THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

TOPIC A: VIOLENT EXTREMISM AS A THREAT TO

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
prepared by Sebastian Vogelpoel

TOPIC B: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCILS

REACTIVITY TO HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW VIOLATIONS
prepared by
Aikaterini-Paraskevi Karamanli

TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ............................................................................................. 3
TOPIC A: VIOLENT EXTREMISM AS A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY .................... 5
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 5
Linking Violent Extremist with International Peace and Security ....................................................... 5
REASONS FOR RADICALIZATION .............................................................................................................. 6
Economic Grievances .......................................................................................................................... 6
Political Grievances ............................................................................................................................. 7
Identity Grievances.............................................................................................................................. 8
HOME GROWN TERRORISM .................................................................................................................... 8
Methods of Recruiting for Extremist organizations (the example of ISIS) ........................................ 10
Social Media .................................................................................................................................. 10
Activists.......................................................................................................................................... 12
Prisons ........................................................................................................................................... 12
RESPONSE TO THE PHENOMENON ....................................................................................................... 12
United Nations Resolutions ............................................................................................................... 12
Counter-radicalization programs ...................................................................................................... 13
Further measures to counter violent extremism .................................................................................. 14
QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION SHOULD ANSWER ..................................................................................... 16
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RECOMMENDED READINGS ................................................................................. 16
Key readings: ..................................................................................................................................... 16
Further readings: ............................................................................................................................... 16
TOPIC B: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCILS REACTIVITY TO HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS ...................................................................................................................... 18
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 18
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ................................................................................................. 19
The already existing enforcement mechanisms for the protection of international human rights law
........................................................................................................................................................... 20
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ................................................................................................ 24
What is international humanitarian law ........................................................................................... 25
Where did international humanitarian law originate from .............................................................. 25
Where is international humanitarian law to be found ..................................................................... 25
2

When does international humanitarian law apply............................................................................ 26

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW ............................................................................................................................ 27
Violations of international humanitarian law as a threat to peace and security .............................. 27
The enforcement of international humanitarian law through Chapter VII measures ...................... 29
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE ......................... 34
FINAL REMARKS ..................................................................................................................................... 37
QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION SHOULD ANSWER ..................................................................................... 39
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RECOMMENDED READINGS ................................................................................. 40
Key documents: ................................................................................................................................. 40
Further readings: ............................................................................................................................... 40

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

The United Nations Security Council is one of the six main organs of the United Nations.
The Council currently consists of 15 Members. Five of them are recognized
as Permanent Members of the Council. These are: the Peoples Republic of China, the French
Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
as well as the United States of America (in the MUN context they are often referred to as the
P5). The other 10 seats are granted to different UN Member States on rotational basis, with
observance of the official UN internal regional division, and for a 2-year long term of office.
The Security Council is so designed as to function continuously. For that reason,
a representative of each Member of the Council has to be present at the UN (and also the
Councils) Headquarters in New York at all times.
The Security Council is a sui generis body with its main goal being maintenance
of international peace and security. If a threat to the international peace and security
is determined by the Council would, it would usually act as follows:

When peaceful means are still considered as possibly sufficient to bring an end to the crisis at
hand:

set forth principles for an agreement;

undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases;

dispatch a mission;

appoint special envoys; or

request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of
the dispute.

When the crisis leads to hostilities, the Council may:

issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict;

dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate

opposing forces and establish a calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought.

In the last resort the Council may authorize:

economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel
bans;

severance of diplomatic relations;

blockade;

or even collective military action.

The Security Council can issue a Resolution (a legally binding document) or a Presidential
Statement (a legally non-binding document). In order to react and authorize measures against a
threat to international peace and security, nine affirmative votes of the Councils Members
are needed, including affirmative votes of all its Permanent Members. However, should there
be 14 votes in favor but 1 vote against cast by a Permanent Member (so called veto),
the draft Resolution at hand would fail.
For more information on the Security Council see, inter alia: http://www.un.org/en/sc/

TOPIC A: VIOLENT EXTREMISM AS A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL

PEACE AND SECURITY
INTRODUCTION
With the rise of groups such as ISIS, Boko Haram or Al-Qaida, efforts to counter
the phenomenon of violent extremism have assumed a high priority on agendas set across
the world. The United Nations Security Council has already recognized violent extremist
as conductive to terrorism and has underlined the importance That being needed as the impact
of extremism can affect all member states whether in trends of recruitment, raising money
and even waging war. What causes people to join extremist movements can differentiate
enormously depending on the individual; however the impressive ability of extremist groups
and the great challenge for the authorities is the fact that the extremist propaganda is able
to adapt to new circumstances to gain the support of the individual. Member states therefore
need to consider a multifaceted approach.It most above all also encourage a critical approach
to challenge groups that encourage terror but also undermine social cohesion.

Linking Violent Extremist with International Peace and Security

Firstly, in his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism of 24 December 2015 (A/70/674)
the Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon points out that extremist groups like ISIS
or Boko Haram seek to supplant existing States and replace them with their own ones.
Concerning especially the influence of ISIL on the territories of Syrian Iraq, it is justified
to say that violent extremism of such magnitude can pose a threat to the very existance
of a Member State of the United Nations.
Secondly, the Security Council in its Resolution S/Res/2178 of 24 September 2014 noted
continued threat to international peace and security posed by terrorism and condemned, in this
context, violent extremism, which can be conductive to terrorism.
Bearing in mind the above, it is not hard to establish a link between Violent Extremism and
international peace and security.

REASONS FOR RADICALIZATION

Radicalization can be defined as the process through which individuals turn to extremism.
Though easy to define, the concept is inherently ambiguous. What is seen as extreme
or extremist differs according to context, culture, and period of history.
Moreover, extremism can refer to ideas (advocating racial supremacy, for example), methods
(especially violence), or both. This is why many scholars distinguish between cognitive
and violent radicalization.
Most experts agree that there is not a simple formula or template that would explain how people
are radicalized. Each case is different and each pathway needs to be examined on its own merits,
as it is unclear how extremism leads to violence it is important to focus on factors surrounding
the individual that might change their own personal situation from angry or dissatisfied to taking
up arms for a cause. According to those who are familiar with the term a general these set of
drivers that seem to be common to the majority of radicalization trajectories:

One is the perception of grievance conflict, injustice, oppression, or socio-economic

exclusion, for example which can make people receptive to extremist ideas.

Another is the adoption of an extremist narrative or ideology that speaks to the grievance
and provides a compelling rationale for extremist actions.
Also important are social and group dynamics, given that radicalization often happens
in small networks of friends, and that extremist ideas are more likely to resonate if they
are articulated by a credible or charismatic leader.

Economic Grievances

While there is little empirical evidence directly linking poverty, unemployment, or education
with violent extremism worldwide, there are strong indicators that the violence and instability
in many regions today stem, at least in part, from a sense of injustice due to economic and
political exclusion, as well as to a weak or predatory state that does not deliver for its citizens.

Indeed experts have often remarked that successful integration into the world economy had
been mirrored by the growth of weak globalizers who become less competitive, whose
populations have failing or stagnant incomes, and as a result experience growing
unemployment, political tension, and religious fundamentalism.
Even today, the actual or perceived marginalization of important segments of society continues
to serve as a pretext for unrest and, sometimes, violence. It could be argued that the group Daesh
(or ISIS or ISIL) was able to grow by capitalizing on the perceived marginalization of the Sunni
populations in Iraq and Syria. In many countries, youth are marginalized and have little
prospects for productive employment, housing, marriage and limited voice in society.
The challenge for any comprehensive program aimed at countering violent extremism is to
strive towards economic and social inclusion by developing more inclusive and accountable
economic institutions; creating more opportunities for youth through reform of private sector
development and the modernization of the education system; supporting the development of
lagging regions and rural areas; and empowering women. In sum, promote more fair, peaceful
and Shared Societies.

Political Grievances

Politics can be related to terrorist radicalization in a number of different ways. Terrorist

radicalization may be connected by political structures, institutions, actors and processes, which
may inhibit or favour radicalization into terrorism among certain segments of the population.
The working of political institutions can regulate social conflicts otherwise prone to the remit
of some individuals, objectively or subjectively affected by grievances inherent to such
antagonisms, into a process of radicalization leading to terrorism, just like the functioning of
those institutional arrangements could have the opposite impact.
Political actors from elites and political parties to interest groups and social movements are
capable of contributing to radicalization and the prevention of terrorist radicalization within
risk groups under their influence. But some civil society entities may equally tolerate and even
promote ambivalent attitudes.
Furthermore, politics has an unavoidable international, nowadays often worldwide dimension.
Issues of global governance, balances of power between states, ongoing disputes affecting the
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stability of entire geopolitical regions, as well as open conflicts involving armed confrontations
such as in the case civil wars, may all provide ingredients for the narrative that terrorist
organizations elaborate as part of their propaganda initiatives. This propaganda is now widely
disseminated by means of Internet and the social media, with the purpose of widening the
support basis that terrorist organizations enjoy within their respective populations of reference.

Identity Grievances

Identities, more precisely collective identities, are usually framed and shaped in a given political
context and amidst concrete political processes. Adopting and affirming a political or
politicized collective identity need by no means to be linked to violence and to terrorism.
However, there are observable instances when the universally human quest for identity may
become a major motivation to enter the radicalization process and even to become involved in
some kind of terrorist behaviour. For a given identity to be associated with support or
involvement in terrorism, this form of violence must be incorporated, either from the initial
formative period of that identity or throughout its evolution under changing social and political
conditions, as an exalted and glorified means of action among the core definitional elements of
the ideology.
The challenge is to find ways in which identities, political processes and institutions can be
mobilized to prevent rather than promote radicalization, and identify key priorities and tradeoffs that should guide policymakers and societies in navigating these issues.

HOME GROWN TERRORISM

The most potent result of both political and identity grievances, is the increasingly worrying
prospect of home grown terrorists. Although terrorist plots carried about by overseas terrorist
organizations form most of the image of terrorism in peoples minds, many people do not realize
that terrorism is often carried out by members of their own countries and communities. Famous
bombings, such as the 7/7 London Bombings in 2005 and the Oklahoma City Bombings were
all committed by home-grown terrorists. Another example is the 2011 killing of 77 people by
the Norwegian mass murderer Anders Breivik who was explicitly aiming at destabilizing
Norways tolerant society by dividing local communities and provoking an overreaction.
8

Unlike imagined by many, homegrown terrorists happen to be people with a strong educational
and social background rather than individuals who appear to live on the fringe of society. This
poses a new question: how could institutions that instil education of the highest order
and are the pride of Western society be the breeding ground for terrorists?
This is by no means a question easily answered and certainly covers both of the previous
questions of identity and political persuasion, however in addition to both of these we also need
not ignore who vulnerable individuals are (often identified by loner tendencies), perhaps the
best way for us to deal with this problem is to look at current and past cases and learn from
them. The situation regarding ISIS being a particularly thoughtful example:
ISIS is most known around the world for their prolific, gruesome and yet effective online
propaganda. This propaganda, especially geared towards young people, has caused a significant
amount of young European, Arabs and Americans to join the fight for jihad. Only recently, a
group of three young girls from the UK successfully managed to join ISIS in Syria. While it
may initially be baffling why, especially young girls, would want to join ISIS, Peter Bergens
United State of Jihad offers an interesting understanding into the motivations behind many
young jihadists convictions. Interviews with convicted fighter show that many of these young
individuals came out of average American households and even had higher education levels
than the average Americans. Radicalization almost always happens in groups, very seldom do
individuals turn to jihad be themselves. Many young Americans who join ISIS clearly have
glory and fraternity as their ambition. This is evident in many ISIS propaganda videos, which
promote ISIS as a cohesive brotherhood of Muslims who in death and life will attain religious
glory. Another appealing aspect for many is the prospect of adoration and women. Women are
advertised as a prizes for sacrifice and bravery. Yet, the author of the book himself admits that
it is despite these common threads hard to understand how average Americans, 23 such as those
in San Bernadino, become radicalized. The banality of evil seems to be the best, yet most
frightening answer. The situation in Europe is easier to understand. The majority of the 5000
European jihadists that have travelled to Syria, including those of the Paris Attacks, were 2nd
generation immigrants to Europe from mostly Arabic countries.

Methods of Recruiting for Extremist organizations (the example of ISIS)

Social Media
Social Media is nowadays one of the most appealing sources of information in the western
world. Groups such as ISIS use social media as an instrument by which they can interact with
other users. One of the most popular sites used by extremist groups is Twitter,as well as
Facebook and Instagram. The sites are used to keep their supporters updated and informed about
extremist propaganda inciting fear in the process.
Conversations and posts on social media about ISIS fall into the several categories, most
commonly the following:
Public reactions to acts of terrorism and violence Each time there is an act of violence
perpetrated by ISIS, supporters of ISIS or other acts of terrorism, there is a public reaction.
These include sympathy for the victims, outrage against the individuals who perpetrated the
attack, and accusations and anger towards ISIS or other group behind the attackperceived or
real. But some reactions may reveal sympathy with the attackers and their cause.
Policy discussions about how to respond to ISIS Policy discussions about how to respond
to violent extremism and terrorism, generally, and ISIS, in particular range from providing a
competing narrative on social media to sending in the troops. But while some may consider
people who oppose harsher military responses enemy supporters, there are plenty of reasons to
oppose that response without siding with the enemy. Weeding out opposition who are
sympathizers from those who see escalating military responses as ineffective and/or counterproductive is essential when monitoring social media for intelligence gathering.
Comments about ISISs ideology and goals The public debate about ISIS ranges from basic
descriptions of their behavior to deeper philosophical discussions about the clash of
civilizations. The deeper the philosophical focus of these conversations, the more likely we will
see people positing the reasons why people get radicalized and why violent extremists within
the broader Muslim community do what they do. Some of this discussion will refer to policies
and actions by western nations against Muslim nations and peoples. Much the same as the
discussion about how western imperialism created many problems in Africa, identifying
10

possible causes of the outcomes is NOT the same as supporting the use of extremist violence
in response to them. Sympathizing with why people feel and respond the way they do in these
situations can range from understanding to supporting. It is imperative that we recognize the
distinction.
Declarations of solidarity with ISIS Declaring solidarity with ISIS (or with violent
extremists) is a clear departure from understanding them. It is the explicit endorsement of their
goals and should raise warning flags among authorities. LarkiZaat made this declaration after
the shooting started in San Bernardino, but in many situations there is forewarning. Monitoring
for these types of posts should be the highest priority for authorities.
Demonization of particular religious groups While so much of the focus has been on
identifying potential ISIS recruits and supporters of violent extremism, we should not forget
that some of the responses to that threat can also suggest an extreme violent response.
Demonizing a religious group (e.g. Muslims in case of ISIS) increases the risk of innocent
people being harmed by people taking matters into their own hands. Armed protesters, for
example, gathering outside a mosque in Texas is a good example. The odds are overwhelming
that the members of that congregation are peace-loving members of the community. But the
heightened threat created by protestors carrying rifles outside their place of worship should be
of concern to the authorities. And any indication on social media that someone intends to do
harm to a specific religious group in their community should be taken just as seriously as
indications that someone in a community has been radicalized to do violence on behalf of ISIS.
These strategies are the ones that persuade the uneducated or ignorant to support such
ideologies. An example for the success of extremist ideologies on social media is the case of
the Austrian poster girls. Two teenage girls, Samra Kesinovic and Sabina Selimovic, left their
city, Vienna, in 2014 taking with them their passports and clothes. The Austrian police assured
they got out of the country with the help of someone. The note they left to their parents reads,
Dont look for us, we will serve Allah and we will fight for him. Having arrived, they were
married to jihad fighters and it is believed they got pregnant. To come back to the point of social
media, their accounts were used to broadcast their new life as active members of ISIS. The
smiling pictures of the girls in traditional clothing were intended to convince other teenage girls
of joining ISIS in Syria. Later that year, they contacted their families to express their wish to
return home. Consequently, one of them was beaten to death and the other is still missing in
11

Syria. The parents blame the police for not having informed the public about the dangers of
radicalization.
Moreover, Twitter accounts have been hacked by ISIS members by whom they have posted
threatening statements or propaganda. This was the case of the US Central Command Twitter
account. On the 12th of January 2015 the profile picture of this account was replaced by the
capture of a masked militant with the caption I love you Isis. Later that day, the YouTube
account of US Central Command posted two pro ISIS videos.
Activists
Activists are often the source of the spreading of extremist ideologist. It takes one activist to
create a social media account or deliver a speech that will be heard by a large public. Due to
the fact that the most efficient way of spreading an ideology is through a large audience,
activists choose to make themselves public charming personalities. To do so they raise
campaigns in which they spread their ideologies in physical or audible way. The physical way
is through pamphlets and posters. The audible way is through speeches.
Prisons
According to the FBI the process of radicalization often takes place in prisons. The reason for
that is the environment in which the inmates live and the education that inmates have received.
The feeling of injustice or insufficiency grows. Fellow inmates more easily persuade them.
Apart from that, the information does not need to travel from place to place due to the size of
the prisons.

RESPONSE TO THE PHENOMENON

United Nations Resolutions
The United Nations have established a pragmatic link between violent extremism and terrorism.
Therefore, many actions aimed at weakening the spread of extremism-related ideologies take
place within a more general framework of countering terrorism. Nevertheless, certain
documents may still be pointed out in the above context. These include:
12

The UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism

Strategy (A/RES/60/288) that also addresses prevention of spreading of extremist
ideologies;

The UN General Assembly GA/11474 adopted draft resolutions, encompassing the

subject of combating extremism;

UNSC Resolution S/Res/2178 (2014) The resolution suggested further measures for
universal participation to counter global terrorism and curb the development of violent
extremism and condemned it;

UNSC Resolution S/Res/2170 (2014) This resolution emphasizes the need for all States
to implement fundamental methods to countering violent extremism;

UNSC Resolution S/Res/2242 (2015) This resolution focused on role of women in

addressing violent extremism, it additionally calls for sufficient financing of the UN for
counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism;

The UN General Assembly adopts the Secretary-Generals Plan of Action to Prevent

Violent Extremism (A/RES/70/254).

Also the regional organizations from outside of the UN system have paid attention
to the worrying phenomenon of violent extremism. To give an example, in November 2015
the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the prevention of radicalization
and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organizations (2015/2063(INI))

Counter-radicalization programs

Countering and or Preventing Violent Extremism CVE/PVE programs designed to prevent

radicalization into violent extremism and promote the reintegration of radicalized individuals.
In practice, C/PVE programs and initiatives typically aim at:
Addressing grievances and/or the perception of grievances within communities
13

 Countering extremist narratives and ideologies

Empowering communities and strengthening their resilience.
Rehabilitating former violent extremists, or those on the brink of joining.
Complements counterterrorism but it is not the same. Its objectives are fundamentally different:
Counterterrorism pursues violent extremists;
Countering Violent Extremism empowers individuals and communities, so they are able to
protect themselves, their families and communities against being targeted by violent extremists.
Furthermore, there is an important distinction between de-radicalization and counterradicalization:
De-radicalization targets individuals that have been radicalized. It aims to change their ideas
(cognitive

de-radicalization)

or

behavior

(behavioral

de-radicalization

or disengagement), so they can be re-integrated into mainstream society.

Counter-radicalization targets individuals or communities who are at risk of radicalization. It
aims to inoculate them against the extremist narrative, pre-empt arguments and grievances,
and strengthen community structures so they can resist attempts at radicalization and
recruitment.

Further measures to counter violent extremism

Moreover, governments have developed strategies on how to monitor radicalization in small
communities. To do so, they arrange connections with the local police to stay informed. One
clear example of that is the cabinet of the United States federal Government, the Department of
Homeland Security. This approach is effective in concerns of adults or impulsive young people
who proudly show their extremist ideologies. In that manner the forces are able
to identify and act more quickly. It looks different when individuals share their ideologies in
secret or through the media, something the police or anyone cannot control. Social media, the
second largest source of radicalization after prisons has also intervened in the prevention of
radicalization. Twitter and Facebook have updated their censorship policies, so that
14

no extremist statements, pictures or accounts appear in the respective sites. There remain still
accounts that share extremist countries of which 50.000 belong to ISIS terrorists alone.
A multi-faceted and balanced approach needs to be implemented in order to defeat and prevent
extremist ideologies from impacting and attracting the youth in communities, achieve
democracy as well as reform and successful governance of such communities,
instead of the use of restraint and oppression, while applying the principles of free speech,
religious tolerance, the condemning of all displays and manifestations of religious intolerance,
the necessity of powerful civil societies, the promotion of mutual understanding and dialogue
under a balance of security and observance of human rights.
In particular, education is always effective in terms of long-term solutions. The saying says
give a man a fish and he will not be hungry for a day, teach him to fish and he will never go
hungry again. Education can take place in schools or any other educational institution. Though
this requires the willingness of governments to create programs suited for such a task.
Similar workshops should definitely take place in prisons, being that this is the place where
radicalization takes place the most. Such can be through former foreign fighters that regretted
having been radicalized to the point of supporting a terrorist group. Social media cannot do
more than censoring. The sites are not able to control the information that flows through them,
since the users control them. I would like to refer to thetitle previous attempts to solve the
issue.
Lastly it is a necessity to reinforce international community relations including governments,
religious and civil society leaders who must prepare, focusing on and committing to
synchronized universal actions against extremism. All of which requires enhanced investigation
and analysis of and education on violent extremism, the promotion of the role of youth and
women, and strengthened multilateral strategies in order to adequately address extremism both
regionally and globally. The role of education is a major pillar in countering extremism and
achieving the Sustainable development goals would definitely ensure addressing the root causes
of extremism.

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QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION SHOULD ANSWER

-

What is violent extremism?

What forms may violent extremism take nowadays?

What are the most common reasons for radicalization?

Can a link be established between violent extremism and international peace and
security? If so, explain on what basis.

What specific actions and on what level (local, regional, national, global) should be
taken to most effectively counter violent extremism?

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RECOMMENDED READINGS

Key readings:
United Nations General Assembly, the Secretary-Generals Plan of Action to Prevent
Violent Extremism (A/RES/70/254)
United Nations Security Council, Threats to international peace and security caused by
terrorist acts (S/Res/2178 (2014))
United Nations, Geneva Conference on Preventing Violent Extremism The Way Forward,
2016 (statements and video coverage) https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/genevaconference-statements-programme
United
Nations,
United
Nations
http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/

Action

to

Counter

Terrorism,

Further readings:
T. Barrabi, Lone Wolf' Terrorism: US, Europe Adopt New Security Tactics To Counteract
Homegrown Threats, International Business Times, 2015 http://www.ibtimes.com/lone-wolfterrorism-us-europe-adopt-new-security-tactics-counteract-homegrown-threats-1782520
P. Engel, ISIS has mastered a crucial recruiting tactic no terrorist group has ever conquered,
Business Insider 2015http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-revolutionizing-internationalterrorism-2015-5
16

M. Levitt, O. Decottignies, E. Rosand, Terror in Europe: Combating Foreign Fighters and

Homegrown Networks, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/terror-in-europe-combating-foreignfighters-and-homegrown-networks
R. B. Parent and J. O Ellis III, Countering Radicalization of Diaspora Communities in Canada,
Metropolis British Columbia Centre for Excellence for Research on Immigration and Diversity,
2011 http://mbc.metropolis.net/assets/uploads/files/wp/2011/WP11-12.pdf
Perspectives
on
Terrorism,
Volume
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/162938/PTv6i6Full.pdf

6,

Issue

6,

2012:

Institute
for
Economics
and
Peace,
Global
Terrorism
Index
2015,
http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf
D. Zimmermann, W. Rosenau (eds.), The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism, Zrich
2009 http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securitiesstudies/pdfs/ZB-80.pdf

17

TOPIC B: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCILS REACTIVITY TO

HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Human rights feature prominently in the Charter of the United Nations. Its preamble says that
the Peoples of the United Nations are determined to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war and reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights. Promoting the respect for
human rights is included among the purposes and principles of the organization. Article 55 sees
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights (U.N. Charter art. 55, para. c) as
integral to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for
peaceful and friendly relations among nations (U.N. Charter art. 55).
Nevertheless, for decades, human rights were seen as being largely outside the scope of the
United Nations Security Council (hereinafter: UNSC) and were rarely mentioned within its
confines. Governments felt hesitant about including a set of issues widely perceived as a matter
of state sovereignty in their deliberations about international peace and security. But, after
several decades, when most items on the UNSC agenda had been conflicts between states, the
nature of the situations the UNSC had to address changed towards the end of the 1980s
increasingly to internal conflicts. In these situations, human rights violations are often among
the first warning signs of an imminent conflict; they may be part of a conflicts root causes; and
they are almost invariably a feature of the conflict as such. A failure to accept human rights as
an aspect of the reality which the UNSC needed to deal with would, for purely pragmatic
reasons, considerably hamper the UNSCs effectiveness.

Over the past quarter of a century or so, the UNSC has indeed significantly changed its attitude
to human rights. From largely keeping human rights outside its scope, the UNSC today sees
human rights as an important factor in the situations it is striving to address. Most missions
created or authorized by the UNSC now have various human rights tasks in their mandates, and
most missions have substantive human rights capacities or components. In addition, the UNSC
has used or developed an impressive range of tools, such as commissions of inquiry, judicial
18

mechanisms, visiting missions or sanctions, to achieve goals with an impact on human rights
in different parts of the world.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

The international human rights movement was strengthened when the United Nations General
Assembly (hereinafter: UNGA) adopted of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(hereinafter: UDHR) on 10 December 1948. Drafted as a common standard of achievement
for all peoples and nations, the UDHR for the first time in human history spell out basic civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights that all human beings should enjoy. It has over
time been widely accepted as the fundamental norms of human rights that everyone should
respect and protect (United Nations, 1948). The UDHR, together with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations General Assembly, 1966) and its two
Optional Protocols, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
form the so-called International Bill of Human Rights.
A series of international human rights treaties and other instruments adopted since 1945 have
conferred legal form on inherent human rights and developed the body of international human
rights. Other instruments have been adopted at the regional level reflecting the particular human
rights concerns of the region and providing for specific mechanisms of protection. Most States
have also adopted constitutions and other laws which formally protect basic human rights.
While international treaties and customary law form the backbone of international human rights
law other instruments, such as declarations, guidelines and principles adopted at the
international level contribute to its understanding, implementation and development. Respect
for human rights requires the establishment of the rule of law at the national and international
levels.
International human rights law lays down obligations which States are bound to respect. By
becoming parties to international treaties, States assume obligations and duties under
international law to respect, to protect and to fulfil human rights. The obligation to respect
means that States must refrain from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human
rights. The obligation to protect requires States to protect individuals and groups against human

19

rights abuses. The obligation to fulfil means that States must take positive action to facilitate
the enjoyment of basic human rights.
Through ratification of international human rights treaties, governments undertake to put into
place domestic measures and legislation compatible with their treaty obligations and duties.
Where domestic legal proceedings fail to address human rights abuses, mechanisms and
procedures for individual complaints or communications are available at the regional and
international levels to help ensure that international human rights standards are indeed
respected, implemented, and enforced at the local level.

The already existing enforcement mechanisms for the protection of international

human rights law

The end of World War II signaled a change in the international communitys attitude towards
human rights. Since the adoption of the UDHR by the UNGA in 1948, many more instruments
of international human rights law have been developed with corresponding enforcement
mechanisms.

There are two basic types of legal framework in this regard: declarations and conventions.
Declarations are not legally binding but do have political impact. Conventions are legally
binding under international law and binding on States upon ratification. Both declarations and
conventions can become customary international law over time if meet the necessary
requirements, what then makes them universally legally binding.

A further distinction is to be made between mechanisms for human rights protection: the global
and the regional ones. There are also individual domestic laws within states, which are
considered as the result of a vertical compliance pull of the internalization of international
human rights norms derived from the international and regional declarations and covenants.
Whilst there are irreconcilable political issues inherent in an anarchical society of uneven power
and development, the acculturation power of international law is the dominant protector of
20

human rights. Whilst the two founding principle of modern international society nonintervention and state sovereignty will always be a hinder to the enforcement of international
human rights law, when instances of humanitarian intervention might be considered, the legal
instruments for the protection of international human rights are vital. They have and will
continue to be a relative success, when it comes to the enforcement of human rights laws.
Nevertheless, it is claimed that, whilst international human rights are under-enforced, they are
enforced through the transnational legal process (Koh, 1999, p.1399) This process consists of
interaction between international institutions, interpretation of the legal norms they develop,
and internalization of these norms into the collective consciousness of international actors and
domestic systems. The distinction between obedience of the law and enforcement of the law
should also be drawn (Koh, 1999, p.1401). The path to internalization of norms and laws is
however long and with many different branches.
The initial reasons for state obedience of international human rights law are likely to be based
firstly in power, as from a realist perspective. The birth of international human rights law was
under the United Nations (hereinafter: UN), created by the victors of World War Two: the UN
system therefore favored, and indeed still does, the interests of the powerful states of the mid1940s. This is most strongly reflected in the powers of the P-5 in the UNSC. Secondly, selfinterest has encouraged other states to participate in the international legal system. Rather than,
as Thucydides explained, the weak suffer[ing] what they must (Thucydides., Strassler, &
Crawley, 1996, p.352), it made rational sense in terms of game theory to take part.
Thirdly, the increase in global participation has led to liberal and communitarian reasons for
obeying international law. The spread of democracy during the mid-20th century onwards has
led to an ever-increasing global liberal society. Much work has been done on the theory of the
democratic peace (Doyle 1986), but it is also suggested that democracies do lawbetter at
least with each other (Alvarez, 2007, p.17). The spread of liberal democracy, and therefore
the increase in success of international law leads on to an increase in communitarian reasons
for state obedience of international law. These are based on the idea that ones membership in
a community helps to define how one views the obligations of that community (Koh, 1999,
p.1406). A good example of this is the Council of Europe and the peer pressure exerted by longstanding members onto newer members, such as Ukraine and Turkey, especially when
compared to the relative lack of success of the African Charter on Humans and Peoples Rights,
21

under which democracies and authoritarian regimes work together with less success (Koh,
1999, pp.1405-6).
This logical progression has taken us from realist theories of law obedience to liberal and
communitarian theories, showing that the international human rights legal system is a dynamic
and evolving process. Once law is obeyed for communitarian reasons on a horizontal, state-tostate plane, the vertical internalization of legal norms and values seems the logical next step.
Through the transnational legal process described above, norms are integrated into domestic
law. This is a vertical drip-down effect from global concerns to regional institutions which
often requires states to adopt charter provisions into domestic law. Once in place as domestic
law, these values become internalized.
The socialization of legal human rights norms is the most effective method for guaranteeing
obedience to human rights laws, and is identified as acculturation defined as the general
process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture
(Goodman and Jinks, 2004, p.621). In an increasingly liberal democratic international society,
and within predominantly liberal regional organizations, the acculturation of societies within
each state is inevitable peer pressure and socialization, coupled with the increase in
communications, INGOs, and globalization lead to an assimilation of beliefs about human
rights and the power of international human rights law. The acceptance of human rights norms
into popular culture, political society, and behavior is the most powerful method of
enforcement.
Due to this process, the values we now hold about human are now so internalized that any
disobedience of international human rights law is all the more shocking, and often triggers overcriticism of the enforcement mechanisms for international human rights law. Whilst any human
rights abuse comes at a humanitarian cost which cannot be ignored, obedience to international
human rights law globally is set at a high level. For reasons of conciseness, this essay shall
however examine UN Charter-based enforcement mechanisms only; there are separate
mechanisms for enforcement at regional and domestic levels, and independent bilateral
enforcement methods such as diplomacy and sanctions.
In 2006, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, voiced concerns about the
human rights mechanisms under the UN, including: the ad hoc manner in which the treaty
body has grown, the low levels of public awareness, and the absence of effective,
22

comprehensive follow-up mechanisms for recommendations (OFlaherty, 2011, p.70). These

shall be examined in order.
Firstly, the ad hoc manner of adoption of human rights treaties is to be expected in an
international system characterized by sovereign states with differing political systems. The
proliferation of liberal democracy is still a modern and ongoing concept. If the development of
international human rights law is due to the spread of liberal democracy and acculturation, then
human rights law is bound to grow with liberal democracy in a reactive manner rarely is law
pre-emptive.
Secondly, perceived low levels of public awareness do not correspond with the internalization
element of the legal process. However, lack of public awareness of international human rights
norms is not to say that there is no public awareness of domestic human rights norms, which,
from the drip-down of norms from the international arena identified above, are likely to be very
similar. True internalization of norms and laws means that one is not aware of the reasons
behind their normative values in a legal sense, but that they are inherent in that societys beliefs
system. Therefore, low levels of public awareness do not equate to public apathy.
Thirdly, the absence of effective follow-up mechanisms for recommendations is a damning
critique of the UN human rights protection system. However, the principles laid out under
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (1945), severely curtails the options of enforcement by the UN
toward states that commit serious human rights abuses. The contested concept of humanitarian
intervention is a heated debate, and the UNSC historically tends not to have a unified opinion
on this. The states mainly associated with humanitarian intervention are the United States of
America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, Australia and
Canada. Currently, these states are only likely to intervene in their direct sphere of influence,
region, or ex-colonies. International-led interventions by the UN have been ad hoc, with a
dismal record (Kurth, 2005, p.100) due to the veto power of the P-5.

There is potential for regional organizations with more cohesive human rights policies (due to
the communitarian reasons for adopting human rights norms) to intervene in their sphere of
influence in humanitarian crises. The Responsibility to Protect (hereinafter: R2P) doctrine
gives regional ownership before international (UN) ownership, and prototypes of this kind of
23

intervention have been seen, such as the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (hereinafter: NATO) providing training and support for African Union troops on
the ground in Darfur in mid-2005 (Kurth, 2005, p.101). However, the adoption of UNSC
resolution 1973 over Libya shows that UN-authorised humanitarian intervention is a possibility
(UNSC, 2011). One could find reason for this in the horizontal transnational legal process of
acculturation of human rights values, particularly through the spread of the media and internet.
Following criticism of the legitimacy of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Human
Rights Council was created and held its first session in June 2006 (Weissbrodt, 2011, p.15).
The UNs reaction to criticism of the Commission demonstrated firstly, the power of
internalized human rights norms at societal and INGO level (the Commission was heavily
criticized by Human Rights Watch over the nomination of Libya as Commission Chair in 2002),
and secondly, the power of these norms at state and international organization level within the
UN. The perceived legitimacy of the claims against Libya was the result of the acculturation of
the human rights norms laid down in the International Bill of Rights and other Declarations and
Conventions.
In conclusion, there are many shortcomings in the enforcement mechanisms of international
human rights law. However, the present weaknesses are due to unavoidable aspects of our
anarchic global society, especially the principle of state sovereignty. Whilst this concept is hard
to reconcile with the use of force to enforce human rights, there is hope amongst the recent
decisions of the UNSC over Libya, and also for regional bodies with more credibility within
their regions to act. The most powerful enforcer of human rights is the horizontal and vertical
transnational legal process and the resulting internalization and socialization of human rights
values. The acculturation of human rights within liberal democratic government frameworks
encourages domestic internalization and the spread of these values amongst states, especially
states who perceive they have commonalities, such as democracy, or who aspire to be counted
amongst those morally higher states. Whilst the enforcement of any kind of international law is
fraught with issues that domestic laws do not have due to the lack of an international authority,
the value of socialization and peer pressure is not to be underestimated when it comes to the
enforcement of international human rights law.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

24

What is international humanitarian law

International humanitarian law is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit
the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in
the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare. International humanitarian law
is also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict. International humanitarian law is
part of international law, which is the body of rules governing relations between States.
International law is contained in agreements between States treaties or conventions , in
customary rules, which consist of State practice considered by them as legally binding, and in
general principles. International humanitarian law applies to armed conflicts. It does not
regulate whether a State may actually use force; this is governed by an important, but distinct,
part of international law set out in the UN Charter.

Where did international humanitarian law originate from

International humanitarian law is rooted in the rules of ancient civilizations and religions
warfare has always been subject to certain principles and customs. Universal codification of
international humanitarian law began in the nineteenth century. Since then, States have agreed
to a series of practical rules, based on the bitter experience of modern warfare. These rules strike
a careful balance between humanitarian concerns and the military requirements of States. As
the international community has grown, an increasing number of States have contributed to the
development of those rules. International humanitarian law forms today a universal body of
law.

Where is international humanitarian law to be found

A major part of international humanitarian law is contained in the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 (International Committee of the Red Cross [hereinafter: ICRC], 1949). Nearly every State
in the world has agreed to be bound by them. The Conventions have been developed and
25

supplemented by two further agreements: The Additional Protocols of 1977 relating to the
protection of victims of armed conflicts (ICRC, 1977).
Other agreements prohibit the use of certain weapons and military tactics and protect certain
categories of people and goods. These agreements include the 1954 Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, plus its two protocols; the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention; the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and its five
protocols; the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention; the 1997 Ottawa Convention on antipersonnel mines; and the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the involvement of children in armed conflict. Many provisions of international
humanitarian law are now accepted as customary law that is, as general rules by which all
States are bound.

When does international humanitarian law apply

International humanitarian law applies only to armed conflict; it does not cover internal tensions
or disturbances such as isolated acts of violence. The law applies only once a conflict has begun,
and then equally to all sides regardless of who started the fighting.
International humanitarian law distinguishes between international and non-international armed
conflict. International armed conflicts are those in which at least two States are involved. They
are subject to a wide range of rules, including those set out in the four Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I.
Non-international armed conflicts are those restricted to the territory of a single State, involving
either regular armed forces fighting groups of armed dissidents, or armed groups fighting each
other. A more limited range of rules apply to internal armed conflicts and are laid down in
Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions as well as in Additional Protocol II.
It is important to differentiate between international humanitarian law and human rights law.
While some of their rules are similar, these two bodies of law have developed separately and
are contained in different treaties. In particular, human rights law unlike international
humanitarian law applies in peacetime, and many of its provisions may be suspended during
an armed conflict.
26

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ENFORCEMENT

OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
Violations of international humanitarian law as a threat to peace and security

The UN Charter does not contain any express reference to international humanitarian law. If
respect for human rights is mentioned among the purposes of the United Nations in Article
1(3), no mention of the laws and customs of war appears in either Article 1 or 2. This omission
was intentional, as the drafters saw any reference to the jus in bello as an implicit recognition
that, in spite of Article 2(4) and the collective security mechanisms provided in the Charter,
armed conflicts could not be prevented (Schotten and Biehler, 2008). Human rights have
however been interpreted broadly in UN fora since the 1960s: the notion of human rights in
armed conflict, which includes international humanitarian law, was introduced at the 1968 UN
International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran and was later reaffirmed in several
General Assembly resolutions, starting with Resolution 2444 (XXIII) of December 19, 1968
(UNGA, 1968). Resolution 9/9 (2008) of the UN Human Rights Council has also clearly stated
that conduct that violates international humanitarian law ... may also constitute a gross
violation of human rights (Human Rights Council, 2008).
Nonetheless, the fact that promoting and encouraging respect for international humanitarian
law can now be considered one of the UN purposes does not necessarily mean that the UNSC
is competent to act to achieve that purpose. Indeed, the main responsibility of the UNSC under
the Charter is to maintain international peace and security (Article 24(1)) rather than to ensure
that hostilities are conducted in accordance with the jus in bello. The Charter, thus, makes the
UNSC the arbiter of when armed force can be used, but does not say anything about how this
force can be employed (Fry, 2006): as noted by Judge Fitzmaurice, [i]t was to keep the peace,
not to change the world order, that the UNSC was set up. (International Court of Justice,1971)
In particular, the problem with using Chapter VII enforcement powers to secure compliance
with international humanitarian law is that, as is well-known, according to Article 39 of the
Charter those powers can be invoked by the UNSC only in case of a threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression, as their purpose is to keep the peace and not to enforce the
law (Kelsen, 1950). It is however quite possible that these two goals occasionally coincide. The
27

question is whether a breach of international humanitarian law can be considered by the UNSC
a threat to the peace. Although the drafters regarded this concept as linked to the international
use of armed force (sterdahl, 1998), its scope has been progressively expanded by the UNSC.
Koskenniemi has highlighted UNSCs willingness to use its exceptionally hard powers of
enforcement, binding resolutions, economic sanctions and military force for soft purposes of
international justice (Koskenniemi, 1995, p. 341) He claims that [t]he sense of peace has
been widened from the (hard) absence of the use of armed force by a State to change the
territorial status quo to the (soft) conditions within which peace in its hard sense depends
(Koskenniemi, 1995, p. 309) It can thus be argued that, although in principle the primary
function of the UNSC is the maintenance of international peace and security, which is not
necessarily identical to the remedying of internationally wrongful acts, in practice there has
been a significant overlap, with the UNSC qualifying the most diverse breaches of international
law as constituting threats to the peace (Joyner, 2009). The nexus between the maintenance of
peace and humanitarian considerations was initially emphasized in the 1992 statement by the
President of the UNSC on behalf of its members: The absence of war and military conflicts
among States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military
sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become
threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the
appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters (UNSC,
1992)
Violations of international humanitarian law were expressly considered as a threat to the peace
by the UNSC for the first time in Resolution 808 (1993) with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina
The following year, Resolution 955 (1994) qualified violations of international humanitarian
law committed in an internal armed conflict (Rwanda) as a threat to international peace and
security. In Resolution 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, systematic,
flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian law were qualified for the first
time as potentially constituting threats to the peace without reference to any specific conflict.
The UNSCs meeting records also show that several States have reaffirmed the link between
the maintenance of international peace and security and compliance with international
humanitarian law (Wellens, 2003).
The question is, however, whether any violation of international humanitarian law can qualify
as a threat to the peace in the sense of Article 39. Even though the UNSC enjoys a broad
28

discretion in determining the existence of such a threat (ICJ, 1901), this kompetenz-kompetenz
is not unlimited: a threat to the peace could not be artificially created as a pretext for the
realization of ulterior purposes (Goodwin-Gill & Talmon eds., 1999). The International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) made clear that the threat to the peace
is more of a political concept. But the determination that there exists such a threat is not a
matter of totally unfettered discretion, as it has to remain, at the very least, within the limits of
the purposes and principles of the Charter (ICC, 1995) According to Conforti, the conduct of
a State cannot be considered a threat to the peace when the condemnation is not shared by the
opinion of most of the States and their peoples (Conforti, 2005) Other commentators refer to
the limit of good faith and to the doctrine of abuse of right.31 It is true that there is no direct
judicial control over acts of the UNSC (ICJ, 1993), but there are indirect ones: protest by refusal
to comply with the resolution by the UN Member States, indirect judicial control when a
resolution becomes relevant to decide a case before an international or national tribunal, and
acceptance of the UNSCs action by the international community (Bothe, 1992).
In order to establish the existence of a threat to the peace, then, the rank of the breached norm
or value, the severity of the violation and its transboundary effects need be taken into
consideration.34 This conclusion is confirmed by the practice of the UNSC: Resolutions 808
(1993), 955 (1994), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006), 1894 (2009) and 1314 (2000) all
specify that the violations of international humanitarian law amounting to a threat to the peace
are systematic, widespread and flagrant (Herdegen, 1998). It will however be seen that
customary international law appears to have made this de minimis requirement of scarce
practical importance.

The enforcement of international humanitarian law through Chapter VII

measures

The UNSC has adopted a variety of measures in relation to international humanitarian law. It
has for instance determined that international humanitarian law applies to certain situations
29

(Bothe, 1992) or that certain conduct amounts to a violation of international humanitarian law,
it has invited to consider to convene a meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the IV Geneva
Convention and it has condemned or deplored violations and those who perpetrated them. The
UNSC has also set up fact-finding bodies (albeit that these have sometimes been preliminary to
the adoption of coercive measures). This exercise of a fact-finding function by the UNSC has
at least partly remedied the paralysis of the International Fact-Finding Commission envisaged
in Article 90 of Additional Protocol I, although it has also been noted that this practice of
establishing ad hoc bodies is one of the factors that have condemned the Commission to
inactivity.
Although the importance of the above declaratory and fact-finding measures cannot be
underestimated, this article will focus on the enforcement measures provided in Chapter VII
aimed at forcing compliance by actors breaching the jus in bello. First, the UNSC has in various
armed conflicts encouraged, urged, called on, demanded and requested belligerent States to
comply with international humanitarian law (in general or with regard to specific instruments).
These calls could be adopted under Chapter VI but also under Chapter VII.66 In Resolution
1265 (1999) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, for the first time the UNSC urged
all States to respect international humanitarian law without reference to a specific conflict. In
some cases, the calls have been accompanied by the threat of the adoption of coercive measures
in case of non-compliance: it has however been observed that these threats usually have a
negligible effect on the conduct of those to whom they are addressed (Agirrezabal, 2007). The
UNSC has also on various occasions demanded that the belligerents take certain actions, e.g.
prevent violations, guarantee humanitarian access to the population, protect civilians, provide
compensation and prosecute those responsible for the violations. Again, these calls can range
from mere recommendations to decisions adopted under Chapter VII. In some cases, the UNSC
has even called upon States not involved in a given conflict to adopt certain measures, as in the
case of the resolutions calling upon third States not to provide assistance to Israel in connection
with settlements in the Palestinian Occupied Territories.

The most incisive measures at the disposal of the UNSC are however those provided in Articles
41 and 42 of Chapter VII. As to the former, most of the sanctions regimes established after 1997
have had the purpose of limiting violence that had an impact on civilians (UNSC, 2008). In
30

particular, at least four of the sanctions regimes created after 2004 (Cte dIvoire, Sudan, the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Somalia) are related to violations of human rights
or international humanitarian law. The problem with full-scale sanctions is that they may at the
same time enforce international humanitarian law and have severe negative effects on civilians
and vulnerable groups. Two solutions have been engineered to solve this problem. The first is
the inclusion of a humanitarian exception in the sanctions regime, in order to allow the provision
of goods essential for the survival of the civilian population. The second and now most popular
solution is to replace indiscriminate measures with smart or targeted sanctions in certain
cases accompanied by the authorization to use all necessary means to ensure their respect. The
sanctions regimes with regard to Liberia, Cte dIvoire, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and DRC, for
instance, provide for measures specifically targeting individuals and entities responsible for
violations of international humanitarian law (including non-State actors), e.g. arms embargoes,
bans on the export of natural resources aimed to finance conflicts, the freezing of financial
assets and restrictions on flights and movement (UNSC, 2008. Their efficacy, which depends
on their implementation by Member States, is however doubtful. Another problem lies in the
fact that targeted measures on individuals might amount to the imposition of penalties without
due process guarantees: indeed, decisions on listing and de-listing targeted individuals and
entities are taken by political organs (the sanctions committees) that do not disclose the reasons
for their decisions, the listees are not represented in the procedure and no judicial review against
the decisions is provided. It is therefore not surprising that the World Summit Outcome
Document reaffirmed the need for fair and clear procedures for placing individuals and entities
on sanctions lists and for removing them (Cannizzaro, 2006). The 2006 Watson Report made a
number of recommendations for reform with regard to the processes of notification, access, fair
hearing and effective remedy (Watson, 2006). Some of these procedural safeguards to protect
individual rights were eventually adopted by the UNSC in Resolution 1730 (2006), by which
the UNSC requested the UN Secretary-General to establish within the Secretariat a focal
point to receive de-listing requests and perform the tasks described in the annex to the
resolution (UNSC, 2006).

The UNSC has also adopted other measures that can be ascribed to Article 41 but are not
expressly mentioned therein. The most famous examples are the establishment of the
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda in order to
31

investigate and prosecute those responsible for grave violations of international humanitarian
law and the creation of the UN Compensation Commission for Iraq. Furthermore, by Resolution
1593 (2005), acting under Chapter VII the UNSC referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.
The ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have both held that the
UNSC had not exceeded its powers when it created judicial organs to prosecute jus in bello
violations. According to the ICTY, in particular, the legality of the tribunals does not depend
on the question whether these measures have been actually successful in securing compliance
with international humanitarian law (ICTY, 2006).
As to measures involving the use of force, if States and regional organizations are not entitled
to unilaterally use military coercion in order to secure compliance with the jus in bello as neither
Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions nor Article 89 of Additional Protocol I constitute
exceptions to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,92 the UNSC could take or authorize military
action under Chapter VII in order to prevent or stop violations of international humanitarian
law.93 From this perspective, it has been claimed that there is an evident trend towards
militarization in the implementation of international humanitarian law (Boisson de
Chazournes and Condorelli, 2000, p.82) In 1996, the ICTY amended its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence and adopted Article 59 bis, which authorizes the arrest of ICTY indictates by
international forces in the field when necessary to ensure the effective functioning of the
Tribunal. The UNSC has also repeatedly authorized UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement
forces, state coalitions and regional organizations to use force if necessary to protect civilians
and guarantee humanitarian access: The UNSC referred for the first time to the protection [of]
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and authorized a peacekeeping force to
take necessary action to ensure such protection in Resolution 1270 (1999) establishing the
UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (Holt, Taylor & Kell, 2009). Although the language
is not always consistent (apart from necessary action, peacekeeping forces have also been
authorized to use all necessary means or all necessary measures to implement their
mandate), the inclusion of a protection mandate based on Chapter VII is now virtually standard
in UN peace operations.

The inclusion of protection activities in the mandate of UN forces, as reaffirmed in Resolutions

1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009), is one of the most important developments in the field of
32

peacekeeping in recent years. In fact, one of the results of the UNSC public thematic debate on
the protection of civilians in armed conflict has been the establishment, in January 2009, of an
informal Expert Group on the Protection of Civilians to receive and consider briefings from the
Secretariat prior to consultations on the mandates of specific peacekeeping operations. The
Group meets when a peacekeeping mandate with a protection element needs be renewed.
Obviously, this broader peacekeeping mandate requires that peacekeepers be provided with all
necessary resources to implement it: This does not seem to have been the case of UNAMID
(African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur) which has made very little progress because
of insufficient troops and assets and because of limited cooperation from Sudan (Grey, 2008).
As observed by the representative of Japan, a substantial gap exists between the high
expectations placed on a mission to carry out the mandate when the UNSC takes a decision and
the actual implementation on the ground of those mandates. It is therefore not surprising that
the two recently published studies of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations try to
address the operational challenges faced by UN operations in the implementation of robust
mandates involving the protection of civilians in armed conflict.
It is worth recalling that Article 42 provides that it is only when Article 41 measures have
proven, or are assumed, to be inadequate that measures involving the use of force can be taken,
and only as may be necessary. Therefore, even though Article 39 leaves the choice of means
and their evaluation to the UNSC, which enjoys wide discretionary powers in this regard; and
it could not have been otherwise, as such a choice involves political evaluation of highly
complex and dynamic situations, (ICTY, 2006) this discretion is not unlimited, both from the
perspective of the Charter and of the general system of law in which all international legal
persons operate. (Gardam, 1996) This means that the UNSC should not resort to coercive
measures if the situation can be effectively dealt with through other means: minor or isolated
violations of international humanitarian law could for instance be addressed through its peaceful
settlement powers under Chapter VI. If adopted, coercive measures will have to be
proportionate to the violation they react against, as the Security Council, like other
international legal persons, would be governed by the requirement that all use of force must be
proportionate to its aim. (Gill, 1995, p.227) As a consequence, only the most serious and
widespread breaches of the jus in bello would justify the adoption of military measures by the
UNSC: indeed, [m]ilitary enforcement action is a blunt instrument [which] is unlikely of
achieving results unless it is employed highly selectively Bothe, 1992, p. 227)
33

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY

TO PROTECT DOCTRINE
State sovereignty has long been regarded as the pivotal structural paradigm of international law.
Its recognition in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter as a fundamental, albeit qualified, principle of
the United Nations is only one of many indicators that it has not forfeited its significance. At
the same time, the rising importance of the protection of human rights raises the question of
how to reconcile the inherent tension between these two principles. In the modern international
legal order, it has become clear that the treatment of human beings within the territorial
boundaries of a state does not belong to the domaine reserve that excludes interferences from
the outside. Yet it is far from clear how the international community--represented through the
United Nations, regional organizations, and individual states or groups of states-- should act
and is allowed to act when a state commits major human rights violations such as genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity. When diplomatic efforts and political or
economic sanctions fail, military action in the form of a humanitarian intervention is often
considered as a last resort.
Following the Cold War and the revitalization of the U.N. system of collective security, the
question of the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention gained practical
importance. In the 1990s, massive human rights violations led to fierce debate, especially in
cases where the UNSC did not authorize an intervention. In 1994, the international community
failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda due to the lack of political will and determination
among the main political actors. The NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999 to end ethnic cleansing
and other mass atrocities, despite the absence of UNSC authorization, added to the controversy.
By the end of the twentieth century, the world was deeply divided into proponents who regarded
humanitarian intervention as often the only effective means to address massive human rights
violations and critics to whom humanitarian intervention was nothing but a rhetorical and
euphemistic pretext under which the great powers pursued their imperialist self-interests
through coercive measures.

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In the memory of Rwanda, Kosovo and Bosnia where genocide, massacre and ethnic
cleansing have taken place with the international community remaining on the sidelines - we
should examine humanitarian intervention in parallel with the R2P. It is, indeed, a world with
new challenges that the UN must confront. This burdens of course lies on the UNSC and its
attributed role as set forth by the Charter of the UN. As stated in Article 24, Chapter V of the
Charter of the UN, in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the UN, its Members confer
on the UNSC primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,
and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the UNSC acts on their behalf.
This of course is a fact mirrored in the function of the UNSC and especially attributed to the
veto power the permanent member retains. Among the principles or purposes of the United
Nations are promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms. Member states must promote universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion. They must also pledge themselves to joint and separate action to achieve these
goals. This theoretical analysis gives an insight in the problematic of a terminology with distinct
and direct impact on the international community. Politically speaking, intervention amounts
to a promise to people in need. The main factor that generates the dilemma between
intervention and non-intervention is the impartiality. Intervention, sometimes, means taking
sides in state conflicts and this could lead to a further state fragmentation rather than mitigating
human rights abuses (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
[hereinafter: ICISS], 2001).
The essence of humanitarian intervention could be concentrated in the words of the former UN
Secretary General, Kofi-Annan: if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable
assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica to gross and
systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?
Humanitarian intervention is a sensitive issue, fraught with political difficulty and not
susceptible to easy answers. (ICISS, 2001, para. VII) The former Secretary General recognized
the shared responsibility of the international community to act, but rejected a systematic
approach to implementing this responsibility, favoring instead a case-by-case approach. The
current Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon noted that institution had failed in the past and
attributed this tragic failure to the bold lines that the conceptual framework of humanitarian

35

intervention drew, creating what he called a false choice between using coercive force or
standing by and observing unfolding human tragedies
Another approached definition of humanitarian intervention is the use of force across state
borders be a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave
violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without
the permission of the government of the state within whose territory force is applied
(Holzgrefe, 2004, p.18) One definition of anticipatory humanitarian intervention is the
coercive interference by one state or group of states into the affairs of another state for the
express purpose of preempting or mitigating human rights atrocities that are about to be
committed in the latter state. It is quite obvious that a widely accepted definition of
humanitarian intervention is non-existent. While some try to regulate the term in international
frameworks in order to overrule gaps of legality, history has shown that it is a principle applied
each time differently lacking a certain pattern.
The three cases where the international community failed to meet its responsibilities and was
an observer of the ongoing massacre were: Rwanda, Kosovo and Bosnia. Within the changing
international environment, the United Nations should respond to the new circumstances and the
risks which they bear. The rising of a new era especially after the traumatized last decade bring
new data about the dynamics that have emerged through longstanding challenges but at the
same time from new unprecedented ones that require immediate answer all in the face of the
international community. These new circumstances could be summarized in the following
sentences. First and foremost, the emergence of new actors should be taken into serious
consideration, bringing onto surface new perspectives and new interests. Furthermore, it is
recognized that the end of Cold War resulted in civil wars in the name of democratization,
where suppressed people demand more political and civil rights, whilst the need for selfdeterminations remains a constant request, and therefore the possibility of the proliferation of
armed conflict within states remains extremely high. To that point, the evolving role of human
rights protection as a central subject and the responsibility of cooperative designated fora in
establishing the norm of human security are of great importance. It is a give fact that all these
aspects should be examined in the light of globalization, under a reformed perspective tempting
multilateral action, as the end of Cold War brought in light new opportunities and capacities for
such practices.
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The role of interest in motivating intervention emanates from the nature of the international
system itself. In the absence of a central authority to implement norms such as human rights
standards, the enforcement of these norms falls to states. But concepts such as humanitarian
intervention have brought the UN to uncharted water. Theoretical approaches on the legitimacy
or even the bare existence of such norm were ongoing in the last decades whilst the term itself
remains heavily disputed. Potential abuse constituted a serious objection to the right of
humanitarian intervention. Selectivity and objectiveness plagues actions under this certain
framework and puts its unrestricted practice to question. Consequent attempts to transcend
some ongoing disputed over the legality and desirability of the right to humanitarian
intervention has led to a relatively new conceptual framework, the R2P.

FINAL REMARKS
The UNSC has undoubtedly come a long way in its evolution of the manner in which it treats
human rights. After seeing human rights almost as a taboo for a number of decades, the UNSC
now considers human rights as a part of the reality with which it needs to deal in its effort to
maintain international peace and security. The story of the evolution of the UNSCs approach
to human rights also illustrates several of the most interesting features of the UNSC: its
adaptability, pragmatism and creativity. Not all these features are seen at every point, and not
every member displays them at any given moment, but it is safe to say that collectively, the
UNSC is probably the most pragmatic and adaptable international body. The UNSCs treatment
of human rights provides one of the examples of its ability to accept the changing nature of the
very phenomenon with which it works, i.e. conflict; and thus to modify one of its seemingly
most inviolable tenets, i.e. that human rights fall strictly within states sovereignty, and to invent
or adapt its tools to better fit the changing nature of international peace and security. Yet,
looking at the various conflict situations, the UNSCs approach to them and the impact of this
approach specifically on the human rights of the people living in the different countries, some
more critical thoughts also come to mind. A close examination of UNSCs decisions and action
with regard to human rights suggests that its resort to the different tools and its follow-up have
been uneven, and that a large proportion of human rights-related language in UNSCs
resolutions is declaratory or hortative, rather than operative. From looking at the different cases,
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it seems that meaningful human rights result on the ground in conflict situations are achieved
when there is burden sharing both within the UN and among the different parts of the UN,
maximizing all resources. Follow-up and a close focus, sometimes for years at a time, are
needed to produce lasting human rights improvements. Such long-term commitment is
sometimes hard to maintain, especially when multiple crises compete for the UNSCs attention,
and a sense of fatigue sets in when the conflict continues despite all the measures deployed. It
is also useful to appreciate that human rights improvements are never just one actors success
and that the different actors can reinforce each others value added. In this context, what may
often be useful is advocacy, not only from civil society alone, but also from concerned member
states and across the different UN bodies. Internal advocacy within the different parts of the
UN, aimed at achieving synergies, maximizing the available resources and impact also appears
to be a potentially useful tool. Flexibility and creativity is key to finding ways to address human
rights challenges and the UNSC with its almost limitless adaptability can in this context
probably be seen as a model by other bodies. One final conclusion is that there is probably quite
a high degree of unrealized potential within the UNSC for having a significant impact on human
rights conditions in specific situations around the world. With the recent launch of the Human
Rights up Front action plan and the overall culture of the UN changing toward prioritizing
human rights, promising opportunities might lie ahead. At press time, of particular importance
is the start in the UNSC of discussions of the recommendations submitted by the High-level
Independent Panel on Peace Operations. The Panel placed human rights squarely at the core of
UN peace and security action and made several recommendations highly relevant to UNSCs
potential effectiveness in preventing or mitigating conflict-related human rights crises. In
particular, it stressed the need for UNSCs focus on and engagement in emerging conflicts
rather than operating in a reactive mode. It also emphasized the need for the UNSC to receive
frank and timely information and assessments from the UN system, including specifically on
human rights issues. During the UNSCs first discussion of the report held on 20 November
2015 several members spoke about those aspects of the Panels report and about the SecretaryGenerals Human Rights up Front initiative. Those discussions will continue in the course of
2016 and human rights are likely to feature prominently in them.

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QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION SHOULD ANSWER

-

How has the UNSCs approach to human rights evolved over decades?

Does the UN Charter state in any way that the Security Council should be taking human
rights into consideration while exercising its primary function of maintenance of
international peace and security?

What is the relationship between the UNSC and the parts of the UN system specifically
focused on human rights, in particular the Human Rights Council and its predecessor, the
Commission on Human Rights, as well as the High Commissioner for Human Rights?

Upon fulfillment of what requirements is a coercive action - especially military action,

against another state in order to bear the responsibility of that state to protect its civilian?

Are there any criteria over intervention - such as right intention, necessity, proportionality,
last resort and reasonable prospects of success that should be implemented, in order to
ensure transparency and to enhance legitimacy of this action?

How has the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect been implemented so far? Compare
the cases of Libya and Syria.

Why has the Council failed to address human rights violations on certain occasions in the
past? What were the criteria for its actions/inactions? Name examples of the Councils
failure to prevent/stop grave human rights violations.

Is there any code of conduct regarding the Councils response to human rights violations?
How does the Councils voting procedure affect it?

What can the Security Council do to better protect human rights?

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BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RECOMMENDED READINGS

Key documents:
United Nations, The United Nations Charter, 1945
Resolutions

adopted

the

United

Nations

Security

Council:

http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

Further readings:
A. J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, Polity Press,
2009.
G. Evans, The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria, Annual Castan Centre for
Human Rights Law Conference, Melbourne, 20 July 2012:
http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech476.html
T. J. Farer, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Chapter 2:
Humanitarian Intervention before and after 9/11, ed. J.L.Holgrefe and Robert O. Keohane,
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
D. P. Forsythe, The UN Security Council and Human Rights: State Sovereignty and Human
Dignity, 2012: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/09069.pdf
J. Genser, B. S. Ugart et al., The United Nations Security Council in the Age of Human Rights,
Cambridge University Press 2014
J. L. Holzgrefe, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Chapter 1:
The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, ed. J.L.Holgrefe and Robert O.Keohane, Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect,
2001.
Secretary-General of the United Nations, A vital and enduring commitment: implementing the
responsibility to protect, 2015 (A/69/981)
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Security Council Report, Human Rights and the Security CouncilAn Evolving Role, 2016:
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/research_report_human_rights_january_2016.pdf
B. G. Ramcharan, The United Nations Security Council and the Protection of Human Rights,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2002
M. Roscini, The UN Security Council and the enforcement of international humanitarian law,
2009 http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/MarcoRupdatedpaper.pdf
R. Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the
Responsibility to Protect, Cambridge University, 2006.
J. M. Welsh, Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, Oxford University Press,
2006.

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