Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil.

79
FACTS: On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the
left side of the street when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to which a
pair of horses was attached came along the street in the opposite direction at great
speed. The horses ran into the carromata and wounded Martinez servely. The
defendant presented evidence that the cochero was a good servant and a reliable
and safe cochero. And that he was delivering stuff so he tied the driving lines of the
horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and went inside the wagon to unload
the stuff to be delivered. But while unloading, another vehicle drove by whose driver
cracked a whip and made some noises which frightened the horses and which made
it ran away. The cochero was thrown from the inside of the wagon and was unable
to stop the horses. The horses collided with the carromata.
ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero
HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an
accident. It has been a custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal
practice of merchants to leave horses in the manner which the cochero left it during
the accident. This is the custom in all cities. The public, finding itself unprejudiced
by such practice has acquiesced for years.

LEGAL PERIODS
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292
Section 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar
months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in
which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month
contains; "day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and "night," from sunset to sunrise.
CIR v.Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007
FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund
or credit of income tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are
entitled for a refund because they suffered losses that year due to the increase of
cost of labor and materials, etc. However, despite the losses, they still paid their
quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales
to BIR. Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer
Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit additional documents to which
Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon which prompted it
to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it
was filed beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax
refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year period is
equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown filed its final

adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the
petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence,
beyond the reglementary period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the
decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period

HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be
understood to be 12 calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month
designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain.
The court held that Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as
the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed
within the 2-year reglementary period.

The Facts:

Alfredo (Montajes) was charged and convicted for Direct Assault against Barangay
Captain Jose (Rellon) when he allegedly tried to hit the latter with a bolo when he
stopped a benefit dance which already exceeded the time allowed for it. The
Municipal Trial Court of Buenavista Agusan del Norte convicted him, and his appeal
to the Regional Trial Court was also denied, hence, Jose filed a petition (motion) for
extension of time to file a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals for 15 days,
counted from May 21, 2007 or until June 5, 2007. It appears that he received the
copy of the RTCs order denying his motion for reconsideration on May 4, 2007. He
then filed his Petition for Review on June 5, 2007.

On September 21, 2007, the CA dismissed his petition for review outrightly for being
filed out of time. The CA noted that Jose received the copy of the RTC order denying
his motion for reconsideration on May 4, 2007, hence he had 15 days within which
to file the petition for review. Considering that May 19, 2007 fell on a Saturday, it
was error for Jose to compute his extension of time on the first working day after the
deadline (Saturday, May 19), or on May 21, 2007 since when a party is granted an
extension of time, the 15-day reckoning period should start from the last day which
is Saturday, Sunday or holiday, according to the CA. His motion for reconsideration
denied, Jose filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing
that his petition was not filed out of time since he filed it pursuant to Section 1, Rule
22 of the Rules of Court; based on such provision, if the last day to file a petition
falls on a Saturday, the time shall not run until the next working day. Here, the last
day of the reglementary period within which to file the said petition for review with

the CA fell on a Saturday, thus, the last day to file the petition was moved to the
next working day which was May 21, 2007, Monday. Hence, he was not wrong in
asking the CA to give him 15 days from May 21, 2007 to file the petition and not
from May 19, 2007, Saturday. He asks that his petition be resolved on the merits
rather than on technicalities since he filed his petition for review long before the CA
dismissed the case.

The Issue:

Whether the Petition for Review was filed on time.

The Courts ruling:

We grant the petition.

Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court relied upon by petitioner provides:

Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or

allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the
day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to
be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as
thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where
the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

We then clarified the above-quoted provision when we issued A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC
dated February 29, 2000 (Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a
Saturday, Sunday or a Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension on Next Working
Day is Granted) which reads:

xxxx

Whereas, the aforecited provision [Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court] applies
in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday,
Sunday or legal holiday, in which case, the filing of the said pleading on the next
working day is deemed on time;

Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the
next working day immediately following where the last day of the period is a
Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, so that when a motion for extension of time is
filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from the next working day and not
from the original expiration of the period.

NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, to
declare that Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of the last day of the period so that
when a party seeks an extension and the same is granted, the due date ceases to
be the last day and hence, the provision no longer applies. Any extension of time to
file the required pleading should therefore be counted from the expiration of the
period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday.

In De la Cruz v. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc.,1 we said:

Section 1, Rule 22, as clarified by the circular, is clear. Should a party desire to file
any pleading, even a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, and the last
day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, he may do so on the next
working day. This is what petitioner did in the case at bar.

However, according to the same circular, the petition for review on certiorari was
indeed filed out of time. The provision states that in case a motion for extension is
granted, the due date for the extended period shall be counted from the original
due date, not from the next working day on which the motion for extension was
filed. In Luz v. National Amnesty Commission, we had occasion to expound on the
matter. In that case, we held that the extension granted by the court should be
tacked to the original period and commences immediately after the expiration of
such period.

In the case at bar, although petitioners filing of the motion for extension was within
the period provided by law, the filing of the petition itself was not on time. Petitioner
was granted an additional period of 30 days within which to file the petition.
Reckoned from the original period, he should have filed it on May 8, 2006. Instead,
he did so only on May 11, 2006, that is, 3 days late.2

Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, where the last day of the period
for doing any act required by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in
the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. In
this case, the original period for filing the petition for review with the CA was on May
19, 2007, a Saturday. Petitioners filing of his motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review on May 21, 2007, the next working day which followed the last
day for filing which fell on a Saturday, was therefore on time. However, petitioner
prayed in his motion for extension that he be granted 15 days from May 21, 2007 or
up to June 5, 2007 within which to file his petition. He then filed his petition for
review on June 5, 2007. The CA did not act on the motion for extension, but instead
issued a Resolution dated September 21, 2007 dismissing the petition for review for
being filed out of time.

We find that the CA correctly ruled that the petition for review was filed out of time
based on our clarification in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC that the 15-day extension period
prayed for should be tacked to the original period and commences immediately
after the expiration of such period.3 Thus, counting 15 days from the expiration of
the period which was on May 19, 2007, the petition filed on June 5, 2007 was
already two days late. However, we find the circumstances obtaining in this case to
merit the liberal application of the rule in the interest of justice and fair play.

Notably, the petition for review was already filed on June 5, 2007, which was long
before the CA issued its Resolution dated September 21, 2007 dismissing the
petition for review for being filed out of time. There was no showing that
respondent suffered any material injury or his cause was prejudiced by reason of
such delay. Moreover, the RTC decision which was sought to be reversed in the
petition for review filed in the CA had affirmed the MTC judgment convicting
petitioner of direct assault, hence, the petition involved no less than petitioners
liberty.4 We do not find anything on record that shows petitioners deliberate
intent to delay the final disposition of the case as he had filed the petition for review
within the extended period sought, although erroneously computed. These
circumstances should have been taken into consideration for the CA not to dismiss
the petition outright.

We have ruled that being a few days late in the filing of the petition for review does
not automatically warrant the dismissal thereof.5 And even assuming that a
petition for review is filed a few days late, where strong considerations of
substantial justice are manifest in the petition, we may relax the stringent
application of technical rules in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction.6

Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the
proper administration of justice.7 After all, the higher objective of procedural rule is
to insure that the substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.
Every party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.8

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of

Appeals are SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is ORDERED to reinstate the Petition
for Review filed by petitioner in CA-G.R. CR No. 00410.

SO ORDERED.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
REVISED PENAL CODE
Art. 2. Application of its provisions. Except as provided in the treaties
and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be
enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its
atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its
jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine
Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the
Philippine Islands; chan robles virtual law library
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these
islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding
number;

4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in

the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law
of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.chanrobles virtual
law library
Rayray vs. chae kyung lee
FACTS:

Plaintiff testified that he met the defendant in Pusan, Korea, sometime in

1952, where she was operating a night club; that they lived together from
November 1952 to April 1955; that they were married in Pusan, Korea, on
March 15, 1953, as attested to by their marriage certificate Exhibit D; that
before the wedding she obtained the "police clearance" Exhibit A, written
in Korean language, and dated February 16, 1953, which was necessary in
order that she could contract marriage; that on June 30, 1953, he
proceeded to India and left the defendant, then in advanced stage of
pregnancy, in Korea; that in October, 1953, she joined him in India,
bringing with her said Exhibit A, and its translation into English, Exhibit B;
that he then noticed that, on February 16, 1953, defendant was already
married, according to said Exhibit B; that as he confronted the defendant
with the contents of this document, her reply was that it is not unusual for
a Korean girl to marry twice in Korea; that when he inquired about her
status on March 15, 1953, defendant confided to him that she had lived
with about two (2) Americans and a Korean, adding, however, that there
was no impediment to her contracting marriage with him; and that, later
on, they were separated and her whereabouts are now unknown to him.
Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant
Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter's whereabouts is unknown, and
she was formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea, summons was served by
publication, as provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved
that defendant be declared in default, she not having filed an answer.

ISSUE:

WON Philippine court has jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of

plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul,
Korea.

RULING:

Yes.
In order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it
must have jurisdiction over: (1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the
person of the parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem,
the res.
The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff's
marriage to the defendant, which is within the jurisdiction of our courts of
first instance,[2] and, in Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations.[3]
The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission
thereto in consequence of the filing of the complaint herein.[4] Defendant
was placed under the jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of
summons by publication.[5]
This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein,
and status affects or binds the whole world. The res in the present case is
the relation between said parties, or their marriage tie.[6] Jurisdiction
over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not
the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.[7] plaintiff
herein is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is,
therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant
was and - under plaintiff's theory -still is a non-resident alien. But, this
fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.
The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the
res, in an action for annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the
parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum.[8] Since plaintiff is a
Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the lower court had
jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subjectmatter and the parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the
legality of the marriage between the parties herein.

FAMILY CODE

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance

with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order
227)

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC

HEALTH-KUWAIT Petitioners, vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 178551
October 11, 2010

FACTS:
Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner,
Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a
two-year contract with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.Within a year, Respondent
was terminated for not passing the probationary period which was under the
Memorandum of Agreement.
Ministry denied respondents request and she returned to the Philippines
shouldering her own fair. Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a complaint against ATCI for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter
rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her $3,600.00,
her salary for the three months unexpired portion of the contract.
ATCI appealed Labor Arbiters decision, however, NLRC affirmed the latters decision
and denied petitioner ATCIs motion for reconsideration. Petitioner appealed to the
Court Appeals contending that their principal being a foreign government agency is
immune from suit, and as such, immunity extended to them.
Appellate Court affirmed NLRCs decision. It noted that under the law, a private
employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the
contract of employment of an overseas worker; hence, it can be sued jointly and
severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or
contract of employment.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract
specifically stipulates that respondents employment shall be governed by the Civil
Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.
Ruling:
Court denied the petition. According to RA 8042: The obligations covenanted in the
recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign
principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either or
both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties
towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the
same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the
employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law. Where a foreign law is not pleaded
or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented
before us.

Jurisprudence: Tuna Processing, Inc. vs. Philippine Kingford, Inc. [2012]

FACTS:

Kanemitsu Yamaoka, co-patentee of a US Patent, Philippine Letters Patent, and an

Indonesian Patent, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with five
Philippine tuna processors including Respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc.
(KINGFORD). The MOA provides for the enforcing of the abovementioned patents,
granting licenses under the same, and collecting royalties, and for the
establishment of herein Petitioner Tuna Processors, Inc. (TPI).

Due to a series of events not mentioned in the Petition, the tuna processors,
including Respondent KINGFORD, withdrew from Petitioner TPI and correspondingly
reneged on their obligations. Petitioner TPI submitted the dispute for arbitration
before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California,
United States and won the case against Respondent KINGFORD.

To enforce the award, Petitioner TPI filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition,
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City.

Respondent KINGFORD filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the RTC denied for lack of
merit. Respondent KINGFORD then sought for the inhibition of the RTC judge, Judge
Alameda, and moved for the reconsideration of the order denying the Motion. Judge
Alameda inhibited himself notwithstanding [t]he unfounded allegations and
unsubstantiated assertions in the motion. Judge Ruiz, to which the case was reraffled, in turn, granted Respondent KINGFORDSs Motion for Reconsideration and
dismissed the Petition on the ground that Petitioner TPI lacked legal capacity to sue
in the Philippines. Petitioner TPI is a corporation established in the State of California
and not licensed to do business in the Philippines.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines,

but which collects royalties from entities in the Philippines, sue here to enforce a
foreign arbitral award?

ARGUMENT:

Petitioner TPI contends that it is entitled to seek for the recognition and
enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral award in accordance with RA No. 9285
(Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004), the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the United Nations
Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention),
and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law),
as none of these specifically requires that the party seeking for the enforcement
should have legal capacity to sue.

RULING:

YES. Petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines, may seek
recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with the
provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004. A foreign corporations

capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material insofar as the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.

The Resolution of the RTC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides that the opposing
party in an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may
raise only those grounds that were enumerated under Article V of the New York
Convention, to wit:

Article V

1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the
party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent
authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:

a. The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were, under the law
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under
the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was made;

b. The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case;

c. The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of
the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced;

d. The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not
in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or

e. The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made.

2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the

competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought
finds that:

a. The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration

under the law of that country; or

b. The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public

policy of that country.

Not one of the abovementioned exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of
the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.

Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution,

which was promulgated by the Supreme Court, likewise support this position.

Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that [a]ny party to a foreign arbitration may
petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award. The contents
of such petition are enumerated in Rule 13.5. Capacity to sue is not included.
Oppositely, in the rule on local arbitral awards or arbitrations in instances where
the place of arbitration is in the Philippines, it is specifically required that a
petition to determine any question concerning the existence, validity and
enforceability of such arbitration agreement available to the parties before the
commencement of arbitration and/or a petition for judicial relief from the ruling of
the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question upholding or declining its jurisdiction

after arbitration has already commenced should state [t]he facts showing that the
persons named as petitioner or respondent have legal capacity to sue or be sued.

Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforcement of a foreign

arbitral award, the Court deny availment by the losing party of the rule that
bars foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines from
maintaining a suit in Philippine courts. When a party enters into a contract
containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this case, in fact submits itself
to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the
result of arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter
into the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the implementation of the
result. Although not on all fours with the instant case, also worthy to consider is the
wisdom of then Associate Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her Dissenting Opinion in
Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals [1998], to wit:

xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is gaining adherents in legal

and judicial circles here and abroad. If its tested mechanism can simply be ignored
by an aggrieved party, one who, it must be stressed, voluntarily and actively
participated in the arbitration proceedings from the very beginning, it will destroy
the very essence of mutuality inherent in consensual contracts.

Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be

respected not because it is favored over domestic laws and procedures, but
because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law question.

Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the RTC correctly
observed that the Model Law, not the New York Convention, governs the subject
arbitral award, Petitioner TPI may still seek recognition and enforcement of the
award in Philippine court, since the Model Law prescribes substantially identical
exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement.

G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)

Bellis vs. Bellis

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had
five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate
children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate
children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the
remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The
appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have
been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the
Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to
be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the
illegitimate childrens successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall
be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is
illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that
Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic
validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not
require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the
legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the
legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.