LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S.

PUNO of the Court of Appeals

dated 14 November 1990 A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA | June 29, 1992 |
FACTS:
November 14, 1990 - Associate Justice Renato S. Puno, a member of the Court of
Appeals, wrote a letter addressed to the Court seeking the correction of his
seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals
Puno was first appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 20 June 1980
but took his oath of office for said position only on 29 November 1982, after serving
as Assistant Solicitor General in the Office of the Solicitor General since 1974.
17 January 1983 - Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the
Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary. Appropriating Funds Therefore and For Other Purposes.
Petitioner was appointed Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases Division of
the Intermediate Appellate Court.
7 November 1984 - petitioner accepted an appointment to be ceased to be a
member of the Judiciary. The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986
brought about a reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary. A
screening committee was created
President Cory Aquino, exercising legislative powers, issued E.O. No. 33 (govern
reorganization of judiciary) Screening committee recommended return of Puno as
Associate Justice of the new Court of Appeals and assigned him rank eleven (11) in
the roster of appellate court justices.
Appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino ! seniority ranking of Puno changed
from eleven (11) to twenty-six (26).
Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be
attributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33 SECTION 2. Section 3, Chapter 1 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, is hereby amended to read as follows: "SEC. 2. Organization.
There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding Justice
and fifty Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment and the
Associate Justice shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective
appointments, or when the appointments of two or more shall bear the same date,
according to the order in which their appointments were issued by the President.
Any Member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other
position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled
under his original appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all intents and
purpose be considered as continuous and uninterrupted."
Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the
correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request. (Presiding Justice of CA Nocon
directed seniority rank of Puno from 12 to 5.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr. and
Javellana, who are affected by the ordered correction.
They alleged that petitioner could not claim reappointment because the courts
where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last
appointment. ISSUE: WoN the present Court of Appeals is a new court or merely a
continuation of the old Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

such that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed
by petitioner existing prior to Executive Order No. 33.
HELD:
The present CA is a new entity (established under EO No 33), different and distinct
from the CA or the IAC existing prior to EO No. 33, for it was created in the wake of
the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon
Aquino in the people power. A revolution has been defined as the complete
overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were
previously subject to it, or as a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the
government or political system usually effected with violence or at least some acts
of violence.
RULING:
The Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of
members of the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the
appointments were made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137**

Marbury vs Madison (1803)
Facts:
-The case resulted from a petition to the Supreme Court by William Marbury,
who had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia by
President John Adams but whose commission was not subsequently delivered.
-Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to compel the new Secretary of State
James Madison to deliver the documents.
-The Court, with John Marshall as Chief Justice, found firstly that Madison's
refusal to deliver the commission was both illegal and remediable.
-Nonetheless, the Court stopped short of compelling Madison (by writ of
mandamus) to hand over Marbury's commission, instead holding that the provision
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that enabled Marbury to bring his claim to the Supreme
Court was itself unconstitutional, since it purported to extend the Court's original
jurisdiction beyond that which Article III established.
-The petition was therefore denied.
Issue:
Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?
-YES. When a commission has been signed by the President, the appointment
is made. The commission is completed when the seal of the US is affixed to it by the
Secretary of State. Thus, it gave Marbury the right to hold office for five years,
independent of the executive. To withhold his commission would be violative of a
vested legal right.
If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford
him remedy?
YES. One of the first duties of the government is to afford that protection.
The President is invested with certain important political powers which authorizes
him to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his
orders. It is political in nature and the court has no jurisdiction over it. But when the
legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed
peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent
on the performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to
the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights
of others. Thus, Marbury has a right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which is
a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.
He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies?
-NO. This depends on:
1st. The nature of the writ applied for.
2nd. The power if this court.
3rd. The nature of the writ.

These circumstances certainly concur in this case.

For the 1st: Where the head of the department is directed by law to do a
certain act affecting the absolute rights of individuals, in the performance of
which he is not placed under the particular direction of the President, and the
performance of which, the President cannot lawfully forbid, and therefore is
never presumed to have forbidden; as for example, to record a commission,
or a patent for land or to give a copy of a record; it is not perceived on what
ground the courts of the country are further excuse from the duty of giving
judgement, that right be done to an injured individual, than if the same
services were to be performed by a person not the head of a department.
This is a plain case for a mandamus.
For the 2nd and 3rd: The Supreme Court is authorized to issue writs of
mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any
courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the US. It
was insisted that the Supreme Court should have had appellate jurisdiction
for it to issue a mandamus. It appears that issuing a writ of mandamus to
public officers is not warranted by the Constitution. Since the act is
repugnant to the Constitution, the former is deemed void.
Decision:
Petition denied

Sanidad vs COMELEC (October 12, 1976) Martin, J

This is here as a demonstration that at some point in our history, the President did
exercise in this function of proposing revisions/amendments to the Constitution.
But now, that power resides in our people, and for anybody to exercise it, they must
locate their authority to do so under the Constitution.
Facts:
-On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve some issues.
-On September 22, 1976, the President issued
another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous
Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No.
229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"
(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October
16, 1976.
-On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree
No. 1033,
stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on
October 16, 1976.
-The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control
of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.
-On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and
son, filed for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and
1033, insofar as
they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No.
1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold,
and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16,1976.
-On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent
Commission on Elections. The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners
have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial
cognizance of this Court.
-On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
was

instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional

Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the
Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim
National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.
-Another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5,
1976 by RAUL M. GONZALES.
Issues:
WON petitioner's have legal standing. YES
WON the issue at hand is justiciable.-YES
The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to
initiate the of normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the
terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to
propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in
the period of
transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso
facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art.
XVI, 1973 constitution). Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All
cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may
shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive
agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at
least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the
last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of
the Constitution itself. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the
act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but
his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a
constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that
power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question.
WON the President can amend the Constitution. NO and YES
The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the
ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or
adoption of amendments to the Constitution. The amending process is laid out in
the Constitution and can be found in Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution and Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions. (see notes) In times of
normally, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a
Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the
National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a
majority vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon special call by the
interim Prime
Minister.
In the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution
lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (Sec. 15 of

the Transitory Provisions). Harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President
decided not to call the interim National Assembly. If the President has been
legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is
no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross
legislative actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the
governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a
destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end
the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential
initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns
supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the
President now, are mere agents of the people.
The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise
their sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as
earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are
the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the
authority who can presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal vein,
the submission of those proposed amendments and the question of martial law in a
referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people themselves
implemented only by the authority of the President.
WON the referendum-plebiscite is inoperative because of the participation of 15
year olds.
-NO. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1)
Do you want martial law to be continued? - is a referendum question, wherein the
15-year olds may participate. For the succeeding question on the proposed
amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may participate. This is the
plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new Constitution.
A "referendum" is merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing
public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people foe their consideration,
the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of
the President. A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of
those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen
years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding
the election. Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is not
imposed. It is generally associated with the amending process of the Constitution,
more particularly, the ratification aspect.
WON the time given for deliberation is too short.
-NO. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is
not too short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues.
The questions are not new. They are the issues of the day. The people have been
living with them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago.
Held:
The vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This
decision is immediately executory.
Notes:

The questions ask, to wit:

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the
following amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question,
the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of
Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang
Pambansa. Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be
more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the
incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the
different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen
years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the
incumbent President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional
representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio while the sectors shall be determined by law. The number of
representatives from each region or sector and the, manner of their election
shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its
members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges,
and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular
National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise
the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the
election and selection of the members, convene the interim Batasang
Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been
elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime
Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the
interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions
and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under
the nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and the powers vested in
the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers
and functions, and discharge the responsibilities of the regular President
(Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such
disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The
President (Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime
Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until
martial law shall have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a
grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim
Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act
adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary
decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of
the land.

7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but

their functions, powers, and composition may be altered by law. Referenda
conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission
on Elections may be called at any time the government deems it necessary to
ascertain the will of the people regarding any important matter whether of
national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these
amendments shall continue in full force and effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have
proclaimed that they have been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the
referendum-plebiscite.
Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1)Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may,
by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or,
by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a
convention to the electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be
valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or
revision.
Transitory Provision
SECTION 15.The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the
interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose
amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when
ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.

FERNANDEZ vs. TORRES (1992)

GR No. 102940, 215 SCRA 489
FACTS:
1. On November 18, 1991, the First National Tripartite Conference for
the Protection of Overseas Entertainers was convened in order to evaluate a
Government proposal for the complete interdiction or prohibition of overseas
deployment of Philippine entertainers and performing artists following the
growing number of documented reports about exploitative working

conditions, harrassment, forcible detention, physical injuries, death, and

rape .
2. The consensus among the management and labor representatives in
the conference was that the Government should adopt a policy of selective
( rather than comprehensive/complete) prohibition for the deployment of
Philippine entertainers abroad to avoid adverse effects to the countrys
manpower export program. In addition, the labor representatives
recommended that the minimum age for performing artists seeking overseas
deployment be raised from 18 to 23.
3. In lieu with the decision and recommendations in the conference,
DOLE issued Circular No. 01-91 dated November 20, 1991 entitled:
Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the
Deployment of Performing Artists.
4. Petitioners Adelpha Fernandez, Marissa Domingo, Eunice Ofrecia,
Roselyn Mendoza, Arlene Caballero, Almira Miranda and Mary Christine
Valenton who alleged themselves as qualified performing artists of ages 1822 challenged the constitutional validity of Item No. 1 of the said DOLE
circular on the grounds that it is violative of the equal protection clause and
due process clause of the Constitution. This was done through filing the
petitions of certiorari and prohibition against Ruben Torres, Secretary DOLE
and Jose Sarmiento, Administrator of POEA to stop the implementation and
enforcement of Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular 01-91.
Item No. 1 of the aforementioned DOLE Circular provides as follows :
1. No Filipino entertainer shall be deployed outside the
Philippines except for legitimate performing artists
consisting of
musicians, singers and members of dance troupes. In all cases, the
performing artists must have a
track record of legitimate and
reputable performance in the Philippines for at least one year.
In no case shall the performing artist be below 23 years old. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment may,
for justifiable reasons, exempt
performing artists from the coverage thereof.
JUDICIAL INQUIRY: The firmly settled rule when it comes to actions
involving constitutional issues is that the issue will not be heard or resolved
by the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry or review
are met:
(1) the existence of an actual case or controversy; (2) the party raising
the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in the
resolution thereof; (3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest
reasonable opportunity and (4) that the resolution of the constitutional issue
must, be indispensable for the final determination of the controversy.
5. Appraising the case at bar based on the requirements, The Solicitor
General urges that it does not have a justiciable controversy for having been
filed prematurely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case satisfies the first requirement for
judicial inquiry (i.e. the existence of an actual case or controversy).
HELD: The court agrees with the Solicitor General that the case has
been filed prematurely since the petitioners have failed to allege that they
have first and foremost applied for the exemption provided in Item No. 1 of
the assailed DOLE circular where it was expressly stated that the Secretary of

Labor and Employment can exercise the discretionary power to exempt

performing artists from the coverage of the said item in the circular. There
being no application or denial of exemptions yet, there is no actual case or
controversy to speak of. The petitioners have failed to show the first requisite
of a judicial inquiry i.e. the existence of an actual case or controversy. Hence,
the petition for certiorari and prohibition are dismissed.