ibid. ii. 10
\eyerai elvai
.

(Thesameibid.

n.)

Top. vii. 5, 154, a, 31


\6yos 6 rh ri ^v clvai
(T'nfiaiuwv.
Metajy/i. v. 8, 1017, b,
21
rh ri ^v eJvai ov 6 x6yos
opifffxhs, Kot TovTO ovtria Aeyeroi
kKaffTov.
So also vii. 4, 1030, a,
6, cf. a, Ifi, b, 4, and ch. 5, 1030,
also Part. An. i. 1, 642,
b, 26
a,
25.
Hence Aristotle also
94, a,

6pi<x^6s effri

designates the concept (in the


subjective meaning) by the expressions
6 \6yos 6 dpl^wu r^v
ovffiav {Part. An. iv. 5, 678, a, 34),
b x6yos 6 tI iffri Xiycov {MetapJi.
V. 13, 1020, a, 18) and similar
phrases.
(AJ70S or \6yos ttjs
oixrlaSj in relation to the objective meaning of \6yos, stands
for the
form or the Being
of things e.g. Gen. An. i. 1, 715,
:

Be An.
8
414, a, 9, &c.

a, 5,
2,

1,

i.

403, b, 2

and

ii.

precedthe nature of the


;

cf.

ing note.) By
case '6pos is synonymous with
6pi(TiJ.hs, e.g.

5'

'6pos

a-nfiaivcov.

in Top.

\6yos

ix.\v

So ch.

oh. 7,103, a, 25

72, b, 23

i.

101

4,

%cti

^v

eJuai

init.

6 rh tl

b, 21,

Anal. Post.

and
i.

3,

Meta/ph.
ch. 13, 1039, a,
vii. 5, 1031, a, 8
19 ; viii. 3, 1043, b, 28 ch. 6, 1045,
a, 26; Poet, ch.6,1449, b,23. But
the same word, in a further sense,
signifies either of the two terms
of a proposition (subject and
predicate), and is therefore the
standing expression for the three
Anal.
terms of the syllogism
'6pov Se koAw
Pri. i. 1, 24, b, 16
6ts %v SiaXverai tj irpSraais, etc., ch.
4, 25, b, 32, ch. 10, 30, b, 31, ch.
34, 48, a, 2 Anal. Post. i. 10, 76,
:

ii.

10, 97, b, 26

35 et sup7'a.
2 Cf. pp. 215, n. 1, 216, n. 1.
Aristotle expresses the relation
b,

ARISTOTLE

220

the essence of things, according to Aristotle, consists


It is therefore only with the
only in their form.^

form that the Concept

is

concerned, and no concept of

sensible objects as such can be presented to the mind.^

For although a

definite relation of

Form

to

Matter does

and therefore

belong to the peculiar Essence

also to

odv (sc. ovcrlai) ovtoo [in the sense


of the avvoXov^ K^yovrai, tovtwv

between these two elements, by


designating the genus as the
matter and the specific difl'erence
and
as the form of the concept
by this he explains how in the
concept the two are one. The
genus is that, in other words,

ruv 8e \6yov ovk eanv ovtoos ooarc


ovSe yap yeveats (ou
(pdeipeaOai
yap yiyveraL rh olKia elvai aWa rh
5ia tovto 5e koI
Tr;Se rrj oi/cta)

which, in

rwu

becomes
concept

indefinite, first
definite in the specific
itself

the substratum

(inroKei-

whose properties are the


matter, and whose form is made
up of the distinguishing marks.
But the substratum never actually

fxevou),

without properties, nor the


matter without form, and therefore neither does the genus exist
outside the species, but only in
them looked at in itself, it only
exists

contains the aniversal presupposition, the possibility of that


which exists in reality in the
lowest species Metaph. viii. 6,
v. 6, lOlfi, a,
cf. ch. 2, 1043, a, 19
25 ch. 28, 1024, b, 3 vii. 12, 1038,
cf. ch. 3,
x. 8, 1058, a, 23
a, 25
1054, b, 27; Phys. ii.S) fin.; Gen. et
;

Corr. i. 7, 324, b, G {Part.AnA. 3,


643, a, 24, does not come inhere).
Cf. p. 217, n. 1. More fully
treated in the account of Aristotle's Metaphysics, infra, ch. vii.
'

p. 219, n. 1, and Metaph. vii. 11, 1036, b, 28 tov yap


2

See

KaQoKov Koi rod etSous 6 SpiafiSs. So


ch. 15 init. by Substance is meant
sometimes the A^7os alone, sometimes the K6yos crvv rf} v\t) crvvei'daai fieu
\7ilJ,/x4vos (the aivoXov').
:

fieu eari (pdopd

Kol

'

yap

yeuecris

'

ovcriSov

on

ToioLVTr]

Kal

1X7]

alcrOrjTwp ru)v Ka9'

ovO' bpiafxhs ovt'' airodei^is

eKacTTtt

eariv,

rwv

'

ix'^vcriv

vX-qv

rjs

r]

(pvais

ivdex^crOaL Ka\ elvai


5tb (pOapra iravra ra KaO'

oSffT'

eKaara avrwu.

el ovv H] t' aTrJSei^is


avayKaicov Kal 6 opia-jxhs eViKal
ovk
eVSexerat,
arriixoviKbs,
Sxnrep ouS' iTtiaT'i]p.7)v ore jxev iiriore S' &yvoiav elvai, aWct
ar'i]fj.'t]v
So|a rh roLOvr6v iariv {vid. SUpra

Tu>v

p. 163),

ovrois

ou5'

airS^ei^iv

ou5'

aWa

5o|a iarl rov evSeXo/Jievov &WUS e~)(^iv, SrjAov (in ovk


tt.v ein avroov ovre aTToSei^is. As soon
as we perceive it no longer, we
bpiafibv,

do not know whether it is now


the same as we think it to be. (Cf
Anal. PH.
Top. V. 3, 131, b, 21
And in ch. 10,
ii.21,67, a, 39.)
1035, b, 34 rov \6yov /j-epr] ret. rod
;

eWovs }x6vov ecrrlv, 6 Se x6yos icrrl


rod KaOoXov
rh yap KvKAcf eluai
Kal kvk\os Kal ^vx'^ ^^vai Kal ^vx^
rov 5e (Tvv6Kov ijdr), oJov
ravrd
kvkXov rovdl, rwv KaOeKacrrd nvos

^ alaOrirov ^ vovrov (X4yw 5e vof]rovs fJi\v oJov rovs /naOrj^ariKou^,


alaOrjrohs Se oTov rovs x-^^ovs Koi
|i;AiVous but
even the
rails
former have a vXrj, only it is a iJ\t
j/oTjTrj, 1036, a, 9 sqq.), rovrav Se

LOGIC
the Concept of any object,^ yet
sense

itself,

but only

this

221
it

is

not

this object of

determinate mode of sensible

which

existence, only tlie universal form of the object,

It follows as a consequence of this

can be defined. ^

that the conception does not relate to individual objects

but this applies also to all IndividKnowledge, in fact, aims always at a


Universal,'^ and the words of which a definition is made
Each concept
up are themselves general terms.-^
of sense

as such

uals in general.

ovK

ecTTiv

<reajs

aX\a

bpifffjibs

aireAdduTas [-ra]

5'

fiera voj]-

yvcapi^ovrai,

alard^crews
e/c

ttjs

eVreAe-

xetas oi) drjAov irSrepov rrore eialv


^ OVK elalv, aA-A' dei Xiyovrai Kal
5'
t]
yvwpi^ovraL t<S Kad6\ov \6ycf
0A7J ^yvucTTos Kad' auT-fju,
^
As in the concept of the
house (Metajjh. vii. 15, see preceding note), the soul, the axe
(Be An. i. 403, b, 2 ii. 1, 412, b,
II), of the (TifjLhv (MetapJi. vii. 5,
&c.), in fact in all concepts of
material and natural things. Cf

although the
Phys. ii. 9 fin.
material causes are subservient
to the ideal or final causes, still
in explaining natural phenomena
we must give both Kacos 5e Koi
iu T<j5 \6y(}} iarl rh avayKoiov [i.e.
because the physical or material
causes belong to the concepts of
ihingH']. dpiaa/jLevcp yap Th pyov Tov
:

irp'uiv,

on

Biaipecris

roiadi

avrr]

OVK (TTai, et 1X7) e'let odovras


oh, 6t fxr] ffLO-qTOiovaOL
ovToi
povs. eaTL yap Kal eV rev Kdycf evia
Cf 3Iefi6pia oos v\r] Tov Xoyov.

numberless things cannot be


defined without
giving their
matter, this seems, at first sight,
a contradiction. In the passage
referred to (lletaph. vii. 10)
Aristotle seeks to escape this
contradiction by saying that in
such cases, not this individual
object, formed by the combination of a specific concept .with
this definite matter, is defined,
but only its form it is not this
circle, but the circle, or the
ki!>k\^ ehai, not this soul, but the
But the
soul, the ^vxv elvai.
difficulty is, indeed, by no means
;

removed in this way.


If, for
instance, the soul is the Entelechy of an organic body {Be
'

'

the ri ?iv eJuai r^


{Metaph. ibid. 1035,
b, 1 6), then a matter constituted in a stated way belongs
to the concept of the soul.

An.

5'

taph.

vii. 10,

1035, a,

1,

ch. 11, 1037, a, 29.


2 If
on the one

b, 14,

and

hand we
deny that matter belongs to the
concept of a thing, and on the
other are obliged to admit that

ii.

roiwSe

1),

adifxari.

Metaph.

vii. 15,

as at p. 220, n.
*

Vid.

2,

mpra,

1039, b, 27,

mpra.
p. 163, n. 2.

Metaph. ibid. 1040, a, 8:


not only are sensible things incapable of definition, but also
ideas rwv yap Kad' eKaarov r] i5ea,
^

us

<pacrl,

Kal x^P^<^''"h-

5'

ov iroirjaei 6

avayKoiov

5'

K6yov ouo/na
dpi^S/xevos, uyuwaTov

e^ ovofidroov dvai rhv

ARISTOTLE

222

embraces several individuals, or at least can embrace


and even if we descend to the lowest species
several
^

we

are

still

always met by universal determinations

Within

only.

these, the individual

entities are dis-

tinguished no longer by anything relating to species,

Between

but only by accidental marks of difference. ^


yap

earai.

ra

5e

6,Wa} Tuvra

olnv

'

Koiva

Keifxcva

avdyKT] apa

iracTLV.

virapx^i-v

Tts

elf

(Te

Koi
bpi-

aaiTO, ((^ov epe? lax^^^^ ^ \VKhv ^


erepov ri h koI aWcp inrdp^CL.

Loc.

'

cit.

1.

14, Aristotle pro-

poses the objection

ix7}Qfv

kxXv^iv

Xo^plsjxkv irduTaTvoWoils^'d^a Sc

TQVTU}

vi?dpx^i-v

(which

is

juovct}

really

the case in the determination of


concepts, r/VZ. mpra, p. 21G, n. 1),
and lie gives among other answers
this (cfT Bon ITZ, on this passage)
even though an object
at 1. 27
'

be the only one in its species, like


ihe sun and the moon, still its
concept could only contain such
things oaa. eV iikXov eVSe'xera/,
idu

olov

erepos

yeurjrai

Koivos dpa 6
Similarly, in De
supposing
9, 278, a, 8

SrjXou OTL yjXlos (xrai

Aoyos,

Cwh,

tolovto^,

6cc.'
i.

there were only one circle, oiidev


fiTTOv dWo eo-rat t^ kvkXo) eluuL koI
TwSi T^J kvkXw, koL to jiifu eldos, rh
5"

dSos

eV

rfj

Kal

vArj

twu

kuO'

(Kaarov. Ibid, b, 5 there is only


one world, but still the ovpav(f
ilvai and the r^^Se t^ ovpav^ dvai.
:

two

different things.
Metapli. vii. 10 (r?VZ. mpr. p.
220, n. 2) 6 Kityos earl rod KadoXov.

are

Anal. Post.
5'
\

iarl

iras

13, S7, b, 26: alel


The
opos KaOoAuv.

ii.

determination of concepts may


be continued till all specitic
diiferences are exhausted, and
the reXkvra'a Siacpopa is reached ;

but below this there only remain


individuals which are no longer
distinguished (see
specifically
Metaph. x. 9, 1058, a, 34 sqq.
and5?/j!>rtt,p. 216, n.

a sense

l),andarein

{Anal. Post. ii. 13,


these, however,
7)

'6jxoia

97, a, 37, b,

continue to form a multiplicity,


and, in fact, an indefinite multiplicity, and for this reason cannot
be the object of science and of
the concept 3Ietaph. iii, 4, iriit.
(Ire yap jxt] eari ri irapd ra Kad(.Kacfra, rd he KadeKaara direipa, rccv
:

8'

direipwv

iTnarr]/j.r]v

sqq.;

iruis
;

cf

2\)j?.

A7ial. Post.

ii.

i.

evBexerai

Xafielv

994, b, 20
109, b, 14;
2,
24, 86, a, 3 sqq.

ii.

2,

and ibid. c. 19-21, the proof that


argument cannot be continued to
inlinity either upwards or downwards. In this Aristotle exactly
follows Plato see Zell. Ph. d. Gr.
Aristotledept.i.p 524,3,587,1.
signates singulars by the phrases
rd Ka9' eKaara (or k. eKaarov), rh
dpLdficv ev{Metaph. iii. 4, 999, b, 34
:

s^ipra ; see
this passage), to rtva,
6 Tts dvQpoiKos, &c. {Categ. ibid.
Anal. Post. i. 24, 85, a,
1, 4, b

Categ.

c. 2, 1, b, 6, et

Waitz on
;

34; Metaph.

vii. 13, 1038, b, 33),


{Categ. c. 5, 3, b, 10;
Metaph. ix. 7, 1049, a, 27 ct supra ;
see Waitz on this passage of the
Categories^, also rd dro/na (e.g.

r6be

ri

Categ.

c. 2, 1,

Metaph.

iii. 1,

b, 6, c. 5, 3, a,

35;

995, b, 29. It is true

LOGIC
this accidental difference

223

and the

specific differences lie

those attributes which belong exclusively to the

mem-

bers of a certain species, without, however, being directly-

included in their Concept


j^erties (Xhio)}

But

and Aristotle

calls these

in a wider sense this

name

is

Froalso

used by him to include specific differences on the one


side

and accidental qualities on the other.^


falls under one Concept must be,

What

so far as

this is the case, identical.^

What

that the lowest species, which


do not divide into sub-species
the aSid(popa, vid. m})ra, p. 216,
are given the same name
n. 1
but in that case, whenever this
meaning does not appear from
the context itself, he uses, not
merely ra drofxa, but Sro/io eWr]
and similar expressions (cf.

5th book, which deals with the


treatment of the ^5ia
(c. 1) he distinguishes the tdiov
Kaff avrh from the Wlov
irphs
erepov, the oei ^Biov from the ttotc
IfStoj/.
He himself, however, remarks (129, a, 32) of the Uiov
irphs cTepop, and it is true in any
case of the irore XSiop, that it belongs to the (rvfxfiefir]K6Ta. On the
other hand, he gives as examples
of the X5. Kad^ avrh and del essential marks such as C^ov addparop,

Metaph.

iii. 3, 999, a, 12, v. 10,


1018, b, 6, vii. 8 fin., x. 8, 9,
1058, a, 17, b, 10, xi. 1, 1059, b,
35) or ra eo-xaro, because in descending from the most universal

thej come last (Metaph. xi. 1,


Mh. JV. vi. 12, 1143,
1059, b, 26
a, 29, 33
Be An. iii. 10, 433, a,
;

16

De Mem.

451, a, 26).
In Toj). i. 4, 101, b, 17, he
distinguishes y4vos, Wiov, and
and as soon as he
(Tvfji.fifir]K6s
has divided the Uiov again into
opos and iSiou in the narrower
sense, he defines the latter, c. 5,
102, a, 17: 'tdiov S' iffrlv f> fx^
StjAo? luLev rh ri ^v eJuai, fiSpq) 5'
U7ra/5%et Kal apTiKaTrjyopeTTai rov
vpdyfxaros [is related to it ^as
an interchangeable concept], otov
tSiou avdpduTTov rh ypafifxariKrjs elvai
;

c. 2,

5e/CTt/cJj/,
2

Already

{loc. cit.)

he distin-

guishes the TTore ^ irp65 ri tSiov


from the cnrKcos 'loioy, and in the

fall

under

topical

^(fop dpr]rhp, rh e'/c ^l/vxvs Kal aca/j-aTos ffvyKei/xepop (128, b, 19, 35,
Cf. preceding note,
129, a, 2).
^ Aristotle does not say so in
these words, but it is shown by
his discussions on the various
meanings of ravrhp. In Top. i. 7
(cf. viii. 1, 151, b, 29
152, b, 31)
three of these are distinguished
yepei ravrhp is what belongs to one
genus, elfSet ravrhp what belongs
to one species (cf. Metaph. x. 8,
1058, a, 18), and apiQyi.^ ravrhp, Sip
opS/nara irXeica rh Se irpay/xa eV.
This last kind of identity may
be expressed in various ways
.

Kvpidirara
dp6/j.ari

&c.

does not

KaOdirep

Kal

/mep
opt}}

trpwrois

lixdriop

Xwiricf

Toj

Kal

^<^op

Sevrcpop 8'
(5j^, Kaddirep rh iTriarrrjfJLTis

ire^hp Sivovp apOpwircf},

orap

'6rap

rh ravrhp airo^ody,

ARISTOTLE

224

one concept

is

different.^

Complete Identity, however,

implies unity of matter also, for individuals between


whicli

there

no difference of a species are yet

is

different numerically, because in each of them the same

Conconcept presents itself in a different matter.^


gives
us
highest
degree
ceptual distinction in the
Opposition;

Contrary

TLo) are such as, within the


as possible asunder.^

For Contraries (hav-

Hrau

lie

as far
fact, is

aiTo

there disting-uishes, first,


the Tavra Kara (Tvix^fir]Khs and
ravra KaO' aura then the ravrhv

stotle

i8ei

and

apidtxS,

same Genus,

Contrary opposition, in

Tpirov S'
avOpwTTCf},
tov avjx^^fi7]K6TOs, diov rh
KaQ'i]fx^vov ^ Th ixovaiKbv 'S.wKpd.Tei.
There is a somewhat different
Aridivision in 3Ietaj)h. v. 9.
beKTLKhv

difference pro-

whereas simple

duces Contradictory Opposition.

and

10, 1018, a, 38 sqq.


1024, b, 9.

ch. 28,

See preceding note and p. 222,


That the individual differences of things must be based
on Matter will be further shown
later on, in the second part of
^

n. 2.

ch. vii. infra.

both of which

'^

Aristotle states this defini-

are afiirmed partly of that which


has a Matter, partly of that which
has an Essence (fulleratx. 3,1054,
a, 32 that is identical in number
which both in Matter and in Form
As a general explanais one).
tion he gives us a formula which
to the one
is easily reducible
cited above
v rahr6rr)s eySr-ns
irXeiovuiv tov elvaL r)
ris icTTLV
lirav xp^/'''"' ^^ TrAeiocrtv (as in
avro avTcpravTou). Since, however
(according to ch. 10, 1018, a, 85),
Unity and Being can be used in
different senses, the meaning of
the ravrhu, '^repov, kc. must vary
accordinolv.
Meiaph. v. 9^ 1018, a, ^9:
erepa 5e Keyerai uv fj to. f^Sr)
TTAf/w ^ v vXv ^ o \6yos rrjs

c. 6, 6, a, 17; Etli.N.
1108, b, 33, as one already
in use (bpi^ovTaC) but in Metapli.
X. 4 iii'd., he puts it forw^ard in
his own name, and he there
establishes the proposition that
opposites must belong to the
same genus, by observing expressly TO. ixkv yap yivn SiacpepovTa ovK e^ei 65hv els &\X7)\a,

ovaias' /col '6\us avrLKd/nevcas rcf


On e!'5et
ravTcp Keyerai to eTepou.
and yev^i eVepoj/, cf. ibid. x. 8, v.

Toou iv

T^ avT^

(TTOP

^ia<p4povTa

'/)

>

tion, Cateff.

ii.

8,

ttAcov Kal acrv/xfiKrjTa

dAA.' aTre^ei

a sound and a colour are not


opposed to one another, because
they cannot at all be compared,
they are aavyi.^Ki]TOi).
Yet, on
the other hand, we read in
MetapTi. v. 10, 1018, a, 25 ivavrla
{e.g.

\yTai

awTw

TO.

re

fi^

Svvara

a/xa

t&j

irape7yai rCov ^ia(pep6vT(i>v kuto.

yvos, Kal

deKTiKcfi

TO,

irXilcrTov 5ia((>epoj/Ta

(that

yeuei, Kal
Toiv

the

ra

iv

TrAel-

TavT(f
ivavria are

LOGIC

226

nothing but specific difference made absolute.^


tradictory opposition,

on the other hand,

accidental to one and the same


deKTiKhv is contirmed by Metaph.
X. 4, 1055, a, 2y
De Somn. No. 1,
453, b, 27), KoX ra irX^iffTov Sia(p4;

povTa Twv

Oirh

avrV

ttjv

Suva/xiu,

wv 7] diacpopa /jLeyiaTi] ^ ottAws ^


Kara yevos f/ Kar' elSos. rh 5' ^AAa
evayria Xey^rai ra ixkv r(f to.
roiavra ex^iv, ra Se TCf Scktiko. iJyai
Twv ToiovTcou, &c. (and the like in
Kal

X. 4, 1056, a, 35), and Categ. c.


11^7?.. also has: avdyKr] Sk Trdvra
T^ ivavria ij iv r^ avrcp yepei

and white],

dvai [like black

ij

iv Tols ivavriois yiveaiv [like just

and
[like

cites

unjust],

^ avra yivt] etvai

good and evil].


8impl,
something similar (/m Categ.

Sohol.

84,

from the

a,

At. Ft.

6;

treatise

n.

117)

at/riKeifxe-

vwv, about which cf. p. 70, n 4.


The more mature and correct
siatement is that which is given
in Metaph. x. {e.g. good and evil

could not be contraries it they


did not fall under the same
generic concept, that of moral
behaviour)
and, in fact, Aristotle himself (at 1055, a, 23
sqq.) resolves the earlier statements by bringing them into line
with the idea of the eVaj/T oj/ as
there defined.
It is only in
reference to that definition of the
iuavTiov that we can understand
;

Aristotle's

important axiom {Me-

taph. iii. 2, 996, a, 10; iv. 2,


1004, a, 9, 1005, a, 3 ; xi. 3, 1061,
a, 18 ; An. Fri. i. 36, 48, b, 5
Ue An. iii. 3, 427, b, 5, et alibi;
see BoNiTZ and Schweglbe on
Metajjh. iii. 2, loo. ait.), rwv ivavriwu fxia iiTKTT'fifi'n.
That is the
same science which deals with
the same things
things which
;

VOL.

I.

Con-

the relation

is

belong to different genera, like


sound and colour, belong also to
different

sciences:

cf.

too.

cit.

31. Further, from the

1055,

a,

same

definition of

{ibid. 1055, a, 19, cf.

the ivavriov

Be

Ccelo,

i.

269, a, 10, 14, and Fhys. i. 6,


189, a, 13) Aristotle deduced the
principle that to each thing
2,

there can only be one contrary.


Between contraries there may lie
an indefinite number of intermediate grades, which are compounded of these contraries (as
colours out of light and dark),
yuch intermediate grades are
not found, however, between every
pair of contraries, but only between those pairs of which one or
other predicate does not necessarily belong to the subject concerned, and in which there is a
gradual transition from one to the
other. {Metaph.y..!; Categ. c.lQ,
11, b, 38 sqq., 12, b, 2b sqq. cf.
SiMPL. Categ. Schol.inAr.M, a, 15
sqq.,28 sqq.) What Aristotle hadin
his mind in this doctrine of the
ivavriov is the scale of changes
in the natural sciences ; for every

change

is

a transition from one


Phys.

condition to the opposite


v.

226, b, 2, 6, i. 4, 187, a, 31,


188, a, 31 sqq. Ge/i. et Cott.
i.
7, 323, b, 29. To the above
definition of the el'Sc-t ivavriov
3,

c. 5,

corresponds that of the ivavriov


Kara rdirov in MeteoT. ii. 6, 363,
a, 30, and Phys. v. 3, 226, b, 32.
The correct way of formulating
oppositions was dealt with in the
treatise n. avriKeifxivuiv {vid. supra
70, n. 4, and Simpl. loc. cit.
83, b, 39 sqq.; At. Ft. 116).

p.

'

The

biatpopa reKeios of

Me-

ARISTOTLE

226

between such concepts as stand


relation of

Yes

to

one another in the

to No,* of affirmation to negation,

and

between which, therefore, no third or middle term can


object one
lie,' and of which as applied to every given
to
opposition,
This kind of
or other must be true.=*
put it differently, arises when everything which is not
a certain concept

contained in

collected into one

is

where the aggregate of all


divided between two concepts
is
possible determinations
or difference from some
with
by the test of identity

negative expression,'*

i.e.

Between contrary and contradictory opposition Aristotle places that oi frivation and
the
jiossession,^ though he is not able quite to establish
of
kinds
two
other
the
and
this
between
difference*^
given

determinant.

13, a, 37 sqq.;
1057, a, 33.

tract n. auriKei^ievwv mainthat onl}^ the concepts

tained
(^('.(j.

and

(pp6vn(ns

acppoavvT])

were

called airXcis iuavria, not the


beings to which these concepts
apply (such as the (pp6vi/xos and

to

le

SiMPL.

tlie icppwv).

24 sqq.,
'

loc. clt. 83, b,

PlATO, Phcedo, 103

cf.

Aristotle's

CaUg.

sqci.

tlie

Catef/. c. 10, 12, b, 10.


c. 10, 11, h, 16 sqq.,

here: see

X. 4, 1055, a, 10 sqq., 22
Since this opposition only
occurs between abstract concepts
and not between concrete things,
tapJi.

B.

standing formula

and

Metcqyh.

" An
opofxa or prifxa aopicnov
vid. infra, p. 232, n. 2.
"^
"'^''
" "E|is and arepT^ais, e.g. ' see;

ing

'

and

bHnd.'

'

For what

ings of the

judgment
In
^.. c.
a jv^wg.^.....
the like opposition is called
durlcbaffLS (vid. n. 6, &c., infra)

avrh ^v TrecpvKhs ^x^iv, oTov

and in PJiys. v. 3, 227, a, 8 and


Metaph. iv. 7 init., v. 10 init.,

(3) hu irecpvKhs koI 8t6


^nlj
kv ^x^iv fi^ Ixfj-

.,ovu..
(pa(nsavTLKt(jeaL.'

the opposition of concepts


included under the same word.
2

19

Metaijh.

iv. 7, xi. 6,

Pliys. loc. cit.,

and

is

1063. b,
cf.

what

will be 'said presently about contradictory judgment. The kind of


opposition is the same there as

fol-

lows, cf. Trend bLENBUEG, Bist.


Beiir. i. 103 sqq.
6 In Metaph. v. 22 Tand, referring to this, X. 4, 1055, b, 3) Aristolle distinguishes three mean-

for this kind of opposition is


therefore, ws Kardcpacris kuI dnS'

x.

o-repTjo-ts

(1)

fti'

Ti roov Tr(pvK6Twv ex^o'Gai,

m^ %xV
Khu

fi^

(jyvrhu

oinixdTwv (rTeprj(Teaihey<iTai.(2)Uv
^x^iv, ^ ahrh ^ rh yeuos,

-rrecpvichs

exr?.

7re(|)u-

the

meaning would privation


be synonymous with 'negation
(for blind' = not-seeing ), and
'

first

'

'

we could

affirm of the opposites

Ka\ %i,iv that which


are told by Catey. c. 10, 3, b,
20 sqq. (that is to say, by the
/cara

we

o-repyjo-tj/

LOGIC
Notions

opposition.

of relation are adduced as the

author of the Post-proedicamentd)


can not be affirmed of them,
namely that everything is either
one or the other (either * seeing
or * blind ') in such a case, therefore, the relation between a-Tepr](Tis and ^is would be reduced to
that of a.vTi(pa<ns, In the other
two senses of ffripriffis this is not
the case, for in them the (TTeprjffis
itself, as is admitted in Metajyh.
'

'

iv. 12,

1019, b, 3 sqq., expresses

something positive, and

is

a kind

of |ts ; and thus, if we take


* privation
in this sense, the
opposition of the '4^is comes
under the definition of the kvavriov.
The distinction of the two
in the Post-prcedicamenta ( Categ.
c. 10, 12, b, 26 sqq.) is founded
on the following argument of
'

which have no
middle term between them (as
straight and crooked '), one or
other must necessarily apply to
those

evavria,

'

'

'

everything capable of the distinction {e.g. every nuniber must


be either odd or even ) when,
on the other hand, there is a
'

'

middle term between two ivavria,


such a conclusion never follows
Everything
(we cannot say,
which is capable of colour must
be either white or black ') but
*

in the case of

a-Teprja-is

and

e^is,

neither one nor the other of these


we cannot say
results will arise
that to everything capable of the
distinction one or other of such
opposites must apply,' for there
may be some time at which
neither of the two will apply to
;

it

T^

y^p

fi-fjiru

irecpvKhs

oxpiv

ovre oxpiv ^X^^


neither can we
reckon this class of opposites
with those between which there

IXff

oiire TV(p\hv

\4yeTai

but

237

is

a middle term

yap

'6Tav

ixov

6>^Lv

It is,

^ri%(rf'.xi.

ijSr)

rv^Khv

ire^vKhs ^ orpiv ^x^tv, rdre ^

how-

be observed that (1) so


long as the thing in question is
not Tre(f)VKh5 o^piu ex^iv, it is not
ever, to

SeKTiKhv 6\pea)s either, and therefore the instance adduced is not


to the point
and (2), on the
other hand, there is much that is
intermediate between * possession' and 'privation,' for there
are all the degrees of partial
possession
there are not only
;

'

seeing

things,

things

'

but

also

and

blind

'

things

'half
blind.'
A further distinction of
the ivavria from the opposites
Kara (rreprjaiv Koi e^iv is said to lie
in the fact {Categ.c. 10, 13, a,
18), that in the former the transition from one to the other is

mutual (white can become black


and black white), but in the
latter only one-sided, from possession to privation, and not conversely.
But this is likewise incorrect

not

only

can

things

which see become blind or the


rich poor, but blind things

may

become seeing and the poor rich


and even if this is not possible
in every actual case, the same is
just as true of the ivavria themneither can every sick
get well, nor every black
thing become white.
For the
logical relation of concepts, such
a distinction would in any case
be of no importance. Lastly, in

selves

man

Metaph.

x. 4, 1055, b, 3, 7, 14, it

said that the ffreprja-is is a kind


of avricpaffis, namely the avri<pa<ns

is

iv r(S

5e/cTt/c(ju,

a kind of
xi.

6,

and the

ivavTi6rr]s

(thus also in
b, 17); so that,
this, these three

(rrepria-is

1063,

according to

Q2

ARISTOTLE

228

Of all these
subjects of a fourth sort of opposition.^
holds good,
proposition
general
the
opposition
kinds of
that

'

opposites

fall

within one and the same science.'

concepts would form a kind of


gradation from the higher to the
r>at tliis also can only be
lower.
said when the concept of arepricns
as
is not accurately determined
soon as this is done, the relation
;

of crep7]ais

and

under havriS-

avric^acns or

under

To the

r-ns.

falls either

e|is

latter result Anal.

ean
Post. i. 4, 73, b, 21 points
yap rh ivavriov t) arepr^ais ^ avri(paais eV rui avrw yevi, olov &pTLOV
:

Th

TTepiTThv eV

IJ.7]

be an

apidjj.OLS

for, to

ivavriov, the o-repTjo-is

must

express a positive concept, and


this not merely indirectly, like
the avTKpacns from which it is
here distinguished. The same is
true of passages like Metapli.
vii. 7, 1033, a, 7 sqq., where the
sick person who is elsewhere
the ivavriov of the healthy person is given as his ar^prja-is
&s fi^v
ibid. xii. 4, 1070, b, 11

eJSos [airia rcHv crwixdrcov'] rh Q^pixbv


Ka\ &\\ov rp6-Kov rh ^pvxphv i) (Tr^p

for cold forms a contrary


opposition to w^arm, and if it is
an dSos, it cannot be merely a
negation and hence, though it
is given as a negation with other
analogous concepts (e.r/. Be Cede,
ii.
3, 286, a, 25), yet Aristotle
himself in other passages admits

r](ns,

that, in

certain

cases,

it

is

natural property, and not merely


a defect (JPart. An. ii. 2, 649, a,
18), and that it has the power of
acting (^Gen.
24),

et Corr.

ii.

2,

329, b,

which cannot possibly be

true

of

a mere

Trendelenburg,
sqq.,

theor.

<rr4p-f](ns.

Joe.

cit.

Cf.

107

and Strumpbll, Gesch. d.


Fhil. 27 sq. The tract

n.

avriKeifievav

(Trep-ncris

and

also

^is

treated of

Stmpl.

Seliol.

Ar. Fr.
119. We shall have to discuss
hereafter the metaphysical signiin Ar. SG,

b, 41, 87, a, 2

fication of

and

o-TepTjffis

its rela-

tion to the vAt].


Cat. c. 10, 11, b, 17, 24 sqq.;
Top. ii. 2, 109, b, 17, c. 8, 113,
b, 15, 114, a, 13, V. 6, 135, b, 17;
Metaph. x. 4, 1055, a, 38, c. 3,
1054, a, 23. Instances of such relative concepts are (see Cat., loc.
cit., and c. 7; Metapli. v. 15):
double and half in fact, the manifold and its part, the virepixof
and vTrepx6iJ.^vov the active and
'

the passive the measurable and


the measure; the knowable and
;

knowledge. Though in Metaph. v.


10, two further forms of opposition are named, yet Bonitz, on
this passage,

and Waitz,

Ai'ist.

Org. i. 308, have demonstrated


that these latter come under the
four already given. Conversely,
Phys. v. 3, 227, a, 7 only mentions

two

{avriipacis

and

ivavriorris^.

See n. on p. 225, and as to the


extension of the above principle
to all avriKeifjLeva, cf Metaph. iv. 2,
'^

Top. 1. 14, 105, b, 83,


9
ii. 2, 109, b, 17, viii. 1, 155, b,
The founda30, c. 13, 163, a, 2.
tion of this proposition lies mainly
in the fact that, of opposites,

1004,

a,

one cannot be known without


This has different
the other.
causes in different cases in contradictory opposition, it arises
from the negative concept Non-A
immediately presupposing and
containing the positive one A;
in correlative concepts it arises
:

Logic
But concepts taken by themselves cannot,

so far,

produce Discourse of any kind; they are neither true


nor

expression, and

Definite

false.

and falsehood likewise, are

therewith

truth

found in the Propo-

first

The coupling of the Noun or Name- word


with the Verb or Time- word, of the Subject with the
sition.^

Predicate,^ presents us with a

spoken thought, Xoyos)


the form of Assertion,
in

we

it,

unit

and

anything

if

of discourse (or

affirmed or denied

is

(a7r6<j)av(TLS'y

words,'* the Proposition

for

which Aristotle

simple Categorical Judgment as the

ment

when

is trve,

(so far as that applies here) it


arises because the knowledge of
the opposed specific differences
presupposes that of the common

genus,
Vid. sujjra, p. 202, &c.
Interj)r. c. 4, c. 5, 17, a,
'

d.

vi.

4;

De
17

Zeller, Ph.

of.

Gr. pt.
2

As

i., p. 527, 5; p. 628, 1.


to ovofxa and prifxa (the

Org.

Ai'ist.

i.

in that the latter is


darcpov fiopiov rrjs avri(pd(Tws, and the former, on the
AT]\pi.s

other hand, ip(t)T7}(ns avn^daews.


Similar definitions of irpdraa-is
will be found in De Interpr. ii.
20, b, 23, and Anal. Post. i. 2,
cf. Soph. El. 6, 169, a,
72, a, 8
;

8, 14.
s

llpoTaais

on the expression

2;

Waitz,

1, 16, a,

13, c. 2,

d. Arist. i. 128,
Arist. Org. i. 368
Ind. Ar. 651, a, 33 sqq,

3, c.

BONITZ,

1457, a, 10, 14

De Interpr.
Anal. Pr. i. 1, 24,

10, 19, b, 11 ; Poet. c. 20,


; Rliet. iii. 2, 1404,
b, 26.
This is also Platonic ; see
pt.

>

7]

Be

De

'

pp. 557,

n. 5, 532, n, 2.

jxkv

Interpr.

airXri

Interpr. c. 4 ; and Rhet.,


ut supra.
* Such
as wish, request, &c.

(TTIjxavTiK)]

In Anal. Pr.

fi^ virdpx^i'V,

Top.

i.

10,

i.

104, a,

1,

24,

8 (cf.

a,

22

Waitz,

is

airodeiKTiK-^,

De

Gr.

judg-

352). Interrogation

Biese, Phil.

d.

under the concept of


Trp6raais, but it is distinguished
as irp6ra(ns SiaXeKTiK^ from irp.

cf.

Zell. Ph.

regards the

type.'^

both copula and predicate), see


c.

modes of
or Judg-

put

is

latter of which, however, includes

Interpr.

''

the thought whose inner process

from their mutually presupposing


one another; in contrary opposition, and in (rrep-nffis and e'|is

Metaph.

discourse takes

if this

as distinguished from other

get,

thought expressed in

ment

7)

S^

Se

e/c

71

icrrip

c.

4,

17, a, 20
aird^avais

c. 5,

TOVTcov crvyKifi4vT}
fiev

airXri
irepl
oiis

17, a, 1

a, 16.

aTrStpavcis

ecr
(poju)]

rod virdpx^^v ri

fi

ol )(_p6voi. diijprjvTai.

ARISTOTLE

S30
signified

by the spoken words,^ regards tliat as conjoined

or divided which
it is

so conjoined or divided in actuality

is

false in the opposite case.^

The most fundamental

between judgments is therefore that of


Every affirmation stands
affirmative and negative.^
opposed to a negation which forms with it an exclusive
distinction

opposition

(contradictory)

that one or the other of


third

On

is possible.'*

(ai/Ttc^ctcrtp),

them must be

such wise

in

true and no

the other hand, certain affirm-

ative propositions are related to certain negatives (as,


for instance, universal affirmatives to the

On

'

the definition of speech

^opiov

corresponding

S' auTi(f)d(Toos

rh

Kard

fxev r\

ratu eV rrj ^vxf) Ta0nixdraov, see De Interpr. c. 1, 16,


fi,
i?,
c. 2 init. c. 4, 17, a, 1

rivos Kardcpaais, rh 5e rt atrd rivos

El. c. 1, 165, a, 6; De
Sensu, c. 1, 437, a, 14 liJict. iii.
The events in the
1, 1404, a, 20.
soul which words express are,
according to these passages, the
same in all men their designation in speech, on the other
hand, is (like written signs) a
matter of convention, and thus
differs in different persons.
- Metapli. vi. 4., ix. 1 init.
^ De Interi)r. c. 5 init.
icTi
5e ^^ TTpuTos \6yos airocpavriKhs

about the law of contradiction


and the excluded middle. According to De Interpr. c. 9, an

as

(rvfxfioAov

fioph.

Kardcpaffis elra aTrocpaffis

irdyres

'

&Woi

Further,

eh.

crvvSeafxcfi

oi 5'

A7ud. Pr.

24,
Anal. Post. i. 25, 86, b, 33.
a, 16
The irpoTaais Kara(pariK^ is also

ibid. c. 5, 6

i.

1,

called KaTTjyopiK^, the airocpaTiKT]


Anal. Pr. i. 2,
also (TTepriTiKi).
c. 4, 26, a, 18, 31, c. 6, 28, a, 20,
b, 6, 15, 0.13, 82, b, 1.
*

De

Inter^r.

c. 6, c. 7,

17, b,

72, a, 11
aTr6<pav(Tis Se avTi(pd(r(cs dirorepovovv fjidpiov. avricpacTis Se avTid(Tis

16

ris

Anal. Post.

ovK

^ari

i.

2,

fiera^h

Kad^

avr^v.

Cf. p. 226, n. 1

aw6(paaLS.

and

2.

We shall have more to say later on

exception to the rule stated above


is found in such disjunctive propositions as refer to a future
result which is contingent or
depends on free will. As is here
remarked, we can assert nothing
at all about them beforehand,
neither that they will happen,
nor that they will not happen
of them (Gen. et Corr.ii. 11, 337,
b, 3) only '6ri [xeWei, but not '6ti
ea-Tai, is true
for the latter excludes the possibility of the event
being otherwise. Hence of them
only the disjunctive proposition is
true, that they will either happen
or will not happen.' Of the two
they
categorical propositions,
they will not
will happen and
happen,' neither is true of them.
The latter assertion is remarkable, for we should rather say,
that one of the two assertions
is true, but we only find out
;

'

'

'

'

Log Id

231

way

of contrary opposition,

universal negatives) in the

which does not exclude a third possible

But

we must not expect

in truth

exposition of these relations

was not yet able

case.^

a perfectly clear

from Aristotle.

As he

to distinguish the Copula expressly

from the Predicate,^ he was naturally unable to


cover the true status of the Negative.

Copula alone, that

states that negation concerns the

which by the

But Ari-

result.

regards

only

true
those assertions which assert
actuality and since this, in the
stotle

as

given case, is itself undetermined,


no definite proposition can, with
When
truth, be then affirmed.
it is equally possible that something will happen, and that it
will not happen, the assertion
that it will happen is neither
true nor false
it only becomes
one or other, according as a corresponding or a contradictory
;

Cf. Simpl.
state of fact arises.
Categ. 103, /3 Bas. according to
the teaching of the Peripatetic
:

school only the disjunctive proposition is true, * A will either


be or not be
but which part of
this disjunction will be true, and
' ;

which

false,

&\r)irTOP

(pvaei Koi da-rarov.

lvai

Hence

class of assertions

fjS-n

all

rfj

that

fj-ev

ovk

Toia ^ roia.
It is from the
Megareans that Aristotle took the
Aporia
subject-matter of the
which he discusses in the passage
cited: cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr.

'

pt.

cf.

i.

p. 220, 1.

De

Interpr.

c. 7,

17, b,

what has been said

20:

at pp.

The
224-5, about the ivavTioTrjs.
particular aflarmative and particular negative propositions which,

dis-

He nowhere
it

according to later terminology,


are opposed as subcontraries, are,
in A7mI Pr. ii. 8, 59, b, 10,
reckoned among the ivavricas avriKcl/jievai.
Aristotle, however, re-

marks

(c. 15 init.) that this is


only according to the words, not
as to the thing itself.'
2
Vid. supr. p. 229, n. 2. In De
Interpr. c. 10, 19, b, 19, a case
is certainly before his mind, otolv
'

rh effri rplrov TrpocrKarrjyoprjrai, as


in the proposition ean S'lKaios
&v6pci}Tros.
This, however, does
not relate to the separation of
the copula from the predicate,
but only to the fact that,
in existential propositions (Ttiv
&vdp(i}iros, OVK iCTLV S., &c,, the
:

subject

means
which

can be expanded by
an added adjective,
itself may be put either
of

affirmatively (Si/catos &.), or negatively (^ov SiKaios &.) ecrrt Sik. ft.
means 'there is a just man,'
which is different from &v9po}iros
SiKaios i(TTi, 'man is just.'
Aristotle nowhere says that every
proposition, or even that the
existential proposition logically
considered, consists of
three
parts and the treatise n, eptirjveias even shows a preference for
selecting examples from those
existential propositions which fall
into two parts only.
:

ARtSTOTL^

232

has to do only with the connection of the subject to


the predicate, and does not in fact deny the subject or
the predicate

The omission caused him

itself.^

to

treat propositions with a negative subject or predicate

whereas there

as a special class,-

doing

for

no ground

in fact

is

so.^

proceeds

Aristotle

to

Quantity

the

consider

of

Judgments, distinguishing between those which relate

many objects at once and those which relate to one,


and then subdividing the former into universals and
to

He

particulars.

has therefore a general division into

judgments universal,

In Anal. Pr. i. 46 init. c. 3,


25, b, 19, he shows that there is
a distinction between ^^ eli/ot To51
'

and dvai
and cJuai

/xr)

tovto,

fjL^

eJuai

KevKhu

inasmuch as
propositions of the last kind have
the form of ailirmative proposi)U7/

\fvKhu,

tions but he does not detect the


real reason of this either here or
in De Interpr. c. 12 (to which
;

Beandis,
b,

no

p. 165, refers).

De

Interpr. c. 3, 16, a, 30,


12, he says: ovK-&v9pwiros is
2

and ovx-vyiaivei no
but he wants to call the
former ouo/j.a adpiarov, and the
ovo/xa,

pv/ia;

latter ^7j/xa aSpicrrou

and

in

c.

along with the propositions


eariv &udpwTros, ovk e. &., &c., he
introduces also the correspond10,

ing ones
concepts
OVK

made up

fffTiu

ovK-&u9p.,

OVK-&.,

OVK

of negative
ovK-&vdpcoiros,

Io-tij/

icTTiv

effriv

ov-^'iKaios

ov-SIk.

ovk-

Theophrastus called
&c.
these propositions e/c fxeraB4crws
(Ammon. De Interpr. 128, b, 129,
a., and Philop.
Scliol. in Ar.
121, a), or Kara ixerddeaiv (ALEX.
&vdp.,

Analyt. 134,

a.).

and

particular,

But

individual.''

which consists
the form of the judgment the
^

_Pqj.

^hiit in

definite conjunction of the subject with the predicate remains

the same, whether the subject


and predicate be positive or negative concepts.
And Aristotle
liimself admits (Anal. Pr. i. 3,
25, b,

19,

cf.

c.

13, 32, a,

31),

that expressions such as: eVSeX^TaL /j.r]dul vTzdpx^t.v, ea-riv ovk


ayadhv, have a o-p^rjyua KaracpaTiKou.
*
Still, this is only the case
in De Interpr. c. 7.
Universal

judgments, which are also called


eVI
rwv KadoKov airocpaivopTai
KadoAov, and particulars, which
are also called eV yuepet or Kara
/mepos {Anal. Pr. i. 1, 24, a, 17,
c.

2,

25,

a,

10, 20, Sec), are

4,

also designated as those


eVl

ruv KaB6\ov

aTTOcpaiuovTai, i.e.

fii]

ject is a KadoKov, t
ir^cpvKe

which

Ka66\ov 5e
in both the sub-

fiev

KarTjyopelo'dai,

one the predicate

eir\

TrXfiSvcav

but in the

affirmed of
whole extension, in the other not so.
The Analytics, on the other
hand, does not mention individual

the

subject

in

is

its

LOGIC
he

adds what he

and thus

which

judgments,'

'indefinite

led to bring in,

is

distinction

the

calls

233

here

as elsewhere,

nothing to do with the

really has

logical form of thought-connection at all, but solely


with the grammatical form of the expression.^

Aristotle also devotes

of Judgments,
subject

connection

in

much

attention to the Modality

on account of the importance of

this

He

with the Syllogism.

dis-

tinguishes between judgments which assert actuality,

and

necessity,

possibility,^

coincide with that which

Apodeictic,
/classification
/

possible

now

and Problematic

in use
for

of Assertory,

Aristotle

does not regard subjective

in

his

degrees

of

By

things.

he does not mean what may perhaps exist, but


may exist but does not exist necessarily, and

'

only what

may

therefore rriay or

not

judgments (see following note)


and although it is true that they
are without meaning for the
main object of that treatise,
which is the doctrine of the
;

syllogism, yet we should expect


that, if Aristotle at the time he
wrote it had already had his
attention called to this form
of judgment, he would have expressly stated why he passed it

We may infer, if

over.

but this division does not

but the objective nature of

certainty,
'

is

the com-

position n. kpfx-nveias be really his,


that the peculiar notes of indivi-

dual judgments must have struck


himafter he had written Analytics.
^
In the De Interpr. he adds
nothing as to indefinite judgments. In Anal. Pr. i. 1, 24, a,
16 (cf 0. 2, 25, a, 4, c. 4, 26, b, 3,
etc.) he says 'jrp6Ta(ns
^ Kad6\ov ^ eV /xepei fj adi6pi(Tros but the
.

exist

The

indifferently.^

examples which are there given


Tuv ivaurioop eJvai r^u avr))V iiri<rT-i]fji.T\v ,

r^v

r]5oui]v

fx)]

eluai

aya66v,

belong, logically considered, to


the class of universal propositions
others which might be adduced,
such as ((TTLV &v6p(airos biKaios,
are particular.
Aristotle himself
makes no further use in the Analytics of the irpOTaa-eis abiSpiaroi.
Theophrastus designated under
this name the particular negative
(Alex, Analyt. 21, b), or perhaps

Ammon. Be InterjJT. 73, a,


states, particular propositions in

as

general.

Anal. Pr.

i.
2 init. iracra
rod virdpx^LV ^ rod
avdyKTjs U7rap%etj/ ^ rov ivdex^-

TrpSraa-is 4crTiv
e'l

'/)

trOai virdpx^iv.
3

\eyw

Anal. Pr.
8'

i.
13, 32, a, 18
iuSex^ffdai Kal rh ivdex^fJ-f-

ARISTOTLE

234

which he deduced from his definitions were


partly confuted by critics as old as Theophrastus and
Eudemus.^ To what is called the Eelation of Judg-

corollaries

'

vov, ov

fxi]

uuTOS avayKULOv, reOevTOS


ovSev earai bia tout'
effrai &pa ro eV1. 28

virdpx^i'V-,

S'

^Uvarov

ovk ayajKoiov Ka \rh fxi)


Mefajfh.
avayKoiov ivBex^H-^vou.
eari Se dwarhu
ix. 3, 1047, a, 24
Sexd^ei/oj/

TOVTO, $ iav virdp^r) 7] eVepyeia, ou


AeysTUL 6xel^' rr]v Swafiiv, ovOcv
Likewise C. 4,
eo-Tai dSvvarou.
1047, b, 9, c. 8, 1050, b, 8 TrRaa
:

avTicpdcrecos icrriv

hvvajXLS a/xa ttjs


.

kjl).

rh dpa Svvarov 4hai iuSex^rai


rh avrh dpa
Koi /urj eJpai

elj/at

hvpaTov Koi clvaL Koi

fxrj

e'ivai

ix.

yap Kara to dvvaadai


\eyeTai, ravrdv iari Swarhv rdvavria
i.e. what can be healthy

1)

i?lit.

'dcra

can also be ill, what can rest can


also move, he who can build can
also destroy.
Aristotle
'

'

possibility,'

a
says that in
the possibility of the
also contained (see

contrary is
preceding note, and Be Interjjr.
BoKe7 5e rh avrh
c. 12, 21, b, 12
irav
dvvaa-daL Kal ehai Ka\ fii] eluai
yap rh Svuarhv refiveaOai v) )8a5/(,6ij/
:

'

Kal

ix)]

^adi(eiv Kal

riuveaQai.

/xt]

determining the
concept by taking that meaning
of ^vva/xis according to which it
designates a power of doing or
dvvarov,

&c.),

suffering {3retaph. ix. 1, 1046, a,


and it
12 init.)
V.
sqq.,
i)
matters not that this possibility
;

contrary is not always


equally great, and that the ^vSexoixevov or Svvarhp (for these two
expressions are really synonymous) at one time designates

of the

something which happens as a


though not without excepanother something
at
tions,

rule,

which may equally happen or


not happen (Anal. Pr. i. 13, 32,
Hence he maintains
b, 4 sqq.).
in Anal. Pr.

Be

Ccelo,

from the

1.

13, 32, a, 29 (cf.

12, 282, a, 4), that


^vSex^crOai virdpx^^v the
i.

eVSexeo'^at l^h virdpx^i-v also invari-

ably follows, and from the iravrl


eVSexeo-0at the ivdex^ffdai /xv^evl
and fx)] iravrl (i.e. the possibility
in question
of the predicate
occurring to none, or not to all,
for Prantl, Gesch. d. Lof/. i. 267,
explains the words wrongly) for
since the possible is nothing
necessary, the contrary of all
that is (merely) possible may
happen. And for the same reason
;

Aristotle refuses {ihid. c. 17, 36,


b, 35) to allow, in possible propositions, the simple conversion
of the universal negative judgFor, since the negative
ment.
judgment, it is possible that no
B is A,' according to him, init is
cludes the affirmative,
possible that every B is A,' so the
'

simple conversion of the former


would include the simple conversion of a universal affirmative

judgment; and universal affirmative judgments cannot be converted simply. Theophrastus and
Eudemus denied these assertions,
because they understood by
'possible,' everything that can
happen, and lost hold of the state-

ment that it must also at the


same time be able not to happen
and thus they included some
things necessary in the possible
(ALEX. Anal. Pr. 51, b, m, 64, b,
72,

a,

b,

m,

73,

a).

Aristotle

LOGIC

235

ments Aristotle pays as little attention as to the Hypothetical and Disjunctive Syllogisms.
Only in what he
'

himself admits {Anal. Pr. i. 3,


25, a, 37; Be Interpr. c. 13, 22,
b, 29 cf MetapJi. vs.. 2 init. c. 5,
1048, a, 4, c. 8, 1050, b, 30 sqq.)
with regard to the forces of
nature (Swti/tety) which only act
in one direction, that the necessary also may he called a possible
(Sworbj/), and that, allowing this,
universal negative possible-propositions can be converted simply,
and that we may conclude from
necessity to possibility but he
also adds that this is not true as
to his own concept of the possible. Two further points of

there was a perfect possiblesyllogism (Alex. loc. cit. 66, b).


Both sides are right, according to
their concepts of the possible.
If we understand by * possible '
everything that can be, including
also the necessary, the syllogisms
are quite correct and simple
' Every B
is A, every C can be B,
therefore every C can be A
' No
B is A, every C can be B,
therefore it is possible that no C
is A.'
If, on the other hand, we
take possible to mean only that
of which the contrary is likewise

which Alexander
wrote a work (Alex. Anal. 40, b,
83, a), arose between Aristotle
and his pupils upon the question

syllogisms, because in this supposition the minor, every C can


be B,' includes the negative proposition, 'every C can be not-B.'
And also, as Theophrastus and
Eudemus merely adhered to the
principle that the modality of
the conclusion is conformed to
the weaker premiss (ALEX.z&i*^.),
they asserted, on the same prin-

on

dispute,

about the mood of conclusions in


syllogisms, the
premisses
of
which are in different moods.
Aristotle says that where one
premiss is a possible- and the
other an actual -proposition, a
perfect syllogism can only be had
in the case where the major proposition is a possible-proposition
if, however, it is the minor, we
get, first of all, an imperfect
syllogism, i.e. one in which the
conclusion is only obtained by
a deductio ad ahsiirdum and not
immediately from the given premisses, and secondly, in the case
of a negative syllogism (more
correctly in all cases), the possibility in the conclusion must be
taken in the improper sense (i.e.
:

not as confined to that which


both can and cannot be) (^Anal.
Pr. i. 15). Theophrastus and
Eudemus, on the contrary, were
of opinion that even in this case

'

'

'

possible,

we cannot make such


'

ciple,

that

when one premiss

assertorial
apodeictic, the

is

and

the other
conclusion is

apodeictic (Alex. ihid. 40, a, 42,


b,

and from him Philop.

Schol.

in Arist. 158, b, 18, 159, a, 6),


whilst, according to Aristotle
(Atial. Pr. i. 9 sqq.) it is apodeictic when the major is so.
In
this case also, according to the
meaning which we attach to the
modality of propositions, both
assertions may be made. If the
propositions 'B must be A,' 'B
cannot be A,' are supposed to
express that between B and A
there is (or is not) not a contingent, but a necessary connection,
it follows that between every-

AntSTOTLB

L>36

says of contradictory opposition

do we find the kernel of

On the
the late doctrine of disjunctive judgments.
other hand, he is copious in his treatment of the Condown the well-known

version of Propositions,^ laying


rules,^

but he

treats it solely in connection with his

theory of the Syllogism.

This theory

of the Syllogism was expounded by

Aristotle at full length,

most original
duce the

and

discovery.''

name

it

may

of the Syllogism

vocabulary,^ so he was also the

connections and

upon the
'

Syllogism

all

syllogistic
'

is

truly be called his

As he was

the

into

first

to intro-

the scientific

remark that all


our thought depend

first to

advances in

combination of judgments.

a chain of thoughts, in which, from certain

matters assumed, and by virtue of these alone, there issues


of necessity

some further matter

thing contained in B and A, by


the same necessity, tliere is, or
is

'

from

them.'''

think connected or not connected


with B.

not, a connection (if all living

beings, by reason of a necessity


of nature, are mortal, the same
every kind of
is also true of
living beings, e.g. of men), as
Aristotle, loo. cit. 30, a, 21 sqq.
shows quite clearly. If, on the
other hand, these propositions
are meant to state that we are
obliged to think A connected or
not connected with B, the proposition, C must (or cannot) be
A can only be deduced from
proposition 'B must (or
the
cannot) be A,' when we are
obliged to consider C implied in
B.
If, however, we only know
as a fact (assertorially) that
C is B, then we only know as a
fact, likewise, that C is or is not
that which we are obliged to

different

Vld.

S7ij}r.

Anal. Pr.
32, a, 29 sqq.

p. 230.

-'

sqq.
'

ii. 1,

i.

c.

2,

17,

3, cf. c. 13,

36,

b,

15

53, a, 3 sqq.

Simple conversion of uni-

versal negative and particular


affirmative judgments, particular
conversion (later so-called conversio ])er accidens) of universal
affirmative, and no conversion at
all of particular negative judgfor the conversio per
ments
contrapositionem was not as yet

known
*

c.

to him.

As he himself says. Soph. El.

34, 183, b, 34, 184, b, 1.


5 Cf.
Gesch.
Peantl,

Log.

i.

d.

264.

Anal.
Pr. 1. 24. b, ^18^
avWoyicrixhs Se ecrri x6yos iv ^
reOevTcav rivwv erepdu ri rwv K6t-

LOGIC
The

2.r/

principle that this process in its simplest form in-

more than two assumptions, or more accurately


two judgments, from which a third is derived, and that
therefore no syllogistic conclusion can have more than
two premisses, is nowhere expressly proved by Aristotle
volves no

in the beginning of his treatise, though he refers to

Now

later.i

it,

the deduction of a third judgment from two

given judgments can only arise out of some bringing


into connection of the concepts,

judgments were

which in these given

as yet unconnected.^

This

is

impossi-

except a mediation be effected between them by


another concept connected with both of them.^ Every
ble,

must

syllogism

is

therefore necessarily contain three con-

no more and no less,'* and of these the intermediate

cepts,

connected in the one premiss with the

way

the other with the third, in such a


the connection between the
iihwv
ravra

audyKTjs

e|

r^

avfifiaivei

(Likewise

elvai.

Tojj.

100, a, 25, cf. Soj?h. El. c.

1,

i.

1,

165,

Ae'7cy Se r^ ravTa eli/ai rh


ravra (rvfifiaiveiu, rh Se * 5ia
ravra (Tvfxfiaiv^iv rh fiTjdeuhs e^coOev

a, 1.)

'

'

5ia

'

opov irpocrSelv trphs rh yeueadai rh


auayKa7ov.
1

Ajial.

Pr.

i.

25, 42, a, 32.

As regards terminology, the pre-

first
^

first

and in

as to bring out

and third in the con-

principle

which

Aristotle

does not state in this form, but


which follows immediately from
his definition of Judgment, if we
apply it to the case before us.

Cf Anal. Pr. i. 23, b, 30


but especially 41, a, 2.
Anal. Pr. i. G.25,init. Ibid.
42,b,l sqq. on the number of con^

sqq.,
*

the conclusion invariably = o-y/tirfpaa-ixa.


In Anal. Pr. ii. 1, 53,
a, 17 sqq., however,
avfnrpa(Tfjt.a
stands for the subject of the con-

cepts in whole series of syllogisms,


Of the three concepts of a syllogism {opoi, vid. siqyr. p. 219, n.l),
that which occurs in both premisses is called (ji4(ros ; that which
comprehends the latter is called
thehigherorgreaterduei^oj/orTrpoJto/ ^/cpoj/) that which is comprehended by it, the lower or lesser
(e\arrou &Kpou oi effxarov), Anal.
Pr. i. 4,25,b, 35, 32, 26, a, 21,c.38

elusion.

init.,

misses are generally called


rda-eis

{Metaph.

virodeaeis

rod

v. 2,

irpo-

1013, b, 20:

the

avixTc^pafffxaros')',

minor proposition in Eth.

JSf.

vi.

9=

12, 1143, b, 3, vii, 5, 1147, b,


^ Irepo (or TeAeura/o) irpdracris

and Anal. Pr.

ii.

23, 68, b.

ARISTOTLE

238
elusion.

But

this result

judgments

all

with a predicate
disjunctive

may come

in three ways.

As

consist in the connecting of a subject

and
and
as
reckoning),

(for Aristotle leaves hypothetical

judgments out of his

the connecting of two judgments into a conclusion, or,


in other words, the deduction of the conclusion from the
premisses, rests

relation of the intermediate

upon the

concept or middle term to the other two, it follows


that the mode of the connecting ('the form of the syllogism') will be determined by the way in which the

middle term

is

related to the others.

only three ways possible

Now

the middle term

be related as subject to the higher

there are

may

either

and as predicate to

the lower concept, or as predicate to both, or as subject


Aristotle does not take any direct notice of
to both.2
a fourth possible case, in which

it is
;

but we need not

this fourth

arrangement can

lower and predicate of the higher


greatly blame him, for

33 sq. or the major concept is


called briefly 6.Kpov, and the minor
;

Tpirov.

Anal. Pt. i. 23, 41, a, 13, at


the end of the section on the
1

syllogistic figures, Aristotle, after

having treated of the necessity


and significance of the Middle
concept as a connecting-link
between Major and Minor, conovv avdyKiq fxevri Xafielv
5' ivSex^rai
Koi rh T tov B
(^ yap rh A tov T

tinues
irphs

&iJ.(pcti

KOLvhv, tovto

rh F nar'' ajxKara rod T), ravra S'

Karr]yope(TavTas,
(poiv,

eVrl

&ix(pa}

TO. etprj/ieVa

fj

(XX'^l^^^'ra,

the subject of the

<pavphv

gri TrduTU (rvWoyKrfihv avdyKT} yiv(r9ai 5ta rovrwv rivhs t&p axV'
Cf. 0. 82, 47, a, 40 sqq.,
fxdrccv.

and the searching discussion in

Ueberweg's

Zogik, 103, p. 276

2 The position of the propositions has, as we know, no influence on the form of the syllogism.
The precedence of the major, customary since then, seemed more
natural to Aristotle than to us.
In laying down a syllogism, he
begins not, as we are accustomed
to do, with the subject, but with
the predicate of the major: A

vwdpx^i Travrl r^ B, B virdpx^t iravrX


so that, even in his form of
expression, there is a constant
descent from the greater to the
middle concept, and from that

T^ r

to the lesser.
he. cit. p. 276.

Cf.

Uebbbweg,

LOGIC

239

never occur in a single and rigorous chain of reasoning.

We

then,

obtain,

three

Figures

(o-'xrjixaTa)

which together sum up the categorical syllogism.


so-called fourth figure of later logic

is

The

ignored, and

neither the hypothetical nor the disjunctive syllogisms


are treated of as special forms in any way.^
If

we ask what syllogisms

are possible in these three

be observed that every syllogism must

figures, it is to

contain a universal, and must also contain an affirmative


proposition

^
;

that the conclusion can only be universal

when both the premisses

are so;;^

and that

in every

syllogism at least one of the premisses must resemble


The proof of this cannot be
well given here.
Cf. Zbllee, Ph. d. Gr.
and consult
iii. a, 738, 2ncl ed.
especially Pea.ntl, Gfiscli. d. Log.
'

i.

570
3

sq.

Whether

or, as

Prantl

this

is

{Geseh.

a failing
d.

Leg.

i.

295) thinks, an advantage of


Aristotelian logic, it is not necessary here to inquire but when that
learned writer, as well as Biese
(Phil.d.Arist. i. 155), endeavours
to find that Aristotelian account
of hypothetical syllogisms, which
others miss, in the remarks on
supposition-syllogisms (avWoyiffixol e'l vTToOccrews) at Anal. Pr. i.
23, 40, b, 25, 41, a, 21 sqq. c. 29,
;

45, b, 22, c. 44, he confounds two


different things. Aristotle means
by a * hypothetical syllogism

that which begins with an unproved supposition (cf. Waitz,


on Anal. 40, b, 25). We understand by it that of which the
major is a hypothetical judg-

ment. And the two classes do


not by any means necessarily

coincide, for an unproved supposition may be expressed in a


categorical proposition, and conversely a hypothetical proposition may be fully demonstrable.
The same statement, can, in fact,

without changing its meaning,


be expressed both categorically

and hypothetically. Our modern


distinction of categorical and
hypothetical propositions regards
exclusively the form of the judgment, not the scientific certainty
of the proposition.
*
Anal. Pr. i. 24 init. en re
:

iv

airavTi

[sc.

(rvWoyia-fiq}']

KarrjyopiKSv riva tu>u

'dpccr eJvai

Set

koI

rh Ka66kov virapx^^v. The former


not further proved, as Aristotle
supposes it to be clear from his
preceding explanation of the
syllogistic tigures.
By way of
proving the second, he proceeds
&pv yap rod Kad6\ov ^ ovk earai
(rvWoyia-fihs, ^ oh -rrpos rb Keiimevov,
fl rh e| apxvs alriiacrai which will
be exiDlained in detail in what
follows infra.
' Los. Git. 41. b, 23.

is

ARISTOTLE

240

the conclusion, both as to

its

quality

and

also as to its

Yet Aristotle has nowhere deduced these

modality.'

on general principles from the nature of the

rules

They

method.

syllogistic

are merely generalisations

from his observation of the various forms of syllogism


This analysis, however, he carries out with

themselves.

very great care.

He

well-known moods

is

not satisfied with proving the

for the three

figures,^

but he also

investigates minutely the influence which the modality

must
upon the conclusion and upon the whole

of the premisses in pure and in mixed syllogisms


exercise

He

syllogistic process.^
first

hgure alone as

regards the syllogisms of the

according to his

perfect,' because,

view, they alone immediately reveal the necessity of the

Both the others yield

syllogistic sequence.

'

imperfect

and require to be completed through the


Their demonstrative value rests upon and is

syllogisms,
first.

proved by the fact that they can be reduced to the


first figure,

either apagogically or

ad

impossibilG^ as well

as

in

by conversion.'* These

employed in the

syllogistic forms are of course

hypothetical

'

'

reductio

arguments

generally.'^
1

Loc.

For the

cit.

1.

27.

tirst

7, 29, a, 30, b, 1 sqq., c. 23^, of.

figure (to use

the Scholastic designations) the


Taoods: Harbara, Darii, Celare/U,
Ferio (Anal. Pr. i. 4); for the
second: Cesare, Camestres, Fesfor the
tino, Baroco (ibid. c. 5)
third Darapti, Felapton, Disaviis,
Datisi, Bocardo, Fresison
;

Anal. Pr. i. c. 8-23 cf the


discussion in n. 1 to p. 234, s?{^rfl^.
< See the sections cited, espe=*

24, b, 22

irpoaSed/xevov

irapa

ciallyc. 4:Jin.,c. 6fi7i.,c. 6Jin.,c.

ra

^l\riix4va

rb ^ai'^i/at t8 ai/07/cotoj', areA^


Se rhv irpoffSe6fxevou
^ ivhs ^
ttXhSvoov, & ^(Tti fi^j/ ai'ayKa7a Sta
tSjv
viroKei/xevwu
opwv oh ^^v
Trpbs

t\'t]irrai

Sia irpordarewv.

necessary here to

(c. 6).

c.

reXeiou fihv odu ko\w


avWoyiafihu rhv iJ,r]Sevhs &\Xov

1,

It is

not

defend Ari-

stotle's view,
* Ibid. c. 23, 41, a, 21
cf supra, p. 238, n. 1.
.

sqq.

LOGIC

24]

With

equal fulness does Aristotle set forth rules


for the proper treatment of these forms in scientific

and the errors to be avoided. He shows in the


instance what kind of propositions are more
difficult to prove but more easy to confute, and vice
use,

first

Next he provides

versa}

fitting premisses,

rules for the discovery of the

having regard to the quality and

quantity of the conclusion to be proved,^ and in doing


so he takes occasion to censure

method of

On

in passing the Platonic

head he treats minutely


of the rules and methods which must be observed in
division."*

this

order to reduce the materials of proof so discovered to

the exact syllogistic form.^

Furthermore he discusses

the capacity of syllogisms in relation to the compre-

hension of their contents

the syllogisms giving true

conclusions from false premisses


'

lUd.
lUd.

c. 26.

27-29, here also


(c. 29) with express application
to
apagogic and supposition2

c.

syllogisms.

81), is of no use
to suppose the
chief point that is to be proved.
(c.

we have then

When

it is a question
of the
concept of man as a ^^ou Qv^rhv,
then, he says, from the propositions
All living beings
are
either mortal or immortal man
is a living being,' it would only
follow that man is either mortal
or immortal
that he is a ^^ov
6vT\rhv is a mere postulate. Hence
'

Aristotle says of division, that


it is oTov
aadey^s
[not valid]
<rv\\oyi(Tfi6s.
Similarly in Anal.
Po8t.ii.5. Alsoin Part. An. i. 2 sq.,

VOL.

I.

the circulus in argu-

the Platonic method is blamed


because (contrary to the rule
given at p. 216, n. 1) it multiplies
unnecessarily the intermediate
introduces the same
thing under different genera,
gives negative qualities, divides
from all kinds of opposite points
of view, &c.
Cf. Meyer, Arist.
Thierliunde, 71 sqq.
* See Zell. Ph. d.
Gr. pt. i.
divisions,

To seek to define concepts


by means of continuous divisions,
^

he says

623 sqq.
*

Log.

Anal. Pr.

cit. c.

32-46.
ii. 1.

Ibid. c. 2 init. (cf. Top. viii.


11 sq., 162, a, 9, b, 18) 4^ aK-nduv
fihv ovv ovK ItTTt \pev5os cuWoyicr''

4k \pevSwv S'
7rA?V ov Si6ti dAA' Uti
OVK effTLu K \pv$a>v
acrdai,

ecrrti/
'

aArj^es,

rod yap Sioti


avWoyiarfjLds

(because false premisses give the


ground itself, the 5i6ti, falsely
cf.svjjra,-p.nS,n.2).

Under what

ARISTOTLE

242

endo

the

'

'

conversion

absurdum

ad

'

of the syllogism

which

syllogisms

the Redudio

from

result

the

conversion of premisses into their opposites/ together


with the various syllogistic fallacies and the means of

meeting them.^ Lastly he inquires into those kinds of


proof which do not arise by demonstration, in the strict

method of argu-

sense of the word,^ and establishes the

ment

peculiar

to

each."^

We

cannot

this

at

point

Induction, c. 23 example,
c. 24 (cf. Anal. Post. i. 1, 71, a,
9 lihet. i. 2, 1356, b, 2, 1357, b,
25, ii. 20); d7ra7W7^ (reduction

possible in the
conditions this
different figures, is discussed in c.
is

2-4.

To

koX

kvkK(x)

e|

dW^Awv

This consists in the


SfLKwadai.
conclusion of a syllogism (which,
liowever, must of course be shown
to be true from other sources)
being used in conjunction wath
the converse of oiie premiss to
prove the other. For the cases

of one problem to another more


easy to solve), c. 25 objection

where

these

the syllogism
26
from the probable (ehhs) or cer(evaracris), c.

tain
c.

this is possible, see loe. cit.


Against 'the vicious
5-7.
c.
in argument, see Anal.
circle
i.

loc.cit. c.

The

^^etitio 2)'>'incipii (t^ er

^evSos,

\pev5os,

rules

c.

for

c.

17

18, cf.

the

Toj).

disputation

irpuTov

viii,

10

deduced
on decep-

from this, c. 19, sq.


by too hasty suppositions, c.
21 on proving certain suppositions by the transposition of the
;

tion
;

propositions in a syllogism,

c. 22.

little gall

apxri alrelaOaL), c. 16, cf. 2'ojJ. \ni.


13; the /j-V trapa tovto (rvfi^alveiv

t6

'

Man, the horse &c., are longman &c. have little gall
therefore animals which have

lived

XV.

cit. c.

'

'

ll-14,cf.ro/;.viii. 2,157, b, 34, c.


12, l(5'^,h,b,2ind Anal. Post. i. 26,
where it is remarked that direct
proof is of greater scientific value.

Loc.

The most important of


Induction,' which we

6 5ia Tov

'

8-10.

The Beductio ad ahsnrdum,


aSwdrov crvKKoyicTfJios, c.

'^

is

the

'

wdth the contradictory or contrary


;

27.

which AriEnthymeme,'

((TTj/xem),

proved by the minor and the


conclusion. PJ.g., we may prove
apodictically All animals which
have little gall are long-lived
man, the horse &c. have little gall,
and are therefore long-lived but
the inductive proof will go thus

3, 72, b, 25.

The destruction of one premiss by the other in conjunction


2

of the conclusion

calls

shall discuss later on. It consists


in the major proposition being-

'

Post.

marks

stotle

'

are long-lived.'

This,

however, only applies when the


minor concept (' animals which
have little gall ') has an equal extension with the middle concept
(' man &c.'), and when the minor
proposition (' man &c. have little
gall ') can be simply transposed
so that in its place 'the animals
which have little gall are man
&c.' can be put (loc. cit. c. 23).
' See for a fuller discussion
of these points, Prantl, p. 299-

LOGIC
follow

him

these

into

much

doubtedly owe

243

in the application of the

syllogistic

method, and though they prove most clearly

the

with which the great logician worked out

care

many-sided

its

The

detail.

system forms the foundation upon

syllogistic

which Aristotle built the theory of


which he
)

we un-

although

researches,

them

to

set out in the

is syllogistic,

Scientific

second Aymkjtics.

but not every syllogism

Proof,

All proof

proof

is

It is

only the Scientific Syllogism which deserves this name.^


Science consists in the cognition of causes, and the
cause of a phenomenon

is

that from which

it

of necessity

and apprehension by means of


proof are only possible when something is explained
from its original causes.^ Nothing can be the subject
of proof except that which is necessary.
Proof is a
arises.^

Proof, therefore,

conclusion from necessary premisses.'^

That which

is

ordinarily (though not without exception) true can be

321.
In the selection and sequence of the different sections no
strict order is observed, although
related subjects are put together.
On the division of the Prior Analytics as a whole, see BeANDIS, p.
204 sq., 219 sq.
Anal. Post. i. 2, 71, b, 18

alria iarl, koI

(rvWoyKr/xhu
after giving

yvcopi/JLcorepccv

airddei^iv

Aeyco

Se

And

firKXTTifioviKov.

the requisites for such an argument, he adds: o-vWoyKTixhs fieu

yap
8'

&vcv tovtoov, aTrdSei^is

(ffrai koL

ovK lo-rat

ov yap

TroirfO'ei

iiri-

Log.

adai Se

cit.

c.

2 init.

eTriVro-

%KaaTOV airXoos .
alriav olwfuda yvdoCKeiv

olS/xcd'

'irav ri\v t'


5t'

iffrl

rh

avdyKr]

iiri(TTa(rdai

otov

edefiev,

t^v airoSeiKTiK^v

koI

iiri-

e| aXriduv t' ehai KalirpcaTOiv


a/xeacou [about this below] koI

(rriiix-QV
/col

koI

(TVfj.-Kepa.(TfJLaTos'

rov
yap ecovrai

Trporepcav

ovtoo

kuI at apxal oIkuui. rov deiKw/nepov.


Ibid, line 29 :alfTta re.
.delehai
.

[sc.

that from which a proof is


(in t6t iiria-TdfieOa

deduced]

'6rav ttjv alriav etScDjuey.

a'T'fjfirjv.

eVSe'xeo'^ot tovt''

p.)]

&A\as ex^"'- Further references in


support of this, sujjra,ip. 163, n. 3.
^ Ibid.
et roivw
71, b, 19

%v rh irpayfid

ecrriv,

on

iKeiuov

* Ibid.
5'
4 init.
c.
iirel
aSvuaTOv d\\(i)s exetv ov iarlv
:

iirKrrTJfxr]

rh

airKcos,

iiriTrrjThi/

avayKa'iov

rh Kara rvjv

h.v

e^r;

a-rroSeiK-

ARISTOTLE

244

included under matters of proof only in a limited sense.^


On the other hand, the contingent cannot be proved

known

cannot even be
sary truth

is

contingent, so
is

istics

subject, while everything else is

may

it

be said that

proof relates to

all

founded exclusively upon the essential characterof things, and that the concept of each thing

once

at

is

since neces-

that only which proceeds from the essence

and the idea of the


and

And

scientifically. ^

its

The purer and

starting-point and goal.^

which any
more perfect the
concej^tual
the
form of Proof secures to us concerning
nature and the causes of an object, the higher is
the kind of knowledge which it warrants and so, other
information,

therefore,

things being equal, a universal proof ranks above a


particular, a positive proof above a negative, a direct

above an apagogic, one which enables us to know the


cause above that w^hich merely instructs us in the fact/
TTpdyfiacriv

(pavephu

on

%v exo^ej/ to? ex^tv airdhei^iv


e$ avajKaiccv &pa (rv\\oyi<Tfx6s iariv

roiovTcav rivuv Uv eCt) 6 onrodeLKriKhs


airav yap rj ovrois
au\Koyi<xfji.6s

Cf note 3 infra.
Metaph. xi. 8, 1065, a, 4:
rod ael
fxhu yap traaa
iiria-TViiJ.'n

^ Karcc (rv/j.$e^T]Khs, rh Se
(ru/x^e^rjKSra ovk avayKala. Ibid.
eVel 5' e| avdyK7}s
at the end
xjirapx^i- Tepl eKaarov yeuos oca KaO*
avra virdpx^t ^at 77 cKaarov, <pavephv
OTi irepl rwv Kad' avra virapx^VTWV

i(Tr\v

7}

airdSei^is.

ovTos

cos

eu

(Tu/ijSejSTj/f^y

a-vWoyirrixhs ^

Koi

us

4irl

Si'

rh iroXv

(rvfXTrepa(T/ji.a

rh

5e

tovtccu

30 ttSs yap
avayKaiwv % 5ia
i.

Trporacrewi'

al irporaffeis

et fxev

Koi rb

ttoAv,

ovSerepc}}

Anal. Post.

iariv.
Tccv

rh

iirl

avayKoiai,

avayKoiov,

el 5'

rh ttoXv, koI rh (Tv/xTrcpaafxa


Cf. p 168, n. 1.
2 AimL Post. i. 6, 75, a, 18,
cf c. 8, c. 33, &c. vid.
c. 30
supra, p. 164, n. 2.
3 Ibid. c. 6 init.
ei odv iffrlu
airoSeiKTiKT] iinariiniri e| avay7}
Kaioiv 6.p')(^uv (& "y^P etTiffrarai ov

ws

iirl

roiovrou.

Svvarhv &\\W5 ^x^iv) t^ Se ko0'


rols
hvayKoia
virdpxovTa
avrh

virapx^i-

al

4-iri(rrr}/j.oviKal

rwv roiovruv
(rvix^e^f}K6Ta

OVK avdyKt] rh
SiOTt

Kad'

virdpx^iy

avrh

Sh,

(TvKKoyiaixoi.

Ka& avrh

awodei^eis Kal

rh

elclu.

ovk

avayKala,

ffvixiripafffxa

ovd'

olov

ei

oi

del

e/c

yap

/j-ev

&(rr^

elhivai
eXu],

fx)^

did crrj/xelav

rh ydp Kad^ avrh ov

iirKXr'fjo'erai,

ovdc SiSrt.

rh Se SiSri eiriaraaOai ecrri rh Sth


rov alrlov iirlffracrOai. Si" avrh &pa
Set Kal rh jxecrov r^ rpircp koX rh
Cf.
irpchrov r(p fieacf uTrapxetv.
p. 213, n. 5 supra.
* Anal. Post. i. 14, c. 24-27.

LOGIC
If

we take demonstration

245

and consider the


an axiom that

as a whole,

building up of a scientific system,

is

it

the knowledge of the universal must precede that of

The same

the particular.^

up from

considerations lead

another point of view to a principle which

ie

deeply

way of thinking that nothing


can be demonstrated except from its own peculiar
rooted in Aristotle's whole

principles,

and that

from without.

is

it

inadmissible to borrow proofs

Demonstration, he thinks, should start

from the essential

characteristics

the

of

object

and any properties which belong

question,

genus can only accidentally attach to


they form no part of

its

it,

in

to another

seeing that

All demonstration,

concept.^

consequently, hinges on the concept of the thing.

Its

problem consists in determining, not only the properties

which attach to any object by virtue of the conception


of

it,

but also the media by which they are attached to

deduce the particular from the

Its function is to

it.

universal,

phenomena from

their causes.

Is this process of mediation


'

unending, or has

'

it

Aristotle takes the latter alternative,

a necessary limit ?

from three points of view.


200, b, 24
twv IBlwv Oeupia

Phys.
vcrepa yap 7]

iii.

rrjs irepl rcov

koivwv

'

1,

irepl

iffriu.
:

TiKr?.

rh yetafxerpiKbv

apiQixt]-

Tpia yap icrri ra iv raTs ottoev fxkv rh airoBeiKuifievov

Sel^eaiv,

'

rovro S' icrrl rh


(Tvixirpa(rfjt.a
virdpxou yevei rivl KaB'' avr6. %v 5e
raa^id/xara' a^idl>iJ.araS^ io'rlv i^uv
rpirov rh
[sc. oi airodei^eis etVtV].
yeuos rh vTroKeifievov, ov ra irddr} Kul

rh

ra

'

Kad' avrh <rvix^fiT]K6ra StjAoT

aTfdSei^is.

i^

S>v

iJ.v

oZv

clvai

r}

r)

air6-

apid/xr]-

tV

koI yecofierpias, ovk ecrri


apiOfnjriK^v awSSei^ip ((papfiSffai iwl
ra toTs fieyeOecri (ru/uySejSTj/cJTa
.
&(rr^ ^ airhMs avdyKT} rh avrh ehai
tj/ctjs

ovk
Anal. Post. i. 7 init.
&pa ecrriv i^ ciWov yeuovs fierd^avra
2

Setlot, o'tou

5ei|ts, ej/Se'x era*


to ovtci.
wv 5e rh y4vos erepov, Siairep

yevos ^

iry,

fierafiaiveiv.

SrjXov

e'/c

'

ei

fieWei

rj

airSSei^is

aSvvaTOu,
yap rod avrov yivovs
&\\(as

S' '6ri

avdyKt) ra &Kpa Kal ra fi^ffa ilvai.


el yap fi-^ Kad' avra, av/x^e^T^KSra
5ia

ecrrai.

5e7^ai

aW'

f)

'6ffa

&(Tr' elvai

rovro

&\Xr)

iiricrr'fjfJ.T)

ovk ecrri
rh erepas,

ovrcos e;^et rrphs

Odrepou

virh

&WTj\a

Odrepov

C.

ARISTOTLE

246

We

may

from the particular to the general


from the subject, beyond which there is nothing of
which it can be predicated to continually higher predirise

and we may, on the other hand, descend from


from that predicate which is
the most universal point
the subject of no other predicate down to the parBut in any case we must arrive eventually
ticular.
cates

where

at a point

this progression ceases, otherwise

we

could never reach an effectual demonstration or definiThe argument excludes also the third hypothesis,
tion.^

may

that there

If the

dicate.2

an

exist

terms between a

infinite

number

definite subject

list

of intermediate

and a

of middle terms

is

definite pre-

not

infinite, it

follows that there are things of which there cannot be a


demonstration or derived knowledge.^ For wherever the

middle terms cease, immediate knowledge must necesTo demonstrate


sarily take the place of demonstration.
evGrytliinrj

is

brought round

either

bility of

which

is

solid demonstration.'^

Ser^at

(pavephu

ovK

again

we attempt
to

knowledge and Proof, or

circle,'

9 init.

If

it

eariv

are

else to

'

all

possi-

arguing in

equally incapable of producing a

There remains, therefore, but one

eKaffrou airodAA' ^ e/c rwv

'6ti.

We

return
e/cao-Tou apxc^J^, &c.
to this later on.
^
For he says at 83, b, 6,84,
ra &Treipa ovk eari 5te|eA0eTj/
a, 3
voovvTa.
Cf note 4 infra.
2 I old. ch. 19-22.
The details
of this treatment, in parts not
:

very clear, cannot well be repeated here. We have already


^seen at p. 222, n, 2,

we

that progression ad

already mentioned, which annuls

infinitum

not possible.

that Aristotle

supposes a limit to the number of


concepts above as well as below.
^ Ch. 22, 84, a, 30; and so ifeta2JJi. iii. 2,

997, a, 7

irepi

iravruv

yap aSvparovaTroSei^ivehai' avdyKti


yap e/c rivcou elj/at Koi irepi n /col
rivdv tV airJSetljj/.
* After Aristotle {Anal. Post. 1.
2) has shown that the proof -power
of syllogisms is conditional on
the scientific knowledge of the
premisses, he continues, in ch. 3
:

LOGIC

247

must

conclusion, that in the last resort demonstration

from propositions which, by reason of their


immediate certainty, neither admit nor stand in need of
start

These 'principles' of

proof. 1
'

Many

conclude from

no knowledge at

this,

that

all is possible

others, that everything can be


proved.' But he confutes both
Of the former he
assertions.

says

ol

/xev

SXcos

elvai

yap

virodefievoi

fx.^

ovroi

(Is

iiriaraaOai,

refute

it

by reference to

quo

a circle

swpra, p. 242, n.

V.

Anal. Post.^ c. 2, 71, b,


audyK-q Koi r^v a-TvoSeiKriK^v
aX-qQwv

e'l

(de

'

1).

'

ffr'fuj.rjv

his

on the subject

earlier exposition
of * reasoning in

20

elvai

t'

eiri-

KoX

ws ovk
Uv iTTiffrafxevovs ra vcTTepa 5ta ra
TTpSrepa, wv /u.-^ effri it pur a, opdcos
\eyovres, aSwarov yap ra 6.ireipa

trpcvruu Kal afieauv Kal yvcopi/JLODrepcav Kal irporepwv Kal airioou rov

Si\6e7v. et re '{aravrai Ka\ elcrlu


apxo-h ravras ayvdocrrovs eluai airo-

fx))

&iripov a^iovffLV

76

5ei|ec6s

(pafflv elvai

8e

etTTi

yu.^

/xi]

avdyecrdai,

ovcn]s

aiiruv,

oirep

rh iiriaTaffOai ix6vov

ra irpwra

elBfuai, ovSe

el

ra

rovrcav eluai iiriffraadai air\a>s


ov5e Kvpicos, a\y e| viroOtcreoDS, t
e'/c

He admits

that
what is deduced would not be
known if the principles (apxal)
are not known, and that if mee/cetya

'

proofs must possess

all

iariu.

diate knowledge, by way of proof,


is the only knowledge, then there
can be no knowledge of opx^>
Yet he himself in the same treatise denies this very thing at p.
cf. Metaph. iv. 4, 1006,
72, b, 18
tffri yap airaideva'ia rb fi^
a, 6
;

yiyvdoffKeiv, rivcov

Set

0jTe7v air6-

rivwv oh Sc?" '6\(as fiev


yap airdvroov aSvvarov airdSei^iv
ehai.
els hreipov yap Uv fiaSiCot,
uiffre /i7j5' ovrws elvai d7r(}5ei|t/. As
to the second of the above propositions, Aristotle states it at
p. 72, b, 16, in other words
Sei^iv Ka\

(Txmfiepdffiiaros.
dj/airoSei/cTcoj/,

elvai

KwXveiv

'

yiveffOai

airS^ei^iv

euSexecrdat

r^v

yap

air68ei^iv

oAA^Acoi/ and then at


of the

11.

ovhev
KVKXcf}

Koi

i^

25 sqq.

same page he goes on

to

irptarwv

e/c

8'

ex<v air65ei^iv avrSiv [because

otherwise
SeiKTot

know

they were not

if

avatr6-

we

could, likewise, only


them by proof]; rh yhp

eiTiffraaBai

uu

eari

airdSei^is

fx^

rh

ex^iv dTrJrjixeXs
5et|fi/ ear IV. C. 3, 72, b, 18
Se <pap.ev ovre iraaav eiriar^ix-qv
Karb.

(rvfifie^-qKhs,

aXXa r^v rwv

airoSeiKriK^v elvai,
afxeawv avairSdeiKrov.
eiriffr-t^fx-ns

aXXa

Kal

ov

Kal

apxhv

elvai rivd (pafiev,

^ rovs

e-KKXr^ix-qv

fidvov

Upovs yvwpiQifxev.

Cf supra,ip. 197,
.

and 210, n. 2, 179, n. 4, and


On the other hand,
210, n. 2 fin.

n. 6,

the circumstance that a thing is


always so is no reason for rejecting proof by causes, for even the
eternal may have its causes on
which it is conditional see Gen.
An. ii. 6, 742, b, 17 sqq.
;

trdvruiv

8ri ovk itnar-iiaerai

airoSei^ews, dpx"^

'Apx"^ "PX"^

(TvXXoyi(rriKal, a. d/xeaoi, irpord<reis


dfieffoi,

C.

10

Anal. Post. 72,

init. (A.e7cw

yevei ravras, &s

8'

a,

7,^ 14,

apxas ev

eKda-rcp

on

eari

[x^

ev-

Sex^rai Se7^ai) ii. 19, 99, b, 21, cf.


Gen. An. ii. 6, 742,
p. 197, n. 4
b, 29 sqq.; Metaph. v. 1, 1013,
a, 14, iii. 1, 2, 995, b, 28, 996,
b, 27, iv. 3, and also cf, Ind,
;

ARISTOTLE

248

even a higher certainty than anything deduced from


Consequently, the soul must contain a faculty

them.^

knowledge higher and more sure than


And, in fact, Aristotle finds in

of im'mediate

any mediate cognition.


f

the A^os

the

pure reason

he maintains that
case
it

B,

such a faculty; and

^just

never deceives

either has its object or has

it

in

it

that in every

itself,

it not^

but never has

false or illusive way.^

Yet

must be admitted that he has neither proved


tlie infallibility of any such knowThis immediate certainty, he says, is of two

it

the possibility nor


ledge.

There are three elements in every process of


demonstration that which is proved, the principles
kinds.

from which

it

The

prove^.

knowledge,

is

proved,^ and the object of which

first

for

it

of these
is

is

it

is

not matter of immediate

deduced from the other two.

These, again, are themselves distinguished in this way,


that

axioms are

the

common

to

different

fields

of

knowledge, but the postulates relating to the special


Arist. Ill, b, 58 sqq.
In Anal.
Post. i. 2, 72, a, 14, Aristotle
proposes to call the unproved
premiss of a syllogism Qfffis, if
it
refers to a particular fact,
a^'Kajxa if it expresses a universal presupposition of all proof.

also used in a wider sense, see


Anal Post. i. 7, 75, a, 41, c. 10,
76, b, 14, and Metaj)h. iii. 2, 997,

contains an
affirmation as to the existence or
non-existence of an object, it is
a virSdeffis if otherwise, a dpicrfiSs.
&eais is used in a broader meaning in Anal. Pr. ii. 17, 05, b, 13,

sqq.

Again,

if

64(ns

and Anal. Post. i. 3, 73,


a narrower one in Top. i.
(For further
11, 104, b, 19, 35.
references see Ind. Ar. 327, b,
18 sqq.) For a^iufia, which is
66, a, 2,
in
9

a.

a, 5, 12.

from

AlT7)ixa is

virddea-is

in

23 sqq.
Aoial. Post.

distinguished
Anal. Post. i.

10, 76, b,

cf. p.

Vide

2,

i.

247, n.

72, a, 25

1.

supra,

p.

197

sqq.,

where Aristotle's view of this 'immediate knowledge is explained.


'

Anal. Post.

7 (as cited
supra, p. 245, n. S),andibid. ch. 10,
76, b, 10 TTciffa yap airoBeiKriK^ iiri(rT-fifir] Trepl rpia iarlu, '6<ra re ehai
riderai (ravToi S' ecrri rh yevos ov
i.

Tuv

Kad' avra. iraOrifidTwv eVrl dew-

prjTiK^),

Koi

Ttt

Aeyofieva

Koivb,

LOGIC

249

matter are peculiar to the particular science.* It is


only upon postulates which are proper to a particular

department that he allows a binding demonstration to


be founded. 2
But these postulates are just as litfcle
capable as the universal axioms of being deduced from

They must be supplied to us by our


knowledge of that particular object to which they
a higher law.^

They are

relate.''

a^tci/xaTa e|

wv

Koi 4^

rpia ravTU

rivuv

2,

997, a,

In

t)]v airdSei^iy.

Anal. Post.

viroKi[X^vov

another order.

Kal rh vdu, Koiva


C.

32

Uv dcpcKri
ras

init.

'6

fieyedos.

'iSiat,

olov

apidfihs,

More about the

airo-

SeiKTLKal apxal or the Koival SS^ai e|

&udiravTesSeiKvvovaivwillheiound
in the passages cited at p. 247, n. 2.
2 Vid. S2i2)r. p. 245, n. 3
Gen.
An. li. 8, 748, a, 7 ovtos fxev ovv d
Xoyos KaOoXov xiav Kal Kevus. oi
yap fi^ eK roSv olKeicoi/ apxS>u x6yoi
Ket/ol, aXXii. BoKovaiv ehai ruu irpayixdroiv OVK ovres.
Cf. p. 174, n. 2,
;

supra.
'

Anal, Post.

ras

i.

9,

76, a, 16

avKKoapxas rds

roov

fxev

i/jLireipias

Sovvai. Aeyco

S'

i(TTl

irapa-

olov ri)v affrpoXo-

eViCTirj/xTjs.

at fxev olv e| oov Koival,

irepl

eKaffrou

yiKris

auras opxas

5e

[^apx^l

5ih

yicr/xaiv].

irepl

on tcra ra Komd.

varov, and after this has been


proved at length he says at the
end at yhp apxal dirral, e| wv re
at

irMtaTai

/xhu

airduTcav eJvai Tccv (rvWoyLff/xcav dSv-

Kal irepl

ai

i. 30, 46, 'a, 17


eKaaT-qv [eVto-T^yurjj/]

Sh Kaff

yi,K)]V

S'

effTi

Anal. Pr.

X^iat

Se oTov rb Xcra

ovk

Mas apxas avo87^ai


yhp [for there would be]

cited p. 248, n. 3 supra.

ra 5e Koivd
ypafifj.}jv ehai roiavSl
,

Se (payephu

et
'6ri

iK^tvai airavruv apxal Kal iiriar-iifXT]


iKeivcav Kvpia irdvTcov. Cf. ch. 10,

i.

e/cacrrrjs iirKTT-fjfnjs

iSia fihv diov

ecrovrai

tj

l,cit. sujyr. p.
245,n.3,andi^i^. c. 10, 76, a, 37:
effrt 5' wv xP^^'Tot eV Ta7s airoSeiKTiKOLs iiriffT-fjibLais ra jxkv X^ia

atrh Xffoiv

sujjra, p. 245, n. 3,)


(pavephv koI

ras kKaa-rov

iii,

rivoov elvai Kal

e/c

irddv, d^Kafiara in
*

(following on the passage cited

Metaph.

he gives yhos

ch. 6

rovro,

avdyKT] yhp

irepi Tc Kal

re Se'iKwai Kal & SeiKwai

'6

u>u.

of

such an experience could come to

irpcarcav airodeiKwa-i,

Kal rpirov ra irdOr}


iffTi, Trepl

therefore matter of observation

How

experience.^

i/xireipiav

rrjs affrpoAoX-qcpOevTav yap

iKavus ruv (paivonevcov ovrws eupedrjcrav at affTpoKoyiKol airoSei^eis.


So in Hist. An. i. 7 init. we have
first to describe the peculiar properties of animals, and then to
discuss their causes
ovtm yap
:

Kara

(pvaiv iffrl iroielffQai

odov,

virapxovarrjs

eKawrov

r^v

fj-eO-

ttjs iarropias rrjs

a/v re yap Kal


e| wv eJvai Set tt;?/ airSSei^iu, e/c
tovtwv yiverai (papepSv.
^ Cf. preceding note, and the
remark in Eth. vi. 9, 1142, a, 11
sqq., that young people can make
advances in the knowledge of
Mathematics, but not in Natural
History or the wisdom of life,
'6ti ra /xhv [Mathematics] 8i' afaiirepl

pecrecis

icrriv

irepl

[is

an

abstract

ARISTOTLE

250

he does not further inquire. Sense-perception he


treats as a simple datum, whose elements he does not
pass,

He

try to analyse.

even includes cases which are to

us merely judgments

he

upon given

immediate

calls

materials,

among what
im-

It is therefore

certainties.^

possible to give a clear and sufficient account of the


faculties

to which, according to him,

we

are indebted

for the immediate truths in question.

To enumerate the
various sciences

is

special presuppositions of all the

science], rwv

S' ai

apxcd e|

iixirei-

pias.
1

b,

iii. 5, 1112,
practical reflection

It is said in Bt/i.

153,

that

(fiovXevais) is

concerned with to

et
apros tovto
aicrflrjo-ews
ws Set
yap ravra. Ibid. vi. 9, lli2, a,
23 sqq., Aristotle explains that,
contradiction to eiricrTijfjL'n,
in

Ka9' Ka(Tra,

-/)

olov

TreVeTrTai

(pp6uT)arLS

is,

like

uovs,

an im-

mediate knowledge but whilst


the latter is concerned with the
ecTTi
x6yos (the
uu ovK
'6poLf
;

highest principles,' which in this


case are practical principles),
is
a knowledge toG
(pp6v7](ns

'

eVxctTOu,

OVK

01)

effTiv

iin(Tri]ixT\

[the
sensible properties of things]
dAA' o'la al(T6av6fida, on rb iu toTs
fxaOr^fioTiKols ecrxaTOv rpiyauov (i.e.
the last thing obtained in analysing a figure is a triangle). Here,
therefore, the judgment ' This is
explained as a
is
a triangle
matter of a1(TQT]ais (and so also in
Anal. Post. i. 1, 71, a, 20) and
the minor premisses of practical
syllogisms, such as * This deed is
just,' 'This is useful,' &c., are redAA.' a((rQ7}<ns,

'

ovx V

Even

also obviously impossible.

general view of the universal axioms

''wf i^icou

is

not to be found

ferred to an ala-d-nffis in like man(See also the discussion of


ner.
So in
<pp6v7](Tis in ch. xii. infra.)
Eth. iii. 12, 1143, b, 5, referring
to the same class of propositions
tovtwv ovv e;^' Se?
he says
:

ataOrjo'iv, avrrj S' icrrl vovs.

although (as

is

Now,

indicated in c. 9
here to be taken

Jin.) a(<rd-nais is
as in Polit. i. 2, 1253, a, 17, in

the wider signification of consciousness,' still it always means


immediate knowledge,' as
an
distinguished from an iiria-T-fifir].
Kampe {Erhenntnissl. d. Ar. 220
sq.) finds in the above passages,
a proof that Book VI. of the
Nicomacliean Ethics originally
*

'

belonged to the Eudemian but


Polit. i. 2, shows how unfounded
As little does
is this conclusion.
it follow from Eth. vi. 3, 1139, b,
33 where the et jxkv yap irws
iriffrevr), &c., does not mean 'we
have knowledge when we have
any conviction,' but knowledge
consists in a definite Hnd of conviction based on known prin;

'

ciples.'
2

xii.

For proof of

infra.

this,

see ch.

LOGIC

He

in Aristotle.

251

merely seeks to determine which of

principles is the most incontestable, obvious, and

all

can involve no possible

unconditional,^ so that

it

This he finds in the

Law

can seriously doubt

this principle,

of

cannot, that

to say, be

is

the highest

it is

no demonstration

admits of

it

all,

one

though many may

pretend to do so; but just because


principle

error.

No

of Contradiction.'^

it

deduced from any higher law.

It is certainly possible to defend it against objections of

every kind, by showing either that they rest upon

misunderstandings, or that they themselves presuppose


the axiom in question and destroy themselves in attack-

ing

He has, however,

it.^

Metaph.

'

^ffiaioTdrr} 5'
Siaipevffdrjvai

rrjv

iv.

aZvvaTov

yctp

irdvTes^

^u yap avayKalov
^vvteuTa

'

Tuv

Tvepl

^v

yvcopLixwrd-

avaryKolov elvai

roiavTTjv (Trepi yap &


atraroovTai

1005, b,

3,

apx^ iraauv

carefully

rh)v

fj.^

yvwp'iQovffiv

ical

avvrrddeTOv.

ex^'** "^^^ Stiovv

ovtwv,

tovto

ovx

uTrdOeffis.
2 Line 19 (xi. 5 mit.)
rh yap
avrh ufia virapx^iv re Kol fxij virdpX^iv a^vvarov r^ aur^ Koi Kara rh
avr6 Kal Hffa SAAo TrpoffStopicraifxed^
:

'

tiv,

efTTOJ Trpoff^LOipifffxiva ttphs

Kas Svffx^p^tas.

\oyi-

aiirrj Si] iraffwv iffri

apx^v. The axiom


opposites cannot belong to
.>^** the same thing in the same respect, is only a form of this. And
the further principle that no one
can really ascribe such opposites
at once to anything is so closely
connected that sometimes the
latter is proved from the former,
at other times the former from
the latter; cf. Anal. Post., ut
et Se (j.)) ip54x^rai
supra, line 26
a/na vTrdpx^iv rv avrto ravavria

guarded against any

(Trpoa5i(i}pi(rd(o 5' rjfuu

Kal ravrr) rrj

ivavria 5'
5d|a S6^ri 7} rrjs apTKpda^ws,
fpavephv '6ti aSvvaTOv d/xa viroXafifidviiv rhv avrhv elpai Kal /xij eivai rh
avrd
afxa yap ttv e^o: rds ivavrias
5d|as d 5tei)/ua'/AeVos Trepl roirov.

irpordcr^i

ra

elcoddra'),

iffrl

'

Ibid. c. 6, 1011, b, 15: eVel 5'


aSvvarov t^v avT[<pa<nv dhTjdeveadai
a/xa KaTo. rov avrov [for which at
line 20 he substitutes afxa Karacpdairo<pdvai aKi]Qu)s], (pavephv

vai Kal

on

ou5e Tavavria djxa virdpx^i-v iv-

Se'xeTai
djx(^(t),

r^

auTcfJ

^ ddrepov

jxkv

dW'

irij

fj

irij

Odrepov 5e

fiefiaioTdrr] tcou

airXcos.

that

3 In
this sense Aristotle in
Metajjh. iv. 4 sq. confutes the

'

'

'

statement (which, however, he


only ascribes to certain of the
older schools as being in his view
an inference from their tenets
Gr. part i.
cf. Zellee, Ph. d.
600 sq., 910, 4), that an object
can both be and not be the same
thing at the same time,' by
proving that in every statement
the principle of non-contradic;

'

ARISTOTLE

252
sophistical

misuse of

it

to

deny the connection

of

one subject, or the possibility of

different properties in

becoming and of change, by that detailed exposition of it


in which he shows that it is not absolutely impossible
that contradictions should be predicated of the same
subject,

but only that they should be so predicated

together and in the same relation.^

By

similar arguments to these with which he esta-

blished the

Law

down

of Contradiction, he lays

that of

an incontestable Axiom.
tlie
But he does not expressly deduce the one from the
Excluded Middle

as

other.

Though

Aristotle maintains so decidedly that every

kind of knowledge brought about by demonstration is


doubly conditioned by an immediate and undemonstrable conviction of the mind, yet he is far from repre-

senting this conviction as itself incapable of scientific

The

verification.

undemonstrahle

starting-point of

it is

all

demonstration

is

incapable of being deduced from

any other principle as from its cause. Yet it can be


shown from the given facts to be the condition which
underlies them, and which their existence presupIn c. 5
1007, b, 22,
xi. 6 init.), he reduces to the
same principle the dictum (de
quo V. Zellee, Ph. d. Gr. part i.
982, 1, 988, 2) that that is true
for each one which appears so to
him ; and to this, amongst other

tion

is

i7iit., c.

presupposed.

6 (of.

c.

4,

'

'

arguments
coinciding broadly
with the Platonic Thecctetus he

especially opposes the objection


(1011, a, 17 sqq. b, 4) that since

every

(paivS/uLeTov

must be a nvl

(paivofjLeuov,

make
'

x^"^"'

dictum

the

everything a

would

Trp6s ri.

See preceding note,


OwSe fiera^v avricpdaias ivSe^^'''

ovliv

cf p. 230, supra.
.

Metaph. iv. 7 in applying


has
argument, Aristotle
his
reasons
those
adopted
here
which are borrowed from the con^

sideration of Change in Nature,


evidently wishing to prove his
theory not only as a logical, but
also as a metaphysical principle.

LOGIC

253

So in the place of Demonstration, conies in


There are thus two lines of scientific
thinking which require to be distinguished the one
poses.

Induction.^

which leads up to principles, the other which leads


down from principles ^ the movement from the universal to the particular, from that which is in itself the
more certain to that which is so for us and the reverse

movement from the individual, as that which is best


known to us, to the universal, which is in its own
nature the more sure. In the former direction goes
syllogism

and

all

demonstration

scientific

goes induction.^

And by

knowledge comes

to be.

'
Cf with what follows the
references on p. 242, n. 6 supra.
The name * iirayta-yh] refers either
to the adduciTig of particular
instances, from which a universal
proposition or concept is abstracted(TRENDELENBUEG,JE'^<^?;^.
Log. Arist. 84 Heyder, Vergl.
d. arist. und hegel. Dialehtik,
p. 212 sq.), or to the introduction
to these instances of the person
to be instructed (Waitz, Arist.
Org. a. 300). In favour of the
latter explanation there are certain passages, in which ' iirdyeiv
has as its object the person
knowing as 2'op. viii. 1, 156,
a, 4
iirdyovra ficv airh ruv KadcKaaroy iirl ra KaOSXov, but especially A?ial. Post. i. 1, 71, a, 19
OTi fiev yap irav rpiywvov e^et Sutrti/
opQats "iffas, vpopSei, '6ti 5e rdSe
rpiywvSv iffriv, a/na iirayofxevos
irplv 8' 'iraxdwa^ ^
iyvcipiffev
.
.

'

'

AajSeTv

Tiva

(TvA\oyi(Tixhv,

tffcos

c. 18,

rpdirov

fidp

(pareov iTria-Taffdai, See;


liraxOvvai 5e ^t?

81, b, 5

in the latter

one or other of these ways

That which by virtue of

its

^Swarov. * 'Eirdhowever, also means


to

exoj/ras aiffdrjanv
y^iUy

'

prove by induction,' as in iirdy^iv


rb KaQdKov, Top. i. 18, 108, b, 10
Soj^h. El. 15, 174, a, 34.

Eth. N. i.
Zellee, Ph.

1095, a, 30
i. 491,
2 and see p. 205, n. 2 supra.
^ Besides Induction, Heyder
( Vergl. d. arist. und hegel. Dial.
232 sq.) finds in Aristotle (Phys.
i. 1, 184, a, 21
sqq.) indications
of another process, by which we
should proceed from the universal
of sensible perception to the concept, as the more particular and
definite
just as in induction we
go from the particular in perception to the universal of the conBut he himself rightly
cept.
observes that this is only an
induction reversed (though this
case is not usually made very
-

cf.

2,

d. Gr. pt.

prominent by Aristotle). When


a universal is brought out as
that which is common to many
individual cases, it is thereby

ARISTOTLE

254

nature admits of no demonstration must be established


have already remarked that this
by induction.^

We

undemonstrable element of thought need not necessarily be abstracted from experience, but that Aristotle
rather regards the universal axioms as apprehended by

the

But

spontaneous activity of the reason.^


that

sees

activity

this

of reason

as he

gradually

only

is

developed in the individual under the guidance of


experience, so he believes there are no other means of
scientifically verifying its

content and deliverance but

by a comprehensive induction.^ Many difficulties are


For inductive reasoning is founded,
involved in this.
separated from the complex in
which it presents itself to perand this is all that
ception
Aristotle has in his mind in the
passagecited; cf. p.205sq. mj)ra.
Anal. Pri. ii. 23, 68, b, 13
airaura yap TricrTevofxep ^ 5ta cruAAo;

'

yLa/iiov

35

?)

Si'

eTraycoyris.

Ibid, at line

vld. supr. p. 206, n. 1


twp apx(*>v
7, i098, b, 3
;

Eth.i.

S'

al fxkv

^nayuyri OewpovvTai, al S' alffOrjcreL,


irpoe'/c
&c. vi* 3, 1139, b, 26
yLycocKOfxevcov Se -rraaa diSaaKaXia
:

'

7]

fxhv

yap

(TvAXoyLajLLCf.

apxv icTi

t]

Kal

auWoyL(r/j.us

Si'

e'/c

671-070)7775,

/xeu

Sr?

r]

Se

eiraywyr)

rod KaQoXov,
tu>u KaQoKov.

Se

eiVii'

&pa apxal e| wv 6 (rvWoyiafihs, wv


iiraywyr)
ovK eCTi (TvWoyiafMos
(Trendelenbueg, Hist.
&pa.
Beitr. ii. 366 sq., and Brandis, ii,
b, 2, 1443, would like to cut out

the last two words, on the gTOund


that all unproved knowledge does
not rest on induction; but the
form of statement is not more
universal than in the other parts
of this passage, and the explana-

tion of the whole will be gathered


from what is said in the text.)
Similarly Anal. Post. i. 1 init.
Anal. Post. i. 18: fj-auddt/ojuiev ^
iirayooy-^

d7ro5et|ei.

fj

jxkv a7roSei|is

e/c

iirayojyr] 4k twv Kara fxepos


Tov Se rd KaOoAov O^oopriaai
'

IMd.

iiraycoyrjs.

S^

Sf;Aov

iirayayfi
i.

12:

OTt

XoyKTfjLos

indav(i)Tf:pou

Kara
Kal

rh

rrju

To7<i

/jlt]

[e?5os

{xey

ecTTi 5'

Kal

7)

Top.

X6ywv

Se

to,

tj

airh

KaQoKov

p.\v iiraybiyr)

aacpearepov

aXffQiqffiv

rh Se ci^A-

itrayccyr]

inl

Si'

irpccra

TO.

e'7ra7w777,
.

S'

19, 100, b, 3

7}ixLV

KadeKaffTou

(podos

ii.

tj

t]

dSui/a-

yvupi^nv avayKalov.

etTTi Se

SiaAe/fTiKwj']

tS}v

5'

cctti

rcbv KaBoXov,

Kal

yvoopiixwrepov

TToXAols KOivhv, 6 Se truA-

^laariKcoTfpou Kal irphs


kvTiKoyiKovs
ivapyecrrepov.
Bhet. 1. 2, 1356,
c. 8 init.
and cf snpra, p. 205 sq.

Aoyiff/jhs

Tovs

Hid.
a,

35
'^

See

p.

197 sqq., and 246 sq.

S7c2)ra.
3 See also
the citation infra
(in note 1 on p. 256) from To^f.
i.

2.

LOOIC

255

we have shown,^ upon such

as

a mutual relation of

concepts as will admit of the conversion of the universal


affirmative

minor premiss.

It

assumes that the minor

and the middle of the syllogism have the same extenIn other words, no cogent induction is possible,
unless a predicate can be shown to be common to all the
sion.

individuals of that genus of which

it is

to be predicated.

Such an exhaustive acquaintance with every individual


It would seem, therefore, that
case is impossible.^
every induction is imperfect, and that every assumption
which bases itself upon induction must remain un-

To meet

certain.

this difficulty,

it

was requisite

to

introduce an abbreviation of the inductive method, and

something which would make up

to find

for the

im-

possibility of complete observation of every individual

This Aristotle finds in Dialectic or Probable

instance.

Demonstration,'* the theory of which he lays

the Topics.

The value of

not only in the fact that

nor that

dialectic consists,

an intellectual

it is

teaches argumentation as a

it

it

P. 242, n. 6.
Cf. Anal. Pr.

(UeV^

it is

inasmuch

.,

rh bk

fin.

ovK e|

delKvvffiv.
:

e7ra7co77j 5ta iravTUV.

Even

if

all the cases which liad


occurred of a particular kind,
still we could never know that
the future would not bring other
experiences differing from them.
The supposition itself is by the
nature of the case impossible, and
even more clearly unprovable,
* On this narrower meaning
of the ' dialectical in Aristotle,
see WAITZ, Arist. Org. ii. 435
sqq. cf following note.

knew

24

ii.

Ihid. c. 23,
Set Se voiiv rh T [the
68, b, 27
lowest concept in the inductive
syllogism] t^ e| airavrcov rcou
yap
rj
KaB^Kaarov (rvyKeiiJ.evov
airdvrojv

teaches us to explore and estimate the different

\jh 7rapd5et7ywa] Siacpepei rrjs ivaywyris, '6ti t] fxkv e| aircivTcov ratv


aTOjxwv rh uKpou iSeiKuvev wTropx^"'

T^

in

says,

discipline,

fine art

also of essential service in scientific research,

as

down
he

we supposed we

'

AUISTOTLE

266

aspects under which an object can be contemplated.

It

specially useful in establishing the scientific prin-

is

for as these cannot be deduced by demonstration


from anything more certain than themselves, there is

ciples

nothing

us but to get at them from the side of


Such an attempt must start from the

left for

probability.^

prevailing tenets of humanity.


at

What

all

the world, or

experienced and intelligent part of

the

least

always worthy of consideration,

believes, is

presumption that

carries with it a

it

rests

since

upon a

it,

it

real

experience.^
Tojy.

'

i.

a0'

Koyov

avKAoyi^ecrdai.

syllogism iTnxeipr)iJ.a.
Thurot,
sur Ao'lst. 201 sqq., compares the dili'erent statements of
Aristotle on the office and use of
Dialectics; but he has laid rather
too much stress upon the partial
inaccuracy of Aristotle's language. Cf. on the Tojncs also p.
<)8, n. 1, supra.

tov irpoTeQevTOs

iravrhs
e|

fiKr\ixaTos

65hu exei. Aristotle (Tojh viii, 11,


162, a, 15) calls the dialectical

p-ev

fxeOodov

bvi/r](T6fji.eda

7]s

Ttepl

npoQ^ais
evpuv,

'H

TTpayfJ-anias,

rr\s

vTvepauTiov.

ipovfxeu

jX'qQ'kv

SiaAeKTLKhs

^oimevos
'/)

^)

to7s (ro(pois,

iraaiu ^ tols TrAeiarois


Kol
jJidXiaTa
yuwpifj.ois

TOLS

eudo^oLS.

t)

Ibid.

[XP''7(T'i/ios
yv/Jij/ aalai',

i.

((Ttl St] irpos

irpayfxaTela],

y]

irphs

2 Birm. in S. c. 1 init.: irepl


Se rrjs fiauriKijs rrjs eV ro7s viruois

irphs

yLuofxeurjs

ras euTv^eis, Trphs


.

iin(Tri]jxas,

dwd/xevoi

'dri

irphs

ajx(p6repaZiaTTopTi<raipaov ev kKacrrois

KaTO\p6fX9a ra\r]ds re koI rh \pvdos.


ir I 8e irphs ra irpura r wv ire pi
e

Koicrrrjv
fxev

6/c

tV

iir Lffr'}]yL7]v

ap^ci^v.

yap ruv oiKeiwv rcov Kara

irporeQela-av

nL(rr-r]fJiriv

apx(*>v

o.'^vvarov elirelv rt irep\ avrcov, eVetS/j

irpwrai at apx".^ airdvroov elal, Sia 5e


Tocv irepi eKacra ivoo^a^v avdyKy]
irepX
t)

avrcov SieAdelu.

/xaXiara

iariv
ras

rovro

5'

ifStoj/

o'lKelov rrjs diaKeKriKrjs

c^eraariKT]

airaauiy

Tf

yap oZaa
fj-eddSuu

J'Jtudes

rpia

Kara (piXoaotpiav iTriaT-fifxas


irphs Se ras Kara (piXoaoipiav

TCLS
.

ev5o^a Se ra doKovvra

rols irAeiaTOis

Ka\ rovTOis

8e

avWoyi-

avWoyicriJLos 6 e 4uS6^ccv
KacTLV

avroX

koL

6v5o|a)j/,

virexovres

irpo-

irphs

apxo.s

ovre

pdSiov

ovre

Karacppovriaai

rh /nhu yap
iroWovs viroXa/xfidveiy
e'xeij/ ri (Trj/jLeiwSes rh ivvirvia irapfX^rai iriariv us e^ efiireipias Aey6/xvov, &c.
Bth. i. 8 init. vi. 12,
1143, b, 11; Bhet. i. 1, 1355, a, 15
(cf.the beginning of ch. xiv. infra).
For the same reason, Mh. vii. 14,
1153, b, 27 appeals to Hesiod
("E, K. T)fx. 763)
(pv/JLT] S' oij ri ye
irdjxirav air6\\vrai,
^v riva Xaol
iroWol
and Synes. Calv. Enc.
c. 22 (^Ar. Fr. No. 2) quotes as
irdvras

ireiarOTJuai.

i)

Aristotelian
iraXaias

elcri

'6ri

[sc. at irapoifxiaC]

(piXocrocpias

ev

rats

fieyiffrais avdpccirui/ <pdopa7s ottoAoyueVrjs

iyKaraXeififxara irepiffwOevra

LOGIC

267

Such a foundation may appear unstable

and the

sense of this forced on Aristotle the need (which had like-

wise driven Socrates to form his dialectic) of supplying

by combining the

its deficiencies

different points

of

view which cross one another in popular opinion, and


by balancing them one with the other. From this he
got his habit of prefacing his dogmatic dissertation^

with ^kiroplai of enumerating the different sides from


which the subject may be touched of testing conclusions
by mutual comparison and by established standards
;

and,

of

finally,

raising

by

difficulties

this

testing

process and obtaining a ground for a scientific exposition from their solution.^

way

tions prepare the

These

dialectical

elucida-

for positive scientific conclusions

by clearing up the questions which are in issue;,


by grouping the inductive results under a certain
number of general aspects, and by making them explain
each other and so combining them into an aggrer

From them, our thought

gate result.

koHL Se^iSrrjra. Cf also


Eth. End.
1264, a, 1
i.6mi^., and, as to the belief in the
aldiip,De Coelo, 270,h, Id, Metajfh.

hik ffvvrofxiav

Polit.

5,

ii.

xn.S,aiid Meteor. 3Sd,hy27.

With

this is connected Aristotle's preference for proverbial sayings and


* gnomes,' about which cf
p. 104,
.

(on the

n. 1

'

To7s

Ilapot/xtat).

Metaph.

iii.

Sio-TTopTjo-at

airopovfxfvuv

iffrl,

ayvoovvTas rhu
JV. vii.

rwv

I.

twv

\veip

Seff/xSv,

t)

yhp

TrpArepov

ovk tffTiv
&c. Eth.

5'

S\ Soavcp iir\
TiOfPTtts tA <paiv6fjt.eva

fin.

&\\(i>v,

VOL.

effrt Se

Ka\S)s-

iiffTfpov eifiropia \vffis

Sc\

led

on into the

Ka\ irpcorov Siairop'fia'avTas oiiruSeiKT

vvvai
irepl

ix6.Ki.ffTa jxkv

ravra ra

irdvra

irddr],

el

evSo^a

ret

Se

fi^,

rcb

ihv yhp
\in)Tai re ra dvffx^pv koI KaraXeiinirai to. evSo^a, dedeiyfievov Uv elTj
irKitffra

koX

Kvpidorara'

iKavws.
Cf. De Coelo, i. 10 init.
Anal. Post. ii. 3 init., and WaitZ
on this passage also Phyg. iv. 10
;

Unit.:

fiovKofievois rrpoijp-

cviroprjffai

yov rh

is

Meteorol. i.lS init., DeAn.i.


2 init., Zongit.Vit. c. l, ^Qi,h^2lf
&c. InTb/;. viii.11,162, a, 17, the
airSpriiJ.a is defined as ffvWoyiaixhs
5ia\KTiKhs a.vTKpdffeccs. These Aristotelian
Apories
served the
Scholastics as a model for their
disjmtatio jjro et contra.

init.,

'

'

ARISTOTLE

258

explicit problems, the true solution of

which brings us

to philosophic knowledge.^
It is true that neither this theory nor the actual

practice of Aristotle can satisfy the stricter require-

ments of modern

science.

his procedure in the working


of the laws and definitions
facts
observed
the
from
out
of natural phenoestablishment
the
in
or
of Science,

Whether we consider

mena

themselves,

we must admit

omissions and defects.


says that

it

Of

consists in

that

it

shows serious

Induction, for example, he

the collection, from

the

all

of a given class, of a proposition which


expresses as a universal law that which was true of all

instances

these particular cases.^ In truth, Induction consists in


inferring such a proposition from all the cases hnown to

and in considering the principle on which the inductive method rests, the main point is to inquire how
we are justified in concluding from all the cases hiown

us

to us,

all like cases.

a law for

blamed

Aristotle can hardly be

for not raising exactly this question, since

none

of his successors succeeded in stating it clearly until


Stuart Mill wrote his Logic and even he could find no
answer but an inadequate and self- contradictory theory.
;

But

it

was an inevitable result of

Aristotle's position

that his theory of Induction does not help us over the


real difficulty, which is to ascertain how the correctness

of an inductive proof can be assumed in spite of the


fact tbat the range of experiences on which it rests is

The

not complete.

Metaph.

lo-Tt 5e

&v f]

iv.

2,

v 5ia\eKriKh

fact is that Aristotle, as

1004, b, 25

ireipaffTiK^ irepl

<pi\oa-o<pla yvoxTTiK-fj.

we have

Cf. svpra, p. 242, n. 6,

p. 255.

and

LOGIC
already indicated, has tried to

invention of the
dialectical

'

259

up the gap by the

fill

proof from probability,' and by the

treatment of the diroplai.

In the latter his

acuteness and his scientific width of view are conspicuous

But

throughout.

it

cannot make up for a satisfactory

and methodical comparison of observed

facts, if

only for

the reason that the theories discussed are not themselves

based on pure observation, but on the svBo^ov

on
which guesses, inferences and fancies
have, or at least may have, become mixed up with
Even where Aristotle is dealing
actual experience.
with actual observation, he falls, in many respects, far
short of the standard which we are accustomed to set
views, that

in

is,

As

to the scientific observer.

the conditions of a

to

trustworthy observation, or the methods to be applied


for establishing the correctness of one's

controlling

or

others,

As he
tive

we have
is

own

observations

the accuracy of information given by

only here and there a chance remark.

too little conscious of the part which a subjec-

mental activity plays

was natural that

his

in

all

perception,^

so

it

method should not adequately

provide for the subjective control of the errors of observation.

In his own work there


criticise.

It

is

true

is,

on

that he

this side of

it,

much

to

has brought together,

especially in the zoological writings,

an extraordinary

volume of statements of fact, the overwhelming majority


of which (so far as they can
'
"^

Cf. p. 210 and tw/Va, ch. X.


For this is not always pos-

because it
uncertain which animal

sible, partly

is
is

often

meant

now be
by

this

verified
or

^)

have been

that name,

partly

because not all the animals mentioned by Aristotle are sufficiently

known

to us.
s

ARISTOTLE

260

Most of

found to be correct.

patent enough to any observer

of course, are

these,

but there are also

many

cases among them where careful investigation would be


The methods of experiment he did not
required.^

His

altoo-ether neglect.^

historical studies excite our

Part.
33 sqq. (cf.
Lewes, AHst. 394), that he had
made experiments on the development of the embryo in the egg,
since he there remarks that we
often find in eggs, even on the
third day, the heart and the
'

An.

Thus we see from

iii.

liver as

4,

665,

a,

isolated points.

So in

Gen. An. ii. 6, he makes remarks


on the order of appearance of the
different parts of the body from
which, as even Lewes ( 475) admits, we see that Aristotle studied
embryonic development. A statement, long considered fabulous,
about the appearance of a placenta
in a kind of shark {H. An. vi. 10,
565, b, 1) has been confirmed (by
Joh. MuLLER, Ahh. d. Berl. All.
1840, PJiys. math. Kl. 187, cf.
Lewes, loc.cit. 205) the same.is
the case (cf. Lewes, 206-208)
with Aristotle's statements about
the embryo of the ink-fish ( Gen.
An. iii. 8, 758, a, 21) about fishes
which build a nest {H. An. viii.
30, 607, b, 19) about the eyes of
;

the mole (^De An.

iii.

1,

425, a,

10, H. An. i. 9, 491, b, 28 sqq.),


and about a gland which a certain

kind of stag has under the tail


{E. An. ii. 15, 506, a, 23, cf. W.
Eapp in Mailer's Archiv. f. Anat.
1839, 363 sq.). With regard to his
description of the cephalopods,
Lewes remarks ( 340 sq.) that it
could only spring from a great
familiarity with their forms, and
we see in it the unmistakeable
traces of personal knowledge.

All the

more odd is

it

that Lewes

should complain of Aristotle's


failure to mention the freshness
of the sea breeze, the play of the
waves, &c. This is to blame Aristotle for not having the bad taste
to drop from the realism of a
zoological description into the
style of a feuilleton, or the impertinence to explain to people
who had the sea daily before
their eyes the things they had

known all their lives.


2 EuCKEN,
Meth.

d.

Arist.

163 sqq., gives instances from Meteor, ii. 3, 359, a,


12, 358, b, 34 {H. An. viii. 2,
Forsch.,

590, a,
a,

p.

22)

H. An.

30 {Gen. An.

iii.

1,

2, 560,
752, a, 4) ;

vi.

2, 413, b, 16; Be
H. An.
471, a, 31
vi. 37, 580, b, sqq. (if this was
really an experiment, and not
rather a chance observation).
Then again there are others in-

Be An.

Respir.

ii.

iii.

troduced with a

An.
later

iv,

Xiyovffiv,

Gen.

765, a, 21 (which is

1,

on disputed by himself),

Hist. An. ii. 17, 508, b, 4


(though in Gen. An. iv. 6, 774, b,
31 the same is stated in his own

and

name).

Some

ments are

of these experiof such a questionable

kind, that we may well doubt


whether Aristotle himself conducted them and, on the whole,
he appeals to experiments so
seldom that we cannot avoid seeing how little he, or Greek
;

science in
their value.

general,

re

LOGIC

261

high admiration by their extent and their accuracy.^

To

received accounts he so far takes a critical attitude

that he

is

careful to correct

attention to
authorities,^

he

and

is

many

false views,^ to direct

some of

untrustworthiness of

to attack even universally

Where he

myths.''
tion,

the

his

accepted

means of observajudgment ^ where there

lacks adequate

willing to reserve his

might be a tendency to close an inquiry too precipitately, he gives us warning that we should first weigh
all

the objections suggested by the matter in hand

we

before

decide.^

In a word, he shows himself not

only an untiring inquirer whose thirst

ledge of

all

' Besides the numberless


items
of information from the History
of the Greek States, of Philosophy,
of Poetry, and of Khetoric, which
the extant works contain, we

may

refer here to what is quoted


from the Politics and other
lost works; de quo vide p. 101,
n. 1; 73,n. 1; 62, n. 5; 58, n. 1;
103, n.l, and 104, n. 1.
^ Thus in the cases named by

to us

EUCKEN

{loc. cit. 124), Gen. An.


755, b, 7 sqq., 756, a, 2
ch. 6, 756, b, 13 sqq., 757, a, 2 sqq.
iv. 1, 765, a, 16 sqq., 21 sqq.;
H. An. viii. 24, 605, a, 2 sq.
' As in Hist. An. viii. 28,
606,
a, 8, ii. 1. 601, a, 25, where certain statements of Ctesias are
called in question as untrustworthy in Gen. An. iii. 5, 756,
a, 33, where he says that fishermen frequently overlook the occurrence in question: ovQih yhp
avTwv ovOev rrjpel roiovrov rod
yvwvai x^P^v.
So in Hist. An.
ix. 41, 628, b, 8 ; axn6itrri 5' ofjirw
iii. 5,

for the

know-

things great and small was never satisfied.

4t/rTvx'fjKaiJ.ev.

hand, in

But, on the other

37, 618, a, 18,


620, b, 23, he appeals to eyewitness.
* As in doubting the genuineness of the poems of Orpheus,
and the existence of their supposed author; as to which see
Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. vol. i. 50.
^ Cf. supra,
p. 169, n. 1.
I)e
Ccelo, i. 13, 294, b, 6:
dAA' ioiKuffi fJt-^xpi Tivhs ^TjreTv,
oAA.' ov fi^xP'' '"'^P ^^ Swarhv ttjs
c.

29,

70^ 7jfx7v tovto trivrh irpayfia iroifiadai


r^v (ijTTjcrip aWa irphs rhv ravapria
\4yovTa' koI yap avrhs iv avr^
(rjre'i fiexpi Tep tiv ov firiKeri %XV
avriXeyeiv avrhs avr^ iih 8c7 rhv
fieWovra Kahws Qr]r-{]aiiv ivarariKhv flvai Sia ruv oIk^iuv ivarda-coov rep y4vei, rovro 5' iarlv kK
rod irdcras ndewprjKevai ras Siaairopias

jra<rt

Tjdcs, /x^

TTphs

'

(popds.
''

Th

(pi\o(ro(j>ias

supra, p. 169, n. 8.

Si^yv:

vide

ARISTOTLE

262

but also an observer of care and common sense. Nevertheless, we find that glaringly incorrect statements are
not rare in Aristotle, and occur sometimes in cases
where, even with the simple methods to which he was
limited, the correction

And

of the error should have been

more commonly do we find


that he draws from insufficient and incomplete data
conclusions much too rash and sweeping, or that he
forces his facts to conform to some general theory which
easy enough.^

still

In his
basis.
and by basing them
on various popular assumptions he leaves them without
any sure foundation. He shows himself but little

has

itself

no adequate

inductions he

Cf.

is

experiential

often far too rash,

EucKEN,

loc.

clt.

155

Such cases are that Arigives the male sex more


teeth than the female (Hist. An.
on the conii. 3,
501, b, 19
sqq.
stotle

jectured cause of this error see


Lewes, Arist. 332, A. 19);
that the human male has three
sutures in the skull, and the

female only one running around


it (ibid. i. 8,

491, b, 2)

that

man

has only eight ribs on each side


(ibid. I. 15, 493, b, 14) a supposition, as it would seem, universall}^ held at that time, and
explained by supposing that it
was founded, not on anatomical
observations of human corpses,
but on observations of living
bodies cf j). 89, n. 1 that the lines
in the hand indicate longer or
shorter span of life (ibid. 493, b,
32 sq.) that the hinder part of
the skull is empty (H. An. i. 8,
Part. An. ii. 10, 656,
491, a, 34
b, 12;
Gen. An. v. 4, 784, b,
;

35).

Further examples in Lewes,

149 sqq., 154 sqq., 315, 332,


347, 350, 352, 386 sq., 398, 400,
When, however, it is
411, 486.
said that Aristotle in the Part.

An. iii. 6, 669, a, 19, asserted that


only man has a pulsation of the
heart (so Lewes, 399, c, where
According to this pashe adds
sage one might think that Aristotle never held a bird in his
:

and Eucken, 155, 2), this


an inaccurate accusation. Ari-

hand
is

'

'

stotle distinguishes, in

20, 479,

b,

17,

the

De Respir.

(T<pvyixhs

or

always going on,


heart-beat
from the irri^rjcris ttjs Kop5ias = the
strong throb of the heart in passion.
And even the latter he
does not confine to men, for he
says in the tract referred to that
it sometimes becomes so strong
that animals die of it. All that
is said in the passage cited is
iv avdpa>Trc() re yap (TvfjLfiaivei ix6vov
ws elire 7v i.e. the passion-throb
occurs
almost exclusively in
:

Man.

LOGIC
skilled in the art of analysing the

263

phenomena methodi-

cally into their real factors, of following out each fact

to its causes

and the laws of

its action,

and of unravel-

He

ling the conditions of the causal nexus.

mastered

even

has not

in the degree which with the scanty

the best
technical skill of Greece was possible to him
methods of establishing and analysing facts, of checking observations and theories, or of applying experi-

ment

He

to science.

does not, in a word, come up to

the standard to which in our day a student of nature

expected to attain.
rather would

it

There

is

be strange

is

nothing strange in this


if it

were otherwise.

If Aristotle were without the faults

we

note in his

theory and practice, he would not only be far more in


advance of his own time than in fact he was he would
have belonged to another and much later period of

human thought.
titude, correlation

we

Before science could attain to that cer-

and exactness of procedure by which

excel the ancients,

scientific

collected

laws of

and
and

it

was necessary in

all

ranges of

historical inquiry that the facts should

be

manner of experiments made, that the


particular classes of phenomena should be
all

sought out and gradually universalised, that hypotheses


should be proposed for the elucidation of various series

and these again continually checked and


To this end no genera 1
revised by the facts themselves.
disquisitions on methodology, but only scientific work
Until the experimental sciences had
itself could assist.
passed far beyond the position at which they stood in
Aristotle's time, it was not possible that either the
methodology or the methods of experimental knowledge
of facts,

ARISTOTLE

264

should really

advance beyond the form in which he


In the then state of science it was

them.

stated

already a great thing that observed facts should be


collected in such vast masses

was not

and with such care. It


to be expected that they should also be with

the like care tested, or that his personal observations


should be exactly discriminated from information otherwise

received,

appraised.

and the value of the

Many

of the

latter critically

which we find
absurd, were probably taken by Aristotle from others
in all good faith, and were not doubted by him, merely
because the knowledge of nature which he possessed
gave him no reason to think them impossible. When

we

are surprised

often

assertions

by the rashness with which the Greeks


or theories upon facts whose

built hypotheses

obvious to us at

first sight, we do not stop to


utterly they were ignorant of all our aids to
accurate observation, and how greatly this poverty of

falsity is

how

think

tools

ment.

must have hindered every sort of helpful experiTo fix time without a watch, to compare degrees

of heat without a thermometer, to observe the heavens


without a telescope and the weather without a baro-

meter these and the like were the tasks which the
natural philosophers of Greece had to set themselves.

Where

no basis for accuracy as to facts, the


attend the classification of phenomena,
the discovery of natural laws, and the correction of
there

is

difficulties that

hypothesis by experience are so vastly increased, that we


cannot wonder if scientific inquiry rises but slowly and
insecurely above the levels of prescientific fancy.
service

which Aristotle nevertheless did

for

The

the world in

LOGIC

265

the collection of data, and the acuteness with which he


strove

explain the facts he knew, cannot but be

to

appreciated

we

if

try to judge

him by any standards

that conform to the knowledge and the opportunities


of his day.

To enter

into the details of Aristotle's Topics, or to

examine his refutation of the Sophistic fallacies, are


equally beyond our present scope.
No wider view of
his scientific principles is to be got from them, but only

an application of them to a
place to

But

the

point of

this is the proper

touch upon his researches into

which we find partly in the


in

beyond the limits of

field

Science properly so called.^

Topics.'^
all

As

the Concept forms

scientific

research, so

which

strives.

is

Definition

Knowledge

is

is

the starting

we may say con-

versely that a complete acquaintance

cept

Definition,

^Qcondi Analytics, partly

with the Con-

the goal toward which

it

indeed nothing but insight into

the grounds of things, and in the concept this insight


summed up. The what is the same as the ' why.'

is

'

'

We

apprehend the concept of the thing as soon as we


apprehend its causes.^ So far, Definition has the same
problem as Demonstration. In both we try to discover
the means by which the object has been brought to be
what it is.'* Nevertheless, they do not, with Aristotle,
entirely coincide.

In the

Brandis, pp. 288-345 gives


a sketch of both.
2 Besides the general works
'

first

place, it is clear that

Heyder, Vergl

d. arist. u. hegel.

BialeUih,

247

Kampe,
195 sqq.

Kassow,

p. 173, n. 2.

Arist. de notionis definitione (cf. supra, p. 212, n. 2)


;

sqq.,

and

Erkenntnissth. d. Arist.

on Aristotelian Logic, see Kuhn,


notionis definitione, etc., and

De

p.

Vid. supra, p. 163, n. 2,

Vid. supra, p. 173, n. 2.

and

AUlSTOTtn

266

everything which admits of demonstration does not


equally admit of definition

for negatives, particulars,

and propositions predicating properties, can


monstrated, whereas definition

is

be de-

all

always universal and

not concerned with mere properties


but with the substantial essence only.^ The converse
not everything that can be defined
is no less true

affirmative,

and

is

admits

of demonstration,

from the fact that


undemonstrable

may

as

be

definitions.^

Indeed,

once

seen at

must

demonstrations

start

from

seems to be

it

true in general, that the contents of a definition are


undemonstrable by syllogisms for demonstration fre:

supposes a knowledge of the essence of the object, while


The one points
this is precisely what definition seeks.

out that a property belongs as predicate to a certain


subject; the other does not concern itself with individual properties, but with the essence
inquires for a

'

that^'

the other for a

in order to specify what anything


that it

Here, however,

is.^

is,

The one

itself.
'

what

we must

we must draw

'

first

and

know

a distinction.

The fact is that a definition cannot be derived through a


single syllogism. We cannot take that which is asserted
predicate
in the definition of an object and use it as the
of a middle term in our major premiss, in order to attach

again in the conclusion to the object which was to


be defined for if, in such a process, we are dealing
with not merely one or other of the properties, but
with the whole concept of the object, then it must

it

>

Anal

Post.

also.

ii. 3.

Ibid. 90, b, 18 sqq. (cf.


Another
supra, p. 246 sqq.)kindred reason is there given
2

ovk

8t:

?)

^(rn to'Sc kut^ rovSe

fl

lo-rtv.

Anal. Post,

sqq.
*

ibicl.

cf c. 7, 92, b, 12.
^bid. c. 7. 92, b, 4.
.

90,

b,

28

LOGIC

267

follow that both major and minor premisses would be


alike definitions

the one

other of the minor.

of the middle term and the

A proper definition, however, cannot

be applied to any other object except the one to


defined.^

be

Consequently, in every definition, the subject

and the predicate must be equal in comprehension and


extension, so that the universal affirmative proposition

which expresses the


convertible.

as we have described,

must always be simply


by such a process

definition,

Therefore

it

follows that,

we should only be demonstrating the

same by the same,^ and should get, not a

real definition,

but a verbal explanation.^

method of arriving at the idea by means of


for the division presupposes the
division is no better
The same objection also applies to the
concept.'*
method^ of assuming a definition and proving its
for
validity a ^posteriori by reference to individuals
how can we feel certain that the hypothesis which we
assumed, does really express the idea of the object, and
not merely a numiber of particular marks ? ^ If, lastly,
Plato's

we endeavoured

to bring definition within the province

Vid. sum'a, p. 216 sqq.


2 Anal.
Post. ii. 4.
As an
illustration he uses the definition
of the soul as * a self-moving
number.' If we wished to establish this by means of the sj'^llog-

have to argue: 'the concept of


that which is itself the cause of
life consists in its being a selfmoving number the concept of
the soul consists in its being
itself the cause of life,' &c.

* everything
that is itself
the cause of life is a self-moving
number; the soul is itself the
cause of life, &c,* this would be

^ Anal. Post. ii. c. 7, 92, b, 5,


26 sqq, cf. c. 10 init. i. 1, 71, a,
11; Top. i. 5 init.; Metaph. vii.

'

ism

4,

1030, a, 14.

way we

could only prove that the soul is


a self-moving number, and not
that its whole essence, its concept,
is contained in this definition.
In order to show this, we should

insufficient, for

in this

241, n. 3.
of the philoso-

F/<^. sw^^r, p.

Which one

phers of that time (we

know

who) had likewise made,


" Anal. Post. ii. c. 6, and
Waitz.

not
also

ARISTOTLE

268

we should be met with the

of the epagogic process,


difficulty that induction

but always to a

'

that.'

never brings us to a

But although

what/

definition can

by demonstration nor by induction,

neither be obtained

so long as they are separately used, yet Aristotle thinks


it

possible to reach

experience in the

it

When

by a union of the two.

first

instance

has taught us that

certain characteristics appertain to an object,

and we

begin to search for their causes, or for the conception

which links them to their subject, we are so establishing by demonstration the essence of the thing
if

we continue

and

this process until the object is defined

in all its aspects,^

Although

we

at last obtain the concept of

syllogistic demonstration, therefore,

it.

may be

insufficient to constitute a perfect definition, yet it helps

us to find

it,''

and in

may be

this sense definition

said

be under another form a demonstration of the

to

essence.^

This process

is

admissible in every case but

that of things the being of which

any causes outside themselves


'

Loc. cit.

c. 7,

92, a, 37

Indue-

is not dependent on
and the conception of

owS' d7r<J56t|ts, hriKov fiivroi hih <rv\-

shows that something in


general is of such and such a kind,
by proving that it is so in all particular instances
but this is
equivalent to proving merely a

\oyi<rixov koI 5t' airoSci^ews

UrieffTivfjovK e(rriv,nottheTiia'Ti.

&.pa

Ibid. c. 8, 93, a, 14 sqq.


It is necessary at this point

fibs

tion

'

out the too short hints of


Aristotle's statement by reference
to the argument cited at p. 216,
n. 1 suprUf from A?ial. Post. ii.
to

fill

13.
*

Anal. Post.

Koyifffihs fikv

ii.

rov ri

8 Jin.

ffv\-

itrriv ov ylverai

oirr^ &t/ev

ti

4<ttiv

airo^ei^eus

ov

ianv

eTs

rh

aXriov &\\o, otk*

tariv airSSet^is avrov.


* Ibid. c. 10, 94, a, 11:
Spia/xhs

&(rT^

'

ten yvwvai

fxhv

earriv

\6yos rod rl

iarip avatrSSeiKTos, fh Sh crvWoyi<r-

rov ri 4<tti, vrdcni Sia<ppwv


i^s otoSc/Iccds, rpiros 5e rrjs rov rl

icmv

airoSel^ews

(rvfjiVfpaffiJ.a

the

fuller explanation of which is


given above. That definitions of
the latter kind do not suffice,
Aristotle tells us in De An. ii. 2 ;
vid. supra, p. 173, n. 2..

LOGIC

269

these can only be postulated as immediately certain, or


elucidated by induction.^

From

these researches into the nature and condi-

tions of Definition

we

obtain some important rules as

method by which in

to the

practice

Since the essential nature of

is

it

an object

defined genetically by the indication of

arrived at.

can only be

its

causes, Defi-

must embrace those distinctive characteristics


by which the object is actually made to be what it is.
It must, by Aristotle's rule, be got at by means of that
which is prior and more known; nor must these
nition

principles be such as are prior in our knowledge, but

such as are prior and more known in themselves.


is

who

scholars

are incompetent to understand the latter

but in such a case they get nothing which really


essence of the object.'

dates the
[follows
i

Altai. Post.

'

ovK
rl

fifv

'4rp6v

specific

ra

flffiv,

tt,

jxiv

C.

ii.

Sri

Afieffa

rwv 5'
Koi twv

Koi

apxal

Kal flvai Kal ri iffriv into-

^ IkWov rpdirov (pavepk


preceding note and
Anal. Post. ibid. 94, a, 9 6 5e ruv
aficffwv dpifffihs diffis iffrl rod rl
QiffOai 5er

Cf.

iroiriffai.

Metaph.
35: SrjXov 5' 67rl

iffriv avairodeiKTos.

6,1048,

a,

kaOiKaffra

Kiydv,
^TjTeTi/,

ffvvopav;

rfj

Kal

ix.

rS>v

iiraywy^ h fiovXSfieOa
ov

dAAo

Se7
Ka\

and above,

Travrhs

rh
p.

'6pov

avdXoyov
253.

for the

differences:

fffn 8e

aXriov,

iffriv. S)ffT SrjKou


icrri

elucir

This rule, indeed,

from the axiom that Definition consists of the

genus and the

ruv

It

allowable to prefer the former only in the case of

To

Induction also belongs the process which is described in De


An. i. 1, 402, b, 16: toiKc S' oi/

yL6vov rh
fivai

genus

is

iffri yvwvai xp^o-tjuov


rh deupijffai ras aWias

rl

irphs

rcov (TvfifieffijKdTcov to?? oifciais

aWcL

Kal avdiraXiv ret ffvuficPrjKdra


ffvu^aWfrai [xeya fi4pos irphs rh

rh rt iffriv for a definition


only correct when it explains
all the ffvfi^efirjKora (i.e. the ko0*
avrh ffv/xficfiriKdra, the essential
properties w^. p. 214, n. 3 sw^ra)
elSevai

'.

is

of an object. On immediate knowledge, cf. p. 246 sqq., 197 sqq.


^ Qf
course with the exception of the &/iffa just mentioned, i.e. that which is conditional on no principle other

than
'

itself.

Top.vi.4:;ct^.205,n.2supra.

ARISTOTLE

270

and more certain than

prior

contents,

its

differentiae are prior to the species

Inversely

off.^

we

obtain

same

the

and

tlie

which they mark


result:

for

if

Definition consists in specifying the aggregate deter-

mining

characteristics

by which the object is conditioned


it must include the genus and

in its essential nature,

the

differentiae,

for

these

simply the

are

scientific

expression of those causes which in their coincidence

produce the object.^

But

these,

definitely related to one another in

turn,

in their

are

an order of supe-

The genus is narrowed by the


then the species so
first of the differentiating marks
produced is further narrowed by the second, and so on.
It is not, therefore, a matter of indifference in what

riority

and

inferiority.

order

the

finition.3

separate properties shall follow in any de-

definition,

in

not

implies

fact,

the essential marks,'*

mere

but also

the

enumeration

of

completeness''

and the proper sequence of them.^


in mind, it will be found that in the

Bearing this

descent from universals to particulars the practice of


'

Loc.cit.\^].,h,2^;cLsvpra,

p. 215, n. 1, 216, n. 1.

can occur in the definition; of.


p. 217 sqq., Anal. Post. ii. 13, 96,

2 This follows from the passages cited svpra, p. 173, n. 2,


compared with pp. 215, n. 1,244,
By reason of this conn. 3.

b, 1 sqq., i. 23, 84, a, 13., Top.


6 and other passages Waitz
Categ. 2, a, 20.

nection Topics vi. 5 sq., immediately after the remarks on the

246, that the number of


intermediate grades must be a
Qi.dAso Anal. Post.
limited one.

irpSrcpa

Kal

yvcapiixdrnpa,

gives

rules for the correct determination of the definition by y^vos

and

Sta^opot.

s
Anal. Post. ii. 13, 96, b, 30;
cf 97, a, 23 sqq.
* Tci
eV Tcj} rl ecrri KarriyopIt
ov/xeva, at rov y4vovs Sia<popai.
.

is

obvious that only such things

vi.

on

Mt has been already remarked


on

ii.

p.

12, 95, b, 13 sqq.


"

Anal. Post.

ii.

13. 97, a,

23

Se rb KaraffK^vdC^iv '6pou 5i^ ruv


Siaipfo-ewu rpi&v Sel aroxaC^freai,
fov \afie7u to. Kar-nyopovfxeua 4v
is

r^ ri eVrt, Koi ravra rd^ai rl


wpSirov ^ d^vrepov^ Koi Srt ravra
irdvTd.

LOGIC
progressive division

is

271

our surest method, while a corre-

spondingly gradual building up of concepts

is

equally

proper to the upward process towards the universal.^

And

thus Plato's method, though Aristotle could not

accept

it

as a satisfactory process for deducing definitions,

was yet recognised and further worked out by him as a


means to their discovery.'^
Supposing, then, that we have defined and surveyed
the whole field of the knowledge of concepts on this
method, we shall obtain a system of ideas such as Plato
looked

for,^

Summa
down

carrying us in an unbroken line from the

Genera through

to

the lowest

deduction must

and since each


implies the

added

cause

all

the intermediate

And

species.

since

members
scientific

consist in the specification of causes,


specific difference in the

introduction
creates

new

of a

upward scale
and every

cause,

a corresponding differentia,

results that our logical structure

must exactly

it

corre-

spond with the actual sequence and concatenation of


causes. Plato never undertook actually to set forth that
derivation of everything knowable out of unity, which

he saw ahead as the end and goal of science.


' Aristotle includes both, without further separating them, in
the concept of Division. For
this he gives full rules in Anal,

Post.

25;

ii.
96, b, 15-97, b,
13,
Toj).\i. 5, 6; Part. Anim.

Like Plato (Zeller,


Gr. pt. i. p. 524 sq.).
he also considers that the most
important thing is that the dishould be continuous,
vision
should omit no intermediate
grade, and should totally exhaust
i.

2,

Ph.

3.

d.

Aristotle

the object to be divided; and


lastly (to which Plato devoted
less attention), that it should
not proceed by means of deduced
or contingent differences, but by
the essential ones. Cf. preceding
note.
^ Two further rules, contained
especially in the sixth book of
the Topics where he enumerates
at length the mistakes made in
defining are omitted here,

See Zell.

ibid. p. 525, 588.

ARISTOTLE

272

considers such a demonstration to be quite impracticable.


to him, are

The highest genera, according

no more

capable of being derived from any one higher principle

than are the special postulates of each science.^ They


are connected, not by any complete community of
nature, but only

by a kind of analogy,^ and the reason

Anal. Post. i. 32, 88, a, 31


vid. supra p. 246. sqq.

sqq., &c.

Aristotle says, in Metapli. xii. 4,


1070, b, 1 (irapa 7ap t^v ova-iav koL
rdtWa TO KaTt)yopovfiiva ovd4u ecrri
Koiv6u), that the categories especially can be deduced neither from

one another nor from a higher


common genus v. 28, 1024, b,
9 (where the same is said of
:

Form and Matter)


Phys.

b, 8

An.

i.

1096,

iii. 1,

5, *410, a,
a, 19,

xi.

1065,

9,

200, b, 34

13

Uth. N.

23 sqq,

cf.

i.

De
4,

TRENDE-

LENBURG, Hist. Beitr. i. 149 sq.


The concepts, which one would
be most inclined to consider the
Being
and
highest genera,
One,' are no y^vn Metaph. iii.
viii. 6, 1045, b, 5
3, 998, b, 22
'

'

X. 2, 1053, b, 21

xi.

1059, b,

1,

1070, b. 7 Eth. N.
ibid. Anal. Post. ii. 7, 92, b, 14
Top. iv. 1, 121, a, 16, c. 6, 127,

27

sq.

xii. 4,

tion in Metaph. x. 1, in which


the unity of analogy does not
occur) the unity of number, of
species, of genus, and of analogy.
Each of these unities includes in
the subsequent unities (i.e.
it
that which in number is one is
but not
also one in species, &c.)
Hence the unity of
vice versa.
Analogy can OQCur even in those
things which belong to no
common genus (cf. Part. An. i.
to (xkv yap exovc*
5, 645, b, 26
rh KOivhv /cot' auaXoyiav, to 5e
It
/coTo 7eVos, TO kot' (ISos).
occurs in everything 6<ra ex^* ^^
&\\o TTphs &\\o. It consists in
:

identity of relation (tVJTrjs \6y(av),

and hence supposes at least four


members (Mh. JV. v. 6, 1131, a,
ws rovro iv
Its formula is
TovT(f ^ irpds TovTO, T({5' eV r^Se ^
irpds t6S (Meta2)h. ix. 6, 1048, b,
31).

cf.

Poet. 21, 1457, b, 16).

26 sqq. Cf. Trendelenburg,


loo. cit. 67 Bonitz and Schweg-

is

LER on Metaph.

and geometrical (Uth.

a,

on

iii.

(more

276 infra^. Therefore the


principle ' that eventually everything is contained in a single
highest concept as in a common
p.

genus,' which Strumpell, Gesch.


d. theor. Phil. d. Gr. p. 193,
gives as an assertion of Aristotle,
is not really Aristotelian.
2 In Metaph. v.
6, 1016, b,
31, four kinds of Unity are distinguished (somewhat different
is the other fourfold enumera-

It

found not only in quantitative

identity,

such

as

arithmetical
iV.

v.

7,

1131, b, 12, 1132, a, 1), but also


in qualitative identity, such as
similarity (Gen. et Corr. ii. 6,
333, a, 26 sqq.), or in identity of
operation (cf. Part. An. i. 5, 645,
T^ avdhoyou r^v atn^v %xov
b, 9
Svpa/jLiv, ibid. i. 4, 644, b, 11;
ii. 6, 652, a, 3), and in fact in all
categories (Metaph. xiv. 6, 1093,
Besides those in the
b, 18).
passages just mentioned, other
instances are given in Be Part.
:

LOGIC
why

the sciences are not

all

273

one,

knowledge which applies to

among

the sciences

principles

first

expect

it

the

we
*

just because each

peculiar sort of

If

it.^

which

find one

be true that

it

First Philosophy

a science of

is
'

we must not

to develop its subject-matter out of

principle of being.

On

we should

we

the contrary,

inquire into

any single

shall find it

any further researches,

necessary, before proceeding to

that

is

own

class of actual existences has its

the most general points

all

of view from which the world of actual existence can

be considered,

or,

in other words, enumerate the highest

generic concepts themselves.

This
is

it is

with which the doctrine of the Categories

concerned, and these form accordingly the true con-

necting link, in Aristotle's philosophic system, between

Logic and Metaphysics.


Anim., Anal.

PH.

and Bhet.

6 fin.

cannot

i.

46, 51, b, 22,

That which
be deduced from any
iii.

other thing (the highest prinmust be explained by analogy, as, for example, the concepts
of Matter, of Form, &c. cf Meciples),

taph, ix. 6 (vid. sup. p. 269, n. 1);


xii. 4, 1070, b, 16 sqq,, and Phys.
i. 7,191, a, 7.
Thisisthe account
given by Trendelenbueg in
\)Ss,Hist. Beitr. i. 151 sqq.
Analogy is of special importance to
Aristotle in his study of Natural
History; see thereon infra, and
cf, Meyer,
Arist. Thierkundcy
334 sqq.
'
Ayial. Post. i. 28 init.
fila
8' iricrr'f)fMr} 4crTlv
.
7} iuds y^vovs

'

VOL.

I.

Tpa
/xirj0'

iii.

icrrlv

4iri(TT'fifji.r]

eVepot

2,

yivos
T7JS

8'

e/c

fiij'j^

997, a, 21
TO,

6/c

-K^pl

oZv rd avr6

avfifiefirfKSTa

avTTis [eTTio-T^jwr/s]

priffai e/c tS)V

ere'/jay,

rwu avr&v
rwv ereptav. Metaph.

at apxal

'6ff(ou

avTwv

Kad'
eVri

8o^a>v.

avrk
QeuIbid.

1003, b, 19: ottovtos Se


2,
yevovs Kal aX(TQT](ris jxia hds Kal
iiriar-fjixy.
Ibid.
1004, a, 3:
iv.

Toaavra

fi^pr}

(f)i\o<ro<plas

ocranrep at oixriai

vdvs y4vr\

^x^^''''^

"^^

e<rrlv

vndpx^i y^p
^v Kal rd 6u

Sid Kal ai iiricTTrinai aKoKovd-fjcrovai

The relation between


and the concept of the First
Philosophy will be examined

TovTois.

this

infra.

AUISTOTLE

274

CHAPTER YI
INTRODUCTORY INQUIRIES TOUCHING ARISTOTLE's
METAPHYSICS
1

All

The Categories

the objects of our thought

stotle,

fall,

according to Ari-

under one or other of the following ten concepts

Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Where,

When,

Situation, Possession, Action, Passion.

These highest concepts

mean

to

him merely

the

Categories

neither

subjective forms of thought,

which
would be utterly foreign to his Realism, nor are they
merely concerned with logical relations. What they exTrendelenburg, Gesch.
Katcgoriecnlehre {Hist. Beitr.
i. 1846),
pp. 1-195, 209-217;
BONITZ on Aristotle's Catego'

d.

ries, Aristotel. Sttid. vi.

H.

(first

published in the SitzvngsheHclit der Wiener Akad., Hist.pMlol. ATZ. 1853, B. X. 591 sqq.);
PrANTL, Gesch. d. Log. i. 182
SCHUPPE, Die
sqq.,
90 sq.
arist. Kategorieen. (^Gymn. progr,
;

1S66) cf. BrentANO's


der mannigfachen
Bedeutung des Seienden nacli
Ar., published in 1862.
2 Categ. c. 2 init.
r(hv \eyoKara avfj-irXoK^v
jueVwi/ rk juej/
\4y(rai, ra S' &uv av/jLvKoKris.
Gleifvitz,

essay

Vo7i

C.

init.

ruv

Kara

ix-ql^jxiav

o-u/iTrAo/cV X^yoix^vwv '4Ka(rrov ijroi


otxriav (Tr]iJ.ahei ^ iroahv ^ iroibv ^
irpos

/)

irov

^x^iv v) ttoi^Iv
9 i/iit.
fxcTa
:

v)

i)

irorh

-fj

/ceTo-^ot

irdcrx^iv.

to'ivvv

To^).

^
i.

ravra Se?

twv KaTTjyopiwv,
virapxava-iu at ^7]de7(rai Trrapes [opos, yhos, Uiov, av/j-fiefinSiopia-aadaiTayfj/r]

iv

oh

eari Se ravra rhu apiOfihu


d^Ka, ri ion, iroahv, iroiov, npos ri,
k6s].

irov,

irore,

Keladai,

ex^iu,

iroie7y,

iraax^iv.
^ Aristotle
uses various expressions to designate them (cf.
Trendelenburg, loc. cit. at p.
6 sqq., and BONITZ, ^vt stipra^ at
p. 23 sqq., and in the Ind. AHst.

METAPHYSICS
press
all

is

276

Not

rather the different forms of the Actual.^

forms of the Actual, however, are categories or divi-

sions of categories

but only those which represent the


view under which the Actual

different formal points of

may be treated.
378, a, 5 sqq.).
rh.

(^scilicet,

7ej/r7

De An.

Therefore he does not reckon

He
tov

calls them
ovtos, cf.

402, a, 22), to. irpwra


9, 1034, b, 7), also
SjatpcVets {Top. iv. 1, 120, b, 36,
121, a, 6), and irrcixreis (J^Ietaph.
xiv. 2, 1089, a, 26, with which
cf. Etlh. End. i. 8, 1217, b, 29), t^
Koivh. TTpcora {Anal. Post. ii. 13,
96, b, 20, and Metajfh. vii. 9,
i.

Metaph.

1,

vii.

1034, b, 9)

but most frequently

Karriyopiai, KaT'i]yop-i)fxaTa, y4vT]

(Tx^^aTa rSiv KaTijyopiSiv


yoplas).

BONITZ

or

(ttjs kottj-

(with

whom

LUTHE,

Beitr. zur Logik, ii. 1


sqq. agrees) rightly explains the
last expression by simply transand
lating KaTt]yopia * assertion
consequently yfvii\ or ax^H-o-To. r.
Kar. = the chief genera or fundamental forms of assertion,' = the
various senses in which an object
'

'

'

The same
can be spoken of.'
is conveyed also by the

meaning

shorter Kor-qyopiai = the various


'

modes

of assertion,' or Karriyopiai
rov 6vros (Pht/s. iii. 1, 200, b, 28
Metajih. iv. 28, 1024, b, 13, ix. 1,
1045, b, 28, xiv. 6, 1 093, b, 19, &c.);
the latter phrase implying that
every such assertion is concerned
with being. The meaning of
predicate,' which Karn]yopia often
has in other places, and which
;

'

Brentano Qog. cit. 105 sq.) and


ScHUPPE give it here, does not
suit the Aristotelian categories,
designate the
for the
latter
different senses of the to koto
pmihifxiav

avfi-irXoK^v

KeySfxeua,

among the

whereas the predicate, as such,


can only occur in the proposition.
Hence it is needless to ask the
question (over which Schuppb,
loc. cit. 21 sq., gives himself unnecessary trouble) in what sense
Substance,' which is notapredicate-concept (inde infra, ch. vii.
init.), can belong to the scheme
of the categories. Any concept
becomes a predicate by being
asserted of something, and this
may occur even with concepts
expressing substance (cf Metaph,
vii. 3, 1029, a, 23, to /xev yhp
*

&\\a
8e

Karriyopenai aVrrj

Trjs ovorias

TTJS

ii\rjs).

For instance, in

proposition, ' this man is


Socrates,' Socrates is predicate.
From this logical function, which

the

may take on
in a 2Jf"oposition, it by no means
follows that such an idea, when
regarded out of this special relation and with reference solely
to the content of the idea itself,
is to be regarded as signifying
anything dependent, or in the nature of a property or avfjifiifiriKSs.
Strumpell is mistaken in
saying (Gesch. d tlieor. Phil. h. d.
GriecJien, p. 211) that the categories treat of the various ways of
predicating or the distinctions to
be drawn in the ways of combining
concepts, though in other respects
he correctly apprehends the
merely formal character of the
a substance-concept

categories.
^

Mttaph.

V.

7,

1017,

a,

T 2

22

AniSTOTLE

276

categories eitlier tliose concepts whicli are so universal


as to be predicable of things of the most different kinds,

and

to have a different

meaning according

to the rela-

which they are used (such as the concepts of


Being and of Unity ^), or any of those more definite
expressions which concern the concrete condition of

tion in

ouTO 5e dual Xey^Tai offairep


ra o-xVt t^s kottjyopias' 6(rax(ii>s yap Xeyerai, roaouTaxcos rb eluai (TTjfxaiyei (cf.
Mh. JV. i. 4, 1096, a, 23). Hence
the categories are called KaTrjyoplai Tov ovTos (see preceding
Ka6'

ffrj/xaiuei

and a fourth as to place cf.


following note.
These two concepts (which

tity,

'

KaTO,

navTuv fiaKitna \4yerai rwv


according to Metaph. iii.

ovTusv,

3,998, b, 22 sqq.; x. 2, 1053, b>


16 sqq. viii. 16, 1045, b, 6, cf.
That of which they re- supra, p. 272, n. 1), are no y4v7)y
note).
present the various meanings is but predicates which may be
the tv {Metaj?7i. vi. 2 init. ix. 1, applied to all that is possible.
De An. i. 5, 410, a, That they cannot be genera,
1045, b, 32
13 Irt 5t iroWax^s Aey OfjLeuov rov Aristotle proves in Metaph. iii. 3,
by observing that a genus can
ouTOSf ar}fxa(vi yap rh fxeu rdSe ti,
&c.); cf. I7id. Arist. 378, a, 13 never be predicated of the mark
Logical relations of con- which stands to it as a specific
sqq.
cepts, on the other hand (such as difference, but that Being and
Unity must be predicable of
'opos, yhos, X^iov, crvfJifiefirjKhs), are
not expressed in separate cate- every mark which can be added
but run indifferently- to the Sy and the ovaia.^ Both the
gories,
through them all. In answer to concepts are used in various
the question ri ian; for instance, meanings. MetajjJi. v. 7, gives
you may get according to cir- four senses of Being,' while ix.
10 (cf. xiv. 2, 1089, a, 26, where
cumstances an ovaia, a iroahv, &c.
As little are the the Kara (rvfjL^efirjKhs Keydfievov "bv
see Top. i. 9.
categories concerned with the is omitted) gives three, one of
opposition of true and false, these being that /coto to ffxh^-o-'^owhich has reference, not to the rSiv KaT'i)yopiu>v, which suggests
nature of things, but to our rela- that a different kind of Being cortion to them {3Ietaj)h. vi. 4, 1027, b, responds to each category, and
Being
29). Yet Aristotle sometimes does therefore implies that
make, after all, an ontological cannot as such coincide with any
The same is
application of the categories, as single category.
rh %v 4v iravrl
when, for example, he deduces true of Unity
the different kinds of change y4vi dffri ris (pvffis, Koi ovOevhs
from the circumstance that one tovt6 y avrh r] (pixris, rb Iv ( =
there is nothing whose essence
kind is concerned with things as
to their substance, another as to consists in Unity as such '). It
their quality, a third as to quan- likewise occurs in all categories,
;

'

'

'

'

'

m^

METAPHYSICS
any

and

object

physical or

its

ethical

properties.*;

Equally does he exclude from the number of categories


those general metaphysical conceptions which serve to

explain concrete peculiarities and processes,

and the

conceptions of the Actual

the

Form and

such as

Possible, of

Matter, and of the four kinds of Cause. ^

The

but adds to the concept of the

be put in the category of Action

which it is predicated,
no new mark and Aristotle concludes from this, '6ri ravTha-Tjiiiaivei

and Passion {Top.

object, of

rh ej/ Ka\ rh Iv (Metaph. x. 2,


1054, a, 9 sqq.), the rh eu koI rb
tv ravrhv Koi fiia (pvcris r^ a/coAaA\' ou% ais
ovQeiv aW'fjXois

ircos

kvL
2,

\6ycf)

dr}\oi>iJ.va (3Ieta.j)7i.

1003, b,

iv.

and that both

22),

have the same extension (avn(rrpi(p^i, xi.

vii.

b,

5,

3,

1030,

16).

Metaph.

1061,

Upon

a,

15

sq., cf.

10, c. 16, 1040,

b,

Unity,'

cf.

also

(where in paris
of measure

X. 1 sqq.

ticular * unity
treated of), and the references at
and see also
p. 272, n. 2 supra
Heetling, Be Arist. notione
unius, Berl. 1864, As to the hv,
see particularly Brentano, Von
der mannigfachen Bedeutung des
Seienden.
*
For this reason such a concept as Movement (or Change)
is not put among the categories
'

it is

rather, according to Aristotle,

a physical concept which, through


the different categories, receives
its further determination as substantial change, qualitative or
quantitative change, or movement in space (Phys. v. 1 Jin.,
2 init., ibid. 226, a, 23, iii. 1,
200, b, 32 Gen. et Corr. i. 4, 319,
b, 31
Be Ccelo, iv, 3, 310, a, 23
3Ietaph. xii. 2, 1069, b, 9 more
about this infra).
He allows
that, looked at in itself, it may
c.

iv. 1,

120, b,

26; Pliys. v. 2, 225, b, 13, iii. 1,


201, a, 23; Be An. iii. 2, 426, a,
2 Teendelenburg, Hist. Beitr.
i. 135 sqq.), and in this sense it is
;

even used in MetapJi.


b, 22, to illustrate

viii. 4,

how

1029,

the cate-

gories other than Substance have


a substratum, yet it does not
itself become a category.
Still

would it be a category if we
were to accept the belief of the
later Peripatetics (which is not
established by Metaph. v. 13,
Simpl. Categ. 78, 5,
1020, a, 26
29 Bas.) that it belonged to
less

the category of the iroa-hv, or as


others preferred (Simpl. ibid. 35,
So also,
5, 38) to the irpos ti.
when Eudemus (Bth. Bud. 1217,
b, 26) gives Motion (in place of
Action and Passion) among the
categories, it is not Aristotelian.
Other Peripatetics, notably Theo-

phrastus, said more correctly,


that it * runs through many categories (Simpl. ibid. 35, 5, 38
Phys. 94, a). In the same way
the G ood is to be found in
various categories (Bth. N. 1. 4,
1096, a. 19, 23).
^ None of these concepts is
reckoned among the categories
or comprised under any one of
them.
On the contrary, whea
Aristotle
is
the
considering
various meanings of Being,' he
mentions the distinction of Suj/'

'

'

ARISTOTLE

278

purpose of 'categories'

is

not to describe things by their

actual qualities, nor yet to set forth the general con-

ceptions which are needful for this purpose.

They

confined to pointing out the different sides which

be kept in view in any such description.


intention,

they are meant to give

are

may

In Aristotle's
not real con-

us,

framework into which all real


conceptions are to be set, whether they are confined to
one division of the framework or extend to several.'
ceptions, but only the

and ivreK^x^la, with the distinction of truth and falsity, as


matters to be superadded to the
distinctions expressed by the
categories (Metajjh. v. 7, 1017, a,
7, 22, 31, 35, vi. 2 init., ix. 10
init.y c. 1, 1045, b, 32, xiv. 2,
1089, a, 26 Be An. i. 1, 402, a, 22,
cf. Trendelenburg, Gesch. der
Categorise )ileJire, ut supra., p. 157
sqq.
BoNlTZ, nt supra, p. 19
<{/AJ

but themselves running


through the various categories
sq.),

indifferently {Phys. iii. 1, 200, b,


26 Metaph. ix. 10 init. rb Se
Kara dvvafiiv Kol iycpyeiavTOvrajv).
Aristotle does not tell us why
:

they cannot be reckoned among


the categories
but the reason
seems to be that indicated above,
viz, that these ideas do not merely
;

relate, like those of substance,


quality, &c., to the formal cha-

racter and the formal differences


of that which falls under them,
but designate definite real relations of actual being.
Thus also Brandis, ii. b,
394 sqq. On the other hand Trendelenburg, ibid. 1G2 sq. explains the absence of Possibility
and Actuality from the categories by saying that the latter
are ' separated predicates,' whilst
'

'

'

the former is no real predicate.'


It seems, however, that precisely
the opposite is the case. The
categories are not themselves directly taken as predicates, but
only as designating the place of
certain predicates in the scale
whereas the distinction of Possible and Actual is based on real
and definite facts, the contrast
between the different conditions
of development in individual
things, and the opposition in the
universe as a whole between the
corporeal and the spiritual. The
one kind of distinction is only an
abstract, metaphysical expression
of the other.
But it is not possible entirely to agree with Bonitz
when he says on p. 18, 21, that
the categories are only meant to
render possible a survey of what
is contained in the
empirical
data,' and hence that * such concepts are excluded as extend
beyond the comprehension of
empirical data, to any kind of
explanation of them.' For the
concept of Motion is given by
experience just as much as that
of Action and Passion, and the
concept of Substance is as valuable for explaining the data as
that of form and matter, or of
'

'

'

METAPHYSICS
Of the completeness

of this framework, Aristotle is

convinced/ but he nowhere

and possibility. Nor


seem possible to say with

actuality

does

it

Bebntano (loc. cit. p. 82 sq.),that


the categories are 'real concepts,'
by this we are to understand
such concepts as designate the
common object-matter of a series
of experiences, such as are the
concepts of weight, extension,
thought, &c.
For those very

if

categories which are most frequently and universally applied


substance, quantity, quality, relation,
action,
and passion

designate merely formal relations,


and hence are adapted to cover
and apply to a content of the
most diverse character
and
though this is not so absolutely
true of others such as irov, ttotc,
or Ke7(r6ai that peculiarity only
proves that Aristotle was not able
strictly to carry out through
them all the point of view with
which he started his categoryscheme as a whole. Bkentano
himself, at p. 131 sq., admits
that the distinction of the categories is not a real distinction.'

Prantl, GescJi. d. Log. i. 204


sqq., denies that Aristotle adopted
any absolutely fixed number of
categories but it is clear, not
only from the enumerations given
at p. 274, n. 2 and p. 282, n. 3,
but also from many other expressions, that he did. Thus we have
in Soph. El. c. 22, init. iirelirep
;

'

ruv Karrtyopicov
namely, the ten enumerated in
exo/xev Ttt y4v7]

Top. i. 9, to which at c. 4, 166, b,


14, after mentioning rl (rabrh),
TToihv,

TTOcrhv,

iroiovv,

irdffxov, Sto-

(really only a kind of


voihy, the diddeais
see Categ. c.
Kd/xevov

279

how he came

us

tells

to set

8, 10, a, 35 sqq. Metaph. v. 20),


he refers back with the words
KoX ToAAo 5' ws Bi-^prirai irpSrepov.
Be An. i. 1, 402, a, 24: irSrepov

rJSe ri Koi ohcria ^ iroihv ^


Kai

SAAt]

ris

ruv

Ibid.

Karffyopicou.

trocrhv

Siaip0ei(Twv

c. 5,

410, a, 14:

yap rh fihv rJSe ri xb fie


^ iroihv ^ Kai riva &X\7]v tS>v
diaipcdeicrwv
Karriyopicov.
Anal.
PH. i. 37 rh S' vtrdpx^^v rSSe
(rTjfxaivei

TTocrhv

T(^5e

TO(TavTax(t>s XrjirTeov
KaTr\yopiai hn^p'f)vrai.

bffaxSis

at

Metaph.

xii.

1069, a, 20 nrpwrov
rh iroihv, elra rh
TTOffSv;
vi. 2,
1026, a, 36: ra
T7JS Karrjyopias, oTov rh
o'x^fJ'-o-'TO.
jxkv r\, rh Se iroihv, rh 8e iroahv, rh
Se iroS, rh Se ttotc, /col elf ri &XXo
(rr]fxaivi rhv rpSvov rovrov ; vii. 4,
koI yap rh ri iariv
1030, a, 18
eva fiev rp6irov (njiuaivei r^v ovaiav
Kai rh r65e ri, &\\ov Se (Kacrrov
7}

ohcria,

elra

rcov Karr^yopovfievuiv,

Kai '6aa
a,

33

iroahv, iroihv

&AAa roiavra xii. 4, 1070,


it is a question of, irSnpov
;

erepai ^ at avral apxai aroix^la


rSov ovffiSiV Kai rSiv irpos ri, Kol Kad^
eKoiarriv 5e roov Karrjyopiuv dfioicus.

Likewise in Meta^yJi.

vii. 9,

1034,

b, 9, xiv. 2, 1089, a, 7; Phys. iii.


1, 209, b, 26, after mentioning

some of the

categories,

he refers

at
the rest with a mere
&\\ai Karriyopiai,^ as to something
well known, and in Anal. Post.
i. 22, 83, b, 12, a, 21, the impossi-

to

bility of

argument

an
is

infinitely extended
proved by the asser-

tion that the number of categories


is limited to those there named.
The completeness of Aristotle's
list of categories
is
also supposed by the proof referred to
the
end
of
n.
at
2, that
p. 276,

ARISTOTLE

280

out these categories and no others


categories themselves there

any fixed principles

is

; ^

and among the

so little indication

for their evolution

that

we

of
are

there are only three kinds of


motion (in the narrower sense),

sion

qualitative,
quantitative,
and
local (Phys. v. 1 sq.), inasmuch

presented by the adverbs of place


and time; the last four categories are to be looked for in the

as those referred to in
Categ. c. 7 trov and irore are re;

as that theorem is proved by the


process of exclusion.
Motion,'
Aristotle argues, does not occur
in the categories of substance,
&c. therefore only those three
categories remain.'
'
Even in the lost writings no

verb, for 7roi6?v and irdo-xeii' translate into a general concept the
force of the active and passive
voices, as K^lffdai renders one side
of the intransitive, and ^x^iv the
special force of the Greek perfect. But, in the first place, as

'

'

such
have

demonstration

seems

to

occurred; otherwise the


early commentators would have
appealed to it. Whereas, on the
contrary, Simpl. SchM. in Ar.
79, a, 44, says
'6\us ovSaiaov irepl

Bonitz, p. 41 sqq., fully proves,


Aristotle himself nowhere gives
any indication of his having
arrived at his categories in this

way. On the contrary, he does


not distinguish the parts of
speech on any such method as
2 ToTRENDELENBUEG(in his
that
which
Trendelenburg's
dissertation Be Arist. Categoriis theory of the categories
would
[Berl. 18.'i8] and the Elementa
presuppose, for he nowhere exLogioes Arutotelicce, p. 54) be- pressly distinguishes the
adverbe,
longs the credit of having first he treats the adjective
(as priiia)
endeavoured to find one.
But along with the verb, and in fact
even his repeated explanation in the only parts of speech
which
Hist. Beitr. i. 23 sqq., 194 sq. has he names (apart from
the article
not persuaded us that he has and conjunction) are the
ovona
really succeeded in doing so.
It
and the ^^/io. It is therefore
seems rather that the objections not probable that grammatical
which RiTTER, iii. 80, and still forms to which, as 'parts of
more exhaustively^ Bonitz, loc. speech' he paid no attention,
cit. 35 sqq., have brought against
should nevertheless have guided
his opinion, are well justified.
him in distinguishing the classes
Trendelenburg (and after him of concepts. And, again, the
BlESE, Phil. d. Arist. i. 54 sq.) two series do not in fact
correbelieves that in setting out these spond to any such
extent as we
ten genera Aristotle was proxi- should have expected if
Trendemately influenced by gramma- lenburg's
supposition
were
tical distinctions.
He suggests correct.
For 'quantity' and
that oifo-ia corresponds to the
quality may just as well be exsubstantive, voahv and voihp to pressed by substantives
(e.g. \evthe adjective with irpos
corKSrrjs, eep/iorrjs, &c., Categ. c.
8,
respond such forms of expres- 9, a, 29) or verbs (AcAeuKwrot,
:

rrjs

Tttftcos

tcov

'^^vSsv

oiiBefiiau

alriau 6 'Apto-ToreATjs air(pr}vaTO.

'

'

'

'

METAPHYSICS

^81

reduced to supposing that he obtained them empirically,

by putting together the main points

of

view from which

the data of experience can be practically treated.


progress

true that a certain logical

We

among them.
Next
Thing.

is

to

It is

be found

begin with the Substantial

the

in order to this, he deals with Quali-

148 sqq., also seeks to defend the


Aristotelian categories against
the charge of having no scientific
derivation and suggests another
He believes that in
scheme.
arranging them Aristotle first dis'substance'
from
tinguished

there are two facts first, that


Aristotle in speaking of the categories, never indicates such a
deduction, and next, that none
can be found into which they
naturally fit.
Even in Brentano's ingenious scheme, this is
not the case. If the ten categories had come about in the
way he suggests, they would
have been enumerated by Aristotle in a corresponding order.
Instead of that, the irpos ti,
which, according to Brentano,
should come last, stands in the
middle in every enumeration (see
p.274, n. 1 and p. 282, n. 3), andits
regular place (the only exception

and,
among the
distinguished the absolute
from the relative and that he
went on to divide the former
into (1) inherences (material =

being Phys. v. 1) is immediately


after the
inherences'
After
it, again, the
affections do not
follow (as they should according
to Brentano's order), but the

TToahv, and formal = ttoiSv)


(2)
ajfections (iroteTi/ and irdo-xttJ', to
which, at one time, Aristotle added

external circumstances.^ Nor is


the distinction of inherences and

action
&c.) as by adjectives
and passion as well by substantives (irpa|js, v6lQo^, Sec.) as by
time not only by adverbs
verbs
but also by adjectives (x^iChs,
;

'

'

'

very many subSVTpa7os, &c.)


stantives designate no substance
{Categ. c. 5, 4, a, 14, 21); and
a corresponding
for relation
;

'

form cannot be
found. Beentano, loc. cit. p.
grammatical

'accidents,'

latter,

(3) external circumstances


and irore, and, for a time,
K7(r0ai).
The question is not,
however, whether it is possible to
bring the ten categories into
some logical scheme (for that
X^"')

(iroO

could be done with any series,


unless it were merely put together at haphazard), but whether Aristotle aiTived at them by
means of a logical deduction.
And against any such supposition

'

'

affections Mi^^t Aristotelian.


So
far as a logical disposition of the

categories ex post facto is concerned, Zeller gives on p. 288


infra, that which he prefers,
although he does not believe that
Aristotle arrived at his list of
categories by any method in
which he had in his mind beforehand either that or any other
logical scheme into which they
were to fit.

ARISTOTLE

282
ties:

first

iroaov and ttoiov), those

(in the

qualities

which belong to a thing in itself, and then (in the irpos


Ti), those which belong to a thing in its relation to
other things.

From

conditions

sensible

And

of

he ends the

these he passes to the external

list

existence

Space

and

Time.

with the concepts which express

changes and the conditions thereby produced.


cannot be called a deduction in the

strict sense

This

for that,

according to Aristotelian principles, was not possible


in the case of the highest general conceptions at

In

the order of the

fact,

the same. 2

It

categories

even seems that ten

bitrarily fixed as their

number.

not

is

is

somewhat

the categories

ar-

Aristotle himself so

far recognises this, that in his later writings

over

all.^

always

and

of Possession

he passes

Situation,

in

places where he apparently intends to give a complete


It is possible that it may have been the
example of the Pythagoreans,^ and the predilection

enumeration .3

Vide supra, pp. 246 and 272.


Examples will be found in
what follows, and also at p. 279,
n. 1.
The most striking thing

'^

ovv

with regard to this

^ yap

that in
Cat. c. 7, contrary to the otherwise constant rule, and even to
the order given in c. 4, irp6s
precedes iroi6v.
No satisfactory
reason can be found for this, but
it would be rash to conclude anything from it against the genuineness of the work, since a later
writer would probably be less
is

permit a divergence
from the order given than would
likely

to

Aristotle

himself,

for

whom

it

was not firmly established.


'

S>(TTf

Anal. Post.
^ h>

T(j3

i.

22, 83, a, 21

ri i(TTiv [^KarrjyopelraQ

^ iroahv ^ Trp6s
^ Trotiraaxov ^ irov ^ ttotc, Htup tv
kuO^ cvhs Kar-nyoprjOf}. Ibid, b, 15
ray4vr] rSiv KaT-qyopiwv ir^wepavTai'
'6ti

iroibv

t)

fcoibv

^ troahv ^

ttoiovu ^ ttoo-xoj'
ova-ia to

fj

'irp6s ri ^
^ irore (the
latter are op-

ttov

which the

posed as a-vfifiefirjKdTa has been


already mentioned). P7i]/s. v. 1
Ji?).

et

odv at Karrfyopiai Si-ppTjvrai

ova-ia koI troiSTrin

r^

irork koI

t^

koI

iroieTv

rpcTs eJvai

Ka\ rep irov Ka\


ti Kal r^ iroa-^

t^ Trp6s
^

irdarxeiv,

Kiv-fjffeis (of.

avdyKi)

p. 279, n. 1

MetajjJi. v. 8, 1017, a, 24:


Jin.).
rwv Karriyopovfievwv to. ficv ri ia-ri
crrnxaivei, rh 5e iroihp, tA Se iroahv,
to Se iTp6s n, rd Se nov rd Se Trore.
*

325.

See Zell. Ph.

d.

Gr.

pt. 1,

METAPHYSICS

283

them by the
seem to Aristotle
natural that he should find a round number of cateBut we cannot well suppose any further congories.
nection between his doctrine and the Pythagorean ^
for a

decirnal

Platonists,^

system inherited from

which made

it

at first

nor

is

the conjecture^

much more

probable, that he

borrowed his categories from the school of Plato.'* It is


true that almost all of them appear in Plato's writings ;

but we cannot attribute any great weight to this

coincidence, for the reason that in Plato they are merely

used as occasion
at a full

arises,

enumeration of

Among

without any attempt to arrive


all

Zellek, ihid. p. 857 sqq.


As Petersen supposed in
Philos. Chrysipp. Fundamental
*

p. 12.
3

KOSE, ATist. Lihr. Ord. 238

sqq.
place, there is
of the ten
categories among the Platonists
and it is not likely that information about so notable a point
would neither have been transmitted through their writings nor
*

In the

first

no trace whatever

through Chrysippus and other


scholars of the Alexandrian period to

the

the categories in one scheme.

the categories themselves,

later Peripatetics,
And
to us.

and through them

again, the theory of the categories is so closely connected with


the other opinions of Aristotle
that it is not likely to have

sprung up on other ground.


Take, for example, merely the
fundamental statements as to
the ova' a and its relation to prowhich the whole
perties, on
in
division of the categories
These are
Aristotle is basec^.

much

the most

certainly not Platonic in fact it


one chief point of dispute between Aristotle and his master
that the latter conceded to ideas
of quality the position of substances and made the iroihv an
might rather suppose
ohaia.
(as Ueberweg does in his Logik,
47, at p. 100) that Aristotle was
led to his theory of Categories
in his recoil against the theory
of Ideas, and, in particular, by
the reflection that the Ideas only
;

is

We

things under the


form of substantiality, whereas
things in the actual world exhibit many different forms of existence.
But as this explanation

represented

presupposes the distinction


of substance from properties, &c.,
too much importance must not
be attached to the theory.
5 See Trendelenburg, Hist.
Beitr. i. 205 sqq.; BONITZ, vt
supra, p. 56. Prantl, Oesch. d.
Log. i. 78 sqq., and Zeller, Ph.
d. Gr. pt. i. p. 589,
itself

ARISTOTLE

S84

important

is

the

is

a Quantum.^

Quantum

here be

That which can be

set out in

If these parts are divided, then

a discrete Quantum, a multitude;

is

they are interdependent, then


^

if

they are in a definite position

is

extensive

(rd^Ls)

without position,

The undivided,
is

mark

has a measure.

(Oeo-is),

they are only in an order

if

then

non-extensive.^

is

it

means of which quantity


the measure of it.
This is the dis-

or the unity by

distinguished,

tinguishing

if

a constant Quantum,

it is

the quantity

a quantity

fitly

Substance, in the strict sense,

individual Substance.

parts

may

that of Substance, which

is

treated at once in detail.

"*

is

of quantity, that

it is

measurable and

As Quantitas belongs

Metaph. v. 13 init.
iroahv
XcyeraiTh diaiperhvels ivvirdpxovTa,
'

wv cKarepov f) fKaffrov eV ri Kai


r6S ri ir4(pvKv clvai.
The eVuirdpxovra, however, are, the constituent parts as distinguished from
the logical elements of the concept. Thus, e.ff., in 3fetaj)7i. iii. 1,
995, b, 27, c, 3 init. he inquires
whether the yevrj or the iwirdpXovra are the highest principles ;

to a divisible

ber and time are also iroah, we


must not suppose that these
parts are merely material ones
and in Metaph. v. 13, the roSe t*
must be understood not of individual substance, but in a wider
'

'

signifying

as

sense,

numerically distinct

anything

(apiO/j.^ /).

Meta2)h. v. 13 (where also

TToahv Ka9' avrh

and Kara

k6s is spoken of).

(rv/jL^efij]-

Cat. 6 init.

ibid.

Trendelenburg,

is

further of discrete and


continuous quantities, with special reference to Cat. 6, Phys. v.
3, 227, a, 10 sqq. and Metaph.

viii.
17 Jin. the (ttoix^Iov
defined as that ds 6 ^laipelrai
[sc. rX] ivvirdpxov [Acc] ws fj\7)v.
Similarly in viii. 2, 1043, a, 19, cf.
Gen. An. i.21,729,b. 3 wsivirndpXov KoX ixSpiov hv evdvs tov yivofievov
(Ttafxaros fiiyvvfifvov rrj vXr}.
Ibid.
c. 18, 724, a, 24
Ua s 4^ vA-qs
:

to yiyv6p.iva X^yo^^v, e/c


ivvirdpxovros
iariv.

ylyveffdai

rivos

....

Cat. c. 2, 1, a, 24, c, 5, 3, a, 32,


&c. (Ind. Arist. 257, a, 39 sqq.)
The iroahv is consequently that
which is m^de up of parts, like a
body, and not of logical elements,
like a concept.
But since num-

ibid.

p.

82,

treats

loc. cit.

Cat.

c. 6 init.y ibid. 5, a, 15
Aristotle does not here ex-

sqq.

press

the

opposition

of

that

which has and that which has not


extension in any general form,
but merely by means of examples
the

(of

body

former

line,

of the latter

surface,

time, num-

ber, word).
*

Metaph.

X.

1,

1052, b, 15

METAPHYSICS

285

and substantial whole, so Qaalitas expresses the differences whereby the conceptual whole is divided; for
under Qualitas, in the
stotle

Ari-

stricter sense of the word,^

understands nothing else but the distinguishing

mark, or further determination wherein a given Universal particularises itself.

As

the two chief divisions

of qualities, he notes those which express an essential

and those which express a movement or

distinction,

Elsewhere he names four determinations of

activity.^

the most important,^ but these again

quality as

rwv

fall

Cat. c. 6, 4, b, 32. This


follows immediately from the
above definition ot Troff6v: that
which can be divided into parts
can also be built up of parts and

TrdOr]

be measured by them.

second, aper^j and KUKia. With regard to the Sia<popd see supra, p.
Therefore Quality ex215, n. 1.
presses a determination of form,
for that is true of the 8ia<t>oph
Meta^yh. viii. 2, 1043, a, 19
%oiKe
yap 6 fihv Sid rwv Sia<pop(ov \6yos
Tov eWovs Kal ttjs ivepyelas elroi, 6

sqq.

Further

marks of

iroahv (Cat. c. 6, 5, b,
11 sqq.) are that nothing is opposed to it, and that it is what it
is and neither more nor less, and
that the concept of equality and
inequality belongs peculiarly to
it.
'

The generic concepts

(devre-

are sometimes also


called iroihp, or more correctly
irot^ ovffla (Cat. c. 5, 3, b, 13
cf.
Metaph. vii. 1, 1039, a, 1); and
sometimes the <Tvfxfiefi7fK6Ta are

pai

ova-iai)

comprised under the same term


(Aruil. Post.

i.

22, 83, a, 36).

In Cat. c. 8 the concept of


irott^rrjs is not explained except
by reference partly to forms of
speech and partly to examples.
In 3Ieta2)h. v. 14, 1020, b, 13,
however, there is an enumeration
2

of its different meanings thus:


(Tx^^^y 5r; KOT& 5vo TpSirovs \4yoir'
&v rh iroihv, Koi tovtwv eva rhv
KvpitifTOTov
rj

T^s

irpctTT? fitv

ovcrlas

5ia<popd

yap
.

iroiSTris
.

to Se

Kivovfi^uuv y

Kivov/xeva

Kal al ru)v Kivqffiwv hia^opal.

To

the first class belong, among


other things, the qualitative distinctions of
numbers to the
;

5' /c

tcDj/

fuwapx^VTuv

ttjs

v\r}s

fiaWov.
3

The four cWtj


Cat. c. 8.
(bcsidcs which, we are

TTotoTTjTos

10, a, 25, others might


occur) are the following (1) 6|s
and Bid6<ns, which are distinguished inasmuch as f^is expresses
a lasting state, while Siddetris is
used sometimes for every state
whatsoever, and sometimes for a
transitory one (cf. Metajjh. v. 19,
20; BONITZ and Schwegleb
on this passage
Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. i. 95 sqq.
Waitz, Arist. Org. i. 303 sqq.)
Instances of e|t$ are eVia-T^/iot
and dperai] of mere Siddea-ts^
health and sickness. (2) "Oc*

told,

ARISTOTLE

286

He

under the same heads.^

mark

treats as the peculiar

of Qualitas, the opposition of the like and the

unlike. 2

But

in dividing off this category from others

To the category

Aristotle finds himself in difficulties.^

of Relativity

belongs that of which the peculiar essence

consists in a definite relation to something else


this sense Relativity

the category which

is

aSwafilav
fl
Aeyerat (a class which, however,
cannot be strictly distinguished
from the e|ejs and Siadea-as see
Trendelenburg, ibid. 98 sqq.
KaTo, Svva/jLiu (pvcriK^v

More about the

Svua/xis

later).

(3) The passive qualities, 7ra07jTt/cai


also called irddos in
irotdrrjTes,
the meaning of iroidrtjs Kaff %v
aWoiova-Oai eVSexerai (3fetaj)h. v.
21),

and distinguished from the

under the category of Trao-xei"), by their duration.


Aristotle,ho wever, understands by
them not only the qualities which
are produced by a irddos (such as
white and black colour) but also
those which produce a irdeos or
an aWoiwais on our senses cf.
De An. ii. 5 init. (4) Figure
irde-q

(which

fall

(o-^^iiia Kal iJLopcpr]).


*
For the first two and a part
of the third express 'activities
and movements the rest, 'essen;

'

tial properties.'
2 Cat. c. 8, n, a, 15;
on the
other hand (ibid. 10, b, 12, 2G),
the eVoj'TJOTTjs and the /xaWov kuI
rjTTou ( = ditf erence of degree') do
not belong to all quantities. The
notion of Similarity, cf Tojj. i. 17
'

15, x. 3,
1054, a, 3, and ijifra, p. 287, n. 2.
' For, on the one hand, the re-

iVetajjh. v. 9, 1018, a,

in Cat. c. 8, 10, a, 16, that


the concepts of rarity and denseness, roughness and smoothness,
designate no quality, but a sit^^-

mark

and in

expresses

ation of the bodily parts

(i.e.

(as TRENDELENrightly perceives, Hist.

KitffQai),

BURG

would

Beitr. i. 101 sq.) equally apply


to many other things which Aristotle includes under Quality
whilst, on the other hand, the
impossibility of a constant definition of the categories is seen
from the fact that a generic
^irto-TTj/tr;)
may
(e.g.
concept
belong to the Trp6s n, when a
corresponding specific concept
(ypafXfiariK^) belongs to the iroihy

{Cat.

c. 8, 11, a,

20; Top.iv. 124,

whereas in Metaph. v. 15,


1021, b, 3, larpiKYi is counted
under irpds ri, that it may follow
b, 18

generic concept, iirKTrrjixrj).


* That the category of RelaCat. c. 7, precedes
tivity, in
that of Quality (vide supra) is
contrary to the natural relation
of both, as is clear, not only in
all other enumerations and in the
express explanation in Meta2)h.
xiv. 1, 1088, a, 22, but indirectly
also (in Cat. c. 7 itself) from the
fact that the o/xoiov and laov
and quantitative
(qualitative
equality) is in 6, b, 21 counted
as irp6s Ti cf. Top. i. 17 Trenits

delenburg,
5

Thus

^(rrt

rh vpSs

iari

T^

ibid. p. 117.

Cat.

c.

ri ols

7, 8, a, 31
rh elvai ravrdu

irpds rl irws exeti'

where

the earlier verbal explanations


are expressly declared (at the

METAPHYSICS
the least

reality.'

of Relativity

Aristotle distinguishes three kinds

which are again reduced to two.^

,2

however, he

this,

287

In

not consistent throughout,'^ nor has

is

he been able to find any sure marks of this category,^


to avoid confusing it in

or

beginning of the chapter) to be


Cf Top. vi. 4, 142,
insufficient.
.

a, 26, c. 8, 146, b, 3.

Metaph.

'

supra

ut

[for

Trpos Tt TTc^yTwr

rb Se

which Alex.

read iraawv] Hikioto. (pvais ris ^


Karriyopiwv iffri, Koi
ovffia ruv
vcTTepa Tov irotoG Koi iroffov, &c. b,
:
rh 5e irp6s ri oijTC Svudfiei ovffla
;

oijT ivepydc^.

Mh.

iV.

i.

1096,

yap rovr' ^oikc


Koi (TVfjL^efirjKSTi rod ovros.
2 Metaph. v. 15
the irpds ti
appears in the following forms
a,

21

Ttapa<pv6j8i

(1) Ka6' apidfjihv Kal apidfiov irdOrj


(and in other related forms) to
this head belong the ^aov, 'dfioiov^
ravrhv in SO far as these are concerned with relations to a given
;

:
toutci ficv yap wv /xia t]
ovffia, Hixoia 8' S>v rj TroicJrrjs fiia, iffa

unity

S>v rh TToahv eV (the latter also

many ways with

others.^

dently from the fact that it is


measured or thought, and only
becomes a relative in so far as that
which measures and thinks enters
into relation with it). The like
also in Metaph. x. 6, 1056, b, 34,
1057, a, 7.
* Another
division is found
in Top. vi. 4, 125, a, 33 sqq.
* The various peculiarities of
the Relative which are mentioned
in Cat. c. 7 are all found, as is
there remarked, only in a part of
that class
e.g. the ivapndTrjs
(6, b, 15, cf. Metaph. x. 6, 1056,
b, 35, c. 7, 1057, a, 37, and also
:

Teendelenbukg,

123 sqq.), the

jxaKXov Kal ?ittov, the property of


correlatives to be simultaneous
( Cat. 7, b, 15), which is not found
in the relative of the second
class (the iTria-TrjThu, &c., see note 3,

dep/xavriKhv

supra). But it is a universal mark


of every relative, to have a corresponding correlative (rh irphs

and the OepfiavrSv; (3) in the


sense which comprises such ex-

avTi(rrp4(povTa KeyeorOai, Cat. 6, b,


27 sqq.), which, in the main,

pressions as fiCTprirhv,

tallies

in Gen. et Corr.
KOTtt

(2)

iradr}riKr]V,

Stoj/orjToV.

ii.

Svvafiiv

like

The

6,

333, a, 29)

TTOtrjTi/cV

the

first

Kal

iiriffT'nThp,

two kinds

come also in Ph]/s. iii.

1, 200, b, 28.
3fefaph. ibid. 1021, a, 26
In the first two of the cases
is called t<^
adduced the trpds
oTrep eVrli' &Wov Acyeardai avrd h
'

iarlv (double is

that

which

dfpfxavTiKdu).

dnr\daiov,
dep/xavrov
In the third case
rjixiffeos

warms

avrd \4ycadai
it is Tcp &\\o
(what can be measured or thought
-irpbs

has

its

proper essence indepen-

with the statement made


itiit.) and afterwards
repeated (8, a, 33), that the irpos
Tt is oaa avrd amp iarlv kr^puv

at first (c. 7

elyai

Aeyerot ^ oirwaovv

dWws

irphs

statement differing merely by being less exact.


Individual substances {irpwrai
oifffiai) cannot be relative
but
erepov, the latter

generic concepts (Sevrepai ovartai)


may be. Cat. 8, a, 13 sqq.

the

Thus in
e'|iJ,

Cat. c. 7, 6, b, 2,

Siddeais,

atadrjffiSy

iiri-

ARISTOTLE

288

The remaining

categories are dealt with so briefly in

the treatise on the Oa/e^ories and, indeed, wherever


them ^that an extended account of

Aristotle mentions

them cannot be given here.^


The essential meaning of the theory

the cate-

of

gories lies in the fact that it indicates to

us

how

to

distinguish the different meanings of concepts and the


Thus,
different corresponding relations of the actual.
in the first place, the original
or substance of each thing
is derivative.^

Among

division is again
ties,

and unchangeable essence


distinguished from

is

all

that

things which are derivative, a

made between

the qualities, the activi-

Of the

and the external circumstances.

qualities,

one class belong to things in themselves, and in this


case they express sometimes a quantitative and sometimes
a

qualitative

determination

that

to

is

say,

have relation either to the substratum or to the

they

form

^
;

eiffis are referred to TTp6s


of which, however, the first
four belong also to Quality, the
Position; noi^'iv and
to
last
irio-veti', according to Metaj?h. v.

has gone before. Gen. et Corr. i.


7, treats Action and Passion more
at length, but that passage deals
with the physical meaning of these
terms, and we shall have to men-

16, 1020, b, 28, 1021, a, 21, are


relative concepts; the parts of
a whole (^irrtUXiov, K<pa\i}, &c.)
are also said to be relative (Cat.

tion it later on. "Elts is discussed


etymologically in Metaph. v. 15,
and in Cat. c. 15 (in the FostproBdicamenta).
^ cf. note 4 on next page.

o-T^/tTj,

Ti,

6, b, 36 sqq., cf., however,


24 sqq.). Also Matter (Phys.
and if so, why not
ii 2 194, b, 8)
Form as well ?
In the abrupt ending of the

7,

8, a,

'

genuine Categories, c. 9 (as to


which, see the latter part of n. 1
to p. 64, S2ipra) it is merely said of
the category of iroterj/ and Trelo-xetv,
that it is susceptible of opposition

and of More and Less.

As to

the other categories, there is


nothing but a reference to what

' As Trendelenburg, p. 103,


rightly remarks, the Quale is related to the Form, the Quantum
to the Matter vide siq^ra, 284,
n. 1 and 4, p. 285, n. 2, cf. p. 219,
n. 2. Thus similarity also, which,
according to Aristotle, consists
in qualitative equahty (see p.
286, n. 3, 287, n. 2), is deanother place, as
in
fined,
equality of Form (Metaph. x. 3,
Bfxoia Se ihv /xi] ravt^
1054, b, 3
;

METAPHYSICS

289

another class belong to things only in relation to other


things

that

is

With regard

to say, they are relative.^

to activities, the

most far-reaching opposition

Action and Passion

is

that of

on the other hand, the categories

of Possession and Situation, as has been already re-

marked,^ have only a precarious rank, and are afterwards

dropped by Aristotle himself sah

Finally, as

silentio.

regards external circumstances, these are taken on the

one hand in terms of Space, and on the other in terms

Where and

of Time, in the categories of the

In

the

When.

however, both of these ought to have been


ranged under the Category of Relation and perhaps it
was this kinship which led Aristotle to place them as a
strictness,

rule next in order after that category.^


gories, however, lead

airXws Svra .... Karh rb elSos


ravTo. ^), in Metajjh. iv. 5, 1010,
a, 23 sqq. iroa-hv and iroihv are

transposed with iroahv and

elSos,

and

in MetajjJi. xi. G, 1063, a, 27,


TToihv is taken as (pvais d}pi(Tix4uy],
TToahv (like Matter, vide infra)
as aSpiaros.
*
All concepts of relation refer to something which is con-

ditioned; substances are not


Ti
vide supra.
^
Vide snpra, p. 282.

irpos

That
is

Kara rcov ovcriup


KaTvyopclrai (about avfi^e^riKhs
in this meaning see p. 275 sqq.).
Similarly 1. 19, iMd. a, 25, c, 4,
(rv/xfi4fir)Ke

73, b, 5.

Kol

Ph'i/s.

ovOiv yap tuv

VOL.

I.

i.

1,

185, a, 31

aWwv xwp'O'Td^'

r^v

irapa

ovffiav

viroKeifjLfvov

rrjs

base.''

iravra yap Kad^


oixrlas

Xeyerai

(but what is asserted wa^' viroKeilx4vov is a Gvp.^cfiy}Kbs in the further sense Anal. Post. i. 4, 73,
b, 8
Metaph. v. 30 fin. &c) c.
Ka\ yap Troffhv Kal
7, 190, a, 34
Koihv Ka\ irphs Tpou Kal Trore /cot wov
yivTai vTroKei/jLeuov rivos hia rb
ix6vr)v r}ju ovaiav fjLTjOevbs Kar' &\\ou
\4yadai viroKei/xevov to 5' ^A.A.o
TrdvTa Kara rrjs ovcrias
iii. 4, 203,
b, 32:' Metaph. vii. 1, 1028, a, 13,
Ihid. 1. 32
irdvTMV rj ovffia irpooTOv
:

this is not without exclear from p. 282, n. 3.


* Anal. Post. i. 22,
83, b, 11
TTOfTO
yap ravra [iroihu, &c.]
'

ception

All the cate-

back to Substance as their

iart

Kal Koytf Kal ypdcrei Kal

the whole chapter);

XP^^V

c. 4,

(cf.

1029, b,

23, c. 13, 1038, b, 27, ix. 1 i7iit. xi.


1, 1059, a., 29, xiv. 1, 1088, b, 4

vtmpov yap

[ttjs outrtos]

traaai at

Karrtyopiai.
Gen. ef Corr. i. 3,
317, b, 8. Hence in all the enumerations ovcria goes first.
Cf. also
infra, ch. vii. init.

*U

ARISTOTLE

290

An

Being as such,

inquiry, therefore, into Substance, or

must

be the starting-point in the investigation of the

Actual.

Fird

Tlie

2.

PJdlosoj^hi/ as the Science of Being.

As Science in general has for its task the investigation of the grounds of things,^ so the highest Science
must be that which refers to the last and most universal
For

of the grounds of things.

sense experience.
it

are

principles

universal

since

most

is

because

the

It gives us the

is

most instructive knowledge,

out the highest grounds, and

knowledge which

to itself, in that

it is

of knowledge.

It gives us that

Vide supra,

may

we

it

serves.^
163 sqq.
especially

p.

is

shown

For
cite

diroiavovv

ixdvTOiv a1<TQT](nv eJuai 5ok7 crocpdirepos, 6 Sf TexftTTjs rwv i/xireipajv,

apx^f^KTwv, al 5e
rcov iroi7iriKa>v fiaWov.
Se

X^ipoTex^ov
Oeccp-qTiKoi

Hence
riva'i

'6ti

jxlv

nZv

aiT'.as

Koi

apxds eariv

(TT'fip.T],

Srj\ov.

t)

cro(pla -rrepi
iiri-

Metapli.

is

airoLVT^v olv

avrrjv

2,

i,

TrlirTsi

jx^vov uvofxa\jTo(pia\-

twv

(982, b, 7)

twv dprm^vwv

iiriffrrj/jLTiv

to

is

where the above

summed up

thus

all

end to which

But any knowledge which

(981, b, 30)

/xTripos tojv

which dominates

establishes that

Mctaph. i. 1, where, with reference to prevaihng views as to


wisclom, it
that 6 fjLeu

most truly an end

is

concerned with the highest object

other knowledge, for

knowledge

all

a setting forth of the grounds of things.

It gives us that

'

most

removed from

furthest

gives us the surest knowledge,

It

points

it

instruction

this

It gives us the

difficult to attain, as the

has to do with the most simple concepts and

principles.

all

being com-

else

prehended under the most universal.

knowledge which

most

this gives us the

comprehensive knowledge, everything

iiri

t)]v

rh (y]Tov-

deTyapravT'nv

itpuiTwv a.px('>v kx\ alricov elvai


Cf. iii. 2, 996, b, 8

dewprjTiK'fjv.

Mh.

sqq.

1026,

TV. vi. 7.

a,

21

Metapli.

t'^v

vi. 1,

Ti^fjirdrTiv

rh rifxidoTarov

[eirio-TT^urj?/]

Set irepl

yivos

al fihv ovv dfcaprjTiKal

rSiv

elvai.

dWcau iiTKTT'qixoov aiperdjTCpai,


twv de:>:pr]TLKuv.

avTT] 5e

METAPHYSICS

the ultimate grounds of things must clearly

set forth

include

291

actuality, for these ultimate grounds are


simply those which explain Being as suchj
Other
sciences, such as Physics and Mathematics, may limit
all

themselves to

a particular sphere, the

conception of

which they take no further. The science of the ultimate


grounds of things must go through the whole world of
things, and must take them back, not to finite principles,
but to their etern^L^auses, and, in the

all

world. 2

This science

'

Metaph.

TOVT(j}

iv.

is

(ttiv

the First Philosophy, which

4iri-

Of cope? rd Ou ^ ou Ka.1 to
virapxovTa Kad' aur6. aunj S'

Tiy

^f;

iarlu oudefxia ruv iv fiepei KeyoIXIV03V T] avT-i] oifdefMiayaprdiV&Wcov


'

kxBoKov irepl tov outos


/jup.is avrov ti airorefiotoutou
fieyai
d(t.'podm
rd
iirel Se tus apxas
(Tvfji^e^riKOi
Kal TCLs aKpordras otVias ^7]rov/j.V,
SrjXov
CDS
(pvcredos
rivos
avTas
avajKalov elvai Kad' avT^v.
5ti
Kai 7)ijuv TOV ovTos f] hv ras irpdoras
uiTias \rjTrTeov.
Cf note 2 and
iiricTKotrei

i]

ou,

akKa

Trepl

passim.
See the previous note, and
see also Metaph. vi. i
at apxal
Kal TO a^TlO ^'TJTCtTOt Ta>V OVTWU,

siij/ra, ch. iv.


-

SrjAou 5e

on

f)

oi/ra.

Every science

has to do wiih certain principles


and canses.
oAAo iracrat avrai
&c.] irepl eV
yivos
Tre piypaxl/d/xepai itcpl
TovTov TTpayixarevourai, oAA' ovxl
irepl ofTos airXus ovSh ^ ov, ouSt' tov
ri iariv ovdeva \6yov iroiovvTaf
a\\' (K TOVTOV at jxep al(TQi](Tei
[laTpiK^], jj-aOrffiariK^,

Ti Kal

iroi-i](ra(Tai

\afiovffai

to

is

proceeds

(TTXfir]

last resort,

unmoved and incorporeal, from which


movement and formation in tho corporeal

that which

avTO StjAoj/, ai 5' virodeaiu


Th t'i iaTiv outco to Kad"

a'jTa virdpxovTa

t^ yivei

aTToSetKuvovcriu

^ ayayKaidrepov

fia\aKu>Tepoy.
el i(TTiu

i<TTi

jXT)

irepl o elaiv

d^ioius

?)

5e oil'

Th yevos

irepl h
Keyovffi 5to
Th TTis avT7]s eJvai Siavoias t6 t ti

irpayfiaTevovTai ovSev

effri SrjKoj/ iroielv Kal el ecrnv.

So
with Physics and Mathematics, ihe former being concerned with that which is moved
and in which the Form is not
separated from the Matter, the
latter being at the best concerned
with that which is abstracted
from Matter and Movement, but
which does not exist of itself as
immaterial and unmoved (cf. p.
it

is

183, n, 3) el 5e tI ecniv a'ihiov Kal


aKLvrjTov Kal x^'P'O't^j/, (pavephv oti
decoprjTiKrjs Th yvcovai.
ov [xevTOi
:

(pvcnK?is

aXKa

ye

irpoTepas

ovde ixaOrjixaTiKTjs,

The object

a/j.(po7v.

of this science

is

the

x'^'Pi'^rh koI

aKivTjTa
avdyKT} Se irlvTa fxev to.
aXTia a'iSia elvai, fiaK'ffTa Se tovto

TouTO yap aXTia to7s (pavepols tw


Qeiujv.
In them, if anywhere, to
delov must be sought with them
stands or falls the possibility of
;

ARISTOTLE

202

names Theology/ and its task is to invesand the ultimate grounds thereof,
being
ultimate,
are necessarily also the most
as
which,
universal, and concern, not any part of the actual, but
Aristotle also

tigate all actuality

the whole.
It is true that the possibility of

such a science

is

open to much question. How can one and the same


science treat of causes which are of different kinds, and

which do not act collectively together


other hand,

we were

if

to a special science,

how

claim to be that which

described above

Again,

question whether the First Philosophy

scope the

its

whether these belong

inasmuch

at

as all sciences

to

all

make

any

to

is

it

definite

is

draw

into

procedure,

of scientific

principles

since in this

would rather be divided

it

sciences

special

each r/enus

could any one of these sciences

is

case the qualities claimed for

up among the

And, on the

to refer the causes of

or

science,

use of them and

it

is

impossible to assign any definite object to which they


Or, again,

relate.^

is it

to be a single science, or

than one, which will deal with


are

If there

all classes

more

of the actual ?

more than one, the next question is,


all of the same kind or no, and which

whether they are


of

them

then

it

is

If there be only one,

the First Philosophy.

would seem that that one must include

if there is
a First Philosophy
nothing else besides natural substances, Physics is the first science ; tl 8' l(ni ris ovala aK'vrjTos,

ovra p ui/.
Metajjh.

auTTj TTpoTtpa KoX <t)iKo<TQ(pia irpJiri]

init.

Kol KadoXoi) ouTws

oTi irpujT-n

'

fccu

ii,v

e^rj

nepl Tov iiuTos

t)

decoprjcrai Koi ri

iari Koi ra vvdpx-

'bv

ravrrjs

'

loc. cit. et alih.

all

vid.

mpra.
-

b,

26

Metaph.
Ibid.
;

ct.

iii.

1,

995, b, 4,

c.

c. 1, 995, b, 6, c. 2, 996,
sujjra,ch. \.j?ass7m.

METAPHYSICS
objects of knowledge,

293

and thereby the multiplicity

the special sciences would disappear.'

ask whether this single science

Finally

ot

we may

to relate only to sub-

is

The

stances or to their qualities also.

alternative

first

seems inadmissible, because

it would be then impossible


what kind of science had to do with the qualities
of Being.
The latter seems untenable, because sub-

to say

stances

known by

cannot be

same method

the

of

demonstration as qualities.^

answers these questions by

Aristotle

remarking

that not only that which falls under the same conception,

but also that which relates to the same object, belongs

one and the same science.^

to

or

is

somehow

either that
ties

which

is

named Being.

in question denote

Substantial, or else qualities, activi-

and circumstances of Substance, and in the end they


up to certain elementary pairs of opposites, and

opposites

fall

under the same

reasons he concludes that

which has to deal with

it is

'

'^

Among

the

For these

science."*

one and the same science

Being as such.^ The

all

Metaph. ibid. 995, b, 10, c.


997, a, 15.
C. 1, 995, b, 18, C. 2, 997, a,

25.

the case

lead

all

2,

are

is

Substance,

is itself

related to substance, can be

those conceptions which

All

This, he says,

Only that which

as regards Being.

diflSculty

Metaph. iv. 2, 1003, b, 12:


twv kuO' tv \'}o;xV(i}v

ov '^ap fi6vov

eVto-TrjiUTjs i<TTleeu'p?](rai /mas,

aWh

a-vfifiefirjKOTa ra'is

Kal roov irphs jxiav Xiyojxivwv (pvaiv.

ova-iais must be counted also the


concepts of ralrhv, erepov, o/jloiov,

JMd. 1. 19, 1004, a, 24, cf. note


and as to the difference between
Kad' v and nphs ev, see lUetaph.

ivavTiov, Sec.

enumerated

in 995,
1003, b, 34 sqq.
1004, a, 1(5 sqq.
The furtl er
Apories of the third book, which
are concerned not only with the
concept of the First Philosophy
but also with its contents, will
be mentioned later on.
b,

20;

cf. iv. 2,

-I

%ii. 4,
^

1040, a, 34 sqq.
this point see

On

p.

221,

supra,.
* Mttapli.
iv. 2
rb Se ov
Keyerai fih iroXKaxus. a\ha irpls
(v Koi /n av riva (ftvaiv (for which
:

later

airav irpls ixiav

apxhy) kaI

ARISTOTLE

294

must needs resume in itself the content


is removed in Aristotle's mind by

that this science


of

other sciences,

all

the distinction he draws between the different senses of

As Philosophy

Being.

general

in

Essential Being, so there will be as

has to do

many

Philosophy as there are kinds of Essential Being.

Being determinate
general, so

distinguished

is

from the special

distinguished

science

from

As

Being

the First Philosophy as the

is

with

sections of

in

universal

sciences.

It

deals with the particular also, not in its particularity,

but as a form of Being.

It abstracts

from the peculiari-

whereby a particular thing distinguishes

ties

others, in order to

itself

have regard to that only in

it

from

which

all Being.^
The objection that Substance
must needs be treated in other ways than that

appertains to
itself

ovx

... TO,
ivra \iyeTai, to.

jxiv "yap oti

on

ovaiau,

d/jLwvviuLccs

o-j(rlo.i

ra

ovaias,
(pOopal

8'

oShs

S'

(Is

7)

(TTepriaeis ^ TrotOTTjres
^ yevur]TiKa ovaias, r) rSsv
irphs T^v ovffiav heyojj.4vuy, ^ tovtuiv
Tivhs aiTO(\>a(r(is
ovaias Sih Kal to
fxT] hv ehai fir] ov (pafj.4v. The consideration of One also belong-s to
this science, for the ev and the ov
are (ilnd. 1003, b, 22) TavThu Ka\
t)

ir)

apxh
X'jyq}

OTI

(pvais

Tw

Kal

aiTiov,

dr}Xovfxva

Kal

TO,

ovTO.

iravTaxov

ovTa.
trpdjTOv

aWa

aKO\ov6e7u,

T]

aAA' ovx ^^
.

^prrjTot Kal
7]

8f/Aoi/

^'''

ovu

dewprjaai

jULias

Kvpiws tov
Kal 4^ ou to,
h \4yovTai. t

Se

iTnaTTifiT]

ovv toCt' icTTlv

wairep

St'

ovaia,

twv

oixriwy

Tos apxo.s Kal tols otV/as


5ih Kal tov
exejc Thp (piX6ao(poj/.
ouTOS 'Sea ttSr) Oewprjaai fxias iffTiv
cVto-Tirj/Arjs Tq5 y4vei to. re e^Sij tuv
eldccv.
Further, 1004, a, 9 sqq.

h,v

Sioi

Metaj)h. iv.

Mctaph.

2,

1004,

a,

2,

&c.

-7)

iroi7]TiKa

jx'a

25, b, 27 sqq.

oti irddr)

iv. 2,

1004,

a,

9 sqq.

Since the concepts of the One


and the Many, of Identity and
Distinction, &c., relate to one
and the same object, therefore
one and the same science must
deal with them;
1004, b, 5:
eirel

ovv tov kvos

fj

ev Kal tov ovtos

TavTa Kad^ avTd iaTi irddri,


aAA' ovx o.pi6inol ^ ypajxfial ^ irvp.
drjAou us (Keivris ttjs i'in(TTi,fi'qs Kal
fl

ov

TL eo-Tt yj'Mpiaai Kal to, av/j.fiefi'qKdT

avTo7s.
As the mathematical
and physical properties of things
form a special province, ovrw koI
ovTi p hv ecTTt Tivh "(Sia, Kal
toGt' eVrt nepl wv tov (piKoaoipov
iTriaKf^aadai Ta\r}dis. Ibid. 1005,
a, 8.
This is further illustrated
in xi. 3, 1061, a, 28 sqq.
ToJ

METAPHYSICS
which proceeds by deducing its

296

essential attributes

would

not trouble Aristotle,^ since the same thing would be true


of the fundamental coaceptions of any science what-

To

ever.

would

the question whether the First Philosophy

also deal with the general principles of scientific

procedure, Aristotle answers in the affirmative, inas-

much

as these principles themselves relate to

Being in

general rather than to any particular class of Being.

In

he proceeds immediately to a detailed investi-

fact,

gation of the law of Contradiction and the Excluded

Middle, which by reason of

its relation to

has been already discussed at


however, these inquiries

p.

251.

Methodology

By

Aristotle,

^.Ain the present connection

treated ontologically, as giving knowledge of the actual,


for

which reason he includes them in

his First Philo-

sophy.^

The Fundamental Questions of Metaphysics and


their Treatment 'by earlier Philosophers.

3.

The forerunners of
problems in the

he found

it

way

Aristotle had left

him a

series of

of metaphysical inquiry for which

necessary to obtain a

new

solution.

The

most important of these, to the answering of which the


fundamental ideas of his system are immediately
directed,
1..

were the following

First of

Is there

all,

how

are wqjfo think of the actual ?

nothing but corporeal existence, as the pre-

Or is there,
assumed ?
somfthing uncorporeal, as

Socratic natural philosophy

and above

beside
'

vol..

It is

nowhere expressly answered in the Metaphysics.

MetapJt.
1.

that,

iv. 3.

* u 4

ARISTOTLE

296

Anaxagoras, the Megarians and Plato said

Are the

altimate grounds of things of the nature of matter


only, or is form to be distinguished

peculiar and a higher principle

Connected with this

2.

is

from matter as a

the question of the rela-

tion of the Individual to the Universal.

which

is

and

essential

What

is

in the last resort actual ?

the individual things or the universal ideas, or

is

that
Is

it

there

The first
?
was the common view which hnd latel}^ come out, bluntly
enough, in the Nominalism of Antisthenes the second
was the theory of Plato the third that of Parmenides

perhaps in truth only one universal Being

and of Eucleides

after him^'V^

Seeing that unity of being and manifold existence

3.

how can we hold these


Can the One be at the same
time a manifold, including in itself a number of parts
Can the Many come together in an
and qualities ?
are both given in experience,

two

tosfether in thougrht ?

actual

unity

These questions also were variously

answered.

Parmenides and Zeno had denied that the

two

could

ideas

be

and had therefore

reconciled,

declared the manifold to

be a delusion,

while

the

Sophists used the assumption of the manifold for their

theory of argument, as Antisthenes for his theory of

The Physicists of the Atomic and


Empedoclean schools lijjftited the relation between the
Many and the One to that of an external and mechanical
The Pythagoreans found in
juxtaposition of parts..

knowledge.^

number, and Plato, with keener philosophic insight, in


his Ideas, a means of combining a multitude of different
'

See ZELLEfi, Ph.

d.

Gr. pt.

1,

pp. 985 etc.

METAPHYSICS

297

determinations of being in an inner unity, while the

corresponding

relation

things

in sensible

Equally different were the views held as to the

4.

passing of the one into another

that

Change and Becoming.

How

of

explained

according to Plato, by impact.

itself,

as to the theory

is,

can being become

?
How can anything
How is movement possible,

not-being, or not-being being

come

to be or cease to be ?

Such were the questions that Parmenides


and Zeno had asked in doubt, and the Megarians and
the Sophists had repeated their questionings.
The like

or change ?

drove Empedocles and Anaxagoras, Leuc-

difficulties

ippus and Democritus to explain the coming to be and


ceasing to be of

all

things by the combinations and

separations of unchangeable matter.

Plato himself so

agreed with them that he confined change to the

far

sphere of appearances, and excepted from

was truly

Aristotle has all these

To the

it

all

that

actual.

first

questions

clearly in view.

two problems related most

of the diroplai,

with which he opens his great work on Metaphysics,


after the introductory discussions of the first book.

sensible things the

besides
is it

them some other

Is the

'

other

'

Are
there

is

of one kind, or

manifold like the Ideas and mathematical entities

The limitation of Being to sensible things


contradicted by the series of arguments on which Plato

of Plato ?
is

only essential being, or

'^

had already based his Ideal Theory


'

With the exception of those


which are con-

such

Metaph.

iii.

just mentioned,

(xi.

1,

cerncd with the office of the First


Philosophy in general.

23),

iii. 6, viii,

as,

34 sqq.
1060, b,

2, 997, a,

1059, a, 38,
2.

that the

c. 2,

ABISrOTLE

298
particular things

of sense, passing

and

they are, can be no object of knowledge

indistinct as
^

and that

all

the world of sense, as passing, presupposes an eternal


as formed, presupas moved, presupposes an unmoved
These Platonic assumptions,
poses a forming cause.-

however, as
of

we

question
to be

parts

presently find, are beset by

The problem returns

difficulties.

all

manner

in the form of the

whether the ultimate grounds of things are

sought

the

for in their genera, or in their constituent

latter

material

being the basis of their

conditions, the other the basis of their formal deter-

For either view plausible arguments may


On the one hand there is the analogy of

minations."*

be adduced.

corporeal things, whose constituent parts

we have

to

explain their

we name when

On

character.

the other

hand there are the conditions of knowledge, which we


attain to by a process of determination through concepts

And as
in the assignment of genera and species.
between these again there arises immediately the question, whether the highest genera or the lowest species
ought to be treated as the true

would be universal, including

'principia.

all

The former

individual existence as

The

an ultimate principle should do.

latter

would be

determinate conceptions, and out of such only could the


individual in

peculiarity of character be obtained.^

its

Metaph.

vii. 15, 1039, b, 27;


1009, a, 36, 1010, a, 3, cf. i.
G, 987, a, 84; xiii. 9, 1086, a, 37,
'

iv. 5,

b, 8.
2
^

T^

999, b, 3 sqq.
Metaph. iii. 3 Trc^repoi/ Set

Ibid.

iii.

4,

7eVrj aTOix'^'ia KoX

apx^s

uTroAa^u-

^dveiv ^ jxaXKov 6| oov ivvTrapX'^v'''^v


iarh '^KacTov irpuTov (xi, 1, 1059,

b, 21).
"

Vide supra, ch.

Metaph.

iii.

v.

998, b, 14 sqq.

Among the
(xi. 1, 1059, b, 34).
varied and often intricate forms
of Aristotle's dialectic, it is only
possible to state here the leading
line of reasoning.

METAPHYSICS
On

299

like considerations rests the other difficulty, to

tlie

which Aristotle rightly gives special prominence


question whether
tual, or

it is

the

only individual things that are ac-

whether the universal of the genera be actual also. ^

The former theory seems untenable because the sphere


of individual existences
is

unlimited and of that which

is

unlimited no knowledge

knowledge in any case


open to

all

The

lie

case

An

the Ideal

or

application of this question to a

contained in the

is

all

latter is

against the theory

existing independently,

Theory of Plato.^
particular

and since

possible,

is

of universals.

the objections which

universal

of a

is

further inquiry,

whether the conceptions of the One and of Being denote


anything substantial or are only predicates for some
subject

of

at

universals
stantial,

all

must

opposite opinion

Number)

as in

the

proposition

(e.g.

affirm
is

Those who

nature.

different

first

accept

any way subbut the

not only supported by the analogy

by the
argument that you cannot treat the One as substance

of the whole world of concrete things, but also

without denying, as did Parmenides, the existence of


'

Metaph.

(cf. vii.

ibid.

18

10(50,

iii.

4 init.

c.

6 fn.

xL 2

init.,

In the

first

sq.), xiii. 6,

b,

19.

Mctaph.

iii.

ovv fXT\94v
ovOev au

ian

999, b, 1

4,

irapa

vorjThv

etr]

ra KaO^

et jxkv

e/cacrro,

aWa

iravra

TToo-oii'

and hence he here again


adduces the reasons, which were

Qiwpriffai;

there mentioned.

passage this Apory

is

called

llie

xo^^TcoTaTr? Kal oj/ayKatoTaTrj


similarly in xiii. 10,
1086, a, 10; and we shall find
later on, that its importance and
difficulty vest not merely on the
opposition of Aristotle to Plato,
but also on the intrinsic contradiction involved in the foundations of his own system.
2 That
this Apory coincides
with that adduced on p. 298,
in
Aristotle
himself
asserts

oiffQ-nra,

Metaph.

iii.

4, c.

161, 4.
expression for the
5, cf. p.

question
,p'n.),
/
'^

or
rh

(iii.

4,

6,

1008,

999, b, 24, xi. 2

whether the apxal are


apiO/xcp

e/

a,

Only another
above is the

Tt>

yap

KaO^KaiTTov K^y^iv

ohekv (999, b, 33 cf.


30).

et'Set

apid/j-ff

c. 6,

eu

5ia<ppei

1002, b,

ARISTOTLE

300

To the same head belongs the


Numbers and Figures are Substances

the Many, as such.'

question whether

or no, and to this also opposite answers are possible.

For as the qualities of bodies are mere predicates from

which we distinguish the

bodii3s

themselves as their

and as these bodies presuppose, as their


elements, the surface, the line, the point, and unity, it
would seem that surface and unity must be as subwhile on the other hand these have
stantial as body is

substrata,

not any existence for themselves but only in corporeal


things,

and they do not come

to be

and cease

to be, as

Substances do.^ Yet another difficulty which leads back


to the relation of the individual to the Universal
,
'

The

jirincipia

must on the one hand,

as

it

is this.

seems, be of

a potential character, since possibility precedes actuality

on the other hand, they must be actual, since otherwise

Being would be merely

accidental.^

indeed, do actually exist

except in so far as

^individual
if

it

Individual things,

whereas the universal concept,

has found for itself a place in

entities, exists

only potentially.

And

finally,

there be besides the corporeal, an uncorporeal, and

beside the changing, an eternal, the final question

be whether both
If

not.

it

seems impossible to explain the

between them.

Metaph.

have the same principia^ or

ot these

we say Yes,

difference

iii.

4,

1001, a,

If
3

sqq., and, referring to this, x. 2,

xi

1,

1059, b, 27,

c.

2,

1060,

a, 36.

5 (cf. xi. 2, 1060,


p. 1002, b, 32
viii. 5 \n\t. c. 3, 1043, b, 15).
shall meet with further objections to this view in the criticism
2

Metapli.

b, 12 sqq.,

iii.

and on

must

we say No, then we must

of the Pythagorean and Platonic


doctrines,
' Ihid. iii. 6, 1002, b, 32 cf.
BONITZ and Schwegler on this

passage.
*

We

As Plato supposed, in

full

accordance with Aristotle's view,


Cf Zeller, P/i. <?. (rr. pt. i. p. 628
sq. 805 sq.
.

METAPHYSICS

301

decide whether the principia of the changeable are


themselves changeable or unchangeable.
If they be
changing, then we must go back to deeper principia,

with which the same dilemma will recur.


unchangeable, then

we have

If they be

how

to explain

it

can be

that out of the unchanging, in one case the changeable,

another the

in

unchangeable,

ficulty, in truth, applies to all

How,

Being.

which

for

example,

The

arises.^

like dif-

the different classes of


possible that things

it

is

under wholly different categories, such as


those of Substance and Relation, can lead back to
principles that are one and the same ? ^
fall

The other questions

stated above

those relating to

the unity of the manifold, and the possibility of change


were clearly present to Aristotle's mind, and he sought
in the first principles of his Metaphysics to find a solu-

tion for them.


unity, concerns

The combination of the manifold into


him chiefly as leading up to the inquiry

how the genus and the

differentia can be one in conthough he recognises that the same question


may be raised in all cases where things of a different

ception

nature are combined.^


'

Metaph.

iii.

4,

1000,

Aristotle's answer, in all such


a,

sqq. (xi. 2, 1060, a, 27).


2

Ibid.

4.
Aristotle
1070, b, 17) that
the linal grounds of things are
only analogically the same for

answers

xii.

1014, a, 5, and settled in the


manner stated in the text by viii
6.

{ibid.

^11 This question also occurs in


Anal. Pod. ii. 6, 1)2, a, 29. In
Beliyterpr. c. 5, 17, a, 13, it is

propped, discussed more fully


in Metaph. vii. 12, again touched
upon in viii. 3, 1043, b, 4 sqq..

<

Thus with regard to num-

bers (^Metaph.

viii.

1044,

3,

a,

2,

and to the relation


between soul and body (c. G,
1045, b, 11
De An. ii. 1, 412, b,
c.

init.'),

but also in

6 sqq.)

cases:

cf.

b,

12:

itdvTu>v,

Mvtaph.

KofiToi

&c.

many

other
6, 1045,
\6yos iirl

viii.

avrhs

ARISTOTLE

302

as will be seen, is in its essence

cases

one and the

It is based upon the relation of the possible


and the actual of Matter and Form.* The problems
of Becoming and Change are of still greater importance
If a thing comes to be,
for the Aristotelian system.

same.

does

it

being or out of not-being

arise out of

If a

become something, or nothing ?


thino- ceases to be, does
Does change mean the becoming of opposite out of
The one
opposite, or of the same out of the same ?
seems to be impossible because nothing can come out
it

of nothing, nor can anything return to nothing, nor


take on it the qualities of its opposite {e.g. warmth the
qualities

The other

of cold).

impossible, because

a definite time
^;imilar case

is

it is

come

alternative

is

equally

absurd that anything should at

to be that

which

it

already

is.^

analogous problem whether those

the

things which act upon each other are likes or opposites.^

In

all

these questions, difficulties are brought to light

which are soluble only by a careful inquiry into the


first

principles of philosophy.

where
Cf. Phys. i. 2 Jin
Lycophron and others "are blamed
for running into difficulties by
the inference that one must at
the same time be many: lixrirep
1

re Kal
ovK iuSex^fi^vov ravrhv
TToAAa eivai, /utj ravTiKeiiieva 5e
ev Koi 5vvdfii Koi
lo-Ti yap rh

cj/TeAeYeia.
Cf. Phys. i. 6, 189, a, 22, c.
190, b, 30, c. 8 init. iUd. 191,
h 10 sqq., Gen. et Corr. \. 3 init.
ibid. 317, b, 20 sqq. Metajjh. xii.

^^

Y
'

i.

c.

See Gen et Corr. i. 7; Phys.


189, a, 22, c. 7, 190, b, 29,
To Aristotle
8 191, a, 34.
3

6,

this question coincides with the


other, as to Change, since that

which acts corresponds with


that which suffers: &<tt avajKri
rh irda-xoy elsrh iroiovv /xira^dWetv
(Gen. et Corr. i. 7, 324, a, 9).
Hence it is true that, on the one
hand, things which are not opone
posed cannot act upon
another: o-jk e^iarTicn yap &K\r}\a
ttjs (/)u(r6&;s oaa fi-fir' ivavrla fii,T'
i^ ivavricav earl (ibid. p.>323, b,

but on the other hand.


28)
neither can absolute opposites
v-jt' a\Ki]\ov yap irda-x^tu ravavria
h.UvaTov (Phys. i. 7, 190, b, 33).
;

METAPHYSICS
The contributions which

303

his forerunners

had made

towards their solution, did not in any way satisfy Aristotle.^

He

takes exception to most of the pre-Socratic

primarily

philosophies

which made
first

it

because of their materialism,

impossible for them to reach out to the

principles of the incorporeal

and he further

objects that they practically took no account of ideal

and

final causes.^

The

earlier Ionic school is criticised

by him because

of the difficulties which beset every one of their pre-

tendency to overlook the

suppositions,'' because of their

moving

and because of the superficial way in


which they erected an arbitrarily chosen element into
cause,^

the universal
qualities

basis of things, whereas the sensible


and changes of bodies are conditioned by the

opposition of different elements.^

The same

criticism holds for Heraclitus, in so far as

he agrees with the Ionic school in assigning a material


element as the basis.''' To his peculiar doctrine as to
the flux of

all

things and the meeting of opposites,

He

Aristotle has other objections.

doctrine of the flux

is

thought out, while on the other hand


For what follows cf. StrumPELL, GescJi. d. theor. Phil. d.
Gr. 157-184; Brandis, ii. b, 2,
Aristotle's criticism
p. 589 sqq.
'

of earlier philosophers is here dealt


wii h only in so far as it concerns
their fundamental doctrines.
MetaiJh. i. 8 init. cf. iv. 5,
1009, a, 36, 1010, a, 1.
^ Metaph. i.
7, 988, a, 34 sqq.
b, 28, Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b,
32 sqq., Gen. An. v. 1, 778, b, 7.
'*

thinks

the

that

on the one hand not accurately

See

De

it

overlooks the

Caelo,

iii. 5,

Metaph.

988, b, 29 sqq.
l/^to^7i. i. 8, 988, b, 26 6^ew.
et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 24
* Gen. et Corr. ii. 1, 329, a,
De Coelo, iii. 5, 304, b, 11, cf.
8
8,

i.

i. 3,270, a,
14; Phys. 1.7,
190, a, 13 sqq. iii. 5, 205, a, 4.
' Aristotle, indeed,
generally

ibid.

him along with Thales,


Anaximenes, &c.
see Zeller,
Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 585, 1.

puts

ARISTOTLE

304

change presupposes a substratum

fact that every

that

under alterations of matter, the form maintains itself


that it is not all kinds of change which could go on
and that from the changeableness of
ad infi,nitvjm
;

we ought not

draw any conclusion as


The theory of the unity
opposites he dismisses by the argument that Hera-

earthly things

to the universe as a

of

clitus is in conflict

The

to

whole J

with the

Law

of Contradiction/'^

objections to Empedocles cover various points

of detail regarding his natural philosophy which cannot

be gone into here, but they reach also to the funda-

His assumptions as

mentals of his system.

to

the

immutability of the original matter are held to involve


the impossibility of qualitative change, of the passage of
the elements into one another as seen in experience, and
of their combination into unity in the derivative forms
of matter, and also of the doctrines, upheld

by Empe-

docles himself, as to the quantitative identity of the

and their co-existence

elements

in

'

the

Sphere.'

Aristotle also objects that the derivation of these ele-

ments

is

not shown, and that they are not carried back

to the original divisions of material

being,''

which are

only incompletely presented in the definite kinds of

matter

known

to us as

fire,

water,

Metaph.

'

iv.

5,

1010,

15

a,

bqq.; PZ/ys. viii. 3, 253, b, 9 sqq.

See Zellee,

600

sq.,

and

483,

Metaph.

Pit.

d.

Gr.

i.

1.

989, a, 22-SO;
329, b, 1, c.
7, 334, a, 18, 26, c. 6 init. ihld.
i. 1, 3 4, b, 10, 3 5, a, 3, c. 8, 325,
b, 16.
In De Cwlo, iii. 7 init he
^

Gen.

et

Corr.

i.

H,

ii.

1,

He

&c.'^

that the opposition of heavy and light

is

remarks

not explained

gives a detailed refutation of the


atomistic reduction (by Empedocles) of aWoiooais to eKKpiaris.
* The
opposites 'warm and
cold,' &c., on which Aristotle
bases his own theory of the ele-

ments.
^
Gen.
ii.

3,

et Corr.
330, b, 21.

i.

8,

325, b, 19,

METAPHYSICS

305

at all,' and that in the theory of the pores and effluxes


an explanation of the mutual influence of bodies is
put forward which would logically lead to absolute

The two 'causes

Atomism.^

of motion

in the

'

Empe-

doclean system he considers not to be properly deduced

from

first

since

Love not only unites but

principles nor to be sufficiently distinguished,

also divides, and Hate not


and he remarks that since
no laws of their working are laid down, an inordinate

only divides but also unites

scope

He

in the fashioning of the world, to Chance.^

is left,

holds the assumption of alternating states of the

world to be arbitrary and untenable,'^ and the theory of the


composition of the soul out of the elements to be beset
with

difficulties of all kinds.^

Finally, Aristotle believes

that the philosophy of Empedocles would lead in the end

would make all truth uncertain.'^

to a sensationalism which

The

Atomic theory are of a similar


admits that the theory has a very
If we start from the Eleatic presup-

criticisms on the

kind.

Aristotle

plausible basis.

and

positions,

if

we

desire nevertheless to save the ideas

and of movement, then an Atomic


theory is the most convenient way of escape.
So if we
think it an impossibility to suppose bodies to be actually
of the manifold

divisible

cicl

infinitum^ the only alternative

seems to lie
atoms as their ultimate

in the assumption of indivisible

Dc

Part. An.

Ccelo, iv. 2, 309, a, 19.

Gen.

et

Zellek, Ph.

Corr.
d.

8;

i.

Gr. part

i.

cf.

viii. 1,

6J5,

De

3.

See Zeller, Ph.


698, 2, and Metaph.
3

d.
iii.

Gr. pt.
8,

i.

iii.

986,

a, 25.

sqq. (cf.

VOL.

et

Corr.

ii.

6,

333, b, 2

Zeller, iUd. 703,


I.

1)

1,

640, a, 19

Phys.

4.

p/^^^. viii. 1,251, b, 28 sqq.


i. 10, 280, a, 1
Metanli.
1
4, 1000, b, 12.
Coelo,

b,

Gen.

i.

252, a,

De An.

i.

5,

409, b, 23-410,

Metaph. iii. 4, 1000, b, 3.


Metaph. iv. 5. 1009, b, 12;
Zeller, ihid. 727, 1.

27

'

cf.

ARISTOTLE

306

Aristotle, however, neither admits these

constituents.^

Eleatic presuppositions, nor does he concede that the


division of bodies can ever reach its limit,^ or that the

coming of

definite things into being could be treated

as a combination of

minima^ or their passing out of

Rather does he

existence as a resolution into atoms. ^

hold that indivisible bodies are impossible, since every


fixed quantity can be divided into fixed quantities,

again must be

divisible.^

He

which

says that atoms which are

neither qualitatively distinguished nor capable of acting

on each other could not explain the different qualities

and the interaction of bodies or the passage of the


elements into one another or the processes of becoming

The theory that the atoms are infinite in


change.-^
number and kind is also rejected, because the phenomena can be explained without this hypothesis, since all

and

differences of quality or of form are reducible to cer-

tain fundamental types,

and since the situation and

movement of the elements in nature are also limited


by number; and it is Aristotle's view that a limited
number of original entities is always to be preferred to
an infinity of them, because the limited is better than
the limitless.*'' The assumption of empty space, so far
i. 8, 324, b, 85
316, a, 13 sqq.; cf.
Zellbr, Hid. 764 sqq.
2 Gen. et Corr. i. 2, 317, a, 1
But Aristotle expresses
sqq.
himself more exactly on this
point, though without explicit
reference to the Atomic theory,
>

sqq.

in Phys.
3

Gen. et Corr.

c.

2,

iii.

Gen.

17 sqq.

6 sq.

et

Corr.

Phijs. vi. 1

sqq.

2,

317, a,

De

Gen.
c. 9,

et Corr. i.
327, a, 14
;

Ccelo,

iii.

4,

8,

325, b, 34

De

Coelo,

iii.

iUd. c. 7, e. 8, 306,
303, a, 24
shall have more
a, 22 sqq.
to say on this subject later,
" Be C(eIo,m. 4, 303, a, 17 sqq.
29 sqq. b, 4 cf. Phi/s. i. 4 Jitt.
viii. 6, 259, a, 8.
4,

We
;

i.

303, a, 20.

METAPHYSICS
from being necessary

to explain

307

phenomena such

as

those of movement, would rather be inconsistent with

the characteristic

movement of bodies and the difvacuum nothing could have

ferences of weight, for in a

any particular place towards which it would tend, and


everything would necessarily move with equal quickness.2
He finds that movement and its different kinds
are, in the Atomic Philosophy, simply presupposed, and
not deduced from first principles.^ He objects that the
school completely overlooks the

teleology of nature,

and that instead of giving us any principles on which


phenomena rest, it refers us to an unsolved necessity,
or to the assertion that in fact things have always been
as they

There are further polemical passages,

are.''

which can only here be mentioned in passing against


the theory of an infinite number of co-existent worlds ^
:

against Democritus' explanation of sense-perception


against

his

doctrine

concerning

the

and

soul,^

^
;

his

acceptance of sensory appearance as truth.

The natural philosophy of Anaxagoras

is

so closely

connected with the physics of the Atomists and

'

Phjs.

on this
-

Be

7-9,

iv.

cf. c. G.

More

later.

i.

Pliys. iv. 8, 214, b,


Coelo,

i.

33 sqq.

ii.

300,

8.

b,

28 sqq.
275, b, 29, 277, a,
13, 294, b. 30, iii. 2,
With regard to the
7,

theory of Weight held by

Demo-

De Cado, iv, 2,
influence of Aristotle's attack upon the changes

critus, see further

iii.

Mefaph.

a, 378.
xii. 6,

Aristotle's criticism of

nature by Democritus,

of

very
similar to Plato's criticism in the
Phcedo of that proposed by
Anaxagoras.
^

I)e Catlo,

i.

see

is

Zeller,

ibid. 797, 2.
**

2,

1071, b, 31.

where

the mechanical explanation

as to the

Gr. pt.

^
See Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. pt.
788 sqq., and Gen. An. v. 8 vers.

fin.,

which Epicurus made in the


atomic theory, see Zeller, Ph.
d.

Empe-

De Sensu, c. 4, 442, a, 29.


De An. i. 3, 40G, b,'l5, cf!

403, b. 29, 405,

a, 8.

Zeller, ii2U

822.

X 2

c,

ARISTOTLE

308
docles that

it

objections.

The

open

is

for the

most part to the same


of his primary bodies is

number

infinite

not only needless, inasmuch as a small


equally well, but

it is

number would do
mistaken inasmuch as it would

also

make all knowledge of things impossible. Again, since


the primary differences of kinds of matter are limited in
number,

so

must be the primary bodies

bodies have a

magnitude,

natural

Since

also.

their

all

constituent

parts (the so-called ofMotofispi}) cannot be of indefinite


size;

and since

all

in each thing, as

bodies are limited, there cannot be

Anaxagoras was

logically obliged to

hold, constituents belonging to the infinitely various

kinds of matter.^
Further, if primary matter is to be
looked for in the simplest bodies, few of the o^ioiojxepi]
could be considered as primary matter. ^ Anaxagoras
recognises the existence of change in things, but the doctrine of the unchangeability of their constituent parts

is

inconsistent with that admission.

The continuity of
bodies is negated by the infinite number of their constituents,"^ in spite of Anaxagoras's weak attack upon the
theory of em.pty
is

space.''

Aristotle finds that

Anaxagoras

as little able to account for differences of weight as

Empedocles.'"^

The

original

matter, as Anaxagoras states

'

Phys.

i.

4,

7 sqq

187, b,

Calo^ iii. 4.
For a furtlier
remark as to tlie infinite in space,
see Plujs. iii. 5, 205, b, 1.
I)e

''

De

Ccelo,

iii.

4, 302, b, 14.

Gen. et Corr. i. 1
Pkys.
20o, a, 19.
Further objections of a similar kind, but not
especially directed against Anaxagoras, will be dealt with in
^

iii. 4,

mingling of
it,

all

was

kinds of

would be unthinkable

the latter part of ch.


*
Phys. iv. 6, 213,
^

De

viii.

^
;

infra.

a, 22.

Co;lo, iv. 2, 309, a, 19.

Besides the physical objections which are raised against it


in Metapk. i. 8, Gen. et Cori\ i.
*^

10,

327, b,

19, Aristotle asserts

both of this statement and of the


corresponding one (that, at all
times, everything is in evey-

META PHYSICS
but

if it

were more correctly stated

substitution of

'

matter

it

COO

would lead

to the

(conceived of as one and with-

'

out qualities) for the infinite variety of primary bodies

which Anaxagoras assumed.^ The theory, common to


others, of a beginning of movement among

him and

matter, after infinitely continued rest, would contradict

the regularity of the order of nature.^


recognises the advance

Aristotle freely

made when Anaxagoras formu-

lated the doctrine of universal mind, but he considers


it

be

to

hand,

it

still

inasmuch

unsatisfactory,

as,

on the one

did not bear fruit in the explanation of nature,

and, on the other hand, as applied even to man,

it

mis-

conceived the distinction between the spirit and the


soul.^

With regard
first

to the Eleatics

(among whom he takes

account of Xenophanes and Melissus),'' Aristotle's

little

point

is

that their philosophy contains no basis for

any explanation of phenomena/'

Their primary axioms

he takes to be vitiated by grave obscurities


of

'

the unity of being

different

'

meanings of unity

and thus they

being such qualities as negate in turn


unity

(e.g.

Melissus).

they talk

without keeping distinct the

its

attribute to

unconditional

Parmenides, and limitlessness in


They do not understand that every proposilimit in

tion involves the duality of subject

and predicate, of

that it destroys the


principle of contradiction.
See
Zeller, Ph. d. Or. pt. i. 911.
Metapli. i. 8, 930, a, 30.
2 Phys. viii.
1, 252, a, 10 sqq.
See Zeller, iUd. 887, 4,
893, 2; Be All. i. 2, 404, b, J,
405, a, 13.
* Metaph.
\.
5, 986, b, 26

185, a,

tiling),

'

=*

P/n/ft. i.

2,

10,

i.

3 init.,

and De Cado, ii. 13, 2i)4, a, 21


on the other hand Paimenides is
;

always treated with respect.


^ Mctaph. i.
5, 986, b, 10 sqq,;
i. 2. 184, b, 25
De Ccrh,
298, b, 14; Geii. ct Corr. i.
a,
17
of.
Sext.
325,
Math. x.

Phus.

iii.'l,

8,

46.

ARISTOTLE

310

that
thing and quality, so that we cannot even Fay
as
Being
between
Being is without distinguishing
'

'

substance and the Being

which

if

latter,

there

we

attribute to

as

it

quality

were only one Being, would

necessarily be something other than Being, i.e. notThe Eleatics assert the unity of Being and
being.
^

deny not-being, whereas in

fact

'

Being

only a com-

is

'

mon predicate of all things, and Not-being is perfectly


thinkable as the negation of some definite kind of being
'

'

They attack the


the same time describe

not large, &c.).^

(e.g.

Being, and yet at

divisibility of
it

as extended

Becoming,' and therefore


in space.^
the ground that every
on
things,
of
the multiplicity
either from Behig or
start
must
process of becoming

They deny

all

'

from Not-being, and both hypotheses are untenable.


They overlook a third possibility, which not only

makes Becoming conceivable, but is the sole expresthat


sion of any actual process of becoming namely,
Notabsolute
of
out
nob
is,
it
what
becomes
anything
being, but out of that which is relatively not-being.''
Aristotle holds that Zeno's polemic against move-

ment

upon

rests

similar

misconceptions,

inasmuch

he treated space and time not as fixed but as


discrete quantities, and argued on the assumption

as

This is the essential point


of the complicated dialectical
discussion in Phys. i. 2, 105, a,
On the second
20-c. 3 vers. Jin.
half of these discussions (c. 3),
Plato, Parm. 142, b sq.,
cf.
B sqq.; and see
244,
JSt)/jh.

'

Zbller,
''

ibid. p.

Phys.

i.

562

3,

Zellee, iUd. 563

sq.

187,
sq.

a,

3;

cf.

Metaj)h.

Zeller,

ift^rf.

Phys.

i.

iii.

4,

1001, b, 7; cf.

541.
8, cf.

Metaph. xiv

1009, a, 26 sqq. (The point will


ch.
be treated more in detail
On the other hand,
viii. infra.)
the Eleatic hypothesis is ansvvered in Ge7i. et Corr. i. 8, 325,
a, 13 merelj^ by a reference to
the opposed facts of experience.
2,

METAPHYSICS

that they consisted

of an infinite

311

number of

actual

subdivisions, whereas in fact they merely include potenStill


tially in themselves all possible subdivisions.^
less importance does he attach to the arguments used

by Melissus to prove that Being

How

less.^

we

unless

can

it

is

limitless

and motion-

be supposed that 'All

One,'

is

are prepared to ignore all the differences of

and to represent even contradictory opposites


Here also Aristotle finds
as one and the same ? ^
unproved assumptions as to the principles of things, and

things,

failure to solve the weightiest questions of

an absolute
philosophy.

among the Pythaphilosophy


of
nature, although
a
attempted
who
goreans,
and
change,
which are
movement
their principles made
They
the basis of all natural processes, inconceivable.'*
Neither does he find a sohition

proposed to explain the corporeal by referring

to

it

Yet how can that which is extended in space


be derivable from numbers, or how can weight arise out
How, in
of that which is neither light nor heavy ? ^
number.

can the qualities of things be so derived at

fine,

What

is

which drew unto


>

itself

PIujs. vi. 9, c. 2, 233, a, 21


Ihid. 545 sqq.

Phys. i.S

init.',

cf.

Zeller,

ihid. 554, 3.

19 sqq.
989, b, 29 sqq.
5 MetajjJi. i. 8, 990, a, 1 2 sqq.
iii. 4, 1001, b, 17, xiii. 8, 1083, b,
8 sqq. xiv. 3, 1090, a, 30; De
^

Phys.

Metajjh.

Cailo,

iii. 1

i.

2, 185, b,
i.

Jin.

8,

size,

was

'

the centre

portions of the limitless ?

Zeller,
'^

the meaning of saying that in the formation of

the world, the One, as corporeal

cf.

all ?

'

3Ietaph. xiv. 5, 1092, b,


15.
Ti e passage refers to Platonics
and Pythagoreans together. Other
remarks, which refer immediately
to Plato and his school, but also
apply to the Pythagoreans, need

not be here cited,


'

Metaph.

xiii. 6,

1080. b, IG,

xiv. 3, 1091, a, 13; cf.


ihid. 381 sq. 349, 4.

Zelleb,

ARISTOTLE

312

Again, where things different in character are explained


by one and the same number, are we to distinguish

between different classes of numbers by reason of the


differences of the things they signify, or are

we

to

deny

the variety of these things by reason of the likeness of

the numbers that denote them

universal conceptions such as the

be of the nature of substance

How, again, can


One and the Infinite
Finally, if we pro^

ceed to inquire as to the way in which the Pythagoreans

we come upon singular


The theory of number itself
very incompletely worked out,"* and there are numer-

applied their theory of numbers,


superficiality
is

and

caj)rice.^

ous untenable positions in their theory of physics which

marks with

Aristotle

Not only the

censure.''

Natural Philosophy, but

earlier schools of

also the later systems called, in Aristotle's view, for fun-

damental reconsideration.

Only one of the

later schools

can be specially dealt with here, because in this connection there

is

no account

to be taken of the Sophists.

What

they taught was to Aristotle's mind only a mock


wisdom, which dealt in the contingent, the unessential,

and the

unreal.^

His task in regard to them was, not

Metaph. i. 8, 990, a, 18
Zeller, ibid. 862, 1), vii.

1036, b, 17
'-'

cf. xiv. 6,

1093,

11.

a, 1, 10.

With regard to Being and

the One, this view is explained


(against Plato and the Pythagoreans) in Metaph. iii. 4, 1001,
a, 9, 27 cf. X. 2; and it is there
especially remarked that the
assertion of the substantiality
of the One would destroy the
plurality of things. As to the
&ireipov of. Phys. iii. 5, and also
c. 4,

203, a,

1.

Metajjh.

(cf.

i.

5,

986, a, 6, 987,

a, 19.

See Zeller, ihid. 367, 2.


8uch as the Antichthon
(Zeller, ihid. 383, 4 \ the harmony of the spheres {De Cwlo, ii.
9), a theory about time {Pliyg.
*

'

'

218, a, 33, cf. Zelle,


406, 3 sq.), and certain
views as to the soul (^De An. i. 2,
iOi, a, 16, c. 'H Jin. cf. Afial. Post.
iv.

10,

ihid.

ii.

11, 94, b, 32).


*

See Zeller, ihid. 968.

METAPHYSICS

813

any metaphysical propositions, but to


combat the scepticism which brought all manner of
truth into question, and to prove the untenable nature
of their sophisms.^
The services rendered by Socrates
to philosophy are by no means minimised by Aristotle,
although at the same time he emphasises the limitation
establish

to

of Socrates' achievement to the sphere of ethics,

and

observes that in this connection Socrates did not establish

any metaphysical

Of the

basis.^

lesser Socratic

schools Aristotle criticised only the Megarians, for their


assertions about the relation of the possible

and the
and the Cynics, in regard to their theory of
knowledge and ethics.''
actual,^

The attention which Aristotle pays, however,


Plato and the Platonic school is as thoroughgoing
his treatment of the other Socratics is slight.

system grew directly out of that of Plato.

to

as

His own

He was com-

pelled, therefore,^ to distinguish his views from those of

Plato exhaustively, and to set out the arguments which


led

him

to

go beyond the Platonic school.

The former in

Aletaph.

iv.

5, cf. c. 4, 1007, b, 20, x. 1, 105:^,


a, 35, xi. 6 init. ; the latter in the

treatise
^

on the

Cf.

Zeller,

fallacies.

1143
Ihat even the Ethics of
Socrates are one-sided, is shown
by Aristotle in Eth. Nic. iii. 7,

Metaph.

c.

vi.

11, 1116, b, 3

13,

1114, b,

3 (cf. Zeller,
ihid. 220, 1).
Aristotle here confutes the Megarian principle, that
the merely possible is actual, by
=

ix.

it

it is

would not only

destroj^ all

motion and change,

but also

possession of skill or

all

power one who does not now


hear would be deaf one who is
not actually building would be
:

the
passages cited,
ihid. at pp. 94, 2, and

1113, b, 14 sq.
sqq. 1117, a, 9,
17 sqq.

proving that

Thus

no architect.
The former are spoken of in
Metaph, v. 29, 1024, b, 32, viii. 3,
1043, b, 23 (cf. Zeller, Hid.
252 sq.), and in Eth. Nic. x. I,
*

1 172, a, 27 sqq. Aristotle attacks


the exaggerations of the moral
doctrine of the Cynics,

&c.

Supra, pp.

14,

56

sq.,

162,

ARISTOTLE

314
in

no

spirit

of jealousy or detraction

that

Aristotle

comes back again and again to discuss the Platonic


doctrines, and to set out their defects from all points of
view with untiring patience for such a criticism of his
master was unavoidable if he was to defend his own
philosophic individuality, and his right to found a new
;

fame of his predecessor and the


His main criprestige of the flourishing Academy.
school, against the

ticism, leaving out of account incidental objections, is

directed against three leading points

Ideal

Theory,

as

such;

secondly,

first,

against the

against the

later

and, thirdly,
Pythagorising statement of the Theory
the ulticoncerning
against the principles laid down
;

'

'

mate basis of things. Matter and the One.^


The Ideal Theory of Plato rested upon
tion that

it is

can be an object of knowledge.


shared by

his convic-

only the universal essence of things that

Aristotle. ^

This conviction was

So likewise did Aristotle accept

without criticism Plato's doctrine as to the mutability of


all sensible things (which for Plato was the second
buttress of the

Ideal

Theory), and the necessity to

pass beyond these to something stable and essential.^

But when Plato draws from


is

this the conclusion that it

only the Universal, as such, which can be actual, and

must exist for itself as something substantial


(beyond phenomena, Aristotle parts company with him.
This, therefore, is the central point about which revolves
that

it

the whole Aristotelian attack on Plato's Metaphysics.


For Aristotle holds as to this assumption that it is
'

Cf Zellee, Platon. Studien,

p.

197 sqq.

Vide supra, pp. 163, 300, &c.


Vide supra, p. 300 sqq.

METAPHYSICS
devoid of

all scientific

results to difficulties

315

basis in itself ; that

it

leads in its

and contradictions absolutely in-

and that instead of explaining the world of


it makes them impossible.

soluble,

phenomena,

He

holds that the hypothesis of the Ideas

established

of the Platonic arguments for

not one that

is

it,

not

there

is

The
and must

not open to decisive objections.^

ends that Plato sought thereby to attain are

The content of each of these


same as the corresponding-

be attainable otherwise.
Ideas

is

indeed, exactly the

is,

thing of which

it

said to be

is

conception of the ideal man^ of

'

the Idea

man

;
'

for in the

as such, exactly the

same marks are included as in the conception of man in


the ordinary sense, there being no difference between
the two beyond the addition of the word ideal
(to
'

avTo).'^

'

In this view, the Ideas appear as nothing more

than a needless reduplication of the world of things,

and the introduction of the Ideas to explain things


to Aristotle as if a

man who

numbers should attempt

is

could not count in small

But

to count in large ones.^

even apart from the failure of proof, the Ideal Theory


is

in his view in itself untenable; for Substance cannot

Metapli. i. 9, 990, b, 8
1079, a,
3fefaj)h. iii. 2, 997, b, 5
TToWaxfi S' ext^J'TOjy SuaKoXiav,
ovOevhs 7)TT0;/ 6.TOirov rh (pdvai fiku
flval Tivas ^vcreis irapa ras eV ry
ovpavw, ravTas Se ras avTas (pdyai
Tois aladriTols it\t]v Uti to /x^v
diSta rd Se (pQaprd ' avrh yap dv*

sqq.

Cf.

xiii. 4,

Qpuirov (paaiv elvaiKoX "trnov Ka\ vyieiav,

&\Ao

S'

obSev, TrapaTrXi^aiov

TTOLovvrcs

TOis

(pdaKoua-iu

dp0pJi}Troeide7s

deovs

dvai

yuei/

Se

ovre

Ik^lvoi qvQ\v 'dWo ino'.ow^ 5/


avdpwirovs aihiovs, ovB' ovrui ra itSr}
7a/)

aA\' f] alad-nra ai'Sm.


Similarly
Metapli. vii. 16, 1040, b, 32:
itoiovffiv odu [ras i^eas] ras avrhs
toj eJ'Set to7s (pQaproti, aWodi'Qpunrov
avTo'imrov,

Kal

irpoffTiQ^vTts

rots

t5 p7j/.ia rh ahrh.
Ibid.
xiii. 9, 1086, b, 10 cf, Eth. N. 1.
4, 1096, a, 34, Eud. 1. 8, 1218, a,

al<Td-r]Tois

10.
^

Metaph.

1078, b, 32,

i.

9 init.

xiii.

4,

ARISTOTLE

316

be separate from that whereof

Genus from that


essence)

to

belongs.^

it

which

forming part of the

This proposition, in

fact,

sum-

between the Platonic and

marises the whole difference


Aristotelian systems.

the Substance, nor

it is

(as

Aristotle holds, however, that

were waived, the Platonist would only pass


out of one difficulty into another. It would appear, for
even

if this

instance, that in reason there could only be Ideas ot

that which was substantial

and the Platonic school

Yet

accordingly ascribed Ideas only to natural things.

when once
divided

it is

among

admitted that the Universal Essence


individual things,

it

must

is

follow that

Ideas should be ascribed also to privative and relative


conceptions and to

artificial

products of

kinds

all

and

;^

even among the Ideas themselves, the most of them

must have Ideas over them

to

relation of copies, so that

would be true of

it

which they stand

in the

them that

the same thing would be at the same time type and


copy.^
fall

Thus

under a

in form

also for every thing

inasmuch as

series of genera, superior

there

must be

it

must

and subordinate

severed Ideas;'' or again, the

various general marks which together

cept must be themselves so

many

make up

a con-

Substances, and

it

would follow that one Idea would be made out of man}^


Ideas, or one Substance out of

Metaph.

i.
991, b, 1
9,
aSvvoTov, cJvai x^P^^ ''"''''
Koi ou rj ovaia; xiii. 9, 1085,
:

Z6^mv Uu
oiiffiav

a, 23, cf. vii. 6, 1031, a, 31, c. 14,

1039, b, 15.
2

Metaph.

24, 85, b, 18

^^' P^'
^

i-

real Substances,

^^7,

Metaph.

cf.

Zeller, Ph.

d.

2.
i.

9, 991, a, 29, xiii.

In the first of
these passages we should read
oTov rd y^vos, us ylvos, (.i^uv (sc.
5,

1079, b, 34.

i,

9,

22, 991, b, 6, xiii.


c. 8,

many

1084, a, 27

990, b, 11 sqq.
4, 1079, a, 19,
Anal. Post, i.

irapiUiyixa ^CTai).
*

Metai)h.

i.

9,

991, a, 26.

METAPHYSICS

317

and these sometimes of opposite kinds.


the Idea

to be Substance,

is

be a general concept

Or

again,

if

cannot at the same time

it

many

not the unity of

for it is

individual thino^s, but an individual itself amono^ other

Conversely, the things

individuals.^

of which

this

kind any defiuition would be as impossible as

of other

and since the Idea,

individuals,'^

individual,

numerically one,

is

it

which case

it

be

is

the

follows that one or

we sub-

must always be predicable of

clearlv cannot

it

like

other of the contradictory predicates by which


divide the genus

is

it

Of Ideas of

predicated could not be true subjects."*

itself

in

it,

the genus also.^

Aristotle considers the assertion that the Ideas contain the essence of things to be inconsistent with the

view that they are at the same time incorporeal. He


represents Plato as speaking sometimes of a matteir of
'

the Ideas

'

(that being inconsistent with the notion that

they are not in space


that in the case of

^),

and as holding at other times

natural objects matter and the

all

process of becoming belongs to the essence

cannot exist by

and concep-

which case the conception of them

tion of them, in

itself separately.^

Similarly, he argues

that the ethical conceptions cannot be separated from

'

c.

c.

8,

1033,

i^Dl, a, 25), xiii. 9,


'=

1031), a, 3,
b,

1085

19,

xiii. 9, 1080,
1040, a, 2G sqq. cf.

1003, a, 5.
Metapli.
9, ut sujjra.
'^

Metaph.

i.

9,

i.

992, b,

a, 32,
iii. (?,

9, xiii.

103!,b, 15

from
vii.

Cate(j. c. 2.

15, 1040, a,

8-

Top. vi. 6, 143, b, 23. Length


in itself must be eithe]* hnXarls
or irXdros cxoi/, and then the genus
must be at once a species also.
''

vii. 6,

Mctaph.

27.

cf.

LONITZ and Schwegler on this


and the citation at

passpge,

p. 515, svpra,

9,

a, 23.

Metaph.

vii. 16,

13.

JSIetapli. vii.

14; cf.

P^f-

iv.

1,

Zell. iUd. 556


"

Plujs.

ii.

2,

209, b, 33

sq.,

628

sq.

193 b, 35

.sqq.

cf

ARISTOTLE

318

There can be no 'Idea of the Good'


standing by itself, for the conception of the Good appears
under all possible categories, and determines itself dif-

their objects.

ferently according to the different circumstances

aad as

there are different sciences that deal with the Good, so


there are different kinds of good,
in fact, an ascending scale

cludes the possibility of a

further objection

is

among which

there

is,

a fact w^iich of itself ex-

common Idea existing by itself.'

that the theory of Ideas logically

carried out would be a process ad infinitum

for if

an

Idea is always to be posited in every case where more


things than one meet in a common definition, the
common essence of the Idea and its phenomenon must

always come in as a third term different from either of

them. 2

Even

if

the Ideal Theory were better founded and

Eth. N. i. 4 {End. i. 8) cf preceding notes. As to the principle


'

that what

is irporepov

and var^pov

cannot be reduced to a comnion


generic concept, see Pollt. iii. 1
(Zell., ihld, 571
J 275, a, 34 sqq.
On the same principle in
yq.).
Eth. Nie. loc. cit. Aristotle remarks
in criticising the 'Idea of the
Good,' that the upholders of the
doctrine of Ideas themselves say
that there is no Idea of that
which stands in the relation of
Before and After; but this is
actually the case with the Good,
for it is found in all the categories e. (J., a substantial good
is the Divinity and Reason, a
good is Virtue, a
qualitative
quantitive good is Measure, a
relative good is the Useful, &c.
Thus these different Goods stand
:

and After,
and can consequently be included
in a relation of Before
in

no

common

generic concept,

in no idea, but
(109G, b, 25 sqq.) only in a rela(Vide supra, p.
tion of analogy.
276 sqq.)
Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 2, vii.
13, 1039, a, cf. vii. 6, 2, 1031, b, 28.
Aristotle expresses this objection
here by saying that the doctrine of

and therefore

'-'

Ideas leads to the rpiros &vdpwTros.


Cf. Zell., Plat. Stud. p. 257, and
Ph. d. Or. pt. i. p. 623, 5. He
finds the parallel of the rp'.ros
(which, however, is
&i/dpunro5
equally true of the ideas themselves, cf. Sojjh. El,

c.

22, 178, b,

36) in the change of the universal into an individual of the

same name.

METAPHYSICS
less

untenable, Aristotle would

no means

319

say that

still

it

could

by-

the task of a true Philosophy, which

fulfil

to exhibit the basis

As

appearances.

is

and principles of the world of

the Ideas are not in things, they

cannot make up the essence of things, and they cannot


contribute anything to the being of things.'

Even the

relation of the one to the other cannot be stated clearly,

own

some kind of copying and


The
principle of motive power, without which no process of
becoming and no explanation of nature is conceivable,
is wholly wanting.^
So also is the principle of final
Even in regard to the theory of Knowledge,
cause.'*
the Ideas cannot render us that service which Plato

for Plato's

references to

participation are always unintelligible metaphors. ^

expected from them, for

if

they are outside of things,

then they are not truly the essence of things, and therefore the

knowledge of the Idea leads

clusion as to the thing

hand, could

we

itself,^

And

no sure con-

to

how, on the other

arrive, asks Aristotle, at

any know-

ledge of the Ideal, since innate Ideas are not to be

assumed

? ^

creased

if

All

we

MetapTi.

i.

mit.\
2 Metaph.

i.

9,

be vastly in-

and
Numbers, and

so interposing

are to follow Plato

translating the Ideas into

5,

will

these difficulties

991, a, 12 (xiii.

9, 99 i, a, 20, 992,
1079, b. 24), i. 6,
987, b, 13, viii. 6, 1045, b. 7, xii.
10, 1075, b, 34.
3 Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 8. 19 sqq.
b, 3 sqq. (xiii. 5) 992, a, 24 sqq.
b, 7, c. 7, 988, b, 3, vii. 8, 1033,
b, 26, xii. (], 1071, b, 14, c. 10,
1075, b, 16, 27 Gen. et Corr. ii. 9,

a,

28

(xiii. 5,

335, b, 7 sqq.
1217, b, 23.

his school in

cf.

Etli.

End,

i.

8,

* Metaph. i.
7, 988, b, 6, c. 9,
992, a, 29 (where, instead of lib,
li o should be read).
" Metaph. i. 9, 991, a, 12 (xiii.
5, 10 r9, b, 15), vii. 6, 1031, a, 30
sqq. cf. Anal. Post. i. 22, 83, a,

32:

ret

'yap

et57?

x'PfTw

r^p^ri-

re yap tVrt, ice'


Vide supra, p. 202, &c.

fffiaTO.

ARISTOTLE

320

between the Ideas and the things of sense the whole


The difficulties which would
science of Mathematics.
thus arise were set out by Aristotle with a painstaking

thoroughness most tiresome to the modern mind, though


in his day

it

to cut off
school, led

He
of
of

may

all

possibly have been needful in order

ways of escape

for the

Pythagorising

by such men as Xenocrates and Speusippus.

how we are to think to ourselves the causality


numbers,' or how they can contribute to the existence
He shows how capricious and contrathings.^
asks

dictory

is

objects.^

the application of these numbers to natural

He

points out the difference

in

between conceptual determinations, which

character
are

quali-

and numerical determinations, which are quantiremarking that two numbers make up one
number, but two Ideas do not make one Idea, and that

tative,

tative,

among

the numbers which

make up numbers no

quali-

whereas there must

tative differences can be posited,

be units qualitatively different if there were Ideal


With minute and careful thoroughness,^
Numbers.''
he controverts the various suggestions as to the relations
of mathematics to the Ideal Numbers which were

thrown out by Plato and his school and the devices they
resorted, to in order to maintain a conceivable difference

Metapli.

the answer:

i.

if

9, *.>91,

b, 9,

with

things are likewise

numbers, one does not see of what


,

use the ideal numbers are to them


if, on the other hand, things are
only arranged according to number, the same would be true of
the ideas of them, which would
not be numbers, but \6foi. eV

a,pi6ixo7s rivSsv {viroK^iixivusv).


- Metaph.
xiv. 6 iuit., ihid
1093, b, 21 cf. c. 2, 1090, a, 7 sqq
* Loc. cit. from 1092, b, 29
cf,
the commentaries on this passage
;

568

Cf.

Zell. Ph. d. Gr.


867 sq. 884.

pt.

i.

sq. 854,
^

Loc.

992, a,

2.

cit.

i.

9,

991, b, 21 sqq.

METAPHYSICS

321

between the Numbers and the units which compose


But in this, as in other branches of the argument, his main point is always that there is a funda-

them.^

mental contradiction between the notion of a unit of

number and the

fact of differences of kind.

It is not,

of course, necessary here to recapitulate those of his

Numbers which apply

objections to Ideal

also to the

But it is to be noticed that,


in Aristotle's view, if once w^e assumed tbe existence of
Ideas and Ideal Numbers, the ordinary mathematical
numbers would lose their status, for they could only
have the same component parts and therefore the same

Ideal Theory in general. ^

nature as the Ideal

Numbers

magnitudes would

of

be

themselves.^

The

position

equally dubious;

for qua
must go by ideal numbers, and qua mathematical they must go by mathematical number ^ and
from the way in which the theory of magnitudes is

ideal they

deduced, he considers that the further dilemma arises


that either

without

it

line,

must be
and a

possible for a surface to exist

solid

without surface, or else

all

three must be one and the same.-^


Finally, as concerns the ultimate principles of things,

which Plato and the Platonists had sought to

in

the ultimate basis and constituents of their

and

Ideas,^'

know

the

Aristotle asserts that

constituent parts of

Mttaph. xiii. 6-8.


As in Metaph. xiii. 9, 1085, a,
and in xiv. 2, 1090, a, 7 sqq.
'

23,

1090, a, 25-b, 5, they are used


against Speusippns.
* Mt'taph. i. 9, 991, b, 27
xiv,
3, 1090, b, 32 sqq.
c. 3,

VOL.

1.

it

all

is

find

Numbers

impossible to

being, since that

* Mitaph. i.
9, 992, b, 13
xiv.
109O, b, 20.
Ihid. i, 9, 992, a, 10
xiii. 9
1085, a, 7, 81.
;

3,

Cf. Zellek,P/!. d.
028 sq., 805.
"

Gr

pt

ARISTOTLE

322

knowledge cannot be derived from any prior knowledge.^


He doubts whether all being can have the same constituent parts,2 or whether out of the combination of the
same elements, at one time a number and at another

He remarks that such


time a magnitude could arise/^
to substances, and
ascribed
constituent parts can only be
only to those substances which have some admixture of
Hi^ further demonstrates that such con-

materiality.''

stituent parts could neither be thought as individual

not as individual, because they would


and could not be the concognisable
be
not then
not as
or Ideas than one
things
more
stituents of
of the
be
not
would
they
universal, because in that case

nor as universal

nature of

substance.''^

In another connection, he takes

exception to the variance of the Platonic suggestions as


to the 'material element,'^ and rejects altogether the

assumption of Speusippus that there are more than one

original but different principiaJ

the two
'

closer inquiry into

and

Platonic ultimate principles, 'the One,'

the Great and Little,' leads Aristotle to declare that

they are both misconceived.


be a thing existing by

itself,

Mttaph. i. 9, 992, b, 24
against which, indeed, his own
distinction of demonstrative and
inductive knowledge might be
used.
2 This is suggested, without

mention of Plato, in Metaph. xii. 4,


1070, a, 33 sqq. cf. what was adduce'd on pp. 300-301, supra.
;

'inn.

Metapli. iii. 4, 1001, b, 17 sqq.


xiv. 2
Ibid. i. 9, 992, b, 18
;

One can

the

universal

is

only a

expresses

Metaj)U.

1087,
12,

how

when no

asks

of unity

The notion

substance.

He

1086, b, 19,

xiii. 10,

a. 4.

MetapU. xiv.

2(>, c. 2,

1089, b,

1087, b,

1,
1 1

cf.

4,

Zeller,

Gr. pt. i. p. 628, 3.


it the remark in Meta/pli.
xiv. 3, 1090, b, 13 sqq. is true, that
Nature is not lviaoli^lt]s ^airy
T'h. d.
'

Of

fioxOvpa rpaycfdia, and in xii.


the ovk ayadhv TroXvKOipavii].

ther

cf.

Zeller,

ibid.

p.

10/w.

Fur851 sq.

and the passages there adduced.

METAPHYSICS

323

quality or, more exactly, a determination of measure.


This, however, presupposes something measured,., and
even that is not necessarily anything substantial, but

may

also be a magnitude, or a quality, or a relation,


or
different kinds of things, and, accord-

any of the most

ing as it is one or the other of these, the One will be


variously determined, as predicated of one or other of
the
similar kinds of subjects.^
Whoever seeks to deny this
'

be driven to explain

will

'

the One as the only SubEleatics a position which, apart


from other objections, would make Number itself impossible.2
Again, if with Plato we are to say that the
'

'

stance, as did the

One

is

the same as the Good, then there will arise other

intolerable difficulties,^ not worse, however, than


those
which would be raised if, with Speusippus, we attempt to

distinguish the

by

As

One from the Good as

a special principle

the Great and Little,' this conception indicates nothing but bare qualities, or
rather,
bare relations and these, indeed, of such a kind
as
itself.4

for

'

could least of

all be taken for anything in the


nature of
substance, since they manifestly require a
substratum.

How

can substances, he asks again, consist of that


is not substantial, and how can
constituent parts
be at the same time predicates ? ^ Or if we are to
take

which

thisfirst,

second principle to be more closely related to the


as not-being is to being, such a theory would
be

altogether perverse.

escape the
'

Metaph.

and

33,

X. 2

xi. 2,

xiv.

1,

1060, a,

Plato believed that he could only


of Parmenides by assuming a prin1087, b.

36;

36

cf.

312, n.2,and p. 272,11.2.


in. 4, 1001, a, 29.
3Ietaph. xiv. 4, 1091, a, 29,

.wy^?'^, p.
'

monism

sqq., b, 13,
*

init.

Metaph.

1,

20 sqq
Metaph. 1091, b,
'

16, 22

^ 3fetaph.
i. 9, 992
b
1088, a, 15 sqq.
'

1
'

c
,

'

Y2

xiv

ARISTOTLE

324

This assumption

ciple of not-being.

Being

for the purpose, since

only

and

^
;

it

would

itself is

not necessary

is

not of one kind

also fail of the purpose, since the

manifold character of Being cannot be explained by the


simple opposition of Being and not-Being. ^

According

to Aristotle, Plato has not sufficiently defined

Being and

not-Being, and in his deduction of

them he has been thinking


'

Clreat

the manifold

from

movement

or of

^c.,'"^

'

and not

of substance only,

either of qualities, magnitudes,


for if the

'

and Little* produced movement, then

must the Ideas whose matter it is be likewise moved.'*


The main defect of the Platonic view lies in the position that opposition as such
ciple of all things.

If

all

is

the

first

and original prin-

does arise out of an opposition,

not out of mere opposition as such, which

still it is

is

negation, but out of relative opposition Qut of the sub-

stratum to which negation attaches.

comes

to

be,

comes, and this matter

is

Being, but a kind of Being

which
this

it

is'

Ever)' thing

which

presupposes a matter out of which

(thont to

it

not simply a kind of Not-

which

hecome.

?'x

not as yet that

The nature

of matter in

He had

regard was misunderstood by Plato.

in

view merely the opposition of matter as against the


formative principle, and so he thinks of

as the

it

and the Not-Being, and overlooks the other

Bad

side of the

question namely, that it is the positive substratum of


By this
all formative action and of all becoming.-^
MctapJi. xiv. 2, 1088, b, 35
sqq. cf. p. 223, supra.
Ihid. 1089, a, 12.
'
Ihld. 1. 15, 31 sqq.
^

'

Ibid.

i.

9,

992, b.

7.

Metaph.

xiv.

1091, b, 30 sqq.
32 .^qq. Phys A.
;

Ph.

d.

Gr. pt.

i.

init.

xii. 10,
9, cf.

p. Gl-1.

c.

1075,

4,
a,

Zeller,

Ml^TAPllYSlCS

.325

oversight he involves himself in this contradiction, that

matter tends to

own

its

annihilation,

that the evil

tends to the good and must of necessity assume

it

into

Further contradictions arise in the considerations that the Great and Little (as was above remarked
itself.^

of the

'

Unlimited of the Pythagoreans) must be a thing


'

existing for

whereas at the same


time as a determination of number and magnitude it
a substance

itself,

cannot possibly be

so,

and that the same principle would

of necessity have to be given in actuality as unlimited,

which

is

a position in fact unthinkable.^

ask the Platonists in what

way

If,

finally,

we

the numbers can be

deduced from their ultimate principles, distinct statements are entirely wanting. We ask if they arise by a
mixture, or by a composition, or by a generation, and
is no answer.^
We are nob told how out of the
One and the Many could be produced those units of
which numbers are composed,'^ or whether number be

there

itself limited or unlimited.''

There is no deduction of
uneven number or of any of the rest except

the

first

the

first ten.^

We

unities arise out of

duality which,

by

its

shown from whence those


made up the indefinite

are not

which

is

combination with the One,

generate the remaining units

is

to

and we are not shown


how the duality of the Great and Little can, with the
aid of the One, bring forth any numbers which could
Phys.\.^,Vd2,?i,lQ.;Meta2)h.

'

xiv. 4, 1092, a, 1.
P/ti/s. iii. 6,

203, a,

c. 4,

sqq.

204, a, 8-34, cf.


sqq.

Metaph. xiv.

^
;

xiii. 9,

5, 1092, a, 21
1085, b, 4 sqq.; cf. c.

7, 1082, a, 20.

sqq.

Metaph. xiii. 9, 1085, b, 12


an a'-gument immediately

directed against Speusippus.


s
jfji^ io85, b, 23, c. 8, 1083,
b, 3(> sqq.
xii. 8, 1073, a, 18.
Zeller, ibid.
p. 591, 3.
;

][Jetaj)h.

i.

9,

991, b, 31.

ARISTOTLE

326

not arise by

tlie

doubling of the One.^

Tbere are a

multitude of similar objections to be found in Aristotle,

but these will be more than

sufficient.

These criticisms of the Platonic theory are not all


of equal value.
Not a few of them, at least in the form
in

which Aristotle directly states them, rest undeniably

upon a misunderstanding of
cannot

Ije

Plato.^

Nevertheless,

gainsaid that Aristotle has noted the

it

weak

points of Plato's theory with a keen insight, and has


conclusively exposed

Not only has he com-

its defects.

pletely exhibited the obscurities

and dilemmas of the

theory of Ideal Numbers, but he has also refuted once


for all the Ideal

Theory and the assertions of Plato as

Among

to the original basis of things.

which he uses in

the arguments
two which stand

his attack, there are

out as decisive, and to which


or innnediately return

jirst^

all

that

the others mediately


universal concepts

all

(such as those of the One, of Being, of the Great and


Little, of the

Unlimited, and in fact

all

the concepts

involved in the Ideas) are in no sense substantial, and


that they denote only certain qualities and relations,

and at the most only the genera and species of things,


and not the things themselves second^ that the Ideas are
;

devoid of motive power, and not only cannot explain,

but would actually make impossible the changes of

phenomena, the coming to be and ceasing to be of


things, change and movement, with all the natural
properties of things that rest thereon.^
'

Metaph.

Cf.

xiv, 3, 1091, a, 9.

Zellee, Platon. Stud,

257 sqq.
^

Aristotle frequently insists

In the direction

on the importance which he himself attached to this objection


cf., for example, Metaph. i. 9,
;

991,

a,

Trivrwv

5t

(xdMara

METAPHYSICS

327

of Aristotle's polemical energy to these points,

him the

recognise in

we may

Natural Philosopher

spirit of the

reaching out towards clear definitions of the actual

world and towards an explanation of


of abstraction

him

superior to

His powers

facts.

not inferior to Plato's, and he

are

in dialectic

to give currency to

But he

skill.

is

is

determined

such conceptions only as verify

themselves by experience, in that they either combine


into unity a series of
their

common

there

is

cause.

wedded

phenomena, or take them back to


To the logical Idealism of Plato

in Aristotle the Realism of the student

of Nature.

So

far the

attempt has been to state the objections

Aristotle urged against his predecessors.

own answers

turn to his

It is

time to

to those questions the solution

of which he failed to find in them.


&v

ris, ri

e^dr]

to7s

SiairoprjCreiev

rk

Aerot

al(r9r]Ta>v

rots

(f)0ipoixvois

ovT )U6To/3wA7js
and at

avTols;

TrapaSeiyiiiara
e'xetj/

avToou

(TvfxfidK-

aiSiots

yr/vofi^voLS

yap

ovT

'

nore

rwv
Kal

KLvrt(Tws

ovSe/xicis icTTiv a'lTia


].

20

avra

r&Wa

t^ 5e \4yeiv

eluai

/cat

/iT-

KivoKoy^lv iari

Kal ixTa(popas Keyeiv Tron]TiKas

ri

ydp iari rd ipya^6/xevov vpds ras


IBeas airofiXiiTov
a,

24

oAws Sh

cro<pias ir^pi rCov

rovro
Xiyojx^v

fxlv

and

(pavepcov rd a'iriov

e^aKa/j.^v

irepl ttjs alrias

rrjs /iera^oATjs),

so ihid. 992,

^r}Tov<Tr]s rrjs (ptKo-

kc.

(ovSkv
yap
odev 7] apx^

ARISTOTLE

328

CHAPTER

Yir.

CONTINUATION.
Tiue

M dn

I/iqairi/

of Metapliysics.

main questions which now fall to be


In so far as the First Philosophy has to do

are tlires

Tii:<:he

discussed.

with Actuality in general, with Being as such,

it

follows

that the question of the original essence of the actual,

which

the inquiry into the conception of Substance,

is

must precede

all

other investigations.

To

this question

Plato in his Ideal Theory had answered that that which


in a true

and original sense

for only in the

common

is

actual was to be souo-ht

essence of things or in their

which are expressed by general conceptions.


been seeii, was nob content with the

classes,

Aristotle, as has

answer

but for that very reason he attributed the more

inq^ortance to the relation between the individual and

the universal.

It

was

in the inaccurate

this relation that he found the

Plato's view,

ception of

and he

the

felt

same

that

it

relation

statement of

fundamental error of

was from the true conthat any revision of,

Platonism must

start.
The first question for Philosophy, therefore, must be an inquiry into the conception
of substance,' which is an inquiry into the relation of
'

the

individual

to

the

universal.

But inasmuch as
way as to throw

Aristotle defines that relation in such a


^

See

p.

290 sqq. supra.

METAVIIYSICS
essential actuality

to

the

329

of the

side

individual,

follows that the Form, or the sl^os^ which Plato

made

it

had

becomes detached

identical with the universal,

from the universal in Aristotle and takes on an altered

To him Form

meaning.

developed into
which'

is

full actuality:

essence determinate and

undetermined

the possibility of Being, not yet determined

is

this wa}^ or that, is considered as

The

Form.

to

univ^ersality,

relation of

Matter in opposition

Form and Matter

accord-

main object of Metaphysics.


essentially related to Matter, and

ingly furnishes the second


Forui, in

fine,

Matter to Form

is
;

arid this relation consists in

that Matter becomes definite through


is

Movement.

the fact

Form This process


.

All movement, however, presupposes a

first

cause of movement, and in this

the

first

way movement and

motor constitute the third pair of concepts

with which Metaphysics

pages Aristotle's theory

is

concerned.

will

In the following

be set forth under these

three heads.
(1)

The Indiciclual and

the Ihiiversal.

Plato had taken as the essential element in things


'

the universal as

it

is

thought in conception,' and had

ascribed Being, in its fullest and original sense, to that


only.

It

bination

was by a limitation of this Being, by a comBeing with Not-Being, that individual

of

entities could arise.

These, therefore, had, outside and

above them, as something other than themselves, the


universal

essences,

which were the Ideas.

Aristotle

denies this, for he finds the fundamental error of the Ideal

Theory in

this seijaration of the conceptual essence

from

ARISTOTLE

330

the thing

many

itself.'

universal

is

that which belongs to

common,^ or, more accurately, that


which belongs to them by reason of their nature, and
It follows that all
therefore, necessarily and always.^
things

in

universal concepts denote only certain of the properties

of things

or,

in other words, are predicates

Even wlien a number of


condjined to make the conception
subjects.

thereby

something which belongs

and not

these properties are


of a genus,
to

all

we

the

get

things

pertaining to the genus in question, but by no means

them

a universal subsisting beside

ra iroWa

%v nrapa

Plato's

Kara ttoWmp.^
bv

su

Seep.31G,n.l,s?(/;;vi'.

'

of Substance''

Metaph.

lOSG, b, 2: tovto S' [the


iKivriae
doctrine of Ideas]
fxev 'S.'jOKpa.T'ris 5ia rovs bpicrfJLOvs, ov
jxriv ix(*>pio-e ye roov Kad' fKacTTOv
Kol TOVTO opdccs iv6i)(Tei> OV ^wp^a'as
apev fi\v yap tov Ka96\ou ovk
ea-Tiu iTn(TTT]ixt\v \a^e7v, rb Sc- x^P'
i(^eiu oiTLO'y tcou crvfx^aivovTUV ^vaX^P^^ "ffJt Tas Ideas iaTiv Cf. c.
4, 1078, b, ao sq.
Meta2>h. vii. 13, 1038, b, 11
TO 5e Ka96\ou Koivov tovto yap
Aeyerai KaOoKov o TxKeioanv virapx^i-v
xiii.

5),

-'

34 outco
yap \iyo;j.ev to KadeKaaTov rb
apidfjiCf} eu, KaOoKouSeTO eirlTovTwv.
Be Interj)r. 7, 17, a, 39 Part.
iricpvKiv

iii.

9i;9,

4,

b,

644, a 27, and s?/^r.


Anal. Post. \. 4, 73, b, 26
KadoAov 5e \4ya) t> kv KaTO. iravTds
re vTrdpxv koI KaQ'' abrh Koi rj avTO.

An.

i.

4,

(pavephu

avdyKfiS
c.

31,

ixpa

oti

imdpx^i87, b,

oaa Ka96\ov

e|

to7s -npayixaffiv

32: rh yhp

ciel

Ka\

is

not any-

cannot be Substance.

itself, it

name

true that the

is

For

distinct.

then, the universal

If,

thino- subsistino'

as

substituted Aristotle's

is

iravTaxov

Ndaph.

is

KaOoAov
1017,

V. 9,

It

used in various
elvai.

(pa/ihv

b,

35

Ka'ioKov Kad' avTO. virdpx^'-

yhp
See also

ret

BoxiTZ, Ind. Arist. 356,

Kampe,
160

b, 4 sqq.
Erkcnntnissth. d. Arisi.

sq.

Anal. Post. i. 11 init.: eUv


oZv eluai /) eV rt irapa to,
avdyKT}, u airddei^is
TToAAa OVK
fCTTar eivai jxivToi %v KaTO, TroXAciv
'

/jeu

a\ri6es (lire7u avdyKt].

De An.

iii,

8 (see p. 195, n. ], supra).


' Aristotle's oixr'a is of course

and elsewhere translated


substance.'
It is strange
to find this translation attacked
(by Strumpell, Gescli.d.theor.
cf.
(Jr.
213 sq.
Phil. h. d.
Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 555,
Aristotle
ground
that
1) on the
nowhere understands by oWio.
the unknown, constant, and real
substratum of variable attributes.'
It cannot, however, be expected
that we should cease to use for
here

by

'

'

METAPHYSICS
senses,^

but

it

831

applies originally only to that which can

neither be stated as a definition of the essence of any-

thing

nor can depend upon anything else as a


In other words, Substance is that which is

else,

derivative.2

Or

only subject and never predicate.^


is

Being

again. Substance

in its original sense, the source from

which

These conditions Aristotle


all other being is draw^n.'*
The universal, as he
finds fulfilled only in individuals.
proved against Plato, does not subsist for itself. Every
universal, even the genus, has its existence only in the

individuals of which

it

than

something other

predicated.

is

It is

always in

denotes not

It

itself.

'this

The

thing,' but only a stated condition of things.

individual alone

not borne up by some other, which is what it


by reason of itself, and not upon the basis of some

which
is

that which

is

belongs to itself only,

is

an Aristotelian term the word


which the custom of 1,500 years
has consecrated to it, simply
because Herbart connects the
same word with another sense.
On the different meanings

fidXiffra

s^e p. 374 sc[.,ifi/ra.


ovcria 84 imiv v
Cat. c, 5
KuplooTaTOL T KOI TTpwTccs Koi fidAio'Ta

465, b,

of

over' a,

% jUT^re KaQ'
K4yiTai firir' eV

X^yojXivt],

Tivhs

rivi icrriv, oTov 6

tIs

tTTTTOS.

rU

viroKeifjLeuov

viroKeifxhcfi

avOpooiros

Cf. further

f)

TreNDEL-

ENBURG,

Hist. Beitr. i. 53 sqq.


Aristotle himself elsewhere
MetapU.Y. 8, 1017,
so defines it.
airavra 5e TaOra xiy^Tai
b, 13
^

ovfflaoTiovKad'vTroKeifxivovA^yeTai,

aWa

Kara tovtwv
rh
36
Ka9' ov ra

1028, b,
ia-ri

cKeTz/o

Se avrh

hi6 TtpSirov TTcpl

to.

&KXa

8'

vii. 3,

vTroK'ixiv6v

aXXa

Kfyerai,

Kar' &\\ov.
tovtov diopiffreov

/UTjKreTt

yap

So/cet

eJmi ohaia rh

vvu fxev
ovy tvttcp e'lprjrai ri ttot iarlv rj
ovala, otl to firj Kaff viroKeifitvov
a\Aa Ka0' ov ra &\\a. Cf. Anal.
irpxrov

viroKe'/xeuou

PH.

27, 43, a, 25

i.

Longit.

V. 3,

6.

rb hv
jVetaj)h. vii. 1 init.
\4yTai TToAA-axiis [in the different
(pauepov ori. rovrwv
categories]
irpwrov *ov rb t'l iffTiv, oirep (rr]fxa\vei
ra S' &\Aa Aeyerat
tt]v oixriav
oura t(j5 toD ovtws uvtos ra fxiv
*

iroaoT-qras
Sec.

di/ai,
iixrre

ra Se

Tro'oTTjras,

to irpwTcas ov koI ov

nothing else than


to nothing
else; cf. Anal. Post. i. 4, and
the remarks which follow] dA\'

t\ ov

[what

is

and applies

itself

airXws v ovaria
1030, a, 22 rh ri

'hv

ovffia

virdpx^i-

p. 289.

h.v

eiTj

c.

7,

iffriv airkoSs rf)

See further on

AmSTOTLl^

332

being.

otlier

Only in a derivative sense can the

genera be called substances


they

as

number

of substances

'

foriy

a-iTOAS

Txy

tvojotccv

HaAcoj/ ri
?;},

eV vTroKnixiva's

v)

ovaxv

ovy

aSvywoy

rjSy

fj.}}

ov(TL-jiy

Anal. Post.

^IvoLi.

where Aristotle

b, 5,

i.

calls

4,

/ca9"

aWh

that o ^u.)/ /ca9' vnoKntxivoj


KsyeraL aWov riyos, oToy rh ^a^i(oy
erfpjy tl oy ^a^'^ov iau Kal kevKoy,
S' ojcr'a, KM oaa ro'Se ri, ojx
7]
krepoy ri uyra effrly birsp eVx-V
Ta fjLey 5^ /j.^ Ka9^ viroKeia^yov

[sc. Aeyi/xej/a]

ana

a9"

Ae'yw,

ra

Ka9'

vKOKeiu4yov (ru'x^e^rjKjTa.
Mctaph.\\.i. 1, J02S, a,27: that
be

which supports
to be

said

eicaoToy

t]

qualities is
obcria kciX rh Ka9'

rcoy

all

/x(:y

aWvv

yh.p

KaTriyopyjixiray
o-ji)y
X'-^P'-'^t^v,
a"jrr] 5e fx6vr]
c. 8, 102!), a, 27:
TO xaipio-Toj/ Kal to rods ri vndpx^iv
;

5oKu

fidKia-TaTrj o-jaia

c.

lU/JO,

1,

rb roSe ri
c. 10, 10:')o, b, 28
KaldKov S' ojk
ecrriy oiiaia
c. 12, lOvJI, a, 27:
r] oua'.a
hy tl Kal roSe ri arj^uaiyei
cos (/)a;.teV;
c.
13, 1038, b, 10:
a,

] [)

oxxriav kxl

TvpwTT]

ovcria

'ihios

eKxaru)

??

essence

oyx

Kai

di.a

iii.

G,

Kl.G. 22, 178^ b, 37 (cf. ibid. 179,


8) TO yap dvOp'joiros Kal airav t6

a,

Koiyjy OV To'Se
T7

Trp6s Tl

(Tr}:j.alyi.

(payepoy

6ioopoi'(ri,

Te

TO-'jTjiy

5);

on

o-j9fy

tcov

KadoAov viTapx6vTwv ova'a iarl,


OTi

obQtv

(TrjiiayeL

rctr

/cat

KJiyrj

KaTrfyopovixeyaiy
roSe ti,
dAAa
Toi6y5e
c. 16, 1040, b, 23
Koiudy
fxy}9ev ovar a
obSeyl yap uirdpx^i V
;

O'jala

aW

rj

avrfj re Kal

r^ exoyri

airrV oj iarly ova'a. Ibid. fin.


T<2y KaOoAou Xeyo/JLivwv obdev oixria
xii. 5 init.
eVei 5' eVri ra t.uv
x^'P'

i<rrh, TO, 5c

ov

;(OJ/3(rro, ovffiai

eKeTva.

dAAa TOioySe tl
tQv toiovtwv tl
(This holds even of
ri,

TTws

rj

see p. 20(), .supra.)


Gen. An'^\\.
767, b, 33
t6 Ka9eKa(rToy
TOVTO yap 7] ovj-ia.
All other
categories indicate mere accidents ((rvfijBefirjKJTa) of
substance cf. p. 28'J Kujfra. Aristotle
finds it therefore quite natural
{Mefnph. vii. 16, 1010, b, 26 sq.)
that the ideas should be made
into a x'^P'fToj' if they are taken
for substances.
The error of the
doctrine of ideas consisted only
in regarding the universal as

.",

such a substantial idea. (HektLING, Mat. und Form, 44, 1, has


misunderstood this statement.)
Cat. c. 5, 2, a, 15
SevTepaL
:

5e obcriaL \4yoyTai eV ols ei'Seo'iv at


irpwToos ojalai Aeyoyitej/at virdpxovai,
yfi'T]

e/f

77

the sensible qualities of things;

Tavra re

certain

Ibid.

JU

to say,

TovTo irdyTuy airia ravra


1008, a, 8 oudey yap rwv
Koiyy ToSe ri a-rj/xalyiL,
aWa
TonV5e, 7] S' oiiaia roSeri. Soj>h.

virdpxd- ah\(v,Td 5e Kad JKov Koiyov.


1.

is

of a

and they claim a kind of

Cat. c. 5, 2, a, iJi ra 5' akKa


ira/Ta /jroiKad' unroKeia^ycov \4yTa.L
T(2y TTpirwy ovaiwy

in so far, that

common

forth the

set

TO

/cal
.

rd twv elSuy tovtoov

oTov

o re

And

&y0p(O7ros Kal

further on.
Otherwise the expression SevTepa
ovala does not occur in Aristotle.
As, however, he elsewhere uses
((foy.

so

irpMTTi ovtria for substance in the


primary sense,' and rp'.Tr] ova-la
'

for

'third

class of substances,'

no objection can be taken, as we


have already remarked (in n. 1
to p. 64).

MJETAPHYSICS
substantial character with the

they approach to individual

333

more right the nearer

substances, so

species deserves to be called substantial

that

the

in a higher

degree than the genus.^


ception

According to the strict conof substance, however, that term cannot be

applied to them

at

because they are predicated

all,

of individuals,^ and because

it is true of them, as of
every universal, that they are not a This,' but a Such
not substantive, but adjective and that they express,
'

'

'

not substance, but a condition of substance.^

The

further marks of substance which Aristotle


gives us, likewise refer, in so far as they are
really
characteristic of that conception, to individual
sub-

The

stances only.4

so-called

Cat. c. 5,2, b, 7sq. Aristotle,

indeed, Stems to say the opposite


in 3Ietaph Yiil 1, 1042, a, 13:
en aWws [(ru^^o/j/et] rd y^uos

only of individual substance has


been shown. A second (Cat 5
3,a, 6 sq.,and p. 381, n. 2\?/m)

fxaXXou Twv ei5<bu [oiaiay eiVat]


Kal TO KaddXov t<2v KaBUatrra but
;

he does not intend to express his

own view in these ^^ords; cf.


vii 13; BoNiTZandScHWEGLER
*''

o/, ^
'Cat.

o,

c.

19

2, a,

sq., b,

^3^1

.
{),

,.

^5^;^iU:7rao-a5eot;(no5o:iTc8e
iTv^uLueiu.
Of. nrptiTai ohaiai

o^^f^''l''"t^'^P'l^t

u, D,

Ti

holds unconditionally:

this
5e

iirl

SfuTf'pij/ ovaiup cpaiv^rai


ojxoMs T(f> (Txif^ari t^s -n-pocTvyopias ToSe ri a-qfiah^iy
ov
to;;/

tifv

fi'iv

Tt

aKrjdfs ye,
o-ij^aij/er

vTTOKii^Kvov

aAAa

kuto.

dAAa /xaKAou iroiov


yhp kv eVri t6

ov

o5o-7rep

irpxTT) ova'.a,

ttoWuu

avdpwTvos

A7eTa: Kal t6 (^ov.


Ihe tirst characteristic of
suDstance was rd ^^ Kad' v-noK^iti^vov Kiy^fxeai.

That

this

is

true

secondary substance of

is t^ fi^ eV J7roet^eVa; ^hai


lUit
this characteristic belongs also
to the class, and not to it alone

but likewise (Cat c 5 8 a


21 &c.) to the specific 'difference.
since this is
likewise
contained in the conception of
the thing to which it applies;
^^i^e (according to Aristotle,
*^'^-) only that is eV ^TTo^e.^.V.;
which does not belong to the
conception of that of which it
is predicated, but which is
a
quality in a substance quite in-

dependent of

it
e.a.
in the
sentence 'the body is white'
KfvKov is eV viroKeifievcp on the
other hand, in the sentence
man is two-legged,' S.Vow is
not 4v VTroKifi4v<f}.
A further
peculiarity of substance is (Cat
c.
5, 3, b, 24) r6 f,r}dh avrals
iuavr'ou ehai.
And yet Aristotle
himself remarks thkt the 'same
:

'

ARISTOTLE

334

Aristotle cannot be treated as exactly identical with


quality, but neither can it properly
It denotes

stance.

For

only.

it,

it

is

individual

the

In contrast

class of substances.^

perties of a definite
witli

its qualities

the combination of the essential pro-

is

it

be considered sub-

substance on the side of

are of tliat self-sufficient

name

nature to which the

which

substances alone

and independently subsisting


of substance, in

its

original

sense, belougs.

This view, however,

knowledge

is

not without

its difficulties.

concerned with the actual, ^ then

it

If

all

is

only the actual, in the highest and truly original

is

sense of the word, which can furnish the original and

ultimate

object of knowledge.

recognition of

reality,"* it

to real Being, whicli


this substance is
is

is

must

individual substance,

the case with determinations


many other conthe same reply
if

(^ihid.

be said that substance

1.

:}3)
is

it

sus-

ceptible of no diiference of
degree, no greater or less. For
while, perhaps, we might say
that one is more or less of a
man than another, yet we
could in no sense say that he is
more or less 'two-legged.' If,

'

finally {ihid.

4,

a,

10, b, 3, 17),

take as the most distinctive


quality of substance t^ ravrbu

we

tv apid/uLif hv TcSu ivaviiwv


ehai hcKTiKov, to Kara t^v eavTrjs
^erajSoAV 6e/CTi/cV rdSv ivavricau
Ka\

holds only of individual substance, since to classes


the conceptions of numerical
unity and change are inapplica(Ivai,

this

knowledge
the

first

is

the

place,

the substance of things.^

of quantity and
And
ceptions.

may be made

If

relate, in

If

follows that,

it

The statement, moreover,


contains a questionable identitication of substance with matter,
ble.

to which we shall have again to


refer.
Cat. c. 5, 8, b, 18 (after the
passage quoted in n. .3 on p. 833)
ovk atrXws Se ttoiou tl arjixalvei, uxrnep
rh \^vk6v. ouSeu yap &\\o a-nfiayci
t^ XevKhu dAA' y) iroiov. rh 5e elSos
koI rh yeyos -rrepl ovaiav t6 woiov
acpopiC^i-- iroiav yap riva ova'iav
'

(rvfiaiuei.

Bas.,

by

who

Cf.

Simpl.

explains

A'at.

iroid

ns

2f>,

ovaria

ttoiJttjs ovcriwSris.
-

See p. 162.

Ibid,

MetajJll. vii.

and

p. 219, n. 1.

iK^tvo Se (j>avep6u

n. 1.

1030, b, 4

6 irpdyruis Ka\

rb ri ^u ^Ivai roiv
See also p, 219,

a-n-Aws Sptar/xos koI

ovcnuv ianv.

4,

on

METAPHYSICS
knowledge

in the last resort, all

335
of the individual,

is

and that individual things furnish, not only the startingpoint, but the whole essential content and object of
however, Aristotle de-

This conclusion,

knowledge.

He

cisively rejects.

is

convinced that Science relates,

not to the individual, but to the universal, and even


w^hen

it

itself all

descends furthest to particulars,

addresses

This contradicti(m

but to general conceptions only.^


in his system cannot be
is

it

the while, not to the individual things, as such,

met by the observation ^ that

it

only in the realm of natural being that the individual

is first,

whereas in the realm of

first-

Aristotle himself

He

distinction.

that knowledge

any kind of limitation,

says, without

is

spirits the universal is

knows nothing of any such

directed to the universal only, and,

equally without qualification, that

sence only which

is

substantial

examples with which he

it

individual es-

is

and he chooses the

illustrates

both propositions

from the natural and the spiritual world

God

is

individual Substance.

The

Even

alike.^

fact that

Substance

and Form run together proves nothing for, as will be


seen, there recurs in the working out of the conception
of Form the same difficulty which now engages us
:

with regard to Substance.


himself

Aristotle

the difficulty

,"*

recognised the

Pp. 162 sqq., and 220 sqq.


siqna. CiAn Anal. Post. \. 24, 85,
ihe argument that the
a, 20 sq
general method proof is better
than the particular; and ihid.
rd Se ri iari rwy
c. 14, 79, a, 28
Kae6\ov eo-TiV.
BlE3^,Phil.d.Arist.i. 56 sq.
'

'^

full

weight of

and he seems to indicate another w^ay


^

cf ^jth regard to the


_

first,

1086, b, 33 sq.,
Anal. Post. i. 31
1)81, a, 7
i. 1,
in regard to the second, Cat. c. 5,
Metapli. vii. ]0,
3, b, 14 sq. ;
1035, b, 27, c. 16, 1040, b, 21, xii.
5, 1071, a, 2.
* Metajjh. in.
icrn S'
4 Ifiit.

Metapli.

xiii. 10,
;

ARISTOTLE

83G

of escape in the remark


in

indeterminate and

is

jiofise,

Knowledge, considered

tliat

directed to the uni-

is

but that in actual practice, on the contrary, it is


always directed to something determinate. This, howThe knowledge of the
ever, does not take us very far.
versal,

particular arises only

The

positions

by the application of universal proknowledge depends on

certitude of that

Such knowledge,

their certitude.

expressly recognises,- has not for

therefore, as Aristotk^

object the indivi-

its

dual as such, but, on the contrary, the individual is


On the
it only in the form of universality.^

known by
otlier

hand,

the individual be that which

if

actuality, then

ought to be precisely,

it

the proper object of knowledge, and

is

original

(put individual,

tlie

knowledge of

the universal ought to depend upon


In fact, it would be the individual
certainty.
it

as Aristotle taught,^ the universal


its

own nature the

better

yap fx)] eari ri irapa ra


KaOcKarrTa, ra 8e KaOiKcara aTretpa,

vvv
Toov

elre

5'

aireipuiv irws eVSe'xerai Xafi^iv

i-KiaT-'riixriv

KaOoAov

c.

at apx^i,

ix\v

ovv

.A';?.:

et

ravra

(Tvjxfia'vei

ovOeu yap
iaovTUL ovaiaL
rctiv Koivwv ToSe ti (rrj/iaiVet, aXKa
TotoVSe, h 8' ova'ia toI^ ti, as he
says before,] et 5e ii)] KaOoAov, aAA.'
US ra KaOeKaara, ovk tffovrai im[viz. ovK

(TTT]Tai

KaOoKov yap

iravruv. CI.

Metaph.

19, xiii. 10,


a 14.
'

Metaph.

n. 1 supra.

also
xiii.

at itn(Trr\yiai

^\. 2, \OQ>0,h,

1039,

vii.

18,

10

see p. 1G7,

and

and not,
which should be in

known and

exofiep-n reTovTccpaiTop'a Koi TTaawu


XaXe-rrcaTaTr] Kal ava'y KaLordrr} deooprjaai, irepl ris 6 Xoyos i(paTr]Ke

for its truth

the more certain.^

See especially

p. 220,

&c.,

svpra.
^ Tc^ huOoXov \6ya}, as Aristotle
expresses it, Metapll. vii. 10 (see
pp. 220 sqq., svpra).
*
See p. 205, n. 2, Siqyra.
^ Rassow'S solution (J.m^f)^.
de Kotiords Definltione Boctrina,
p. 57) is equally unsatisfactory.
He appeals to Metapli. vii. 10,
1085, b, 28 (where, moreover,
after the words us KadoXov, which
stand in opposition to the following KaQ" e/cao-Tov, we have simply

an iliriiu) and c. 4,
atd tries to solve the
contradiction by remarking that
in definition and in science generto supply
1029, b, 19,

ally the individual is regarded

METAPHYSICS
If,

conceding

this,

we were

337

to say that the

genus had
than the species, but that,
on the contrary, for us the species had more than the
genus we should thereby place ourselves in opposition
in itself

more of the

essential

to the definite statements of Aristotle,


insists that

word,

all

who continually
Substance, in the strict sense of the

individual Substance

not that it appears to


only one case which would make
possible to escape the difficulty
that is, if there were
is

US as such.
it

There

is

a principle which, being individual, could be at the


same time truly universal, for this could be at the same
time, as substantial, a basis of actuality, and, as uni-

Such a principle seems to be


found in the keystone of Aristotle's entire system
namely, in his theory of Pure Thought, or of God. To
him the Divine, as thinking Essence, is Subject as the
End, Mover and Form of the world, it is also a true
versal, a basis of truth.

The conception of it has existence in -one


Essence, not merely contingently, ^ but by
reason of its own nature whereas, in all finite things,
universal.

individual

the universal presents

number

itself,

itself, in

point

would be possible

it

difficulties

or at least might present

of individuals.^
to seek

From

this stand-

a solution of the

suggested, by saying that in God, as the

not as individual, but from the


universal side of its being. That
]ust the reason why it would
require to be otherwise if the individual were the substantial.
IS

Beandis, ii. b, 568, whose


answer to this question is not al

together clear.
As perhaps that of the sun
or of the moon see p. 222, n. 2,

sujjra.
^

Metaph.

xii. 10, 1074 a 33


iroWh [everything of
which several examples are contained in the same classl Savu
eh yhp A6yos Kal 6 airhs
^x^i

Ua

hpiOfK?

ttoAAcDj/,

oiou itvOpdirov,

:ZccKpdT7,s

ds- rb Se ri 7,y duai o^k ^2.


iix-nv rh ttowtok ivreXeyeia ydo
a
54

VOL.

I^

r-

ARISTOTLE

338

ultimate principle, absolute certitude for thought coincides with absolute actuality of being, but that, in all

derivative forms of being, the greater actuality falls to

the share of the individual and the greater cognisability

That

to tlie share of the universal.


ever,

would

misses

is

how-

not yet proven.

Aristotle himself does not

He

says without any qualification

draw the

distinction.

that

knowledge consists

all

this solution,

be in accordance with all Aristotle's pre-

in the cognition

of the

and that substantiality pertains to individuals


h^ven if we were to limit the first of these

universal,
alone.

propositions to the world of sense,'

with the second would not disappear.


is

not that

because

knowledge
are

/'V3

is

incapable

individual as such.

It

is,

incompatibility

its

Aristotle's

view

to

the universal

of perfectly

knowing the

directed

on the contrary, that

iii

^pite

of the fact that the individual things of sense are better


known to us, the universal must furnish the sole object

knowledge in the strict sense, because it is in itself


more original and more cognisable because it alone

of

possesses that immutability which anything that

be the object of knowledge must


conclusion

is

The

is

to

further

inevitable, that, in comparison with the

individual things of sense,

degree

afford.^

of actuality also.

must possess a higher

it

And we

shall

also

find^

the individual can only arise through the combination


1

AsG. V. HERTLiNGdoes,il[/.^.

Form

terial world.

Arist. 43, f., remarking- that the form of universality is not in all spheres the indispensable condition of knowledge,

resource

but only where we are dealing


with the knowledge of the ma-

u.

h.

H^e

it is

the only

we have

in face of the
partial unknowableness of all material things,
"^

See pp. 205 and 220, supra.


Infra, p. 368.

METAPHYSICS

339

Form with

Matter. But one cannot understand how


can belong in a higher degree and a more
primary sense to that which is a combination of Form
of

"reality

and Matter, of Actual and Possible, than


is

pure Form as

to the Actual

it

is

which

Possibility.'

It

known

which

to that

in universal concepts,

limited by no element of

is

i.e,

mere

only remains, then, to recognise in

merely a lacuna*, but a deep contradiction


in the philosophy of Aristotle.^
He has set aside the

this poiat, not

Platonic attempt to hypostatise the universal concepts,

but he leaves standing


tions,

namely/that

its

it is

two main

pillars,

the assump-

only the universal that can be

the object of knowledge and fliat the truth of

ledge keeps pace with the actuality of

was

it

possible to hold these

its

know-

object.^

How

two positions together in

thought without involving contradictions ?


We need not expect, threfore, to avoid contradictions in working out the further developments of his

by which Aristotle sought a solution of the


Ideal theory and the doctrines
connected therewith had left unanswered.

theory,

questions which the

* Even Heetling fails


to make
this intelligible, when he goes on
to say in the passage just quoted

that that only


ledge which

is

is

object of knowof permanent


This in the

worth in things.

sphere of sense is never the whole


thing, but is entangled with all
that is accidental and that has
its source in matter.
He thus
suggests the question how the
thing in which the permanent
worth is mixed with the accidental can be anything more substantial than the form which

presents it pure,
Since Kittee, iii. 130, called
attention to this difficulty it has
beeH further discussed by Hey'-^

dee

cf Arist. und liecjel. Dial.


180, 183 sq., and Zeller's first
edition, p. 405 sq., which was
.

followed
by Bonitz, Arist,
Metaph. ii. 569.
Schwegler'
Arist. Metaph. iii. 133.
Cf. also

Strumpell,

GescJi d. Phil. 251

sq.
3

541

Cf Zeller, Ph.
.

sq.

d.

Gr. pt.

"

AUISTOTLE

^40

{I)

Form and Matter:

We

the Actaal

must now go back

had distinguished

tl:e

and

the Tossihle.

In the Ideas

to Plato.

lie

non-sensible essence of things

from their sensible appearance. Aristotle refused to


think of the former as a universal subsisting for itself
Yet he does not wish to abandon
outside of things.
the distinction, and the grounds on which he bases it
are the same as those of Plato namely, that the nonsensible

that

it

Form can alone be an

alone

He

ances.
different

is

object of knowledge,

and

permanent amid the change of appear-

says, as Plato said, that as perception is

from knowledge,

is

it

equally clear that the

knowledge must be something other than


All that is sensible is passing and
sensible things.
which may be one way or
'contingent
cliangeful it is a
requires, on the
knowledge
may be another. What

object of

'

an object as unchangeable and necessary as


which can as little change into its opposite as

contrary,
itself,

is

Of

knowledge can into ignorance.


can have neither a concept

noi*

alone with which knowledge has to do.^


is

we
Form

sensible things

a proof;

also the indispensable condition of

it is

the

Form, indeed,

Becoming

all

since everything that becomes, comes to be something

from being something else. Becoming, then, consists


in this, that some matter takes on a definite Form.
This Form must therefore be posited before each case
1

Metaph.

y'n.

220, supra), with


iii 4, 999, b, 1: et

iariTapara
et?j

11,

15 (see p.

which

of.

il/id.

ovv tir^Qh
kx9' e/catTra, ohOkv hv
^uev

vorjrhu o-KKt. Ttivra aia9r,TX kcu

eVtg-TTj^uT?

ohdevos,

Aeyet t^v atcdncnv


S'

iv.

ou5'
5,

ei

fi-h

ris

eTriffrvfivv-

ovdh

chai
^ti

aKivoTOv;
1010, a, 25: Kara rh dSos
ai^iov

arravra. yiyvaaKO/xsv.

ov5'

METAPHYSICS
Becoming

of

341

aim and end thereof; and even

as tlie

supposing that in any particular case the Form could


the process of Becoming, yet in any

itself originate in

such

case

supposition

infinitum^ for if

not

could

be

ad

carried

we should never arrive at a


Becoming. The fact of Becom-

could,

it

true instance of actual

ing, in other words, is inexplicable unless

be true

it

came to be there was a Form ^


which itself had not come to be.
For the same reason there must also be Matter as
the correlative of Form.
The relation of these two

that before anything

should not be defined, as Plato defined


*

Ei5os,/lop</>^,

Ao7os(see

p. 211),

n, 'i,snjjraj, ovaia (infra, p. 275),


rh ri ^v ehai (see p. 217, n. 1,
S'{ij)ra).

Mttapli. iii. 4, 990, b, 5


fxriv e/f 76 a'i^iov oitOfv lariv,
ouSe yeveaif ehai hvvariv avdyKr]
yap elvai ri rh yiyuo/nevov Kol c'l
ou ylyvcrai Kal tOvtoov rh %cr-)(^arov
ayivvriTov etir^p 'iararai re koX Ik
-'

aWa

'

ovros yevfcrdai adiivarov


5'
e^Trep r/ v\r]
iarl Sioi rh
ay4vv7]TOs elvai, iroAu ert /nciWou

fii]

T(

^IKoyov
iKeiuT]

which
TOVTO
e<TTai

elvci

t^v

yiyverai.

ohaiav

iffTai

as that

[o,7crta

becomes]

v\t]

iroTe

iXT)TC

yap

ei

/x-fje

iKeipT],

ovQkv

54

tovto

rh Trapdirav,

el

aSuvaTOU, avayKf] ri ehai Trapi rh


avvoXov t)iv jj.op^7]u Ka\ t6 eJdos
vii. 8 init.
eVei Se inr6 rivSs re
yiyverai to yiyvo^ivov
Kal e/c
;

Tiuos

[e.f/.

out of brass]

koI h

(ru/u.^e^r)Kcs

t6

rovTo iv 6.\\cf}. The form, again,


could only come from another
form, and so on ad inji/iitum,
since all coming to be is the embodiment of form in matter.
(paycphv &pa oti ovde rd elSos
ov yiyvcrai
oh^e r6 ri ^j/ Hvai
oTi TO fxlu ws dSos ^ o'jffia
Keyofievou oi) yiyucrai, rj he aivodos
TavTT}V \eyo/j.4t/t] yiyperai,
7) Kara
.

Kai

on

eV Travrl

t^

yevoix4vc()

vAtj

ean

rh jxlv ToSe rh Se
ToJe
c. 9, 1034, b, 7
oy fi6vov
54 TTcpl rris overtax 6 \6yos Sr]ko7 rh
fi^ yiyv(r6ai rh elSos, a\\^ irepl
Taurcou Sfio'cos riav irpccrav Kowhs 6
cpeari, Kal
;

Ao')os, oTop TTocrov iroiov,

&c.

It is

not the ball, nor is it the brass,


that comes to be, but the brass
ball, not TTOihp but iroihp ^v\op
;

ov yiyperai ovre r) uArj


3 inst.
ovre rh dSos, Aeyw 5e ra ^axara,

xii.

Trap

yap yuera^SaAAe:

rroielv

icrrlv ov

tV

(T(pa'tpav

apdyKT] 54 arripai.

\4yco

arpo-yyvKov v)
Trou7v, oAA' eVepdj/

merely as one

imo TiPtjS
rod irpcvrov
KLvovpTOs
h Se, 7] uAt/ els h 54, rh
eibos. fis &TTeipop ovp elcTip, el /x^
ixopop xo^Khs yiyperai crrpoyyvKos,
dAAa Kal rh crrpoyyvXop ^ 6 _j^aA/cJs

wairep
.
le.r/. a ball]
oj^eThviroKeififvov ^01(770^ x^^'^^^'j
ojTU)s ovdh TijV acpalpav el fx^] Kara
yiyverai.

Xa^Kdv (TTpoyyvXov

it,

ti,

S'

on

r6v

olou rd eidos

Kal

ei's

ri.

vcp'

ov

rl Kal

fx\p,

viii. 3,

1043, b,

I hid.

1(5, c. r.,

070, a, 1 5
1044, b, 22.
1

ARISTOTLE

342

of opposition, in the sense that

true Being would

all

exclusively to the share of Form, and that there

fall

would remain

Here again

Matter only the sphere of Not-Being.

for

arises the old question of the possibility of

Becoming.^

It

might seem that out of Being nothing


it is already
and out of Not-

could come to be, since

Being nothing
finds

that

it

for

also,

ex nildln

Aristotle

niliil fit.

possible to avoid this diflllculty only

which comes

all

Becoming out

to be

of that which

in

starts
is

by

saj^ing

the process of

only in a relative sense

That from which anything


comes to be cannot be absolutely Not-Being, but at the
same time it cannot be that which it is only on its

and

in a relative sense

way

to become.

/'.s'

There remains, therefore, as the only

possible alternative, that


possibility,

not.

it is

that which

but not as yet in actuality.

an uneducated

man becomes

is

to be in

If, for

example,

it

an educated man, he does

so out of the condition of a

man not educated,


man capable of

truly out of the condition of a

In

tion.

fact, it is

not the uneducated, as such, that

becomes educated, but


subject,

that

is,

it

actuality.

is

not yet educated.

a passing over of possibility into

is

whose essence

it is

to be pure possibility,

has not in any relation become actualit3^2

w^hicli

the

Becoming, in general, therefore, presupposes

a substratum

Cf pp. 302, 309 sqq.


This relation is tnily developed in P7/?/s.i, G-10, from which
'

the uneducated Tiian

is

which has a predisposition towards

education, but in actuality

All Becoming

but as
educa-

the following are extracts c. 7


<pauu yap yipecrOai i^ &K\ov &\\o
i^ eTi'pov eVepoj/ ^ ra airkci
f^al
:

All

\4yovTs ^ avyKeiueva [the former,

the man becomes cul'the uncultured bethe latter, if I


comes cultured
say 'the ^ncultured man becomes
a cultured man ']. toov Se yivofjiif I

say

tured,'

'

or

'

METAPHYSICS
becomes that whicli

343

comes to be out of

it

opposite-

its

What becomes warm must before have been cold. He


who becomes a man of knowledge must before have been
without knowledge.^

ivociv d)S

rh
rh

fiev

TO awXa \eyo/xev yipeadai,


vTrofievou Xeyo/nev yiveadai,

ovx

S'

Opposites as such, however, can-

vTro/xevou.

yap

fikv

&udpc}iros viro/xfvei fxovaiKhs

yivonevos &v6pQ)Tros ical etrri, rh Se /at?


fiovanchv Kol Th d/movcrou ovre airXws

ovT (TvuTiOe/xcvov

Tis

ecrt Xafielp idi/


&(nrp Kiyojxev, ori

Trifi\e\pp,

viroK(:7(T6ai

KoX TOVTO

el

aXK'

ye ovx eV

raiirov rd
iivai.

Koi

rwv

i^ airavTuv

Se? ri ael

ei'Set

dicapKT-

vTrofxevei.

fievMV 3e TOvTwv
yiyvojxivcav tovto

Koi

iariv %v,
ou 70^
Kol to d/xovacij

avdpccircj}

TO

Td yivSfxevov,

api9/j.y
.

virofjLeuei,

/!/

5'

rb

^'TOyUtVei
Td fjLev fi^ dvTiKdfievov virofxevei (6 yap dvQpunros virolj.euei) Td fxovcriKdv Se /col t6 djxovaov

ovx

ovx vTrofievei. Ibid. 190, a, 81


in the case of all else that becomes the ov(ria is the substratum
of the change oti Sh kuI ai ovalai
Ka\ ocra aAAa airXws uuTa | vtro:

Kei/xevov Tivhs yiuTai, iiriffKoirovvTi

yivoiT'

tiv

(pavepov.

This he goes on

to prove by the examples of plants,


animals, products of art and
chemical changes(aAAo/a)0"e<s),and
then proceeds &(tt SrjAou e/c twv
:

elp7)ix4vu}V,

Th

OTi

(TVvQeTOV

yiv6/j.(uou

dirav

Kal iffTl ix4v Ti


yiv6[JLevov, eVxi 5e rt & tovto yivQTai,
Kal novTO 5itt6v )) yap rb viroKeiat

i<TTl,

^ Th auTiKeiiueuov. Xeyw Se
dj/Ti/ceTff^jtt fxhp Th &/nov(rov, viroKu(r6ai Se Tdv cLvdpwTrov, Kal t)}v fxkv

fxevou

d(rxvi^o(Tvpr]u

tV

Kal

tt]v

djuopcpiau

CLTa^iav to dvTiKe'iixevov,

XaXKou

Tdv

t)

tov Se

^ t6v xP^*^^^
(pavfpdv ovv
OTt yiypeTaiirciv iK re tov vTroKfifxe-

Td

i)

X'i(jOv

vTTOKeifievou.

VOV Kal T7JS

fiopcpTJs

viroKeififvov dpid/x^ /xev

CCTTt

Se Td

e'lSei

ej/,

Se

(1) matter as such and


(2) the negation of form ((XTeprjffis) as property
(<ru/x)8e)8TjK3s)
of matter.
It is just this distinction, c. 8 goes on, which
solves
the difficulty previous
philosophers felt in dealing with
the possibility of becoming which
they ended by totally denying
oijTe yap to ou y'uecrdai {elvai ')dp
^'Stj) e/c re fi^ tvTos ovheu &v yeveaOai
rj/j.e7s Se Kal avToi t^aixfv
yiyueaOai fxlv ovSkv cnrXus e'/c fx^
ovTos, '6fi(t3S ixivTOL yiyveaOtti Ik
5v6, viz.

OUTOS,

fi^

yap

/c

avTd

olov

fx)]

KaTCL

(TVlJLfie^V,K6s

'

eVrt KaQ''
ov, ovK ivvirdpxovTos yiyve-

TTjs

(TTepi]aeu3S,

thing becomes what


not from its negative which
in and for itself does not exist
Tai Ti [i.e. a

it is

man,

becomes what
not cultured from being-

for example,

he is
uncultured]
ovTOs, &XXos

Xdyeiv

15

efs fxfv Sij Tpd-rros

OTi ifSex^Tai TavTO.

Kara t^p
Gen.

ivfpyeiav.
b,

S'

SvyajLuv
et Corr.

Tpoirov jxfv

Kal

t^j'

3,317,
Tiva Ik fi^ ovtoi

dirXoos yiviTai, Tpoirou Se

i.

dXXov

i^

Td yap Svydfxei Ou evTeXexeia Se jj.^ ov dv ay kt) irpoinrdpxeiv


ovTOs

dei.

Cf. Metaph.
2 (an exposition in complete
agreement with that of the
Physics); ibid. c. 4, 1070, b, 11,
18, c. 5, 1071, b, 8, iv. 5, 1009, a,
30 and p. 841, n. 2, svpra.
See infra, and Phys. ii. 5,
205, a, 6.

Xcyd/xevou dfxcpoTfpws.
xii.

'

ATIISTOTLE

844

not change into their opposites, nor even act upon their

Cold does not become warmth

opposites.

does not become knowledge

Becoming

the latter begin.

ignorance

but the former cease when


is

not the passing over of

one property into the opposite property, but the-passage


out of one condition into the opposite condition, by the

Thus it
Becoming presupposes some Being on

interchange of one property with another.


follows that

all

the basis of which such an interchange takes place, and

which underlies

as their suljject the changing properties


and conditions, and maintains itself in them.
Tliis
substratum certainly is in a sense the opposite of that

which

to become, but

is

it

derivatively.
is

it

to

receive,

opposites
to that

and

which

and

in

in so far it

to

is

so not in itself,

is

place of

them

it

has their

come out of
its

it.

This negative rela-

own

essence, but only

the determinations of quality which attach to


'

Cf. besides

the

above nn.

aiid p. 32:J sq., Phy^. i. G, 189, a,


20 for the explanation of ])lie:

nomena

not

eno\igh to
assume two principles standingto one another in the relation of
opposites, aTropTjtreie yap av tis ttws
7)

Ti

is

it

iruKvoTrjs

7]

ofjLo'ccs

TLOT'os,

eari

r)]v jxauor^iTa ttoi^Iv


auT-r]

t/V TrvKforriTa.

Sh Ka\ aXXr]

oiroiaovv ivav-

irc(j)vK(v

kc

/jLu

v)

c. 7, 190, b, 29
ws 5vo \kt(op ehci

5ih
rets

doxa?, to-Tt S' dbs Tpe?s. Koi ^ari fxhv


ris Xtyoi rh
ws ravavr'a, oiou
/xovaiKou Kcl rh a^iovaov v) to Oep/jLoi/
Koi Td \i/vxpov
T^ I'pjxoafxlvov KaX
utt'
rh apap/xo(TTOV eari 5' ws ov

-/)

aW'fjAMV

yap

but

stands in a negative relation

however, concerns not

tion,

it

has not as yet those properties which

It

iraffx^^v

ravavria

it.^

As

hZvvarov.
AVe obtain three principles (apx0 {^hid. 191, a, 12)

besides viroK^ifxeuou and \6yos


ef-pecial
account of
(rrepTiais,
otherwise only two.
A thing-'s opposite is its principle
in so far as its matter is infected
with areprjcris or the contrar}' of
the form it is going to receive
something other than its opposite
is its principle in so far as the
matter in itself is as capable of
the one determination as of the
other c. 9, 192, a, 1() Plato errs
in identifyingthe material simply
with the non-existent, uvtos yap
rivos Oeiov Kal ayaOov Kal icperod,
t6 fxeu ivavriov avTo} (pa/xev dvai,
if

we take

METAPHYSICS

34.5

a presupposition of

it is

cannot ever

itself

all Becoming, this substratum


have had a commencement; and since

everything which perishes resolves

same substratum,

itself finally into the

imperishable

it is

This begin-

also.^

Becoming ^ is Matter;'^ and so we


have Matter alongside of Form as a second term.''
The notion and the relation of these two principles
is more accurately determined in the doctrine that
Form is the Actual and Matter the Possible."^ Both
ningless basis of

TO

'0 irc<puKev
i(t>'rTOa.i Koi opdyeaBai avTov tear a t)]v kavrov (pvaiv.
TO?s 5e (Tv/x^aivei rd ivairiov ope-

PJnjs. ilnd.

1.

31

Xeyai yap

vXriv TO irpcaTOv viroKeifxevov eKaffrc}),

ou yiperai ti

ivvirdpxovTOS ^))
Gen. et Corr. i,

yeadai rrjs kavrov (pdopas. Ka'.roi


ovT avrh kavTOv oiov re etpieaOai
rb fiSos 5la rh fxr] eluat eVSeey,
oijTC
TO evavTLou. (pOapTiKa yap
a\\i]\av TO, ivavria. aAAa toCt'
ecTTii/ 7]
v\r],
uxrirfp au
ei
S^Av
'dppevos Kai
alcrxP^v KaXov (see
Phys. iv. 9,
p. 825, n. 1, svjrra).
217, a, 22 i(TT\v vArj fi'a rwv ivav-

Kara

Tiwv, Qepfxov Kai i\tvxpov

n.
As arfprjais constitutes
of itself no independent principle,
but merely belongs to matter as
such, i.e. to matter as still form-

fill.

aWccv
Kol

Toov

4k

Svyd/xei

yiverai,

Tuv

(pvffLKccu

iuavTido'eoou,

ovtos

oh

Ka\

ivavTiccaeu'v']

tSov

ipepyfia ov

x^^P'f^T'h H-^i'

[sc.

vXt), T(^ S'

fhai

t]

krepov.
'
See p. 341, n. 2, siqyra. Phys.
i.9, 102, a, 28: ^(peaprov KaXdy'ev

vriTov avdyKT] avrriv elvai.

eire

yap

iyiyvero, viroKeiaOai ri Se? irpcorov,


T()

e'l

iwndpxovros

ol'

(pOeipeTai, eis

eiTe

tovto acp'^erai (ffxa-

rd

Kai

To

TO SeKTlKdu,]).
besides followir g notes

VTCOKtlfXevOU,

342, n. 2,
0'e7i.

Corr.

i.

10, 328, b,

ddrepw iJLcv d^KTiKov Gdrepou

Be

1/A77

/j-aAia-ra

jxkv

aWais

Ta7s
i.

3,

[aiT av (pa/nev eJvai^

rd

tV

erepxv 5e
i/'Atjj/-

koI

foregoing nn.
Cf. the foregoing and the

viroKi/j.evov.
*

ytieTajSoAaTs

983, a, 29
Cf.

next

less, it is

assigned a place beside

form and matter only in a very


few passages and with a certain
reservation
see P/irs. i. 7 (p.
344, n. 1); Mctoph. xi'i. 2, 106VS
b, 32, c. 4, 1070, b, 10, 18, c. 5,
1071, a, (5, 16.
;

De An.

ii.
1,
412, a, 6
yeios ev ri twv ovtcov t^v
ovalav, TttUTTjs 5e t^ fxlv as v\t]v,
% KaO' a'.Th juev ovk iari rode rt,
eTfpov Se fjLOp(pi]v Kai elSos, Kad'
t/Stj Xeyerai ToSe tl Kai Tp'nov t5
e/c
Tovrwv.
(Tti
S'
tj
jxlv vXt]
:

\(.')0jxv

and

Se

to-Ti

3fetaj>k.

TOV.

Kai Kupiccs rd viroKeifievov yeviaeus


Kai (pdopas ScKTiKdi', rpoirou Se tivx

Ka\

(xv/xfiefirjKos.

All.

S'

elSos.

414, a, 1): ix.op<p\ koX


ellto^ Tj KoX Xoyoi Kai oiov ivtpyeia
Tov SeKTiKov. Ibid. 1. 13
oifTTe
Ao'7os Tis av ill] \j] if'i'X'''] ''"^ ^'i^os,
ahk" ovx vXt] Kai to liroKe'^uevov.
ii.

2,

Svvafiis, Tt) 5'

ddos ivreXex^ia.

So

414, a, 14 sq.
Coi. et Corr.
ii. 9, 335, a, 32
ds fxev ovv uAtj
ToTs yf.vvr]To7s icrriv c'hiov rh Svvac. 2,

ARISTOTLE

10

conceptions liave been obtained entirely out of the con-

the

sideration of
rhv

Ka\

eivai

yiyv6/j.eva

20: airaura 8e

a,

(pvcTfi

"ifj

^Ii'tapli.

elvai.

fir]

1032,

vii. 7,

distinction

e^^'

rexvrj

rj

to,

SvvaThv yap Koi eli^ai Koi /x^


elpai iKacTTOv ahruv, rovro S" [that
wliicli can be or not })e] i(Tr\v iv
viii.
e/cao-TO) vXi]
c. 15 (/'. sxpra)
vK-qu 5e Keyco ^ /xr}
1, 1042, a, 27
rode Ti oZffa eVepye'ct 5uj/a,iiei eVrl
ivel 8'
T5t ri: c. 2, 1012,' b, 9
ixlu ws viroKeLiaevr] kcu ws uAtj
7]
vXrjV.

olxria d/jLoXoyeTrai, avrt]

Ihid.

Svvdiu.^1.

&AXr}s

iufpyeia oAAtj
X'Syos

20

1.

ipepyeias

1.

rod
27 ^
:

(Ufpyeia;

c.

)>

i//'i/.

Kal rrju /xopcprjv

12

ws

rj
r;

Kal

uArjs

/u-hv

5'

r]

eVxij/

S"

a,

Koi

r?is

yap ws

v\7]

iJ.op(pT}

on

ei'Soy?

iarlu^

[^oviTia

\0V.\,

rrjv ivepyeiay

rrjs evepyeias

1045, a, 23
vXr) rh Se
rh jx\v Bwdfiei rh Se
ijLOpcpf]. Kal
ivfrpyeia
ix. 8, 1050, a, 15
7/ vk-q
earrl Svvdixei, on eA9o( tiv els ru
orav Se y ipepyeia ?), rore
elSos
KOI rod cfSou?
5'

(I

iarlu

c.

rh

G,

fieu

'

iv

eibei

r(f

h.

ro ilhos Cvfpyeid iffriv


vkri Kal
7] ouala [roov <pQa.prooi'~\
xii. 5,
Swa/JLLS ovaa, ojk ivepyeia
euepyeia jxtv yap ro
1071, a, 8
1. 18
dvud;ueL Se 7/ vXr]
elSos
irdurau Sr/ irpwrai apxat t^ iv^p^'^ia
Svudixei.
irpwrov, ro efSet, Kal aWo
Kal

ovcr'a
.

'.

<>

Such passages could

easily

be

multiplied to prove that tJ


^wd,ui OP corresponds precisely
to vXr], rd ivepyela ov to elSos.
Even the statement (BoNiTZ,
Arist. Metapli. ii. 398) that v\-r\
refers raiher to trpwrt], duvdui
hv rather to iaxdrt] vArj (see
p. 348, n. 1, infra), does not seem
correct.
If to Ihe question irSre
Svvd/xei

%Kacrrov ; Aristotle
ix. 7) replies by means

iffrlv

{Mctaph.

between the two poles

of the icTxdrv vXr], he must make


the same reply to the question
as to the iixri eKaarov, the matter
If
of these determinate things.
the earth cannot be said to be
avdpooTTos, neither can it
Si/i/a,uet
be called according to Afetaph.
the
viii. 4, 1044, a, 35, b, 1 sq.,
matter of man'; and what the
same passage calls ZwdjueL oIkIu,
1049, b, 8 sq. designates uAtj.
On the other hand, irpdoTr) uAtj is
So far, theresimpl}" Suj/ct/iei ov.
fore, as there remains any distinction beUvcen the two pairs
of conceptions, it c ncerns not
so much their actual content as
the point of view from which
we regard it. In the antithesis
'

of

form and matter we

distin-

guish between different elements,


in that of ivepyeia and Swdfiei
between different states or con-

Th6 former
ditions of things.
refers to the relation of substance
to attribute; the latter, to the
relation of the earlier to the
later condition, of the incom-

But
plete to the complete.
since the very essence of matter
consists in possibility of form in
actuality, we can conceive no
case in which more than a
grammatical change
in order that we
the latter for the
And vice
sions.

necessary
substitute
former expresis

may

verm we may

most cases substitute matter


and form for the possible and

in

the actual. The only difficulty


that can possibly arise is in the
case where we are speaking, not
of two things- related to one
another as the possible to the
actual, but of one and the same

METAPHYSICS
between which

we

Change and Becoming moves.

all

abstract in any given case from

object

about for the

is

first

Form, and

is

in

is

want of a

definite

consequently as yet only capable of receiv-

we abstract entirely from anything which is


Becoming that is to say, if we think to

If

it.

a product of

ourselves a kind of object which has not as yet

anything, then

we

shall

namely,

or

thinkable

on that

account

equally

is
is

it

b,

1,

ii.

8,

19o,

viii. 4, 255, a, 88; Be An.


Ge7i. An. ii.
417, a, 21 sq.
but even here it
735, a, 9
8,

5,

can

always

be

shown that a

thing is Svud/jei only in so far as


it has the i/Atj in itself. Although,

matter
b,

27:

all.

in Possibility

Metapli.

viii.

5,

1041,

oi-Se Traj/rds {JAtj eVrlj/ ctAA'

fXTa^o\^ els
ocra 5' &vev rod jj.Ta^d\eariv
/ult],
ovk eari tovtcdu
Cf. vii. 7 (previous n.)

oa-cou yet^ecris

i<TTi Kol

aWrjXa.
vX-q.

'

precisely

seemed to presuppose it, is clear


from the statement that
nothing to which 'becoming' is
inapplicable can be said to have a

have, logicall}' considered, a wider


range than uAtj and clSos (since,
while the latter express only a
relation of two subjects to one
another, the former express also
a relation of one subject, to itself), metaphysically there is no
distinction between them,
That Aristotle's conception
of matter and with it the distinctionbetweenmatter and form
thus originated in the attempt
to explain
becoming,' which
'

the

also

Knv

dwd/xei

all

is

all

them

of

is

Subject,

purely potential Being,^

it is

ivepye'a

therefore,

and

receptive

that which

passes from possibility

to actuality, cf. Phys.


ii.

the

which

but

belongs,

and nothing in Actuality

it

everything

substratum to which no one of

predicates

In other words,

thing as

This will be that which

can become

but

become

have pure Matter without any

determination by Form.
nothing,

If

that a given

all

time to become, we shall

have a definite Matter which


ing

347

-1)

Td

Suva/^ei

liu.

A somewhat

different meaning attaches to


Swa/xis when it indicates power
or facultj'- in the sense of the

apxh /uera^SATjTtK//, whether we


speak of a faculty for doing or
for suffering, a rational or an
irrational power (cf. Mctajfh. ix.
1-6, v. 12)
Aristotle, however,
;

again mixes up both signitica(cf. BoNlTZ


on Metaph.
379 sq., and p.. 234, n. 1, sujjra\
tions

ARISTOTLE

348

without any kind of actual existence.^

we
that

If conversely

an object and abstract from

take

everj^thing

it

its way
we think of the end of its growth
attained, we obtain the pure and com-

merely

is

rudimentary and only

on

to completion, if
as

fully

plete

of

realisation

conception, to which

its

no matter that

formless,

The Form,

attaches.

corresponds with

is

or intelligible essence of a thing,

and Form

perfect realisation,

its

nothing

unformed, auy longer

still

general with Actuality.-

Just as a statue

in

contained

is

only potentially in the unwrought material, and comes


into

only through the

existence

actual

Form which

the artist communicates to the material. Aristotle under-

Fioni

this

Zvvau.is

we have

cation of

which

second

iViGaning: of
Aristotle's applito the naaterial in

it

determinate

power

as in Pent. An. ii. 1,


()4(), ;i,
14 sq., where moist and
dry, warm and cold substances,
(icn. An. i. 18, 725, b, 14, where
certain liquids, 3IeteorA\. 3, 359,

resides,

b,

12,

J)e

where

and

salts

alkalis,

444, a, 1, where
scents are called ^wa-

Sensii,

fragrant

5,

man

is

ra

Mctaph.

Karaixyji'ia.

v.

1015, a, 7, c. 24 imt., viii. 6,


1045, b, 17. c. 4, 1044, a, 15, 34,
b. 1, ix. 7, 1049, a, 24.
Some
verbal confusion is caused b}^
the fact that the expression
TTpwTT) vkri is applied equally to
nuitter which is absolutely, and
to matter which is only relativelj', first (to the oAws wpdoTr]
and to the Trpds avrd itpurr] v\r})
see Mctaph. v. 4, viii. 4, 1041,
4,

23; Phya.

fxeis.

a, 18,

This pure matter, which, however {seei}ifra),\s never present as

and

cf.

Cf.

BONITZ,

such, Aristotle calls TrpwTT] vKy.


Its opposite in this sense is uAtj
eVxttTrj (tSios, oiKeia kKaarov), or
the matter which unites itself,
immediately, without requiring
further preparation, with a deter-

b, 10.

minate form.

pleteness or actuality^ but which


are commonly used by Aristotle

'

material as

UpdoTT] uAtj is

the

precedes all elethe ia-xarr}


v\r{, e.g
of the statue is the
stcne or brass; the tVxaTTj v\r\ of
it

mentary differences
,

Mdaph.

'Ej/f'pyeia

ii.

1,

19.3, a,

28,

1014, b, 28.
h\d. Arist., 786,
v. 4,

or eVrcAexeia

(in

the concrete rh it^epyeia ov, rh


eVTcA6;(;eta ov), expressions which
properly differ as activity or
act ualisation

differs

without distinction.
p. 379 sq.

from com-

Cf. in/ia,

META PHYSICS

849

stands by Potentiality in general Being as mere sus-

ceptibilityindeterminate,
capable, indeed, of

made

yet

undeveloped self-existence,

becoming a

By

into one.

definite reality,

but not

Actuality, on the other hand,

he means the same being considered as a developed


totality or Being which has wrought out all that it

When accordingly he
Matter with potential,
being, he means to say that the former is the totality
of the qualities which the latter does not possess but
contains

into

is

existence.

full

Form with

identifies

actual.

Matter as such, the so-called

capable of acquiring.^

without form or definite character, being


just that which precedes all Becoming and all formation;
TTpcoTT] vXrjj'^ is

the

centre

of

nite qualities

indifference to

opposites and defi-

all

the substratum which as yet possesses

none of the qualities that make the Form of


1

8'

i'aTi

7]

vpayixa

G,

ojtus

fir]

duvdaei.
iu

1048, a, 30
ivepyeia rh virapx^^v t5
ix.

jVetc(j?/i.

Socrirep

\iyo/xV 5e

\eyo/xeu

Svudfxei

oToy

^v\y

'Epurju Kxl eV rfj b\r}


T/ju rjfi'a-eiay, on cKpaipede'r] &j/, Kal
TCf)

kA

i-rricrT'fijxovj.

CLV

Svudrhs

7eia.
rfj

Tj

SriKou

rhv

fx)]

diwpTjcrai.
8'

iirayooyrj

iirl

Qewpovvra,
rh S' iuep-

tcov

^ir}Ti7i/,

dAAot

on ws rh
TO oiK)ho;xiKhu, Ka\
T'b iyprjyopos irpbs rh K%dv5 )u, ical
rh bpiav trphs rh [ivov [xku o\piv Se
t^ai', Kal TO cLTroKzKpijXivov iic rrjs
uAtjs irphs T7]v vKr\v, kxX to arreip')a(rp.4vov wphs Th auipyaffTOV. tj.vTrjs Se TTJs Siacpopas BaTtpov jxopiov
eoTCi} 7} ip^pyeia affixpia-fi^vr], OuTepcfi
5e Th 5uvaT6v
c. 8, 1050, a, 21
^5' vnoKeiPJnjs. i, 7, 191, a, 7
Kt\ Th

avdhoyov crvvopau,

Kj^ofjiovv Trphs

jueiTj

(pvais iirLCTTrjTi]

Kar avaho-jiav.

thinffs.^

avdpiavra x"-^k^^JS t)
Trphs KKiv7]v ^v\ov 7} irphs twv 6.KK00V
Ti

T(i}y

irphs

ix<ivToov jxopcp^u

Th ap.op(pou exet
flOpCpT]!/,

OJTOtS

7]

v\r} Kzl

Xa,3e7v

irplv

aVT7]

ITphs

t^v

OVaijiV

exei Kal Th t JSe ti Kal Th uv. Ibid.


1, 201, a, 29.

iii.

'^

See p. 848, n.
su'/ra
Mctapli vii 3, 1029, a, 20
1

KaOeKuara

^ovAo/xeOa hiyeiv.

Kxl o) deT iravrhs opou

yap

ojy

A/yoj

8' v\7]v

^ KaO^

iroahu fir,T

a\jT))u fxiire tI

&\\o

Aeyfrat
oTs liipiTTai TO uv; c. 11, 1037, a,
jx^Ta txkv yap t^s uAtjs o-jk
27
lanu [A070S], aSpiffTov yap; ix. 7,
el 5e' ti ian irpiiTou,
1049, a, 24

/j-iiTi

jULijOkv

ix7]kIti

t)

vivov [of

TovTo

^AAou Ae'yerat iKiisuch and such a nature],


/cot'

irpta T7) vKt]

viii.

see p. 315,

supra, iv. 4, 1007, b, 28


Th yap huud/x^i hv Kxl fi^ eVreAsX^ia Th aSpiaTSu iaTi. Phys i. 7
see above, n. 1, and iv. 2, 209, b,
9 passing from this it becomes

n.

5,

ARISTOTLE

350

Considered in this aspect,

also unlimited or infinite,

it is

we

not in the spatial sense (for Aristotle, as

shall see,

does not admit the existence of infinity in space), but

which the

in the wider sense according to

infinite is that

which, as fixed and circumscribed by no determinate

Form, has reached no conclusion or completion.^ And


since what is wholly indeterminate cannot be known.

by analogy
by supposing a
substratum for things of sense in general which is related to them in much the same way as a special material
To Form, on
is to the things that are made out of it.'^

Matter, as such,

the other hand,

we

form]

a-pKr/.trVoi'

(fat

IQlOVTOlf

Jlr C.rln,

?}

V\l]

\\\.

KO).

S, HO;!,

pud/J.i((T6ai,

[the

cVrt 8e

TO

oApiffTOU.

1),

17: aeiSes

Oh

ih
jxaKinra yap au

a-iofxpoy

elj^at

tov iUous

viro

^f^puxo^J^^v^n'

Hot

It is only

tnroKdf.ceuoi'
o'utu) dvi'aiTO

Kaddirsp iv

of

it,

attribute all the qualities of things,

and

limitation,

defniiteness,

all

unknowable.

is

we can gain any conception

that

rw

Tif-uxw

'

Tthiiov b' o-j5f:i> jlLT] exov t4\os


ov yap Kivov
TO 8e TfAos 7r^.7s
Au'w ffvudiTTnu iarl t^ anauTi Kai
oAoi) rd aiTfipou
ecTTi yap v)
amipoi' Trjs tou /.aytdovs reAe ott]to bvpdixei
oAoi',
ros uArj kuI
eVTeAe^ea 5' ov
Kal ov -Trepte'xei
.

stands, first of all, the unlimited


in space, and in this sense he examines the conception in Phi/s. iii.
But finding that in ac4 sq.
tuality there is no such infinite
space, he finally identifies the un-

e;^6i

limited wilh the aopiarov or uAtj.


the notion
Cf. ih'ul. c. 6, 207, a, 1
commonly entertained of infinity is wholly false, ov yap ov fxrjSeu
e^co, aAA' ou dei ri e|co eVxi, tout'
:

6.irsipou fihv ovv


iaTLv
iarlu ov kxto, iroahu Xafx^avovcnu
aei ri AajSetj/ tffriv l|w. ou Se fxriSeu
e^o), tout' iarl TeKciou Koi o\ov(De

aTreipoV

Ca;lo,u. 4, 286, b, 19, repeated)

7]

vXrj

to

dAAa TTpiexeTai, fi
dyvwaTov fj aireipju
ahvuaTOv,

yeypuTrrai, Tt iravdex^s.
By aweipou Aristotle under'

Form

intelligibility.

Uireipoi'
'

i5os

aroirov

dyvoxrrov

Sid Kal

yap ovk
5e

Kal

Kal

t6

a6pia-Tou nepiex^ti' tal opi^eiu; c. 7,


(pauepov ort oos uAtj to
207, b, i)5
:

a'lTiov, Kal oti


t^
uvai avTta (TTpr]ais, to Se Kad'
avTo vwoKeiixei'oy rh ffvuex^^ '^<**
aiaOrjTou. iv. 2, see previous note.
Phys. iii. 0; see previous
note ibid. i. 7, JSIetaph. ix. 6 see
p. 349, n. 1, supra, Metapli. vii. 10,
1036, a, 8 ^5' uAtj it-yvaitnos Kad^
avT^v. Cf. also p. 220, n. 2, supra
for parallels from Plato, cf. ZklLEii, Ph. d. Gr, pt. i. p. 621, 2.

airetpou

iariv

ywev

'^

METAPHYSICS

351

and Matter, therefore, require nothing further to medi-.


ate between them in order to produce a whole, but are
united:

immediately
Matter in

Form

itself indefinite

the

is

directly the lacking definiteness of

of

definiteness

Matter receives into

Form.

itself

When

the

Potential passes into the Actual, these elements do not

stand opposed to one another as two separate things,


but one and the same thing looked at as Matter is
the Potentiality of that of which the Actuality is its

Form.'

But

just as

we may not regard Form and Matter

in

their mutual relation as two heterogeneous substances,


so neither

may we

regard either of them in any case as

a single substance, so as to imply that one Matter and


one Form constitute the fundamental elements which in
various combinations produce the aggregate of things.
Aristotle

recognises, indeed, in

being which

is

pure

Form

the

Divine

does not treat this as the intelligible idea of


the universal, spiritual substance of

an individual being, beside which


beings exist as so

many

Spirit

all

substances.

all

Yet he

without Matter.
all

Forms,

things, but as

other individual

In like manner

Aristotle recognises a fundamental matter, which, while


in the elements and generally in all particular kinds of

matter
itself

'

it

assumes different forms and

one and the same in

3retaph.

viii.

(5,

1045, b, 17

all

to the question how the elements


of a conception or of a number
can be one, Aristotle answers
that they are related to one
another as matter and form (see
p. 220, n. 2, sifj}ra): ea-n S' iiairep

bodies.

qualities, yet is in

Yet this primitive

e^pTjTat koI tj iffx^rv v^V [ot p.


348, n. l] Kal v ^lopcp^ ravrh kuI eu
[So
rh fihu Swd/xei to 8e ivepyeia.
Bonitz reads, but^ Bekker has
ev
yap
ti
ravTo kuI Svvdfxei to eV.]
'iKaaTou ical rb 5vudf.ii Koi rb
:

^vepy^ia eV ttms iaTiv.

ARISTOTLE

362

matter

never present except in the definite form of


Nor can it be otherwise, since

is

one of the elements.

pure, indeterminate Matter

is mere Potentiality without


any Actuality whatsoever. This original corporeal Matter,

moreover, does not exhaust the conception, and Aristotle


goes on to speak also of an incorporeal Matter which he

example, in conceptions and in mathematical


this belongs whatever, without being itself

finds, for

To

figures.

something

cori)oreal, stands to

as corporeal

same relation
Hence we see

else in the

Matter stands to Form.^

that not only does each of these conceptions denote a


single existence or definite class of things, but they are
used, though undoubtedly obtained in the first instance
by abstraction from corporeal things,^ wheresoever a
relation subsists analogous to that

Thus

express.^

Phys.

'

iii.

roiovrov

Ha-Ti

5,

204, b, 82

au^a

ovk

alffdTjrhv irapa

otherwise
the four elements must needs
resolve
themselves into this,
which is not the case. Ge7i. et
Corr. ii. 1, 329, a, 8.
Ibid. 1. 24
Tj^els 5e (pafiev fxhu ehai riva vX-qv
ffToix^la KaXovix^va,

Ttt

Tuv

(ju^fxaTcav

TavTTiv

rwv

aladT^Tcov,

pauTLeio-ec^s.
e|
^s
KaXovfieva (TT0ix^7a.
320, b, 12 sq.
'^

lo-Tt

aAAa

x^'^o'o'tV, a-^A' ael ^er'

oil

Metaph.
Se TTjs

viii. 6,

rd

yiverai

Ibid,

5,

i,

J
ddrov Xoyov rh

5'

r]

avrh

Kad'^ aiirh

eari yap

rj

vX-q

aAAa r65e
t)

10,

c.

vot]tt]

103G, a, 9
iariv rj Se
:

alaBr}Tii

5e

r)

iv

toIs

vwdpxovaa /nij ij alaQrird


ra fiadrj/jLariKd.
^ This
is
evident from the

examples which Aristotle uses in


illustration

cf.

pp. 341, n. 2, 342,

2,and 345 n.5,,sz/^A Of matter he


remarks also in Gen. et Corr. i. 4,
320, a, 2, that we are to understand
by it [xdMcna koL Kvpiws rh viroKein.

tj

/xhu al(Tdr)r)]

Metapli.

Kal at dpxal
/cot'

S'

;^ej/
.

alcrd-nrois

ivepyeid iffrip
vii. 11, 1036,
b, 35 ^(TTUi yap vXr) ivicov Kal fir]
aladr)Ta)V Kal iravTos yap vXt] ris
icTTiv t fi-f] iffri ri riv dvai Kal eldos

rh

tj

oTov

tan

Kal

5'

j/otjt^

fj-euvXr)

aia-erjTi),

Ibid.

vorir-i].

i/Atj

fxeuov yeueaeocs Kal (pdopas Sktik6v.

1045, a, 33

^uef vo-qr)]

y'Arjs

which they originally

analysing conceptions into their

in

&s

xii.

ra

5'

oXtio.

&\Xa dXXaiu eariu

ws,

KadoXov Xeyrj ris Kal


dvaXoyiav, ravrd irdvrcov
S'

h.v

oTov Xacos robv

alaQ-qTccv

aoifxdroov

ws fih elSos rh eep/mhu Kal &XXov


rpdirov rh \pvxphu rj (rreprjais, vXtj
8e rh Swdfiei ravra irpurou Kad'
avro
irdvToou Sc ovtcc fifv cltreTv
'

rj

Se

METAPHYSICS

353

two elements, Aristotle attributes to the genus the


same significance as Matter, while he identifies the
difference with the Form.^

specific

scheme of the universe,

Similarly in the

in physiology, in

zoology, in

psychology, the upper and the lower spheres and elements,^ the soul and the body,^the male and the female,'*

the Active and the Passive Reason,^ stand to one another

same relation as the Form and the Matter. The


same is true, it need hardly be remarked, of Potentiality
and Actuality. These also express a definite relation
which may subsist between all possible kinds of objects,
and which can best be explained by analogy.^ Aristotle
in the

applies

them

He

Form.

in precisely the

same way as Matter and

uses them, for instance, to elucidate the con-

nection between the genus and the specific differences,

and in general

show the possibility of several properties belonging to one and the same thing.
By them he
explains the relation between the passive and the active
to

'^

ovKiCTTiv, ru> auaXoyov Se, wffirip


it ris UTTOL oTi apxa' el(ri rpe7s, rh

d5os Koi

7/

(TTep-nai'i

TovTwv

'iKaiTTov

Kal

t}

dAA.'

vKt].

'^Tipov irepl

eKaarov

en
c. 5, 1071, a, 3
rpoTTov T(p avdhnyov apxo-ial avToi, olov iucpyeia Kal Sui^a/jLis.

yeuos iariu;
5'

uWou

aWa

/col

&\\(cs.

ravra &\\a re &\\ois Kal


L. 24
B.\\a 5e EWcov

y\/6(pwv, ovaiSov, Trocr6Tr]TOS,

irX^v

r^

avihoyop' Kal toov eV tolvt^ y4veL


erepa, ovk e^Set, aW' OTi tSov KaO^
(KacTTOv &Wo f} re cr^ vXrj Kal rd
Kivrjaav Kal rh eldos Kal t) i/xh, rep
KadSxov Se xSycp ravTo..
*

See

Be

VOL.

aiTia Kal <TToix^7a, uxnrep iXexBr],


TU)v fir) iu ravT^ yeuei,
xP^h"-^"^^^^

Gen. et CorrA.'i^,^\%,
335, a, IS.
^ jjg j^,^
[[ |^ 412^ b^ 9 s;q
q.
2, 414, a, 13 sq. and often.
*
Gen. An. i. 2 i/tit., ii. 1,732,
a, 3, ii. 4, 738, b, 20, and often.
AEetapll. i. 6, 988, a, 5, V. 28,
1024, a, 34.
)]12, a, 12,

b, H2,

p. 219, n. 2, supra.
C(elo,iv. 3,4, 310, b, 14,
I.

ii.

8,

Be An.

ili. 5.

Metapli. ix. 6 seep. 349, n.


1, Sl/pra. Ibid. I04:8,h, 6 Adyerai
S' ivepycia ovirdvra dfxoiws, oAA' v) rd
avaXoyov, 6>s rovro iv tovtc(> ^ irpbs
tovto, rd S' eV TwSe fj irpbs ToSe to,
/mev yap ws Kivrjcns irphs Svvafj.iv, ra
^

'

5' 00s ovcria irpSs

5,

riva v\r]v.

Cf

xii,

1071, a, 3, cited p. 362, n. 4.


''

Be An.

ili. 5.

A A

ARISTOTLE

354

understanding.^

It follows that one

may be viewed in one


Form as Potentiality

in the

The elements,

second.

material of

all

and the same thing

aspect as Matter, in another as


first,

as Actuality in the

which contain the


Forms of the primitive

for instance,

other bodies, are

Matter; the brass which supplies the material for a statue


has

its

own

peculiar

in

its

Form

While the

as a specific metal.

viewed as the Form of the body, yet even


own highest and most immaterial part a distinction

soul in general

is

made between two elements which are related to one


another as Form and Matter.^ Indeed, we shall find that

is

everything except the

'

eternal immaterial substances

contains some element of Matter,^ while on

tlie

other

hand, as we already know,'* Matter never actually presents itself to us except as endowed with Form.

We

may therefore

distinguish several stages-^ in the

development of Matter into


less

Matter

lies at

Form. The

the foundation of

also true that everything has its

Matter. Between these two

all

first

purely form-

things

own peculiar and

lie all

but

it is

ultimate

the material formations

through which the original Matter has to pass before it


becomes the particular Matter with which the Form of
the thing immediately unites itself.^ The same holds

We

true of the hvvafiLs?

Metaph.\n\. 6, 1045, a, 23,


16.
rhysA.2fin.\ see p. 219,
*

b,

n. 2, p. 351, n. 1, p. 301, n. 3
4,

Cf. (ran. et Corr.

ii.

Phys. iii. 1, 201,


De An. p. 375 sq., 440.
a,

and

supra.

32

'

Cf. p. 352, n. 2.

See

compare
*

Cf.

1,

a,

320,

29;

x^^^s TCfauaAv^adai

elsTrjVTrpdljTriv

x^^W-

See p. 351, n. 1.
Phys. viii. 4, 255,
An. ii. 5, 417, a, 21 sq.

and

'

Be

p. 348, n. 1.

passages

knowledge

Y^.^i.%,n.\,e.g.Metaj)?i.\\i\A,\OU,
a, 20: yiyvovrai 8e irXdovs v\ai
rod ai/rov, orav daripov t] crepa v,
oTov tp^ey/na e'/c Xnrapov koX yKvKeos,
d rd Kmaphv e'/c Tov y\vK4os, fK Se
v\-t)v ttjv

p. 352, n. 1, 5?/^r,

the

ascribe potential

quoted

a,

33;

METAPHYSICS
not only to the

man

of learning

355

when he

conceived as

is

not actually engaged in scientific activity, but also to

and even

the learner,

to

man

But the

in general.

we have

sense in each case varies, and

to distinguish

between the degrees of proximity to ivspysta} Nothing

which it had at first the


by degrees and in the universe at large there are an infinite number of intermediate
stages between mere Potentiality or the first Matter,
and complete Actualij^y, which is pure Form or God.
Now in the phenomenal world, Form presents itself
attains the realisation of that

mere capacity

to be, except

under the aspect of a threefold principle of causality,


while Matter contains the ground of all impressibility

and of all incompleteness, of natural necessity and chance.


Aristotle

is

enumerating four kinds

in the habit of

the

of Cause

efficient

and the

material, the conceptual or formal, the


final.^

Gen. An. ii. 1, 735, a, 9:


iyyvrfpo) 5e Koi iroppcoTepa) ajrh
auTov ivSix^rai elvai Sv/uLcifxei, wcrirep

These,

however, on closer

MetapJi.Y.

dros iroppuTipw koI outos tov dewp-

I, 1013, a, 17: iraiTwv


ovv KOivhv tcDp" apxoou rh irpurov
clyaL odeu ^ ^(Ttiv t) yiyvsrai ^
yiyvaxTKirai
tovtuu 5e ai fihu
ivvirapxovaai elaiv al 5e eKTOs.

ovvTos.

Anal. Post.

'

KadevSwv

y^ca/nerpris

On

Apxai.

tov iyprjyop-

the meaning of

Mctaph. v. 1,
with the comments of SchWEG-

this expression see

LEE andBONITZ, and also xi.l^'/i.,


Gen.
i.

et Corr.

i.

7,

324, a, 27, Phys.

5, 188, a, 27, viii. 1 Jin.,

Gen. An.

v.7,788,a,14;also7*o<?Z^. c. 7,1450,
b,27; Waitz, ^7'i,v^. Orr/ i.457 sq.,
the Ind. Arist. under apxh, and
p. 247, n, 2, sujfra. 'Apxv indicates
the lirst in every series, and in
this sense it is used for all kinds
of causes, but more especially of
first

causes,

ducible

i.e.

such as are de-

from no

higher.

Cf,

fihi/

1,

i.

2, 72, a, 6

Tojj. iv.

121, b, 9.

P/ajs. ii. 3, 194, b, 23


eVo
ovv rpSnov ainov \4yeTai rb 6|
o5 ylverai
ivvirapxovTos, olov
&\\ov
x'^^'^^^ '^ov ai/Spiwros, &c.
Se t^ ei5os koi to irapdS eiyfia tovto
^

/i^e^

5' 4(tt\v 6

\6yos 6 toD ti ^v eluai


koi to, tojtou yeVrj [i.e. the classes
above it] ... tTi od^v rj apxh ttjs
fxeTal^oAris

v tt^ccttj t) rf/s i]pefir](Tea}s


... eTi ws rh reAos tovto 5' iarl
Th ol %v^Ka ( = Metaph. v. 2)
195, a, 15 one class of causes is
ws t5 ^| ol olItio., and of these to
[lIv ws tI viroKeiixevov, to. Sc &s tJ>

AX

ARISTOTLE

356

two

inspection, are found to be resolvable into the

The concept of a thing

mentioned.

from

end, since to realise an end

its

But

concept.

not different
actualise a

is to

likewise possible to identify the

is

it

is

first

concept with the efficient cause, whether


thinf>' in motion from within as its soul, or

sets the

it

whether the

motion comes from without. Even in the latter case it


produces motion,
is the conception of the thing which
Only man can
alike in works of nature and of art.

Only the conception of health can determine


In like
tbe physician to labour in producing health.^
beget man.

next we liavc causes


^pxh T'?? ix^rafioKris v)

hai

Ti i]v

ueeu

7]

Kol

(Trdaeccs

Kivr,(Tcos

lastly

rh

Mctapk. i.
T(\os Kul rayaOov.
ra 5" atria KtyeraL Terpax^s,
iilit.
wv fi'av jJikv alriav (pa/xlv ehai rrjv
irepav
ovaiav Koi rh ri i)V eluai
Se T7V ^\r]u Kal rh viroKiifxe/xov,
'i^

rpirw

Se oOeu

rerdprTjv

Se

7]

apyj] tt/s Kivr,(Ttws^

avriKei/JLeuriv

aWlav

Kal rayadov.
1044, a, a2, Anal.
Pod. ii. 1 1 init., IJe Somno, 2, 455,
b, 14, Gen. An. i. 1 init ,\. 1, 778,

ravrr],

Ihid.

b,

7,

rh ov

viii.

'iveica

4,

and elsewhere

of.

Ind.

Arist. 22, b, 29. On the different


terms used for the four causes,
ihid. and Waitz, Arist. Org. ii.
407; on what follows, Hitter, iii.
106 sqq. The further modilications of the doctrine of the four

causes in Phys. ii. 3, 195, a, 2G


sq. (of. Mctapli. V. 2, 101 3, b, 2S),
are unimportant, as is also the
distinction of the ov eVexo into
person and thing, on which cf. Be
An. ii. 4, 415, b, 2 rh 5' ov eVewo
SiTT^J', rh ii.\v ov rh Se ^. See also
:

2, 194, a, 35, and Metajjh.


1072, b, 2 (where we must
read IcTt yap rivl rh ov 'ducKu Kal

Fhys.

xii. 7,

ii.

rivos the

end

in

is

one

the

case to heal the sicl-, and in the


other to estal)lish health).
Phys. ii. 7, 198, a, 24
eu
ipX^rai Se ra rp'a els rh

ncWaKLS rh fih yap ri Iffri Kal


rh ov euKa eV iffri [cf. 198, b, 3],
TO S' o9eu 7] Kivqcris irpcvrou rep
ct,vdpcctros yap
el'Sei ravrh rovrois
Cf. i. 7, 190, b,
avOpooTTou yevva.
l)e An. ii. 4, 415, b, 7:
17 sq.
tan Se r] ^vx^ '''^^ (wvros (Tu^iaros

'

alria Kal apX'h- ravra Se iToKKax<>>s


Aeyeiai. o/xoiws S' t] ^vxh Kara
rovs hiwpi.(Tfxevovs rpoTTOvs rpels
Kal yap iide;/ 7} Kivnais ai/ri],
ou eVe/ca, Kal ws 7] ovcria rS>v

alria
Kal

(Tcofx-drccv

ili^vX<^v

i|/inj/rj

airia,

which he goes on to prove more


Metaph. xii. 5, 1071, a,
iravrwu Srj rrpwrai apxai ro
iuepyfia irpiaroy, rd eifSej, Kal &\Xo

fully.

18

5u'AiJ.ei.

Elsewhere now one

and now another

of these three
identified with the
So Metaph. viii. 4, 1044,
third.
taws Se ravra (i.e. eldos and
b, 1
Gen. An. 1.
rekos) &ix<p(c rd avrd.
yap alriat
vir6Kivrai
init.
1
rerrupes,r6 re ov cVexa w5 reXos,

causes

is

Kal 6 \6yos rTJs oitaias

ravra

fikv

METAPHYSICS
manner we

357

find the pure

which is God,
Form, the ultimate end of the world and

the source of

its

shall in the highest cause,

Aristotle in his
oZv

ios

eV Tt

(fxeSi^r vTroXafielv 5e?,

riraprov

Tp'.rov Se Kol

is

t)

uAtj koL

apxh '^^^ Kit/'fjcrfcos. Ibid.


732, a 3, where the female
called the uAtj, the male the

'6dev
ii.

movement united in one. Nor does


physics distinguish more than two kinds

T]

1,

ahia

Kivovcra

virdpx^i

irpdoTT],

rd

Kol

and

elSos,

\6yos
c.

6,

where, as in i. 1, the
formal and the final cause are
identified, and only three principles are enumerated: the r4\os
or ou eueKu, the apx^ kivtjtlk^ koI
742, a, 28

and the XP^^'-I-'-^^ ^


Xpvrai rh rekos. Part. An. i. 1,
rrjs
641, a, 25
(l)vcrea}s Sixmos
Xeyo/jLfuris kuI oijffTjs ttjs ixhv us
v\7]s TTJs S' US ouaias [which =
yevvriTtKi]

?5os]

Kal

aVTt]

%<TTIV

Koi

U)S

7]

Kivovaa Kal ws rh t4Kos.


Phi/s. ii.
koI iirel t] (pvais
8, 199, a, 30
StTT')/ T) fxku WS uAtJ 7] 5' 0)5 (JiOpip)],
reKos 5' avrr]
avrr} &j/ etrj r/
ahia -q ou eVe/ca. Jbid. c. 9, 200,
a, 14
rh 5' ou eVe/ca iv Tqs \6'Y(f}.
Li. 34
rh reAos rh ou cueKa Kal 7/
apxh airh rov opiajxov Kal rov hdyov.
The artist's method is nature's
also: eVei 71 olKia TOi'i/Se, raSe
Set yiyveadai
ourws Kal el
&vdpci}7ros
ToSl, TttSi.
Part. An.
i.
14: (paiverai 5e
1, 639,
b,
7rpd}T7} [aWla^
%v \cyo/jLV 'iveKa
Tivos
\6yos yap obros. De An.
i.
T<)
eiZo%, eve/ca
1, 403, b, 6
TUivli.
Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 335,
b, 5: us [Xfv OAtj tout' iariv aXriov
Tols 7ej/7jTO?s, us 5e tJ ov eVe/cei/
fiopcj)^
7]
Kal rh elSos
tovtq 5'
effrlv 6 \6yos 6 ttjs eKdaTov oucrlas,
and previously : dalv ovv [at
Tf/s
o-pX"^
yeviaeus~\
Ka)
rhu
:

apiO^hv Xaai Kal

t^ yivu

at

avral

eV rols aiSiois re Ka\ irpcarois

a'.irep

yap

iikv

7)

fiopcpT]

us

iffTiv

tV

5e? 5e Kal

'

Metaph.

'

5'

us

tp'ittjv

ti

uAtj,

t]

see
p.341,n. l,fin. Meta2)h.\\\.linit.:
iravTa to. yiyvofiepa vtt6 re rivos
yiyuerai Kal eK tivos Kal ri. Of the
ixp' ou it is said f urtlier on
Kal
ixp^ ov, 7) Kara rh eJSos Xeyo/xevr]
irpoffvTrdpx^i-v.

xii. 3,

(pvcris

oyitoetSrjs [sc. rcf

7)

yiyvofxevcp]

&v9puTros yap &vQpuTTov yeuua, and further, 1032, b,


1 1
ooare (TVjx^aivn. rpSirov riva e|
vyidas
vyieiuv yiueadai, Kal

avT7] 5' eV

aW(f.

tV

r^v olKiav e'l o'lKias,


r^v exovcrau uAtjv
iarri

Kal

Kal

oIk'ixs

ttjs

ovaiav Svew h\7]s rh


(Cf. Gen.
7]

All.

ii.

5e r^xvr] fiopcp^

Part. An.

'dXAcf.

&vev vXrjs

yap

iarpiKT]

oiko^o/xik^ rh eldos ttjs

7]

vyieias

ttjs
t]

ri

Xiyu
-fju

b, 28

4, 740,

ruv yivojxivuv
i.

1,

S'

elvai.
:

iv

610, a, 31

5e rix^'O Xdyos rov tpyov 6 duev


rrjs v\7]s iffriv ; so in
Gen. et
7}

Corr.

ii.

335, b, 33, 35,

9,

fx.op(p-h

corresponds to Te'xfTj; the art,


however, is elsewhere treated as
the true efficient cause, the
artist only as a secondary cause
e.g. Gen. et Corr. i. 7, 324, a, 34.)
;

Metapli.
Kivovu

xii.

iv

di/dpctiirois

by

4 fin.
/jihi/

(read

(irel

ro7s

avOpurccf),

5e

rh

<pv(riKo7s

approved

ScHWEGLER and BoNiTz)

duOpuTTOS,

iv

5e rols dirh Siavoias

rh eldos ^ rh evavriov, rpowov riva


rpia aXria h.v eifTj, wSi 5e rirrapa.
vyieia yap ttus t} larpiKT], Kal oiKias
elSos 7] oIkoSo/jllk^, Kal &vdpuiros
dvdpuirov yevva
ry
yap
c. 3 fi'n.

larpiKT]
iffriv.

rexvri 6 \6yos rrjs vyidas

Speaking of health again,

ARISTOTLE

358

of Cause, necessary and

the operation of Matter

final,^ in

and that of Form or concept. ^ This is the only distinction, therefore, which we must regard as fundamental that between formal, efficient and final causes
For though the
is merely a secondary subdivision.
;

three are not always combined in the individual,^ yet


in themselves
is

and

in their essence they are one,

and

it

phenomena of sense that they are found


The created universe has several causes

only in the

separate."*

the eternal has only one

the

Form

Again, as the

is

essential concept itself.^

at once the efficient

and

the final force, so Matter as formless and indeterminate*'


said in

it is

ii24, b,
it

is

15,

not

Cicn.

et

Curr.

that as the ov

i.

7,

eVe/ca

K0L'r]TiK6v.

For a fuller discussion on


At this
point, it will be enough to refer the
reader to l^art. An. i. 1. Cf.
'

this, see pp. 841), &c. stipra.

dalv

5vo alriai
rh i^
oLvayKTis.
The opposition is indicated in 1, 17 in the words a.px'n

p, 642, a,
aZrai, r6 0'

ov

6.pa

eVewa

Koi

yap

T]

(pvais

which

/maWou

ttjs wAtjs,

with

further the passages


quoted in the foregoing note from
J*/n/s. ii. 8, and Part. Afi. i. 1.
cf,

For although in Gen. An.


778, a, 34, the moving cause
-

1,

v.
is

classed along with the necessary


and eflicient, yet as Ritter,
appealing to Pltys. ii. 9, 200,
remarks,
the
rightly
a,
80,
moving cause is not here considered by itself, but only as
united with matter. Cf. also
eV yap rrj vXrj rh
Hid. 1. 14
avayKOLOV, rh 5' ov iveKa iv T(p KSyqi.
^ So
that, as is remarked
Phijs. ii. 3, 195, a, 8, of tw^o
things each may be the cause of
:

the otlier, but in a different


sense physical exercise, r.ff., may
be the efficient cause of health,
health the final cause of exercise.
This is the meaning of ttoWolkis
;

ii. 7 (p. 356, n. 1).


Cf. J/etaj)Ji. ix. 8, 1049, b,

in P/u/s.
*

17: rqj Se XP^'^V Trpcrepov [sc. iv4pt^ rqS efSet rh


yia Svfdueccs^ ^5e

avTh ij/epyovv irpdTfpov [^i.e. every


potentiality presupposes a similar
actuality], apLdfji^ 5' oj for, as
this is explained, the seed indeed
precedes the plant which springs

from it, but this seed itself comes


from another plant, so that it is
still the plant that produces the
Ibid. vii. 9, 1034, b, 16
ovaias
'6ti avdyKrj
Trpovirdpx^tv krepav ova'iav eVreAe^e/a odaav ^ Trote?, oTov Cv^''^ ^*
ylyverai Cv*^^5
Gen. Ah. ii. 6, 742, b, 33:
apxv 5' iv fikv To7s oLKivfiTois rh ri

plant.
^5iov

icrriv,

rris

Se ro7s yivofiivois ^Stj


rp6irov 5' &\\ov Kot ov

rhv

apiOfihu, (iOev
^

iv

irAeious,

nacrai

See

p.

avr6v
r,

'

wv

fi'ia

Kivrjais iariv.

318 sq.

srijjra.

rhv

METAPHYSICS
once the passive subject of

is at

cause of

all

359

impressions and the

all

blind operations unregulated by any purpose.

Matter alone can receive impressions, for

all

irddos

is

and nothing is susceptible of


such a process but that which is not yet determined

process of determination,

nothing, that

determinable

but the indeterminate and therefore

is,

nothing but Matter,


which can exhibit every activity and every quality,
other words,

in

itself, it has no
But though Matter is
wholly devoid of any such active and positive force,

reason that, taken in

for the simple

quality

or

operative

force.^

Aristotle nevertheless attributes to


to the

it

every obstruction

other source, indeed, could this be traced


since

that

And

so,

Form always works with a purpose, it is in Matter


we must seek the ground of all phenomena that

are independent of this final purpose


it,

To what

energy exercised by Form.

plastic

and antagonistic

to

the principle of blind natural necessity and chance.

The

first

of these obstructive forces

is

to be explained

by

Nature's need of certain materials and the consequent de-

pendence of her creatures upon the same.


material element

in

is

no sense

Though

this

yet

it is

efficient cause,

an indispensable condition of the realisation of Nature's

Though

ends.

ditionally

Geii. et Corr.

'

ovv

^cra fxep

it is

not necessary in

for if a certain particular


i.

7,

324, b, 4
e^et

to

itself, it is

so con-

being has to be pro-

Trio'xe'J' etrri koX

rb

Kiucla-Oai,

rh

t)]V

Se kivui^ koX ttouIv CT^pas dwdfiews.

TiKuiu,

Tavra fiev awadT} twv ttoii)oaa S' iv vArj, iraOTjTiKoi. tV


fifv yap v\7jt' XeyofjLev S/jLoicas cds
(lirelv Tr]v avT^v ilvai twv auTiKei-

Of Matter as moved and Form as


mover we shall have more to say

fxevccv diroTcpovovv, cSo-Trep

immediately.
How exclusively
passivity was limited by Aristotle
to Matter, appears especially iu

jxt]

eV vKri

p.op<p)]v,

ibid.

kSv

1.

ii.

18

9,

t/S'uAtj

ri

y4po5

ov.

v\r} iraOrjri-

335, b, 29 t^s fxhyap vK-qs


:

his anthropology.

ARISTOTLE

360

duced certain particular materials must be ready to


hand.^ For the same reason, the extent to which Nature
'

had already sharply

riato

the aXria from tlie


avva'nia, the efficient causes (8t'
aJv 7171/6x01 Tt) from
the indispensable conditions {av^v ww ov

distiiig-iiished

yiyuerai)

JJir.

cf.

1.

(512

sqq.

adopts this disHis whole view of


nature turns on the opposition
between design and natural nealso

Aristotle
tinction.

cessity, between what is required


by the conception or form of a
thinii: and what proceeds from

the nature of its material: the


former is the 5i' h, the latter the
oZ ovK aueu the former is independent and
unconditioned, the
latter is for a purpose and conditionally necessar}'.
To these
two there is added a tliird kind
oi^ necessit}^
viz.
compulsion,
which, liowever, does not further
concern us here (unon this as
distinguished from the necessity
of the conce]jtion, cf. P/ti/s. viii. 4,
;

254, b, 18; An.

87;

Metaph.

Pc;,s^.

ii.'u, 94, b,

1015, a, 2(5
sqq.,vi. 2, 1026, b, 27, xi. 8, 1004,
b, 88) Cf. Mctaph. xii. 7, 1072, b,
rh yap kva-yKOLOv roaauraxoos,
11
TO fx-ev I3:a otl vapa ryjv opjjLrjV, to
Se ov OVK civv rh ev, rh Se /x^ eV5eXo/i6j/oy aWws dAA' airAcos.
Part.
An. i. 1, (i8'.), b, 21: rh 5' e| audyv.

5,

iir)s

ov

iraaiu

(pvcriu o/noLccs

fxiv

awAuis

virapx^i

....

To7s

to7s

kuto,

virapx^t 5e t6

aiBiois,

rd

5'

i^

viro9(aojs Kal to7s iu 76 j/6 ere iraaiv.


Jhid. 642, a, 1 etVJv apa Sto aWai
avrai, t6 0' ov evKa Kal rd e^
auiyKrjs
iroWa yap yiverai on
1

avdyK-q.

8'

av ris aTropr}<Tie
TToiau Xeyovffiv avdyK7)v at keyuvres
e'l audyKrjs' tuu /idpyap Svo rpdiruv
ovSerepov olov re virdpx^iv, rww
'lacos

ivTo7s Kara (piXoffo^iav

diaspKTjj.ei'wv

[the necessity imposed by the


conception and that of compulsion].
ecTTt S' ev yc to7s exovai
yhiffiv 7] rpiTTi. X^yojxiv yap t)]v
Tpo(l)))u avayna^ov ti KaT ov5eTpoi/
TovTcav

Toov

on ovx

rpoircov, dAA.'

rovro 5'
iarlp wa-iTip e| uTrofleVews. Gen.
An. i. 4, 717, a, 15 ttuv rj (pvcris
5id rb avayKa7ov Troie? 7) 5id ro
7)
fifXnov ii. 6, 748, b, 16: irdpTa
oiou T &vev Tavrrjs eJvai.

5e ravra, Kaddirep etiro/xev (748, a,


86), Ae/creoj/ y'lveaOai rfj jjlIv e'l
5'

avdyKris, ttj

%VQKd Tivos

ovk 6| avdyK7\s dAA'


5t'
8, 776, b, 82
alrias, eueKd re rod

iv.

a/xcpOTcpas tcls

jSeATiVrou koI e^ avdyKrjs.


Phys.
ii. 2 init.
rh S' e| avdyKris irSrepov
:

e'l

vTToQtffiws vTrdpx^i ^ Kal air\a>s ;

usually we look for the necessity


in the nature of the material
parts
dAA' ofiws ovk dvev yuev
rovrcov yeyovev, 01 fxevroi 5 i d ravra
;

ws

Tr\))u

5t'

v\7)v

Se Kal

dfxoius

aWois iraaiv, eV oaois rh


rov eVrij/, ovk dvev fikv rcav
avayKalav exovrcov rrjv (pvaiv, ov
/xivroL 76 Sid ravra dAA' 1) ws vXtjv
e| vTToOecreoos St/ rh avayKa7ov,
dAA' ovx ^^ rfXos iv yap rrj v\t)
rh avayKa7ov, rh S' ov eveKa iv rqj
koyq}.
L. 80
(j)avephv S^ on rh
avayKa7ov iv ro7s (pv(nKo7s rh ws
iv ro7s
'4vKd

'

iiKr)

Pe An.

So/fg? 5e
aTr?\a>s

ncriv

alria

TTcos

dinov,

ai Kivr,a^is

ai

416,

9:

ii. 4:,

rov

r)

tt/s

a,

-rrvphs

rpocprjs

<pv(Tis

Kal

rrfs

rh 5e crvvair lov
ianv, ov firjv air\us ye

av^^<TQ}s hai
fiev

Kal

\y6fjLvov

ravrr\s.

aWafiaWov

Gen.
7) ^vxriii. 9, 335, b, 24 sq.
it is
not the matter which is the pro-

et Corr.

ducing cause, for


sive

and moved

merely pasthe Kvpiwrepa

it is
;

METAPHYSICS

361

can realise lier end the mode and the perfection in


which the Form manifests itself are conditioned by the
character of these materials that is, by their capacity for
receiving and exhibiting the Form
Just in proportioD as

this capacity is wanting, will the formations be imperfect

and degenerate from their true patterns and the proper


we shall have productions
which serve no end at all, but are developed incideutpurposes of nature, or perhaps

ally as the result of


sity, in

some natural coherence and neces-

the course of the realisation of Nature's purposes.^

and the fiop<pii.


The physical is the mere tool of the
alria is ri ^u elyai

causative conception heat does


not any more of itself effect production than the saw saws of itself.
Part. An. iii. 2, G63, b, 22 iras
;

8e T7JS

avaryKaias (pixreais exova-rfs

To7s vTrdpxovffiv e| audyKr]S

rhu \6yov

rj

kuto,

tov /coxaSimilarly Aristotle distinguishes {Anal. Post.


ii. 11, 94, b, 27) '^v^ko. tivos and e|
avdyKtis and enumerates {Metai)h.
V, 5) the commoner applications
oi kvayKcuov: to that oS &vev ovk
eyS^x^rai (fjy, &c.
ws avvairiov,
to that which is fiiaiou and to that
(pvffis

eueKo.

Kexprirai, x4yup.v.

which is oLvayKoiov in the proper


sense rh airXuvv ( = arrXSos avayKoiov) viz. the /i^ hZex^ijx^pov &\Xws
6X641/.

Quite in conformity with

Eudemus
ajmd Sim PL. P/12/s. 63, a, that
matter and aim are the two
this

is

the statement of

causes of motion.
Within the
sphere of conditional necessity
there is again (Gen. An. ii. 6, 742,
a, 19 sq.; where, however, 1. 22,
we must read, not ov IVe/ca but
with Cod. PS. and Wimmer
rovTov u.) a twofold distinction
made between that which as
efficient cause
conditions the

production of
anything and
that which is necessary to it as
the instrument of its activity:
the former must precede in origin
the thing which it aims at producing the latter must follow it.
Cf. on the whole subject Waitz,
Arist. Org. ii. 409 sq.
Part. An. iv_. 2, 677, a, 15
KaTaxpVTai fxev ovv fviore r] (pvais
;

els rh wcpiXifiov tois TrfpiTTcafiaaiu,


ov fiijv Sia TOVTO Se? ^rjreTv iravra
evcKa TLVOS,
aXXd rivcav vvroiv
TOiovTcav erepa e'| avdyKTis (rvfi^aivei

Tavra iroXXd. So according to


Gen. An. v. 1, 778, a, 30, only
that has an end to serve which
appears universally in all nature's
productions or in certain classes
of them ; individual varieties on
the other hand have none
the
eye has an end to serve the fact
that it is blue has none ibid,
dia

c.

8 Jin.,

mention

is

made

of

phenomena oaa

yiveaOai (rv/xfiaivei
fx^ VKd TOV aXX' e| avdyKrjs Koi 810,
T^u alriav t^i/ KivrjTiK-fji/. According to Metajj/i. viii. 4, 1044,
b, 12, the eclipses of the moon
appear to serve no end
vei 6
;

ovx

rhv (rtrov ah^-tiar),


aXX' e| avdyKr]s
rh yap avax^fv
\|/yX^')''"* ^^^ ^"^ T^ ^vx&^v vSccp
Zei/s

^TTOJs

ARISTOTLE

362

We

shall hereafter

have occasion to observe how deeply

this view is rooted in Aristotle's

whole theory of Nature,

and how many phenomena he accounts for by the resistance of Matter to Form.
Again the same property
of Matter is also the source of all contingency in

By

Nature.^

'

the contingent,'

carefully

first

examine

to

stands in general

all

not belong to a thing


in its

that which

is

neither contained

KareXOuu
to S' av^drovTov yivoixivov rhv <t7tov
ofxoicas 5e

(rvfj-fiaivei.

Koi ^X

rcf)

airoWvTai 6 alros eV Trj a\(f, ov


TOVTov eveica vei ottojs air6\7]Tai,
aWarovTO avfi fie fir] Ki^(Phys. ii.
individual organs
8, 198, b, 18)
of animals are without purpose
the bile is a Tripirrufia Kal ovx
eueKOL Tivos {Part. An. ibid. 1. 13),
the stag has no use for its antlers
;

G6B, a, 6, 664, a, 7).


The same is true of all superfluous materials which are unemployed
such materials are
&xpvo"roi' or even rwv Trapa (pvaiv
Ti (Gen. An. i. 18, 725, a, 1, 4)
we must therefore decide even in
reference to one and the same
material whether it serves a purpose or not
lymph {lx<^p), eg.,
which consists partly of half-assimilated and partly of corrupted
blood, is in the former aspect
a'lfxaros
X"P*'' ^^ ^he latter e|
avdyKTis (Part. An. ii. 4 Jin.).
Necessity of this latter kind, as
is indicated in the passage quoted
above from PJiys. ii. 8, coincides
2,

with contingency.

Whether

'

'

its

neither necessary nor

is

we must assume the

That

yevifxcvop

iii.

the

that can equally well belong or


:

and which accordingly

normal.^

{ibid.

who was

conception,^ under-

essence nor supported by the necessity of

being,"*

viOfQai

Aristotle,

this

existence

also of all

of

freedom

choice in man, from which


alone contingent effects really
spring (to it alone at least these
are referred in De Interpr. c. D,
18, b, 81, 19, a, 7), Aristotle does
not tell us. In Phys. i. 5, 1 96, b, 17,
sq., he expressly excludes frQ^
purpose, as such, from the domain
of rixvof

':^vfxfiifir]Khs in the narrower


sense, rb airh Tvxfis.
^ As he says himself, Phys. ii. 4.
* An.
Post. i. 4, 73, a, 34, b,
10 Aristotle calls KaS" aiira, oaa
koI
virdpx^i^ Te fv rcf tI iffriv
oaois Twv cvvirapx^vrcov avrois avra
iv Ty Koycp ivvirdpxovcri ry ti iari
'^

5r]\ovvTi

Sea 5e

iirdpx^i, (rvfififiTiK6Ta

firfderepoos

further, t^

avrh virdpxov kKdcTT(f Kad^


fi}] 5i avrd (rv/j.fiefir]K6s.
Top. i. 5, 102, b, 4 avfifi^firiKos
Se iffriv ... & eySe'xeTat virdpx^iv
Si'

/iiev

avrh, rd 5e

6r(f}0vv

evl

virdpx^iv

and

fievov

/col

T(f

Svi/ardv,

KoL

avTCf

cf p. 234, n.

[xij

on ivS^x^-

p. 218, n. 4,

on avfificfirjKos.
Metaph. v. 30, init. ffvixfie-

p. 214, n. 3,
^

firiKos

AeyeTai

ft

virdpx^i

fji-fv

Ttv*

METAPHYSICS

363

such a principle, and not ascribe everything to the


operation of necessity, Aristotle proves in the

first

place

by the witness of universal experience,^ and in particular


by the fact of the Freedom of the Will.^ But he finds
the true rationale of
finite existence

contingency in the fact that

all

all

contains the potentiality of being and

not-being, and that Matter as the indeterminate renders


opposite determinations possible.^

property of Matter that


dently of the

final

many

It follows

from

this

things happen indepen-

The

action of eflScient causes.

latter

have always a definite object in view, but they frequently


fail

of

its

perfect accomplishment

'^^

owing

to the inde-

terminate nature of the Matter which they use, while


at other times,

owing

to the

incidentally produce results

design.^

ally

contingent or accidental

Koi aKTjdes elirelv ov fievTOi out'

avdyKr}s otr' eVl

same
1026

t^ ttoKv.

definition is given
b, 31 sqq. (xi. 8).

e|

The
vi.

Phys.

2,
ii.

5 init.
Be Cwlo, i. 12, 283, a, 32:
rh fifv yap avrcfiaTSv icTTi Kal rh
aird Tvxv^ Trapa ro ctel Kai rh a>s
;

iirl
ii.

rh iro\v ^ou t)yiv6ixvov. Phys.


might not the
138, b, 34

8,

appearance of design in nature


be explained by supposing that
of her chance productions only
those survive which are fitted
to Uve ?
No ravra [xhv yap Kal
iraura ra (pvaei fj ael ovtu yiverai
^ cos iirl rh troXh, roov 8' airh rvxvs
Kal TOV avTO/xdrov ovdev.
So Ue
:

Ccclo,
'

ii.

8,

same disturbing cause, they


which they did not origin-

289, b, 26.

Phys. ibid. 196, b, 13.


Be Interpr. c.^, 18,

b, 31,

19, a, 7.
^ Be Interpr. c. 9, 19, a, 9
there must be contingency, '6ri
:

event

is

oXws eariv eV ro7s /j.^ ael ivfpyovai


rd Svvarov (hai, koI fx^ d/xoius.
Metaph. vi. 2, 1027, a, 13: &(tt
t}

uAtj

alrla,

(XTai

irapa t5 ws

rh

iirl

fj

-ttoXu

iubexofx^vr]

&\\u}s, rod

(see p. 345,
n. 5, svjjra), v. 30, 1025, a, 2i: ovSe
S^ aXriov copicrixivov ovdev tov
a-i;^)8e)37?/coTos,
aWa rh tvx^u,
tovto S' aSpiarou. Cf. n. 5 infra.
See pp. 3G0 sqq. s^qjra,
(rv/i/SejSTj/cf^Tos

vii. 7

'

An. iv. 10, 778, a, 4:


fiovXerai fikv oZv 7} (pvais to7s
rovroou [t&v ^.arpoov'] api9/xo7s apidGen.

ras yeueaeis Kal tcls reXfVTas,


ovk aKpifio7 5e did re t)]v ttjs i/Arjs
anpiffTiav KaldiaTh yiveaQaiiroKXas
apX"^> '' "^^^ yevea-eis ras Kara.
<pvaiv koX to? <p6opas i/jLTrobi^ovaai
noWaKis aKnai rwv irapa (pvaiv
ffvfjLirnrrdvToiv elaly.
See further
p. 341 sqq.
ytieTj/

See

u.

3,

sniira.

Phys.

ii.

ARISTOTLE

364

caused by the diversion of free or compulsory purposeful


action to results alien from

purpose through the in-

its

Now,

fluence of external circumstances.^

since these

disturbing circumstances are always found in the nature


of the material

means by which ends

in the system of nature to

Contingency,

in

are realised, and

which these means belong,


word,

sense of the

Aristotle's

may

be defined as the disturbance by intermediate causes


of an activity directed to a purpose. ^

obedience to a purpose

is

or cpnception of an object

does not proceed from


5, 196, b,
fiev 'iviKa
5'

eo'Ti

17 rajv Se yivofxivoov to.


rov ylyverai, raS' ov
eveKo. tov
oca re a-nh

Siavo'as

ii.v

(pv(T(ios.

TO,

5r)

(pafXiv flvai

oaa anh

ToiavTa orav Kara

ysvrjTai,

avixfieP-)]Khs

a'jTo aXriov

Kol

.irpaxdeir]

airh

rh

tvxV^

ovv /ca9'
rh 5e /cara

/xlv

oi>pi(Tjj.4i/ov,

yap
&j/ T(f hi cru/xfia'T].
It is chance,
for instance, if one conies to a
place for another purpose and is
rewarded in a way he had not
aupiarov

(TvfxfiefirjKhs

thought of

OLTreipa

he (Metaj)h. v.
30) digs a hole and finds a treasure

or if
place

or

if

desires to sail to
is
carried to
another or, generally, if from
action directed to a definite end

one

l:ie

and

SQjTiething else results, by reason


of the intervention of external

circumstances, than that which


was intended (orau fi^ rov
(Tvfi^dvTos eveKa

yhrjTai, ov

e|cD

Phys. ii. 6, 197, b, 19).


If the action is one of voluntary
choice (irpoaipeTou) such a chance
(according to the passage just
quoted from Phys. ii.) must be
TO

a'lTiov,

activity in

That which

realised.^

is

is

it

But

that by which the essence

unessential

and there-

called Tiixv, otherwise avTOfxaTou,


so that the latter is the wider
conception. Both, however, stand
ecpially

tion

opposed to purposed ac-

uxTT

atria, Koi

7]

iireiBi]

rvxv

aopiara ra ovtus

o-^pi'f^TOV (^Phljs. ii.

197, a, 20).
Akin to this, but unimportant for our present investigation,
is the coincidence in time of two
5,

'

circumstances betw^een which no


causal relation of any kind exists, e.g.

a walk and an eclipse of

the moon. Such a coincidence


(which is the purest and simplest
case of contingency) Aristotle
calls a-vfiTTUfxa, Div'm, jk S. i.
462, b, 26 sqq.
2 See p. 856 sqq. sujjra.
Metaph. vi. 2, 1026, b, 18
Sxrirep yap ovSfxaTi jxdvov rh trvfjifiefi7]K6s ion. 5tb nXoLTCov rpSirov Tiva
oil KUKois T^v o'o^io'TiKTju irepl rh fir}
Ou fra^ev. elal yap ol ruu (rotpiffrdv
Xoyoi irepl rh ffvfifiefir]Khs us clveTv
(patuerat
IJ.d\iara Trdvroov.
L. 21
yap rh avfiPcPrjKhs iyyvs ri rov (xi)
^

OVTOS,

METAPHYSICS

3G6

fore Aristotle says that the contingent borders

on the
After what has been already said about

non-existent.^

the nature of Knowledge,

it

scarcely needs, therefore, to

be explicitly stated that such a principle as Contingency


can be no object of Science.

While

it is

obvious from what has just been said

about the nature of Matter, that


'primordial than

it is something far more


might have been expected from the first

definition given of its concept, this

from other considerations.

becomes

From Matter
'

clearer

still
'

Aristotle is

not contented with deducing merely what one

is

apt to

consider as accidental and unessential, but also certain


properties of things which essentially belong to the
conception of them and contribute to determining their
generic character. The distinction, for example, between

male and female

is said to be merely one of material ^


and yet procreation, which depends upon it,^ occupies a
most important place in the scheme of the philosopher.'*
;

'
Anal. Post. i. 6, 75, a, 18, C.
Mctaph. ihid. 1 02G,
30, 33 init.
b, 2, 1027, a, 19 (xi. 8).
2 MctajjJt. vii. 5, 1030, b, 21
sex
,

is

reckoned one of the essential

ix,iir\hu\eB,i\\eKaQ' a-jTavTTapxovTa;

but

X. 9 iiiit. it is asked Zia ri


yvv)^ avZphs ovk eiSet Sia(p4pi ...
ou5e QfQv e?]\u Kal &ppiv 'irepoif t^
ei'Se/,
KairoL Kad' avrh tov ((fov

ical ovx ws Aeukottjs


a\X' y Cv^^v, Kal rh
07i\v Ka.1 rh appev vTrdpx^i ; iin(] the
answer is that a distinction in

aurrj

Koi

7;

Siacpopa

fieXavia,

kind rests on ivavTioTrjTes iu rcf


^6y(f alone, not on those eV rfj
fi^rj. rh Se Sipp^w Kal 6rj\v tov
Cv^^
oiKe7a u(u irdOr], aAA' ov
oixTiau,

kot^ r^y

dAA' eV ry vKrj Kal t^

crw/xart.

rh avrb

hih

(Tireptxa

OrjKv

'yiyv^raL -naQov ri nddos.

An.

iv. 3,

v)

&ppij/

Cf. Uen.

767, b, 8 sqq.,

ii.

3,

and p. 353, n. 4, mj)ra.


Be An. ii. 4, 415, a, 2G, and
ol her passages.
That this is in737, a, 27,
'

compatible with the statement


Metaph. x. 9, was rightly

in

remarked

by Engel,

Ueb.

d.

Bcdeut. d. vKf] Arist., llheiii.


3Ius. N.F. vii. 410.
* It is even stated,
Gen. An.
i.
2, 710, a, 17, b, 8, that the
sexual distinction, depending as
it does on dilference of function,
is /faro rhu Xdyov and is one oh
Kara rh rvx^v fiopiou ov5h Kara
ttjp rv^ovaav SvvafJLiv.

ARISTOTLE

366

we

Similarly

liave occasion to observe that the

sliall

which Aristotle always represents as


even in their physical nature different in kind from
human beings, are yet at the same time to be regarded
lower animals,

as imperfect

which have been prevented

formations

(owing, w^e must suppose, to the properties of Matter)

from developing into the form of man.


is to

Matter that

must

w^e

ruptibility of earthly things

from tlie
follows
This
general consideration that all
Change and Becoming presupposes a material (sec jj.342,n.2 sq.
suj^ra) which, as Suvdufi ov contains the possibility alike of
being and not-being ( Gen. et
'

Cor?',

ii.

Metaph.

vii.

and

7,

other passages. Cf. p. 345, n. 5),


as Aristotle himself distinctly
Cf. MctajJh. vii. 15 (see
says.
p.' 220, n. 2, supra), ix. 8, 1050,
b,

eCTt

[Or as this
203, b,

4,

5'

ovdiv Svudfxd

dtSioj/.

expressed P/tys. iii.


30 eVSe'xeo-^ai yap t)
is

eluai cvSev Siaipepii iu to7s ciiStois.]

\6yos 8e oSe.
rf/s avTKpda^ws

-KCKra

iffriv

aua

diiua/JLLs

[the possi-

being invohes the


bility of
possibility of not being, &c.]
Th apa Swarhu (hai ivbex^Tui
Koiflvai Kal p.)] eT'at(cf.p. 234, n. 1),
.

t})

S'

iv^ex^lJ-^vov

(peapro'j (similarly, xiv.

Hvai

(xri

2, init.).

The motion, therefore, of every


perishable thing is combined
with effort, for only thus is the
possibility of the opposite sta*e
(the hvva;xis t7]s avr i<bd(Ttci}S, 11. 25,
.30

sqq.)

overcome

vKt] Ka\ hvpaixis ovaa,

^ yap ovala
ovk eufpyeia,

alria tovtov; viii. 4, 1044, b,

ovd iravrhs v\r) icTTlv oAA'


yiyeffis

iffri

Ka\

27

otrcoj/

/nera/SoA./;

Furthermore,

its

and the same must be

6.K\riXa.

o(Ta

PdWeiv

ecTTiv

Tj

S'

&vev tov fx^raovk eari rovrcav

/ur/,

oea
vii. 10, 1035, a, 25
ovv (TvviiXriixixiva rh elSos Kal
ravra fxku
iarlu
i/Atj

v\7i
jx^v

it

and cor-

refer the mutability

(pdiiperai

ravra

els

oaa Se

avvei\r]Trrai rfj vArj, aA\' ai/eu


ravra 5' ov (pdeiperai ^
uAtjs

/jt.^

oXcos ^ oijTOL ovToo 76 (similarly it

forms,
of immaterial
ou5'
i<rri
1070, a, 15
yivecris Ka\ (pOopa rovrcav, aAA'
dWov rp6irov etal Kal ovk clcrlv
olKia re rj dvev vkrjs Kal vyieia Kal
irav rh Kara rexvr\v not the form
as such, as we must understand
said

is

xii.

3,

only its union with


1. 22, but
this or that material has a beginning and end); xii. 1, 1069,
b, 3
2,

^8'

alaOrjrr] ovcria fMerafiKrjTT)

10G9, b, 24

irdvra

5' i/'At/i/

ex^t
3, 465,

oaa ^jTajBiAAet. Longit. v.


S> p-'h ear IV evavriov Kal oiroi
a^vvarov av ei'rj (pdaprjvaL
fxr} eariv
But we may not infer from this
the indestructibility of any material thing: advvarou yap r(p v\t]v
b, 7

exovri/XT] virxpxeiv ttws rh evavTiov.


yap evelvai rh Oep/xhu ^

TrdfTri fxeu

rh

ei/dv

eudex^Tai,

irau

8'

elvai

aBvuarov ^ depfihu J) evdv rj KevKov


Kexo^pKr/xeva
etrrai yap ra irdOT}
[' for in this case these qualities

would

be

independent

exist-

MBTAPHYStCS
said of all badness
ences

'].

ovv,

orav

and imperfection,^ although the perafxa

^ rh

noir]TiKhv koI rh iraOrjTiKhu, aei t^


jjiev TTOiei rb 5e 7roo';\;6t, adiiuarov
u)] /n^TafidWeiu.
De Ccnlo, i. 12,
nothing that is with283, a, 29
:

out beginning can have an end,


and nothing that is without end
can have had a beginning, since
this could only be if it were its
nature at one time to be, at
another not to be. t&v Se
TOIOVTWV
T]
aVTT}
SvyafjLis
ttjs
avTKpdcreus Kal rj SXt] alria rov
eluai Kol

fi-ff.

Metaph.

ix. 9, 1051, a, 15 ;
Aristotle seems, indeed, to assert
the very opposite of this avdyK-r)
8e Koi itrl Twv KUKccv rh Te\os Kal
iuepyeiav eJvai
x^^P^^ '''VS
Suua/iiecas
t5 70^ Suvduepou ravTO
&!J.(pci) ravavTia.
Srjkou &pa on ovic
eVri rh Ka/cbj/ Trapa to irpdyfiara
vaT^pou yap ttj (pvffei rh Kanhv rrjs
'

tV

'

'

But

Suvd/j.e(i}s.

this only

means

that since every dvuafiis contains


the possibility of opposite deter-

minations (see

what

p. 234, n. 1, S7ij)ra)

merely Swdfxei hv we
cannot attribute one of two
mutually exclusive qualities,
such as good and bad, as the
Platonists had done in explaining matter as evil (cf. I)k\ i.
to

is

642, 6, 721, 737).


Nevertheless,
the ultimate cause of evil can
only reside in the Swdfifi ov, in
other words, in matter and this
is indicated by Aristotle himself when, in the passage just
quoted, he proceeds ovk &pa ov5'
iv To7i e| apxv^ kolI to7s aiSiois
oiidiv iariu ovtc Kanhv ovTe a/j.dpTTifia ovT 5i(f)6ap/xfi/ou
Kal yap rj
:

5i(X(p6opa
is

rwv KaKwu

There
no imperfection in the eternal,

since
7i(f

it

367

ia-riu.

exists continually eVep-

and therefore excludes the

possibility of opposites, since its


conception has for ever been
realised in it and will always
continue to be realised. Evil

and imperfection, on the other


hand, consist in nothing else
than a discrepancy between the
concept of a thing and its
actual state. While, therefore,
on the one hand, the Svud/j-ci hv
cannot be itself evil, yet is it,
on the other hand, the ultimate cause and condition of it.
Accordingly Aristotle himself
speaks {Phys. i. 9, 192, a, 15) of
the KaxoTTOihv of the i/Ar;.
He
it is not evil in itself and in its essence, but only

admits that

in a secondary sense, and in


so far as, being without form, it
lacks also the qualitj^ of goodness
(cf. p. 324, n. 6, and p. 344, n. 1).
But it is precisely upon this want
and this indeterminateness that

the possibility of its turning out


bad as well as good depends.
Eternal reality excludes evil, since
it has either no matter at all, or
one which, as perfectly definite
and formed, is incapable of opposite determinations while mutability and change, on the other
hand, are sure indications of evil
and imperfection,
(On this
subject cf also Eth. JV. vii. 15,
1154, b, 28 fiera^oXi] Se irdvTcov
yXvKVTarov, Kara rhv ttoit^t^u, Sia
TTov-qpiav rivd. uxrirep yap dvOpcoTros
:

evfXiTdfioXos 6 TTovripu^, Kal


7]

Seo/jLeuT]

ixera^oXris

rj

(pixns

yap

ou

And

SO we
shall find that Aristotle traces
all imperfect forms of natural
existence to the resistance which
the matter offers to the form and
by a parity of reasoning he would
have been forced to refer the
aK\rj

oi55'

iirieiKTis.)

ARISTOTLE

368

and imperishable heavenly bodies are no less formed


In Matter alone we must seek
of a definite material.^
for the cause of change and motion, which result from

feet

Matter,

an innate striving of Matter after Form.^


finally, is

the source of individual existence, in

things at least

and Form.

all

those

which are formed of the union of Matter

Aristotle

certainly

did not treat

of the

principle of Individualisation with the universality and

we could have wished and thereby he


bequeathed to his followers in the Middle Ages a rich op-

definiteness that

portunity for scientific controversy.

We shall find here-

after that, in addition to corporeal beings,

he recognises

and
man, incorporeal beings free from any taint of Matter,
which we must nevertheless regard as being also individual existences.^ Yet when the Form becomes actual in
the rational part ot

in the Deity, the spheral spirits

anv material,

the latter alone which explains

it is

source oE moral evil to the body,


which in his general scheme is
alone passive and changeable,

had he

not, as

we

shall see liere-

after, left this question

wholly

vague.
"'
Aristotle himself has not
overlooked this objection. He
meets it {MctapU. viii. 4,1044, b,
eVi Se twv
6) with the remark
(pvcriKciy jiifv aiSiwv 5e ovaiuv &\\os
:

\6yos. "laws 'yap evia ovk exet vhrjv,


(pvaiKoX koX
^1 o-j ToiavTt]i' (as the
'y^vvrirai ovciai)

aXXa

fx6vov

Kara

Similarly xii, 2,
1069, b, 24. The ether, for instance, of which the heavens and
the heavenly bodies consist, is
said to have no ei'avTiwo-is and
therefore to be subject to no
It has
chano-e in its substance.
T6irov KivoTiv.

why the

none of the qualities on which


rest the mutual opposition of
the elements and their transformation into one another (cf.
The question is,
p. ;-}58 sqq.).
how it can be Si">, if it is really
matter and if all matter is a
Syi/ct^ei ov and all Suz/a;u.is contains
the possibility of opposite states.
this, more infra.
The solution which the
Schoolmen in their doctrine of
-

On

angels devised, to the effect that


these pure spirits, as
specitically different from every
other and itself the only member
of the species, is therefore at
once specifically and numerically
single, is nowhere suggested by

each of

Aristotle.

METAPHYSICS

369

Form is never present in it except under certain limiting


conditions and with certain definite properties, which are
not contained in the Form as such that is, in the pure

Concept of the thing.

The Form

or Concept

Universal,' denoting not a thing but a kind,^

is

always a

and capable

of being thought, but not of existing,

by itself apart from


Between the Individuals into which the m^/nce
species resolve themselves no difference of kind or Form
any longer exists,'* and consequently they must be distinguished from one another by their Matter.^ Aristotle is
things.^

unable to apply this principle unwaveringly


See p. 219, n. 4, and p. 221,
supra and upon ii'^os as the object of the conception see notes on
pp. 216 and 341, &c., and cf. p.

173, n. 2.
2 3Ietaph. viii. 8, 1033, b, 21

the form

oipifffxivov

ovK

f(TTiv,

aWa

iroiel Kal

But this
mark of

the distinctive

is itself

universaliiy; see pp. 'S3'd,Scc.supra.


^ Phys. ii. 1, 11)3, b, 4
^ P-op<ph
Koi rb eidos, ov xajpitrrbv ou ctAA' ^
Kara rhv \6yov. Metaph. viii. 1,
1042, a, 2G sqq.
v. infra, n. G.
:

Seeuotesatpp.216, 221,&c.

supra.

Metapk. vii. 8fi?i. (cf. c. 10,


the form unites
with the matter, rh 5' airav ^'St? rh
^

1035, b, 27 sqq.)

Toiovde

elSos

iv Ta?o-Se rais aap^l

Kal oTTols KaXKias Kal ^ooKpdrTis


Kal CTepou fihv Sia r^qv v\r]v, ercpa
'

yap, ravTh 5e to5 eJfSet


H-rofiov yap
rh etSos; x. 9, 10o8, a, 37
i^rel^

i(Tri

rh fih \6yos rh

fiep iv Tqi

ttSei

ooai
evavTi6Tr}T(s
S' i/Arj,

\6ya) flfflu
voiovai Siacpopav, Hcrai

VOL.

I.

5' cV

fxeXauia

ov

TTotu

Se

us

v\t]

yap

6 6.v6p(i}iros,

Sia<})opay
tj

i/Atj-

[a specific
ovk avdpccrrov

yap

is

K tovSc roidvSe.

through-

<Tvv^i\i)fXfi4v(p TTJ vKrj ov iroiova-iv.


Sih avQpwTTQv XevKdrrfs ov iroiu
ou5e

difference]

not something apart


from definite material things,
aAAa t^ toi6v^( arj/jLaluti, rdde Kal
yei/va

<5

t^

etd-r] ^iolv ol ayOpoDnoi Sia tovto,


Kairoi '^Tcpai al (TapKes Kal ra ocrra
e| uv o5e Kal oSe
a^Xa rh avvoKov

'irepov fxh',

(Uei S' ovx '^repou, on


iv T(f Koycp ohK eariu ivavriooais.
There are certainly passages
in Aristotle in which that which
constitutes the difference between individuals of the same
species seems to be included in
the conception of their clSos
thus it cannot be overlooked that
the conception, ^.^., of man, which
according to the passage just
**

quoted is an injima species, does


nat exclude certain individual
differences which have a reference, not to the matter alone, but
also to the form of the individual

members
form).

of

it

{e.g.

their bodily

No clear distinction, how-

ever, is anywhere drawn between


this individual form, and the

universal form or class conception which expresses the common

B B

ARISTOTLE

370

out

but

it is

clear that his system leaves

several individual
the contrary, the
former always resolves itself
Metaph.
finally into the latter.
koli.
xii. 5, 1071, a, 27, it is said
Tu>v eV Tahrf^ et'Set eVepa [sc. to.
fiSej,
aW'
(TroLxeld eVriv], ovk
OTL ruiv KaOcKaarou 6,\\o, Vj re a)]
elSos
rh
v\7} Koi rh Kivr\<Tav Koi
Kal 7] e/j.^, r(^ Ka66\ov Se Xdycp
While, however, accordravrd.

essence
things;

no room

or Socrates.

The only

of

Callias

on

ground of individuality

the matter
v\r]

18).

(1.

(etrrt 5'
T]

[and thererJSe rh Se T<J5e

fiiv

Exactly the same

of Metapli.
/meu

in

Kol iffTi

T^

is]

lies

tV iravrl t<^ yevofifvcfi

(veffTi,

fore

for

viii.

ovaiaTh

vXt]

1,

is true
1042, a, 26

viroKfi/xevov,

&\\ws

^Woos

\6yos Koi

5' 6

that of everyone else, still the one


does not differ from the other in
kind. They will differ from one
anot her, therefore, only in so far as
they belong to different subjects
or in otlier words, in tlieir actual
embodiment, not in their characfer apiO/xcf, not e'lSei. Metaph.

rdSc ri hv ry \6y(f)
rpirov 5e rb iK
rovTCov, ov y^vecns fiSvov Ka\ <p6opd
i(TTi Koi x'^P^^'''^^ air\u>s), and of
the similar statement, Metaph. v.
8 (see p. 3 72, n. 2, i7ifra). The form
is a rJSe in so far as it expresses
a definite kind of being (man,
but it becomes the
beast, kc.)
form of a definite individual
thing in being united with a
Considered
material.
definite

vii.8 (cf. p.:]72,n.8),1029, a,

apart from this

ing to this passage everyone has

an

elSos of his

own

different

from

1, it

said: the name oixria seems fo


belong in the first place to the
toiovtov 5e
vTTOKeiueuov trpwrov
Tp6i:ov yueV riva 7] i/'Atj Acyerai,
&\^ov Se rp6irQV t] fxopcp)), Tpirov Se
Since, then, by
rh e/c TovTuv.
viroKLiJLvov ov substancc the individual thing as the subject of all
its predicates is elsewhere understood (cf pp. 332 sqq., 300, kc), we
should naturally refer /xopcpr) here
to the form of the individual
thing qua individual. But from
the further explanation, c. 8, it

is

'

appears that this

/J-opcph

iv

rep

aiaQ-nrw (1033, b, 5), this ws Mos


^ ovaia AcySixevov, is only the un-

realised form which first makes


this definite thing into a thing
which is defined in this or that
way (T(55e into a roidvSe, 1. 23) in
the actual thing, i.e. in the

matter, but vi^hich on the other


hand itself stands related to
individual things as man is to

T]

fxopcpr],

XcopjcTToV

icrri.

universal,

and
as

conclude,

union it is a
not true to
Hertling does

it is

from the fact


210, b, 29 sq.,
seems to reckon the eWos as well
as the vXt] a constituent element
of the thing, that it is the cons-til utive principle of individual
This is true rather of
being.'
the material in which the form
Even De
is first individualised.
An. ii. 1, 412, a, 6 leads to no
other conclusion. It is there said
Xeyofieu 5^ y4vos 'dv ri rSov tvrwv
t)]V ovaiav, ravTijs 5e t5 fieu ws
vXr}U, h KaO' avrh fifu ovk ^ari T({5e
Tt, eTipov Se ij.op<p^v Kol eJdos, Kad'
^v ^5t7 \4yTai rJSe tj, /col rpirov
rh eK rovrcov. The thing is called
this definite thing, i.e. a thing of

(Form

If.

Mat.

that Phys.

iv.

5(5),

3,

'

this kind, because its material has


received this form so the r6^e
means here also, not the individual, but the specific peculiarity.
;

Still

less

in such passages as

individual
Metaph.

Forms of

xii. 5,

1071,

a,

METAPHYSICS

871

sensible things.^

Every Individual

20 {apxh

yap rh Kad' eKacTov ruv Kad' sKacrrop


&>6pa}Tros yap avOpdoTrov Kad6

\ov

ak\' ecTTiv ovSels, aA.Aa Il-qXehs

'

'Ax'^^ecos, &c.)

itisCasHERTLiNG-

sajs at p. 57), stated 'in plain


words that the form, like all first
principles, must be individual.'
Peleus, however, is not the mere
form of an individual but a real

individual and he has become


so by the union of the form man
with this particular human body.
;

Moreover,

"(Siou elSos

(Metaph.

xii.

1071, a, 14) refers, not to the


individual form of this or that
man, but to the form man in
general. So also the remark (Be
An. i. 3, 407, b, 23) that any soul
may not enter any body, since all
have their Xhiov eI5os Ka\ fxop<p)]v,
must be taken to refer to bodies
and souls of different kinds, and
to
mean that the soul of a
man may not wander into the
body of a beast. And when Gen.
An. iv. 1, 7G6, a, GG sqq. explains
the origin of the female sex on
the ground that the male principle
cannot transform
the
material into its Xhiov ^Ihos, it is
not dealing with the. individual
type, but with the form of the male
sex.
It does not alter the case
here that difference of sex according to Metaph. x. 9 (see p. 365, n. 2,
stqjra) resides not in the ovaia
( = elSos) of the Cv"^ but only in
the i/Ai7 and the craj^a for even
although it be true that to Aristotle this diffeience concerns, not
the essence of man or animal as
such, but only the form of the
5,

hody, yet it is not on that account


a mere question of individuality.
Hertling (Form ti. Mat. 48
sq.) believes that the form in
Aristotle mu.'^t necessarily be an
'

individual thing, since it gives to


the individual its peculiar nature, and is thus distinguished
from the essence {rh t\ ^v elvai),
which is always, at least in sensible things, a universal. He admit?, however, that these two
conceptions, which in certain
passages Aristotle undoubtedly
recognises as distinct, are as a rule

used interchangeably by h im. It


seems more correct to say, on the
contrary, that it was Aristotle's
conscious intention to identify the
two, and to treat the form as well
as the essence as a universal.
If
in

we

find individual expressions

him which 'do not wholly har-

monise with this view, this is an


inconsistency which the actual
facts of the case forced upon
him. It is not the expression of
the view with which he started
and which was only afterwards
obscured. That the essence of
each thing lies in its form is to

an incontrovertible poand is stated by him with


the greatest definiteness.
The
Aristotle
sition,

opposite he never stated in express words; it can only be


deduced from casual expressions
to which we cannot certainly
prove that Aristotle himself consciously attached this significance. As a matter of fact the
boundary line between the essential marks which constitute the
class conception, and the unessential which constitute mere
individual difference, is very impalpable.
In every attempt to
define it and to explain certain
differences among th'ngs as class
differences, others as individual
varieties within the same class,

we

shall come upon cases in


which a certain indefiniteness is

BB

ARISTOTLE

372

therefore implies a material element,^ and everything

that has a body

two terms

'

is

If Matter

ently.^

an Individual.^

object of sense
is

suppose that

sible to

and

'

its

individual

the cause of
it is

all this,

own

rather

indiffer-

'

impos-

it is

Form only

distinguished from

by privation and non-existence


bute something of

Aristotle uses the

'

must

contri-

it

Form.

to

Matter, viewed in this light, must be rated at even


inovitable.

That Aristotle ex-

perienced this difficulty is undeniable but it does not therefore


follow that he did not make the
attempt, and that he intended
from those eihr] which coincide
with class conceptions to distinguish a second kind of d^f] which
represent, not what is common
to the class, but what is peculiar
The truth is
to the individual.
that there is no place in his
scheme for such individual forms.
For since according to the wellknown view that the form has
neither origin nor end (see p. 342
and this must hold also of
the form which as ro'Se ri is in an
individual existence see preceding note) the individual forms of
:

sensible things, if there are such,


must be in actual fact separable
from the things whose form they
are but this in Aristotle's view
is wholly inadmissible.
1
mtaph. vii. 11, 1037, a, 1:
;

yap uArj ti's iariu t fi-i]


ehai Kol eJSos avTo Ka6'
Ibid. xii. 8,
avrh aXXa r6Be ti.
This only
cited p. 339, n. sujjra.
has there
refers, however, as
been already remarked, to the
individual rcembers of an injzma
KoX TrauTos

iari ri

-^ju

See
Plato
2

ivavTicos

e.g.

Meta2)h.

1.

6,

988, a,

makes matter the source

Kahoi

5'

o-vfifiaivfi

yap

ot /itv

uAtjs ttoAAo TTQiovaiv

Trjs

e/c

(paiviTai

K ixias v\r)s fx'a rpdire^a

which,

however, Plato did not deny,


since it is just because the same
material gives only one specimen,
that material things constitute a
plurality even when there is no
distinction of kind between them
as Aristotle also holds.
^ Cf. 3Ietaj)7t.. iii. 4 Ceiled
p.
342, n. supra) where he says
if
there were nothing but individual
things, there would be nothing
but sensible existence
xii, 3,
ovaiai Se rpfis,
1070, a, 9
fxiv

>';

r^

vAtj TiiSe Tt ovffa


7)

els

V)

Kai

TovToou,
i.

9,

7]

e'^ty

Kad^

227, b,

(paiveadai

Se (pvcris (here
ris

'

ert

rpirr]

De

(Kaffra.

is

eldos) rSSe ri.

.30 sq. (cf. p.

Form as such

7)

ck

Ccnlo^

219, n.)

something

differ-

ent from form in the material


if, for instance, there existed
only one single circle, tlie circle
would still continue to be something different from this circle.
The one would be the iUos, the
other clhos V rfj vXri /col rHv Ka6'

and

cKaarov.

eirel

ovv iffriv 6 ovpavSs


iXr]. rh

alaOrjrds roov KaO' eKacrrov hv

yap

alcr9T]Thv

airav

eV

t^

vKri

'Individual reality' and


eihos iv rfj v\r) here signify the
same thing.
virripx^v.

sjtecies.

of multiplicity,

METAPHYSICS

373

a higher value,

when we

recollect that Aristotle allowed

substantiality in its full sense

If the Individual alone

we have

as

seen,

the Individual alone,

Substance,

is

always

is

and

if

universal,

Form,
and if

true ground of individual existence

the

therefore

Matter

just

to

then

we cannot

is

escape the consequence that

Matter supplies the ground also of substantial being,


it is not pure Form, but the composite result

and that

Form and Matter which alone is Substance. Indeed,


since we have defined Substance as
the substratum

of

'

and have

(uTTOKStfisvov)

substratum of

all

the right to claim that

it

primitive Substance of

all

for Aristotle to

Matter the

also recognised in

Being,^ this would seem to give Matter

admit

alone should be regarded as the


things.

Yet

it is

impossible

Full and original reality

this.

Form alone Matter, on the contrary, is no


more than the bare Potentiality of that whereof the Actuality is Form. Not only, therefore, is it impossible that
belongs to

Matter can be substantial, but from

its

union with Form

there can be produced nothing higher than pure

Moreover,
Aristotle

He

there

are

which

2
'
*

27;

iii.

1080,

Kal

A7a;

S'

tV

Substance.'*

and absolute existences,

not different from the thing

999, b, 12 sqq.; vii. 4,


c. 7, 1032, b, 1, 14
Ki-yu r6 ri ^v fhai

4,

6e

fKaarov
.

is

belongs,^ so that

b,^ 5,

(eiSos

it

See pp. 331 sqq.


See pp. 300, 333, and notes.
See pp. 344 sq.
Kg., Motaph. i. 3, 983, a,

'

Form with

expressly identifies

declares that in all primitive

the intelligible essence


to

Form

innumerable passages in which

Trpdirr]v ovalav
ovaiau av^v v\r]s to

it

constitutes the Substance

rl ^v ehai),

c. 10, 1035, b, 32, c.


1037, a, 29, c. 17, lOil, b, 8
viii. 1, 1042, a, 17, c. 3, 1043,
b, 10 sqq.; ix. 8, 1050, a, .5; Gen.
et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 6
Meteor.
iv. 2, 379, b, 2G, c. 12, 390, a, 5;
Part. An. i. 1, 641, a, 25; Gen.
An. i }, 7li, a, 5. Cf, p. 214, n.
* Metajjh. vii. G in
answer to
1

ARISTOTLE

374

of the thing.

Further, he will not suffer anything else

im-

to be considered absolutely real except absolutely

material Form, or pure spirit.

It is not a sufficient so-

lution to recall the different senses in which the term

Substance (ovald)

is

used,^ since it is not here a question

merely of the use of language but of the claim to actuality


in the full

and

strict sense of

whether we are

to assign

it

the word.

or only to their intelligible essence,


is

The question

is

to individual things as such,


i.e.

to a

Form which

unaffected by change in the individual thing and

Here we detect a diffirather a contradiction, which threatens to

remains for ever


culty,

or

self-identical.

shake the very foundations of the system.


Aristotle did not succeed in evading

In

his Metaphj^sics

to look for the substance of things

the Matter, or

in

it

altogether.

he asks the question where we ought


the composite

the question (1031, a, 15) irorfpou


ravriu iariv t) krepov to ri ^u
flvai J) (Kaarov ; it is said that
the}^ are different only in the
cas9 in which a conception belongs to a thing Kara avfifie^riKhs

mere predicate), whereas on


the other hand when the concep(as

tion expresses the essence of the


thing itself they are one and
the same. Kg. the conception of
whiteness is different from the
on the other
KfvKhs Hudpcoiros
hand the hi ehai is not different
irom the fu, the ayaOcp dvai from
the ayaOhv, nor again (c. 10, 1036,
a, 1, of. viii. 3, 1043, b, 2) the
kvkKos,
fhai from the
KvK\cf>
;

in the Form, or in
Whole produced by

exist, things

would not be known

ovK ecrrai ^irKTrrifxy}, to


OVK carai ovra 1031, b, 3).
Tliis holds of all o<Ta fxr) /car' &\\o
Xeyerai, aWa Kaff avra Koi irpioTa.
rwv
1031, b, 13, cf. 1032, a, 5
trpdoTcov KoL Kad' avra Xeyo/xevwu rh
eKaarcf elj/at Kal cKaaToy rb avro
Kal eV 4<TTi c. 11, 1037, a, 33 sqq.

(rwu

fxhv

5'

'

Cf. the following notes

and

1017, b, 23
(rv/xfidivei Sr; Kara Svo rpoirovs t)]V
ovffiav \4ye(rdai, t6 6' vrroKeififVOV

Metapk.

V.

<E<Txo.Tov,

8,

fjir}KTi

Kar^

6,\\ov

hv r65e ri hv Kal
[where, however, as
X<*>pi<tt6v f?
8CHWEGLER and BONITZ rightly
remark upon this passage, we
\4yTai,

Kal h

can only understand the xSytp


be meant on which

the ^vxfi efvat from the ^vx'hOtherwise (not to mention other

Xoopiffri^v to

reasons) conceptions would not

cf. viii. 1

see p. 369, n. 6, sujyra]

METAPHYSICS
the combination of

Bat

both.^

He

from satisfactory.

375

answer

his

cannot

that Matter

admits

far

is

properly be termed Substance,^ yet, on the other hand,

he does not venture to deprive


since

the substratum of

it is

Nor

amid change.^
Matter
the

TOiovrov Se

rb

being

latter
;

kKaffrov

rj

fiop(ph

Kal

VII. 3 init. (cf at p. 370)


use ' substance in various ways as equivalent to the
Ti ^v ehai, tlie KaQoKov, the yevos,
By the last,
the viroKei/xevov.
again, we may understand either
the v\rj or the iJ-op<p^ or the comOf
posite product of both.
these, however, the Ka96\ov, and
with it the y4yos (on the relation
of which to the k3.66\ov, see p.
213 sq.), are quietly set aside,
13 (cf. p. 333, sujjra) and
c.
since the fiopcj)^ coincides with
the Ti ^v fhai there only remain
the three above-mentioned sigCf. 0. 13
nifications of oiia-la.
init, viii. 1, 1012, a, 26 sqq.
'

we may

'

369, n.
a,

6,

Be An.

sujjra)

(see p.
Ind. Arist. 545,
ii.

23 sq.
2

Metapli.

3,

substance = the matter, he goes


aZvvarov Se
koI yap rh
on
'

Kal rh T(^5e ri virdpx^^v


fidAKTra ttj ovala, 8ih rh
flSos Kal rh 6^ afifpoLv ovaia hoJ^mv
Uv fhai fiaWov rrjs i/Arjs.
Cf.
further, p. 345 sqq.

Xo^p^fTrhv

SoKfl

Meta^yh.

conceive of a Substance

on

5'

eV

irdaais

iarlv ovaia Kal

viii. 1,

1042, a, 32

vKt] hr\\ov.

t]

yap rats avriKei/xevais

/xerafioXaTs iffri ti rh viroK^ifx^vov

IMdAx.

ralsfjerafioXais. Cf.p.344.

1049, a, 34 the substratum of


the rode ri is v\r] Kal ovala vKiK-i]',
et ovv iarl rh
vii. 10, 1035, a, 1
fiev xiXr] rh 5' elSos rh 5' e'/c rovrwv,
Kal ovaia tj tc vArj Kal rh elSos Kal
rh fK rovrxv.
Fhys. i. 9, 192,
a, 3 (cf. pp. 342 sqq. and notes)
7,

yap

/xeu

Tjfxus

Kal

v\r]u

ar(pi](Tiv

rp6v (pafieu eluai, Kal rovrwv rh


ov elvai Kara avfxfiefirjKhs,

fieu o'JK

rr}v

v\7]v,

oudaficis.

fikv iyyi/s Kal oi/aiav

vXrfU,

rr)V

Be An

ii.

rijv

7ra)9,

Kad^

areprtaiv

5e

r}]u

avr^v, Kal rrju

5e

ffrfpr](riv

(see p. 669,

n, 6, supra).

Metapli, viii. 1, 1012, a, 26


ovaia rh viroKei/jicvov, &W(i)S
6.K\ws 5' b Xoyos
jxlv 7] vKt],
.
rpirov Sc rh ex
Kal v fiopcp^,
rovruv c. 2 init. cVel 5' r] fi\v
ws vTroKeifj-iPT] Kal &S vXrj ovala
*

5'

%ari

1029, a, 27,
several reasons

vii.

after adducing
in support of the view that the

Form,

only poten-

former

the

actually,

how can we

for

f/5os.

ifnd. 0. 2

maintain that

sufficient to

it

title,

Being, the permanent

substantial in a different sense from

is

tially so

is

altogether of this

it

all

6fxo\oyi7rai, outtj 5' iffrlv

\onrhp

tV

alcrdrirwv

fin.
ris
7]

ris

etVetj/

<pavfphv

5r/

yap ws

eVepyeia

7}

Svpdfiei,

ovcriav

iffriv.

ruv

Ibid.

iK rwv elpTJixevoy

aladrjrr] ovffia iffrl

7}

fxkv

'6ri

^s ivcpyciav

v\7],

7)

7)

Se

5'

Kal ttws

ws

rpir7]

'

fiop<p^,
r)

CK

rovrwv; xiv. 1, 1088, b, 1 (against


the Platonic doctrine of an abso-

ARISTOTLE

376

which is merely potential that is, an absolute existence


which does not yet actually exist ? If we grant that Form
:

the proper Substance of things, actual existence in


the highest sense, and that as such it is opposed not
ouly to Matter but also to the composite product of
is

Matter and Form,' yet Aristotle has done nothing at all to

show how

this is possible, considering that

Form

in itself

always a Universal, that the Individual is always


burdened with Matter, and that Substance is originally
individual Substance.
In like manner he fails to tell
is

how mere Form can be

us

the essence and substance of


things which cannot be conceived apart from a definite
material composition 2 or again how Matter devoid. of
quality and determination can produce the individual
;

doterminateness of particular existences which are not


related to each other as so many impressions of a die
but are differentiated from one another qualitatively by
definite properties.

Finally,

it

not easy to see

is

why

and extinction should pertain to things that are the


joint product of Form and Matter, and 3^et nqt to Form
birth

lutoly great and small)


avdyK-q
re iKaarov v\r]v eluai rh Sui-duei
TOLOvrov, uxrre /col ovaias
t^ Se
irpos Tt oijTe Svvdaei ovaia ovre
:

ivepyela.
:

Kal

T^v

oTov

fiop(pr]v,

t}

oIk'u irdTepuv

rov koivov oti (TKeiraa-fxa e/c


\lQwv cJjSI Kei/jLevu>v, ?)
TTJs epepyeias Kal rod e^Sovs on
arKfiraafia
vii. 3, 1029, a, 5: et
(TTlfMelov

irXivOcoy Kal

Tt>

?5os

fxaWov

T?is

vAris

irpoTcpov

Kal

Kal
rod ef afKpolv
xpSrcpov fffrai line 29 rh eldos
xal rh ef a/x^olv ovcrla SS^eiev &j/
iy,

rrjs

r^y

vKrjS.

fikv

'

Aristotle

frequently distinguishes between conceptions


of pure form and of form inherent in a definite material
the standing example of the
latter is the (ri/jihy as distinguished from the ko7\ov so also
axe, saw, house, statue, and
even soul. Cf. Pkys. ii. 1, 194,
a, 12, ii. 9 Jin.
Be An. i. 1, 403,
2

Mctaph.

viii. 3 init.
iyiore
XavOdv^L trSrepov crrjfialpei rh tvo/xa
(TwOfTov
T
ovff'av ^ T^ju ivepy^iav
'

ehai fiaWov

roivvy e| afi({>o7y ovaiay, \4yco Se


r7}V iK re rrjs v\r]s Kal rrjs ixopcprfs,
a(per4oy
vcrrepa yap Kal 5^ At;,

b, 2,
vii.

ii.

5,

c.

1,

412, b, 11.
10, 1035,

74, c. 11, 1037, a, 29.

a,

Mcfaj)h.
1 sqq. b,

METAPHYSICS

377

or Matter separately. ^

For even if we can suppose that


Matter as such had no beginning, it is hard to imagine
that the

Forms

of created things were uncreated, if they

neither exist independently as Ideas nor are originally

inherent in Matter. All these difficulties exhibit the same

we discerned in dealing with the notion of


The fact is that Aristotle combiues in his Me-

conclusion that

Substance.

taphysics two different points of view, which he

On

harmonise.

fails to

the one side he adheres to the Socratico-

Platonic principle that the true essence of things

be found in their Concept, and this

is

to

always Universal.

is

On

the other side he acknowledges that this Universal


has no existence apart from the Individual, which he

He

therefore declares to be the Substance.

how

explain

these two positions

may

cannot

coexist in one

and hence the above-mentioned contraAt one time the Form, at another the
Individual which is the product of the union of Form
and Matter, appears to be the Actual. Matter causes
philosophy,

dictions arise.

results incompatible with

mere Potentiality. It is represented at the same time as indefinite Universality and as


the ground of individual determinateness.
So the un*

Metaph.

15 cited at p.

vii.

4, sujjra, and the passage


ffomc.lOcitedatp. 366,n. l;i^r<^.

219, n.
viii, 1,

TovTwu

1042, a, 29

TpiToi/ 5e

rb

and matter],

[form

y4ue<Tis fiovov Kal ^0opa. iffri

e/c

oZ

c. 3,

1043, b, 10
ou5e 5r/ 6 avdpwiros
t6 ((^ov Kal diTTovu, aWd ri
:

iffTi

Qii^ (Ivai h irapa ravrd ^(Ttlv, d


ravd' uK-n
ovaia' h i^aip7]
ovpTcs rrjv vArju \4yov7iu. et odv
rovT alTiov rov ehai Kal oixrias
[so BoNiTZJ, TovTO avrijv tiv t)]v
.

ovaiav Xiyoi^v.

audyKT} Sh Tavrrju

^ aidiou dvai ^ (pdapTTjv kvev rod


(peeipea-eai Kal y^yovivai &vfv rov
yiyueaOai
rh elSos ovSeU
.

ovSh yej/^a, aWa Troiilrai


T(i5e yiyvirai hi r6 ck tovtcou
c.
5 init.
iirel
S'
evia
&yeu
yevicr^ws Kal (pdopas ea-ri Kal ovk
noiel

iariv, olov ai dTiyixal, eKirsp flalu,


Kal oAojs to. e^idv Kal al /nopcpal, oh

yap rh XVKhu yiyverai, dWa rh


^v\ov KivKuv.
Cf. pp. 341 sqq.,
and notes there.

AUtSTOTLB

878

certainty goes on, until

we cease to wonder that Aristotle's

doctrine of Matter and Form, Particular and Universal,

received the most various interpretations and supported

the most contradictory assertions not only

among

the

and to a far greater extent


among the logicians of the Middle Ages.

Greek Peripatetics but

also

Yet the doctrine is of

importance to the System.

vital

Aristotle finds the best solution of the difficulties which

perplexed earlier philosophers in his distinction between

Form and Matter, Potential and Actual. By means of this


distinction he explain show Unity can also be Multiplicity;
how the Genus and Differences form one Concept; how the
many Individuals constitute one Species how Soul and
Body make one Being.^ It is this alone which enables
;

him

to solve the

problem of Becoming, over which Plato

had stumbled.

others

Indeed, the dis-

as well as

all

tinction of

which we are speaking serves

has been seen, for the elucidation

Form and Matter being

especially, as

of this

problem.

related to each other as Actual

and Potential, they are in a position of essential correlation

of

the notion of the Potential implies the possibility

its

becoming Actual

the notion of the Actual implies

Everything

that

it

is

the Actuality of the Potential.

that

is

to

become actual must be potential and conis potential must at some time
;

versely everything that


or other

become

actual, since

cannot be called potential.^


'

and

Cf.

pp.219,

369, n.

5.

n, 2, 351, n. 1,

De An.

ii.

1,

412,

b, 6, c. 2, 4 14, a, 19 sqq.
2 Aristotle, indeed
(^Metaph.
ix. 3)

controverts the Megarian

what

is

never to be actual

Nor does

Aristotle

mean

assertion that a thing is potential


only so long as it is actual but
he forbids us also to say {ihid.
c. 4 init.') '6ti Swarov fiev roU
ovk %<rTai 5e, since this could only
;

METAPHYSICS

379

by Potentiality any mere logical or formal but also real


Potentiality.
Matter is in itself or in its capacity
that whereof the Actuality is Fo^^m and consequently
;

Matter of

Form, requires Form, owns a

itself implies

natural inclination or longing (as Aristotle expresses

provoked by

for

it,

On

the other hand

is

by

ness to Matter

Form

to
is

tov

6p4ya6ai

deiov

ayadov

Kal

and this is the principle upon which we must explain


the movement of the world by
God and of the body by the soul.
Kol i(peTov,

Cf such expressions as Metaph.


.

7,

(icjov

1072, b, 3
ibid,

a,

26

KoX rh voTjrbp klv^I

ws

Kivel

rh

oi)

ipdo-

hp^Krhv

Kivovjx^vov.

The longing referred

no
mere

to is

cjnscious desire, but a


natural impulse, and is frequent ly
referred to by Aristotle as the
cause of the natural movements
of bodies.
Thus {Phys. ii. 1,
192, b, 18) we are told
a work
:

of art ovdffi'au
fioKrjs efKpvTov,

Spfiiju

1023,

jx^ra-

whereas the pro-

duct of nature has.


V. 23,

e;^et

a, 8,

Cf. Metajfh.

where Kara r^v

avTov (pvariu and Kara T^fv abrov


ipuhv are parallel phrases Anal.
;

Post.

ii.

11,

94,

inner necessity,

b,

37,

dvay/crj

where

Kara

rijv

it)

itself.^

that which gives complete-

realising its potential capacities

be said of that which by its very


nature could not be
but this
could not be potential, and he
therefore denies (as was pointed
outatp. 366,n. l)that in things of
eternal duration there can be any
potentiality without actuality.
*
Cf. the passage, Phys. 1, 9,
quoted p. 344, n. 1. Matter is
said
by nature icpUaQai. koX

xii.

move and develop

Energy or Entelechy of Matter.^

the

is

it

it

But the

distinguished
compulsion, audyKr] "jrapa
t)]v 6pij.^v, and the falling of a
stone quoted as an example of
the former (similarly Metaph. v.
5, 1015, a 2f3, b, 1, c. 23, 1023, a,
17 sq., xii. 7, 1072, b, 12
cf.
(pvaiy Koi 6pfi})u, is

from

Hektling, Mat.

Form,

u.

91).

Nevertheless we cannot but


recognise in the use of these
expressions the psychological
analogy from which the terminology is borrowed, reminding us
as it does of the earlier hylozoism.
2 Aristotle as a rule makes no
distinction between these two
terms (see Trendelenburg, Be
An. 296 sq. SCHWEGLiiR, Arist.
;

Metaph. iv. 221 sq., 173


BONITZ, Ind. Arist. 253,
sqq., also p. 348, n. supra),

sq.

b,

35

and

if

he seems to do so in individual
passages, yet is the distinction of
each from the other so loosely
defined that in different passages
the same is assigned to both.
Thus motion is usually called the
entelecheia of matter, the soul
the entelecheia of the body
(cf. Phys. iii. 1, 200, b, 26, 201,
a, 10, 17, 28, 30, b, 4 viii. 1, 251,
;

a, 9

Be An.

27, b, 5, 9,

412, a, 10, 21,


28, 413, a, 5 sqq., c. 4,
ii. i.

ARISTOTLE

380

Entelechy of Matter or the actualisation of Potentiality


is

The

Motion.^

correlation

therefore

Matter leads us to consider Motion and

(3) Motion

and

the first

we have

guoted.

of that which exists potentially


yet Metaph. ix.
415, b, 4 sqq.)
6, 8 (1048, b, 6 sqq., cf. 1. 1,
lOnO, a, ;>0 sqq.) motion is defined
as energetic, and yet again (ibid.
c. G, 1048, b, 18 sqq.) it is said
to differ from energy as the incomplete from the complete, so
that only such activity as contains
;

its

own end

thought,

in

itself, e.g. sight,

happiness, is called
energeia, while on the other hand
that which is subord inate to an end
outside itself and ceases with its
attainment, e.ff. building, walking, &c., is called motion.
(On
these two kinds of activities, ?;.
also c. 8, 1050, a, 23 sqq.) Metaph. ix. 8, 1047, a, 30 again
seems to appropriate eVreAexeta
to the state of completion, eVe'pyeia to the activity directed to its
attainment, or to motion (Sok7 yap
life,

in

other words,

is

it

yeiaTov TcrtXeo-fxepov (ci. n. 1 atp


383 infra). But eVreAexem is used
also in this sense, e.ff. De An. ii.
6, 417, a, 28, and the same ex-

pression occurs Mcta]-)li. xii. 8,


1074, a, 35, c. 5, 1071, a, 36, as
applied to the pure, immaterial
form, viz. God.
Phys. iii. 3 init.
the action of the moving cause is
ev4pyia,
called
the
change
effected in that which is moved
eVreAexeict, a use which seems
quite proper, as the latter and
not the former is brought to
completion by motion yet in the
passage that follows eVreAexetais
used of both, and in Metaph. ix. 8,
1030, a, 30 sqq. it is said, with
reference to the two kinds of
activities distinguished above in
the case of those whose end is
outside of themselves, the energeia is in that which is moved in
the case of the others, in that
which acts.
It is therefore impossible to point to any fixity in
the language used to express the
distinction between these two
terms.

Phi/s. iii. 1, 201, a, 10, b, 4:


Tov Swdfici ovros ivreX^x^ia ^
7]
roiovTOv, Kivrjais icrriv
tj rod
Svvarov, y
Suvarhv,
eVreAcxeto
;

(pavfphv

tinguished from the

202, b, 7

a-rrXMs ivtp-

what he meant by

^Motionis the Entelechy

iy(pyeia fxtxKiffTa 7} Kiuriais eJpaij,


so c. 8, 1050, a, 22. Also Be
ii. 5, 417, b, 4, 7, 10, 418, a,
4, ivT^K^x^ia stands for the completed state. (That Metapli. xi,
9, 1065, b, 16, 33, repeatedly uses
ivepyeia where Phj/s. iii. 1 has
eVreAexeja, is of no importance, on
account of the spuriousness of
the former passage.) Elsewhere
motion is called iv^pyeia areA^s,
eV. rod a.T(\ovs, and as such is dis-

and
An.

Form and

Causes.

Cause of Motion.

Aristotle has himself explained

the definition

of
its

'6ri
:

Klvrjffls

Kivrjffis

iariv

c.

2,

cVreAexeja rod

METAPHYSICS

381

the process by which that which existed previously only


in capacity is brought to reality, the determination of

Matter by Form, the transition from Potentiality to

The movement of

Actuality.'

building, for example,

consists in fashioning the materials of

which a house
can be made, into an actual house. But motion is the
entelechy of potential existence only qua potential and
not in any other relation.
for instance, out of

The movement of the

which a statue

is cast,

brass,

does not con-

cern it in so far as it is brass for qua brass it remains


unaltered and has always had a certain sort of actuality
but only in so far as it contains the potentiality of being

made
KivrjTov

into a statue.^

f)

kivi]t6u

4>a/iej/ Stj

tV

viii. 1,

25

This distinction, however, can,

a, 9

Kivr\(nv eluai cVreAe-

X^tav Tov

KH/7JT0V p Kiyr)T6y. So
Metaph. xi. 9, 1065, 'b, 16, 33 see
preceding note.
That only this transition and
;

t'

the condition attained

by

means

of it, only the process of


actualisation, not the actuality, is

meant by the expression entelecheia or energeia is obvious not


less from the nature of the case
itself than from ihe repeated
description of motion as an uncompleted energy or entelechy
(see pp. 383, n. 1, 379, n. 2). The
same distinction elsewhere occurs.

Pleasure,

e.g., is

said not to be a

movement, because a movement


at each moment incomplete,
whereas pleasure is complete. The
former is the pursuit, the latter

is

the attainment, of the end, a


result of the completed activity.
Eth. N. X. 3, 4, vii. 13, 1153, a, 12.
* In this way the
previously

quoted

definition is

explained.

Plujs. iii. 1, 201,


therefore Metaph.

sqq.).

a, 9, sqq.
xi. 9,

it

(and

1065, b,

Brentano's explanation

Vun der mannigf. Bedeutung des


Seienden nach Arist. p. 68), according to which motion is the
actuality which transforms a
(

potential being into 'this potential being,' or which constitutes


or forms a potential as potential,'
is without support either in Aiistotle's use of terms or in actual
fact.
For, in the first place, the
entelechy of the ^wdix^i tv is not
that by which the Sw. hi> first
comes into being ; and, in the
'

second
bronze

place, when,
e.g.,
the
which is potentially a
statue is formed into the statue,
its KLVT](Tis

becoming

does not consist in


^vvafx^i

kudpihs,

its
i.e.

bron7e,
Aristotle, however, has
stated the meaning of his definition
unambiguously
in
the

passage immediately following,


so
has
the author of
Metaph. xi. 9.

and

ARISTOTLE

382
is

clear,

only applied to

be

movement;

particular

for

case of

tlie

special or

movement

sucli

is

always

carried on in material tliat lias already an actuality of

some

sort of its

If, on the otlier hand, we take the


movement, it may be defined as the

own.

general notion of

by which Potentiality is actualised, the development of ^fatter by Form, since the material (pia
material is mere Potentiality which has not yet in any

process

This definition includes

respect arrived at Actuality.


all

Alteration of every kind,

destruction.

It

coming into being and

all

does not, however, apply to absolute

origination and annihilation, for this would necessitate

the birth or destruction of matter, which

sumed by
that wheu he

Aristotle.^

It follows

refuses to regard

is

never as-

from what we have

said,

becoming and decaying

as

forms of motion, maintaining that though every motion


^
this distinction
is chano-e, all change is not motion

must be accepted

as a relative one

which does not

h^

of the general idea of motion; and so Aristotle himserf

on other occasions^ employs motion and change as synonymous terms. The doctrine, however, of the different
kinds of motion belongs to Physics.

We

have seen that motion

is intermediate between
and actual being it is Potentiality struggling
into Actuality, and Actuality not yet freed from Poten-

potential

tiality

in

other

distinguished

words, imperfect Actuality.

from mere

Potentiality

Entelechy, and from an Energy in

its strictest

the fact that in Energy the activity which


See pp. 341 sqq. svpra.
Phys. V. 1, 225, a, 20, 34,
and passim see infra.

'

E.g. Pliys.

It

by being

is

sense

is

an

by

directed

iii. 1, 201, a, 9
2 initAv. lO/fin. viii. 7,
261, a, 9, and 2)assim.

sqq.

c.

METAPHYSICS
to

383

an object

lias also attained its object


thought, for
both a process of search and also a mental
possession of the object of thought
whereas motion
ceases in the attainment of the object, and is therefore

instance,

is

only an unaccomplished

motion

is

opposite

Hence each

effort. *

particular

a transition from one state of being into an


from that which a thing ceases to be into

that which

has to become. Where there is no opposite,


no change.^ Consequently all motion implies
two principles that which moves, and that which is
moved, an actual and a potential being.

there

it

is also

it

Mere Potentiality is unable


lacks Energy and so likewise

it

contains nothing imperfect and undeveloped.

to produce motion, for


is

pure Actuality, since

Motion

can only be conceived as the operation of the Actual or


'
Phiis. iii. 2, 201, b, 27: rov
8e hoKilv adpicrrov clvai t}ju Kivrffiv
aXriov on oVt? els Svyajxiv rSov

oPTwv ovT e/s evfpyeiau tan de7i/ai


avT^u anXctiS' ovtc yap rd Svvarhv
voahv ilvai KiyeTrai | avdjK'qs
otre rh ivepyeia iroahr,

7}

re K'vqcris

fi/epyfia fxiv ris elvai Sok7,

Se' aXriov

areX^s

areAes rh dvvarhv,
ov iarlv rj ij/epyeia.
It is therefore neither a (rreprjcris, nor a
5' '6ri

Sui/o/its. nor an ivepyeia aTrArj


(80
Mctapli. xi. 9, 1066, a, 17.) VIII.
KivCnai rh KivrjrSv
5, 257, b, G
TQvro S' 4(rrl Suvd/xi Kivovficpoy
ovK ivrcXex^ia rh Be Svpa/xei eis
evreXex^iav j^abi^ei.
eari 5'
7}

eveKa 77 Kiur^ffis, ovk eari ravra


^ ov reXeia ye ov yap reXos,
dAA' eKeiuT) evvirdpx^i rh tcAo? Kal
uiv

irpa^is

7]

'

Kiv7](Tis

rh

8e

evreXex^ia. kiptjtov aTe\^,s


Kivovv ^Srj evepyeia iffr'v.

Meiaiih. ix.
5e

Twv

6, 1048, b, 17
eirel
irpdlewv wv earl irepas
:

rtXos aAAa rcov Trepl rh


riXuSy
oiov
rov
icrxvaiueiv
r]
irrxvaaia, avra Be 'drav laxvaivtj
ourws i(TT)piuKivf]aei,fi^ inrdpxovra
ovSep-la

irpa^is

Kal

ov yap

fiefidSiKev,

owS'

a}xa

fiaBi('ei

o'lKoSojuLel

Kal

&c. ecvpaKe Se Kal opx


rh avrh Kal voe? Kal vev67]Kev
ri)v /xev ovv roiavrrjv
evepyeiav
Xeyw, eKeivtiv 5e K^urjaiv.
Cf. c.
8, 1050, a, 23 sqq. and p. 379, n. 2,
supra; De An. ii. 6, 417, a, 16:
Kal yap ecrriv 7] Kivqais evepyeid ris
o''KoB6/j.T]Kv,

ajxa

areXijs fxevroi

7}

yap

"tiv,

7)

iii.
;
7, 431, a, 6:
rov areXovs evepyeia
airXws evepyeia erepa 7) rov

Kivriais
S'

rereXea-fxei/ov
2

1, 224, b. 26 sqq.
Metapli. viii. 1, 1042,
32,
2, 1069, a, 13:
eU
evavrictxreis hy elev ras KaQeKaarov

PItys. V.

225, a, 10
a,

xii.

fxera^oXai
avdyKT) Si] fierafidXXeiu r^u vX7]V Svva/j.eu7]v &iLL<pco
eirel 5e dirrhv rd hv, fieraBdXXei
trau eK rov dvyafxei ovros els rd
evepyeia ov.
Cf. p. 342 sqq.
at

ARISTOTLE

384

Form upon

the

which moves

Potential or Matter

itself

we always

even in that

find the motive force

separate from what

it

the soul

from the body, and in the soul

as

we

is different

moves, just as in living creatures


itself,

from

shall see below, the active part is different

the passive.^ While Becoming, therefore, is impossible


without matter or potential being, some Actuality is not
less indispensable as

an antecedent and motive cause.

where an individual has developed itself


from mere Potentiality to Actuality, and consequently

Even

in cases

the former principle precedes the latter in

yet another

it,

individual must have come before it in actual existence.


The organic individual is produced from seed, but the
Phys. iii.2(p. 38P,,n.l),viii.
257, b,'8 Metapli. ix. 8 esp. 1050,
Phy^. vii. 1 a-KCLV
b, 8 sqq. xii. 3
v-k6 riVQS avdyKT}
Kivovfiivov
T()
'

5,

even in the case of


Kive^adai
that which apparently is selfmoved, the material which is
moved cannot be at the same
time the movino: cause, since if
a part of it is at rest the w^hole
:

but
also be at rest
neither can rest and movement
of

it

in the

must

self- moved

be dependent

The true exelse.


planation is to be found in the
above account, and Phys. iii. 2
(ren et Corr. ii. 9 neither form
in itself nor matter in itself explains becoming; ttjs filv yap
t^ Tracxf'" ^^^t^ ^aX t^
{/Atjs
KiveiffQai, T^ 5e TTOiflv Kol KiveTv
on anylhing

kripas

Svvd/xews.

See

further,

:U1 sqq.
2 See preceding note and Phys.
it is impossible
iii. 4, 255, a, 12
that a (Tvux^^ ^al avfx.cpv'ks should
be self -moved
^ yap %v Ka\
p,

ffvvfX^^

M^

"^?7 ravTT) airaOes [cf.

Metaph.
?l

ix. 1,

1010,

a,

28]

aAV

K-exwpio"Tat, ravrri rd fxev TTfcpvKe

iroitiv

that

TO

8e

Nothing

Trdcrx^^^-

single, therefore, is selfmoved, ctW' avdjKr] dirjpriaOai Td


Kivovv iu kKacrrcf irpds rb Kivovfiipov
oiov

is

e'lrl

Kivrj ri

rcJov

ai^'vx^'^

opcoficv,

orav

avra

aWa

T(V /x\pvx(^i^

Kal

av/x^aivei
Kive'tcrQai

ravra

yepoiTO

Siaipovcri TCLS alrias

vir6 tlvos asi


5'

ttu

(pauephu

257, b, 2
advvarov 5)] rh avrh aiirS kivovv
irdvTr] KLv^lv
aWh avru ^epoiro
yap av oXov Kal (pepoi rrjv ahr^v
(popav, ev hv kol aTO,uov tQi ei'Sft,
&c., Tt bicapiarai on Kivcirai rd
KivrfTov, &c.
(see p. '68'^, n. 1).
Therefore, we certainly hear nothing in Aristotle of any Identity
of Mover and Moved
(Biese,
Phil. d. Arist. 1. 402, 7, 481)
:

c. 5,

'

'

'

nor does the existence of something which at the same time


moves and is moved {Phys. iii. 2,
202, a, 8 and above) in any way
prove it, i the above explanations are true.

MBTAPHYSICS
seed

38$

contributed by another individual the e^g is


Conversely, where an actual

is

not antecedent to the hen.^

meets with a potential being, and no obstruction from


without intervenes, then the corresponding motion is
net-essarily produced.^ The object in which this process
takes place
it

is

moved or Matter that by which


motive power or Form. Motion

the thing

effected is the

is

therefore, is the

common function of

both, though

it

takes

\
Metaph.

'

oel

e/c TOX)

ix.

Svud/jLei

1049, b, 24
liuTos yiyverai rh
8,

6Vep7etot ov VTrh ivcpyciq, ovtos, oTov

&vdpcoTros

e'l

/jLOvcriKOv, del

audpcanov, jjLOvciKhs virh


klvovvtos tivos irpdorov.

1050, b, 3
(pavephu (in irpSrepou rrj
euepyeia Suj/a/tiews
koI uiairep
:

ovcTia,

efTTOyuei/, Toil

xpovov aelTrpoXa/ufiduei

ivpyeia kripa irph krepas e'tts rrjs


Tov dei Kiuovvros vpdiroos. xii. 3,
(cited in note to p. 356, supra)
;

xii. 5,

a, 9
(I

1071, b, 22 sqq.

c.

6,']

072,

Trporepov ivepyna Swd/ULCcas

8e fxeWei y4vcns Koi (pOopa eluai,

aWo

ivepyovv &Wa}S
ii. 1, 734, b,
'6(Ta. (pvcrei yiverat ^ rex^V vtt^
21
iuepyeia uvros yiverai eK rod Svpdjiiei
roiovrov.
Phys. iii. 2 fin. fldos
Se del o'taerai ri rh klvovu, ... &
del

eJuai

Kal &\\a}s.

aet

Gen. An.

icrrai

orav
TTOS

apxh foi
Kivfi,

u'ltiov rrjs Kiifrjaeu-s,

oiov o ivTeXexeia dvOpw-

e'/C
TOV hvudjXei UVTOS
duOpwrou.
Ibid. c. 7
viii. 9, 265, a, 22
Metaph. vii. 7,
c. 9 >/*., ix.
^fin., xii. 7, 1072, b,
30 sqq. Be An. ii. 4 init. iii. 7
init.
cf. also p. 355-6, mpra.
Phys. viii. 4, 255, a, 34 sqq.
[Only an apparent exception to

TTOiei

av9pu)irov

KaKelvas

dvdyKrj,

oTav ws
UuauTai [under the conditions
which limit their activity and pas.

sivity] Tb'/roirjTiKhvKal ThiradTfTLKhv


rh fih iroielvTh Se 7ra(rXf t^^ ^Keivas 5' ovk di/dyKrj avTai fxev
yap [the irrational] iraa-ai fxia kvhs
irX7i(xia(w(Ti,

'

TToirjTtKij,

waTe

(Ke7vai 5e

to);/

ivaiTiuv^

dfia iroi^aei TavavTia (so

that
necessity forced this powder of
-choice to be exercised on both
alternatives, opposite effects must
be produced at one and the same
time).
For even in the case of
the latter, so soon as the choice
has been made, the result necessarily follows
oiroTepov yap tv
if

6peyr)Tai
T(S

tovto

Kvpiws,

OTavwsSvvaTai

Troirjaei,

inrdpxr} Kal irXTjaid^fi

irad-nTiKui

(1048, a, 11); but


the wall must decide on the one
side or the other, if the condition
of action is to be present
for to
produce opposite effects at the
same time is impossible, ov ydp
:

ovTOJs e^et
eo-Ti

TOV

avTuu

d/j-a iroielv

Finally,

it

tV
7}

Svuafxii/ ov5'

SvuaijLis (1.

22).

follows also' that the

'*

introduced by Metaph. ix.


6, where it is said (1047, b, 35)
we must distinguish "between
'his is

irrational

VOL.

I,

and rational forces;

effect

necessarily' produced
when the active and passive principles are in the condition ws
SvuavTai TToielv koI irdax^iv and
the general reasons of this have
already been stated at p. 378-9.
is

C C

AMISTOTLJ^

386

opposite directions in each

the motive power excites

the latent activity in the thing

moved

realises it for itself.^

moved, while the thing

Aristotle conceives of the

operation of the motive principle upon the thing moved


them.^
as conditioned by continuous contact between
Pliys.

>

where

3,

iii.

this is

discussed at length. V. 1. 224, b,


Kivnais ovk eV
t)
4, ihid. 1. 25
Tw ("ihei a\\' eV Tq3 KivovfM^V(f KoX
vii. 3: the
KLvr^TO} kot' ivfpy^iav.
dAAoicDO-ts takes i)lace only in the
:

De^

material thing.
426, a, 2
'

ci 5' i<Triv

r]

An.

r/

yap rov

2,

Kivriais Koi

KoX rb iraQos iv

TTOiTjo-is

iii.

tw

ttoiov-

iroirjTiKov

/col

KivnTLKOv ivfpyeia iv t<^ Trao'xoJ'Tt


iyyiperai. dih ovk avayKT] rh kivovv
KLVilaQai ...
iv

To3

iroirjais

Traaxo!'''''

koX

o.\?C

See further

-noLodvri.
2

7/

t]

Trddrjais

ovk iu
p.

rw

358-9.

Cf. p. 378-y.

3
v Kivnais iuPhifS. iii. Jin.
TeAe'xeta rov Kiurjrov f] kiv7]t6v (rv,u'2,

)3atJ/ei

tovto

5e

iiioff oLfxa

0i|et

Koi irdcrx^i.

rov Kiv-qriKOv,
vii. 1, 242,
rh 5e Trpwrov

b, 24, vii. 2, init.


a/xa TCf kivov^^vc}) eVri*
Kivovv
Xeyw 8e rh d/xa, on ovdfu iffTiv
:

avrSiv ixTa^v- tovto yap Kouhv iirl


kivovvt6s
iravThs Kivovjxevov koi

eVrii/ which is then shown to be


true of all kinds of motion. Ibid.
1
viii. 2, 255, a, 34, c. 1, 251, b,
sqq.; Gd)t. et Corr.i. 0, 322, b, 21,
Gen. Jn.n. 1, 734,
c. y, 327, a, 1
Kive7v re yap n^ cfKTdiKVOu
a, 3
dhvpaTov Metajjh. ix. 5. Cf. n. 1
supra, and p. 387, n. 3. That this
contact of the moving force with
;

Here the motion


of throwing.
of the thrown seems to continue
after contact with the thrower
But this Aristotle
has ceased.
cannot admit to be the case. He
therefore

assumes

{Phys.

viii.

2GG, b, 27 sqq., 267, b, 11,


De Insomn.
cf. iv. 8, 215, a, 14
2, 459, a, 29 sqq.) that along
10,

with the thing thrown the thrower


moves also the medium through
it moves {e.g. the air or
water) and that the motion of
the thing w^hich is moved is com-

which

municated to it from this, when


it has passed from the thrower.
But since this motion continues
after that of the thrower has
ceased, while (according to his
presupposition) the motion of the
medium must cease simultaneously with that of the thrower,
he adopts the curious solution
that the medium can still pro-

duce motion even when it has


itself ceased to be moved ohx afxa
:

iravTai kivovv koI Kivovufvov

dWa

Kivwv
TraucTjToi Kivwv, kivovv Se eTi iaTiv
(267, a, 5;. The law of inertia, according to which motion persists
Kivovfxevov

/xev

d/xa

OTav

moved, is conceived
of by Aristotle as not merely a
momentary one giving the tirst
impulse only, but as lasting during the whole continuance of the

that which

is

obvious especially
from his account of the motion

motion,

is

until it is met by an opposing


force, was not, therefore, known
the natural motion
to him.
of the elements, which carries
each of these to its proper place,

How

can spring from contact with a


moving force, it would be hard

By what is said of these,


however (Pkys. viii. 4, 254, b, 33

to say.
sqq..

Be

Cwlo,

iv.

3 Jin.),

it

METAPHYSICS
Indeed, this appears to

yV even

of what

V through
touching

it

even thought apprehends

the

latter,

thinking subject as

manner God,

however,

Form

to

is

Matter

it

its

acts only

object

related
^

and

to

by
the

in like

as the first cause of motion, is said, as

we

be in contact with the world.^ But

shall shortly see, to

in

so necessary that he asserts

absolutely incorporeal that

is

contact

him

387

what sense such expressions can be used of immaterial

things, Aristotle has not further explained.


It follows

Form and
sents,'*

from this that Motion

as

is

eternal as

Matter, whose essential correlation

and that

it

repre-

it

has neither beginning nor

end.-^

had a beginning, the movens and the motum


must either have existed before this beginning or not.
For

if it

must have come into being,


movement would have taken place before the
motion.
If they did exist, we cannot suppose that

If they did not exist, they

and
first

so a

they were at
to move.

rest,

But

since

if it

it

was of

their very nature

be granted that they did move,

some active force must have operated to endow them


not proved even that they are

moved by anything

else at all.

'

Cf. p. 203, n. 3.

Metaj)7t.. xii.

29: JDe An.


29 sqq.

iii.

9,
4,

...
lOTl, b, 19,
429, b, 22,

'*

Gefi.et Corr. i.G, 322, h, 21:


nothing can affect another without being in contact with it, and
in the case of things which at
the same time move and are
moved, this contact must be
mutual (323. a, 20 sqq.); ecrt 5'
ftjs

ivioTe (pajxiv to k vovv aTrr^adai

fi6uov Tov Kivov/jLPov, xh

vov (x^

which touches is not touched byanything which touches it again]

S' ciK ro/xe-

(ixTTe

'[

kiv^I aKivrirov ov,

ainoiTo rod kivtitov,


iKeivou Se ouSeV
<pafx,hv yap iviore
rhp KvirovvTa drrreardai rj/nwy, ctAA'
ovk avrol iKduov.
That this,
iK^lvo /xev

&</

however, is no more than a play


upon words is obvious,
See p. 341, n. 2, 345, n. 1.
'

With what follows, cf. SiET&^CK.,Die Lehre d.Ar.v.d.Ewig^


keit d. Welt (^Untersuch z. PJnl.
d.
GriecJien Halle, 1873, pp
137 189).
^

avTeardai airTO/xdvov [that

CC

ARISTOTLE

388

with

tlie

we should

in this

before motion.

It is

property of motion, and tlius

case also arrive at a

movement

motion
equally impossible to conceive of
is always conditioned by
movement
a
of
The cessation
movement which puts an end to the first. As
as destructible.

another

former argument we were forced to admit a


the first, so here we
process of change antecedent to
Motion is
the last.^
to
cannot escape one subsequent
was
world
the
end;
therefore without beginning or
in

the

perish.'^
never created and it will never
this point of view is infrom
Motion
although
*\ Yet,
which it has its limitain
aspect
another
there is
finite,

'

tion.
it

principle,
Since every motion presupposes a motive
involves
general
in
motion
that file idea of

follows

the assumption of a

moved by anything

first

else.

motive force which is not


Without this assumption we

of moving causes,
should be involved in an infinite series
motion, because
which could never produce actual
and without
cause
first
a
to
us
they would never bring
kuI
Kivwiv, ^iVep 6
ehai
The above account contains on h.v6.yK7]
'^"^"^ '"' ";'5'^^'^\. With
in
discussion
the
XP''^^^
of
essence
the
pasThat motion must reference apparently to this
PJnis viii 1
1

be eternal is also asserted in 3Ictank xii. G, 1071, b. 6: hW'


i,Larov KivvTiP ^ -y^viaBai ^
<peapwar ae\'yapf,u. Further, if
Time is without beginning and

end (on this see infra, p. 406,


also, since
.^c.) motion must be so
Time, as we shall find, cannot be
conceived of apart from motion.
Cf PJu/s

ianu

et S^
251, b, 12
KivU^cos aple^lhs ^

viii. 1,

b xpovos

li.V^is r's, .r^ep aa xPor'os eVrl.,


apdyKV Kal KipvcTiP aidiou ehai,^nd
after proving the infinity of time

in both directions he goes on at 1.


26 : aWa fx^v (ty^ XP^"^^^ (pavephy

sage, Metaph. xii. 6 proceeds oi/Se


XP^^ov ov ^ap oUvryo -npdr^pov
/cal '^ar.pov .Iva^^ fir) ovros xP^^ov.
Ka\ v Kiuv<r^s upa ouro, avuexvs
:

iixrirepKaco^popos?)

K.u^<r.<is

^ yaprhavrh

-.dOos.

The same

inference follows from the state


ment (PJnjs. vi. 6 2o6, b, 32 sqq
iMetaph. ix. 8, 1050, b, 3) that
every change and process presupposes a previous one
In this form viz the question as to the eternity of the
world, the present subject will
Ch. IX. infra.
recur
"^

METAPHYSICS
that,

389

none of the succeeding causes could operate.

This conclusion cannot be avoided by presuming that


the object

moved produces

own

its

motion, since

necessary for the motive force already to be


object

moved

cases,

however, resolves

it is

the

vi^hat

become
and hence the same thing
cannot at the same time and in the same relation be
both moved and moving. We are forced, therefore, to
admit a primum mobile. That principle, again, might
be either something moved and therefore something
The first of these
self-moving, or something unmoved.
is

to

the

itself into

second,

for

even in a self-impelling substance the motive force

must of necessity be different from what it moves.


Consequently there must be an Unmoved Substance,
which is the cause of all motion.^ Or as this is elsewhere more briefly demonstrated since all motion
must start from a motive principle, a motion which has
no beginning presupposes a motive principle which is
as eternal as the motion itself, and which, as the presupposition of all motion, must be itself unmoved.^ Thus,
then, we obtain three elements that which merely is
moved and never causes motion, = Matter that which
both causes motion and is itself moved, = Nature that
which causes motion without itself being moved, = God."*
Our previous pages will have shown that this position

'

Cf. p. 384, supra.

Phys.

rrdwra

aW'a^vvarov

(jydapToi.

Kivn-

and

criv

agreed that
neither efficient nor formal nor
even final causes permit of a
regresms ad injinitum.
Metaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 4

^v.

Metaph.

avajKY]

emended by BONITZ) De An. iii.

ii.

(a), 2,

viii.

where

5,

cf

vii.

it is

='

aKiurjTou.

eJuai

TWf ovTuv,

riva

a'iSiov

ouaiau

a" re yap ovcriai irpoorai


Koi

et

Tracrai (pdapral,

v)

ael
yeu<rdai ^ (pBaprjuai
c. 7, 1072, a, 21 : eo-rt
'

Kivovfxevoy

Kivrjcriv

ean

Toivvv

Phys.

&irav(TTou

ykp
ael
.

koL % kivu.

viii.

xii.

7,

5, 25G, b, 20
1072, a, 24 (as
;

10, 433, b, 13.

ARISTOTLE

390

an isolated one in Aristotle's pliilosophy. Actuality in the highest sense is synonymous with Pure
Form devoid of Matter the Absolute Subject which as
is

not

perfect

Form

once the motive force and the end of


The gradations of existence, ascending

is at

the Universe.^

from the

first

consumma-

formless Matter, reach their

tion in God.

And

formed the

actually

thesis

this

starting-point for a demonstration of the existence of

God

In the same

in Aristotle's treatise on Philosophy.^

work he deduced the


ciples

from

two prin-

belief in the gods from

reflection

upon

self-revealing traces of the

divine nature in the presentiments of the soul and from

A well-known fragupon
the witness of
laid
he
stress
what
ment shows
existence of
the
to
universe
beauty and order in the
justifitheir
Nor are these arguments without
God.'*

the contemplation of the heavens.^

Cf. pp. ?>55, kc, and the


passages quoted, pp. 395 sqq., on
God as highest form, pure energy
and supreme end. Mdaph. xii.
(Ttiv ^picrrov del
7, 1072, a, 35
[in every sphere of being]
kvaXoyov ro irpwrov.
- SiMPL. De Ccelo, 130, ScUol.
in At. 487, a, 6 {Ar. Fr. 15):
'

J)

rovrov ev toTs irepl


which see Ch. II.
snpra) " KaBoKov yap iv oh eo-ri ri
Aeyet 5e

Trepl

toIs virvois
niaffixovs

yap,

yivo^hovs

koX
eV

<P'n(T\v,

Tavr'r]s ^vBov-

naurelas.^ orav
virvovv Kad' eourV

ras

ry

yevnrai t] ^vxh, t^tc r^v IlZiov


airoKa^ovaa (pixriv irpofxavriv^rai
re koI irpoayopevei ra jx^Wovra.
roiavTT} Se eVrt Koi ev t^ Kara Thv
edvarou xP'C'^^* '^^^ ffwfidTOJv.
So Homer represents Patroclus
and Hector as prophesying at

tovtwv

ovv,

vire-

^i\o(ro(ptas(as to

death,

Koi ctptfieXriov, iv rovTois iaTi


arov. 67rel ovv iu toTs oiaiu iarlv

uvOpwiroi ehai ri Behv rh


KaB' kavrhv [-J)] ^oiKbs rrj ^vxv k^
irdvTuv iirKTrrnxoviK^jTaTOV.

&\Ko &X\ov

fieXriov, cariv

6.pi<TT0V, '6irep err? &/


^

rh

apa ri

/col

ix.

'Apto-TOre'ATjs 5e ciTrb dvolv dpxaiv


evvoiau Bewu eAeye yeyovevai eu to7s
dvBpwirois, dir6 re rwv ircpX r^u
xpvx^v (Tv/xfiaivSvTuv KOI airb rSiv

20

fjLCTedpuiv.

dXX' avh

TTjv

<Tv}xfiaiv6vr(i)v 5td

^vxhf'

fihu

(f)'n(r\v,

aWa

8)/

Koi airb

/xevoi

eeloj/."

Fr. 13, b, 8exT. Math.

e'/c

uor^ffav ol

yap

ruv
ficB'

fierewpcov

T]^4pav ^ fxev

BeaffdifiXiov

rev rSiV

vvKrwp 5h r^v cvraKdXXccv aar^puv Kivrjcriv,

iuS/JLiaav

elval

irepiiroXovvra,

roiavTTjs

riva Behv rhu '^fjs


euTo|ia
Koi

Kiu-ljcrews

curiov.

rS}v irepl

rovs iv

also

In the brilliant

from the

11.

i^r.

14 (prob.

(piXo(ro<pias

in

METAPHYSICS
cation in

i391

system, although there are, no doubt,

his

certain points of

them which must be interpreted

in

the light of a less rigid logic, or perhaps referred to an


earlier

form of his teaching more akin to Platonism.

Presentiments which exhibit themselves in prophetic

dreams and inspired

states of feeling are only

an obscure

manifestation of the force which under the form of the

Active Understanding unites the

The beauty

intelligence.^

connection of

human and

the divine

of the world, the harmonious

the purpose observable in their

its parts,

arrangement, the splendour of

the

and

stars,

the

order of their motions, point not only to

inviolable

astral spirits (in

whom we

shall

have hereafter to recog-

nise the guiding forces of the heavenly spheres), but


also to a

Being placed

above them, from

far

whom

alone

the simple movement of the universe and the harmony

between the whole and


ClC.

iV.

D.

minds us

ii. .37,

95,

the parts proceed. ^

all

which

re-

the beginning, of
Plato's picture of the dwellers in
si
the cave {RejJ. vii. init.")
essent, qui sub
terra semper
habitavissent
accepissent
at

'

autem fama

et auditione, esse
et vim Deorum
deinde aliquo tempore, patefactis
terrae faucibus, ex illis abditis
sedibus evaderein haec loca, quae
nos incolimus, atqueexire potuissent
cum repente terram et
maria coelumque vidissent, nu-

quoddam numen

bium raagnitudinem ventorumque vim cognovissent adspexissentque

solem

ejusque

tum

magnitudinem pulchritudinemque
tum etiam efficientiam
cognovissent,
quod
is
diem
efficeret toto coelo luce diffusa;

cum autem

terras

Oonse-

nox opacasset,

coelum totum cernerent


astris
distinctum et ornatum
luminum varietatem
lunaeque
turn

tum
omnium

turn crescentis

eorumque

senescentis
et
ortus

occasus atque inomni feternitate


immutabilesque cursus
haec cum viderent profecto et
esse Deos et haec tanta opera
Deorum esse arbitrarentur.' According to CiC. ^V. D. ii. 49, 12.5,
Aristotle seems to have pointed
to the instinct of animals as a
teleological argument for the
being of God.
^
For the fuller discussion of

ratos

this see infra.


^

Besides the passage from i?e

6^?^, i. 9 quoted -w/r^, in n. 6 at p.


395, cf, Metaiih. xii. 7, 1072, a,

ARIS7VTLE

892

quently the arguments whicli Aristotle puts forward,


the passages indicated, to prove the existence of

in

God, though based, like those of Socrates and Plato,^

upon teleological principles as well as the identification


which he elsewhere establishes between the force of
nature working to fixed ends and God^ are not a mere

adaptation of his views to unscientific notions, but are

harmony with the

in

spirit of his

35 sqq., where God is described as


the upiaTov or ov ev^Ku, and as thus
the eflicient cause of motion in
the world; but especially c. 10,
where the question is discussed
TTorepxs ex^^ '? "^^^ o\ov (pvais rh
ayadup icai Tt &piaTOv, nonpoi'
:

avrh Kad' avrh,

Kex(^pi-(riJ-^vov Tt KoX
/)

T-V Ta^LV,

v)

aucporepws,

tlxrirfp

GTpdT^vjjLa.
In the case of an
array the good resides as well in
the general as in the order of the
whole in the former, however, in
a still more prhiiary sense than in
the latter. The universe is com:

IDared to

an army

TCTaKrai

ttws,

iravra 5e (tvvaAA' ovx oixoioos, Koi


:

TTAwTCC Kol TTTflVa Kol CpVTO.

ex^^ ocare

ouTcos
Tvphs

/jltj

OoLTepou fXTjOev,

eTvai

OVX

KOlI

Barepw

a\K' iari

tl.

yap ev awavra (rvi/reraKrai,


except that each creature is more
fully subject to this order just in
proi^ortion to the nobility of its
nature, even as in a household
the freeborn are subjected to
a stricter discipline than the
TOLavTT] yap kKaarov apxT]
slaves.

irphs fiev

avTOov

7]

(pvais iariu.

Xcyco

5'

oTou

ye rh diaKpiOrjvai ixvdyKr] airaatv


i\de7v, Kol aAAo ovras iarlu wu
Koivcavel airavra els rh o\ou.
All
other systems are founded of
necessity upon the opposite principle
Aristotle's is the only exception, ov ydp iariv ivavriov rS
("is

whole system.

The

wpciro} ovdiv (1075, b, 21, 24).

Speusippus,

like

If,

we accept a

whole series of primary principles

we

destroy the unity of all being


(see the passage, Div. I. p. 854,
1); Ttt 5e ovra ov fiovXeraL iroXiTeveadai kukms. " ovk ayadhv ttoXvKoipavii]
efs
Koipauos Icttco."
Cf. xiv. 3, 1090, b, 19, where he is
again attacking Speusippus ovk

eoiKC S'
6/c

rwv

7}

(pvats e7reja-o5iw57]S

(paivofxevooy,

oiaa

wairep /jlox^VP^

rpaycpSia.
We have the same
point of view in I&. 16, preserved
us only by an unknown
to
scholiast, where Aristotle says
given several apxaK they must be
either ordered or disordered. But
the latter is impossible, since
from disorder no natural order,
no K 'ifffxos. could have arisen ei
Se Terayjuevai ^ e| kavTUV iraxQil'
aav t) virh e^ccOev Tivhs alrlas ; but
even in the former case exovcri ri
Koivhv rh avvdiTTOv avras KaKelvo rj
The comparison of the
a.px'horder of the world with that of
an army is further developed in
Sext. Math. ix. 26 sq., which
perhaps follows Aristotle Ilepl
:

<piXo(TO(pias.

See Div. i. p. 143 sq. 786


(Zeller's Plato, Eng. Tr. p. 281

sqq. 485).

T]

<pv(Tis

ovZhv fidrrju iroiovaiv.

METAPHYSICS
unity of the world and

393

adaptation to fixed ends can

its

only be explained by the unity of the Supreme Cause.


It

not without good reason,

is

most important

in his

of the reality of the

motion
is

treatises

that Aristotle

Supreme Being with

his theory of

which the Changeable


seen most directly to lean upon an Unchangeable, as

itself

for this is the point at

the condition of

The further

change.

all

characteristics of the

may be determined from what

Supreme Being

has gone before.

Motion
must be continuous (crvvsxv^), and so
must be one and the same throughout. But such a

being eternal,
it

also,

connected the proof

it

single motion

is

the product of a single mobile and a

Hence the primum mobile

single motum.

eternal as motion

is as

itself.^

is

single and

In the next place what

has been said about the continuity and uniformity of

motion implies that this motive principle

unmoved;

which

that

since

is

subject to change, cannot impart

uniform movement,^ and


essence of the
of change.^

sary
'

and

Phys.

primum

It is

6,

259,

a,

13

the

KoX fila Kivr}(Tis, that of


fixed stars, it is shown how

Trpc^TTj otStos

motion

moving

presupposes
cause.

Cf.

a
p.

391, n. 2. On the constancy and


unity of motion we shall have
more to say in the next chapter.
- Phys.
viii. 6, 259, b, 22, c.
10, 267, a, 24 sqq.

it

is

of

the

mobile to exclude the possibility \

where in connection with

single
single

itself

unchangeable and absolutely neces-

MetajjJi. xii. 8, 1073, a, 23 sqq.,

the

absolutely

an unbroken and

consequently

this unconditional

viii.

is

moved, being

necessity

is

the law by

^ In Fr. 15 (preserved to us by
Simpl. Do Ccelo, 130, 45, K.,
Soliol. in Ar. 487, a, 6), from

the treatise n. (l)i\ocro<pias, the


immutability of God is proved
on the ground that the KpdTicrrov
can neither suffer change from
anything else nor feel in itself
the need of any such change,
(It must be granted to BeeNAYS, Dial. d. Arist. 113, and
Heitz, Ar. Fragm. p. 37, that

)(

394

ARISTOTLE

whicli the universe

is

involved in this that

held together.^
it

is

It

is

further

Only that

incorporeal.

on
by nature

indestructible which cannot possibly cease to be

the other hand


destructible
in

"^

which there

But

that

all

is

merely potential

no element of unrealised

is

the Potential

is

The
the Aristotelian fragment.
passage in Plato's Republic, ii.
880, D sqq., as Simpl. remarked,
served as the original of it.)
The same reason is assigned
also in the De Ca-lo, i. 9 (see p.
395, n. fi) for the immutability of
God, and in Metaph. xii. 9, 1074,
b, 2(), for the doctrine that God
must always think the same
ex. p. 397, n. 2.
thing
;

1072, b, 7:
eVet S' eo-Ti ri kivovv avrh oLKiyriTOU
bv, ivepyfia ov, zovto ovk ej/Sexerat
xii.

7,

a\K(t)s exe'J' ovSa/xws

e'l

avdyKr]S

upa eVrtv vv ' Kal rj avdyKr) KaXoos


[i.e. in so far as it is necessary it,
is good, since, as is immediately
explained, its necessity is neither
external nor merely relative, but
absolute fir] iv^ex^y-^vov &\\ws,

aW'

airXws

avayKa7ov']

&pa

TotauTTjs

ovpavds Kal

rj

apxvs

^pTTjrai

e/c

(pvm^.

After showing that the


iuepyeia precedes the Swafxis in
all the three respects of hoycfi,
Xpov(f and ohcria Aristotle goes on,
-

Afrtaph.

ix. 8,

1050, b, 6 (follow-

ing immediately on the passage


p. 385, n. 1) : aXXa fi^v
Koi KvpicoTcpcos [actuality has a

quoted at

higher reality than the Siva/xis].


T filv yap aidia trpirepa ry ovcria

is

possibility.^

A Being that

necessarily material.

this amplificalion also belongs to

Metaph.

only that can operate as priwAim mohile

-contains in itself nothing that

^^

is

is

merely potential must

Twv (pdapruv, eai 5' ovOhv 5vvd/xei


aiSiov.
This he then goes on to
That which is merely
prove.
potential can both be and not be.
i

T^

5'

ev^ex^lJ-^vov jx)] (Jvai (pOaprhv,

^
TovTo avrd [relatively to
that], 'o \yTai eVSexec^at |U7j elvai
[the former, if I say, * it is possible
the latter, if I
for A not to be
say, it is possible for A not to be
in this place, or not to be so great,
or not to have this quality ']
airXais Se rh Kar^ ovcriav [but that
whose
is absolutely perishable
substance can cease to be]. ovOiv
&pa Toov a(p0dpT(i}V airXus Swdfiei
ovSt ruu e|
iorlv hv airKccs
airXus,

'/)

'

'

audyKiqs ovtuiv.
3 Metaph.
xii. 6, 1071, b, 12
there were a KivtyriKhv which
did not realise itself in action
there would be no eternal unineVSe'xeTot yap
terrupted motion
T^ Svvafiiu ^xov fjL^] ivcpyf7v. But
this would be equally true, et
:

if

r] 5' ovaia avTrjs Sivafiis'


ob yap earrai Kivrjcris ai'^ios eV5eX^Tai yap rh Svvdfid ov fxh eluai. Se?

ivepyficreL

'

dpa elvai apx^v TOiavTr]v rjy rj ovffia


ivepyeia. The leading thought of
this proof (iuSex^o^Oai ') fJvai ouSev
SiO(i)ep6i iv ro2s aiSiois) Aristotle
states also Phys. iii. 4, 203, b,
30, and he shows in Metaph. ix.
4 that it is inadmissible to say,

METAPHYSICS

395

Only the

be immaterial and therefore incorporeal.^


incorporeal can be unchangeable

on the other hand,

everything which has a material side

motion and change,^ and can

subject to

is

Moreover

alter its state."^

bodies have magnitude, and magnitude

all

is

always

But the limited cannot possibly produce an inactivity like eternal motion, for its power is just

limited.
finite

as surely limited as that of the infinite is illimitable.''


It follows that the

incorporeal,

primum

indivisible

motionless, passionless,

mobile must be absolutely


and unconditioned by space,
changeless in a word, it must
:

be absolute Reality and pure Energy.'^


on

dvvarhv

fxev rohl,

from which

ovk

etTTot 5e,

immediately follows that we can never say of anything which by its very nature
it

cease to be, that it will never


and consequently
cease to be
it cannot be of the nature of
that which never ceases to be
(the a'iSiov).
ca7i

'

xii.

Cf. p.
f),

ravras
vXtjs.

aWo

847

sq.

and Mefaph.

1071, b, 20:
Set ras ovaias
aiSiovs

yap

^ Plujs.
viii. 10, 266, a,
10
sqq. 267, b, 17. Metapli. xii. 1 jitu
" Metaph. xii. 7 (see
p 394, n.
;

a,

35

preceding and following

n.

1,

supra)y

Ccelo,

i.

9,

ovpavov

c.

8,

1074,

279, a, 16

SedeiKTai

ivSe-xcrai

oijre

on

&pa

(pavephv

Kevhv oOVe

on.

cf.

De

e|&>

Se rov

ovt'

eanv

yeueaOai
aufxa.
ovt tSttos ovre
((TtIu

;(;p(5j/os

e^oodev

'

ert

toIwv

diSTrep out' iv roirq} ra/ce? iricpvKcv,

eJua.i

auev
ye koI

ovT xp^^o^ avra iroie? yqpdcTKeiv.


ouS' ecrrlu ovSevhs ovSe/j-ia jxera^oX))

SeT, et irep

Tt cuSiov. ivepyeia &pa.

Toov vTTfp

T^v

e^coTOTCtf

TTayix4v(av

After what has been said


above, this does not require any
further proof.
All change is a

aAA' avaXXolwTa Kal airad?)


T7]v api(rT7]v exovTU ^w
Kal r^u
avrapKeaTarr^v SiarcXeT rhv airavra

transition from possibility to


actuality, which is only precluded
where there is no matter, and
therefore no Zwdixei ov.
Cf. (besides p. 359 sqq.) the proof in

alwva.
After some remarks upon
the expression ali^Vy Aristotle
proceeds rh rov iravrhs ovpavov
riXos KaX rh rhu irdvTa xP^^^v Kal
Tryi' aireipiav Trepte'^oy
riXos a'lwu

everything which

4(Tnv, airh rov del elvai i\7](pw5 rrjt

Phijs. vi. 4, that

changes must be divisible.

We

shall thus find also that the soul


is in essence unmoved.
3 PJiys. viii. 6, 259, b, 18.
Cf.
preceding n. and p. 366, n. 1.
*
See p. 394, n. 3, and MetapTi.
vii. 7, 1032, a, 20, c. 10, 1035, a, 25.

<popav,

iTvuivvjxiav,

Kal

ro7s

ddduaTos Kal

dWois

dcTos.

To7s fiev aKpifieaTepov ro7s


p'lis,

06 ev

i^^prrjTai,
S'

rh eJval re Kal Cv^'

dfxavIt,

is

thus seen that the highest Deity


(rh delov irav rh irpZrov Kal aKpS-

rarov)

must

be

unchangeable.

ARISTOTLE

396

By

a converse

process,

follows that, since

it

multiplicity partakes of matter, the

that

which

moves are

it

motion, or God,
(to rt

rjv

primum

mobile and

The cause

single.^

of

elvat to TTpcoTov), incorporeal Substance

centred thought

is free

Nothing but pure

Thought.

in other words, is

from materiality,

all

Form

therefore Pure Being, absolute

is

all

or,

self-

even the

for

an essential relation to the body, and in all


substances form is involved with matter.
Again, perfect activity exists in thought alone. Neither

soul has

corporeal

constructive
is

(TroirjTifcr))

perfect, since the

nor practical

end of both

is

(irpaKTi/cr)) activity

external to them-

selves, and therefore they require material to work


But the Supreme Being has no end beyond
with. 2
itself,

because

aWo

ovT yap

[nom.]

it is

the ultimate end of everything.^ It

Kp^lrrSv icrriu o ri

KLU-fjaei

oijT

Ix*'

(pavKov oudev, out' 6//5ees tu>v avTov


KaXwp ovSevos iffTLV. (Cf. p. 398,
n. 3.) Asto whether this account,
indeed, was to be taken as refer-

ring to the primal mover or the


primally moved (the outmost
sphere) the old commentators
according
held divided views
Alexander
to SiMPL. i7i loc,
as well as his Peripatetic predecessors, gave the preference to
the second, the younger (Neoplatonic) expositors to the first
explanation. Alexander's view
seems to be supported by the words
:

is

and tliat we must do so is obvious


from the fact that the subject of
this explanation is expressly said
to be that which is e|w rod ovpavov,
the incorvireprrjv i^uTaToo (popav
poreal, immovable, all-embracing,
the 6e7ov irpwTov Kal aKpSrarov,
the cause of all being and life.

Metajjh. xii. 8, 1074, a, 31

on

5e efs ovpauhs, <pav(p6v

irXdovs

ovpai'ol

Sxrirep

el

'

yap

di/dpcoiroi,

rj irepl ^Kaarov apxh,


ctW' oca
76 iroWai
e^s yap
api6/x(f TToWa, vXrjv e^ft
rh 5e
\6yos Kal 6 avrhs iroWwv
ri ^v elvai ovk e^et vKrjv rh irpcoTOP

effraL elfSei /xia

apiOfj.^

Se

'

'

'

eVreA-exeto yap.

Simpl.

Cf. p. 400, n. 1.
Ccelo, ii. 12, 292, b, 4:
T(p S' uis &pia-ra ^xovri oitdeu Set
TTpd^ecas eari yap avrh nh ov eVe/co,

however

7]

Kot

6.iravcrrou

5^

v\6y(os, unless

Klvr^triv

we

Kiuelrai

alter KivelTui

with some of the MSS. used by


into KLve7; it is easy,
to supply 6 ovpavos "as
the subject, even although God
is spoken of in what precedes,

'-

De

'

5e TTpa^is del iaTiv iv Svcrlv, orav


Kal ov eVe/co ^ Kol rh rovrov eycKa.

METAPHYSICS

Thought we separate Potentiality

true that in analysing

from Actuality

Thought

the

397

faculty of thinking

But

(Oscopla).

from actual

this distinction does not apply

to the Deity, for his substance contains

no undeveloped

and even in the case of man, it is only his


nature which renders him incapable of uninter-

potentiality
finite

The nature of the Deity

rupted thought.

consists of

unceasing sleepless contemplation and absolutely per-

an activity that cannot alter, since to a


perfect being alteration would involve a loss of per-

fect activity,^

fection.2

God, therefore,

thought, and, as such,

and

vitality

and

is

He

the absolute activity of \>^

constitutes absolute reality

the source of

is

all life.^

What, then, are the contents or subject-matter of this


Thought ? All thinking derives its value from the object
of thought but the Divine Thought cannot be dependent for its validity on anything beyond itself, nor can it
relate to anything except the best. But the best is
;

liJth. JV. X.
8, 1078, b, 20
S^ QoivTL rod TrpdrTeiv acpaipov-

rcp

fxivov, Ti Se

luaWov tov

Troi7u, ri

AeiTrerot irKijv dioipia ; Sxrre 7] rod


deov ivepyeia, ixaKapi6Tr]Ti hia(pipovffa,

deii}p'r]TLKi]

ttv

eXr].

koX

tuv

man

(d avOpunipos vovs 6

twv

arvv-

at isolated moments when


it contemplates perfection, not in
broken fragments but in its en64tci}]/)

tirety:
t)

v6t](Tis
"

ovruis 5' exe<

ihv airauTa

Metaph.

avr)) aurijs

aloova.

vSvffis

[actual

9, 1074, b, 2o
rh 6ei6TaTov koI
ri/xiwraTov voe? Kal oh fxcra^dWei
^is
x^^P^^ 7P V fi(Ta^o\}] koI
Klu-qais ns ^'Stj t^ tolovtov.
Metaph. xii. 7, 1072, b, 28
(pa/xev Se [5^] rhv dehv ehai ^<^ou

dAAa

tyvafiis,

atSiou &pi(TTOV, oxttc ^wi] Kal aiccv

to avvex^s
alrcf rris voi](Tu>s.
Ihid. 1075, b,
7 (following BoNiTz's text) pure
reason is indivisible as is therefore the discursive thought of

avuex^^ '^"^ a'iSios virdpx^i t<^ decf


rovro yap 6 deos.
Be Ccelo, ii. 8,
286, a, 9 deov 5' ivepyeia aOavaffia
tovto 5' ia-rl fcw^ atSios.

avdpcairivwv 5^

TaTT]

7]

ravrri ffvyy^v^cr-

Metaph.

v^aifxoviK(ara.TT].

xii. 7, cf. p. 398, n. 5

1074,

c. 9,

28
we cannot think of the
divine thought either as resting
or as in a state of mere potenb,

tiality,

for

et

fxr)

thought] iariv,
v\oyov iviiTovov

iivai

SrjKou roivvv

xii.

on

=*

ARISTOTLE

398

nothing but

Consequently God contemplates

itself.^

Himself, and his thought

is

the thought of thought.^ In

must necessarily be the


case with Pure Spirit, thought and its object are identithe
cal.^ This unalterable repose of thought upon itself
indivisible unity of the thinking subject and the object of
the thought of God, therefore, as

thou"-ht

constitutes the absolute blessedness of

less, of course, can


affected by any emotion
from without. Hence the statement {Etk. N. viii. 0, 1158, b, 35,
] 159, a, 4, or more deli iiitely End.
vii. 3, 12, 1238, b, 27, 1214, b, 7,
1245, b, 14, and from this treatise
M. Mot: ii. 11, 1208, b, 27), that
God does not love but is only
loved, and that between Him
and man there is too wide a
separation to peru\it of mutual
'

Still

God be

alrictiv

Metapli.

70^

dAA.'

(Te/xyhv,

Kvpiov,

1074, b, 17:
tiv ejfrj to

9,

j/oeT,

ti

exet wcrn-ep

tiv

et

tovtov 5' aAAo


ovK av 7] apiarr] ovaia
5ta "yap tov uoelv rh rifiiou

Kadevdooi'

i'lT]

xii.

fxridev

'

e'lre voel,
.

avTw virapx^i- ^t' Se


%repov
If yap avThs avrhv 7)
.

ti voel
ri.

Korspov ovv SLa(t)pei ri 7) ovdkv t5


vos7u rh Ka\hu t) rh tvxov ; }) Kal
aroirou rh biavoe7aOaL irepl iuicci'
(as at p. 397,
S/jAoj/ roivvv
if
further, at 1.
29,
n. 2);
vovs were the mere power of
thinking, SriKov, on aAAo ri Ssv e'lr]
rh Ti/XLWTepov ^ 6 vovs, rh voovfxivov
KoX yap rh voeiv Kal r] uoTjffis virdp^ei
war^ el
Kal rh xiipicTTOv voovvti
ovk ti.v ei'r; rh
(pevarhv tovto,
apKTTOu 7) voTjcris avrov &pa voel,
.

'

KpaTiarov, Kal effnv


c. 7 (see
voi](T(i)s voricris.
7} uSiqais
Be A71. iii. 6, 430, b, 24
n. 4).
Se rivi fJ-T] ioTiu iiavriov rwv
t
tiVep eo-Tt

tJ)

eavTO

yivuxTKei

Kal 4uepyeia cVtI Kal xcDpiO'TOJ'.


^

See preceding note and Jlf(paiuiraL 5' dei &\Aov

taj)h. xii. 9

^ eTr' iviwu t]
rh Trpayfia ; eVt /xev rSiv
T\oi7]TiK(iov avev v\7]S 7) ovaia Kal to
7]

iinarr 7)1X7],

iin(rr7]iJ.ri

ri ^v elvai, eVl 5e rcou deccpririKccu


6 Xoyos TO Trpayjxa koX t) v67](ti9.
ovx CTepou ovv ovtos tov voovfievou
Kal TOV vov, oaa /xi] vK7\v ex^i to

avTh

e(TTai,

voovixivov
efre

avTh

[?],

God.'^

(cf. c. 5

Kal

and

c.

tov

voriais

7]

De An.

fiia.

iii.

7 mit.')

4 pn.

eVi /xev

yap TMv &vev uArjs Th avrd

icXTi

Th

voovv Kal TO VOOV]XCVOV.

1075, b, 7:
exov v\7]v,
&c., see p. 397, n. 1, supra.
^ This view
is set forth in
the passage immediately following that quoted p. 394, n. 1 5ta

uMetajjJi.

xii.

9:

Th

fii]

adiaipeTov irav

ycay))

KivovvTi]
7}iJuv.

iifuv
TjSoi/^

icTTlv

S'

t^

[sc.

irpdlncf)

7] dpiCTTj fiiKphv xpovov


yap dei iKelv6 iffTiv
yap oBvvaTov. eVel Kal

o'ia

'

0VTU3
ixkv
7)

ivepyeia

[so

BONITZ,

following
Alexander,
rightly
instead of t] tjS. iv4py.'] tovtov koI
Std toOto [i.e. because not God's
activity alone, but activity in
general, is pleasant, for in this
passage, as often in this book,
lucidity is sacrificed to an excessive brevity of style] iypifyopa-is
atcrdTjffis v67)(ns

Kal

jxviiixai

^iSkttov

Sid TauTa.

t]

^AxiSes Se
l\ vdrjais

tj

METAPHYSICS
These
Divine

Spirit

scientific basis for

attempt to find a

first

Here first the idea of God


was logically deduced

Theism.

intelligence

self-conscious

as

the

contain

concerning the

Aristotle

of

propositions

.399

from the principles of a philosophical system instead ox


being borrowed from religious notions. And on the

we

very threshold
solution of

which

are confronted with the difficulty the

the final problem of

is

theistic speculation

God

how

are

we

systems of

all

to define the idea of

so that while maintaining his essential difference

from

and

body and

of

yet preserve

his per-

Aristotle represents

vice versa ?

self-conscious Spirit

Him

we may

all finite reality,

sonality,

God

as

on the other hand, he deprives

senses, and, not content with this,

declares not only action

and creation, but the direction

of the will itself towards an object, to be incompatible

outV fov

Ko.Q''

KaB' avrh apiarov

ixaXiara rod /jLakKxra [pure


thought has for its object that
virhich is absolutely best, and all
Koi

71

the more

the purer it is].


aurhv Sh voe7 6 vovs Kara fxerdAri^piv
Tov voTjTov
vorirhs yap yiypeTOi
Qvyyavtav Koi vouv^ Hxm ravrhv
vovs Koi voy]T6v. TO yap SeKTi/cbv
fitly

Tov

uor}Tov

iuepyd

Kal

Se

ttJs

e^ajj'.

vovs,

ovcrias
Sicrr'

eKUVo

and exeiv] fxaXKop toutov


more than the mere recep-

passage

is quite general, referring


neither to the divine nor to the
human reason exclusively ; 1. 24,
however, continues et ovv ovrcos
e5 ex*> ^^ rjfieTs ttotc, o dehs ael,
:

OavfJiaarTSv

^W<-. x. 8,

(and therefore actual knowledge,


and not the mere capacity of
knowing, is the best and most

earai

kuO'

aiirijv)

this

.,

as

Further cf

3, sujjra.

citedatp. 397,

n. 1; iJ/*^.

eXrovT] (pixris
154, b, 25
airArj eXr], del r} avri] irpa^is ijSioTT]

vii. 15,

t]

koX

w5i,

apiarr] Kal aiSios. tpafxkv S^,

[i.e.

vdrjcris

ert

Se

'

tivity] t SoKe7 6 povs delov e'xetr,


Kal 7) dicopia rh t^Sio-tov koI dpicrrov

Se

jxaKKov

5e'
ye virdpx^'^- V y^P vov
ivepyeia (o)^, e'/ce?i/os 5e t] ev^pyeia
ivipyeia Se t/ KaQ^ oi/tV eKclvov ^corj

at p. 397, n.

{t)

6;^ei

^a>)/

{^evepyiiv

blessed state.
On this meaning
of deupla vid. BONITZ, Tnd. Ar.
From 1. 18
328, a, 50 sqq.)

Se

et

'

Qavixaciwrepov.

Sib 6 6ehs ael n'lav Kal airXriv

xa^P* ''75<'V

1323, b, 23

and

t^

Fulit.

vii.

1,

&s cvdaifiwu
fxev iari Kal /xaKapios, Si' ovOhv Se

tuv

i^coTfpiKcov

avrhv avrhs Kal


r^v (pvcriv.

^ecfJ

ayaQuv aXXa
tc^

ttoios

tis

Si'

ehai

ARISTOTLE

400

with divine perfection/ and confines his thought within


iroi-qcris
nor
(on the difference between
them cf. p. 182 sq.) can be attributed to God is definitely stated
by Aristotle in many passages
The
e.g. Eth. x. 8, 1178, b, 7 sq.
1

That neither

7rpa|ts

position that perfect bliss consists


in thought alone, he there proves

by showing that everyone con-

and that

siders the gods blessed

the

7rpd|ts
then is
aTTOueTfiai XP^^" avrols ;

question

Se -Ko'ias
TrSrepa ras SiKtxias

ctAAa ras
ras i\fvdpiovs ;
ai 5e (Tuxppoves ti &z/ (hu ; All
these being inconceivable (5ie|lovai Se TTOLVTa (paivoLT^ av to. irepl
TUs 7rpa|ets fiiKpa. Koi avd^ia deuv),

avSpelovs
.

,'

fj

he concludes

t^>

8/j

C^vn,

&ic.

(as at p. 397, n. 1). Be Ccelo ii. 12,


292, a, 22 eoi/re -yap rui p.\v ^picna
xouTi viTapx^<-v rh ev &uv irpd^ecos,
5'
iyyvrara [the heavenly
rcf
:

bodies of the outer sphere] Sia


Ibid, b, 4, cited
oAiyrjs /cat fxias.
p. 39(), n. 3, suj)rd

(ren. et Corr.

i.

since every Ttoikiv


323, a, 12
involves a corresponding iracxeiv,
we cannot ascribe a -KOifiv to
every movens, but only to such as
must itself be moved in order
G,

that it may in turn move Kiviiv,


therefore, is a more comprehen;

than Trotetv.
conception
These details are much too explicit to permit the assertion
(Beentaxo, Psychol, d. Arht.
247 sq.) that Aristotle desires to
deny to Deity only such actions
sive

'

action
universal
must be ascribed to God on any
view) as result from a felt need,
and that therefore, while denying that irpdmiv contributes anything to the blessedness of God,
he does not deny that it belongs
to Him generally. Aristotle does
(irpdTTiv

'

not recognise any such limitawhich, moreover, would be


wholly inconsistent with his
other views (for since, according
to the passage quoted p. 394, n. 1
properties must be
all God's
absolutely necessary, none can
belong to Him which He does
not require for his perfection and
blessedness, and which therefore
He could not dispense with without prejudice to these). On the
contrary, he says without any
reservation {Eth. x. 8 see p. 397.
n. 1, S7ij)ra), that neither iroielv nor
irpdrreiv can be attributed to
God that perfection in action
(practical virtue) can only find a
place in human intercourse and
among beings who are subject to
human passions (EiJi. x. 8, 1178,
a,9,b,5, vii. 1, 11 45, a, 25); that
every action is a means to an end
tion,

different from itself, and therefore that it cannot be attributed


to God, for whom there is no end
not yet attained (JDe Coelo, as

quoted above).

Nor

is

it

any

objection to this view that Aristotle elsewhere {Eth. vii. 15, see
p. 398, n. 5 fin. Polit. vii. 3, 1325,
b, 28) speaks of God's -rrpa^is, since
the word here used in the wider
sense in which it occurs in Eth. vi.
2, 5, 1139, b. 3, 1140, b, 6 (where
it is said that irpaf^is differs from
;

having its end in itself,


being the t4\os) and includes every form of activity,
activity of
pure
the
even
thought. No other meaning will
suit the words, Eth. vii. 15, oel v
and in a similar
avT^ irpa^is
TToiriais

in

cvirpa^la

sense Pol., as above, 1. 16 sqq.,


distinguishes irpd^eis irphs kr^povs,
Tas rS}V aTTofiaivSvTav X'*P"' 7'7''oin a word,
fxivas Cf Tov wpdrreiv

METAPirVSICS

401

the limits of an isolated self-contemplation.


irpd^iis

actions which

e^coTepiKoij

elsewhere

are

simply

called

in the narrower sense of


the word from tus avT0Te\e7s,
Koi ras auTuv eueKa deupias Kal
Siavoijaeis, and attributes only
the latter to God, in opposing- the
view that the practical life is
superior to the theoretic (rxo^fj
yap tiv d dfhs exoi kuAws koi ttus 6
i^coTcpiKot
k6tixos, oTs ovk elalu
irpd^eis TTapa ras oiKeias ras avruu.
Still less is it a pertinent objection that in using popular language Aristotle ascribes iroieTu
to God, as in Be Caelo, i. 4 Jin.
irpa^is

Kal

(d dehs

voiova-iv).

336, b, 31

&

r]

(pvais

Gen. et

oiiShv

Corr.

{arvucirK-fjpwcre

fidrrfv
ii.

10,

rh oXov

ivTcAexv iroiiicras r))v


@ehs here means the
yeveffiv).
which governs
divine
force
nature, whose relation to the first
cause of motion is left, as we
shall see, wholly undefined
nor
can we draw any conclusion from
this use as to Aristotle's view of
God as the absolute supradehs,

mundane

reason, any more than


from the frequent use of d^ol as
in Eth. X. 8, quoted above, and

iUd.

viii. 14, 1162, a, 4, x. 9,


1170, a, 24, we may argue that
Aristotle was a poly heist. UoieTi/
also in these passages seems to
I

be used quite generally and not


limited any more than

to be

3Ietaph. xii. 6, 1071, b,


12 (to which Beentano appeals,
but which is nowhere directly
applied to God b}'- Aristotle) to
iroiT]TiKhv,

narrower sense discussed


it
bears merely the
182
general signification of creation
or production, as in the phrase

thtj

p.

vovs

iroiTjTiKhs,

cates causality

VOL.

I.

and merely

indi-

in general with-

But

this

out further specification of its


nature.
But if action does not
belong to God, neither can will,
for as will (irpoaipeais) is dpxh
irpd^ecos and originates in turn in
a desire on the one hand and the
conception of an end on the
other, it always presupposes an

7]eiK)) e^ts

(Mk. vi.

and these ideas

2,

1139, a, 31)

impossible
to reconcile with Aristotle's conception of God. Furthermore,
it is

De An. iii. 10, 433, a,


23, is defined as rational desire ;
but desire cannot in any sense be
jSouArjo-ts,

ascribed by Aristotle to God


nor can we admit the assertion of
Brentano, p. 246, that because

he ascribes to Him 7}hov^, he must


also have ascribed to Him something corresponding to desire in
us.
It is only of sensuous KvTn}
and T]^ov^ that Aristotle says
{De An. ii. 2, 413, b, 23) that it
involves iiridvfiia
he expressly
adds that he is not here speaking
;

of

Nous

10

he

and ibid. iii. 7, 431, a,


declares dpcKriKhv and
(()fvKTiKov to be identical with
:

atae-nriKhv,

and remarks

iii. 9,

10,

432, b, 27, 433, a, 14, cf. Mh. vi.


a,
2, 1139,
35, that the vods
OeafprfTiKhs (therefore
also the
divine) does not deal with the
(j)VKrhv and ZiwKrhv by which
desire is always conditioned. It
is evident that those passages in
which Aristotle uses the common
conceptions of God as generally

admitted premisses from which


conclusions may be drawn -9..7.
Top. iv. 5, 126, a, 34 Eth. x. 9,
1179, a, 24, or, indeed, such
quotations as Eth. vi. 2, 1139, b,
9, Bhet. ii. 23, 1398, a, 15 prove
nothing.
Such statements as
that God in making Himself the'
;

'

D D

ARISTOTLE

402
solution

is

'

wholly unsatisfactory.

On

the one hand,

personal existence implies activity of will no less than

On

of thought.
is

the other hand, thought qua personal

always in transition from possibility to actuality

other words, in a state of development

mined

as

changes
these

much by

the variety of

of intellectual states.

conditions

and

its

Aristotle

is

in

deter-

by
by destroying

objects as

and confining the function of the

Divine Keason to a monotonous


not quickened into

life

self- contemplation,

by any change or development,

merges the notion of personality in a mere abstraction.


The diflficiilties which perplex us when we come to
consider the operation of (lod upon the world are not
object of desire for his own sake
universe and the
desires the
whole order of nature (Brext,
247), receive no support whatsoever from Aristotle. Such a conception, on t lie contrary, is wholly
irreconcilable with his idea of
God, for all desire is an effort
after something not yet attained,

xii.

and

in a (pvais tov dpicrrov reTvxnKv:a (3fetapk. xii. 8, 1074, a, 19)

dAA.' iKeivr]

any such

apply this to the idea of God and


the world it certainly follows
that the perfection of the uni-

'

On

effort is inconceivable.

this point also Aristotle

has expressed

himself

with* a

no room
Neither the view of

definiteness that leaves


for doubt.

AH

St. 246 sq.),


IJRENT. {Psych, d.
that in knowing- Himself, God
knows the whole creation as well,
nor Schneider's modification of
it {Be Caum p'nali AHst. 79 sq.
cf. also Kym, Mefaphya. UnterK.
252, 256), to the effect that God
knows the intelligible world as
the totality of the forms that are
contained in his thought, finds

any

.S91, n. 2.

supra) offers

either.

Aristotle

here inquiring in what way the


world contains the good.
The
only answer which he gives, however, to this question is contained
in the words Koi yap iv rij rd^ei

is

rh fd Kol 6 a-Tparrjyhs, Kal fiaWov


ovTOS oi) yap ovros Sia Ti]v rd^iv
'

diarovTou

iffriv.

If

we

verse resides in the first place in


God as the first cause of motion,
and secondly in the universal
order that owes its origin to it.
On the other hand, t he comparison
of the world to an army gives no
clue to the method in which the
order of the universe proceeds

from God (for this was not the


question under discussion). As we
evidently cannot conclude from it

Aristotle's

God sketches plans, issues


commands to his subordinates,
&c. (though this way of repre-

The passage ^^etaph.

septing God's government of the

justification

>vntings.

10 (see p.

no support to

in

that

METAPHYSICS
less

weighty.

Aristotle describes

403

God, as we have
also more
and the ground of

seen, not only as the priimim mobile, but

generally as the highest principle

the collective cosmos. ^


attributing to

extends

its

him

While we
belief in

care to individuals,^

are not justified in

Providence which

we may

yet see that he

acknowledges the world to be the work of Reason,'^ that


universe is common enough), TrSrepov al avral tuv (pdaproov KaX
neither does it follow that God T&v o.<pQdprcav apx a i elaiv. On the
produces the order of the world other hand we read in Metaph. xi.
by a process of thought which 7, 1064, a, 34 sqq. if there be
has for its object the world itself an ovaia xupiffr^ Kal aKiwqTos,
or its individual parts. That point ivravd^ tiv e??; irov Kal rh deTov, Kal
can only be decided by a refer- avTT] hv UT] TrpwTT] Kal KvpiwraTf]
ence to declarations elsewhere apx-f].
- Metaph. xii.
made by Aristotle. Still further
7, 10; see p. 394,
at variance with the spirit of the n. 1, and p. 391, n. 2, supra. Be
above comparison is the state- Cwlo, i. 9; seep. .395, n. 6.
^ On this subject cf.
ment of Kym, p. 246 sq.,that the
p. 422, n.
good or God does not merely exist 1 see Ch. XVI. infra. How little
outside the world as an individual the passages referred to are to be
being, but is immanent in it as taken literally is obvious from
' God
order and design.
and the fact that the gods (0eol) are
'the good 'are not, however, to always spoken of in them in the
Aristotle convertible terms (cf. plural.
But if we have thus first
to translate them into language
e.ff. Eth. i. 4, 1096, a, 2.S, Bonitz,
Ind. Ar. 3, b, 35 sqq.), and the possible to the philosopher in
general is quite different from order to discover his true meanthe order of the army. Cf further ing, it is a question whether we
have not to mnke as great a dep. 413 sq.

Metapk. xi. 2, 1060, a 27, duction from their literal content


cannot, indeed, be quoted in sup- as in the parallel cases which will
port of this statement for the be discussed infra, at the end
words etVrep e(TTi ris ova(a Kal dpxv of the section in Ch. IX. on the
roiavrt) t^v <pvaiv o'lav vvv Q^Tovfi^v,
Universe.
*
Kai avrrj /xla irdvTccv Kal t] ovtt] tS)v
Anaxagoras
is
praised
aidioiv re Kal (pOapTuv, not only, as
{Metaph. i. 3, 984, b, 15, cf.
may be seen from the context Phys. viii. 5, 256, b, 24) for
and from the parallel passage iii. having made vovs anios rov Koa/jLov
Kal Trjs Tct^ecos Trdaif)s, and it is re4, 1000, a, 5 sqq., leave it in
doubt whether there be such an marked Phys. ii. 6, 198, a, 9, that
apxh or not, but they do not avrdfiarov and tvxv always pre
speak of God as an individual suppose a vovs and a <pv<ns.
being.
The words in iii. 4, are
:

'

D d2

ARISTOTLE

404

he recognises,^ in the adaptations of nature, traces of the


operation of God, and that he finds in human Reason an

But if we attempt to
bring t*hese convictions into harmony with his theology
as above discussed, we are met by many questions to^

indwelling element of Divinity.^

which
vj

noi]easy to find

it is

In the

place,

firsl?

it is

an answer.

obvious that

if

God

exercises

neither creative nor practical activity in relation to any-

thing

He

else,

Here,

cannot be the lyrimum mohile.

we have
itself,
moving
Form, without

are met by the notion to which

however, we

already alluded

that

power of attraction over Matter, causing it


God moves the world in this
to move in its direption.
way: the object of desire and the object of thought
But these
cause motion without moving themselves.
exercises a

'

two motive forces are ultimately the same (the absolute


object of thought is the absolutely desirable or pure
of desire

is

apparent beauty,

while the original object of will

is

real

good)

for the object

desire

is

object)

and not

vice versa.

starting-point or principle.

by the object

in motion

two

of the

Cf. p. 421,

and

Eth.

S),

ix. 7,

117'.), a,

b,

7;]fi

4,

series

.SO,

p.

but

ii.

I>,

JJsAn.i.
Part. An. ii. 10,

a, 7, iv. 10,

NoTjr^ 56

7}

Thought, however,
of thought;

is

the

is

set

but only one

and in

and as is obvious
the series of being and
good. The expression refers to
tt^e
Pythagorean and Platonic
doctrine of the universally prevalent antithesis of being and notbeing, perfection and imperfecly point out,

686, a, 28, 373.


kripa (TvaToix'a
Kad" ai}ri]v. By this It epa (rufrTOtx'a
we are to understand, as the
more recent conimentators right3

Thought, therefore,

absolutely intelligible,^

4G0 sq.

Gen. An.

2G;

29

is

1177, a, IH, b,

27, 7;{7, a, 10

4U8,' b,

^'ij%,

beauty

conditioned by our notion (of the value of the

from

tion,

1.

3o,

(fcc,

which Aristotle had

discussed at length in the 'ExAoy^


tuv "EvauricDu (see p. 61, n, 1,

METAPHYSICS
Being stands

this

defined

first,

40o

simple and ac-

as

Tlie final cause operates like a loved object,

and
communicates motion to the
rest.' 2
God, therefore, is the primimi mobile only in so
far as He is the absolute end of the world,^ the
Governor, as it were, whose will all obey, but who
never sets his own hand to the work.^ And He fulfils
tual.'

'

that which*

moved by

is

it

by being absolute Form.


As Form in
general moves Matter by inviting it to pass from
this function

God upon
Without doubt

potentiality into actuality, the operation of

the world must be of the same


supra) and often alludes to else-

where

Metaph.

sort.''

would certainly be strange, for


God is the first mover He must

1004,
a, 1, ix. 2, 1046, b, 2,xiv. 6, 1093,
b, 12, i. 5, 986, a, 28; Phys
iii. 2, 20U b, 25, i. 9, 192, a, 14;
Gen. et Corr. i. 3, 319, a, 14.
Metaph. xii. 7, 1072, a, 26
see BoNiTZ and Schwegler.
2 lUil. 1072, b, 3
Kiv^l 5e <ws
ipd>lj.pov, Kivovjxcvov (better Cod.

and only a certain kind of

ET

is

denied of

n.

1).

cf.

iv.

2,

'

5e

Kivov/x4}'Cf>)

raAAa

KiV7.

As

also do the movers of


the celestial spheres (to be discussed infra, Ch. IX. in the section on the Spheres) these cause
motion, according to Metaph. xii. 8,
1074, a, 23, ws t4Xos ovtrai <popas.
* Cf Metajih. xii. 10 init. and
^

if

be the
are the

The

subject,

however,

is

here only treated generally:


the question is not whether God
moves the world but how He

moves

it,

relevant

and

it is

therefore

when Brentano,

ir-

ibid.

235 sqq., contests the assertion


that God 'is not the first operative principle, but only the final
cause, of being
that according
to Aristotle no operation at all
belongs to Him. This assertion
'

'

'

and the iroir]riKhv


same (Be An. iii. 5 init.;

Gen. An. i. 21 729, b, 1 3 Metaph.


1071, b, 12; Gen. et Corr.
,

xii. 6,
i

7,

324, b,

aXriov ws oOcvtj

But

tan

Se t^ iroirjTiKhv

apxh

God

Trjs Kiwfjcreus)

(see

iroi-ncris

p.

400,

quite another

it is

thing to say that according to


Aristotle God operates upon the
world not directly but indirectly,
not by Himself exercising activity upon it, but as perfect
being by eliciting its activity by
his

fin.

operator, since the

first

KivrjTiKhv aXriov

mere existence He is
;

cause
being

efficient

only

in virtue of his
final cause.
Nor is it
sufficient to discredit this s'atement to adduce passages in which
God is described in general as the
moving or efficient principle of
the world. No one doubts that this

To prove our view wrong,


would be necessary to produce
passages in which direct action
upon the world is attributed to
Him it would be further neces-

is so.
it

ARISTOTLE

406
this

system.
the

harmonises admirably with the whole


It gives us, in fact, the proper coping-stone of

doctrine

Metaphysics, by clearly exhibiting the

unity of formal,

and

efficient,

relation to the material cause.

We

find in

ultimate

and their

final causes,
it,

moreover,

the ultimate principle of union between the Metaphysics


and the Physics the point at which the investigations

Unmoved and

into the nature of the

and find a common

issue.

the

Moved meet

enables Aristotle

It

to

trace to absolutely immaterial and unmoved Being the


ultimate source of all movement and change, and to

make God

central,

the

controlling

universe without involving


*^>

Him

principle

of the

in its machinery

on

the one hand or disturbing the uniformity of natural


law bv personal interference with it on the other. It
further furnishes him with the means of reconciling the
eternity of the world with its dependence upon a divine
If the existence or the order or

supernatural Being.

the motion of the universe be referred to definite acts


of Deity, we are forced to assume that the world had a

beginning, since every single act and that which is


produced by it has a beginning in time.^ On the other

hand, a system which

and

definite point,

attraction w^hich

is

is

gravitating towards a fixed

and which owes

its

motion to the

thus exercised upon

it

(and Ari-

such a system), can be conceived of


stotle's
But the
or without beginning.
with
indifferently as

Cosmos

is

sary to show how any such statement can be reconciled with those

passages v/hich explicitly deny

any such action of


finally to harmonise

Him
it

and

with the

Aristotelian conception of the


nature of God as an absolutely

unchangeable Being who


only object of His
'

Cf. p. 412, n.

own
1.

is the
thought,

METAPHYSICS

407

more important the above doctrine is for Aristotle, the


more obviously does it reveal the weak side of his

The notion

theory.

of the motiim naturally desiring the

mobile, the Corporeal seeking the Divine,


as to be almost unintelligible to us.^

As Theophrastus easily
discerned, IV. 12 (3fetajjh.), 8
ei
e<pe(ris,
S)]
SA\cos re Koi rod
'

apicrrov, /j.era
at/

i7j

Tci

i/zuxrjs,

PROCLUS,

ScHRADER,

Tim. 82,
Arist.

cfirpvx

Similarly

Kivovfieva.

dt}

(of.

Volunt.

Doctr. Brandenb. 1847, p. 15, A,


42) asks et 70/j Ipa. b Koff/xos,
&s (prjcn Kal 'Aptaror4\r]s, rov vov
:

Kal Kivelrai

irphs

avrhv, irSdev e;^et

tV ecpecriv ;
We are not, of course, there-

ravrrjv
'

fore justified in denying that


Aristotle held this notion in the
face of his own plain and re-

peated statements and the interpretations of them in this sense


by the most faithful of his disciples
all the less as it is hard
indeed (as the discussion in
Theophrastus, Fr. 12, 5, clearly
proves) to say in what other way
motion can, on Aristotle's principles, be conceived of as proceeding from the absolutely unmoved.
Brentano (as above, 239 sq.)
thinks, indeed, that there is nothing so totally in contradiction to
the Aristotelian doctrine as the
view that ' matter is the efficient
principle because it moves of
itself to meet God, who is its
end.' As little, he says, can 'the
end produce anything of itself
;

without an

efficient

principle.'

But nobody has asserted either


the one or the other.
When
it

is

said

that

God

motion by causing

the

causes
desire

for

so obscure

Further,

own

his

is

perfection,

if,

it

as
is

not meant that the matter in

which

this

desire is produced

causes the motion as little can


it mean that the end produces
it by itself alone, apart from any
efficient principle. The fact is that
the efficient cause is not here regarded as different from the
final.
Though we should perhaps
in such a case conceive of two
independent causes at work,
the attractive force and the
thing that permits itself to be
attracted, Aristotle represents
the relationship otherwise. He
ascribes to the mover a ^vvaixis
iroi-qriK)}, to the motion merely a
;

(Meta])h. v. 15,
1, 1046, a, 16
sqq.). It is impossible, therefore,
for him to attribute to that which
owes its motion to something else,
any independent efficiency of its
own.
On the contrary, the
efficient and the final cause, as
has been shown at p. 356 sq., he
conceives of as in essence one.
ZvvafJLis

iradririK^

1021, a,

15,

ix.

Their apparent severance under


certain circuTustances is only a
phenomenon of the sensible
world, where form realises itself
in matter, and therefore (cf. pp.
368 sq.) in a plurality of individuals. In the intelligible world,
however, efficient and final cause
are always one and the same,
and accordingly it is impossible
to speak of an end producing
anything apart from a principle

ahistotle

408

motum must be

Aristotle supposes, the

the

mohile,

it

primum

contact with the

for

motum

is

contradiction that

is

here involved, w^e find the notion

goes beyond the view which he


combats, in saying, p. 240, that
according to Mcfaph. xii. 7, 1072.
a, 26: 'God moves as known:'
for since matter, as he himself
adds, cannot know God. it would
follow from this that God does
not move matter at all.
The
assertion, however, rests upon
a misunderstanding.
Aristotle
says (cf p. 404) rh opeKrhv Koi rh
vorjThv Kive? oi) Kivovmvov
vovs Se vnh rov votjtov KipeTrai
KJi/e? 8e ws epcufifuov.
As
:

voTjrhv

God moves

onl}^

"

But even though we overlook the

to the
of efficiency.- Similar
action of God Himself is that of
the spheral spirits, which produce
motion in their respective spheres
as being themselves the end of
the motion cf p. 405, n. 3. It is
still more strange that Brentano
.

Moreover, he asserts

in contact with the iirimmn mohile,

vice versa.

contact

space, but only to an immediate

connection between tw^o things.^


that the

'

clearly proves that he does not allude

to juxtaposition in

he endeavours to

he often employs the expression

when the context

but not

in

the notion of contiguity in space from this

exclude
;

must be

mohile, as, indeed, Aristotle

It is true that

explicitly states.^

idea

in contact' with

follows that the Universe

Nous

(to

which, however, motion can be ascribed only in an improper sense


cf. Ch. XI. at the commencement
and at the enddnfra); the world, on
the other hand. He moves as 4p(i>/jLvov by means of the up^^is which
He causes. "VVe, indeerl, should
;

not think of ascribing any such


quality to matter, and we should
hesitate scarcely less to attribute
to plants and animals a longing
after the divine as Aristotle does
in Le An. ii. 4, 415, a, 26 sqq. (see
Ch. X. pt. 2, infra). Even the
doctrine of a plant and animal
soul would scarcely justify sucli a
view in our eyes, as from such a
soul thethonght of God is necesBut just as
sarily excluded.
Aristotle here attributes to nonrational existence an unconscious
yearning after t^ Q^tov, so the
conception of a world animate
throughout, so natural to the
Greek and j^et resting ultimately
on an untenable anthropological
analogy, enables him to view the
astral spheres, which he holds
to be of a far higher nature than
any earthly existence (see Ch.IX.
on the Universe), in the samelight.
Cf. supo'a, p. 386.
2 Gni. et Corr. i. 6, 323, a, 20.
3 Cf. snjjra, p. 203, n. 3.
*
Gen. et Corr. ibid. see p.
387, n. 3, svjn'a.
'

'

'

METAPHYSICS
of existence in space forced

upon us

ably by the further assertion that

world in motion starts from

409

its

still

God

more remarkin setting the

circumference.

generally the primordial motion

is

For since

taken to be motion

and of the original motions in space none is


continuous and uniform except circular
motion,^ the operation of the first mover upon the
world must consist in the production of circular motion.^
According to Aristotle, this might be effected either
in space/

absolutely

from the centre or the circumference of the world, for


both of these places are ap;^at, and command the whole
movement. He prefers the latter, however, because it
clear that the circumference

moves faster than the


and that which is nearest to the cause of
motion ought to move at the quickest rate.'* In defending
is

centre,

he might hope to evade the objection that


he places God in a particular locality by his peculiar
theory of space, which excluded from the notion everything that lay beyond the limits of the world.
It is
this position

'"^

we cannot

obvious, however, that

Again

accept this defence.

as the Deity, relatively to Himself,

is confined to
the unvarying exercise of uniform self-contemplation,
so, in his relation to the world, He has no other func-

tion but that of monotonously causing circular motion.

To explain the
'

^^^

Phys.

viii.

rich variety of finite existence with the

7,

see p. 421

- Ilnd. c. 8sq.
De Coelo,\. 2;
J/e%^7/. xii. G,_1071, b, 10.
;

Phya.

viii.

Metapli. xii.

2^

6 fin.,

6/;^

c.

8,

^ fin.
1073, a,

c.

s<l%

P%.

Cwlo,

279, a, 16 sqq. (see p.


supra).
Hence the
assertion (Sext. Matli. x. 23;
HypoUjp. iii. 218) that God is
to Aristotle t^ Trtpas rov ohpavov
^ Cf. De
Ccelo, i. 9 (cited as
above, at p. 395, n. 6)/ and p. 432,
r
395,

^,

viii. 10,

267, b, 6

i?^

n. 5.

i.

n.

9,

6,

ARISTOTLE

410

and subdivisions of its motion, by


simple and uniform activity, would be im-

infinite diversities

means of this

Aristotle himself admits as much with reference to the heavenly bodies; and accordingly he adds
to the first mover a number of subordinate but equally
possible.

whose business

eternal substances,

made

must, however, be
of

all

it

is

to cause the

The same

special motions of the planets.^

to account

provision

for special

motion

kinds and for every separate property of things.


cannot have produced

the First Cause of motion

As

them, seeing that

it

exercises one general function in

the world and nothing more,

some

are driven to assume

we

Only

special cause for them.^

point merely to something which

operation

its

for

is

it

do to

will not

equally general in

example, to the inclination of the

of the sun and planets, from which Aristotle


^
deduces the phenomena of growth and destruction.
The special character of everything must be ascribed

orbit

to its

own

particular nature

question rises

and Form.^

Here a new

what position do these particular Forms,

which operate as creative

forces

and

in finite things

constitute their peculiar essence, occupy with respect to

the highest form, the primordial motive force, or

Or what
as they

For

we

are

3Ieta2)h.

fuller

xii.

8,

1073, a, 26.
see Ch,

explanation

mtaph.

ixeKX^i yiv^ffis koX (pOopa ehai,


Set elvai ivepyovv

AWcos

/col

&K\o

dWus.

Gen. et Corr. ii. 10, 336, a,


see the section of Ch. IX.
infra, which deals with the
earthly world.
^

xii.

6,

1072,

a,

to secure the uniformity of the


motion of the world (TreptcJSy
1. 10 is prob. corrupt), Sel -ri aei
/icVetj/

do to the supernatural world, are unaffected by

IX. infra.
-

God

to say of those beings which, belonging

wo-auTOJs

ivepyovv.

el

5e

23

* Cf., besides p. 350 sq., the


passages quoted iy?//-, p. 432, n. 5.

METAPHYSICS
the changes of birth

411

and destruction the heavenly


move and animate them,

spheres with the spirits that

and the immortal part of the human soul

What

?^

explanation does Aristotle offer us of the existence


peculiar nature of these beings ?

them

to be God's creatures

^
;

We

and

cannot suppose

for not only does

such a

notion obtain no support from his system and writings,^


That these three classes of
being are uncreated and indestructible not only follows from
the eternity of the world and its
motion, but is also expressly
stated by Aristotle cf. p. 474 sq.
and Ch. IX. infra.
'

As Beentano holds them

to

be, Psych, d. Arist. 198, 234 sqq.


BuLLiNGER goes even further,

Erhabenheit uber alien


BiMlismus etc. (1878), p. 2 sq.
According to his view, Aristotle
supposed not only the whole
world, but even the material of
which it is made, to originate in a
divine act of creation. Thus the
JDes Arlst.

'

material out of which God


creates the world would, according to Aristotle, be nothing else
than the power and might eternally actual in God, whereby the
world is actualised,' &c. (p. 15).
'

'

It will be sufficiently evident from


the account already given in the
text that speculations are here
attributed to Aristotle which
are as foreign to the range of his
thought as they are in conflict

with his definite declarations.


^ That
God is called irpuTrj
dpxh (see p. 403, supra), proves
nothing for this may mean, not
only that He has produced everythino-, but also that He is the
;

condition of the eternal


activity of the world

and

indeed (Metaph. v. 1, 1013, a, 16,


20 sq.), is used in as many senses
as'o^Ttoj/, and includes especially
the conception of final cause.
Since it is God who, as the most
perfect being in the universe,
gives unity of aim to the whole,
and who causes the all-governing
motion of the first sphere, He is
also the irpct-Trj koI KupiwTa.T'n dpxh,
on Him the whole order of the
universe may be said to depend

395, n. 6), and


justified in applying " eTs Koipavos ea-Tw " (p. 391, n.
(p. 394, n. 1,

to

and

Him we are

The commander, however, is


not therefore the creator of his
subordinates. And as little does
it follow from Mctaph. ix. 8, 1050,
b, 3 (see p. 385, n. 1 supra)\.\\2X the
creative activity of God precedes
all being in time; for the ael
Kivovv irpcoToo^ does not (as Ps.
Alex, in loo. certainly thought)
refer to God as the first cause of
motion in the universe. On the
contrary (as is obvious from the
explanation upon p. 1049, b,
17 sqq. which the Sxrirep (tirofiei/
recalls), the reference is here to
the fact that every individual
thing presupposes as the condition of its production another
similar already existing thing,
and this likewise another, ecuj rov
2).

order

del KivovvTos irpcoTcos

dpxh,

come

to the first

i.e.

until we
of the

member

ARISTOTLE

412

but

would involve us in the contradiction of sup-

it

posing the uncreated to be at the same time created,


that which has been declared to be eternal to have had
a beginning in time.^

series

in

the

tirst

series, t\ie j)7'imn in niovens

each

Kivovy);

which has
impulse to the

question

in

given the

whole

The same question

case (not the TrpcoTov


this is the reason why

and

ael Kiu. irp. is

repeated from

1049, b, 26, where (as Phys.


viii. 10, 267, a, 1, 3) this is unAridoubtedly its meaning.
stotle was precluded from holding any theory of creation by his
view of the eternity of the
world. Such a theorj^ moreover,
p.

is incompatible, not only with the


assertion that to God belongs
neither irpdrTtiv nor ttoic'iv (see
p. 400, n. 1), but also with the
principle ex nihilo niliil ft
(P/n/s. i. 4, 187, a, 84, c. 7, 190, a,
H;'Gen. An. ii. 1, 733, b, 24;
Metaph. iii. 4, 999, b, 6, vii. 7,
1032, a, 13, 20, b, 30, c. 8 init.,
ix. S, 1049, b, 28, xi. 6, 1062, b,

from which we have not the


smallest right to make an exception in fa\our of the Deity, as
24),

Brentano, 249,
Brentano,

does.
p. 240, indeed,
believes that the eternity in time
of immaterial substances as little
dispenses with the necessity of
an efficient principle for them as
the eternity of motion dispenses
with the necessity of a mover
in other words, he endeavours to
reconcile the eternity of the
world with the theory of its
creation by means of the conception of an eternal creative
activity in God.
But upon the
principles of the Aristotelian as
'

arises with

of every subsequent theism this


is
impossible.
One who conceives of God as the substance
of the world, and of finite things
as mere manifestations of the
divine force immanent in them,
may, and even must, in consequence, declare that the one is as
eternal as the other.
One, on
the other hand, who treats God
as a personal being outside the

world, distinguishing other beings from Him as so many independent substances, would involve himself in a palpable contradiction were he to hold that
the latter are eternally created
by the former. Creation as an
act proceeding from a personal
will must necessarily be in time,
and an individual being in order
to produce other beings must
necessarily exist before them.
For only causcc im7nane7ites\m\e

contemporaneous effects ; causes


frariHeuntes always precede their
effects : the father precedes the
son, the artist the work of art,
the creator the creature. Such a
contradiction we should be justified in attributing to Aristotle,
only if we could show that he
held alike to the eternity of the
world and to a creative activity
of God.
The opposite, however,
is the case.
Aristotle holds, indeed, quite definitely the doctrine
of the eternity of the world, but

of a creative activity in

God we

not only find no word in his


writings, but he expressly de-

METAPHYSICS

413

Forms of sensible things, and to the order


of nature which results from their union with Matter
they also are uncreated.^ It is equally impossible upon
respect to the

Aristotle's

showing to explain the adaptations of nature


any personal interference on the part of

as the result of

God.2

finally,

If,

the

ancient

Greek view of

universe as interpenetrated by divine forces

is in

the

open

disagreement with Aristotle's dualistic theism,^ this


does not, where the question is one of his scientific
views, justify us in setting aside or explaining

own

away

his

and well-considered statements, on the


ground that he has neglected to bring them into harmony with views that were pressed upon him from
definite

another side.

Brandis adopts another method of solving the above

He

difficulties.

Forms

as the

believes that Aristotle regarded the

eternal

thoughts of God, whose selfdevelopment produces alteration in individual things,


and the harmony of whose transmutations is guaranteed

by the fundamental unity which underlies them.^


Clares that
Him at all.

no

iroiitv

belongs to

Cf. also infra, Ch.

XI. near the end.

As

is

we must supply certain


important conceptions, and goes
on * Indeed, that all existences
must be traced back to, referred
ultimately to, living thoughts of
God, and that these must be
treated as the simple substrata
physics,
:

shown

in reference to
the forms p. 341, n. 2; in reference
to the universe as a whole, p. 887.

But,

Such interference is expressly denied of God (see p.


:i68, n. 1), nor on the theory that
the world is eternal can we
*

understand when it could have


taken place cf. p. 412.
Cf. infra, p. 420 sq.
;

upon which concrete existences


and their mutations ultimately
hardly requires to be expressly stated, and is indicated

rest,

by the question {3fetaph.


see p. 298, n.

is

fully understand Aristotle's

worth?

meta-

xii.

9,

2, supra)
If nothing
attained by the thought of the
divine spirit, wherein consists its

Qr.-rom. Phil. ii. b, 575,


where he says that in order to

We

may, moreover,

as-

ARISTOTLE

414

in the first place, this statement can apply only to the


Forms as such, and leaves the existence of the eternal

substances

(the

spheral

spirits,

wholly unex-

&c.)

In the second place, it is untenable even


It finds no support in
with respect to the Forms.
in more than one point
and
utterances,^
own
Aristotle's

plained.

it

The

contradicts what he indisputably taught.

object

definite
of Divine Thought, according to Aristotle's
only
not
Himself:
God
than
statement, cannot be other

are finite existences,

as these particular things,

ex-

forms, which
cluded, but even the specific concepts or
remote
remain
must
essence,
internal
their
constitute
different
from Him, since they are always something
alone
which
that
below
far
stand
from Himself, and

and perfect
can be matter of his thought viz. divine
Aristotle anticipating to the eternal thought of God
:

sumethat

Leibnitz's doctrine of monadsmore or less consciously intended


qualito refer the changes in the
exties or essence of individual

istences to the self-development


which
of the divine thought on
Ihey rest, and the obstructions
and disturbances in this self-

development to its connection with


matter or potentiality; and the
iTarmonious variations in the developments of different individual

existences by an anticipation of
the conception of a harmonia
pra'staMUtn., to the unity and
perfection of the ultimate reality,
the unconditioned spirit of God,

is their common substratum.' Cf further his p. 578, where


the central point of the Aristotethe
lian theology is sought for in
doctrine that all determination
dy
in the world is referable to
ITamic IcTivities, and these again

which

'

That dynamic activities which have gone out from


God, and therefore also finite
being which is animated by these,

and

p.

577

n.

'

should seek to return to Him, is


bo also
quite comprehensible,
iJ/^^. iii. a, 113 sq
Even J/c%^^. xn. 9 contains
nothing to support Brandis s
view (cf. also Kym, iMetaph^
Aristotle there
Urders. 258).
asks how we are to conceive of
the thought of the divine spirit
if nothing is thought of by him
(not: if 'nothing is attained by
his thought ') his power of thought
must be as worthless as that exif something
ercised in sleep
'

other than Himself is thought of,


then is the worth of his thought
to be measured by the worthiness
But this does not
of its object ?
mean that the Divine thoughts
constitute the essence of things.

METAPHYSICS

415

Conversely, the Forms of things cannot be


being.'
thoughts of the Deity, since, according to Aristotle, the

Form

is

the substance of the thing, and Substance can

be predicated of nor belong

neither

anything.^

to

Thoughts cannot be substances, since they exist in the

we

Again,

soul as their substratum.^

find

no analogy

in Aristotle for the notion of a self-development of the

divine thoughts

the proposition

indeed,

is

it

that there

is

directly contradicted by
no change in the thought

of God, no transition from one thing to another. Finally,

while Brandis maintains that

things strive towards

all

Deity, because the active forces which emanate from

Him

Him

struggle to return to

self rather ascribes

again, Aristotle him-

this striving,

like

motion, to

all

Matter, which desires to complement and complete


self

by means of the

Nor

forces.^

is

portant objection to this view that

it

it-

the least im-

it

clashes with the

whole character of Aristotle's system.

For supposing

the thoughts of Deity to be the supporters of concrete


existences and of their mutations, the relation of finite
reality to

God would be one

immanence

of

the Deity

would by virtue of his thoughts be inherent in things,


and the latter would have in God the permanent ground
of

their

shifting

dualistic theism,

should arrive

dynamic pantheism.^

n. 2,
,

See

p. 398, n. 1,

svpra.
gee p. 330

and

But not only


p. S97,

and

'Eiria-T-fifif)

p.

373

sq.

and
is

the very

ex-

ample which Aristotle mentions

at
is it

system

of

impossible to

stratum; seep. 214,n.


*

sq.,

mpra.
'

Instead of Aristotle's

properties.
v/e

4y^.5?/;;r.

P. 397, n. 2, supra.
Cf. p. 404 sq., p. 344, n. 1,
p. 379, n. J, and on the

doctrine that motion resides in


the motum and therefore in the
material, 386, n. 1.
Thig is made
*

still

more

AIIISTOTLE

41G

discover such a system in the works of the Philosopher,

but even his school were unacquainted with anything


of the sort, until the influence of Stoic opinions intro-

duced that fusion of things diverse and fundamentally


distinct which meets us in the spurious book upon the
World and still more in Neoplatonism. Aristotle leaves
it

quite uncertain

the

how we

are to define the relation of

and individual Forms to the Deity.


utterances upon the subject we can only say

particular

From

his

that he placed

them

side

by

without explaining

side,

satisfactorily the existence and the special motions of

things by the operation of the Deity, or even


They are given
attempting such an explanation.

finite

factors, just as

Matter

is

a given factor which he does

It is true
not attempt to deduce from Form or Deity.
iroXva'yaBov
the
ovk
system,
his
of
unity
tliat the
KotpaviT], is thus

rendered more than doubtful.^

This brings us to the conclusion of the Metaphysics.


God being defined as the First Cause of Motion, phi-

losophy passes from the

Unmoved to

the

Moved or,

in

other words, to Nature.


obvious by-KYM; cf. ibid. p. 242
2i6sq.,256,258sq.,andp.402,n.l,
According to Kym,
tin. supra.
God is said to be, not only the
creative conception, but also the
material cause of the world, the
indwelling purpose and the productive force that is immanent
This, however, is a mere
in it.
assertion, and is not proved to be
Aristotle's own opinion by any
detailed investigation into his
declarations on the subject.
'
Cf THBQPfJB. Fr, X2 (^Me.

taj)7i.),

Kdyov

rh 5h fi^rh radr'
7
SeTrai irKelovos TrepI
:

icpeaeus,

iroia

/col

rivwv,

i^d-q

rrjs

eVetS^

ra kvkXikcl [the heavenly

TrXeiw

spheres] Kal

at <\>opal^ rpSirou

nva

rh av-hwrov [? we
should have expected dyadhv ov
virevapnai

/col

&pi<jTov'] Kal

ov xf^piv acpaves.

e^re

yap ev rh kivovu, dronov rh fxrj


irdura r^v out^j/ [sc. <f>opav Kivel-^
elre KaO' eKaarou erepov, a'i
(rdat']
dpxoX TrAeioyy,^ SjTTe [?] rh
t'
avficpupou avrS>v ets tp^^^iv iovrwv

r^v

apiffrTjv ovSafius <pavep6v.

PhI'sics

CHAPTER

417

VIII

PHYSICS
A.

The Idea of Nature and the most General Conditions


of Natural Existence

First Philosophy, according to the view of Aristotle,


we have seen, with unmoved and in-

has to deal, as
corporeal

reality

though,

we were

proper subject,

in

treating

of

this

in fact obliged to include

its

some

notice of the opposite principle.

Natural Philosophy
occupied with the aggregate of corporeal existence
which is subject to Motion.' All natural substances

is

are bodies, or united to bodies

we

of natural existence

and under the name

include bodies and masses

everything, in

fact, which possesses them or is related


Hence the whole domain of corporeal existence
belongs to Natural Science.^
But
regards form only

to them.

ifc

in its connection with matter,^


'

Cf. p. 183, n. 3.

De

(pvaews

Coelo,

iin(TTi}fir]

init.

ax^^hv

7]

Tr^p't

irXdar-n

(paiv^Tai irepi re crcvfiara Kai fiey^eri


Kalra rovrwv elvai nddr] kuI 7 as
KLu-nafis,
ba-ai

rrjs

Tuv yap

cTt

Se

irepl

Toiaxmjs

ras apxds,

oixrias

dcriv

avveaTciyrwv ra fxeu
i(TTi acafxara /col fieyeOr] [as the
human body], to 5' exei (rSifia Kal
fiey^dos [as man], t^ 5' apxal rwu
fXOi'roiu

wsm.

VOL.
vuLi.

<picrL

elaip [as
I.

soul in its con-

1, 298, b, 27
eVel 5^ ruv tpia^i
^cyo/nevuv to yueV ea-Tiv ovaiai ra
5' cpya koX
irddv rovrwv [by ovaiai,
:

i.

and the

the soul]

iii.

however, he here means both


simple and composite bodies]
(pavephv on r^v irKeiaTTiP avfifiaivei
Trjs

irepl

(Tco^uctTwj/

<pv(TiKal

(p{)aus

duai
ovaiai

7)

iaropias
iraaai
a-wjuaTa

yhp

nepl
at

^ fiera

(rw/xdrcou yiyvourai Kal fieycduiK


iVfitajjh. vi. 1, 1025, b, 26 sq.
(xi. 7) and elsewhere ; see infra.
=*

Eg'

ARISTOTLE

418

nection with the body.^

It

must, however, be remem-

bered that material existence pertains to Nature and to

Natural Philosophy only in so far as


Mathematical
motion and repose.
natural bodies

not

bodies are

Mathematics may be

indeed,

subject to

is

it

distin-

guished from Physics by the fact that the former deals


with immovable, the latter with movable, substances.^

Furthermore, movable existence can only be regarded


as natural when it contains within itself the principle
*

of

'

motion

natural things and the productions of art.^


tinction, on the other hand,

and

rational

former

irrational forces,

may

realm of Nature.^

Yet

since in all substance

vi.

oa-n

Be

avv
i.

a,

rod

Qiupriaai

fJ.^

All.

102G,

1,

^vlas

^vxn^

(pvaiKOv,

vhr]s

ttjs

403, b,

1,

7.

a, 21, '62.
the
193, b, 31
as well as the

FuTt'.An. 11,64:1,
-

Phrjs.

ii.

2,

mathematician

physicist is occupied with the


form of bodies, aAA' ovx v (pvaiovSe
Kov (rdfiaTos ir4pas '^Kaarou
ra (Tu/i/Se/SrjKOTa SewpeT ^ roiovrois

[sc.
Sih

ovai

(pvaiKols^

Kal x^p'^C^''

'

av/jL^efi-nKev.

7P \V

X'"/"'^'^"

rh ^\v
iari
yap irepiTrhv earai Koi to apTiov,
voi](rti.

etc.

Kiviiaectis

ixvev

oarovv Ka\

we are met by

Form and

this question

Kiu-ncrews,
oLudpooiros

what follows and

<rap^

Se Kal

ovKeri.

Cf

183, n. 3, sv2)ra.

Form

essential reality of nature consist in the

Metapli.

iffTiv.

is

on the ground that the

only a subdivision within the

is

Matter are distinguishable,

Does the

dis-

drawn between

two opposite directions, the


and that the former, therefore, are free,

the latter necessary

'

which

The

act in either of

latter only in one,

nepl

between

this is the point of difference

and

Phyi^. ii. 1, 192, b, 13: ra


nev yap ^vaei ovra irdvra (paiverai
""

^xoura iv eawroTs dpxV Ktvficrews


kol a-Taaeus, ra /xev Kara rSirov, to.
8e

/car'

av^V(riv Ka\

aWoioiaiv

KaT

IfxaTiou,

etc.

'

(pQiaiv, to.

8e

kX'vk)

.^ovSefiiav

5e

koX
dpfi^v

as he
proceeds in the rest of the
chapter further to explain. ^ 3IetajjJl. xii. 3, 1070, a, 7
v fih oi
r^xv-t] apxh eV &A?^cfi [similarly ix.
exet

/nerafioKris

ifKpvrou,
_

10^^' b' ^] ^ ^^ ^^'^'^ "PX^ ^^


avr^.
Metajih- ix, 2 init. c. 5, c.
De Interjjr.
8, 1050, a, 30 sqq.

"*

C. 13,

22, b, 39.

PHYSICS

419

In support of the second alternative


might be asserted that everything requires some
material in order to be what it is.^
Yet Aristotle is
or in the Matter ?

it

forced to maintain the

first alternative.

things invariably resides in the

Form and purpose

that a natural object

The true causes are the

is. 2

Form

The essence of
only by its
becomes what it
it is

causes

final

the material

causes are only the indispensable conditions of natural


existence.^

If,

we wish to determine the gewe must not consider what


much as the moving and informing

therefore,

neral definition of Nature,


in

it

is

material, so

Nature is the cause of motion and rest in everything which possesses these conditions of being originally
force.''

and not merely in some derivative fashion. A natural


is one that has such a motive force within itself.''
But Aristotle does not help us greatly in defining

thing

Phys.

193, a, 9-30.
1,
1014, b, 26.
Phys. ii. 1, 193, a, 28 sqq. c.
Metaph. as above,
2, 194, a, 12.
1. 35 sqq.
Part. An. i. 1, 640, b,
28, 641, a, 29, b, 23 sqq.
For a fuller discussion of
this point see i/i/ra and p. 357-8.
* Part. An.
:7
i.
640, b, 28
*

Metapli.

ii.

V. 4,

'^

v.

4:

Jin.

\cyoiJ.4v7]

t]

<pv(ns koX Kvpius

irpdirri

iarlv

7;

ovcria

rj

rwv

ixovraev apxhv Kiv-fia-ews iv avrols ^


avrd.
vi. 1, 1025, b, 19 [xi. 7,
1064, a, 15, 30]
ir^pl yap rfji^
roiavrrjv icrrlt/ ovaiav \Ji <pvaiK)f\
:

4v

77

77

apxv

rrjs

Kivi\<Tews

koX

(rrdaeus iv avrfj (or 1. 26: ircpl


toiovtov hv
ean Swarhv KiveTadai).
It is indifferent whether
nature is described as the substratum of motion merely, or of
rest
as
well,
since,
according to Aristotle, rest {^p^fiia,
<TTd(ris) belongs as an attribute
only to those things to which
motion belongs, or at least can
belong, and is merely (rreprfais

vwapx^i irpdoruis KaO' avrh /col fiTj


Kara avixfie^rtKos. 1. 32: <i)V(ns fifv
o5j/ i(TTLTO pr]div
(pvcTiv 8e e;^ei
oaa ToixvTrjv Hx^t apxW' Metaph.

Phys. iii. 2, 202, a. 3,


226, b, 12, c. 6 iidt., vi. 3,
234, a, 32 c. 8 239, a, 13, viii.
1, 251, a, 2^.

')fa.pKaraT^vp.op(p))v<p'u(TisKvpia}T4pa

641, a, 30: the


scientific investigator has to deal
with the soul still more than with
the body, oarcp /xaWov t] v\r] Si'
rrjs vXiKTJs (l)v(r(as.

iKeivTju (piKTis iarlv


*

fj

dvdira\iv.

Phys.

oUffrfs rrjs

ii.
1, 192, b, 20: us
(pvaews apxvs rivhs /col

airias rod KiuetaQai koX -^pefxeTu iv

Kivfjo-eus.

2,

E 2

ARISTOTLE

420

the character of this

one

side

force

considers

lie

her a

attributing to

with accuracy

'

On

the

Nature as a Single Being,

which permeates the world

life

throughout,^ and a definite design which determines

and

He

unifies all its parts.

talks of the aims

which

she attempts to realise in her creations, although the


properties of matter often thwart her purpose.

In a

word, he uses expressions that can scarcely be explained


analogy of the human soul and the

except by the

Platonic anima mundi^^ although he distinctly argues

against this idea as conceived by Plato. Though he


remarks that the designs of Nature are not determined
by deliberation like those of an artist,^ and though in
general we cannot attribute to him any real and intentional personification of Nature, yet

On

mains.^

regards

the

analogy re-

the other side, however, he undoubtedly


substances.

beings as individual

living

ascribes an individual principle of

life

to

He

them, and he

never indicates, or sets himself to discover, how this


Nor
principle is related to the single force of Nature.
does he teach us
causality."^

how Nature

When

insisting

of divinity, he denies
'

it

to

See the end of this chapter.


Proofs of this are innu-

merable it will suttice to refer


to the discussion of design in
nature which follows in the text.
As will
be shown in its
;

proper place.
^ By
analogy is meant, not
identity, but similarity.
Cf. with what follows BeanDlS, iii. a. 113 sqq.
'

'

'"

As

in Part.

An.

ii.

10, 656,

is

related to the divine

upon the exact significance


any but rational beings ^
;

^ovov fxercx^i' [^b twv


v) yap
avOpdiruv ycuos^ tov Oeiov ruv r]/juu
yvupificap ^(fOiV ^ fidXiara irdvrcov.
man stands
iv.
10, 686, a, 27
upright Sia rh rrju (picriv aitrov Kal
T^v ovalav eli/at delav epyoi/ 5e tov
rh voe7v Kal <ppovilu.
deioTOLTOv
Eth. N. X. 7, 1177, a, 13 sqq. (cf
vovs is the divine in
p. 1 65, n. 1)
man, and therefore the highest
activity is the theoretic.
a, 7

PHYSICS
and from

this point of

as a whole

view he will not allow that Nature

divine, but only

is

421

demonic*

Yet there

are

other passages in which he seems to follow the popular

theology of the Greeks, who recognised and revered


an immediate exhibition of divine force in natural phenomena. Nature and God are so used synonymously,^'

and a share

in

divinity

view

is

God

as

conceded to

is

existences, however trivial.^

natural

all

Indeed, this vacillation of

deeply rooted in Aristotle's philosophy.


is

the

first

cause of motion,

universe must proceed from

Him

So

far

motions in the

all

natural forces can

only be an emanation of his force, and natural causes a

On

manifestation of his causality.

we

confine the functions

of the

the other hand,

primum movens

if

to

setting the outer sphere of heaven in motion, these

conclusions

sphere

are impossible.

we have

If even in the heavenly

assume in addition to the Supreme


of subordinate and eternal beings, it is
to

Mover a series
still more necessary in order to explain the
much
greater variety of movements in the realm of nature
to assume a train of independent substances endowed
with motive power of their own. How the harmony of
these movements or their conjunction in an orderly
system
'

is effected, it is

Dhin. p.

hard to say.

S. c. 2, 463, b, 12

since beasts also dream,

dreams

cannot be divine they may, however, be demoniacal r) yap <pv(ns


;

Saifxovia,
'^

rj

Be

(pvffis

a\\' ov Oeia.
Cado, i. ^ fin.: 6 Oehs Kal

ovSeu fxarriv noiova-iv.

Gen.

et Corr. ii. 10, 386, b, 27 sqq. (see


r\ext chapter, infra). Polit. vii. i,

rovro
^32: edas y'ap
^vvajxius epyop, ^ris Kal t6S avu1326,

a,

cannot be by the

It

Etli. N. x. 10, 1179,


4xei rh -irav.
rh /xev oduTrjs (ptxrctas [the
b, 21
moral disposition]
Sid nvas
9ias alrias rois us aK-ndcos evrv:

viroipx^i.

X^*'""'

The

dflai

alriai

correspond here to the Platonic


Oeia

/xoTpa,

as to

LER's Plato and

which see Zelcf. p. 402 sqq.

svjjra.

Mh. N.

vii. 14,

1153, b, 32:

iravra yap (pvaei ex^i ti Quov.

ARISTOTLE

422

natural operation of the priWtm movens upon the world.


Aristotle's philosophy, moreover, excludes the conception

of God's immediate interference in the course of the

universe; and

would be

it

illegitimate

to

attribute

to Aristotle the popular belief in Providence,

strength of a passing allusion to

Consequently

on the

in his writings.^

it

remains in obscurity whether we are to

it

regard Nature as a single force or as an assemblage of


forces, as

something independent or as an emanation

from the divine activity

or,

on the other hand, whether

we ought to combine these two points of view, and, if


so, how we ought to do it.
But meantime we may
permit Aristotle further to unfold his view of Nature.
'J'lie

most important idea with which we have

deal in the Philosophy of Nature

our earlier researches


general bearing

should

that of Motion.

is

to

In

we had

therefore

to examine this idea in its


what now remains is that we

supplement our previous conclusions with an


motion in its stricter and more

analysis of physical
special sense.

Motion was defined generally on


actualisation of

what

the different sorts of Motion

we

'

Eth.K.x.

9,

1179,3,22:

Kara vovv iuepycov Kal rovrou

depaircvccv koi SiaKelfxcvos apiarra Kal


60((>iXe(rraTos eoiKcu elvuL

et

yap

ewLU^Kcia rCov auOpunrivoov inrh


deuv yivirai, lixmep SoKe7, Kal etVj &j/

Tis

evXoyov xatp^"'
Kal
ciTj

ry
6

'""^

ovToi/s

t^ apiffTcp

(Tvyyet/e(rrdr(p (rovro S' &i/

povs)

lndXiffra

Kal

Tovs

aya-rraiuTas

rovro Kal rinwvras avrev-

troiuv us

ruu

Koi

fiivovs

trpdrrovras.

the

as

analysing

Aristotle distinavTols iTrififXovre koI KaXws


Se iravra ravra rai

(J)i\q3V

opOws

on

fidXicrO^ virdpx^i,

(ro(f>(fi

60<pi\4(TraTOS

that

sq.

By

arrive at the special

definition of its physical character.

5e

380

p.

exists potentially.

&pa.

Aristotle

is

ovk SStjAov.

It is obvious

here arguing

from popular conceptions


he
himself ascribes to God no ex;

ternal operation.
sujjra.

Cf. pp.

389sqq.

PHYSICS

423

giiishes three kinds: quantitative motion, or increase

and decrease; qualitative motion, or alteration; and


motion in space, or locomotion to which may be added
as a fourth kind, birth and destruction.^ Now all these

kinds of movement

may

be ultimately resolved into the


For,

kind Motion in Space.


them more closely, we find that
third

if

we examine

increase or growth, to

begin with, consists in the addition of fresh material to


matter which has already received a certain form the
:

increment

is

that which

a,

potentially but not actually identical with

it

augments, and assumes

its

form

in other

stance (birth and destruction) is


not admitted to be motion (simi-

Phys. V. 1, 225, a, c. 2, 226,


23 (Metajjh. xi. 11, 12), cf.

Mefapk. viii. 1, 1042, a, 32, xii. 2


mit.,P/iy8.Yiil 7, 260, a, 26, 261,
Gen. et
a, 32 sqq., vii. 2 init.
De An. i.
Corr. i. 4, 319, b, 31
Long. v. 3, 465, b,
3, 406, a, 12,
.^0; De Ccelo, iv. 3, 310, a, 25.
Aristotle here
Cat. c. 14 init.
three
generally
distinguishes
;

change {fieTafioXi})
from being to being,
from being to not-being, and from

kinds

of
transition

not-being to being. Tlie first is


motion in the stricter sense, the
second destruction, the third

cf Simpl.
c. 5, 229, a, 30
Phys. 201, b, who extends the
statement to the Peripatetic
school in general, remarking, however, that Theophrastus, among
others, did not keep strictly to
elsewhere
this use of language)
larly

Aristotle treats this also as a form


of motion, and uses * motion' as
synonymous with ' change.' See
p. 382, n.'i,svpTa. Phys.\ii. 2,243,
a, 21 (cf. Pe An. i. 3, 406, a, 4)
distinguishes two kinds of loco-

that which is selfmotion


he then originated and that which is
The
divides into the kinds mentioned caused by something else.

orif/ination.

Kara

in the text

(Kiuriffis

KOTCt Trddos

and Kara

them Phys.

calls

fieycdos,

roirov,

viii.

7,

as he

260, b,

and destrucagain together, thus enume-

26), and, taking birth

tion
rates

four kinds of fieTafioXi]


Kara rh ri (yeveffis Kal (pQopa), -q
Kara, rh iroffdv {aij^riais /col (pOiais),
Karb.
7] Kara rh iroihu (ctAAotaxrts), 7]
rh TToO {(popa). That these are the
only categories under which motion caa be thought, is shown
Phys. V. 2, where change of sub-

T)

Motion

four kinds
the
StVrjo-Js,
third and fourth of which, however, may be resolved into the
Cf. viii. 10, 267, b, 9
first two.
Pe An. iii. 10, 433, b, 25
sqq.
Ingr. An. c. 2, 704, b, 22 i3fot.
An. c. 10, 703, a, 19); the

again

latter
e\^is,

&(ris,

is

of

6xV(ris,

statement mRhet.i.

5,

1361, b,

16, is less exact. "Cicns is either


in the stricter sense, or
io-is
nrK-nyi]

An.

ii.

3{eteor. iv. 9, 386, a, 33 ; Pe


419, b, 13,andcf. Pr(>&^.

8,

ARISTOTLE

424

words, such increase is an augmentation of matter,


the form remaining constant.
Similarly decrease is
the diminution of matter without change of form.i
Quantitative alteration, therefore, implies both qualitamovement and locomotion. 2 But the second of

tive

these two

is

prior to the first

for

results from the coincidence of

duces

it

active

and a passive element

every transformation

something which pro-

with something in which

it is

produced, of an

This coincidence, then,

can only take place by local contact,

for (although the


not necessarily true) the patient must always
be touched by the agent, and contact cannot be effected

converse

is

without locomotion.''

Even the
tion,

one

If

last species of

change, birth and destruc-

eventually founded upon

is

were to assume

end of

existence,

movement

in space.

an absolute beginning

such a transmutation

could

or
not,

indeed, be called a movement, since in such a


case
the substratum of the movement would itself

begin

But

or end.

sense

birth

and annihilation

are really impossible.^

xxiv. 9,936, b, 38. IdeleE,^W#.


Meteor, ii. 509.
P tae the full discussion in
Gen. et Corr. i. 5.

Phys.

-'

lloiuv

'

IS

tlie

2G0, a, 29, b. 13.

physical sense

synonymous

to Aristotle with
Trdax^Lv with aWoiov-

aWoiovv,
aOai.
^

(TLs

viii. 7,

Of. Ph7/s. in. ^ fin.

fi^v

yhp

aWomThv,
pificoTpov

7]

Kol Tra9r)TiKou

6om

kWoiw-

rod aWoiwTov, f,
ivT\4xia tri Se yuco7]

Tov Swdfiei TTOiririKov


f,

toiovtou.

Gen.

et

i.
6, 322, b, 9, 323, a, 17:
ov yap ol6v re irav rh Kivovv ttoicTv,
finep rh iroiovy o.vTiB'{]<TofXv t^

in this absolute

Everything starts from

rovro 5' oh ^ Kivr^ais


vdOos
Kaff Strou iWoLovrai ixdvov.
On a further meanin'>*
of 7rote?y see in n. 1 to p. 400
* Phys.
viii. 7, 260, b, 1 sqq
where it is further remarked that
all qualitative changes are ultimately resolvable into rarefaction
and condensation, which involve
change of place. Geoi. et Cm-r.
i. 6, 322,
b, 21 sqq. c. 9, 327, a,
iriffxovTi-

nrddos -

1, of, p.
^

386.

et Corr. i. 3, amonoarguments, shows thai


matter would in the end be all
used up, if destruction were to

other

Ge7i.

PHYSICS

being of some

and

sort,

425

resolved into being again,

is

It is only a particular object, as such, that begins

ends

existence

its

Its

beginning

the

is

end the beginning, of something

its

in

different

from change, this difference only

far as generation

individual object.

aod
and

Conse-

else.^

quently,

so

end,

and destruction are


affects

The individual changes when

it

the
sur-

vives as a whole, although its qualities alter,


but it is
generated or destroyed when it, as a whole, begins
or

ceases to exist.^
If on the contrary we regard the
universe and not the individual, then generation
and
destruction coincide partly with composition and
division, partly with the transmutation of
materials.^ Now
both of these processes are occasioned by movement
in
space.'^

cause

mean
-^j

all

Everything that comes into being has its


becoming implies a being by which it is
'

'

'

actual annihilation (318,


,

a,

...

^^^' ^' ^''


yeveais ehai irpc^TT]
Twv Kiuvcrea,u 5LhTovro,'6Tiyueaeai
Set t5 TTpay^ia irpuTov.
rh S' >'
,,v

T'i
7 hv

S6^i

^"^',

7]

fpbs fi^v 6T0V0VV tS>v yivotxh^v


ovTws exei,
erepou hvayKoTiov
wpdT^pdy TiKiv.Tfrdai Twu yiuofi4yu,p
ov avTb Kal fi-q yiySfievov, Kal rovrov erepou irpSr^pou.
Cf.
38 1-7.

aW

p.

Gen. et Corr. i. 3, 318, a,


23 5ia rh r^v rouSe (pdopav &KKov
^Ivai y4vjaiv. /ca2 r^V rov^^
y^p^triv
&A.\ov Hvai (f>dopau diravarov amy'

^^-^"^o^V.
o?n " ^^^? .T^"

319, a, 20,
P'

'

10,

11.

336, b, 24.

IMd.
Cf.

,^

(ren.et Corr.

i. 2, SU, a, 20:
yevetris air\rj Ka\ <bdoph ov
(TvyKpmec Kal SiaKpia-^i,
Urav

fan yap

MeTa^a\A77

/c

'AKKoiacris is

rovS^

els

in the irddv, birth and destruction


by change in the viroKeifxevop,
whether in respect of its form
(\6yos) or its matter c 4, 819
;

10: kWoiucris /n^u iariv, 'drav


rov iwoKeifidvov, alaOr}.
rov Hvtos, fierafidWv iu to7s a{>rov
TrdO^ffiu .... Uap' S' '6\ov ^erafidWr, fii] hirofx^vovros alaB-nrov
rivos oos viroKeifieuov rov avrov
y4u<rLS ijSn rh toiovtov, rod 'si
h,

{,Trofx4vovTos

<peopd.
*

Cf. Meteor, iv. 1, 378,

b 31
where he argues that geis effected by definil e
becoming transmuted
and determined in certain ways
by the agency of efficient forces
destruction, on the other hand
by the conquest of the passive
sqq.,

neration
materials

dW

matter

roSe o\ov.

form.

produced by change

'

over

Cf. P/ii/s.

the

determining^

viii. 7,

260,

b 8

ABISTOTLE

426

Since this, as

produced.

we saw

in tbe case of altera-

cannot operate without movement in space, such

tion,

Again, if
movement must precede all generation.^
movement in space precedes generation, it must of ne-

and destruc-

cessity precede growth, change, decrease,


tion

since these processes can only be carried on in that

which has previously been generated.^ Therefore this


species of motion is the first in the order of causality, as
well as in the order of time and in the logical order also.^

Notwithstanding what has just been


is far

said, Aristotle

from explaining natural phenomena by the merely

mechanical principle of motion in space, as the Atomists

Even purely physical occurrences cannot, in


satisfactorily accounted for by this
method, seeing that many of them are only to be
conceived as modes of qualitative alteration, or the

had done.

opinion, be

his

transmutation of

materials.''

Physics do not by any

means exhaust the conception of Nature.


TrdvTuiv TU3V KO.B-qfxa.Tuv apx'h tukttvkuciXTis Se
uwffis Kol fidvoocris
.

Kol

jjLOLvcoais

avyKpiais Kal SiaKpLcris,

KaO^ &s yivecris Kal (pOopd Aeyerat


(XvyKpivofieva Se Kal
rccv ovaiSiv.

dvayKH]

ZiaKpivSjxeva

Kara

roirov

lj.eTa^6.A\iv.
^

Gen.

Fliys. ibid.
et Corr.

ii.

261,

10

a,

sqq.

init.

- Pkys. ibid, b, 7.
It is here
further pointed out in proof of the
priority of movement in space,'
'

that, while it is presupposed by


the others, it does not presup-

pose them. Without the movement of the heavens, neither


o;eneration nor destruction, neither growth nor material change,
could take place. Movement itself, on the other hand, is indepen-

Final Causes

dent of these conceptions, and


none of them are applicable to the
heavens (260, b, 19 sqq. Gen. et
10

Corr.

ii.

ment

in space

init.).

So

also

move-

the only one of


these conceptions which has to do
with the eternal, and is of infinite
duration (260, b, 29, 261, a, 27
Aristotle also argues that
sqq.).
because it is the last in time in reis

spect to individual existences, it


must be the first in nature (260,
b, 30, 261, a, 13) and he holds that
it causes the least change in the
nature of the thing moved, and is
the motion which the self -moving
produces in preference to every
other (261, a, 20).

Ibid. 260, b, 15 sqq.


^ Seep. 304,n.3,andp.306,n.o.
;

PHYSICS
rise

427

above the material causes which subserve them

and these are not provided


Democritus.^

Lastly,

if it

for in the

philosophy of a

be true that 'becoming'

is

transition from potentiality to actuality, or a process of

development, and that the importance of Aristotle's natural philosophy consists, to a great extent, in having
first

made

this

consciously given

of development possible

notion
it

the foremost place,

Aristotle could not favour opinions

it is

which started with

an express denial of any becoming or qualitative


^

ation,

and

left

'

us nothing but a

and

clear that

movement in space

alter-

of un-

alterable materials. Therefore qualitative alteration must

be added to locomotion, even in the domain of matter, as a


second source of natural occurrences

but over against

both, Aristotle sets the teleology of nature, which uses as

means to its end all that is corporeal and determined


by natural necessity.
Next to Motion in Space, and not without direct
relation to it, come investigations by which Aristotle
further illustrates the idea of motion in his Physics
and these include discussions upon the Infinite, Space,
Time, the Unity and Continuity of Mot ion, ^ &c.
The Infinite ^ had played an important part in pre*
See p. 307, n. 4, and cf. p.
359, sq. supra.
- He describes those conceptions, indeed, generally, iii. 1,
200, b, 15 sqq. c. 4 init., as belonging to the discussion upon
motion, and deals with the first
three in bks. iii. and iv. before the
section upon the kinds of motion
but the way in which he treats

them shows that he


chiefly of locomotion.

is

thinking

^ The discussion of this conception Aristotle introduces mPhys.


iii. 1, 200, b, 15, with the words
Zok^I h'' t] Kivr](Tis ^Ivairwv (rw^x^^i
rh S' &Treipov SfKpaiverai irpwrov ii/
t&5 (ruvexe?; c. 4 mif. he remarks
that natural science deals with
masses, motion, and time, each
of which is either finite or infinite,
On what follows see Zeller, P//.
d. Or. pt. i. 186.
:

ARISTOTLE

428

Plato and the Pythagoreans

Aristotelian pliilosophy.

went

so far as to

make

therefore a substance.

be impossible

to

'

an element of

it

Aristotle begins

infinity

pose

to be a body,

it

superficies

or if

it

body

Then he shows
For sup-

inconceivable.

is

that which

is

is

limited by

be a number, numbers are capable

of being counted, and that which can be counted


infinite.^

Lastly,

and more

especially,

an

could neither be composite nor simple.

be

composite,

this

does not belong to the

'

order of substances but of qualities.'


that an 'infinite magnitude'

things, and

all

by proving

the

since,

not

is

body

infinite

It could not

elements being limited in

number, an infinite body could not be made up of


them unless one of them were infinite in magnitude, and
such an element would leave no room for the rest.^

And

to think of

In the

first

it

as

simple

is

equally

impossible.

place, as far as this world is concerned,

no

bodies exist except the four elementary ones, nor can

there be any out of which alone everything could come,


since
if

all

becoming moves between two opposites

there be several primitive bodies,

that one should be

it

and

quite impossible

Again, every body has

infinite.'*

natural place, in which

it is

abides,

and

to

which

it

its

tends

and this law determines the difference in weight between bodies every body without exception must exist
;

in a definite space, in a locality; but in the infinite

there is no definite locality, no distinction of up and


down, centre and circumference, before and after, right
and left.-^ Moreover, whereas it is manifest that bodies
'

n. 2,
-

iii. 6, 204, a ; see p. 312,


p. 325, n. 2, supra.
Phys. ibid. 204, b, 4.

Phys.

i.

7 init.

and

Ibid. 204:,h, 11, cf.

Be

Ctelo,

iv.

Phys. ibid. 204, b, 22.


Ibid. 205, a, 8 to end of chap.,
8, 215, a, 8.
De Ccelo, i. 6

PHYSICS
move

either

429

in a circle like the celestial spheres or in

straight lines

up and down

like the elemental bodies,

infinity admits of neither of these

former

is

movements.

circumscribed, and circular

movement

a centre, whereas in the infinite there

end.2

rotation round
no centre the
; ^

'

'

would take

infinite

ceivable space.^

time to traverse the smallest con-

Finally, Aristotle uses an

conclusive with Greeks,

shape

is

is

because lineal motion has a starting point and


Indeed, infinity could not move at all, since it

latter,

being

The

impossible, because circles are by their nature

the infinite, as such,

we

call that infinite

indeterminable, which

argument

who could not imagine

is

formless

incomplete and without

is

the magnitude of which

is

never finished and complete,

which cannot be limited in such a way as not to leave


some portion of it outside."* The infinite first becomes
a whole and complete when it is enclosed by means of
form.
But the world cannot be conceived except as
complete and a whole.^ It is therefore impossible that
imt.

c. 7,

274, b, 8, 29, 276, b, 6

In c. 6, 273, a, 21 sqq., the


same conclusion is reached by
showing that infinite bodies mui-t
be infinitely heavy or light, but
sqq.

an

infinitely heavy or an infinitely light body is an impossibility, since it must either exhibit infinite speed or be absolutely immovable.
As is shown, at unnecessary
length, De Coelo, i. o, 271, b, 2ri
sqq. 272, b, 17 sqq. c. 7, 275, b,
'

12.
'^

De

Coelo,

i.

6 init.

Also

c. 7,

21

sqq.

275, b, 15 sqq.
^

IMd.

Phy.

c.

vi. 7,

6, 272,

238,

a, 36.

a,

Aristotle's

yap ov

firiSev

tout'

eVrl,

^o>

words

e^cc,

ov
are
aAA' ov aei
:

aireipSv

iariv,

where, however, the antithesis is


merely verbal, ov jwrjSej/
e|a)
meaning
that beyond which
nothing exists,' ov aei n e|a>, on
the other hand, M hat of which a
part always remains beyond.'
'

6 see at p. ^^Q,sup.
715, b, 14
^ Se (pvais
((xvyei rh direipov
rh /xev yap
&iripov oTeAes, tj 5e (fivais ael ^T/ret
rehos
The objection {Phys. iii.
4, 203, b, 22 sqq.) that infinite
space presupposes also an infinite body, he afterwards sets
asidc(iv. 5,212, a,31, b,8, 16 sqq.;
^

Pliys.

Gen. An.

iii.

i.

ARISTOTLE

430

the infinite, as such, should really exist as an inter-

minable magnitude.^

Yet we cannot entirely do without it. Time, and


is measured by time, are without beginning or end. Magnitudes are capable of* infinite
motion, which

number

division,

De

of

Ccelo,

i.

9,

'

occupied.
Phys. iii. b Jin. on
iuepyeia ovk effri (TUfxa
'

(ptxv^pbv

e/c

TdUTOJv.

c.

(5,

ovv

fxkv

&ireLpou,

206, a,

1(5

T^ 8e/ie')e9os oTi war' ivepyeiav ovk


^(TTLv &Tripov, i1pif]Tai
-

fxi]

Phys.
IdTiv

iii.

6,

uireipov

itiit.

ibid, b, 24.
:

otl

ctTTAis,

5'

el

iroWa

ahvvaTa (Tv/j-fiaiueL, brjXou. rod re


yap xP^^"^ ecTTat tis apx^l Kal
Tf AewTT?, kclI ra fxey^dr] ov Smipera
/cat apiO/j-ds ovk earai
Aristotle proves in particular: (1) the eternity of time,
and with it the eternity of motion
which is measured by time. Besides the passages quoted p. 388,
n. l,seeP////.viii. 1, 251, b, lOsqq.
and cf. 3Ictaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 7.
He argues that as every present is the middle point between
the past and the future, and
every moment is a present, it is
wholly impossible to conceive of
any moment of time which has
not a before and after, and therefore of any which could be a
first or a last moment, a beginning or an end of time. (2) He
proves the infinite divisibility of

els

increase.^

infinite

see p. 395, n.
siqjj'o) by his peculiar definition
of space as the boundary between
the enclosing- and the enclosed.
The boundary of the world itself
is,
therefore, according to his
beyond it
iew, not in space
there is no space either void or
cf.

ixeyedr],

dneipos.

magnitudes, by showing that


nothing which is continuous, whe-

Hence we

ther it be spatial size, or time, or


motion, can consist of what is
indivisible.
Continuous magnitude can only be constituted
(according to Phys. v. 3, 227, a,
10) by such elements as have a
common boundary, and, moreover, lie outside one another
indivisible magnitudes, on the
other hand, must either lie wholly
outside one another, in which case
they would have no point of contact, or must wholly coincide
(Phys. vi. 1 init., cf. Gen. et Corr.

817, a, 2 sqq., I)e Cceloy iii.


306, b, 22). The assumption of
indivisible bodily surfaces
or
lines is not only incompatible
with the fundamental principles
of mathematics (Be Ccelo, iii. 1,
298, b, 33 sqq, c. 5, 303, a, 20, c.
cf. the treatise n.
7, 306, a, 26
i. 2,

8,

uto/jluv

ypafi/uLwu),

but

it

would

likewise make the most universal


of all physical phenomena, viz.
motion, impossible, for, magnitude and time being alike indivisible,it is impossible to traverse
one part before another. Inrespect, therefore, of each of the indivisible elements
and accordingly also of the whole which is
constituted by
them motion
could only be predicated as a thing
of the past, never as a thing of the
present (Phys. vi. 1, 231, b, 18
sqq. cf c. 2, 233, a, 10 sqq. c. 9,
239, b, 8, 31), and all difference of
velocity must also in like manner
vanish (ihid. c. 2, 233, b, 15 sqq.)

PHYSICS

431

must conclude tliat the infinite exists in one sense


and not in another or in other words, that it has
:

a potential but not an

may not

actual

The

existence.

magnitudes in space

sibility of

indefinite

is

divi-

we

yet

an infinitely small
particle. The multiplication of numbers has no limit
yet there is no infinitely great number.^ In a word,
therefore argue that there

is

the infinite can never be represented in actuality.

always potential, and in


opposite directions

its

extension

being capable of infinite

but not of infinite augmentation

division,

It is

two manifestations takes

number, on

the other hand, of infinite augmentation, but not of


infinite division, since the unit is

the smallest number.^

Real infinity is only possible in incorporeal substance


&ireipov.
Only we must not
suppose that this potentiality can

Again, all change is excluded in


things indivisible, for change in-

TO

volves division between an earlier


and a later condition {Phys. vi.
4 'mit.). In particular, when we
come to the indivisible elementary bodies and surfaces of Democritus and Plato, we shall find
these beset by a whole series of
new difficulties in addition to
the above. (3) Lastly, as there
is no highest number, number is
capable of infinite multiplication.
This, however, has never been
disputed, and therefore requires

ever

no proof.
Phys.
'

iii.

6,

206,

12 sqq.

a,

TTws fi\v ecrri [rh &ireipov'], ircas S'


oij.

Keyerai

rh

5^

rh

elj/ot

fxev

ecTTL fj.hu irpoo'deaei

Kol a(j)aip4(Ti. rh 5e iJ,4ye6os

Kar'

iu4pyeiau

ftprjrai,
XctA.6irbj/

ypafj-fids

ovk

S' iffriv

aveXuv

'

actual,

&(rr6

Xafifidvciu

rh

ws roSe

dAA.'

c.

7,

iffriv,

fx4v

ivepyeia

5' oti

'

ctAA.'

dei

virepfidW^i rh Aafi^auSfjievov iravrhs


wpifffiivov irk-fiOovs. dAA' ov xcwpttrrhs 6 apidfihs ovros tt)s SixoTOfiias,
obSh ij.4pi 7] aireipla
yiverai,

dWa

ciffirep

Koi 6 xpovos Kal 6 dpiQjxhs rov

It is shown also, Gen. et


Xpovov.
Corr. i. 2, 316, a, 14 sqq., with respect to infinite divisibility, that
ic never can be actually realised
in fact and therefore exists only
potentially.
It is just because it

merely

'

4v

Swd/xei.

reckoned

that

the

among

Infinite

'6ti /j.kv

material causes (see p. 350, n. 1,


supra).
Phys. iii. 7. Time, however,
even Aristotle holds to be infinite

oh yap
ras
aTd/xous
AeiTrerat ovv Sufo/tet efj/ot

diaipecei

Set

ecrt 8e
^ir^ipov,

%(Ttiv

ov

del eV yeveaei fj (pdopa,


207, b, 11 (on the infinity of number)
Ibcrre Swdfi^i

Tt

&c.

is
6.ireLpov

become

direipoy

is

'^

in both directions.

AiasTOTL^

432

an

as

infinity of force.

This

only in a series which

is

also,

however,

is

manifested

never exhausted, and in the

endless motion of the world.'

In proceeding to the notion of


remark, in the
it

we may

Space,

that Aristotle did not regard

first pl^ce,

as the boundary-line or shape of individual bodies

for in this case bodies

and
same

would not move in a space, but

until their space,

several bodies could not succes-

sively enter the

space.

with

tified

the

No more

matter of bodies,

inseparable from the body which

can

since
is

in space

that which circumscribes, but that which

In the third place, we

scribed.

be iden-

it

this

may

is

also

is

nor is

it

circum-

not regard

it

as

the distance between the boundaries of bodies, since

changes with the bodies, whereas space

this distance

remains always the same, whatever

may

and move

exist

Space may more properly be defined as the


limit of the surrounding body in respect to that which
within

it

it.2

The place

surrounds.^

of each particular body*

is

therefore formed by the (internal) limits of that which

surrounds
world.

it,

and space

in general

See notes to p. 395, supra.


Phys. iv. 1-4, cf. esp. 211,
b, 5 sqq., 209, b, 21 sqq.
^ To
irepas
rod iripi^xovros
adofiaros, or, more accurately, to
ToG irepiexouTos irepas aKivrirov
*

Cf

trpwrov.

De

Coelo,- iv.

3,

310,

b, 7.
'

as it is called
as opposed to
It is also called 6

"iSios tJttos,

Phys.

iv.

T6iros Koiv6s.
irpSjTos

init.,

rdiros 4v

iarlv cKacrrov

ibid. c. 4, 211, a, 28.


5

by the

limits of the

'^

Phys.

iv. 5,

212, a, 31, b, 18.

It is strange that space should


here be called as in c. 4, 212, a,
20 (cf. n. 3, supra) rod ohpavov ri rb
(Txo.Tov KaX aTTTOficvov rod Kivqrov
(xdiixaros irepas T]pfiovv
for we are
told (v. below and p. 377) that
the vault of heaven moves continually in a circle.
Aristotle
;

means, however

(c. 4, 212, a, 18
212, a, 31 sqq., viii. 9,
265, b, 1 sqq.) that just as in the
case of a ball which spins round
its own axis without otherwise
moving- the circumference is as

sqq.

c.

5,

PHYSICS

438

Time by a similar
Time cannot exist without motion, since it is
only by the movement of thoughts that we perceive it.
Aristotle obtains the notion of

process.^

Yet

not motion, since motion

it is

another slower

faster, in

the same, and

in one case

is

whereas time

movement

its

inseparable

itself is

from the object moved, and therefore

is

universally

always equally

is

It

fast.

follows that time stands in a special relation to motion,

but

is

different

from

number

unit of this

It is the

it.

of motion in respect to

what
the

is

by the movement of the

'

measure or the number


and later.^ The

is earlier
'

Time

now.'

now.'

is

occasioned

It is this that

makes

time at once a continuous and a discrete magnitude


continuous, in so far as

now

is the same in the prewas in the past discrete, in so far


as its being is different in each moment.^
These notions of Time and Space involve the infinity of the former and the finitude of the latter
and

moment

sent

as

'

'

it

we

know

already

distinction
stationary

between
the

as

them."^
the

centre,

motion affecting merely


pans, since only those change

circular
its

their

the highest
heavens move only in a certain
respect, and are in space only Kara
(Tvfifie^rjKds, and in so far as their
] tarts
move and are in space (^Be
(

position,

V, 5,

'o'lo,

so

which passage Bban-

Dis, ii. b, 748, w^rongly suspects).


In a like sense it is said (212, a,
18) that the river is stationary,
and that only the individual

waves move.
'

Phys.

'ApidfjLQs

Kiwria-ews

VOL.

I.

In like manner his concepiv. c.

11, of. p. 220, a,


T6 5^ 6 xp^vos rep vvv
KoX Sfpp7)Tai Kara rh vvv 219, b, 9
Clxrircp 7) Kivncris aei 6.Wi] kol aWrj,
Kal 6 xp^^os
6 5' cifia nas xP^vos
6 avros
rh yap vvv rh avrh 8 ttot'
i)v
rh S' elvuL avrcp erepov. Ibid.
c 13, init. rh 5e vvv icrri awextia
Xpdvov
ffwex^i yap rhv xp^fov
rhv irape\66vra Kal ea6/j.evov, Kal

(Tvi/X'f)!f

Kara
1 1 Jjn.

to
;

Be

'

oKoDS

TTcpas

XP^^*^^

Swdfief koI

Siaipe? Se
ael erepov

avr6
ravrd

iv. 10, 11.

npSrepov Koi varepov, c.


Ccelo, i. 9, 279, a, 14.

further reasons for this

Aristotle's

rh vvv,

-p

icTTiv
fj

'

/xev toiovto,

dh avvSe?, del rb

eari Se ravrh Kal Kara


rj Siaipcais Kal r] V(0(tis, t6 8'
elvai ov ravrd.
* Cf.
p. 428 sqq., and 387,
supra. Aristotle, however, here
.

ARISTOTLE

434

tion of Space implies the impossibility of a vacuum.

Space

is

If

the limit of the enclosing body in relation to

the enclosed,

we cannot but conclude that there is no


empty space would be
is no body

space where there

Aristotle tries on

an enclosure that encloses nothing.

this point, with minute and patient arguments, to con-

fute the widely-received assumption of a vacuum, which,


owing mainly to the teaching of the Atomists, had
become part of the current Natural Philosophy.
The reasons with which they had supported it appear

him inconclusive. Movement does not need to be explained by such an hypothesis, since we can imagine that
to

another body quits the space which the object in motion

Condensation

enters.

air or other

may

be referred to

water, for example, experiences


is,

into steam)

may

rare-

The expansion which

faction to its entrance into them.

(that

exit of

th-e

matter from the bodies in question

when passing

into air

be explained by the alteration

of materials, which necessitates another degree of rarity


or the

phenomena

of gravity by the tendency of the

The vacuum
elements to reach their natural place.
would rather put a stop to the possibility of motion.
^

Since emptiness yields equally on all sides, one cannot


imagine anything capable of determining a body to
follow
afford

one direction

rather than another.

no distinction of natural

motion could take place in


distinguishes, as Plato had done
(Tm. 37, D, 38, b), between the
endless time in which mutable
existence moves, and eternity
(aiwv) or the timeless being of

localities.

On

it.

221. b.

De

3.

11-28 see
Phys.
;

c.

8 mit,

c.

No

would
special

the other hand,

immutable.

the

It

Phys.

Coelo,

i.

p. 895, n. 6,
iv.

7,

iv,

9,

it

12,

279, b,

mpra

s(
214, a, 24 sqq.

PRYSICS

436

would be equally impossible, on


infinite

vacuity,

Nature

Again,

if

bodies

fall

proportioned to the rarity

hypothesis

tlie

any reason

assign

to

for

of
in

rest

or rise with a rapidity

medium through
which they are moving, everything would have to fall
or rise with infinite rapidity through the infinite rarity

On

of the void.
greater masses

fall

of the

the other hand,

if,

ceteris paribus,

or rise quicker than smaller ones

because they more easily overcome the withstanding


medium, then in the void, where there is no resistance to

overcome, the smallest would move as quickly as the


greatest.

Lastly,

how

are

we

to

conceive that an

empty space exists beyond the space occupied by bodies,


since, if a body entered that space, there would then
be
two spaces, an empty and a fall, the one within the
other?
And what is the use of such a void space,
since every body has its own extension ?
Besides, by
*

maintaining that there

empty space or any space at all


beyond the world, one would end in the contradiction
of asserting that a body could be where no body can.^
If empty Space is impossible, empty Time, filled with
no movement, is equally inconceivable, since Time is
is

nothing but the number of motion.^ Aristotle, in fact,


maintains the eternity of motion as having neither be'

Phys.iv.S; ct Be Coph,

iv.

In estimating- the force of


these arguments we must, of
course, take accoimt of the state
of scientific knowledge at the
time, and of the presuppositions
which were shared by Aristotle
and the Atomists alike.
See
2.

p. 442, infra.

J^^

&fxa

5e

P'^\on

5rj\ov

^-

^'

P^'

a,

11

ovSh tottos ovSh

Kevhv ovSh xP<^j/os eVrlj/ e|o.


TOV
iO)
ovpavov- iv airavTi yap tSttcp SwatoV v-ndp^ai trcDyuo- Keuhu S' (hal
(paaiv

iv

ju^

iwircipx^i

nwarhv

(xooixa,

5' iat\ yeviaOai


r|co
rod ovpavov SeS^iKrai on ovt'
^anv oUr' ivdix^rai yeviaOai (ru:ixa.
P/njs. \m. 1. 251, b, 10: t^
irpSrepov Kal varepov irws iffrai
xP^vov fx)] ivros; ^ 6 xp^vos fx^
.

de

-^

ova-qs

Kiv^crecos ;

et

S-fj

FF

ianv
2

ARISTOTLE

430

ginning nor end.^ On this point he suggests the remarkwhether there could be Time without a
able question
:

And he answers it by saying that Time in its essence

soul ?

implicit in motion, but that in reality it cannot be


without the soul, because number does not exist without
a calculator, and reason is the only calculator.^ But we
is

make

should

a mistake

if

we sought

to discover in this

Time
modern

inclination to the idealist theory of

remark any

so vast a.n

which has obtained


Its

philosophy.

importance in

apparent bias towards Idealism pro-

ceeds from Aristotle's not conceiving the ideas of Time


and Space in as pure and abstract a sense as is familiar

Although he does not go so far as Plato, who


identified Space with extended substance, and Time

to us.

with the motion of the

apiO/xhs

Kiv'cr^ois

Xpovos

v)

Kiuria-'s

xpoJ'os eVrii/. audyKf]

ael

Ibid. 1.
elvai..
^hai ael xP'^^^'^dye xpo""". ^avephv on

Koi KLur}(nv a'ibLou

2o

avayKt)

aWa

fjL^v

avdyKfi

9.

a,

279,

world there
apid/xhs

is

direp

Kiv^cnv,

Kal

elvai

xpovos irddos ti
i.

De

Kivfjcreajs.

'

KLvhae'jos

KiurjaLS

8'

&Uv
Cf. p.

supra.

B,

See p. 887. mpra.


Phys. iv. 14, 22:'),

esp.l. 25:
apie/xelu

Coflo,

outside the
14
no time, for xP^vos

(pvffiKov aa>ixaT0S ovk eariv.

395, n.

r)

el

Se

a.

10 sqq.

'aXXo irecpvKev
"^ ^"XVS^ fovs,

jUTjSei'

^ux^

advuaTOU eh'ai XP^^^^ "^^xh^ f^h


oijavs, a\\' r) tovto o irore uv iariv
6 xp<^'os [apart from the soul
time, as such, cannot exist, but
only that which constitutes the
essence of time, the reality that
lies

yet he never attempts to

accurate distinction between Space and

make an

Tis, e^Trep

stars,-^

beneath

it

as the substratum

Time

of its existence; v. Toesteik in


Wi. Miis. xii. 1857, p. 101 sqq.],
oiov el evSexerai Kivrjcnv elvai avev
Aristotle is not quite
\\ivx^sconsistent in his answers to the
question, what faculty of the soul
it is that perceives time. Accord-

Da
we must

ing to the above passage and

A II. iii.

10, 483, b, 6 sqq.,

suppose That it is the reason, and


that the sense of lime is limited
In the Be
to rational beings.
Mem. i. 450, a, 9-23, on the other
hand, he assigns it 'to the wpwrou
aia-e-nTiKhu, and attributes memory,
which involves the perception of
time (ihid. 419, b, 28), to many
of the lower animals (ibid, and
Hist. An. i.
c. 2, 453. a, 7 sqq.
1,

488, b, 25).
3

i.

See Zell. Ph.

pp. 613, 684,

2.

d.

Gt. Abth.

PHYSIOS

4a7

as universal forms of sense, and the existence in which


have seen that he cannot
they are manifested.

We

conceive of space without physical locality, higher and


lower, gravity and levity.^ He limits existence in space,
in

strictest sense, to that

its

which

is

surrounded by

arguing from this

another body different from


position that there is no space beyond the world, and
itself,

ia not in space, but only its


In the same way the homogeneous parts

that the world as a whole


single parts.^

of a coherent body, as parts of the whole, are only

space; they are not actually so until


separated from the whole.^ It is the same with Time.
Time, being the number of motion, presupposes an
potentially in

moved on

object

the one hand, and on the other a

counting subject.

when Time

He

is called

remarks expressly, however, that

the

number

of motion,

we must not

understand by the word number that by which one counts,


but what is counted.'^ Number, that is, must be taken
Far from
not in its subjective but its objective sense.
considering Time as a mere form of our perception, he
regards

rather as something

it

pertaining to motion,

and, indeed, to the body moved.

where

bodies cease,

Time

Outside the world,

also ceases to exist.^

In the further discussion of Motion which is found


in Aristotle's Physics, our attention is chiefly drawn to

more directly upon his doctrine of


the primum movens and the structure of the universe. He

the points which bear

P. 428, supra.
says, therefore, Phys. iv.
the movements of
1, 208, b, 8
simple bodies (fire, earth, &c.)
'

He

show

ov fx6vov

dA.A' oTi Ko.\

'6ti ea-ri

ri 6 rdiros,

exet rivh dvyaij.iv (a

real significance).
^ j^gg p. 429, n. 5, supra.
* Phys. iv. 5, 212, b, 4.
* PAys. iv. 11, 219, b, 6.
* De Ccelo, i.
see p. 435,
9
;

n. 3, svf>ra,

and

p. 3&!", n. 6.

ARISTOTLE

438

defines the meaning of coexistence in space, of contact,


of intermediate space, of succession, of continuity, S>lc}
He distinguishes the different relations in which the
unity of motion can be spoken of,^ finding the absolute

unity of motion in continuous or unbroken movement


is, in such as belongs to one and the same
object

that

same relation at one and the same time.^ He


asks what constitutes uniformity of motion and its
opposite
in what cases two movements, or movement
and repose, may be said to be opposed to each other
in the

'^

how

far the natural or

ment has

proving further that

ad

divisible

unnatural character of a move-

to be considered in either instance.-^

continuous

all

that time

infi^dttDn,''

and space in

respect correspond, and that in reality

P/ujs^ y.?>:

a^ia

fxev

ovv

Ae-yerat tcwt duai Kara tottoi/, oaa


eV epl Tdtrcf iarl irpwrcv, x^p'^s Se

aTreaQai Se wv ra
fxera^v oe els
irecpvKe
Trpwrou acpiKvMai rh fxerafidWou
jpe^^s 5e ov fxera Tr}u dpx^u
o(Ta eV ere>(^,

a-Kpa'dixa,

t)

/xouoy SuTos

firiShv ixera^v

Tu>u eV lavTCf yevei kou

TauT^j]

4(pe^r\s

oil

fX^l^^vov

8e

eVr

[join with

iariv.

[immediately suc-

cessive] t

....

tv 4(p^ris ov d-wT-nrai
Xiyu) S' elvai avv^x^s

[continuous], orav ravrh yevrirai


%v rh
iKarepov irepas ois
diTToi/rai.
In the <rvvex^s, therefore, there must be unity as well
as contact.
On acp^ of. Ge/t. et
KoX

Corr.

323, a, 3.
v. 4 init.
motion is
either yiv^i or Met or avKws juia.
For other senses in which motion
is said to be one,' see ibid. 228, b,
11 sqq. Of. vii. 1, 4, pp. 125, 139,
-

i.

6,

Phys.

'

After

magnitudes are
it

is

this

only with

of Bekker's smaller edition.


^ P/ajs.
v. 4, 227, b, 21
awAws
5e yum Kyrjais rj rfj ovaia fxia Koi t<2
apiQfx^, the latter is the case when
:

not only the thing moved and


the kind of its motfon {aWoiwais,
(popa, k.c.,
together with their
special varieties) but also the

time

is

the same, 228,

re aTr\S>s

auvexv

fxiav

^^i^ai

[^k\v'I](T iv~]

koI

a,

20

t-^u

dvdyKr) koI
et

(Tw^xhs,

fiia.
*

Ibid, b, 15 sqq.

Fhys.

V. o, 6.

*"

Ibid.

vi. 1 sq.

2, sicjjra.

The

see p. 430, n.
indivisible unit of
;

space and time (the pointand the


moment) is therefore (as is shown

De An. iii. 6, 430, b. 17 sqq.)


never found existing actually and
independently as a xpto-T^v, but
only as contained potentially in
the divisible, and not ever known
except as a negation.

<

PHYSICS

439

finite spaces traversed in a finite

time that motion has

spaces are only said to be


whereas
which the time of motion
traversed in the same sense
of the
the
establishes
he
to do

infinite

in

infinite

is

indivisibility

present moment, and concludes that in this unit neither

motion nor rest are possible.^ He discusses the divisimotion and of the body moved, ^ remarking that

bility of

every

alteration

completion in an indivisible

attains

moment, but that the moment of

its

beginning

is

never

capable of being accurately determined/ He shows that


it is equally impossible to measure a merely finite space
in infinite time or an infinite space in finite time,

and

consequently that an infinite magnitude cannot move

any distance

at all in a finite time.'^

These conclusions

supply him with the means of refuting Zeno's argu-

ments against motion,^ and enable him to prove that


the indivisible can neither move nor change in any way.'^
Finally,

he prepares the way

movement

for

investigating the

of the universe and its cause,

by asking^

whether there can be a single movement of infinite


duration. After establishing the eternity of motion and
*
'^

Pky.

vi. 2,

Ihid.

c.

3,

233, a, 13 sqq.

and again

c. 8,

where he adds in the transition


from motion to rest, the motion
:

long as the transition


while, therefore, a thing is
coming to rest, it is moving still,
3 Ihid. c. 4 (cf. also
p. 430, n. 2).
Motion according to this passage
is divisible in a double sense
first in respect of the time occupied, and secondly in respect of
the object moved.
* Ihid. c. 5, 6.
We see from
SiMPL. Phys. 230, a, m. 231, b,
lasts as

lasts

m. and Themist. Phys. 55, a, m.,


that difficulties had already suggested themselves to Theophrastus and Eudemus in connection
with this view,
^ Phys. vi.
7 ; of. p. 429, n. 3,
supra. Aristotle shows, P%s.viii.
9, 265, b, 10, that his predecessors
also treated motion in space as
the most primary,

Phys.

vi. 9, cf.

c.

21, viii. 8, 263, a, 4,

2,

and

233, a,
p.^Sll,

supra.
^ Phys. viii. 10.
At the end of this chapter.
**

440

ARISTOTLE

the necessity of a
if

there

primum movens^ he

beginning or end,

it

must be movement

not only does this precede every


is

^
:

in space, for

but every other

other,'-^

^ and where this


is the
motion ceases at a certain point, at which

a transition betw^een opposites

case the

gives this answer

movement without

a continuous and single

is

first

a new movement may begin in another direction, but


one and the same cannot continue without a break.

The same argument proves that only


answers

ment

circular motion

the necessary requirements.

all

If all

move-

space must be either in a straight line, or

in

mixed movement could only be of


and continuous if both the others

circular, or mixed,-"* a

endless duration

Movement

could.

in

straight

cannot

line

has terminal

points

at

which

betw^een these terminal points

repeated,

yet these repeated

it

it

therefore, the only kind of

''

and though

infinitely often

movements do not con-

one continuous motion.

stitute

ceases,

may be

have

movement

this character, since every finite rectilinear

Circular motion

is,

movement which, continuing

one and the same in unbroken sequence, can be without


beginning and end.^ It unites the repose of the universe with unceasing motion, since

'

Phys.

viii.

1-6; see p. 387

sq. supra.
^

Phys.

viii.

see p. 423 sq.

supra.

Generation from not-being


to being destruction from being
to not-being increase from less
to greater decrease from greater
to less alteration from one state
to another, e.g. from water to
steam.
;

'

enables

it

to

move

'

lUd.

Among mixed

forms of mo-

we must

this division

tion

reckon

it

**

261, a, 31 sqq.
in

curves except the circle.


intinite one is impossible,

all

An

not only in itself (see p. 430, n. 2,


supra) but also because the world
is not infinite,
^
All this is explained at
length, Phys. viii. 8, 261, a, 27263. b, 3, 264, a, 7 sqq. c. 9 hdt.

PHYSICS
without changing
sure for

its

441

place as a whole.

other movement. It alone

all

whereas in rectilinear

movement

is

It is the

rapidity increases in

proportion to the distance from the starting-point.^

primum movens

How

brought about by the operation


we have already shown.

this eternal rotation is

of the

mea-

entirely uniform

"*

Important though movement in space is, as the


most primitive kind of change on which all others are
dependent, Aristotle cannot agree with the mechanical
theory of physics in merging
one, and iu

forms of change in this


assuming only the combination and-separation,
all

while rejecting the transmutation, of materials.


questions arise upon this point.
distinction

between

sorts of

matter

tative alteration of materials ?

Three

Is there a qualitative
?

Is there a quali-

Is there such a

com-

bination of materials as to cause the change of their


'

PItys.

viii.

9,

265, b,

cf.

p. 398, 4.
-

Those, namely, which Aris-

totle treats as the natural

of elementary

motions

bodies: in

other
words, the downward motion of
heavy, and the upward motion of
light bodies.

With forcible move-

ments the opposite

is the case.
Phys. viii. 9, 265, b, 8 sqq.
^ The
seventh book of the
Physics is passed over in the
above account, because it was not
originally a part of the work (see
p. 8 1, n. 2, svpra). Its contents are
as follows.
After it has been
explained in c. 1 that every movement must have its source in a
3

privium movens, and in c. 2 (see


p.386,n. 3, and p. 423, n.\,adfin.)
that the latter must move along
with the motion, c. 3 goes on to
show that dWoiwais concerns only

the sensible qualities of things;


c. 4 inquires in what case two
movements are commensurable,
and c. 5 finally proves that the
same force moves half the mass in
t he same time twice as far, in half
the time the same distance as the
whole
likewise that the same
mass is moved, by the same force,
in the same time, the same distance, in half the time half the
distance, while half the mass is
moved by half the force the same
distance on the other hand, it
does not follow that twice the
mass is moved by the same force
half as far as half the mass, or
the same mass by half the force
half as far as by the whole force
for the force may not perhaps be
able to move it at all. The same
is true of the other kinds
of
change.
;

AltlSTOTLE

442
qualities ?

The Atomists answered all three of these


and Empedocles at least the

questions, Anaxagoras

second and the third, in the negative. Aristotle feels


himself obliged to answer all affirmatively, combating
the mechanical theory of his predecessors, and seeking
the solution of their difficulties in the peculiar tenets of

That he wholly succeeded in this


attempt the natural science of our day will certainly
refuse to admit, and will even be frequently inclined,
with Bacon,^ to take the part of Democritus against
him. Yet-this is just a case in which we have to guard

own

his

system.

against a too hasty criticism of a


of the first places

among

man who

occupies one

the scientific investigators as

In order to form
well as the philosophers of antiquity.
an impartial judgment of Aristotle in his contest with
the mechanical theory of physics, and to appreciate his
own views, we must never forget that we have not here
to do wdth the atomistic philosophy of our days, but
with that of Democritus, which differed from

it

Mo

Aristotle, like his opponents, possessed nothing

co'lo.

but the scantiest rudiments of the methods and processes of observation which we have to so boundless

an extent at our command.

He had

to

define the

elementary physical conceptions of an age whose observations did not extend beyond the reach of the naked
eye,

and whose experiments were confined to a few

simple and for the most part very unreliable empirical


processes.

Of

all

our

Cf. KUNO FiscHEE, Fran:


Bacon, 262 sqq. (Eng. tr.).
^

sq.,

Cf. also

1220

sq.,

Beandis, ii. b, 121.3


and Meyer's refer-

mathematical,
ences

{Arist.

optical,
ThierTtuiid^,

sq.) to Aristotle's

ing heat.

method

and
419

in test-

PHYSICS
physical instruments,

443

possessed only the rule and

lie

compasses, together with the most imperfect substitutes


for some few others.
Chemical analysis, correct measurements and weights, and a thorough application of
mathematics to physics, were unknown. The attractive

force of matter, the law of gravitation, electrical phe-

nomena, the conditions of chemical combination, pressure of air and its effects, the nature of light, heat,
combustion, &c.

in

physical theories of

short, all the facts

modern

on which the

science are

wholly, or almost wholly, undiscovered.

based, were

would have
under such circumstances
Aristotle had developed views in natural philosophy of
which we could have availed ourselves without alterabeen more than a miracle,

tion at the present time.

It

if

It is the business of a history

show how he explained phenomena consistently with


the position of knowledge in his own day.'
to

None of the ancient systems presents so pure a form


of mechanical physics as the atomic, to which the theory
of the elements adopted by Plato from Philolaus is
closely allied.

and consider

Both deny qualitative variety in matter,


and magnitude as the
and real distinction.
Aristotle opposes

differences of shape

only original

merely because it maintains the existence


of infinitely small bodies or superficies, but also because
this view, not

denies specific difference in matter.

it

In both rejudgment, the weaknesses of


the Platonic theory are most striking.^ It contradicts
spects, according to his

mathematics, because
superficies,
'

it

regards bodies as composed of

which brings us

Cf. supra, p.

262

sq.

Qf^

logically to the

assumption

Zellee, Platon. Stud.

270

sq.

ARISTOTLE

444

of indivisible lines

magnitudes

nay, further, to the resolution of

into points.^

Again

destroys the divisi-

it

Moreover, the figures of the elements

bility of bodies.^*

assumed by Plato do not fill the space within the world,


and yet he allows no vacuum.-* Lastly, it is impossible
to

form any coherent bodies out of them/'' Nor are the


which beset this theory from the point of

difficulties

view of physics

less

For how can bodies


which have

important.

surfaces

of

which have weight consist


none V6 And how, according to

this hypothesis, could

the specific gravity or levity of the single elements be


Fire would have to become heavier and
produced?

ascend more slowly in proportion to

would be heavier than a

air

experience

shows that

all

its

water.^

little

bulk;

the elements are mutually

transmutable, Plato only admits this with


the three just mentioned;^
arise

culties

even in their case

and Xenocraadopted this assumpZell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i.

cf.

ad fin. 868.
Ccelo, iii. 1, 299, a, 6, 300,
Cf. Gen. et
a, 7, c. 7, 306, a, 23.
since the
Corr. ii. 1, 329, a, 21

IMd.

'

Ph.

d.
'>

pp. 807, 2
2

diffi-

are not balls or pyramids.

es actually

tion

respect to

from the circumstance that superfluous

Plato, indeed,

'

much

Again, while

b,

Zell.

pt.

IMd.

De

Ccelo, iii. 1, 299, a, 25 sqq.


31 sqq. (where, however, we

De

8 iuit.; cf.
i. 679, 3.
306, b, 22 sqq.
c.

Gr.

a superficies, elementary matter


cannot be resolved into super-

must read to a-w/bLararwu iTrnrebwv,


the gen. iniire^icv being governed
by 7rA^06t) cf the corresponding
objection to the Pythagoreans, p.

ficies.

311, n. 5, 6 supra.

irpdoT-r)

of the Timcens is not

uAtj

De

305, b, 31,
306, a, 26 primary atoms of the
elements cannot be divisible (nor
are they according to Plato and
3

Ccelo,

iii.

7,

Democritus) seeing that when


fire or water is divided, each part
is again fire or water whereas
the parts of a ball or pyramid

'

c. 5,

De

Ca;lo, iv. 2, 308, b, 3 sqq.


It has al-

312, b, 20 sqq.

how we are to
interpret these objections in the
mouth of Aristotle.
s
De Ccelo, iii. 7, 306, a, 1 sqq.
Zell. Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 676, 1, 2.
ready been shown

PHYSICS
triangles are left over/

and that

a superimposition of surfaces

assumed by

Plato.^

445
as easy to think of

it is

as of the

composition

Furthermore, the theory of un-

changeable type forms of the elements contradicts the


fact that the
for instance

shape of simple bodies

is

water

and

earth,

determined by the surrounding space.^

place, how are we to comprehend the


and movements of the elements by these
hypotheses of Plato?
Democritus supposed that fire
was formed of globes, on account of its mobility and

In the

last

qualities

disruptive force

Plato thought

but that the earth was

made

comparative immobility.
are hard to

move

in their

it

was made of pyramids,

of cubes, on account of its

Yet both of these elements


own locality, and easy to move

in a strange one, since they strive to escape from the


latter

and not from the former/*

Aristotle

is

therefore

forced to regard Plato's theory of the elements as in

every respect mistaken.^

The Atomic theory of Democritus and Leucippus is


treated by him with more respect ^ but he holds that
;

56

Ibid.

sq.

Be

Jbid.

1.

20

cf.

Plato, Tim.

ball does not

which
Casio, iii. 1, 299, b, 23.

306, b,

c. 8,

9.

Ibid. 306, b, 29 sqq., where


it is further objected that balls
and pyramids are easily moved
only in a circle, whereas tire has
an upward movement. Again, if
corners that give to
it is its
fire its heat-producing power, all
elementary, bodies must likewise
produce heat as well as everything that has mathematical
i-hape, for they all have corners.
Fire changes things which it
a pyramid or a
seizes into fire
*

change that with

comes

into contact into


balls or pyramids.
Pire separates only dissimilars, whereas it
unites similars. Further, if heat
be united to a particular shape,
so also must cold,
^ Pkoclus at a later date defended it in a separate treatise
against his attacks
Simpl.,
Schol. in Ar. 515, a, 4.
^ Cf. the discussion in
Gen.et
Corr. i. 2, 3 5, b, 30 sqq., the chief
sentences of which are cited in
it

Zell. Ph.

d.

Gr. pt.

i.

771, 4 also,

on the Platonic theory,


Coelo,

iii.

7,

306, a, 6 sqq.

cf.

De

ARISTOTLE

446
it

also is

fiir

from having proved that everything

be deduced from a primitive matter of absolutely

may

homo-

geneous quality. In the first place, it is open to all the


objections which beset the hypothesis of indivisible
Next, as in the case of Plato,

bodies.^

is

it

clear that

the materials could not adjust their shape to the space


in which they find themselves, if

already

know

the reasons

we

attribute a distinct

In the next place, we

elementary figure to them.^

why

Aristotle

is

not inclined

to admit an infinite variety of difference of shape

atoms

tlie

and

if

among

the elementary atoms are to be dis-

tinguished only by their

size,

one element could not be

developed from another.^ If all the atoms are homogeneous, one does not see how they are separate, and
why they do not join when brouglit into contact with

one another.
materials,

If they are

composed of heterogeneous
the cause of phenomena

we should have to seek

in this circumstance,

and not in the difference of shape,

and then they would influence one another while in con1

See, besides p. 306, the state-

It is certainly hard to
a cohesive body could be
constituted of such atoms. The

collision.

how

ments quoted p. 430. n. 2, all of


which are more or less directly
Here
aimed at the atomists.
also, we must continually remind

see

oiirselves of the state of science

ing corners and hooks to atoms,


by which they may hang on to
one another (Zell. Ph. d. Gr.
i.
796, 2, 798, 4), could not
but appear to Aristotle, as they
Cic.
appeared (according to
Acad. ii. 38, 121) to his follower

at the time, and of the peculiar


character of the theory which
When, for
Aristotle attacked.
instance, he shows that atoms
could not coherein a solid body, he
is not speaking of the atoms of
modern physics, which attract and
repel one another, are held in

means which Democritus adopted


end by attribut-

for securing this

Strato, fantastic and absurd,


See p. 445, n. 3, mpra.

equilibrium, &c., in many different

ways, but of the atoms of Democritus, which act upon one another
only mechanically by pressure or

"

Seep. 331

De

CopIo,

sq.

iii.

Cf. p. 306, n. 6.

4,

303, a 24 sqq.

riirsics

447

what the Atomists deny.'

tact,

which

way

a reciprocal influence would exist between

is

if certain qualities

warmth,

like

coupled with a certain shape

it

In the same

for instance

them

were

however, equally

is,

impossible to imagine the atoms without qualities and

suppose them

to

endowed with

definite

properties.

no reason why there should be only small


and invisible atoms and not also large ones.^ Lastly, if

Again, there

is

moved by another power, they experience


an influence, and their apathy is destroyed if they
the atoms are

move themselves,
and

the motive force

from what

different

are not indivisible


in one

and the same

is

moved

is

either inside

in which case

them
they

or opposite properties are united

object.

"*

Again, Aristotle believed that Democritus was quite


as unable as Plato to explain the physical qualities of

things.

The one makes

the other pyra-

fire spherical,

midal in form, but both are equally w^ong.-^

Ari-

however, derives his most conclusive argument


against the homogeneity of matter from the very phestotle,

nomenon by which modern


support it the phenomenon

sphere they

is

accustomed to

of gravity.

was ignorant that

like Aristotle,

attract each

science

all

Democritus,

bodies mutually

other, that within the terrestrial


all

atmo-

gravitate to the centre of the earth, that

the inequality in the rate of their descent

is

caused by

326, a,

<

lUd.

29 sqq., to which, however, it


might be replied that they refuse
to unite because they are not
liquid but solid bodies.

In the passage quoted

'

(ren. et

lUd.

Corr.

i.

326, a, 1-24.
Ibid, at line 24.

8,

326, b,

2.

p.

445, n. 4, supra, Aristotle attacks

both views alike and on the same


grounds. Cf. also Gen. et Corr
^f /
^

j,

8,

326, a, 8.

4t8

ARISTOTLE

the resistance of the

air,

and that the pressure of the

atmosphere occasions the ascent of

Democritus believed that

the atoms

all

in the void, but that the greater


less,

fire,

fall

vapour, &c.

fall

downwards

quicker than the

deducing from this hypothesis the concussion of the

atoms and the pressure by which the lesser are driven


upwards. For the same reason, he held that the weight
of composite bodies, supposing their circumference equal,

corresponds to their magnitude after subtraction of the

empty

Aristotle demonstrates

interstices.^

that this

no above or beneath in
infinite space, and consequently no natural tendenc}downwards all bodies must fall with equal rapidity in
hypothesis

is

false

there

is

make them
But being equally unphenomena which have to be

the void,^ nor can the void within bodies


lighter than they really

are.

acquainted with the actual

explained, Aristotle repudiates the only true point in the

system of Democritus, in order to avoid the consequences

which he saw to be implied in the Atomic hypothesis,


but the truth of which Democritus was as far from recognising as he was.
to be facts,
tive,
it

On

the strength of what he assumed

he opposes a theory which, originally specula-

could only be supported by a verification of the facts

had assumed, such

as

was wholly beyond the reach of

It is true, as he says, that in a

ancient science.

everything must sink with equal rapidity


'

779

Zell.

Cf.
sq.,

791

Ph.

d.

Gr.

i.

sq.

P?iys. iv. 8, 214, b, 28 sqq.


JJe Ccelo, iv. 2, 308, a 34-309, a,
18 see p. 428, n. 5, supra.
;

Epicurus, indeed, had

cognised

this, not,

re-

however, as a

vacuum
but this

real advance upon the atomic


theory, but only as a means of
making his own arbitrary assumption of deviations in the atoms
comprehensible. Seep. 307, n. 4,
sujjra.

PHYSICS

449

appears to him so inconceivable that he considers


sufficient

space.

ground

for rejecting the hypothesis of

He goes on to say that

would be nothing that was in

own nature

of its

disposed to

be heavy, and there

and by virtue

itself light

rise,

driven upwards by something

but only some things

Although

else.

be that of two bodies of equal

tire

all

downward movement

that remain behind in the

be the heavier,

bodies be composed

if all

must

of the same matter, they

it

empty

or are
it

may

the denser might

size,

great mass of air or

nevertheless a

would necessarily be heavier than a small quantity


or water.
This, however, he thinks impos-

of earth

and he says

sible,^

manifest

is

it

when we

consider

that certain bodies always tend upwards, rising quicker


in proportion to the increase of bulk

phenomenon

which seems to Aristotle quite inexplicable on the hypothesis of absolute

homogeneity in matter.

If gravity

be determined by bulk, then a greater mass of rarer ma-

would be heavier than a small one of denser, and


accordingly would move downwards. If, on the contrary,
it is said that the more vacuum a body contains the lighter
terial

Cf./*Ays. iv. 8, 216,a, 13: 6pajfi^uyap rh fxei^co f>oirr]V exovra fi fidpovs ^ KovipOTTjTos, icLV ToAAtt d/jLolus
'

eXV '^'^^^ (TX'hho.ffi, dccTTOv (pepofJLfvaTO


^aou x<^p^ov,Kal KaraXoyopovexovai
TO ix^ydOr] irphs &A\ri\a. uxrre Kal
Sta Tov Ktvov.
aW' aSvvaTov. 8ia
riva yap alTiav ohrQi]<TkTai QarTov
iv /xev yap toIs irK^peffiu e| avdyKTjs
'

QaTTov yap Ziaip^t


yuet^of

[in

IffOTaxri

a vacuum].

Tjj

&pa irdvT

De Coilo, iv. 2, 310, a, 7 t(^


Prantl rightly reads, instead
:

of rb] 56

Ty

eo-rai

dAA' ahvvaTov.

[as

rh

Iffx^'i

piiav

TToielv

ix^yedci SiacpipouTOi'V

VOL.

I.

(putriv

twv

apayKa7oi'

ravrov

avinfiaiveiv to7s fiiav iroiovaiv

Koi

vKrfV,

ixi\Q'

airXois

elvai ixt]Q(v

Kovtpov firire (pi:p6ixivov &uq}, oAA' ^


varrepi^ov t) iKdAifiofieuov, Kal iroWa

oKiycou
[small atoms]
5e
jx^yaKuv fiapvrepa tlvai.
et
tovto icrrai, (TvixfiriffiTai iruKhv
a4pa koX iro\v irvp vSaros eJuai
tovto 5
fiapvrcpa Kal yijs 6\iyris.
eVriV aSwarov.
Cf. previous D.
Ibid. C. 5, 312, b, 20 sqq, (where,
/xiKpa

however, in
ihv

Se Suo,

1.

to.

32

we must read

/iTa|i/

irws eo-rat

&c., as Prantl does in


his translation, though not in his
troiovvTa,

text).

G G

Aristotle

450
it is, it

may be answered

that a great mass of deuser and

heavier substance includes more

vacuum than

a small

one of the rarer sort. Finally, if the weight of every


body corresponded to the proportion between its bulk and
the empty interstices, ever so great a

lump

of gold or

lead might sink no faster, and ever so great a bulk of fire


rise no faster, than the smallest quantity of the same

He

stuff.

we

concludes that

are driven to assume the

existence of certain bodies heavy or light in themselves,


which move respectively towards the centre or the cir-

cumference of the world

^
;

and

this is possible only

when

conceive of them as distinguished from each other


qualities of the matter composing them and not
the
by
merely by the figure or magnitude of the elementary
wt^

ingredients.^

Not only

are the materials of the world different in

but they are also subject to qualitative transUnless we admit this, we must explain
formation.

(jnality,

apparent transmutation of

tlie

matter

either

(with

Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the Atomists) by a simple


extrusion of existing materials, or (with Plato) by a

change in the figures of the elements. ^ We have already


seen ' how far Aristotle is from agreeing with the latter

On the other hand,


solution as maintained by Plato.
were we to imagine that one and the same corporeal
substance, like wax, assumed first one and then another
elementary form, and that this metamorphosis was in
Aristotle here follows Plato's
view; see Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i.
678 sq. Strato, on the ocher hand,
returned to that of Democritus
'

see infra, Ch.


'

Be

Ciclo,

XX.
308, a, 21 sqq. 309,

b,

Cf.

27 sqq. c. 5, 312, b, 20 sqq.


the section concerning the

Elements, infra.
^ Cf
De Cceh,
P. 4i4 sqq.
.

'

iii.

7.

PHYSICS

451

fact the transmutation of materials, the indivisibility

of these elementary substances would follow,^ and this


he finds to be at direct variance with the nature of

As

corporeity.2

Atomists,

it is

to the theory of

Empedocles and the

clear that, according to them, those sub-

stances into which others seem to be transformed existed


previously in a state of interminglement with the latter,

and are merely extruded from them.


that this conception

is,

Aristotle thinks

in the first place, at variance

with the testimony of our senses.^

Experience shows

us a metamorphosis of materials in which the elementary properties of substances alter. One substance
passes into another, or a third

When water

is

formed of several.

freezes or ice melts, the

phenomenon is not,

he says, occasioned by a mere alteration in the position


and order of the parts, nor has a mere separation or combination of materials taken place, but, while the substance remains the same, certain of its qualities have

changed.^

Again, when water

is

comes into existence heavier than

made from

air,

air,

a body

yet not, he thinks, as

a consequence of the separation and compression of certain


portions of the

Be

Cu'lo,

sqq., 306, a, 30.

that

iii.

air.
7,

Conversely,

305, b, 28

The meaning

we may suppose

is

the ele-

ments formed of atoms of a definite shape earth of cubical, fire


of quadrilateral, atoms without
adopting Plato's view of the constitution of these bodies, and that
the conversion of one element
into another may be explained,
not as its resolution inlo its primal surfaces and the coiubinatlon
of these into a new form, but as
a transformation of the material

when

that underlies

air is
all

produced

the elements

alike (as was actually done by


Philolaus, of. Zell. Ph. d. Gr.
i. 376 sq.).
By thus conceiving
of the atoms of the elements as

divisible, however, we should involve ourselves in the difficulty


already mentioned, p. 444, n. 3.
^

See p. 430, n. 2, ?f7^m.


Gen. et Corr. i. 1, 314, b,

10 sqq.

l)e Cmlo,

iii. 7, 305, b, 1.
989, a, 22 sqq.
Gen. et Corr. i. 9, 327, a, 14

Metapli,
sqq.

i,

8,

ARISTOTLE

452

by evaporation from water, the former occupies so large


a space in comparison with the latter that

How

the vessel.

is

this to be explained

it

even bursts

on the hypo-

had previously existed in the water withIf a body grows or dwindles,


out change or difference ?
it is not merely that new parts are added to it, but all

thesis that

it

'

its

parts increase or diminish in size

flesh are

formed from

made from what we

and this involves


When

a general change in the material. ^

bones and

food, they are not taken ready

eat, like bricks

from a wall or water

from a cask, but the food passes into a wqw material.^


Moreover, it is clear that the elements themselves come
into existence

water

is

How'

atmin.

and perish

fire is

are

we

to conceive of such

must be

and dissolution?
which they begin and end,
'Jliere

ing, else

kindled and goes out

precipitated from the air and passes into steam

as in the case of all

we should be driven

<n*ession in

two

to suppose

cannot consist of indivisible bodies

Be

an

Becom-

infinite pro-

Yet these terminal points

directions.

indivisible (or atoms) as

formation

definite points at

whether absolutely

we have already

seen,'*

or such

as above, 305, b,
view of gravity
precludes the admission that the
greater weight of water as com-

to explain steam as a kind of air

due merely

atoms emanating froni water in


which they had previously been
imprisoned. As against such theo-

'

o sqq.

C'atlo,

Aristotle's

pared with steam

is

to its greater density. The atomists of that time could not pos-

sibly explain the expansion of


fluids into steam as the result of
increased repulsion in the atoms
at least the atoms of Democritus
are certainly incapable of internal
;

Empedocles and Anaxchange.


agoras (with whom Aristotle, ibid,
1. 16 sqq., first deals) were obliged

which emanates from water nor


;

could atomists generally regard


it as other than a complex of

riesAristotle'sobjectionsarevalid.
Gen. et Corr. i. 9, 327, a, 22.
^ Ibid. ii. 7, 334, a, 18, 26; cf.
Be Ca;lo, iii. 7, 305, b, 1. Cf. p.

457

sq.
*

In the passage from i)<;6?^,

cited at pp. 306, n.


446, n. 4.

iii,

4,

6,

and

PHYSICS

453

as are divisible by nature but are never actually divided

why

for

should the smaller resist division, when larger

bodies of similar substance do not do so

No more

can

the elements be produced from incorporeal substance,^ or

from a body different from themselves

were not one of the elements,

for if the latter

could have no gravity or

it

natural locality, and hence would be a mathematical and


not a physical body, and would not exist in space.

we

Hence

are driven to suppose that the elements are developed

from one another.^ But this process can only be conceived

For

as one of transformation.

if

there were not a trans-

formation of the elements, but only a putting forth of

something which they already contained complete within


themselves, one substance could not be entirely dissolved
into another, but an insoluble remnant would be left
and so any complete transmutation of substances, such
Coarse
as is given in experience, would be impossible.^
:

and

fine materials could

into each other."*

never be completely converted

Lastly,

how

are

we

to

imagine the

reciprocal influence of substances on one another, unless

they are capable of qualitative change?

Empedocles
and Democritus made bodies enter each other by means
But not only can this hypothesis be disof pores.'
'

As is proved at superfluous
and with some obscurity,

length,
in the
sqq.
-

De

Be

CoelOy

CopIo,

iii. 7,

305, a, IG

6.

iii.

This objection is first brought


against Anaxagoras in the Pliys.
i.4,I87,b, 22 sqq. in2)e 6Wo,iii,
7, 305, b, 20 sqq. it is used against
all who explain material change as
an extrusion in the latter case
with justice, since if steam, for
=

example, consists of a different


material or different atoms from
water, steam might be extruded
from water, but water could not
be wholly resolved into steam.
^

De

Cwlo,

iii.

4,

803, a

24,

where the words viroX^iy^ei yap


ael, &c., must mean 'since the
larger atoms would fail to obtain
release,' so that in water, for ex-

ample, a residuum would be left


whichcouldnotbe turned into air.

ARISTOTLE

454

pensed with, since bodies only require to be

divisible,

and need not be actually divided in order to experience


reciprocal influences
but it really serves no purpose, for,
;

two bodies cannot affect each other by contact, those


parts of them which interpenetrate by means of pores
if

do so

will not

Therefore while the mechanical

either.^

movement

theory of nature confined itself to a

of the

elementary ingredients in space, Aristotle maintained


qualitative

their

Where

alteration.

the former

had

explained apparent metamorphosis as a mere process of


extension,

assumed

Aristotle

the

changes under certain conditions.

operation

of

His predecessors

stricted the reciprocal operation of bodies to pressure

impulse

he extended

by

is

their primitive qualities.

which he understands

precisely this process

and passion

re-

and

to the internal nature of bodies,

it

whereby they transform


It

real

The
movement,
are contained in the correlation of potentiality and
actuality.
AVhen two things meet, of which one is
actually what the other is potentially, then, so far as
'

action

in their stricter sense.^

'

conditions of such transformation, as of

this is the case, the latter

and a change

is

is

28,

patient, the former agent

Gen.

C. 9,

rai fxovou,
ijlov

rh

irdarxovri.

vdOos.

iroiovv

rovro

avri.Qi\<Toixev
8'

oh

if

Trddos 5e Kad" oiTov

T(j3

Kivr\(ns

aWoiov-

o'tou

rh KevKhu koI rh Oepiirl TrAeoj/ rov

oAAa rb kiuuv

rroielt/ ItTTiv.
^

e'lirep

*'

produced in the one, which proceeds from

et Corr. i. 8, 326, b, 6327, a, 7 sqq.


Gen. et Corr. i. 6, 323, a,
if the
12
movens is likewise
partly ntotuni, parti}- i/nmobiJe,
this must be true also of the
aorent
Kid yap rh kivovu iroifTv ri
(pacri Koi TO TTOiovv KivcTu.
ov fx}ju
aWa dia<pfpfi ye Kal Se7 Siopi^eiv
ov yap oi6v re irav rh Kivovv toluv,
'

all

Ihicl. c.

9 init.

riva Se rpSirov

yevyav Koi iroifiv


\a^6vTs
Ka\ iricrx^iv,
\4yu/xev
upxhv t)]V iroWaKis elprj/xevrjv. et
yap i(TTi rh /ahv Swd/j-ei rd 5' ivTvwapx^t to7s

ovcri

roiovrov, 'K4(pvKev ov rfj fiev


Trao'xeij', ctAAa irivrr) Ka0'
oaov iffrX roiovrov, jfrrou Se Kal
fiaWov rj roiovrov fxaWdv iari Kal
\f:X^'a.

rfj

5'

rirrov.

ov

PHYSICS

455

Action and passion, like all movement,


the other.^
presuppose on the one hand the distinction of a movens

and a motum^ on the other their direct or indirect

Where one

contact.

or other of these conditions fails,

no passion and no alteration


are present,

it

is

possible

where both

Again, this consequence

inevitable.^

is

depends upon the agent being partly similar and partly


opposed to the patient since of things which belong
;

and a colour, for


example, neither can produce any change in the other
and the same is true of such things as are completely
similar, since change is always a passage from one
condition into an opposite, and that which does not

to wholly different genera, as a figure

stand in any opposition to another thing cannot produce


in

it

Hence the agent and the

an opposite condition.

patient must be
different

and

generically

so the old

but specifically

similar,

moot point

as to

whether likes

or unlikes influence each other is decided

by the law

that neither the one nor the other do so absolutely, but

both in certain relations.^

opposed within the limits

The agent and

patient are

of the same genus

"^

and

the change consists in the removal of this opposition,


in the agent's

making the patient

like itself.^

been already shown,


that all motion has
its seat in the motum, not in the
movens.

n. 3, sujjra.
Gen. et

Ibid. 327, a, 1 c. 8, 326, b,


1. Longit. Vit. 3, 465, b, 15. Cf.
p. 378 sq. iupra.
^ Gen. et tbrr. i. 7, 323, b, 15324, a, 14, with which cf the
quotations on p. 340 sqq.
* Like all 4vavria.
Hee p. 224,

Kal

'

It has

p. 386, n. 1,

'"

Sih

nal

CorrAhid.^2^,

eijKoyov

depixaivuv

oXus to

Hence

kuI

to

a,

t6 re irvp
^pvxpov \l/vxeip,

^5rj

ttoititikov dfioiovu eavrtp

to irda-xov t6 Te yap iroiovv Kal rb


irdaxov cuavria iarl, Kal t] y^veffis
Tovvavriov.
ctiaT^
avdyKt] to
eis
irdexov cis rb iroiovv fieTafidw^iv
ovroi yap (arai etV Tovvavriou v
yiveais.

ARISTOTLE

456

the patient

so far as

it

form,

is

it

in the position of the

is

determinate

'

form

'

matter,' to which a
communicated by the agent.
In

is

has not yet received this form or has another

opposed to the agent

be capable of receiving

agent

'

is also

inasmuch as

must

it

similar in kind.

it, it is

If the

a patient, so that the two mutually act

upon

each other, both must be of the same material, and


in this respect belong to the same genus.But this
condition does not universally apply to agents

the jirimidn movens

is

without passivity,

is

for as

unmoved, so the first active power


and therefore without matter

whereas, on the contrary, the lowest force that acts

immediately upon another


is

conditioned by

why

reason

all

and

material,

is

on

irdOos

its

own

active influence

is

and by the alteration

subject in

to actuality,

its

offers

it

occasions,

and being

to

divisible at all

force."*

of materials

be judged from the same points of view.


a combination of

two or more

relation obviously identical with that which he expresses


in the passage quoted p. 454, n. 3,
under the form of potentiality
and actuality.
2 Ihid. 324, b, 6
t^v fiev yap
^

is

Body, as poten-

an absolute resistance to the

The question about the mixture


is

The

whole extent to the transition

to change,

e.

nowhere

points,

active

operation

part.'"^

parts of the patient are affected by this

be found in the nature of corporeity.


tial,

its

avrijv elvai

ruv

us

clireTv

tV

avTiKi(x4vu)V oTrore-

which

upra.
For the above, see Gen. ct
Corr. ihid. from 324, a, 15 to the
end of the chapter ; and cf. c, 10,
'^

328, a, 17.
*

Gen. et Corr.

P- 454, n. 8,

i.

supra).

9 init. (see
Ibid. 327,

a, 6 sqq.

povovv, S>airp ycvos ov.

Tlie y4vos
stands to the elSos generally in
the relation of matter; see p. 219,

mixture^

materials,^' in

n. 2,

v\r)v \4yoixev dixoiojs

must

^
i.

According to Gen.

et

Corr.

10.

Aristotle shows, ihid. 327, b,

PHYSICS
neither the one

is

merged

457

in the other/ nor both exist

together unchanged, but a third


itself 6fioio/JLSps9.'^

is

In other words,

formed which

is

consists neither

it

in the absorption of one sort of matter into another, nor

in a merely mechanical junction or interminglement of


both,^

but in

When

chemical combination.

two

them remains the same,


They are not merely
qualities.

materials are mixed, neither of

preserving

its original

blended in invisibly minute

particles,'*

new

material,

wholly passed

into

but both have

wherein

they

remain only potentially, inasmuch as they can be again


Such a relation, however, only
extracted from it.^
13 sqq. 828, a, 19 sqq., that only
the union of substances(xf>'o''"a),
not that of qualities or of the
form with the matter or of the
immaterial efficient cause with
its passive object, can be called a
mixture (/xi^is). To us this seems
superfluous
but according to
Metajjh. i, 9, 991, a, 14 (cf.
Zell. Ph. d. Gr. i. 890, n. 4,
and ibid. i. 881 sqq.) he had
some occasion to make this reservation. That the substances,
moreover, which are mixed can
only be of a material nature is
self-evident
for the incorporeal
;

is atradis

As happens in the case


of burning {Gen. et Corr. i. 9,
327, b, 10), where it is not a
mixture that takes place, but the
production of fire and the destruction of wood, or, in other
words, the change of wood into
fire.
The same is true of nutrition, and generally of all cases in
'

which one material is transformed


into another (ibid.

23

sqq.).

This

but

aWoioiXTis.

fM^is

is

1.

13, 328, a,

not a case of

-Ibid.
ftirep

S'

328,

10:

a,

Se? fiefiTxOai

(pa/nev

n, rb

fiix-

Oh ofioio/jLcphs elj/at [or as it is


i^ei
rov
previously expressed
avTov \6yov t^ oXcp to fiopiou'] koI
Sia-ir^p t)v uSotos t^ ixipos iidwp,
On the
ovtw kcu rov Kpadevros.
dfioio/xepei see the end of Ch. IX.
w/m, and cf. Zell. Ph. d. Gr.
:

i.

879, n. 2.
^ ^vvdeais,

{ibid. 328,

a,

as distinguished
5 sqq. cf. Metaph.

xiv. 5, 1092, a, 24, 26) from [xi^is


In Metaph. vii. 2,
or Kpaais.
1042, b, 16 o-uvSeo-ts is further distinguished as the class notion
under which Kpaais comes.

As Anaxagoras, the Atomists


and, later, Epicurus supposed.
^ iir^. 327, b, 22
eVeU' ^(ttI
ret iikv Swdfiei to S' evepyeia ruu
uuruv, ivBex^rai ra jxix^^vra elvai
:

ttws

koI

h^}

elvai,

ivepyeia

uvtos tov
5'
SwdfisL

ixev

yeyovSros e|
^n cKaripov
airep fiaav irp\v /xixSvpai koI ovk
airo\a)\6Ta .... aw^srai yap t]
SvvafMis avruv, just because they
and
can be again separated
sqq.
In later usage com1. 31
kripov
avruv,

AltlSTOTLE

458

occurs

when

the materials brought together are mutu-

ally capaple of acting

and being acted on

and when,

^
;

moreover, the forces of both stand in a certain equilibrium, so that one of

the other and


in a

them does not get merged

its qualities

hundred gallons of water

and

lastly

Where

points as possible, like fluids.^

ditions meet, materials

affect

when they

upon each other

are easily divisible, so as to act

many

in

absorbed like a drop of wine

each

other

at as

these con-

such

in

manner that both, while combining, change at the


This combination, attended by the
same moment.
simultaneous transmutation of the materials combined,
is

mixture.'^

Aristotle

is

not content with substituting the theory

of qualitative differences and transformations in matter


for that of the

is far

from being

physical view of things which

causes and their laws.

mediate

merely

plete mixture of
fiiJ.7x6aL,

tliis

Dc

"

with that

confined to material

is

Material causes are only inter-

kind

Above them stand

(^to

Scnsu, c. 3,
440, b, 11), as distinguished from
a mere compound of smallest
parts was called rj 5t' o\ov Kpacris.
This is the case when their
material is of the same kind but
their qualities are of an opposite
character ibid. 328, a, 19 sqq.
cf, p. 454, stfj^ra.
31
^ Ibid. 328, a, 18 towards the
end of the c, where the above is
thus expressed mixture takes
place iTre'nrep cVrlr evia roiavra ola

Tvavrr)

goes further,

satisfied

the means and indispensable condi-

phenomena.

tions of

He

mechanical physicists.

and shows that he

rraOrjTiKo.

Ka\

ffra

what

re

v-rr'

dAATjAcoj/ Koi evopi-

ivSiaipeTa

Aristotle

[according to

says,

ibid.

328,

two coincide with one

b, these

another]

causes

final

ravra yap

i(j)9dp6ai

oijr

avdyKri fiefxiyfxfva ovr' %ri ravra


ottAws (hai, ohre avvdecriv elvai rijv
fu^iv avruv, otjre irphs r^v atffd'naiv

[the previously mentioned apdAA' co-t: ixlkt6v

jiarent mixture]
jxkv h

h.u

iv6pi<TTou iv iradr]TiKdv

koI voir)TiKbv koI roiovrcp /j.ikt6v.


^

Ibid. 328, b, 22

ri

twv ixiktwv aWoiwdcvTWV

Se

fii^is

eVwcts.

PHYSICS

450

above material necessity, the design of the universe


above the physical explanations of nature, theteleological.

Our researches up

to this point have already led to

the conclusion that everything in nature has


If Nature

has

its

is

goal by which

form, the form

its

measure and direction are

is

not to be distinguished from their

moves must of necessity be

If everything which

moved by something else, it


cause of movement resides
universe as

End.

If the essence of things consists in their

determined.^

End.^

its

the inner cause of motion, every motion

its

follows that the ultimate


in that

Final Cause,^ and

which moves the

movement

in general

can only be conceived as the action of form upon


matter, in which the former

is

the

object of desire,' and

the goal towards which the latter

so

stotle

strives.''

Ari-

cannot conceive of regulated and orderly events

except under the analogy of

human

action

directed

Hence while combating the theory


an anima mundi in the form in which it had been

towards an end.
of

held by Plato, he adopts himself a similar view.^


See p. 1)41, n. 2, supra.
See p. 356 sqq., p. 418, and

'

p. 462, n. 2.

and

li^ee

See p. 383, and

sqq.;

p. 404,

p. 396, n. 3.
p. 379, n. 1.

De An. i. 3, 406, b,
De Coclo, ii. 1, 284, a,

25
27

sqq.
Metaph. xii. 6, 1071, b, 37.
Aristotle rejects this theory in
;

the first place because he cannot


regard the soul as in any sense a
motum and therefore not even as
kavrh Kivovv (see the beginning of
Qh.^. infra). He further objects
that Plato conceives of the soul of
the world as something extended
in space. But it would be impossible to suppose that its thought

He

consists of circular motion, or of

any motion at

all.

It

would be

inconsistent
with its perfect
happiness that it should be intermixed with the body of the
world and, burdened with the
latter, should have uninterraittently to produce, like an Ixion
with his wheel, a motion which

had no affinity with its nature


and which therefore involved
exertion. Nor, indeed, is it shown

how

it produces it,
Lastly, the
soul cannot be opx^ as asserted
in the Phcf-drus, if, according to
the Tinucus, it comes into exist.

ence only with the world,

ARISTOTLE

460
refers not only the

movement

which communicates

of the outermost sphere,

but also that of

itself to all others,

the stars, like Plato, to the action of spirits, which are


related to the spheres
soul

is

body J

to the

moved by them

He

human

as the

even treats the forces of

nature in general, to a certain extent, from the same


point of view in the eternity of motion he recognises
:

tlie

immortal

of nature,^

life

and he even ascribes a

Every

of animation to the elements.^


also, as

we

shall

see,"*

an activity guided by a purpose,

everything in living beings

for

sort

vital activity is

related to the soul as

is

the incorporeal unity of the corporeal existence. Hence


it

follows that

by regarding nature

Cf. p. 373 sq. and see the section in the next cliapter concerning the Spheres. Aristotle is so
'

far justified from liis own point


of view in treating both the world

as a whole, and its individual


parts as animated with life, as he
does also Be Ccclo, ii. 12 followed
bv Eudemus {Fr. 76 b, Simpl.

Phys. 283 m.
Lchie (I. At. r.

Siebeck, D.
d. Lehen d. Univer-

cf.

avvi, in Flclite's ZtscJir f. Phil. Ix.


3 1 ). God is a part of the universe

which reason
a part of the man and of the

in the
is

same sense

in

is the relation of the


spheral spirits to their spheres.
Each of these spirits, however,
animates only the sphere which
it moves and the jirimum worens
only the irpSoTos ovpavos. While
the movement of the latter, indeed, extends to all the other
spheres, yet in their case it is

same nature

something communicated from


without like the motion of the
driver on a carriage their own
proper motion, on the other hand,
;

is

as a living whole,

due, not to

iheprimum movens,

Albut to particular motors.


though the whole world is thus
animated, yet Aristotle refuses to
call it with Plato i^fov, because
its life springs from no single
principle of motion.
2 Plii/s. viii. 1
U6Tepov
init.
:

yeyouf irore

5e

Kiv7\(ns

ovk nixra

irpSrepov, Koi (pOeipeTUi ttolKlv


SJa'Te

Kiveladai /xrjShv,

-/)

outus

iyevero

oijT

ovT (pdeiperai, ctAA' ael ^v Kal del


Koi tout' adduarov Kal dirav-

((TTtti,

(XTOV vTrdpx^^ To7s oixriv, olov

^ojtj

tis

ovaa To7s (pvcrei (XvucaTwcn iraaiv.


In these words Aristotle seems to
have in mind the passage from
Ileraclitus,

Qr.
3

i.

quoted Zell. Ph.

Gen. An.

yiuerai

d.

586, 2.
5' iv yrj

11, 762, a, 18:


koi ev irypcp ra ^wa

iii.

Kal TO, (pvTO. Sia ro iv yfj ficv

virdpx^iv, iv

S'

vSwp

vSari irvevfia, iv 5e

rovTcp iravrl d^ppidrrira ypvxtKqv,


uxrre Tp6-Kov riva irdvra ^/zu^^s flvai

At the commencement of
Chap. X. infra.

PHYSICS

461

and deducing its movement from the incorporeal forms


which govern all material change and shape, Aristotle
is driven, as was Plato on similar grounds,' to adopt of
God and
necessity a teleological theory of nature.^
nature, he says, do nothing without a purpose

always

perfection

nothing

plete in her

and

superfluous, profitless, or incom-

is

we may

of her productions

more truly than of those of

far

nature

circumstances permit, to realise

strives, as far as

say with truth,


that there

art,

nothing accidental in them, but that everything has

own purpose

it

is

its

indeed, this very prominence of

is,

design in nature which constitutes the beauty of her


creations

and the charm with which even the

them repay

investigation.^

See Zell. Ph. d, Gr.

'

G42

i.

sqq.

With what follows, cf ElTTee's exhaustive treatment of


the whole subject, iii. 213 sqq.
265 sqq.
3 De Ccelo, i. 4
fn. 6 B^hs kuI
'

7}

<pV(TlS

OvSeV

1T010V(TIV.

^ICLTTIV

\\.

ohK
8, 289, b, 26, 290, a, 31
iCTTiv iv Tols (pvaei rh ws irvx^v
:

least of

The essence of Nature,


/iidrrjv fxrjdiv ixr^r^

as

aTroAeiVet ri TaJv

avayKaiwv ttX^v iv rois irTjpwfxaari


KoX rois are\f (Tiu.
Gen. et Corr.
iv airaaiv del
ii.
10, 336, b, 27
rov P^Xriovos opiycadai (pafiev r^v
<pi(nv.
Be Vita et M. c. 4, 469,
r^v tpvcriv dpcofxev iv iraffiv
a, 28
cK ra>v Svvarciv iroiovaav rh KciWi(TTov.
Gen. A n. ii. 6, 744, b, 36
:

ovQkv

TTOif'i

TTfpiepyov ouSe /ndrrjv

Likewise

r]

.... ovOfV MS ^Tvx^ TToieT T] <l)vais.


291, b, 13: r) 5e (pvcris ovdev
aXdyws ouSe /naTTju Troie?. c. 5, 288,
ael Troie? twv eV5ea, 2
17 (f)v(ris

(pvffis.

XOfiivwv rh fifXTiarop. Pol'it. i.


8, 1256, b, 20: et olv v (pixris
jurjfler
artAts rroiti firirt
fiT^Te
IxdTrjv.
Part. A/t. i. 1, 639, b,
19: fxaWov 5' icrrl rh ov (veKa Kol

Si6-irp ei
yivos ^(f>ov rh dpicrrov
^iXriov w5i, ovrus koX ex^t koto
(pvffiv. Even in the most insignilicant products of nature we may
perceive the effort after perfection cf foil. n. and Eth. N. x.
Xffws Se Koi iv ro7s
2, 1173, a, 4

c. 11,

rh Ka?^hv eV rots

a, 15 (cf.

14)

ii.

12,

694, a, 15

iroiii

rrcplep^ov.

432,

b,

21

ri

(puais eV

rh

iroiel

VSxo/A6'a,''
c.

rrjs (pixrcajs epyuis

eV ro7s rrjs rexvy]s. iv. 10, 687,

fieAriarov,

uiiShv

r}

De An.
(pvcris

rwu

/x^re

(pvais
iii.

9,

iroid

T/ff/r.

An.

ouOev

iroieT ixdrtiv

c. 4,

c. 2, 704, b,

'S6;^ojueVajj' T77

739, b,

15

dW'

ovaia

dei

Trepl

19.

v <pv<ns
/c

rwv

eKaarov

'

(pav\ois

icrri

ri

(pvaiKhv

dyadov

KpeTrrov fj Kad' outo, h ip'irai rov


o'lKflov dyaOov. vii. 14, 1153, b, 38
irdvra ydp <pvaii e^et Tt 0(:'lov.
PaH. An. i. 5, 645, a, 15
:

'

ARISTOTLE

402

is Form, but the form of everything is determined by the function for which it is designed.^ All
Becoming has its goal, and the terminal point of all
motion is also its end or object.'- This pursuit of fixed
designs in nature is demonstrated to our experience by
the order and coherence of the universe and the regularity with which certain effects are produced by certain
It is impossible to ascribe to chance what
means.

he shows,

happens always or even usually.^ He lays especial


stress upon the motions of the heavenly bodies, the
of living creatures

birth

from seed, the instinct of

animals, the- evidences of design in the structure of

human

animals and plants, and also upon

hib

Se't

/j-rj

SivfrxepatVei;/ irai^iKws ttjv

ari/JLUTepuv

Tuiv

irepl

(iri-

(cfccv

eV iraai yap to7s (pvaiKoTs


(rKe\piv.
As HeracliueaTL Ti Oav/xacTTdv.

tus bade tlie strnngers welcome


to the bakery wliere they found

him, saying
ovTco

also,

yap

Toils

(puaiKov koI kuAov.

rvxovTws aKTC

jx)]

Ti)s

jxaKiaTa
t)

tliere

(T]Ti](nv

ry)u

jXT)

(ivTos Tivhs

iv

npos

iKaarov rwu Cv^^ irpocrUvai


SvauTTOvixeuoy ws iv airaaiu

iTp\

Se?

God was

tliat

Kal

eVe/ca tivos

(pyois eVrl Kal


eVewia avv<rTr)Keu

(pv(rOi)s

ov

'

to

5'

y^youe r^hovs

rrju

rod

Ka\ov
cited

X^pO'V d\r](pev. (Cf. c. 1,


in previous n.)
Cf also Meteor, iv. VI, BOO,
airavTa 5' iar\v wpia/xdva
a, 10
1

Tw

epyq)

'

ra

/jl^v

yap

dvvd/uLeua

rd avruv epyov aXrjdws ((TtIv


Ka<JTa, olov 6 ocpdaXfids [sc. aArjOws
6(p9aXiJ.ds itTTiv^ el opa, Td 8c fi^
Svvdixivov dfiwuvficos, olov 6 redvews
TToteTi/

^ 6 XiOivos.
2

(pvais

Pkys. ii. 2, 194, a, 28 j v 5e


up yap
t4Aos Kal ov eVe/co

action, inas-

(Tvuexovs TTjs Kiwrjcrews

otj(Tr]S ^cttl

TCAOS Ti)s KIVT](X(:WS, TOVTO ^(TXO-Tov Ka\ TO ob kvKa. c. S, 199, a, 8


eV oaois Te'Aos eVrt ti, tovtov eveKa
KpaTTiTai Th
irpoTCpov
Kal
rh
^(pe^ris, kc. I hid. 1. 30, see p. 350,
supra. Part. An. i. 1, 641, b, 23
iravTaxo^ Se \4yoix^v To5e ToCSe
ez/EKo, OTTov tiv <paivii]Tai t4Aos ti
Tl

irphs

irepaiuei iJ.r]Bephs

KLvrjffis

r)

(ixTTe

edTl
KaKovjXiv

TOIOVTOV,

TL

OTt

12

b,

Pliys.

(pvcTLv.

(pvais

T]

(paucphv

eJuai

flJ.iro5i(opTOS,

7]

St]

ii.

1,

Kal

193,

AeyoyueVrj

ylveais [see Mctaph. v. 4


b^os iffTiv els (pvaiv

oos

init.^

apa
415,
wff'n-ep yap 6 vovs 'iviKa tov
b, 16
TTOte?, Thv avTov TpSirou Kal r] (pvcris.
^
Phys. ii. 8, 198, b, 34, 199,
b. 15, 23 Part. Ari. iii. 2, 663, b,
Gen. An. i. 19, 727, b, 29, cf
28
Dc Ccelo, ii. 8, 289, b,
p. 302, n. 5
26 ovH ecTTiu iv to7s (pvaei Th cos
eTvx^v, ou5e tJ) iravTaxov Kal ira(Tiv
vndpxov TO otTTo tvxV^'
.

lxnp(pT)

(pxxxLs.

Be

Ail.

ii.

f]

4,

PHYSICS
much, that

403

an imitation or comand the design of the one therefore

to say, as all art is

is

pletion of nature,

implies that of the

other.

If

we cannot deny the

evidences of design throughout the world of mortal

we must admit the same in a


measure with regard to the universe at

things, he argues that


far greater

where the order

is more strict, and the regularity


more unbroken. Whence, indeed, could the laws which
govern the former have sprung except from the latter ?^

large,

Consequently the discovery of

final

causes forms the

and most important problem of natural science.


must direct its attention, not to the individual, but

first

It

to the whole

which the individual subserves not to the


But if it is suggested that, in

matter but to the form.^

*
Phi/8. ii. 8, 198, b, 32-199,
h, 26, cf. viii. 1, 252, a, 11

1, 641,
289, b,

diro rvxvs koI rod avro/j-drovroiovrov (Tva-TTJvai, eV ^ otto rvxvs Koi


ara^ias ou5' driovv (paiveTai.
Cf
also Zell, Ph. d. Gr. i. 650,
579, 1.
PJiys. ii. 9, 200, a, 32 (after

Gen. An. iii. 10, 760, a, 31


25
Metapli. xii. 10, xiv. 3; see p.

the passage quoted p. 360, n. 1)


/col kfi^u fih r^ (pvatKCfj Aeicreai ai

391, D. 2, suj)ra.

airiai,

aWa

ye draKTOv rwv (jyvaei /cat


<pv<nv 7] yhp (pvais alria

(x^v ovd4u

Kara
Trao-t

b,

Tci^eajs.

12-30

Part. An.

De Cwh,

i.

8,

ii.

\Pavt. An.
7}

(pv(Tis

J/e/ca

641, b, 12:

1,

i.

rov

iroie7

iravra.

(palujrat yap, wcirep eV ru7s Te^J'o(TTors

iffrXv

ahrols

apxh

7)

rexvr),

ovtws

iv

roh

tal

irpdyixaa-iv
&\\r] ris
alria roia^rrj, ^v exo/xeu

Kaddirep [as well as] rb depiubu Kal


^pyxpov 4k rod iravros. Slo /xaWov
eiKos rov ovpavov yeycurjaOaL virb
roiavr'ns

airias,

et

y4yove,

elvai 5td roiavrr]u alriav

rd ^ya TO dvrjrd

Kal

fiaWou ^

rb yovu reray-

'

fievov Kal rb wpia-fXiuoviroKv /uLaKXov


<j>aiueraL

ovpaviois

eV

ro7s

5'

&\\ot' &\Xws Kal ws

V/xas,

rb

ervx^

irepl

r)

irepl

ra Burira /xaWov.

ol 5e
rS)u fiev (cfJMv %Ka(rrou <pv(rei (paalv
elj/ot

Kal yevfffdai,

rbv

S'

ovpavov

=*

aXriov

naWou

5e

yhp rovro

tj

rivos

eveKa

rrjs vXrjs [inas-

much as Nature chooses her


materials with a view to the
thing thpt is to be produced]
oAA' ovx avrr] rov reAouy.
Gen.
et Corr. ii. 9, 335, b, 29 it is not
sufficient to give the material
causes of a thing.
Matter is
merely the motmn, the movens
in the province both of nature
and art is something quite
different the Kvpiwrepa alria is
the form. Materialistic physics,
instead of giving us the real
causes, can tell us only of implements of production as if one
in answer to the question ' Who
saws the wood ? were to reply,
:

'

ARISTOTLE

464

order to pursue definite ends, Nature must be capable


of conscious deliberation, Aristotle considers this un-

Even

reasonable

Art,

lie

remarks, does not

Moreover,

artist unconsciously.^

but works in the

reflect,
it is

we already know, forms to Aristotle's


between Art and Nature, that the
distinction
the
mind
have their motive principle
former
the
productions of

just this which, as

We

outside themselves, and those of the latter within.^


thus arrive for the first time at the important concepof

tion

immanent

design,

point

to

essential

so

system that we might define Nature, accordrealm of internal activity toward

Aristotle's

imr to his view, as the


a fixed end.

'The

Cf. p. 360, n. 1, and


p. 303, n. 3,

saw.'

the passages quoted

aud

p. 307, n. 4,

and Zell. Ph.

Gr. pt. i. 7.^8, 1, 3, 81)3,


2, on the neglect of final causes
in ancient physics. Part. An. i.

d.

(paivcrai Se irpuTH]
039, b, 14
[sc. alria] %v X^yofifv iveKci tiuos
1,

\6yos yap ovtos, apxh 8' 6 \6yos


ev re ro7s Kara rexvriv
ofio'ctis
eV

Kal

rols

avufffr-nKoaiu.

(pvcrei

Ibid. c. 5, G4o, a, 30: in the


investigation of the animal ovganism tlie question is, not of the

individual parts or the matter,


but of the oAtj ixop(f>^, of the
a-vvdecris and the oAtj ovaia.
Pkt/x.n. 8, 11)9, b, 26: arooUaOaL '4vcKd rov
TTOV 5e TO jUTj
yivtaOat, iay |U?; Uwari to kivouv

^ov\V(rdiJ.yov [ = idu /xtj ^ouAeuTjrai TO Kivovu, for the poirt is

missed by Doring, who, in his


Kuni^tl. d. Arist. 68, puts a false
emphasis on tluiai], Kairoi Kal rj
T^xvV ov fiovMveTai Kal yap et ivriv
iv r^ ^vXcf 7] vavwqyiKr], Sfxolws h.v
*

(pvcrei

i-noUi

^<n'' ei

iv ry

rix^y

ej/e(TTi T^ fVcKa rov, Kal eV (pvaei.


Aristotle has here in view the
ai't that has become a llxed habit

and second nature in the artist.


Such art he conceives of, hownot as belonging to the
but as inherent in 'Art'
itself, seeing that the creative
principle resides, not in the artist,
but in the artistic conception
which operates in him, and w^hich
Aristotle therefore identifies with
the T^xv-f] itself cf. the passages
quoted from Mctaph. vii. 7, Gen.
An. ii. 4, Part. An. i. 1, in n. 1,
p. 356, and Gen. et Corr. i. 7, 324,
oo-o yap fir) exet r))v avrrjv
a, 34
ever,

artist,

TTotel

v\r)v,

larpiKt]

ov^fv

'

yap

TTcttrx^* ^''^^

oiov

ouTa,

cnraOri

avTT)

iroiovara

'"''^^

rj

vy'ieiau

vyia^o/iituou.

See p. 418, n. 3, ,wpra. In


this sense Nature, as the internal
in living
operative principle
-

things, is also expressly opposed


to the human understanding,

which operates upon them /row


without (Ovpadev vovs)
A7i.

ii.

6,

744, b, 21.

cf.

Gen.

PHYSICS
But

465

this action in obedience to purpose cannot obtain

a complete mastery in nature

along with the free


operation of form, we have the necessary element of matter
for,

We have al-

which cannot be entirely overcome by form.

ready shown (p. 359 sqq.) that Aristotle finds in matter the

groundwork of chance and blind natural necessity.


in fact, ultimately coincide, since chance

Both

precisely that

is

which does not happen as the fulfiment of some design,


but is produced by the way, in consequence of the
operation of intervening causes which are indispensable
to the attainment of a further end.

of natural existence renders

it

pose for everything in the world.

towards

Nature, indeed, works

ends, but, in the

definite

plans, she produces

many

way, from mere necessity


far as possible to

This characteristic

impossible to assign a pur-

make

realisation of her

things parenthetically, by the


;

yet she

still

endeavours as

use of such chance products,

em-

ploying her superfluities for purposes of her own, and,


like a

good housewife, taking care that nothing be

lost.^

It follows that natural science, in like mann<r, cannot

always proceed with the same rigour, but must take


into account the disturbances introduced into the
designs of nature by necessity and chance, admitting

exceptions

to

rules,

and feeling

satisfied

when her

generalisations hold in the majority of instances.^


'

See p. 361, n.
G/m. An. ii.

1,
(5,

supra.
744, b, 16

ayadbs, koI t) (f>v<ris


ov9ev anofidWeiv e^udev ^| y Io-tj

SxTirep olKOpSfios

troiTJcrai

ri

xPW'r^v.

He

points

especially to uses to which siiperfluous materials (Trepmwfxara, on


which see Gen. An. i. 18, 724, b,
23 sqq.) are put in the formation

VOL.

I.

and nutrition of animal orgarisms Gen. An. ii. 4, 738, a, 3/


;

sqq.,

iii. 2, 663, b, 31.


Cf. also p.
361, n. 1, and Part. An. iv. 5, 679,
a, 29, where be says of the juice
of the cuttle-fish
ri Se (pvais o/'
:

nj? Toiovrcp irfpirrdifiaTi KaraxpyiTai


irphs fio-fjdeiav Kal aaoTTfpiav ahrwy.
*

PaQ't.

An.iii.

2,

663, b, 27,

HH

ARISTOTLE

4GCj

from this resistance offered by matter to form

It is

that Aristotle derives

phenomena

irregular natural

all

He

(rspara), such as abortions and the like.

regards

as the stoppage of nature in the midst of an

them

and failure of the


Such phenowhich she originally intended.'^
mena arise from form not being completely master over
unfulfilled design, as a mutilation

result

we may

Moreover,

matter.^

note that he even con-

siders it a kind of abortion or failure of the ends of


nature when children do not resemble their parents,
and especially their father,^ when a good man begets

a bad son and rice


cf.

Metapli.

Avhen the nature of the body

versa,''

H /?"/?. and p. 168,


Hitter's statement

ii.

n. \, 2, supra.

(see his p. 212) that the doctrine


of Nature rests according to Aristotle rather on opinion than on
science, seems to be due to a
mistranslation of Anal. Post. i.
33, 89, a, 5, where t] <pv<ns ri
TOiavr-n (i.e. to evBex^l^^^ov KOi

&\Xa}s

ex^Jj',

context)

is

is clear from the


taken as = ^ cpvais

as

and

Kara

ecTtJ'

evia

bpBws

fvcKci

t^x^V

^^ ^'^

'''"

rov, iv Se toTs a/xap-

ravofx^vois eVewa fx^v rivos iirix^ia.XK'' aTTorvyxo-vcrai, 6/j.o'cos

purai

^^ '''^'^ (pvcriKols Koi ra


eKeivov
rov
ajxaprr^iara

&/ ex''* '^-^

repara

eVe/ca tow.
3

f'ari
ri,

An.

fren.

iv.

4,

770, b, 9

yap ro repas rwv irapa (pvaiu

irapa tpvffiv

r^v ws

iirl

oh iracrav ciAAo

5'

ro ttoKv

yap r^v

irepl

so also

del Kal r7]U i^ avdyKris ovOhv ytverai

Gen. ^M.iv. 3,759, b, 10 sqq.


Aristotle is here speaking of abor-

<i>v(nv (a proposition which


was afterwards applied by theologians to the miracles, and in
become
has
application
this

roiavTT]

Nature

is

irapa

(i.e. d)8e)8aios).
'

tions which want essential parts


of the human body as well as

those which have more than the


proper number, and applies the
above explanation to both t\os
yap ru>v fiev Kiu^ffeoov (form-giving
:

motion) Kvofx4vwv,
'

rovTO

S'

5' vKiis

to

ficvei

KpaTovfxeurjs,

fia\i(TTa

rr\s

ov

Kad6\ov

(TtI (oJov

Cf.
TO Te'pas avaTrrjpia rls icrriv.
also 767, b, 13: to 5e repas ovk
KoiX
rov
eueKoi
avayKa'ov irpos r^v
T^v rod T\ovs alriav, aWa Kara
aviiiPefirjKos
^

Phys.

avayKa7ov.
ii.

8,

199, b, 1

et

5)/

famous, although
ally known that

it is
it

not gener-

comes from

Even a repas, thereArihtotle).


fore, is in a certain sense Kara
(pvaiv,
ri]U

orav

ii\i)U

T]

fx^

Kpari](Tri

Kara ro

r^u Kara

eTbos ^ixris.

Cf. previous n.
* Gen. An. ii. 3, 767, b, .5: h
ioiKws ro7s yovevaiv ^'5rj rpoirov
rivh. repas iarlv.
* Polit.
i.
6,
1255,^ b, 1
yap, &(Tirep e| avQpuirov
a^iovcri
iK dijplwv yiveadai
&vdp(t}irov Ka\

jjL^

9r)piov,

ovrw Ka\

e| ayadSov

ayadov

'

PHrSICS

467

does not correspond to that of the soul.'


Indeed, he
looks on all the female sex as imperfect and mutilated
in comparison with the male, because the informing
force of the man was insufficient to overcome the
matter

taken from the

Again the brutes

woman in the act of procreation.^


are dwarfish as compared with human

beings, because the upper

members

of their body are

not properly proportioned to the lower ^ they


are the
imperfect attempts of nature to make men a
form of
development analogous to that of children." Moreover,
;

among the animals we may discern a further malformation in the case of single tribes the
mole, for instance ^
or, to speak more accurately, we may distinguish
between more perfect and less perfect animals such
as
have blood are more perfect than such as have
none
the tame than the wild;^ those which
possess but one
:

centre of organic

life than those which are


provided
In like manner, vegetables, as compared

with several.^

V 5^ <l>{,(ris^ $oi\eraL fxh rodro


iroLUv iroXKaKis, ov fi4uToi Uvarai.

1 oht.^l. 5, 1254, b, 27 ^oiK,raLfx,vovvr,^vcriSKa\rb.<T<i,f,ara


Siatpepopra rroi^iv ra ru^v iXevO^ptcu
:

Kac

rcou Sov\a,u,

avf^fialue^

8h

^o\\aKis rovuaurjdu.
Lt. znjra the section in Ch.

X. on 8ex
on.
JU

Animals

ID

^\

^''''^'
'^- 1^'.^^^' b, 2,
Trai/ra 7ap eo-Ti ra (.cfa uaud,5r}

raAXa^apa

Tou&uepcc^ou.

IZ, b.hj, a, 8.

the

^^'

il>
h/jjass2m.
2 p. and
'

ii.

Cf.

c.

Children also, for

same reason, are


^'

^^

-t\r''-b

ravc^5;
^^''''- c-

^^^' ^' ^^

^Z^Lf.f'^^^^"''}''''^'^^'''''
from
that of a beast.
Btst. An. IV. 8, 533, a, 2.

e
^

Gen. An. ii. 1, 732, a, 16


PoUt. i. 5, 1254, b, 10- tI

^xh ^/u^pa [^ya] rciu ayp'mv ^eAx/o;


rV <i>iciv. Aristotle admits,
however, himself, Part. An i ;)
643, b, 3, that the division of
animals into tame and wild is a
false one, as all tame animals are
found also in a wild condition,

Thegreaterperfectionoftameanimals is therefore something that


is acquired
so far as it is%i<T.i,
;

it

consists in a

Part. Aoi.

mere capacitv
iv.

5,

682, a

indeed, desires to give to such


creatures only one central organ,
^^*' ^ei"g enable to do this she
'' ^^^^^^ ^ ^i^^ tt^^ several
In the Problems (x. 45) the
writer goes so far as to say that

HH

ARISTOTLE

4C8

Tliey display design but

with animals, are incomplete.^


developed form

in a less
see,

^
;

and they

we

shall

have an animate existence, although only in the

lowest stage of

mentary

development and in

its

Aristotle

outline.

though the

life,

what appears

inorganic'^

whole

is

to be

life.

That which

temporal origin

ment out
wliich

is

first

the

in

in every case the end.*

inorganic.''

order

tlie

it

beginning (that
thought)

of

It follows that

the

also

organic to

eartlily existence.

chiefly to organic nature, in

had the insight

is

complex exist-

Aristotle, however, does not carry this

thought beyond the sphere of


applies

perfect development

ences must be posterior to simple ones


tlie

as a

over Matter

first, or Form, in its


Becoming is a move-

Form, and

of Matter into

comes

more

since all

least possible, in

Form

absolutely

is last,

most rudi-

Thus Nature

the gradual conquest of

continual progi'ession towards

its

even goes further and

recognises a degree of

of

too, as

which he

He
first

to discover a continuous progress from

inanimate to animate, from imperfect to perfect forms


of existence.
nature produces wild plants and
animals in greater quantity than
tame ones, because it is easier
to make what is imperfect than
what is perfect, and because
nature, like art, is only able to
create the better after long pracThis, however, is an extice.
aggeration of the Aristotelian
doctrine of nature's weakness.
Cf. Gen. An. iii, 7, 757, b,
19,24.
2 Phys. ii. 8, 199, b, 9
kuI iy
'

ToTv

(pvTo7s

^veari rh

ijTTOV Se ^L^pdpdiTai.
^ See
p. 460, n. 3,

cveKo. rov,

supra

and

Ch. IL.infra, at the end of pt. i.


^
Part. An. ii. 1, 646, a, 25

ra vcrrepa

tV

yeveaei irpSrepa
(pvaiv icrrl, koI -rrpwrov rh rfj yevecrei
TeKevTa7op
rcf /lev olv XP^^V
trpoT^pav r^u vXrjv avayKa7ov dvai
kol
yev<Tiv, rcji Xoyqs 5e t^/j/
kKaarov fxop<pi]v. Metapli. ix. 8,
oiraj/ eir' apx^f /SaSi^'ei
J 050, a, 7
rh yiyv6fiivov koI t4\os apx^ yap
rh ov eucKa, rod reXovs 5' eVewa ?;
ycueffis. Seealso-p. 205, n. 2, supra.
^ Part. An. 646, b, 4.
Meteor.
oel Se, fiaWov
iv. 12, 389, b, 29
Srjkop [ti eKa<TTOu} iirl rwv xxrrcpwv
koX '6\oos '6(ra olov opyaua K2) fveKd
rfj

tV

PHrsiCi^

469

CHAPTER IX
CONTINUATION
The Universe and

B.

the

Elements

TuKNiNG now from these more general

inquiries into

nature to the consideration of the actual constitution of


the world, Aristotle comes upon a question which had
occupied a leading place in previous metaphysical discussions

the question, namely, of creation.

His pre-

decessors had without exception assigned to the world


in

which we

live a definite

beginning in time

such as Anaxagoras,

Plato,

holding that this world

is

world we see

is

the only one

among an

only one

declare

to

begotten.^
itself

that

our world

Although

Wehaveaclearerideaof the
true nature of man than of flesh,
bones, &c., and a better idea of the
nature of the latter than of the
elements. T^ 7^^ ov fi/Ka ^Kia-Ta
ivravda StjAov oirov irMlcTTov t^s
uAtjs
wo-Trep yap ei ra e(Txo.Ta
rov.

outV, V

t]

/xhv vKr] ovdhv

5'

ovaia

&\\o

ovOh &\\o

Trap'
v)

\6yos, rh 5e nera^v avaKoyov rcf


iyyvs ehai '^Kaarou, iirelKalrovruu
oTiovu i(TTiv eucKdrov.
'

On

others that the

was the
and un-

Aristotle
eternal

is

This conviction seems to have early forced

upon him/

Xricpdeiri,

infinite series of

other worlds both past and present.^


first

some,

and the Pythagoreans,^

the latter

cf.

Zell. Ph.

d.

in his system
Gr. pt.

i.

it

H78 sqq. 410

is

not

sq.

The atomic school held the


existence of both Anaximander,
Anaximenes, Diogenes, and Em'-

pedocles placed the series in the


On Heraclitus cf. Zell.
Ph. d. Gr. pt. i. 586, 2 ad Jin.
629, 1 ad Jin. .and on Xenophanes,

past.

iind. 498,
^

De

Ca-lo,
*

Fr.

'^

Jin.

As he says himself
i.

in the

10, 279, b, 12.

Cic. Acad.
18), quotes

ii.

38, 119 (Ar.

probably from

AklSTOTtS

470

placed in direct connection with the doctrine of the


eternity of motion/ yet

it

follows, equally with

it,

from

the consideration that the operation of creative force in

the world must be as eternal and unchangeable as that


force itself,

and that therefore the universe which

change,"''

it,

Aristotle, indeed,

time.

result in the

nowhere expressly

works that have come down

he approaches very near to


tlie
5()

treatise n.

(\)i\oao<pia<;

sq. Hn])ra), at

(sec p.

any rate from

one of the dialogues, as Aristotle's


Neqne enim ortum esse
view
'

unquam mundum, quod

nulla

fuerit novo consilio inito tam


praeclari operis inceptio, et ita
esse eum undiqueaptuni ut nulla
vis tantos queat niotus iiiutationemque moliri, nulla senectus
diuturnitate temporum cxistere

ut hie ornatus uncjuam dilapsus


occidat.' (Cf. Plato, Tim. 84, :b,
8o Ps.
68, E, and elsewhere.)
Phit-o, uFAcrii. M. ii. 189 {Ar.
Fr. 17), where it is declared to
be Sfctrr? a0eo'T7js to regard the
bparos B^hs as no better than any
human product.
The
See p. 387, supra.
latter is even quite compatible
with the doctrine of the birth
and destruction of the world.
'

On

this, cf. p. 468, n, 3.

Phys. viii. 1, 251, a, 20 sqq.


where, in opposing the view that
motion had ever a beginning, he
says
had the movens and the
mobile existed without producing
any motion, the transition from
rest to motion could only have
been effected by a previous change
^

is

however the individual parts may


cannot as a whole have had a beginning in

produced by

it.^

states this

to us, although

He contents himself,

in

either in one or both of them,


to suppose

and we should have


a TTpoTfpa

/xTa)8oA.^

ttjs

TrpuTrjS.

Similarly we should have to conclude that as a preliminary to


the transition from creation to
destruction of the world or vice
versa a change must take place
in the creative force or in the
material upon which it works.
If both remain unchanged their
mutual relation must also remain unchanged, and therefore
also the resultant effect.
But

according to Aristotle, God is


eternal,
and
unchangeable
matter, on the other hand (setting aside the doctrine of the
immutability of the material of
which the heavens are made), we
know can only suffer change
through the operation of the
moving cause. If, therefore, the
latter is unchangeable, its relation to the matter and the universe which is its product must
This is the
be unchangeable.
argument indicated by Cicero
in the passage quoted above,

where Aristotle declares

it

to

be inconceivable that so perfect


a product as the world could

PHYSICS

471

his investigations into the origin of the world,

with

and refuting the doctrine


The docthat the world has a beginning but no end.^
proving that motion
however,

trine,

For

if

which

clearly involved in his metaphysics.

primum movens

the

is

unchangeable, the

effect

produces upon the world must always be the

it

same.

is

is eternal,

It

cannot at one time act as a creative, at another

as a destructive, force.

from Aristotle's

The same conclusion

scientific doctrine of the

follows also

immutability

of the material of which the heavenly spheres and the


stars are

made.

Not

only, therefore, does the doctrine

of a beginning and end of the world in the sense of an

absolute birth
have

had

consllio

inito

and destruction

beginrjing

novo

whence

may

it

be concluded that the creative


force must have produced the
best from all eternity in virtue
of its own unchangeable perfection.
'
Aristotle devotes De Cwlo,
10-12, to the proof that the
heavens are without beginning
and end, confining himself, however, almost exclusively to the attack on the Platonic view, that,

i.

w bile

they will endure for ever,


ihey yet had a beginning in time.
His chief argument against it is
that beginning and endlessness,
end and beginninglessness, are
mutually exclusive. That which
exists for an endless period can
neither begin nor cease to be
in either case there must be a
time in which it is not (see c, 12,
281, b, 18 sqq. where, however,
it is proved in too formal a way).
Why, moreover, should that
which has not existed for all
eternity begin to be at this pjir;

find

no place in Ari-

ticular moment ? or why should


that which has been from all
eternity cease at this particular
moment to exist? (283, a, 11)
It is its own nature which constitutes a thing without beginning
or end, and this in such a case
excludes the possibility of not-

being the nature of that which


has had a beginning and is liable
to perish must, on the other hand,
include it. The latter, therefore,
cannot last for ever any more
than the former can begin or
end (1. 29 sqq. cf. p. 366, n. \,fn.
and the passage quoted, ibid.
;

ilt.

from Metaph.

ix.

8).

The

views, on the other hand, of those


who hold that the world has
both beginning and end are

here only lightly touched upon.

The atomic view Aristotle considered that he had disposed of


by his doctrine of the unity of
the world, while in reference to
the view of Heraclitus and Empedocles he contents himself

with remarking

(c.

10,

280, a,

ARISTOTLE

472

but even such a fundamental change in

stotle's system,

the constitution of the world


Heraclitus and Empedocles

is

as

presupposed by

is

wholly inconsistent both

with his cosmology and his metaphysics.

The question
any origin of the world in time,
actual character and constitution.

for Aristotle is not of

but only of

its

The universe

divided, according to Aristotle, into

is

two halves of opposite character


the other celestial.

the one

This opposition

terrestrial,

and

at once revealed

is

by the testimony of our senses


and Aristotle can
hardly have come to it in any other way.
The un:

alterable nature of the stars


larity of their

a contrast

we

subject

lie

to

different

demonstrate

argues, are

movement
compound
from the

two,

simple and original


the centre

the

to

its

necessity.

tirst

different

The more imbe, the more he

All natural bodies,

movement

in

space.

But

The

third of these being derived

it

follows that the latter alone are

rectilineal

motion proceeding from

circumference,

circular motion revolving

are the

laws.

either rectilineal or circular or a

is

of both.

and change, that

essentially

seems to him to

capable of

in space

first

two

recognise

])ortant this opposition


strives to

in his opinion, so strong

to terrestrial corruptibility

are forced to

realms,

and the changeless regu-

movements form,

or

vice

versa,

round the centre.

natural motions, there

and

If these

must be

certain

bodies which by reason of their nature are the subjects


of such
1 1

sqq.

movement, and which are consequently the


cf.

Zell.

P/i. d.

Gr.

pt.

ad Jin.) that it attributes


to the world a mere change of
form and not a veritable birth
i.

629,

and destruction,
That it was the observation
of this which led Aristotle in
'

the

first

instance to

make

his

PHYSICS

473

most primitive and ancient bodies.

Those, on the
movement, must be
formed by combination from them, and receive their
contrary, which exhibit a composite

particular

from the constituent which preponThat which is natural is

bias

derates in their composition.

always earlier than that which

is

opposed to nature and

and

It follows that circular,

violent.

movement must be
other, the

more

also rectilineal,

naturally fitted for some body or

so that rotation is the only

unbroken and

interminable movement, and nothing that

is

contrary

to nature fulfils these conditions.

Accordingly there

must

the

exist

two

sorts of simple bodies

one origin-

ally destined for rectilineal, the other for circular,

ment.^
it is

Rectilineal

either

movement has

upwards or downwards, passing from centre

to circumference, or vice versa.

which exhibit
for the

move-

opposite directions

it

Consequently, the bodies

must be of opposite

natures, destined

one or the other kind of motion that


:

be either light or heavy.

is,

they must

Circular motion, on the other

hand, exhibits no such contiaries. It starts from any point

towards any point in the circumference.

which

is

naturally qualified for

out contrariety.
it

does not rise or

It

it

So the body
must likewise be with-

can neither be heavy nor

fall,

and in

kind of rectilineal motion.

fact it

It is

light, since

cannot exhibit any

even impossible to com-

municate either upward or downward motion to it by force,


since if the one were unnatural to
distinction between two realms
of being is obvious from his
whole treatment of the subject,
Of. also p. 366, n. 1.
'
De Cailo, i. 2, 268, b, 14 sqq.
- According to the principle

it

the other must^ be

already laid down (c. 2, 269, a,


10, 14) as the basis of the discussion (see p. 224, n. 3), %v hi
ivavrlov, which, when thus universally expressed, is certainly

open

to dispute.

ARISTOTLE

474

The body that is destined

natural motion.^

its

motion

is

for circular

also without beginning or ending, subject to

neither increase nor diminution, neither impression nor

His argument for this is that everything that


comes into being springs from its opposite, and everything that perishes is resolved into the same ^ all inchange.

'-^

and decrease depend upon addition or subtraction


of the matter out of which a thing has grown, and therefore that which, being without beginning, possesses no

crease

such matter, cannot increase or decrease

which

finally,

there

is

no such process neither

JW;. c. a, 269, b, lS-270,a,


nor can the positioD ySm fx^
yap iv^ex^rai t^v aXKov Kai Irepou

12

all

alter, either increase or decrease,

\sc. KU'Tjaii/ KiuelcrdaL] (c.

2,209,

a,

7) be accepted except provisionally as of universal validity.


As is shown in the sequel, it is
The
inapplicable to the aether.
position upon which the latter

is

bodies,

and where

there any alteration.^

TUerhinde, 393) in
casting a doubt upon Aristotle's
clearly expressed meaning, mereIv on the ground of the actual
clitliculties that beset the theory,
(Aristot.

He

a, 13. b,

says, Be Cwh. i. 3, 270,


ayeuriTou kuI acpdaprou

koI auav^hs kol


kuI out'

avaWoiuTov,

u'iSiou

av^r]aiv '4xov oy're (pdiaiv,

conclusion rests, (viz. that movement in a circle has no opposite).


indeed, endeavours
Aristotle,
(c. 4) further to establish by

aAA' ayrjparov koL dvaWoiajrov Kal


airaOes.
Cf. Mctaph. viii. 4, 1014,
b, 7, xii. 1, 2, 10G9, a, 30, b, 25.
On this point, cf. also p.

But he cannot
prove that the motion may not

341

be crooked or oblique for if we


have two opposite motions on
the same or on parallel lines

The immutability of the body

special proofs.

which deviate in opposite


tions,

it

does

not

direc-

make the

shghtest difference whether the


lines are straight or circular,
Moreover, the courses of the
fixed stars and of the planets
are actually in opposite directions
why may these bodies
;

not,

then,

consist

of

different

substance ? We are not


warranted, however, with Meyer
ffitherial

'^

sq.
'

Be

Cudo,

i.

3, 270, a,

13-35.

which has no opposite might have


been proved more simply and
conclusively from the proposition (p. 341, andp. 353 sq. above)
that all change means transition
from one state into its opposite,
and that a thing can only be
operated upon by its opposite,
Aristotle, however, does not here
adopt this method, as his investigation into the conception of
change and affection was not
published until later in his

PHYSICS

475

This position draws further support from experience.


For he contends that if the spaces of the heavens, as well
as the intermediate space

were

full

of air or

fire,

between heaven and earth,

then the bulk of these elements,

considering the magnitude of the stars and their distance


from each other, would be so hugely disproportioned to
that of the remaining elements that the latter could not
preserve their equilibrium, but would be swallowed up

by them.

proper proportion between the elements

can therefore only be maintained on the hypothesis that


is filled with a body different from the

the celestial space

matter of the elements.^


this

body

is

superior to

We

are also led to believe that

all

change, by the fact that

antiquity, so far as tradition reaches, furnishes us with

no evidence of the
heaven or

least alteration in the fabric of the

its parts.^

Finally, the unthinking belief of

humanity harmonises with


generations.^

and such a
unnumbered

this conviction,

belief deserves respect as the inheritance of

All nations have placed the residence of

the gods in heaven, because they were convinced of

its

immortal and divine nature. The name a3ther may


be traced to the same source, for Aristotle, like Plato,-"'
'

'

derives

treatise
tion.

it

from dsl

dslv^

from the

on birth and destruc-

Such a proportion involves


that there is as much air and as
much fire as will be produced by
the transformation of all water
into air and all air into fire on
'

the basis of the existing quantitative extent of these bodies.


2 3feteor. i. 3, 339, b, 13-340,
a, 18.

restless rotation of

De

Ovlo,

o\)

yap aira^ ov5k

airfipdKis

Se?

o.<\>iKV7(TQai

Ccelo,

3,

270, b, 11.

vojui^eiu

U^as

els

5ls oAA'
ras avras

^;uay.

JDc

See Meteor.
where the same reason
in almost the same

270,

339, b, 27,

i.

b,

19.

given
words, and JMetaph. xii. 8 ad fin.
See infra, the section of Ch. I'X.
on the Heavens, and Ch. XII. pt. 2.
is

Plato, Crat.

410, b.

ARISTOTLE

476

the celestial globes, and not from aWeiv}


sion

De

and

Be

must be distinguished from all


Without opposition and without

that the nather

is

elementary

Meteor,

Codo,
i.

3,

matter.''^

3,

i.

389,

270, b, 4-25
b, 19 sqq.

following these
3Itmdo, c. 2, 392,

passages

bu

a, 5.

the name * aether,' cf Zell. Ph.


il. Gr. i. 897, 4 ad
fin.
- Althongh it is called irpurov
(TToix^7ou, De Cwlo, iii. 1, 298, b,
c. 3,
6; Meteor, i. 1, 338, b, 21
339, b, 1(5, 340, b, II, rh twv
6.(Trp(iiv aToix^lov;
Gen. An. iii.
it is yet expressly
3, 737, a, 1
.

ri\)ni tlie
3, l',M\,

twv

Meteor,

i.

KaXov/neuooi'
3,

cf. ih'id. c.

therefore,

o-ToixeTa

;>

(following n.).

we understand by

only such simple bodies

as stand to one another in the


relation of opposites, and pass
into one another, we cannot
reckon the rether among these.

Only when we extend the meaning of the word to embrace all


simple bodies can we call it a
aroix^lov.
On the other hand, it
is,
to say the least of it, inaccurate and misleading to say
that according to Aristotle the
celestial spheres have
no ma'

terial

substratum

'

PsyeJiol. d. Arist. 198

(EfiENTANO,
;

Heetling,

Mat. und Form, 22), that the


aather consists of a material which
is'no material, of an immaterial
'

material

is

it

/jioi'op

340, b, 7
(ef, p. 488, n. 3, infra), erepov a-wfia
iTvpos T Kal &cpos
and De Orlo,
i.
2, 2G9, a, 30: ovaia crco/naTos
aWf] irapa tus ivravQa (rvardcrfis
diiorepa Kal Trporepa tovtoop airdv;

four (nuix^7a.
Gen. An.
I), 29, it is called irt^pov

adj^ia ical Otiorepoy

If,

d.

meant by the

is

a'ihioL

(TToix^iwv

ruiv

Arist. 30 sq.) that all


uArj of the
stars is the potentiality they
possess of motion and change
in space, and that in this sense
we might even attribute vk-rj to
vovs (Heetling, ibid. 23).
Aristotle certainly says, Metaph. viii.
4, 1044, b, 7
in the case of
yivvqTou oixriai, we have to deal
both with their matter and form
7iissth.

that

in tlieso ])assages

(listiiigiiislicd

ii.

The conclu-

'

(Kampe,

Erliennt-

oiiic

otherwise with
Sf

e^f

ovcriai.

vAr]u,

'

01;

7)

icara r^irui'

(pva-iKol fxiv

frrajy

'

70^ evia

roia.vTi]v

aWa

Matti-r,

kli'-)]t%u.'

however, is denied of the heavenly bodies only in the sense in


which it belongs to temporal
things.

means that

Aristotle

we understand by
which

thing

vTTOKiifxevou

uAtj

that

made,

is

yepeareus

Kal

if

of

the

<p6opas

SeKTiKov (as it is defined, Gen. et


Corr. i. 4, 320, a, 2), the unseated
and eternal has no uAtj in this
sense but if w^c take it in the
more general sense of the substratum of change, the Swd/xei hv,
;

it has v\ri, inasmuch


as it is
capable of movement in space.
'I'hat this is all that Aristotle
means is obvious from the parallel
passages, xii. 2, 1069, b, 24
Trdura 5' v\riv ^X^' '^^'^ fiera^dWei
r

Kal Tcop aiSiuu

jx^ yevP7]Ta

'6iTa

KLpr]ra Se <popa, ctAA' oh yfpprjT^p,

aWa

irSdip

izoi

viii. 1,

1042, b. 5

yap apdyK-q, e? ri S\7]p


TdiriKrjp. TotTO Kal ypp-qT^p
oh

ex^i/cat

050, b, 20
ouS' e*" Ti KiPOv/j.pop aidiop, ohK effri
Kara hvpafiip kipov/j.pop aAA' ^
iroSiP TTot
[only in respect of
(pddprrjP exeij/

c.

8,

PHYSICS
mutation,

477

stands above the strife of the elements:

it

these belong to the terrestrial,

to the celestial, world

it

are formed the heavenly spheres and stars


the god-like in the realm of matter.^
of

it

The
circular

ment

four elements are different in

movement

is

all

it

respects.

peculiar to the a3ther, their

is

If

move-

But, as we have remarked, rectimotion follows two opposite directions, upand down,
toward the circumference and toward the centre. That
is rectilineal.

lineal

which tends naturally downwards is heavy that which


rises is light.
Accordingly the elements exhibit the
opposites of heavy and light.^
This opposition cannot,
;

he holds, be reduced to quantitative differences of magnitude, of mathematical figure, or density


it is original
;

and

qualitative.

The

peculiarities of the elementary

materials we cannot explain either, with Plato and Democritus, by the mathematical qualities of atoms, or,
with

the elder physicists, by the rarefaction and condensation


can it be said to move
merely Zwdii^i and not ivepyda,
inasmuch as it is not yet in the
place to which ^it is moving]

denied of them in
as it is denied of
immaterial Nous, or that it
be attributed to the latter in

rovTov

same sense

locality

5'

[l.p.

vK-nv

ffOai']

Tov irSdey

ov9h KuXvei

iroi kiucT-

uwapx^iv.

Be Ca;lo, i. 9, 278, a, 10 sqq.


Aristotle expressly says 6 ovpavhs
as a universal conception
is
different from oSe 6 ovpav6s the
:

former
latter
less

is
rfj

flSos
v\r)

Kal

noptp^,

fj./xiyfi4vov.

the
Still

can we infer from Metapli.

that the celestial globes


are incorporeal beings (like the
ther, they are frequently called
diia (Tcifiara, &c.
see Ind. Ar.
742, a, 43-60) ; we cannot, therefore, suppose for a moment that
viii. 4,

likt}

is

same sense

It

is

the
the

can
the

as to the former.
called OeTos, Meteor

339, b, 25
also, similarlv, Be
Ca-lo, i. 3, 270, b, 1], 20
^ wpdrtj
ouo-/o
tmv acoudruv, rh vpurov
3,

riov irapa yijy Kal irvp


Ibid. ii. 1, 284
a, 4
Later philosophers, such as
Cicero's Epicurean (iV. De. i, 13
33, cf. Krische, Forseh., 'sOG
sqq.)
and the pseudo- Justin
Cohort, c. 5, 36, identify on this
ground God and the tether
(riafia,

'4rep6v

Kal a4pa Kal vSwp.

g^e

p.

473

sq.

ARISTOTLE

478
of one and the

We

same primitive material.

already proved this

have

with regard to the

point

first

But those who deduce the differences of


matter from a condensation and rarefaction of some one
original element are, besides other arguments, met by
hypothesis.^

the objection that they do not explain the distinction

between light and heavy substance.

They

confine

the difference between the elements to a mere relation


of magnitudes, and accordingly represent

thing merely

it

as

some-

To Aristotle's mind, the oppomovements and natural localities at

relative.'^

sition of rectilineal

once demands a qualitative difference between the elements.

Rectilineal motion being just as primitive as

circular motion, there

must be certain bodies which are

especially designed for

Again, since

it.-"^

it

includes

two tendencies, upward and downward, we must in the


first place assume two bodies, of which one naturally
sinks, the other rises, the

one tending to the centre, the

In the second

other to the circumference of the world.


place,

rather

we must imagine an

intermediate element, or

a pair of elements, the one approximating to

Of

the former, and the other to the latter.


bodies, the first

two are earth and

water and

Earth

air.

devoid of lightness

devoid of heaviness.
centre,

is

fire,

these four

the other two

absolutely heavy and entirely

fire is

absolutely light and entirely

The one moves

and therefore sinks below

all

straight to the

other bodies

the

other moves straight to the circumference, and therefore

'

Be

See p. 443 sqq.


Aristotle discusses this view
Ccelo, iii. 5, cf. iv. 5, 312, b,

20

Metapli. i. 8, 988, b, 29 sqq.


ggg p_ 473^

PHYSICS
rises

above

Water and

other bodies.

all

479
air,

on the

other hand, are only relatively heavy, and therefore also

Water

relatively light.

but lighter than earth

heavier than air and

is

air heavier

Under no

than water and earth.

than

fire,

possible circumstances,

unless compelled by forcible movement, does


itself into the place of air

fire,

but lighter

fire

sink of

nor, again, does earth rise

Air and water, on the contrary,


when the matter which fills
Earth is everywhere heavy; water,

into that of water.

sink into the lower regions

them is withdrawn.^

everywhere except in earth

air, everywhere except in


and water ^ fire, nowhere.^ Therefore of two
bodies the one which holds the more air may be heavier

earth

in air but lighter in water

weight of wood,

We

may

arrive at these four elements even

by

definitely

than the other a hundredthan a pound of lead.''

for instance,

another

process

of

reasoning.^

more
All

Properly, indeed, they ought


to rise into the higher Aristotle;
admits himself. Be Ccelo, iv. 5,
H12, b, sqq., that this does happen
unless external force be applied,

world cannot consist of sether


alone, fox it must have an immovable cen're. There must therefore be a body whose nature it is
to rest at the centre and move

circumstance which has so important a bearing upon his

it, and therefore also one


an opposite nature. We thus
have earth and fire, which in
turn require water and air as

'

without, however, explaining a


theory.
- That even air has weight is
obvious from the fact that a
bladder full of air is heavier than

an empty one
3

just

ibid. c. 4, 311, b, 9.

in

Aristotle,

referred

theory

the

to, finds

passage
in

this

an

explanation of the
difference between absolute and
specific gravity.
*

Be

Ccelo, iv. 3-5.

The same

ideas
occur, in a somewhat
different application, ii. 3, 286, a,
12 sqq. It is there said that the

towards

of

'

intermediate elements,
'"

For what

follows, see Gen.


The true author
of this theory of the elements is
said to be Hippocrates (according
to Idblbr, ^riz^. J/z-^^or. ii. 389,
who appeals to Galen, i>e ^/^w'.
sec. Hipiiocr. i. 9, 0pp. ed. Kiihn
i. 481 sq.).
This, however, is uncertain for several reasons.
In
the first place, neither of the
works here referred to, n. <f>v<nos
avOpdoirov and n. aapKuv, can be
et Corn.

ii.

2, 3.

ARISTOTLE

480

bodies capable of being perceived by the senses are


prehensible but all qualities perceptible by the sense of
;

touch, with the exception of gravity and levity,^ are

reducible

to

four

warmth,

dryness, moisture.^

cold,

two of these properties as


the others as passive.'"' Now, by joining these

Aristotle regards the first


active,

The

attributed to Hippocrates.

former is without doubt the


work, or an extract from a work,
the
of Polvbus, his son-in-law
post-Aristotelian
of
is
latter
:

KtJHN, Hipyocr. 0pp. I.


Littre, (IJuvrea (V
315 sqq. iJSl.
i.
llippoeraie,
A gain, while tlie treatise n, (pvaios

origin, cf.

cxlvii., civ.

avOpwirov

recognises (c,

init.)

Empedocles's four elements and


even makes heat and cold, dryness and moisture the constituent elements of every living thing
(c. 3), it yet does not bring these

two positions together as Aristotle does, or deduce each of the


four elements from the various
combinations of those four pronor, indeed,
perties into pairs
does Galen (see supra) claim this
for it. The treatise n. aapKwv, on
the other hand, refers (at i. 425, k)
to the Aristotelian account of the
elements, but this merely proves
that it is later than Aristotle.
That heat and cold, dryness and
moisture, were regarded as the
elements of things in the medical
schools of his time, is corroborated by Plato, St/m. 186, d.
The early physicists
187, D.
regarded the conflict of heat and
cold as the primary principle of
;

evolution and frequently united


with it that of dryness and moisture, without, however, as yet expressly combining these four as
the primary properties of things.

Cf. Zell. P/i. d. Gr.


519 sq. 897.

205, 241,

i.

We

have not here to do with


these, as they do not indicate a
particular kind of action and

passion
the elements, on the
other hand, stand to one another
in that particular relation of
action and passion {ihid. 329,
b, 20), which the treatise on
birth and destruction chiefly dis;

cusses.
e^p^ilv
Ibid. 329, b, 24
Kol ^vxp^v KoX vyphu Koi ^r]phu to

-'

ra 5e t^
yap iari
rh (TvyKplvov to. dfxoyevT] [from
which it follows that fire separates
heterogeneous elements], x^/vxpou

/j.(u

r^

dvai

iToir)TiKa

iradriTiKa

K^yerai

'

d^pfxhv

5e jh (Tvvdyov KoX avyKplvov o/xoims


(Tvyyfvr} Ka\ ra /x^ 6ix6<pvKa,

ra T

vyphu 8e rh aopiffrov
evopiarov

ttv,

jjiiv olKeicf) '6pcf},

opcp

olKcicp

5k rh a6pi(Trov

^r}phv

5v(r6pi(rrov 5e.

(Cf.

The
3Ieteor. iv. 4, 381, b, b, 29.)
qualities Xeirrhv, iraxh, yXi^xpov,
Kpavpou, /xaKaKhv, ffKKripov are reduced to these primarj'^ qualities

diepdv

and

fie$pyfivov

kinds of moisture,
narrower sense and
dryness.
^ Meteor,

rerrapa

iv.

SicapiaTai

form two

^-npdv

in its
of

ireir-nybs

init.

5e

eirel

aXria rS)v aroi-

S}U ra /j.hv 5vo ironjriKa,


X^ioi3V,
rd dep/xov Kal rd ^vxp^v, to Se Svo
TradriTiKa, rd ^r]p6v Kal rd vyp6v
t\
.

Se

TTiffris

(fiaiuerai

rovrwv eK rrjs iiraywyrjs.


yhp iv vaaiv rj fiep

PHYSICS
we

four properties in pairs,

481

obtain, after eliminating

two impossible combinations, four that are possible, in


which one active and one passive property are always
united, and thus four simple bodies or elements are
exhibited

i warm and

or air;

cold

dry, or fire
warm and moist,
and moist, or water; cold and dry, or
;

earth. 3
These are the four sorts of matter of which all
composite bodies consist, which are excreted from all.
Kal

6epix6rr}s

opl^ovffai

four primary substances and their

stituent parts of any kind (cVuttdpxovra), and thus even the component parts of a conception or a
demonstration, as well as the
form as constituent part of the
thing, but in a more special
sense the
iwirdpxop
us uAtjj/
(BoNiTZ, Ind. Arist. 702, a, 18
sqq-) stands for the ultimate
material constituents of bodies
themselves, that els % SiaipeTrai ra

fundamental attributes Aristotle


not quite consistent. Thus

&Wa

^f/vxp^r-ns

Kttl crvfi<pvov(rai

ra

ofioyevrj Kal

vypaivovcrai

tSAAo ra
Cf.
c.

^rjpaivovtrai

Kal fiaXdrrova-ai,

vypa

Kal

|r/pa

SfioyeyTj, Kal

/j.^

Kal

(TKXripvuovffai

Se

Kal ix^rafidXXova-at

ra

Spi^S/nej/a

koI

ra
Kal

elprffiepa iraQr) irdcrxovTa.

4 init. c. 5, 382, a, 27 sqq.


10, 388, a, 21, c. 11, 389, a, 29.
^
In his descriptioTi of these
c.

is

ffcafxara effxara,

Gen. et Corr.

3,

c. 3,

els h

ii. 2, 329,
b, 7, 13,
330, a, 30, 33, and Meteor, i.
2, 339, a, 13, he calls the latter
(heat, cold,&c.) both arroix^la and
apxal, the bodies of which they
are attributes, ottAS adifxaTa, Ind.
Ariit. 76, b, 15 sqq. Again, they
are frequently called (noix^7a
with the addition ra KaAovfxcva
[Phys. i. 4, 187, a, 26, iii. 5, 304,
b, 33.
Gen. ct Corr. ii. 1, 328, b,
31, 329, a, 26.
Meteor, i. 3, 339,
b, 5.
Gen. An. ii. 3, 736, b, 29.
Metaph. i. 4, 985, a, 34 t^ ws eV
:

^\r}s

elSci

\ey6jLLva

ffTOix^^a'],

Fart. An. ii. 1, 646, a, 13 even


ra Ka\ov/j,va vt6 rivoov aroix^^oi.,
SO that we clearly see that he is
merely following in this the
usage of others. On the other
hand, aroix^lov which in its
most general sense indicates con-

YOTi,

I,

efSei

1014,

a,

raKKa

iKuva 5e

fnjKer'' els

Sia^epoura [^Metaph. v.
32 cf. i. 3, 983, b, 8],
;

(rdfiara

SiaipeTrai,

ev-

virdpxov Svvdfiei fj evepyeia, avrd S'


ear IV aSialperov els erepa r^ eXZet
(^De 6teZ<>, iii. 3, 303, a, 15).
So

Gen.
i.

Corr.

et

1 init.

TiKwu)

ii. 7 init.
Meteor.
(ruu aTOX^ioiv rwv ercojULa;

355, b, 1, iv. 1 init.


3 init. c. 5 init., and
innumerable other places. The
original oppositions, moreover,

Be

ii.

Coelo,

2,

iii.

which succeed primary substance


as the second principle of existence (as the elements are the
third, Gen. et Corr. ii. 1, 329, a,
32),are called aXria tuv aroix^iwvy
Meteor, iv. 1 init.
- 'Ofor arixls yap i, ct^p,'
Gen.
et Corr. ii. 3, 330, b, 4.
' Gen. et Corr. ii. 3.
Meteor.
iv. 1 init.

II

ARISTOTLE

482

and into which

all

own

Their

are resolved. ^

primitive

and indecomposable nature is proved by the fact that


though they can, by transmutation, pass into each
otlier, they never excrete any other body from themEvery composite body in the terrestrial kingselves. ^
dom contains all of them.^ Yet they are never revealed
For example,
to our experience in perfect purity.^

must not be confounded with a flame,


produced by an intensification of its warmth,

elemental

which

is

as ice

fire

by an

is

water.

fire

flame, on

evaporation;-^

Metaph.

or

caloric,

is

Oepfior-nros,

see p. 481, n. l,and elsewhere.


2 De OrJo, iii. 3, 302, a, 19 sqq.
3 As
is more fully proved,

ipvxp^rrjros

I)e CVelo,

Gen.

ii.

3.

\l/vxpi^T'nTOS

ia-Ti

'^KacTTOV

aWa

IjliktSv

^qpov

OjULOLOU,

TTUpoeiSfS,

referring to the distinction between wet and dry vapour, which


f o-Ti
is discussed below, he says
S' ovTi rh vyphv &vv tov ^rfpov
ofjTC rh |i?pbj/ &vev tov vypov, aWa
irdvTa ravra Xeysrai Kara r^v
Ibid. ii. 5, 362, a, 9
vTrepoxhv.
dry vapours are only produced
where moisture is present. Ibid. iv.
21
i,i^ii,
XV. 7,
Phys.
/t^o. iv.
uu -I
According to
ACCOXUing
8.
O,
a 32 air is intermingled with
water; whereas, in i^e -Se/is?/, c. 5,
:

4, this is

controverted;

cf.

Arist. Thierkunde, 404 sq.


Gen. et Corr. ii. 3, 330, b,

Meyer,
*

25

TO

Si=

irDp

7]

yci.p

rwes

^(xrlv

dep/jLOv.

elcriv,

5h Oep/jLorriros

virepfioX^

is

7]

1]

/lej/

(I ovv
vypov

irii^LS

icrrai

5ih Kal oiidhu

The same remark

koI

ttTi^ls

KpvrrrdWov yiyverai ovt'

ov TTVp, Kol r-h TCf aepi aepoetSe's


Cf.
ofJLoiws 8e KOLirl rSov aKXwv.
Meteor, ii. 4, 359, b, 32, where,

443 a'

t]

Kpva-raWos iari
\^vx,pov, Kal rh irvp

to S" an\a t o lavr a


jxhroi ravra [raOra],

Oiov et Tl TO} TTVpl

8.

et Corr. \i.^,'m,h,2\:
Se rh -rrvp Koi 6 arjp Kol
Tuv clpr]jj.4vwu a.n\ovVy

fifu eariv, oi

no constant

is

uxnrep Kal KpixrraWos

(eais virepfioAai

Gen.

ovK

et Corr.

iii.

warm and dry

the contrary,
v.

'

3,

intensification of the cold natural to

Elemental

C^(Tis

oUr

e/c

f/c

irvpSs.

made about

340, b, 21, c. 4,
341, b, 22; cf. 1. 13: irpwrov (ikv
yap vTch r))v iyKvKXiou (popdu itrri

fire.

Meteor,

i.

3,

rh depfxhu Kol ^vphv, t Xeyofifu irvp


auwuv/jLou yap rh koivov, &c. What
is called fire is a kind of inflammable material (uTre/cKau/io) which,
'

like

'

smoke, can be kindled by a

little

motion.

had

Heraclitus

with heat in
fire
identified
general (see Zell. Ph. d: Gr.
distinction
the
588 sq.)
i.
between fire and the heat of
;

appears in his school (Plato,


Aristotle had a
special reason for emphasismg
this distinction, as is indicated
by the above passage from the
Meteorology. For it was impossible that between the aerial and
the celestial sphere there should

fire

^- ~, c).
Crat.
^^. 413,
^,
-V-

PHYSICS

483

phenomenon occasioned by the transmuand dry substance (air and earth).


Again, while each of the elements exhibits two essential
properties, one of which in each case is its proper and
material, but a

of moist

tation

distinctive characteristic

the dryness of

of water, the

or fluidity of air, the

moisture

earth, the cold

warmth of
Since, finally, each element includes a passive
and an active quality,*^ it follows that all act upon and
'

'

fire.2

by one another, that they mingle and are


transformed into one another a process, indeed, which
would not otherwise be conceivable.^
Each element
are acted on

may

pass into

the

all

rest,

be a region of fire, as he was


forced to hold there was, if fire
included only visible flame.
'

Meteor,

yap (p\h^

/tec

2,

ii.

355, a, 9

-^

vypov
Kal ^T]pov fjLTa^a\\6vTwv yiyvcTai
Kal oh rpe^erai [with which that
which is improperly called rpotp^,
Long. nt. 3, 463, b, 24, Vita et
M. c. 5, 470, a, 2, does not conflict]
ov yap 7] aWi} olffa Sia/mevei
ovOeva xp^vov ws elireTj/.
Ibid. c.
3, 357, b, 31
Kaddvep rh tuv
peouTcov vBdrcou Kal rb rrjs <p\oyhs
Sia

(Tvi/exovs

pevfia.
-

Vita, et

M.

Gen. et Corr.

aW

470, a, 2.
331, a,

c. 5,
ii.

3,

3 ov fi^v
ottAcDs ye rerrapa
bvra [to (rroix^la^ kvhs eKaarou
:

iari,

yrj

\l/vxpov,

[xiv

vSccp

^ vypov, a^p

^rjpov

5e

/xaWov

\f/vxpov

5'

^
fjLaWop

vypov jxaWov ^
^aWov ^
Irjpou.
Mtteor. iv. 4, 382, a, 3.
In the latter passage Aristotle
says, among other things, that
earth and water alone are inhabited by living beings (on which
vide below), because they alone
are
uAr;
rSov
acafiaTuiv.
For
although cold is held by Aristotle
depuov,

TTvp

Se

depjuov

for everything goes

from

be the primary quality of


water, moisture of air, he yet tells
us here Key^rai Se riav (rroix^iuv
to

iSialrara ^r}pov

/j.hv
777, vypov Se
ridefieOa 5e vypov awfia
tiSwp, ^ripov 5e yijif (iv. 4, 5,
382,

iiSup

a, 3, b, 3)
and since dryness
and moisture are regarded as the
;

passive or material qualities (see


p. 480, siqjra), earth and water
are held to be the matter of all
bodies.
Fire, on the other hand,
represents in a special sense
the element of form {Gen. et
Corr. i. 8, 335, a, 9 sqq.), for here,
as elsewhere, the containing element stands to the contained in
the relation of form to matter

{Be

Coelo, iv. 4, 312, a, 11)


Similarly, more reality is attributed to heat than to cold, inasmuch as the former is a positive,
the latter a negative, attribute
;
the one is classed as being, the
other as not-being {Gen. et borr
i. 3, 318, b, 14).

See pp. 479 sq. mjJi^a.


Gen. et Corr. ii. 2, 329, b,
22, c. 7, and elsewhere
see pp.'
450 sq. su2)ra.
^
*

ARISTOTLE

484

opposite to opposite

but the elements are

all

opposed

to each other just in the same way as their distinctive


properties (warmth, cold, dryness, and moisture) are

more

this opposition

The more complete

opposed.

difficult

and the slower

is

is,

the

the process of transition

from one to the other; the less complete, the easier.


Therefore, when two elements exhibit respectively a
both their essential properties, the process is
difficult than when they have one
property in common and conflict only in respect of the
In the latter case the alteration of one property
other.
conflict of

slower and more

in one of

them occasions

a complete transmutation into

while in the former case we only gain one


intermestep by such a change for only the element
is produced, and
opposed
are
that
two
the
between
diate

the other

requires a second transmutation before the metamorphosis is complete. For instance, by removing the
it

we obtain air but it is only when the


humidity common to water and air has been removed
If the humidity of water disthat we obtain fire.
cold of water,

produced; but in order to generate


to earth and water must be
fire, the coldness
that the elements which
follows
withdrawn. Hence it

appears, earth

is

common

metamorphosed
are wholly opposed to one another are
by an indirect process those which are but partially
;

opposed are transformed

directly.

Fire passes directly

directly into
into air or earth, indirectly into water ; air
directly
water
earth;
into
indirectly
fire or water,

into air or earth,

into water or

fire,

indirectly into fire


indirectly into
'

Gen. et Corr.

ii.

air.^
4.

earth directly

Thus

all

the

PHYSICS

485

elements, as Heraclitus and Plato had already demon-

form together one complete whole, a

strated/

self-

contained circle of generation and destruction,^ the parts


of which are incessantly undergoing transformation, but
steadfastly maintaining the law of their metamorphosis,

preserving the same forms and proportions in the midst


of the ceaseless transmutation of their matter.^

These propositions concerning the nature of the


elementary bodies are enough to prove that there
only one world.

and

if its

For

each body has

if

very essence consists in

by

bodies, unless hindered

their natural localities

force,

earth

its

its

is

natural place,

having

it,

must move

then

all

to these

to the centre, aether to

circumference, and the other elements to the inter-

mediate spaces.

Hence

it

is

impossible

that

there

should be more than one region of earth, water,

air,

and consequently that there should be


another world besides the one in which we live. We
cannot suppose that a body is forcibly retained in a
locality beyond the world, since such a locality must be
fire,

'

619,
'^

&aT

and

ZeLL.

Cf.

and

sether,

ibid.

ii.

pa.

d.

Gr.

i.

680.

Ge7i.et Corr. ibid. dSl.h, 2:


(pavephv on KVKKcp re earai r)

^ Meteor, ii.
it
3, 357, b, 27
asked, irorepov Kal rj QaXarra
:

dei Sia/iieuet. roov avTobv ovffa fiopiwi/


apidix^, ^ r^ efSet Kal T<p iroa-^
rSsv
jx^puv,
fjL^ra^aWSvToiv dei
Kaddirep a^p Kal rh ttSti/jlov vScop
Kal rh irvp. ael yap dWo Kal aWo
yiverai tovtcov '^Kaarov, rh S' elSos

rov
rh

eKdarov rovrwv fx4vi,


rwv peovruv vddrcov Kal

TrKi]6ovs

KaOdirep rh
rris

(pKoyhs pev/xa.

(pavephu

^paSurriTi rris /aerafioAris eVi irdvraiv re Koi (pOopau clvai Koi yeveffiu,

y4v(Tis TOts ottAoTs ffdixaai, &c.


is

tovto koI inGavhv, ws a^vvarov fxri


rhu avrhv eJuai irepl iravruiv tovtojv
\6yov, Koi ^ia<p4peiv TaxvTrJTi /cot

Sr?

ravr-qv ix4vtoi reray/j-evcas


iraaiv avro7s.
358,

v^iv

av/j-fia'-

b,

29

ovre del ra avra fiepr] dia/xevei, ovre


yy^s ovre daXdrrrfs, dAAd fiSvoy 6
Kal yap Ka\ Trepl yrjs
iras uyKOS.
rh fikv yap
ojxoiws Set vTro\afie7u
av4px^Tai rh 5e iraKiv ffvyKarafiaivei Kal rovs rSirovs avuficra

fidWei rd t' fTriiroXd^oura Kal to


Kariovra iraKiv.
Cf. also Tt^hL.
Ph. d. Gr. i. 2, 576, 620.

ARISTOTLE

486

the natural place of some other body

and

if all

in this one world have their place, there can be

bodies

no body

and consequently no space, since space is


is or can be.^
The same
conclusion is arrived at also from another side.
Several
worlds would presuppose several first causes of motion,
which would be specifically similar, and consequently
outside

it,

only that in which a body

But the primum movens


and complete in itself. It
follows that the world which derives its continuous and
eternal motion from the first cause must be so too.^
only different in their matter.

has no matter

If,

it is

single

however, we are told that the concept of the world,

like all concepts,

must manifest

duals, Aristotle bids

itself in several indivi-

answer that

this argument
would be only conclusive if there were an extra-mundane
matter in which this concept could incorporate itself,

us

but since our world embraces the whole of matter,


of necessity single

in

its

kind, although

it is

we ought

always to distinguish between its concept and the


phenomenal manifestation of the same which is present
to our senses.^

If there are not several worlds

now

in

more can there be such in the future, or


have been at any past period. This world of ours is
one, and single, and complete.'*
existence, no

Be Cwlo, i. 8,
21 sqq. 279, a, 11.

c.

'

9,

278, b,

This metaphysical proof,


held in prospect Be (Joelo, i. 8,
277, b, 9, is given Metapli. xii. 8,
1074, a, 31 sqq. of. also p. 388
sq., and on matter as the source
of multiplicity, p. 368 sq.
Be Cwlo, i. 9 cf. p. 222.
^

'

Ibid. 279,

a,

nXclovs ovpavol oijT iyevovro


ivSex^Tai yev4(r6ai TrAejous
aAA.' efs Kal fiovos koI reAeios ovros
ovpavSs ianv.
lUd. i. 1 fin.
particular bodies are infinite in
uffl

out'

Sxrr'

ovt vvv

number

t)) Se vav ov ravra fi6pia


;
reAeioj/ avayKolov elvai koi Koiddirep

Toijvo/xa

/xh

<rr)ij.aivi, Trdyrt),

tj? 5'

oij.

koI

jx)]

ry

PHYSICS

487

Furthermore, the shape of the universe is determined by the nature of the five simple bodies. Since
circular

motion

motion to the

is

proper to one of them, and rectilinear


we obtain in the first place the

rest,

touched upon above, between the two chief


regions of the world that in which circular motion
distinction,

and that in which the opposite movements up


and down hold sway i.e. that which is full of sether, and
In both of
that which contains the four elements.
rules,

them the materials

lie

in spherical layers one above

For since similar materials uniformly strive

the other.

to reach their natural localities,

mined by
it

their distance

which in turn are deter-

from the centre of the world,

follows that the materials of each sort are conglobated

which are at all points equidistant from the


In the middle of the whole lies the earth

in spheres
centre.

solid sphere,^ but in extent a relatively small portion of


Its fixture in this locality proceeds partly
the world.2
>

Besides the argument quoted

in the text, Aristotle proves the


rotundity of the earth {De Ccelo,
ii. 14, 297, a, 6 sqq.) from the
form of its shadow on the moon

during an eclipse, from the different stars visible in the north and
the south, and the fact (already
touched on 296, b, 18) that falling
bodies do not move in parallel
lines but only at similar angles
towards the earth. With regaid
to the last,

there

doubt whether

it

is

had

room

for
been ascer-

tained by accurate observation


and experiment, or whether it
was not, an inference from the
theory that all bodies which have
weight gravitate towards the
(jentre.

" In proof of this statement


Aristotle, Meteor, i. 3, 339, b, 6,
340, a, 6, refers generally to the
affrpoKoyiKk 6wp-f]ixara, BeCoslo;
as above. 297, b, 30 sqq., he
adduces the fact that when we

short distance north


south, some of the stars
or
visible over the horizon seem to
change their positions. He_ rtJ"

move even a

marks here that mathematicians


reckon the circumference of the
earth at 400,000 stadia (50,000
about double, therefore,
miles
the true measurement), and that
as compared with the size of the
celestial bodies this is a comparatively small figure. The hypothesis (so important in later
times for Columbus's discovery)
:

488

AklSTOTLJE

from the nature of

its

position in the universe

us of the

and partly from

material,^
'^

The hollows on the

fact.3

its

observation, moreover, assures


surface of the earth

are filled with water,

the upper surface of which is


the water and the earth are hollow

Around
spheres first of air, then of
spherical. 4

fire.

not unfrequently identifies the two

Aristotle, however,

remarking that
composed partly of moist and partly
of dry vapour, the latter produced from earth, the
former from water and the moisture of the earth the

what we

last,

call air is

drier kinds

mount upwards, the more humid, from

their

Indian and Atlantic


Oceans are all one sea, he further

presupposes a fixed centre, which


Aristotle conceives of as cor-

thinks worthy of respect.


Do
An. iii. 8, 428, b, 3, Meteor, i.
8, Mo, b, 2, he tells us that the
sun is larger than the earth.

poreal see p. 480, su^jva.


^ Thus, heavy
bodies when
thrown upwards in a straight
line return to their starting-point

where Aristotle

{ibid. 296, b, 25 sqq.). Moreover,


astronomical phenomena find a
satisfactory explanation on the
hypothesis that the earth rests
(297, a, 2), while on the opposite
hypothesis
irregularities
must result; for instance, the
stars could not always rise and

that

'

the

DeCcelo,\\. 14,

opposes the view that the earth


moves, both in the form in which it
was held by Philolaus (Zell. Ph.
(I. Gr. i.
388), and in the form
p:iven to it by Hicetas, Ecphantus,
Heraclides (ihid. i. 459, ii 1,
8^7 sq.), and attributed also to
Plato (ihid. ii. 1, 682, 2). His
chief reason is (296, a, 27, b, 6, 25)
that circular motion is contrary
to the elemental nature of the
earth, in virtue of which its
proper motion is rectilinear and
toward the centre.
For the

same reason all other motions


must be denied of it. For since
its

natural motion

is

toward the

centre, and all bodies rest when


they arrive at the place toward

set at the same points (296, a,


;]4 sqq.).
The motion referred
to in Anal. Post. ii. 1, 89, b, 30, is
'

'

the earthquake.
* The proof of this,
De Coelo,
ii. 4, 287, b, 1 sqq., is as follows

as water always accumulates in


the deepest parts, and the nearer
the centre the deeper any part is,
w^ater must continue to flow towards the centre until all the
deep places are filled up, i.e.

which they naturally gravitate, until its surface is at all points


motion away from the centre equidistant from the centre. The
cannot belong to any part of it proper place for water is the
and the whole must be at rest.
space occupied by the sea, Meteor.
- The
rotation of the world ii. 2, 355, a, 35, b, 15, 356, a, 33.

PHYSICS

489

greater gravity, sink downward ; so the former fill the


upper, the latter the lower, region of the atmosphere.^

The spherical form of the lower world involves that


of the celestial region which surrounds the former and
touches it at all points. 2 But considered in themselves,
the heavens could scarcely be supposed to have another
shape,^ since the sphere is the first and most perfect

and therefore the one appropriate to the first


Moreover, it is only this figure which can
revolve within the space which it encloses,^ and external to the heavens there is no space.
Lastly, the
motion of the heavens, being the measure of all movefigure,

body.

ment, must be the most rapid but the most rapid is


that which has the shortest journey, and a circle is the
;

shortest road from the

same point

'
Meteor, i. 3, 340, b, 19 sqq.
341, a, 2, c. 4, 341, b, 6-22; cf.i.
7, 344, b, 8, c. 8, 345, b, 32
ii. 2,
354, b, 4 sqq.; De Ccelo, ii. 4,
a,
287,
30 on the difiference be;

tween dry and moist vapours


{avaevfiiacris, or Kairvbs and arfxls),
also Meteor, ii. 4, 359, b, 28,
360, a, 31, iii. 6. 378, a, 18.
2 De Calo, ii.
4, 287, a, 30
sqq.
As there can be no space
V.

which

is void (see pp. 432 sq.),


it follows that the celestial and
the fiery spheres are at all points
in contact with one another.
' For
what follows see De

Coelo,
*

ii.

4.

lUd.

287, a, 11. This state-

ment is certainly strange, for as


Alex, apud Simpl. in loco,
Schol. 493, b, 22, observed at an
date, a whole series of
figures
share
this
attribute

to the

same

point.^

which are described by the


spinning of a smooth body, and
of which, therefore, each section
which cuts the axis at right
angles
forms a circle whose
centre is on the line of the axis.
Simplicius gets out of the difficulty by remarking that, while
in the case of other shapes there
is only one axis that will serve
the purpose, in a sphere you
may take any you please an explanation with which we may
;

rest content on so trifling a point.


^ Or as Simplicius, in
loco,
explains it: of all lines which
return to the point from which
they started, and thus inclose a
space, the circle is the shortest
just as of all surfaces of equal
extent that which is circular, of

early

all

with the sphere,

which is globular, has the smallest


circumference.
Kven with this

viz.

all

those

bodies

of

equal

bulk that

ARISTOTLE

490

The

finer

and more uniform

its

matter

the more

is,

perfectly spherical will be the shape of the celestial

world

indeed, in

as,

the most perfect body matter

and as the argumust


ments by which the spherical shape of heaven is proved
be perfectly adapted to its form,

'^^

Still

re(iuire.

we cannot regard

matter of the

the

Nature, in Ari-

heavens as uniformly homogeneous.


stotle's

opinion, reconciles all opposites by a gradual

process,

and the purity of the


diminishes

heaven,

as

it

aether,

which composes
the

approaches

terrestrial

atmosphere.^

In proceeding to investigate the disposition of the


All the
is guided by observation.'*

heavens, Aristotle

the argument is a
It is obvious that
Aristotle accepts the globular
form of the earth on the direct
evidence of the senses, and
merely adds these other proofs
as supplementary evidence.

explanation

lame one.

>

Unci. 287, b,

acpaipoeidrjs

iffriu

olv

'6rL /j-ev

6 Kocrixos SriXov

(K Tovrwv, Kal on kot' aKpifinav


(VTopvos 0VTW5 waTC fxrjdhu /UTjre
TTapanKriaiws
exftv
X^ipoK/j-riTov
jxry 6.KK0 ixr]dfv Twv irap^ r]u7u eV
ocpdaAfjiols

(paivofifucov,

no

terres-

body being so completely


adapted for an exactly symmetri-

trial

cal form.

According to the above


argument, the smallest elevation
'^

or depression in the outer surface of the celestial globe would


presuppose a void space outside
of it.
3 Meteor, i. 3, 340, b, 6
rh
:

(x\v

yhp

&v<i}

Kal

fJ-^XP''

<T^X'i]VT]S

Tpov eJuai aSoiia <pafxiv irvpds re


Kal aepos, ov fxrjv ctAA.' eV avr^ ye rh
fxiv KaOapuTipou dvai to 5' tjttuu

Kampe is wrong
dAiKpives, Sec.
the
in supposing that it is
air as the matter of the fiery
region and not the fether that is
here spoken of. The &v( M^Xf"
aeX-f-iurjs does not mean the region
below the moon, but the upper
regions reaching down as far as
the moon, and lying between it
and the starry heavens. Moreover,

accfia

'drepov a4pos

cannot

possibh^ mean the air, but, as


10 immediately says, the
1.
irpocTOP aroix^^ov kvkKc^ (pepofxevov
must not,
or the aether.
however, conceive of a mixture
of elementary substances which
cannot extend to the region
of circular motion, but merely of
of
differences in the degree
density.

We

^ According to Eudemus (in


SiMPL. Ife Ccelo, Sohol. in Arist.

498, a, 45) Plato had thus stated


the problem of astronomy rlvwv
:

inroTeOeKTuv ofiaAccv
Viav Kivrftrecov
Kiur](Tiis

SiarrcoB'p

Kal rerayfie-

ra vepl rhs

TcovtrAavu/fiepwv (paiuSfieya,

PHYSICS

491

heavenly bodies seem daily to move from east to west,

but seven of them

move

and from

this time forth Greek


astronomy held to the view that

function consisted in discovering hypotheses which would


explain the phenomena as satisfactorily as (on their somewhat
hardy assumption) the motion
of the stars is explained by
the theory of uniform motions.
The highest criterion of the truth
of a theory is rh adiC^adai ra
(paivS/xcva. To take only a few instances cf. the quotations from
and about Heraclides, in Zell.
Ph. d. Gt. i. 881, 1, and in
BoCKH, D. Tiosm. Syst. d. Platon,
134 sqq. Aristotle's statements
about Callippus, Metaph. xii.
Tp S' 7)\iov Ka\
8, 1073, b, 35
its

T^} (re\r]V7]s

Teas
il

eJpai

5vo qiero
acpaipas,

en

ra

rrpocrde-

(t)aiv6[xeua

the statequotations from

fjLiWei Tis airoScaaciu

ments and
Geminus, in Simpl. Phijs. 64, b,
and what the latter says of
the
old
following

astronomers

Eudemus and

partly
Sosi-

genes, Pe Coelo, Schol. in Arist.


472, a, 42, 498, a, 43, 499, a, 7,
500, a, 25, 501, b, 28, 502, b, 5
sqq. 503, a, 23, 504, b, 32 sqq.
Aristotle adopts the same criterion.
He asserts only those
positions which are warranted
by the facts where the latter are
inadequately known, or do not
speak with sufficient plainness,
he makes no pretence of absolute certainty, but is content
with probability. Thus Meta2)h.
xii. 8, 1073, b, 38, 1074, a, 14,
afterdeclaring(1073, a, 11) that
the investigation is not yet concluded, he says avayKoiov Se et
/ueAAoi/cri
cruvTeddaai
iraaai.
ra
;

besides in longer periods of


Kaff iKaarov

(paivofieva airoBdcreiv,

Twv

irXaviafievoov

erepas

a<paipas

... to
oZu Tr\rj6os tuv (Xtpaipwv eoTco
Toaovrov
rh 'yap avayKoiov
ixdrrovas

fiia

&c.

eTi/o;,

fieu

a(peia6a>

Be

Coslo,

ii.

5^ Tovrwv
Ka\

tV

ro7s Icrxvporepois Kiyeiv.

12, 292, a, 14: -nepl


KaKS>s ^'x^t

(ilTeTv yikv

f'^i

irXelov avveaiv, Kaitrip

ixovras a<popfi6.s, Sec. ; C. 5,


the desire to explain
287, b, 28
everything is a mark either of
great zeal or great folly.
The
extent,
however,
to
which
the attempt is open to blame
depends upon the motive which
inspires it, and the strength of a
man's conviction of the truth of

fiiKpas

his views

iroTcpov avdpcairlvus ^

KapTepix<>}Tepov, Tals fikv oZv aKpi^((Tripais avdyKais orav ris iiri-

roTc X"P"' ^x^^v Sfi To7s evpvvv 5e rh <paiv6iJt.Pov (irjreov.


Cf. also Part. An. i. 5, 644, b,31,
where it is said that the study of
the heavens possesses an infinite
TVXXI,

IffKovffi,

charm,
rdfieda

ei
:

Kara

Kal

fiiKphv i<pair-

and on the necessity of

observation, cf ibid.
.

c. 1,

639, b, 7:

TTorepov, KaBdirep ol /jLadrjixaTiKol


Trepl

ouTco

Ti]v dcTTpoAoyiav

Se?

Kal

ihv

(pvaiKov

(paivofxeva -rrpioTov to, irepl


Qe(t}p'f](ravTa

KaX

ra

to

Sciicvvovffiv,

fx^pi]

to.

rh

ra
^ya
irepl

eKaarov, eveiff ovtco Keyeiv rb 5ia


ri Kal ras alrtas, ^ &\\as irus.
(That Aristotle would decide for
the former method is obvious.)
Aristotle himself was a most
careful observer of known facts
see p. 46, n. 1, supra.
'
Aristotle speaks, of course,
only of the stars known to the ancients, and visible to the naked
eye.
;

ARISTOTLE

492

very unequal lengths in the opposite direction,

from west to
could

move

east,

i.e.

around the earth. That these bodies


was a thought beyond the

freely in space

reach of ancient astronomers.

They fancied each

star

and therefore were obliged to


imagine at least as many celestial spheres as they saw
Aristars differing in their movements and periods.^
fixed

in

its

stotle does

sphere,

not get beyond this view.

says,^ as well as the

and since the earth


explained by a real
stars, or of

both

he

phenomenon must be
of the heaven or the

It is not conceivable that both should

Xenophanes and Heraclitus, who


held that the stars were nebulous
masses, this view was shared by
Anaxagoras, Democritus, and
perhaps even xinaximenes ; Empedocles held that it was true
of the planets but not of the fixed
set

this

movement

Many of the older philosophers held that the stars were


carried round by the air or the
rotation of the world.
Besides

which were

stars,

whole heaven, appear to move

is fixed,

'

stars,

The

immovably

in the arch of heaven (see Zell.


Ph. d. Gr. i. 226 sq. 500, 622,
715, 799, 898, 3). Anaximander
seems to have been the first to
start the theory of spheres {Ihid.

206 sq.) which was subsequently


adopted by thePythagoreans(ii>/<^.
384, 1, 449) and by Parmenides
{iUd. 528).
Plato adopted it
from the Pj-thagoreans (^ihid. i,
685), and was followed by Eudoxus and Callippus, the leading
astronomers of Aristotle's time
(see p. 497 sq., infra).
It seemed
forced upon them by the difficulty they had in conceiving of
a free motion of the stars, tlie
idea of universal gravitation not

dawned upon them.


seemed, moreover, to be demanded by the nature of the
stellar motions themselves, which,
if tliey were one and the same
every day round the earth, were
more naturally explained by a
yet having
It

motion of the whole


sphere of the fixed stars than by
a number of separate motions.
A like hypothesis seemed to
afford the best explanation of
the movements of the planets,
including tlie sun and moon
their proper motion being the
result of the rotation of their
spheres, which takes place, however, in a direction opposite to
that of the fixed stars, while
their daily course was to be explained on the ground that the
rotation of the stellar regions
included them also.
2 Be Ccelo, ii. 8.
This argument is stated with some fullness,
because it shows the important
fact that Aristotle already presupposes the existence of different stellar spheres.
single

PHYSICS
move independently,

493
case

in this

for

how

could

we

explain the exact correspondence between the rate at


which the stars move and that of their spheres ? We

cannot refer an invariably regular phenomenon to an


accidental coincidence.

The same may be said about


move while their spheres
also the rate of the astral move-

the hypothesis that the stars

In this case

are fixed.

ment would have

correspond to the size of their

to

circle,

although there

two.

Hence we

is

no

real connection

between the

are driven to suppose that the spheres

move, but the stars are fixed and carried round by


This hypothesis satisfactorily explains why,

them.^

among concentric circles, the larger move at


It is further seen to

rate.

more rapid

be necessary because the

from their spherical shape,^ in order to get into

stars,

Mere

motion, must either roll or spin.

rolling,

how-

would not carry them on their way ^ and the fact


that the moon always shows us the same side proves that
ever,

they do not spin.

Moreover, their shape

is

the least

adapted to progressive movement, since they are devoid


of locomotive organs^'' obviously because nature has not
intended them for any such movement.^
'
Tovs fih kvkXovs Kive7adaL
To Se &(rTpa ^^uepeTv [i.e. they have
no motion of their own within

their

own

with

them]

spheres, but
koI

move

eVSeSe^ueVa

toTs

organs of locomotion, the corresponding shape, viz. rotundity,


^ Moreover, Aristotle adds, it
is only the sun which appears
to roll at its rising

and setting

289, b, 32.
their form is de-

this, like the twinkling light


of the fixed stars, is merely an

monstrated,iJ*<^.c.ll,bothbythe
shape of the moon in its different
phases, and by the teleological
argument that since nature does
nothing in vain she must have
given the stars, which require no

optical delusion,
* Cf
also Zell. Ph. d. Gr
i. 681, 1.
* In
his refutation of the
doctrine of the harmony of the
spheres (c. 9 /w.), which we

KvK\oi5
2

<f>epe(reai,

That this

is

and

ARISTOTLE

494

Now

in order to explain the motion of the heavenly

bodies upon this hypothesis,

sphere revolved on

its

own

it

was assumed that every

axis at a perfectly uniform

Accordingly, so far as the movements of the

rate.

separate stars varied from a perfect circle, or progressed


at unequal rates, they were regarded as composite

movements capable of being analysed into pure and uniform


rotations.

many

Therefore, t^ach star refpiired as

as were found necessary for

tlie

spheres

resolution of its ap-

parent movement into pure circular revolutions.

was bound

stotle

Ari-

to accept these various hypotheses,

since even he never doubted that the heavenly spheres


and the matter which composed them performed such

revolutions only as our eyesight seems to witness to

moreover, he was obliged to suppose that the spheres


contained within the universal globe, in which there

was no vacuum whatever, had no room for any other


He went further, and connected

kind of movement.'

may omit,

Aristotle gives another


reason, viz. that infinite confusion would result if the movements of the stars were free.
'

Cf what has already been


.

said upon the movement of the


heavens, p. 489, and on the circular movement of the primeval
body, p. 473. It was a universal

presupposition among ancient


astronomers, traceable to Plato
(seep. 490, n, supra, and the references to Eudoxus and Callippus, p. 500 sq. ivfra), that the
movement of the spheres must
be perfectly uniform. Aristotle
endeavours to establish its truth
in the first instance in connection with the irpcoros ovpavhs, the
sphere of the fixed stars.
In-

crease and decrease of velocity


possible only, he asserts, in a

is

movement which has beginning,


middle, nd end it is impossible
;

in circular motion, which is alike


v/ithout
beginning and end.

Unequal motion
presupposes
change either in motum or
viovens, or both, but this is impossible with
regard to the
heavens.
For it is obvious to
the senses that the parts of the
(highest) heavens are uniform
in their movements, while with
regard to the heavens as a whole
the same conclusion is forced
upon us when we consider that
unequal motion is only possible
where force is either added or
withdrawn, and that every with-

PHYSICS

495

his peculiar theory of motion with these views.

All

motion depends upon the contact of a mobile with a


motive body, and this law must apply to the motion of
the spheres, since one movens in the same matter can

and since every

only produce one kind of motion,^

motion ultimately proceeds from an unmoved cause, and


every motion which has no beginning from an eternal
cause of movement,^ we must imagine as many eternal
and unmoved substances for the production of the

movement of the spheres as there are spheres required


phenomena to be accounted for.^ The heavenly

for the

bodies are no dead masses, but living beings


drawal of force (aSuj/a/tta) is an
unnatural condition inapplicable
All these reato the heavens, &c.
sons hold equally of the spheres of
the planets considered individually and apart from the influence
of their spheres upon one another
Arias of the first heaven.
stotle, at 288, a, 14 of the passage
quoted above, confines himself
The moveto the latter only.
ments of the lower spheres are
compounded of those of the
true account
The
higher.
of the motions of the planets
(attributing to them acceleration
and retardation of velocity) is
declared to be iravTiXSis &\pyov
Koi irXdcTfiari '6iJ.oiou, 289, a, 4,
Phjs. viii. 6, 259, a, 18 (v.
above p. 293, n. 1): fiia S' [^
/ciVrjo-ts] 1 u<|)' cv6s re rod kivovvtos
Ktd evhs Tov kivovjx4vov.
'

way

388 sq., and on the


which motion is produced

Cf. p.

in

by the unmoved mover, p. 404.


3 After showing the necessity
of an eternal incorporeal cause
of motion, Metaph.

xii.

7,

Ari-

asks,

stotle
6er4ov

there

vdrepov filav
ovaiav ^
jr\elovs, Koi irSffas ; and answers,
1073, a, 26: eTrel Se rh Kivovfievov
avdyKf] vTTo rivos KivctaQai, Koi rh
c.

roiavT7)v

t)]v

Kiuovv aKipTfTOv klvai Ka0'


avrh, Koi rijv cuStov Kivricnv inrh d'iTTpicTov

Slov KivelffQai KoL

tV

dpwfjLev 5e irapd t)]v

airXrju

(popau

a*'*"''

^<^'

^vhs,

tov iravrhs r^v

^v Kiviiv

(pafxcv

r^v

ovaiav Koi aKivrfTOu, &KXas


(popds oijo'as ras tcov irXaviirav
aihiovs
avdyKT] Kal
tovtoov
irpdoTTiv

Kd(TTr}v

tS)v

(popwv

utt'

CLKiviirov

T6 KiuelaOai Kaff avrh Kal aiSiov


oixrias. ^ re yap roov dcrpuv (puais
d'lSios ovcria ris od<ra, koI t5 kivovv
aid tov Kal irporepov rod Kivov/uifvov, Kal
rh TTporepov ovcrias ovaiav dvayKoiov
elvai. (pavephv rolvvv 8ri roaavras
re ovcrias dvayKaTov elvair-ffv recpvcriv

aiBiovs

Kal

Kal SLvev

dKivi^rovs

fieyedovs.

KaB'

avrds

BeENTANO'S

view that these eternal beings


were created by God has already
been discussed at p. 412, supQ'a.
*

b, 1 )

De^ Ccelo,
:

avruv

aW'

12, 292, a, 18 (cf.


ws irepl (Tujx&tuv
Kal fiovdSuv rd^tv

ii,

Tifiels

fxdvov

ARISTOTLE

496

must be

as

many

'

souls,' to preside

The

there are spheres.


of a

therefore,

over their motions, as

fabric of the heavens consists,

system of concentric hollow balls or

spheres, so placed within each other as to leave no

empty

The centre of

interspace.^

system

this

the bottom, the circumference the top

is

and

called

the
outer spheres are uppermost, the inner are nethermost,

and each

so

locality in space is higher or lower according

as it has a greater or less distance from the centre. ^


is

Siavoovfxeda

'

inroXafifidveiu

5e7 S' els /xeTex^uTcov

Kal

irpd^^cos

(wrjs.

true that avrwv seems to


refer to the stars, not to their
spheres, and that we are at
liberty to picture with Kampe
{Eriienntnissth.
d.
Arist.
39
sq.) each
individual star as
It

It

only indirectly, and relatively to the motion of the

is

animated by a

spirit

but

the

passage does not compel us to do


the spheres are animate
the stars which are part of them
must share their life and action.
Elsewhere,
however,
Metaph.
xii. 8 (see p. 501 sq. ivfra, and
cf. previous note), he expressly
says that there cannot be more
eternal unmoved beings than
so, for if

there are spheres, and this is


only what we should have expected from him, since it is only
from the movement of the stars
that he infers, in the way indicated in the preceding note, the
existence of such beings. Moreover, it is only the spheres, and
not the stars, which are said
by him to be moved. It is only
these, then, that have * souls of
their own, or, to speak more
strictly, it is only these which
'

are united severally to spiritual


beings which stand in the same
relation to them as the human
soul does to the body which it

moves without being


wfra,

(see
ii.

vol.

285,

2,

cfxrpvxos

Kal

So 284,

b,

ii.,

29:

a,

itself

init.^.

5'

moved

Be

Ccdo,
ovpavhs

e^et KLvr}<Teus apx^v.

cf. Part. An. i.


641, b, 15 sqq.
As, however,
the mover of the highest sphere
lies outside the world and is un-

32

1,

moved, Plato's conception of the


'

world-soul

'

(which, indeed, Ari-

stotle expressly rejects, see p.459,


n. 5) is as inapplicable to it in its
relation to its sphere as it is to
the other spheral spirits in their
relation to theirs.
' Aristotle denies
that there is

any void (see p 433, sq. supra),


and accordingly conceives not
'

'

only of the astral spheres but of


the others, even the lowest,
as in immediate contact with
one another. Meteor. 1. 3, 340,
b, 10 sqq. 341, a, 2 sqq. ; Be Coelo,
all

ii.

4,

287,

a,

5 sqq.

Cf pp. 473 and 478, supra


Phys. iii. 5, 205, b, 30 sqq. Be
2

Coelo,

i.

6 init.

and elsewhere,

ii.

4,

287,

a,

8,

PHYSICS

497

and beneath are applied


opposite points in the circumference, and consequently that we come to speak of right and left, front
and back, in the world. In this case, reckoning from
spheres, that the terms above

to

the sphere of the fixed stars, we call the southern half of


the globe the upper, reckoning from the planetary sphere,

Each sphere has

the northern.^

See De Cmlo, ii. 2 (cf. Phys.


passage just referred to) and the
lucid explanation in Bockh, P.
liosm. Syst. d. Platon, p. 112 sqq.
The differences here spoken of
apply only to motion, and therefore properly only to that which
living

and

peculiar

self -moved

;
to
(285, a, 23)
TO oQiv 7] KiuTjais, the right hand
rh d</)' ov, the front to icp' o ri
Kiurjais.
(Cf. Inyr. An. c. 4, 705,
b, 13 sqq.)
If we apply this to
the world, that is tlie right side
of the irpwros ovpavos from which
its motion proceeds in other

is

own

motion will be that which carries


the point in the periphery which
has received the push past one
who stands in the line of the
axis in front of him
in other
words, that which proceeds from
the right in a forward direction
and thence to the left. This,
however, will be the case with
the motion of the sphere cf the
fixed stars only if the head of
one standing inside of it be
upon the south pole with that
of the spheres of the planets

'

such the upjjer

its

is

which move from west to ea^t,


on the other hand, only on the
words, the east. This motion opposite supposition. According
is conceived of (285, b, 19), as it
to Aristotle, therefore, our anwas by Plato (see Zell. Ph. d. tipodes are in the upper hemiGr. i. 684, 1), as proceeding in a sphere, which he also calls
circle towards the right, as when (obviously from a different point
in a circle of men anything (as, of view than that just indicated)
for instance, the cup or the talk the right side of the world
we
at table, Plato, Symj). 177, d, in the lower hemisphere and on
214, B, c, 222, E, 223, c) is passed the left side. On the other hand,
along by each to his neighbour reckoning from the courses of
on the right. The irpuros ovpavos the planets, ours is the upper
is therefore represented (285, a,
and right-hand, theirs the lower
31 sqq.) as standing inside the and left-hand, side. He points
circle of the heavens in the line
out, indeed, that we cannot proof its axis, touching one of the perly speak of a right and a left
poles with its head, the other at all in connection with the
with its feet, and as giving the world as a whole (284, b, 6-18
;

at some point upon its


equator the push with its right

Tt 5e|iOj/ Koi

hand which sets it spinning.


The natural direction of such

iravrhs (rd/xari

ball

VOL.

I.

e7r6i57;

Se rivis elffiv

e^Trep

o'i

(pacriv eivai

apicmphv rov ovpavov


Se? trpoadimiv T<f rod

ravras ras dpxds

K K

ARISTOTLE

498

communicated by the presiding incorporeal

motion,

being

but in

all

cases the motion

uniform, without

is

beginning or ending, round an axis

but the direction

and the rapidity of this rotation vary in the several


At the same time the spheres are connected
spheres.
each other in such a

witli

way

that the inner, or lower,

are carried round by the outer, just as if the axis of each

sphere were inserted at

its

poles into the next above.'

how we

Consequently, the problem arises


.

el

51 Sel Koi T(f ovpavcfi Trpocr-

rwu toiovtmv). Nevertheless, Fhys. iii. 5, 205, b, 33,


he sa>'S that the distinctions
above and below, before and

dimiv

Tt

behind, right and

left, exist ov

fxovov TTphs r]ixas Ka\ 64(ri,

dWa

Kol

Jngr. An. 5, TOG,


T(f o\cp
he finds it natural that
motion should proceed from the
upper front and right side, t] [dv
yap dpxv Tifiiov, rh S' ^I'co rod
iv

avT^

b,

11,

tov uinaOev
Kal TO Se^LOU tov dpKTTepOV TljXlWTtpov (t.houiih it might; bo said
with equal truth, ws 5jd to tcls
KOLTw Kal rh

dpx^-s

eV

irpocrBiv

TovTois

TavTO.

iJvai

nuiwTioa rwv duTLKn/j-ivwi' /.Lopiwu


irrtiv). So in BcCdlo, iii. 5, o the
question why the heavens move
from east to west and not in the
contrary direction, he gives the
answer that since nature orders
everything in the most perfect
])ossible way, and forward motion is superior to backward,
the heavens have ret^eivcd that
motion which, according to the
t

description of right and left in


is to be regarded as a forward one. The allusion, Meteor.
ii. 5, 362, a, 32 sqq., to the north
pole as the upper, the south pole
as the lower, is an unimportant
use of ordinary language.
c. 2,

are,

under the

A similar connection oi" the


surrounding
the
inner with
spheres Plato had conceived of as
existing between the spheres of
the planets and of the fixed stars,
when in Tim. 36, C, 39, A (cf Fh.
d. Gr. i. G83), he represents the
axis of the former as inserted in
the latter, and accordingly attributes to the planets a spiral
the
of
motion compounded
'

One
motions of both circles.
would suppose from Arikt.
Metaph. xii. 8, 1073, b, 18, 25,
fSiMPL.

Be

b,

I'.KS,

Cirlo, Sohol. in Arist.

3(1,

that

Eudoxus and

(pus also conceived of the


stars collectively as carried round
by (he sphere of the lixed stars,
and the planets collectively by a
sphere moving in the line of the
It is clear, however,
ecliptic.
from the further explanations of
Simplicius and from Aristotle's
( 'alii

enumeration of the spheres(which

from that

of Callippus
addition of the
o-(pa7pai aveXiTTOvcrai) that this was
not the case. Plato's proof that
the spheres of the planets are
carried round by the sphere of
the fixed stars appeared to them
Only those spheres
fantastic.
they conceived of as connected
with one another which belonged

differed
only in

the

PHYSICS

499

specified circumstances, to determine both the


number
of the spheres and also the direction and rapidity
of

their rotation, so as to explain the motions of


the stars
revealed to us by observation.^

For

purpose Eudoxus, the famous astronomer


who may be regarded as the first founder of

this

of Cnidos,

a complete theory of the spheres based upon


accurate
sketched out a system of twenty-seven

observation,^

spheres, twenty-six of which belong to the


planets.
Considering the simple nature of its motion, he thought
one sphere enough for the heaven of the fixed stars, and
in this sphere the whole assemblage of the stars
was

On

fastened.

the other hand, he assigned four spheres

to each of the five

upper planets, and three apiece to


the sun and moon, which, in agreement with Plato,
he
placed lowest in the planetary scale.
The first sphere
of each planet was intended to explain
tion

in

since

it

to the

same

planet.

Aristotle,

on

(Cf. also De Coelo, ii. 12, 293, a,


TToAAa (T^ixara. Kivov(Tiv at irpb
5
:

r^s reKfVTa'as
exovcr-qs

Kal^rrjs^

iv iro\\a?s

Tf\vra7a

ff<pa7pa

ei/

yap

&crTpov

crcpaipais

4v5e5efj.4uv

IMd.G.lO.) Hejustiview on the ground that


the upper spheres stand to the
lower as the form to the matter,
^pTai.

ties this

De

Ccelo, iv. 3, 4, 310, b, 14, 312,

12

supra, p. 325, n. 2) and


that, asall spheresare incloseand

a,

V.

daily revolu-

with the heaven of the fixed stars,


accomplished every day a rotation from east to

the contrary, extended Plato's


doctrine to the relation of all the
upper spheres to those that are
contamed within them, as is
clear from his hypothesis of
retrogressive spheres (see iTifra).

its

concert

immediale contact with one anp. 496, n.l,7//;m), each


can communicate its motion to the
one next below it. This relation
need not apply with equal strict
other (see

ness to the elementary spheres as


to the heavenly, seeing that they
do not, like the latter, consist of

a body whose nature it is to


move in a circle.
Aristotle,
however, supposes in Meteor i
3, 341, a, 1, ii. 4, 361, a, 30 sqq'
that the winds circle round the
earth, being carried round by the
rotation of the world,
Cf. p. 490, n. 4 si/pra

Eudemus and Sosigenes

Simpl.

'

Be Coelo,

a, 45, b, 47, cf.

Sohol. in

Ar

in

498

svpra, p. 451, n. 2

K K 2

ARISTOTLE

500
west.

The second, which was fastened

in the opposite direction, completing

into
its

it,

revolved

course in the

space of time required by each planet (in the sun's


case oG5^ days) to traverse the zodiac in the plane of

the

The

ecliptic.

others, likewise carried

round by the

surrounding spheres, but differing from them in direction and the period of rotation, were

meant

to explain

the variations which are observable between the apparent

motion of the
spheres.

stars

and that produced by the two

The lowest sphere


Callippus

star itself.^

two apiece

for the

added seven other spheres

sun and moon, and one apiece for

Mercury, Venus, and Mars.'' Aristotle approves of


as being the

more probable

IDEIJJK on Euilt^xus, Philo.wjfh.Abk.d.Berl. Ahad. 1830, p.


67 i^.
For a fuller account oi" tlie
Hiul

'

theories of Eudoxus and Callippus, see besides the scanty allusion in Aristotle (^Metaplh. xii. 8,
1073, b, 17; SiMPL. ibid. 498, b,
5-500, a, 15, who depends partly
upon the work of Eudoxus
n. Taxwj/, partly upon the account
of Sosigenes, but has not altogether avoided falling into mistakes, and Theo. Astronom. p.
276 sqq. ed, Martin, in whom,
however, his editor (p. 55 sq.)
points out serious errors. In explanation, cf.lDELER, ibid. 7osqq.

Krische, ForscJiuiigen, p. 288 sq.,


are followed by Bonitz,
Anst. Metaph. ii. 507 sq., and
w4io

Schwegler,

Arist. JMetaph. iv.

274 sq. PbaNTL, 'Apiar. w. ovp.


303 sqq.
2 According to
Simpl. ibid.
;

498, b, 28, 500,

a, 23,

first

of each planet supports the

this astro-

theory,^ without

nomer was a pupil

this,

remarking
of

Eudoxus

perhaps only of his pupil


Polemarchus) who on the death
of the latter betook himself to
Aristotle at Athens,
Simplicius
kjiows of no work by him, but
gives some account, taken from
Eudemus's History of Astronomy,
of the reasons which led him to
dissent from Eudoxus.
Arist. ibid. 1073, b, 32
SlMPL. ibid. 600, a, 15 sqq.;
Theo, ibid. 278 sq.
Ideler,
Krische, 294 sq.
81 sq.
* It is obvious from the passage quoted p.490, n. 4,supra, that
he did not attribute complete certainty to it. According to Simpl.
503, a, 3, he even brought forward
several objections to it in the
Problems. The passage, however,
does not occur in this treatise as
we have it, which makes it all
the more difficult to
decide
upon its genuineness.
(or

=*

PHYSICS
that his

own

501

doctrine of the connection of the spheres

in one coherent whole renders the

first

sphere assigned

by Eudoxus and Callippus to each planet


At the same time he judges an important

superfluous.^
rectification

of the theory to be needful, on account of this very

coherence of the heavenly system.


carries

in

it,

round in

its

course

all

For

if

each sphere

those which are contained

the motions of the lower planets must be greatly

disturbed by those of their superiors, and the whole

assumed spheral system would be altered


communication of movement from the spheres of one planet to
result of the

unless precautions be taken to neutralise the

those

of another.

accordingly, inserts

To meet this difficulty Aristotle,


some other spheres between the

lowest of each planet and the highest of that which


comes next beneath, meaning them to obviate the
action of the first upon the second.
But the premises
of the whole theory require that these fresh spheres

should move at the same rate as those which they are


destined to neutralise, but in an exactly opposite
direction;

'

and again that there should be

For, as Simplicius also re-

marks, 503, a, 38 sqq. (where,


however, 1. 41, we must read crwcnroKadiaruffav), a special sphere
is not required to explain the
daily rotation of the planets from
east to west, since, in consequence of this connection the
motion of the spheres of the fixed
stars communicates itself to all
that are contained in it.
2 For
if
two
concentric
spheres, whose axes lie in the
same line, and of which the inner

as

many

one is fixed to the outer by the poles


of its axis, spin round the common
axis with relatively equal velocities in the opposite directions,
each point of the inner sphere is
at each moment precisely in the
position in which it would be if
both spheres were at rest. The

two motions have

completely

neutralised one another in their


effect upon the inner sphere and
all that depends upon it, as Sosigenes, in Simpl. ibid. 500, b, 39,
truly explains.

ABISTOTLE

602

retrogressive or retarding spheres

as the

movements

they are used to obviate.

In other words, the collective


motions peculiar to each planet have to be considered
none of these may be communicated to another planet,
:

whereas the daily revolution from east to west excited


in each planet

by

neutralised.^

It is only the

its first

sphere does not require to be

moon which

requires no

retrogressive sphere beneath the one which carries her,


since there

no planet below the moon that she could

is

interru])t.

Aristotle,

consequentl}?-,

adds twenty-two

retrogressive spheres to the thirty-three of Callippus,

three apiece for Saturn and Jupiter, four apiece for


'

Tpwu

aveXiTTOvaai

1(pa7pai

ply ras

(sup-

ru)V viroKaru) (l)pou.(U(i}V &<T-

not

(r<f>aipas,

does, SiMPL,

ib.

as

Sosigenes

502, a, 43, ras tu>v

1071, a, 2-12'*,
'spheres which serve to turn

vvpdv(i) Kivfjcreis,
i.e.

those beneath them backwards,'


to

communicate

to

them a motion

of the next
above them, and in this way to
keep them in the same position

opposite

that

to

the fixed stars as


they would ha^e held had the
planetary spheres above them
produced no effect upon them at
all ("ras dv\iTTOvaas Kcd els rh
avrh a.iroKaOi(TTa.(Tas rfj Oeaei t^v

relatively to

irpcirriv

del rod utto/cotco


&(rTpov");
Mefaijli.

a'(pa7pav

rerayixevov

ihid. 1074, a, 1

Theophrastus

sqq

called these spheres avrava^epov<rai,


because they carry those
that are beneath them back,

of individual constellations); cf.


ibid. 502, a, 40.
" This
supposition
is
as
erroneous as the view, discussed
p. 501, snjjra, that the theory of a
special sphere for each of the
planets with daily rotation from
east to west is compatible with
Aristotle's system of the spheres.
For since, according to his view,
the sphere of the fixed stars in
its revolution carries round with
it all that is contained in it, each
further sphere which revolved in
the same direction and at the
same velocity would only add one
more to the number of the daily
rotations of the spheres contained
in it, unless this result were obviated by a special arrangement

of

retrogressive

spheres.

Ari-

are star498, b, 41,


where, however, the retrogressive spheres appear to be con-

has obviously overlooked


this.
If he had remarked it, he
would not have neutralised the
action of the primeval spheres
of each planet which run parallel
with the heaven of fixed stars,
but would have abolished them

founded with the

altogether.

and

&va(TrpoL,

some, but

less

because not only

all of

(SiMPL

them

ibid.

starless spheres

stotle

PHYSICS

503

Mars, A^enus, Mercury, and the


fifty-five or,

we add

if

unmoved

entities

giving in

all

in the sphere of fixed stars,

spheres, together with as

fifty-six

poreal

sun

from

many

whom

eternal incor-

the motions of the

The progress of observation could


show that the theory of spheres, even as thus
was inadequate to explain the phenomena

spheres proceed.^

not

fail

to

conceiv^ed,

accordingly, as

earl}^

as the middle of the third century

before Christ, Apollonius of Perga advanced his theory of


'

epicycles

triumphantly against

'

Yet even the ant-

it.^

agonists of Aristotle's system admitted that his theory

was an ingenious attempt to


and supplement the hypothesis of Eudoxas.^

of retrogressive spheres
rectify

Metaph.

'

ibid.

Simpl.

cf.

Krische,
500, a, 34 sqq.
iMd. 206 sqq. Ideler, ibid. 82
ibid.

BoNiTZ and Schwegler on the


passage in the
Metajjhysics.
There Aristotle expressly says,
1. 17 sqq., that more spheres are
not required, for, since every
motion exists for the sake of
that which

moved, there can


be no motion and therefore no
sphere in the heavens which is
is

not there for the sake of a

star.

Sf (XT]Zfxlav oiSv t' eJyai (pophv fx^j


(Twreipovcrav Trpos 'darpov <popav^
Ti
5e iraaav ^ixriv koI iraffav
ouaiav diradrj Kol Kad' avr^v rov
6t

dpiffTov
Sei

TTvxVKv7av r4\ovs elvai


ovSs/j.ia Uv etr) irapa

vofxl^eiv,

ravras

erepa

dWa

(pixris

dirad'^s

[sc.

dudyKT] rdv
dpidfidv elvai rSiv ovaiuv. eire ydp
fl<riv eVepot Kivoiev
tiv
cus reAos
&c.],

o{i<rai

(popas.

rovTOV

(Instead of tcAo us,

however, in 1. 20, we must clearly


read with B< nitz t e'Aos BrbnTANO's objection to this emendation, Psychol, d. Ar. 344 sq., is
;

groundless the traditional reading is obviously meaningless.)


Here also we can see that his
theory is founded upon observation.
In 1. 12 he remarks that if
we were to leave the sun and the
moon out of our reckoning, the
number of the (planetary)
spheres would be 47 but the
difficulty is so obvious that Sosigenes conjectured this to be a
slip for 49 (Simpl. ibid. 502, a,
11 sqq.). Krische, with whom
and
seemingly
also
Bonitz
Schwegler agree, refers the remark to the eight retrogressive
spheres under Mercury and the
sun but it is not easy to see
Low the (T<pa7pai avfK'movaai belonging to the sun and the moon
could have been left out.
;

ibid.

Upon which cf esp, Ideler,


83 sq., Lubbert, On the
.

Greek Theory of the Moon's Orbit,'


RUein.
3

Mm.

xii.

(1857), 120 sq.

Of the Peripatetic Sosigenes

(as to whom, see


d. Gr. i. 696, 701)

Zell. Ph.
Simpl. says,

ARISTOTLE

604

One

circle of fixed stars,

Aristotle called

object,

single motion.

'

first

heaven,' as

Stationed next to Deity, the best and

celestial world.

most perfect

or the

the most perfect portion of this

is

it,

In

it

accomplishes

single sphere

its

its

it

purpose by a

an innu-

carries

merable multitude of heavenly bodies.^

motion

Its

is

pure, unalterable, uniform rotation,^ starting from the

and following the better

better side

Moving without

right to

right.'^

no Atlas

to support

ihid. 500, a,

40

it

nor any

ravra toIvvv tov

'hpi(TTor4\ovs crvvToixtas ovtuis koX


(Tacpcos flprfKoTos, 6 'Siucriyeurjs iy-

t^v ayxii'oiav avrov &.G.


SiMPL. proceeds, 502, b, 5 sqq.,
to give the arguments which he
brought against Aristotle's theory.
Koofiidcras

asks

De
how

Ca'h),
it

is

ii.

12,

that the

Aristotle

number

motions belonging to each


planet does not increase with

of

from the prlmum


inovens, but the three middle
planets have one motion more
than the two above and below
their distance

them and, further, why the


;

first

sphere contains so many stars


while the converse is the case
with the others, several spheres
being assigned to each star.
In reply to the former question
(292, a, 22) he says that whereas
the
Most Perfect needs no
action (see p. 396, n. 2, 3, and
that is beone thing attains its

p. 397, n. 1), of all

neath

Him

end by a few actions, another


requires many, others still make
no effort to attain their end at
all, but content themselves with
a distant approach to perfection.

The earth does not move


that which

lies

nearest to

direction,

trouble,

sail to

carry

it

from

requires

round by

it

few motions, the next above that


and the next again reach higher
attainments, the former by the
aid of many, the latter by the
aid of few, motions. Finally the
highest heavens a,ttain the highest with one single motion.
In
answer to the second question,
Aristotle remarks that the first
sphere far excels the others in
vital

yap

and original energy


t^s

Set

eKacTTris

C'^^js

koX ttjs

iroW^v inrepox^v

7r/?coT7js TTphs

{voriffai

apx^s

eluai ttjs

ras &Wa5, 292, a, 28)

but that the nearer each is to


first the more are the
bodies
which it carries, seeing that the
lower spheres are carried round
by the upper. Aristotle himself
seems, from the way in which he
introduces them, 291, b, 24, 292,
a, 14 (cf. p. 169, n. 3, and p. 490,
n. 4) to place no great reliance

upon these explanations. The


problem, however, appears to him
too important to be altogether
passed over. There are questions
which he approaches with a
species of religious awe, but
which nevertheless lie very near
his heart.

at

all,

it

has

See
See

p. 494, n.

supra.

p. 497, n. 1, supra.

PHYSICS
Its

force. ^

motion embraces

605

and generates

all

all

Unbegotten and indestructible, affected by


no earthly distress, comprehending in itself all time
and space, it rejoices in the most complete existence
that has been allowed to any bodily thing. ^
Less
motion.

perfect

is

the region of the planetary spheres.

Instead

of one sphere bearing countless heavenly bodies,

we

here perceive a multiplicity of spheres, several of which

bear one star on

are required to

motion proceeds from the

left side

though, considering each sphere by

and uniform

its

Their

course.

of the world, and


a pure

itself, it is

rotation, yet the general result is not so,

round by the upper,


and as a consequence motions composite and deviating
since the lower spheres are carried

'

See

p. 459, n. 5.

De

Coelo,

iffnv
eTs Kcu aiSios [d ttos ovpavhs
Aristotle, however, has principally
view
itpwros
in
the
ovpavhs, which,
in i. 9, 278, b, 11, is called by
preference simply ovpavSsI dpxhv
ovk %-)(^u)v rod
fxiv KOI TeAeuT^i/
1 init.

ii.

iravrhs alcovos,

iv avrcp

rhv

exw^

Se koI TrepiexoifV

&,iripov

xpjyoj'

SiSirep KaXws e;^et ffv/uLireideiv eavrhv


rovs dpxaiovs Kal [xaXiffra irarpiovs
TfiJLoiu a\7}d?s eJpai xSyovs, us %<ttiv

addvardu ri Kal 6e7ov tSou ixovTwv


ix^vraiv Se roiavTTjv
Sxrre firjdeu ehai irepas avTrjs,

fieu

Kiv7)(riv

aWa

fxaWoy ravTTjv twv &K\(tiv irepas.


t6 re yap irepas rwv Treptex'^j/Tcoj/
eVrl, Kal aiirt]

oZaa

rj

KVK\o(popia reAeios

tos areAers Kal rhs


ixovtras irepas Kal iravKav, avr^
/Av ovSe/xiav
oUt apx^v exovcra
otfre reAeuT^j/, aAA' &iTav(Tros ovcra
rhu 6,iripov xP'^'^oj/, rciv S' &\\<i)v
Trepte'xet

rS>v fikv alria ttjs


Sfxo/ifVTj

t)]v

apxv^ t^v Se

iravKav.

The

ancients were right when they


assigned the heavens, as alone
indestructible, to the gods, for it
is

&<pdapTos Kal

airaO^s

irdarjs

ayeyrjTos,

Oui^Trjs

$ti

5'

Sutrx^peias

iarlv, irphs 5e rovrois dirovos Sid

rb

/xrj56/Ams

Piaias

irpoaSelffdai

KuXvovTa
Karex^i
(t>4p(rdai irefpvKSra avrhv SAAws
yap rh roiovrov iiriirovqv,
irav
avdyKijs,

Hacfirep &i/ aiSicorepov

ri,

Kal

Sia-

dea-ecos rrjs dpia-rr]s &iJ.oipou.

I. 9,

els
Kal fxopos
279, a, 10
TeAetos ovros ovpavSs icrriv.

The

Kal

passage which follows (quoted


p. 395, n. 6), refers partly to the
same subject, even although the
description contained in it refers
primarily to God and not to the
heavens. All that was said of
the aether, p. 473 sq., is equally
applicable to the irpuros ovpavhs,
which, according to the account
p. 490, n. 3, is formed of the
purest aether.

ARISTOTLE

606

from the

circle are

these motions

is

Moreover the rate

produced.'

affected

by the

the upper spheres,^ which in itself

a further proof

is

of their less complete self-sufficingness.

Nevertheless,

these spheres belong to the most divine part

which

of the

removed from mutaand impression from without, and which partakes

visible universe, to that


bility

of

relation of the lower to

of perfection.-^

elements, so

As

is

the aether

tlie stars

is superior to the four


without exception occupy a posi-

tion of superiority to the earth.

They form

tlie celestial

world, in comparison with which the terrestrial seems

but an unimportant and transient portion of the whole.^


'

Cf

De

p. 494 sqq. mipra.


Cwlo, ii. 10: the velocity
of the planets (by which, however, Aristotle, as Plato, Tint.
;}9, A sq., Rep. x. 617, A, Laws,
vii. 822, A sq., here means, not
their absolute velocity, but merely
the time of their revolutions, and
accordingly calls those swifter
which take a shorter time on
the other hand, see c. 7, 289, b,
15 sqq., Meteor. 1. 3, 341, a, 21
sqq.) is in inverse ratio to their
distance from the earth.
The
further each is the longer it takes
to complete a revolution, inasmuch as the motion of the stellar
heavens from east to west has a
stronger counteractive influence
upon that of the planets from
west to east the nearer it is to it.
As Aristotle expressly appeals to
mathematical proofs for the truth
of the latter proposition, we must
understand it to mean that of
concentric circles or spheres
which revolve round their axes
in the same time, the outer ones
move swifter than the inner,
.

and that therefore the velocity of


their motion (in the present case
that of the daily motion round
the earth) constantly decreases
towards the centre.
^ Cf
pp. 474 and 505, n 2, supra, and Phys. ii. 4, 196, a, 33 to^
.

ovpavhv KoL

to,

deiSrara robv

(paivo/j.e-

vuv.
Metaph. xii. 8, 1074, a, 17
(see p. 503, n. \, supra). The stars
are therefore called 0e?o auixaTa,

Metaph.

ibid.

1.

30,

De

Ccelo,

ii.

likewise the
heavens, ihid. 3, 286, a, 11.
* Part.
An. i. 1, 641, b, 18:
t6 yovv TeTayfjL^vov /col rh wpiff12,

292,

b,

32;

fi4vov TToAu

fiaWov

ovpaulois

Trepi

'/)

(pa'v^Tai iv ro79

v/xas to

S'

^A\ot'

&W(i}S Koi ws ervx^ Trepl ra QvqTo.


fiaXXov.
Metapli. iv, 5, 1010, a,

28

6 yap irepl rjfxas rov aladrjTov


Toiros 4u <pdopd Ka\ yeveaei 5iaTeXe7
:

fidvos

&u

'

eiirelp fiopiov

ovtos
tov iravrds

aAA.'

oifdev
icrriv.

ws

By

thus dividing the universe into a

and a celestial part,


Aristotle intends to distinguish
terrestrial

between the sublunary world,


the materials of which are

pirrsics
Aristotle,

like

507

thought the stars were bodies

Plato,

animated by rational

spirits,

and ascribed

beings a nature far more godlike than man's.

these

to

There-

he attributes a priceless value to the smallest iota


we can boast to have acquired
about them. 2
In this view we can trace the consefore

of knowledge which

quences of a metaphysic which deduced


possible to recognise in

it

motion

in

space,

admits

neither growth nor transformation

Be

any

of
Ccelo,

it4^vk4

i.

Tis

kind.
2, 269,

Similarly,

14

a, 30, b,

&XXr)

ffdjxaros

oifcria

Traps rhs ivravOa avcndccis, OcioTfpa Kal irporepa rovrccv aTrdurcou

....

etTTt Tt

Sevpo Kol
fffiivou

rijv

irep]

i]ij.as

rtxrovrq}

ipvcTLV

ra

Trapa

<rd>/xaTa

ra

Tepov K^xcopi-

rifiicoTepav
a<l>aT7)K

'6<T(firep

e;^o'

tuv

ivravQa ir\e7ov c. 8, 276, a, 28 sqq.


b, 3, ii. 12, 292, b, 1, where twv
&(Trp(av and ipravOa are opposed
Meteor, ii. 3, 358, a, 2,5 tout' del
yivecrdai Kara, riva rd^iy, us eVSeX^rai fxeT^x^iv ra ivravOa rd^ccos.
In ordinary language evravOa and
iKe? indicate
respectively the
upper and the under world (e.ff.
;

Soph. Ajaw, 1372

Plato,

Efij?.

330, D, V. 451, b; AjjoL 40,


E, 41, B sq., and elsewhere), in
Plato also the sensible and ideal

i.

world C^heat. 176, A,

Phrsdr.

250, A), as also in Aristotle,

he

is

describing

the

it

a reflection of those

supplied by the four elements,


and in which birth, death, and
qualitative change take place,
and the world of the heavenly
spheres,which consists of astherial
matter and which, while exhibit-

ing

all

from incorporeal essences; but

ultimately

where

Platonic

motion
also

is

modes of

doctrine, Metaph. i. 9, 990, b, 34,


991, b, 13, iii. 6, 1002, b, 15, 17,
22, 467.

1
Eth.
vi. 7, 1141, a, 34:
avOpdirov iroXv OeiSrepa r^v (pvffiv,
oTou (pavepdorard ye e| wv 6 Kda/xos

avv(rrriKj/.
De Ccelo, i. 2 see
preceding note.
^ Part.
An. i. 5 init.
the
beings in the world are either
unbegotten and imperishable, or
begotten and perishable o-u^/Se;

j8T7/ce

5e

irepi

fjiXv

iKeivas

ikdrrovs

otjaas Kot Oeias

Ti/xlas

rjfuv

xnr-

ire pi Sh rwv <p6apdpx^tv Oewpias


rcov (pvToov re koI ^(fuv eviropov/jLfv
fxaWou Trphs rijv yvSxriv 5td to
avuTpoipQv. ex^' ^' ^ndrepa X'^P^^rwu fih yap el koI Kara i^uKphv
.

e<paTrT6fie6a,

'6fxa)S

Sia

t^v

Tov yvwpi^eiv ^hiov ^ ra


arraura,

clxTirep

rifitorriTa
Trap' Tjfuv

Kal ra>u ipwfxevwv rh

rvxhv Kal

fiiKphu fiSpiov KariSelu


iariv i) iroWa erepa Kal
fxeydha 5t' aKpifieias Idelv t^ Se
5fd rh fiaWou Kal wXeiu yuwpl^eiv
iflSidv

avrciv Xafxfidvei ri]v rrjs iiriarriiixris


uTrepoxV, ^Tt 5e 5ih rh Tr\7\(Tiairepa
Tjficou elvai Kal rrjs (pvaeus o'lKeiSrepa

avriKaraXXdrrerai ri

ra dela
CoelOy

ii.

irphs r)]v irepl

Cf. also Pe
12 {suj)ra, p. 169, n. 3).

(piXocrotplav.

ARISTOTLE

608

thought which lay at the root of the natural religion of


the Greeks, and which stamped themselves in similar
notions upon the philosophy of Plato.^
indeed,

self,

perfectly conscious

is

Aristotle

him-

of this connection

between his theories and the ancient faith of his nation.


The relation between the terrestrial world and the
celestial spheres gives rise to the motions and change of
earthly things.
The laws that govern the earth are
necessarily different from those of heaven,^ because of

the difference

of materials,

The nature of the elements

no other reason.

for

if

forces

them

to

move

in

opposite directions and to exhibit opposite qualities, to


act and be acted upon, to pass into and to inter-

mingle with one


is

another.''
But since everything that
moved must be moved by something else, it follows

that the reciprocal interaction of the elements receives


^
-

Zell. Ph. d. Or.


See p. 505, n.

and

p.

xii.

8,
e

p.

i.

68G

2,

475, supra.
1074, a, 38:

sq.

svpra,

Metaph.
TrapaSe'So-

irapa tcou apxaiu^v Kal irujULiv jxvQov ax^f^ari Kara-

Kal ravras ras 5o|oy


eKeivuu olou Xei-^ava irepKreaSxrOai
fJ-expi- Tov vvv. 7] jiiev ovv irdrpios
5o|a Kal 7] irapa roov Trpurwv iirl
(pOeipoinevcoj/

roaovroy

vaXaicov

XcXfi/m/uLeua ro7s vcrrepov oti deoi

(laiv

Koi

ovroi [the
TTfpie'xet

<pv<riu.

Ttt

irpoarriKrai

Se

re
starry heavens]

rh 6e7ov t^v
\onra /xvdiKoos

irphs

rijv

ircidcis

'Skrju

^Stj

rcou

rroXAuv /cat wphs t)}v els rovs vo/llovs


Kal rh (TvjuLcpepov xp^^^i-v
avOpunroeL^els
re yap rovrovs Kal rwv
&\\wv C4'wv o/xoiovs riffl Xeyovai,
Kal rovrois erepa
aKoXovda Kal
'

irapaTrAy^o'ia

rois

elpri/meuois

'

wj/

et ris xt^P'Vas avrh Xdfioi fiSvov rh


irptorov '6ri deovs wovro ras irpdras

ovaias elvai deicos tiv etprja-dai vojxia-eiev Kal Kara rh eiKhs iroWaKis
evp7)fxevf]s eh rh Svvarhu eKdirrr/s
Kal

rex^ns Kal

<piKo(ro<pias Kal-KaXiv

rifuu (pavepa (xdvov.

Both Christian and heathen

opponents {e.g. the Platonist


Atticus, see Euseb. Prcpp. Ev.
XV.

5,

6;

Athenaq.

Svpplic.

c.

Clemens, Strom, v.
Euseb. ihid. 5, 1
Chalcid. in Tim. c. 248 and
elsewhere; cf. Keische, Forsch.
22, s, 88 p
D;
591,

have distorted this to


that the Divine Providence
reaches only as far as the moon
and does not extend to the earth.
How far this representation
agrees with the true Aristotelian
doctrine may be gathered from
what has been already said,
at pp. 403,410, and 421.
347,

1)

mean

See pp. 453

sq.

477

sq. sup.

PHYSICS

509

an impulse from without.

The immediate sources of


Their movement occasions the changes of warmth and cold, which
in the opinion of Aristotle, are the most generally active
forces in the elementary bodies. ^
Although the stars
and their spheres are neither warm nor cold,^ yet, by
their movement, they generate light and heat in the
these motions are the heavenly bodies.^

stratum of air that

nearest to them as, indeed,


moving bodies warm and even set fire to
surrounding substances by friction.
This is partilies

swiftly

all

cularly true of the place in which the sun


since

it

is

Meteor,

'

neither so far off as the fixed


i.

2,

21

339, a,

5'

ef audyKT]s truu^xv^ irws


ovTos [6 vepl rriv yriv Koaixosl^ rats
cfTTt

6,vu)

(popais,

lixm

rijv

dvua/xiv

Kv^epua<rdai

....

oicTTe

rOsv

TTvp

(xkv

avTov

irciaav

avrov

iKilQiv.

(rufx^aivovTwv irepl
KaX yrjv koI to.

avyy^ur} tovtois ods iv v\r]s eifSet


rd>u yiyvofievwu airia xph vofii^eip,
rh 8' 0VTU5 aXTiov ws oOev 7] ttjs
.
.

apx^ r^v twv

Kivifa-ews

fifvwv airiaTiov Svi/afiiv


a, ]4.

See

'^

p.

480, n.

del kiuou-

340,

c. 3,

3, sujjra.

impossible that they


should be, seeing that the jether,
of which they consist, admits
none of the opposites which
constitute the qualities of the
elements. Some further reasons
against the view that they are of
a fiery nature are given, Meteor.
^

i.

It

is

fiit.

DeCoelo, ii. 7, 289, a, 19 the


do not consist of fire, t) 5e
Ocp/xorrjs ott' avruu koX rh </)cos
yiverai 'ttap(K'rpi^oix4vov rod aepos
*

stars

virh

TTJs

iKeiuuv

(popas.

Motion

causes wood, stone, and iron to

is

fastened,

stars,-*

nor yet

burn, and the lead of arrows and


bullets to melt (on this widely
spread error of the ancients, cf.

lDELEK,.lm^. 3Ieteor. i. 359 sq.);


must therefore heat the air that

it

surrounds them, raina

/xeu ovv
5ia to eV de'pt
ts 5id T7ji> TrKrjy^iv rfj
ylyverai irvp' tu)V 5e &v(i}

avTct iKQepfxalverai
^4pffdai,
Kivr]<Tei

eKaffrou iv

avra

ixkv

r^
fi^

ff<paipa,

(pip^rai, Sxtt^

iKirvpovadai,

rov

S'

aepos virh rr]v rov kvkXikov (XdofiaTOs


(r(j)a7pau
uvros audyKTj (pepofievrts
iKeivrjs

ijcdepixaiviaQai,

IxaKurra

Se/xduos.

6 i\ios

Sih

koX ravry
TeTvxVKev ei/Se-

S^

nXrjcnd^ouTds re
avrov Kal a.vi(Txovros KoX virep tj/jlols
uvros yiyverai rj depfidrrjs.
That

the sun has this effect is explained, Meteor, i. 3, 341, a, 19, in


the course of an exposition which
agrees with the passage just
quoted, in terms similar to the
above. See further Meteor, i. 3,
340, b, 10, i. 7, 344, a, 8.
The
whole account, however, would
suggest many diflaculties even to

an Aristotelian. For how can


light and heat proceed from a

ARISTOTLE

510
so slow of

motion as the moon.

ment frequently causes the

fire

Again the solar movewhich has raised the

air, to burst and rush violently downward.^


If the
motion of the sun were uniformly the same in relation
to the earth it would produce a simple and unvarying

effect either of

generation or of destruction.

inclination of the sun's path

sun

makes

But the
The

unequal.

it

sometimes nearer and sometimes further from the


and the alternation of birth

is

different parts of the earth,

and death

is

Whether

a result of this circumstance.^

one connects the former

proximity and the

witli the

latter with the remoteness of the sun, the one with the
approach of warmer and the other with that of colder

seasons of the year,^ or whether one regards generation


as the consequence of a proportionate mixture of heat

and

cold,

when

and destruction as produced by a prepon-

celestial

!sing-le

body

like

this,

the motion of the


whole sphere that produces them?
AVe sliould require in tliat case to
siipjjose that the sun stands out
oi its sphere like a jironioiilorv.
Or how does it ;i,ii,ree witli tlie
account here given that the lire
and air region is separated from
the solar sphere by the lunar ?
Meteor, i. 8, 341 a, 28.
Gen. et Corr. ii. 10 eVel t\
Kara r^v (^opau Kiwqcrls SeSeiKrai
OTi aiSios, dvdyKri rovrwu out wu Kal
yeveaiv elvai arwexSos
>; yap (popa
TToi-fj(TL T^v yiveffiv eVSeAexcDs 5ia
it

is

'

'^

'

rh irpoadyeiv Kal dirdyeiv rh yevvrjTiKov.


But as both birth and
death are eternal, <pavepov on
fiids fieu ofjo-rjs tt)s (popas ovk eV5eXerot yivea-dai dfjitpw Sia rh evavTia
elvai
rh yap avrh Kal axravrois
^xov del rd avrd irecpvKe iroie?!/.
Siffre iJTOi yeveffis del earai fj (pdopd.
,

'

Sel Se ttX^'ovs ehai ras Kivfjo-eis Kal

iuaur ias,

tj

rij (popa

tt] auwjULa\tla.-

yap ivavTiwv rauavTia a'lTia.


Sio koI oux v irfxarr] (papa alria ^arX
YeveVewy koX (pdupas, aAA' r] Kara
rhu Xo^ou kvkKov eV rav-rr) yap
Kalrh (Tvvf:X^^ ^(Ttl Ka\ rh Kiyi^iodai
ruiy

5uo

Kivriff^is
.
rris fxhv olv avvtx^*"^ ^ '''^^ oXov (popa alria, rov 54
TrpoaUvai koI airUvai ?/ ^yKKiais
avfxfiaivii yap ore fxlv iroppoo yiveo-dai ore S' iyyvs.
aviaov 5e tow
SLaarr^/jLaTos uvtos auw/xaXos earai
.

rj

Kiurjais

wctt' el Tcp irpoffieuai Kal

iyyvs elvai yevvS., rqi dirievai raitrhv


tovto /cai irSppu) yiyecrdai (pOeipei
Kal el r^ iroWdKis Trpocrievai yevva,
Kal ry iroWdKis direK0e7v (pdelpei
raiu yap evavricov rdpavria atria,
Cf. Meteor, i. 9, 346, b, 20, ii. 2,
354, b, 26.
^ As is done in the
preceding
note and in the passages quoted,
p. 512, n. 1 , infra.

PHYSICS

611

derance of one over the other/

The double movement

same.

still

the facts are the

of the heavens occasions

the interaction of the elements upon one another, and,

by causing

their

mutual metamorphosis, prevents their

the different localities which, if prevented by


no controlling influence, they would severally occupy.
flying to

The

materials of the world are thus continually conducted in a never-ceasing stream of reciprocal trans-

mutation downwards from above and upwards from

The endlessness of

below. 2

this process

a sort of infinity to perishable things.

communicates

The substances

which are further removed from the highest cause having

no right

to indestructible existence, the Deity has en-

dowed them with perpetual becoming

instead, and has


no gap or discontinuity in the universe.^
'

thus
'

the

left

Gen. An. iv. 10, 777, b, 16:


generation, evolution, and

the life of animals have their


natural periods, which are determined by the revolution of the
sun and the moon, as we might
expect: koX yap 9epix6T'i)Tis Ka\
y\iv\(:is

H^xpi

(rviJ.iJ.eT plus

rivhs

ras yeveaeis, fxera 5e ravra


Tos (pdopds. rovTOov S' exovai rh
Tr4pas Koi rrjs apxyjs Koi rijs reAeuT^s at TovTwv Kivr}(reis tS>v aarposv.
The changes in the temperature

'

awjxara.

a'lTiov yap tovtov iarlv rj


&A\r]\a
uerdfiaa-is
el
yap
eKaarov e/xepev ev rfj avTov x^P'"els

Kal

iJ.erefia\\ei/ viro

/j.^

i]Sr]

tcu

tov

irXrjaioi^,

Siea-TrjKea-av.

fieTafiaAAei
SnrArjy ovrrav

oZv did T7V <j)opdu


did 5e TO ixerafiaAKeiv ovk eVSe'xtTcti
ixeveiv ovdeu avrwv iv uvSefiia xw/>a

iroiovari

Terayfxevr].

of the air depend upon the sun


and moon those in the water
upon air and wind. Whatever is
or comes into being in them must
adjust itself to their state. (Then
follows the passage quoted p.

the sun effects the constant


transmutation of the elements, as
is placed beyond a doubt by the
arguments in the Metem'ology
which are discussed below.
Gen. et Corr. ii. 10, 336, b,
20 Tovro S' eiiAoyus (rv/j.fiefir]Kev
eirel yap ev diraaiv del rod fie\riovos
opeyeaOai (pafiev r^v (pvaiv, fieAriov

363, n. 4.)

Gen.
7

5e rh eJvai
et

Corr.

Here also it is only


by variations of temperature that

aixa 5e StjAoj'

awopovcriu, Sia ri

e/c

10, 337, a,
rovrcav '6 rives

ii.

kKacnov roov

5'

rh

t) t^ fii] eJvai,
rovro
dSvvarov ev airaffiv vndpx^tv Sid

irSppo} TTJs

crco/ua-

\enrojj.evcf)

x^pw

'6\ov

ro3v els t))v olKeiav (pepofievov


eV T(^ dneipcf} XP^^V o'' 5tf(rTa(rt rh.

evSe\.)

dpxvs

rpoircp

6e(is
iroi-fiaas

dcpiarraaOai, rqi

(TweirAripoxre

evreXexv

rh

(better
ri]v yeyeffiy oVrw

ARISTOTLE

512

Accordingly a higher order

mutation

is

mirrored in the law of this

heavenly bodies approach the earth

for as the

and move away from

it

and equal

at fixed

intervals,

nature has ordained that birth and death should occur


coincidently with these periods
of the heavens

is circular,

and

'

movement

as the

the opposite motions of the

elements in the terrestrial world also accomplish their

kind of

circle,

inasmuch as each of them passes into

the others, and finally returns upon

all

itself.^

Aristotle's Meteorology is occupied with the

mena produced by

He

mixture of the elements.^

which belong to the

[in this

nature]

in

irvvbipoiro to i'ivai

way no
hih.

be left
rh iyyvrara dvai
,a:ap

will

ovaias rh yiueadai del Kal tt]u


yfvtcriu.
Ibid. c. II fin. perishable things complete the circle of
their being apie/j.cp not (Uei.
Cf.
also Zell. Ph. cl. Gr. i. p. 512.
Ibid, at 836, b, 9
eV X(T(f
Xpovcf Kal 7] (pdopa kol t] yeveais rj
Kara (pvaiv. 5ih Kal ol ^pouoi Kal ol
'

kKacrruiv apiO/xhu

fiioi

fx^^c'^

'^'*'

Kal eV

icrriv,

aTriouTos 5e ^6i<ris,

XP^'^V ^Karepov.

tffcf

It is

true that in many cases death


takes place quicker. The reason
of this, however, is to be found
in the disproportionatenessof the
materials.
2 Ibid. 337, a, 1, c, 11, 338, b,
3,

sqq.

cf. c.

(see p. 484,

on

the

those

circle

of

14, 22;), b,

P/i//s. iv.

The object of the


c.

treatise is
:

offa

a-v/j.-

Palvei Kara (pvaiv /xhu, araKToripav


jxivrOl T7?S TOU TrpwTOv (TTOix^iou

Twv

rbu ytiTvivvTa

aco/uidToov, irepl

fidXiara tottov t^ cpopa ruv &(npwv,


o(Ta T OeirifXiv hv a4pos dvai
KOiva TrdBt] Kal vhaTos, en 5e yf/s
.

ocro

ei'577

and

yeviffis

and

finally

set forth thus, in

Experience, moreover, is in hardpw/xeu


this theory
yap (in irpoffiouTOS jxkv rov /;Atoy
:

''

sqq.

2'.]

fiepcov.

and

generation,

rovTcp Biopi^ovrai iravToif yap iffri


rd^Ls Kal TTcis fiios Kal xpovos /j-erpelrai Trpi65cf,Tr\^v ov r^ avrt^ irdures.

mony with

next^ those of the

,sujr/'a),

TT/s

describes those

first

fiery circle;

lower portion of the iitinosphere


yap au ^aAarra

pheno-

the motion, reciprocal action and

Kol

/ueprj

Kal

irddt]

tSsv

With these investigations

ought to be connected the discussion of organic being Qibid.


12/m.).
3IeUor. i. 3-8.
Ibid. i. 9 iii.

iv.

'
'>

fxera

TOTTos

TTJ

tovtov

6.

fxiv hivrepos
after the fiery

64(Ti

[i.e.

circle], irpwros 5e irepl rrji/ yrjv ;


tottos Koivhs vbaros re

and again
Kal &epo5,
''

i.

Ibid.

9 init.
iii.

6,

378, a, 15 sqq.

according to Belcher's reckoning, or iii. 7 according to that of

IDELER.

PHYSICS

513

which are exhibited within the sphere of the earth.


The latter part of his treatise does not seem to have
been finished. Aristotle appears, instead of continuing
the work, to have composed the separate essay which
now forms the fourth book of the Meteorology and

which

offers a

proper point of transition to the science

of animate existence in

we should

its

discussion of topics which

refer to the province of inorganic

chemistry.

In the

first

of

these

and organic

sections

various

phenomena, such as meteors and aerolites,^ together


with the Comets and the Galaxy, are explained to be
collected masses of dry
fire

this

and inflammable vapours set on


by the motion of the stars.^ Comets are bodies of
vapour in a state of slow combustion, moving

freely or in the train of a star.^

Similar in kind is the


vaporous material being excreted and
by the movement of the whole heaven.*

Milky Way,
inflamed

its

In the lower portion of the atmosphere are observable


all circumstances connected with the formation of
the

Under the influence of solar warmth the


moisture on the surface of the earth evaporates. The
rising mists cool themselves in the higher regions of
the air, imparting a portion of their heat to the fiery
clouds.

'

'

See

p. 83, n. 2, sujpra.

^{eUor.

i.

were thought

4, 5.

Cf pp. 482,

n. 4, 479, n. 4,
490, n. 3, and 509, n. 4.
"J^'i^.c. 6-7, especially .344, a,
16 sqq. and c. 8, 345, b, 32 sqq. In
3

harmony with the account

of the
nature of comets which he here
gives, Aristotle endeavours (344,
b,
18 sqq.) to explain those

meteorological

phenomena

{e.g.

storm and drought) which they

VOL.

I.

to forecast.

On

Meteor, i. 396 Ideler points


out that Aristotle's account of
comets held its ground among
the most distinguished astronomers until the time of Newton
^
jj^^ ^ g^ ^^^ 34g^ ^^ g
where the attempt is made to
explain in detail, on the basis of
this supposition, the form and
appearance of the Milky Way.

L L

ARISTOTLE

514

sphere, and losing the rest in contact with the chillness

Then they condense, change


from air to water,^ and fall again to earth. In this manner
there is formed a stream of air and water, moving up
and down in a circle when the sun is near, the column
of air, or warm exhalation, rises when it retreats, the
stream of water flows downwards.*^ Aristotle makes
use of this phenomenon to explain the clouds and
of the upper atmosphere.^

snow and hail,"^ and goes on to


connect with it the nature and origin of rivers ^ and
of the sea." The former are produced in part by the products of the atmosphere and in part by a transmutation
The sea, though
of vapour into water within the earth.
mists,^ dew, rime, rain,

no

less

eternal than the

world,

portion of its waters in the

returns to

it

is

always yielding a

form of vapour, which

through the rivers after having been again

transformed into water in the atmosphere and dis-

charged in this form.

Its

salt

and

bitter

taste

is

occasioned by earthy particles which obtain their bitterness in combustion


in the earth, a

for

when dry vapours

are generated

change ensues from earth to fire

in other

words, combustion. These vapour, then, carry the result


of this combustion aloft with them, which mingles with
the water of the rain and the streams, and being by reason
of

its

weight unaffected by evaporation,

The reason

given,

it

remains

Air, which is a compound


moisture and heat, when it
cools down, is transformed into
moisture and cold, i.e. water see

Ihid. at 346, b, 32.


Ihid. c. 10-12.
J^m?. c. 13, 349,b, 2-c. 14yif/i.,
where he gives a survey of the
most noted rivers and their
sources.
The matter of c. 14 will

p. 484, supra.

be further touched upon ivfra.

'

iMd.

i.

c. 8,

of this
340, a, 26.

is

'^

of

Ihid.

i.

c. 9.

'

Ihid.

ii.

c.

1-3.

PHYSICS
behind in the

sea.

Dry evaporation

515

causes wind, as moist

Both are mingled in the lower


atmosphere, but the dry exhalations rise aloft and are
carried round by the rotation of the upper regions.
This excretion of the warmer matter causes the remaining moisture to cool and be condensed into rain
evaporation rain.

and

this refrigeration

vapours of the upper

being communicated to the


strata, causes

warm

them to rush towards

the earth in the shape of wind.^ Consequently, the alternations of wind and rain depend upon the fluctuations of

moist and dry vapours continually changing place with

one another.^
terior

of the

Masses of vapour penetrating the in-

winds produce earthquakes.^

earth as

Similar in their origin

are

thunder and lightning,

whirlwinds and simooms,"* while halos round the sun

and moon, rainbows, parhelia, and light-streaks in the


clouds

may

be explained by the reflection of light in

moist exhalations and water.

In the earth

itself stones

are produced from dry exhalations, together with all

other minerals which are incapable of fusion

damp

vapours, on the other hand, by hardening, before passing

become metals.^
At the end of the third book of the Meteorology

into water,

Ibid. i. c. 13, 349, a, 12 sqq.,


4-6, especially c. 4, where the
subject is further developed. Cf
also IDELEK, i. 541 sqq. Meteor,
i. 3, 341, a, 1
Prohl. xxvi. 26.
2 Upon this oj/TJTrepia-Toats, a

ii.

conception which plays a great


part in Aristotle's philosophy of
nature, as it did in Plato's before,
and in the Stoics' after, him, see
also Meteor,

i.

12, 348, b, 2

De

Somtio,

3,

457, b,

2.

Meteor. ii.T,^. An enumeration of the various hypotheses


advanced by the ancients to explain earthquakes is given by
Ideler, in loco, 582 sqq.
* Ibid. ii. 9, and iii. 1.
* These phenomena are dealt
with in Meteor, iii., chapters 2-6.
^ Meteor, iii.
6, 7, 378, a, 15
^

sqq.

ARISTOTLE

516

Aristotle promises to give a fuller description of these

But the fourth book, which

bodies.

the

not properly

is

connected with the others,^ makes a new

elementary characteristics, and

four

warmth and

and

cold as active, dryness

Taking

start.

regarding

moisttire as

passive, principles, ^ Aristotle first considers the former

and then the

in

latter,

From warmth and

several manifestations.

their

cold he derives generation on the

one hand and corruption on the other ^

when
tion

generation,

these principles, being combined in due propor-

and acting on the material substratum of a being,

obtain complete ascendency over

when the warmth

ruption,

substance

its

cor-

peculiar to the moist ele-

withdrawn by some external heat,


and consequently form and distinctness are destroyed.''
ments of a being

is

Among phenomena

of a similar description, but not

may be reckoned

involving generation or destruction,

Of the two

digestion, ripening, boiling, roasting, &c.^

iraffa

Meteor,

eVrt (pQopa

irpwTOV jxkv
yevecris Kal

7}

iv.

378,

1,

KaOoXov

ol)V

b, 28:
7]

aTrArj

(pvaiKJ] jx^raRoKr) tov-

7]

Kara

avTiKeijxivr) (pdopa

(pvcriv.

%(TTi 5' 7} olttXti


31
KoX ((>vaiK7] yeueais fxerafioAT] vttS
rovTwu roov Swdfieaf, orav e;^a>o'i
AoyOV, 6K TTIS VTT0Klfliv7)S vK7]S
*

Ihid.

1.

eKaarr) (pvcrei
at

elprjfxevai

yewwai

Se

Kparovvra
5

avrai

S'

Kparfj,
a.7Ti\iia

rrjs v\7]s.

Kara

fxepos

ylverai, rij

ivavTiov

[wAtj] elalu

Swdixeis iradrjTiKa'.
rh depiJ-hv Kal ^vxp^f

Ibid. 379, a, 2

fidXicTTa

jiieu

5'

orav 5e

/x^

fxdoKvffis Kal

airXfj yepecrei

Koivov

7]

Kara

Tovff oSos icTTiv.

TOiV dvpd/j.civ icTTiv ^pyou Kal

Tcoj/

yap

Cf, p. 513, supra.


See p. 480, n. '.i, supra.

c^i/zts.

olKeias Kal
utt'

ttjj

(pvaiu <p6opa els

L. 16
eV

Kara (pvaiv

aWorpias

a7i'>\iis

5'

vyp<^

eKacTTC}}

6ep/j.6r7]ros

depfidrTjros

'

auTTj 5'

earlu 7) rov irepiexoyros.


Corruption may also be described as the
joint effect of ^pvxp^rTis o'lKeia,
and 6ep/j.6r7]s aXXorpia. Moisture,
however, is (ace. to 1. 8 sqq.) a

necessary means, all generation


being the result of the action of
moisture (which is evopiarov see p.
480, n. 2, S2q?ra) upon dryness in
obedience to the efficient force of
nature destruction begins orai/
;

Kparfj rod opi^ovros


did rh Trepi4xov.
"

irerpis, iriiravffis,

rh opi^fiepov
'<^i^i.s,

6im]<Ti$

PHYSICS
passive principles moisture
in its nature the

more

517

and dryness, the former

easily determinable

must needs determine the

therefore,

dryness and not vice versa

is

moisture,

characteristics of

neither of the two, however,

can exist without the other, but both (and therefore


also the two elements, whose fundamental qualities they
are)

must

This com-

subsist together in all bodies.'

bination produces

the opposition of hard and

Every body, again, which has


must be stiff, and all stiffness
Consequently,

we

its
is

own

definite

soft.^

form

a form of dryness."^

are next led to treat of the nature

and

kinds of drying, melting, and stiffening, together with

Homogene-

the materials subject to these processes.^

ous bodies are formed of earth and water by the influence of

warmth and

as effects of heat,

a7re\|/m, wjucJttjs,

as effects of
Cf. Meteor, iv. 2 sq,
IMd. c. 4
elal 5' al jxkv

/xdoXvais,

cold.

cold/'

crrdTevcris

dpxa^ Tcov crw/ictTcoj/ al TradrjTiKal


vyphv KoX ^rjp6v
iirel 5' eVri rh
fxkv vypdv evdpKTTOv, rh Se ^rjpdv
Zv(T6pi<TTov [see p. 480, n. 2,su2)ra],
.

oixol6i' ri T(f

u\l/Cf)

Kol to7s r]5vcr/xa(n

&\Arj\a irdcrxovcip'
rb yap
TCf ^vpcfi aXriov rod Spi^eaOai
Ka\ 8ia rovTo e| afxcpoTv icnl rh
upifffxepou (TWfia. Xey^Tai 5e tS)V
Trphs

'

vyphv
.

(TToix^lcov

Idiairara ^r]pov ixku

vypov de vScop [see p. 483, n.

ravra

5ih

diravra

ra

yri,

2, stip.'].

upiff/xeva

ivravQa [added because


the statement does not apply to
aetherial regions] ovk &vev yrjs Kal
(Tca/xara

SSaros.
^

Ibid. 382, a, 8 sqq. c. 5 init.


rh wptcTfievoy ffStixa oiKeicf} Upcf)

(cf p. 480, n. 2), as distinguished


.

from that which has its form


imposed on it from without, as

Aristotle proceeds at once


water in a

vessel.

Ibiff. c. 5 init.

Ibid.
Ibid.

5-7.
8 init. c. 10, 388, a,
20 sqq. On the nature of homogeneity, cf. Part I, 879, 2. Homogeneous bodies (ofioio/nepri) are
defined in general as those composed of one kind of material,
'

c.
c.

whether that material be simple


and elementary or compound, in
the narrower sense as those composed of the latter. Opposed to
the homogeneous is the heterogeneous (di/ofJLOiofjLepes), or that
which is composed of different
held
materials
mechanically
together, as is the case especially
with organic bodies. See, besides
the passages referred to above,
Meteor, iv. 10, 388, a, 13. c. 12
init.
De An. i. 5, 411, a, 16-21,
where besides
b, 24 sqq
cf.
;

dfxoiofjLfp^s

which

is

we

have

6fioii5-^s,

further expanded into rh

ARISTOTLE

518

and composition/ passing to

to describe their qualities

the detailed discussion of living beings with the remark


that homogeneous bodies serve as the matter of hetero-

geneous ones, and that the designs of nature are more


clearly exhibited in the latter
fact,

than in the former.^

however, everything which

we

In

find scattered over

the later writings about the objects of sense-perception,


light, colour, sound, smell, &c.,

physics which

is

therefore here do
o\ov rots

more than
Part. An.

fMopiois ^/toeiSe's,

655, b, 21, where d/xoioaeprj


is explained by (rwwvvfia rois 6\ois
TO. fiep-n
cf. the Jjid. Arist. under
the word. According to Philop.
Aristotle distinguished in his
ii.

9,

between elementary
homogeneous and organic bodies.
In a quotation from this dialogue
occur the words {Ar. Fr. 1482,
Eudeinns

davfia, 10, cf p. 482, supra)


fxerpia eVrt rSiv (TTOix^icov 7] v6(T0S
:

Twu bjxoiofxcpwv 7} dcrdeveia


Tuv opyaviKuiv rh ai(Txos they are
perhaps, however, only inserted
by the reporter by way of ex.

belongs to that portion of

treated of in the Meteorology.,

planation.

Ibid. c. 8-11. Caps. 8 and 9


treat especially of stiffening by
heat and cold; of melting by
heat and moisture of softening,
bending, extending; of breaking,
bruising, splitting, &c. caps. 10
and 11 treat of the constituent
elements of homogeneous bodies
and the properties by which they
;

may be known.

For a fuller
account of Aristotle's treatment
of the latter subject see Meyer,
Arist. TJderhmde, 416 sqq. 477.
'
Ibid. c. 12.
5 Aristotle gives the following
account of Light, De An. ii. 7,

We cannot

refer to these suggestions,^

Be Sensu, c. 8,
418, b, 3 sqq.
439, a, 18 sqq. transparency is a
;

common

property (koiv^ (pixris Koi


of many bodies with
whose other properties it is inseparably united (ov x^P^^'^'h)That which gives actuality to
this property (J} rovrov ii/fpyeia
Tov Sia^avovs p 5ia((>aves 17 ej/reAe'xem rod 5ia(pavov5, 418, b, 9,
419, a, 10) and as it were colour
to the transparent object is light,
whicli again is caused by fire or
Siva/uiis)

aether (virh irvphs^ roiovrov oTov rh


&V0} (tS/xo),

and may therefore be

^ toiovtov rivhs
At the
same time he controverts (De
An. 418, b, 20; Be Se7mi, c. 6,
446, a, 25 sqq ) the view of Empedocles that light is motion
passing from heaven to earth, on
the ground of the immense distance at which we see it. Light,
to Aristotle, is the effect of motion
(see 468 sq. sujjra), but is not jjer
se a motion, but rather a definite
state which is produced in a body
as a whole in consequence of a
qualitative change {aXKoiuais)
such as freezing (De Sensu, c. 6,
It is asserted at
446, b, 27 sqq.)
the same time that vision is the
defined as
irapovffia

irvphs

iu rep 5ia(pave7.

PHYSICS
as

will

it

be

now

519

necessary to pass at once, in the next

volume, to Aristotle's observations and conclusions as


to Organic Nature.
motion which passes
from an object to the eye through
the trans]parent medium (Be An.

result of a

ii.

29,

7,
c.

419, a, 9, 13,
12, 435, a, 5

iii.

Be

1,

424, b,

Se7isv, 2,

438, b, 3). That, he says, which

by

presence causes light, by


absence darkness, is also that
which on the border of transparent things produces Colour.
For colour resides only on the
its

its

surface of bodies, and belongs,


therefore, only to those which
have definite limits as light is
said to be ^v aopicrTq} rep SLa(pave7
(Be Sensu, c. 3, 439, a, 26), so
colour is defined (ibid. 439, b, 11)
as rh rod diacpavovs iv (rdofxari
o)pi(riJ.ev(p irepas.
White and black
correspond on the surface of
bodies to light and darkness
(439, b, 16), and from these two
primary colours come all the
others, not merely by the mechanical confusion of their atomic
elements, nor by the shining of
:

one through the other, but also


by a real process of mixture, such
as is described at p. 420. If they
are mixed in simple numerical
proportion, we have pure colours
if otherwise, impure. Inclusive of
black and white, Aristotle enumerates in all seven primary
colours (ibid. 439, b, 18 to the end
of the chapter,

and

also c. 6, 445,
b, 20 sqq.,and c. 4, 442, a, 19 sqq.
Cf, Be An. ii. 7 init. ibid. 419, a,
1 sqq.
Meteor, iii. 4, 378, b, 32
sqq., i. 5, 342, b, 4).
The treatise
upon colour starts from somewhat different premisses
vide
Prantl, who treats Aristotle's
doctrine of colour from different
;

points of view in the most


exhaustive manner, pp. 86-159,
as also Baumkee, Arist. Lehre
V. d. Siniiesvermoffevi (1S77 ),ip. 21
sqq.
S o u n d is said to be motion
caused by the concussion of hard
bodies and transmitting itself
through the medium of the air.
It was to describe this idea of
the sound-medium that Theophrastus and other Peripatetics
invented the word Sirjx", formed
upon the analogy of Sta^aj/rjs, just
as in like manner they invented
Sioa/xos to describe the medium
by which smell is transmitted.
Phi LOP. Be An. L, 4 cf. ibid.
M, 8, o. 10, o. Those notes are

high which make a forcible impression on the ear in a brief


time, i.e. quick notes
those on
the other hand are deep which
take a longer time to produce a
weak impression, i.e. slow ones
(Be An. ii. 8, 419, b, 4-420, b, 5).
Bodies which are fastened into
others and carried round by them
as the stars are, produce no sound
;

by their motion (Be

Casio,

Smell

ii.

9,

held to
be caused by dry materials which
are dissolved in moisture, i.e. in
291, a, 9 sqq.)

is

water or

air (e7xuAtos

a, 1, b, 4

note that the earlier and

|7j/j(^t7js,

provisional description of
KttTTi/wSrjs

avaBvixiaaiSy

Be

443,

as
Sensu,

ocr/n^

2, 438, b, 24, is rejected, ibid. c. 5,

443, a, 21).

This

become objects
Sensu,

is

how they

to the sense

(Be

442, b, 27-443, b, 16
9, 421, a, 26 sqq., 422, a,

c. 5,

Be An. ii.
6 cf. Baumker, 28 sq.) In the
same way Taste is the effect of
;

the union of dry or earthy material

ARISTOTLE

520

with moisture, which, however, in


this case is not that of water and
air, as in the case of smell, but of
water alone. The object of the
sense of taste is x^f^^'X^f^^^
is defined as rh yiyvd^ifivov
virh Tov elprjfievov ^-qpov [viz. rod
'

again

Tpocpiimov |rjpoO] irdOos eV to? vypcf,

yevaeus ttjs Kara ^vva^iv


rrjs
ivipy^iav
[i.e.
ets
aWoLcoTLKhv
which causes our sense or faculty
of taste actually to feel a sensation, 441, b, 19], TOV Tpo<piixov
^rjpov irdOos

(TTepri<ns {ihid.l. 24).

a mixture of
white and black, so all tastes

As

all colours are

Spi/J-h and
and 6|u) are a
mixture of sweet and bitter if
these elements are mingled in a

(Xiiraphv

and

aKj-ivphv,

avffTTjphu, (TTpucpvhv

certain proportion we have pleasant tastes otherwise, unpleasant


Be An. ii.
ones (Be Sensu, c. 4
;

10,

Baumk. 32

sq.).

In this

way

the law discovered by the Pythagoreans which declared that the


harmony and discord of sounds
depended upon certain numerical
relations is considered also to
apply, not only to colours, but to
tastes (xu^oO- T)e Sensu, 4, 442, a,
19 sqq. c. 7, 448, a, 15. Aristotle
compares seven principal tastes
to the seven primary colours.
Fm'ther investigations into the
nature of x*^/"**^ ^^ reserves (Be
Sensu, c. 4 fin.^ for the (pv(Tio\oyia
irepl rwv (pvTciv. Upon the treatise
attributed to him ir. x'"f^^^-> ^ee p.
84, n. 1. The sense of Touch has
for its object all those general
qualities of bodies (Be An. ii. 11,
422, b, 25, 423, b, 26), which are
ultimately resolvable into terms
of the elementary oppositions
referred to on p. 479, supra, and
do not, therefore, call for further
special notice here.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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