University of Cebu

Constitutional Law Review

Maria Adelfa Sios e

1. Nepomuceno vs. Aquino / Belgica vs. Ochoa

GR 208566 November 19, 2013
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Actual or Controversy; No
question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless
there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.- The prevailing rule in constitutional
litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law
or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Of these requisites,
case law states that the first two are the most important and, therefore, shall
be discussed forthwith.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence
provides that an actual case or controversy is one which - involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. - By constitutional fiat,
judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. This
is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that
an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights,
an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other
words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy
is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for
constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then

been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come

into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged
action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues
through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions."
Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; The requirement of
contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the - Pork Barrel
System.- The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by
the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their
utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya
Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund
are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of
these public funds.
Same; Same; Same; PriorityDevelopment Assistance Fund
(PDAF); Moot and Academic; Neither will the Presidents declaration
that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF
moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be
done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or
by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.- As for the
PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had
been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by
respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court observes that
respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the
controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said
reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article
which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing.
Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had already "abolished the
PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive
branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its
legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a
law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law,
or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.

Same; Same; Same; The "limitation on the power of judicial

review to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance that
"the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government."- The "limitation on the power of judicial review
to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance that "the courts will
not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government."
Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question
doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, applies when
there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents
submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to
perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the
specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to
impose a solution at this stage."
Same; Same; Same; The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork
Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the
political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.- A political
question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." The intrinsic constitutionality
of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the
political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the
contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political
branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an
exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not
only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially
makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."

Same; Same; Same; when the judiciary mediates to allocate

constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution. - It must also be
borne in mind that when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments;
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the
executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by
the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the
reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by
constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately,
it is the Courts avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not
arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but,
in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm
constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that
each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share
towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society.
For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents plea for judicial
restraint.
Same; Same; Same;Taxpayers Suit; Taxpayers have been
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law. - The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any
of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing." Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective
capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully
contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury." Clearly, as taxpayers, they
possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork
Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be
utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer
from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules.
Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.

Constitutional Law; Pork Barrel System; Words and Phrases;

the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of
rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are
utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and
Executive branches of government, including its members.- The Court
defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and
practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary
funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the
respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches
of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves
two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: First, there is the
Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lumpsum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or
collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively
control certain aspects of the funds utilization through various postenactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider
the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel
since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual
legislators to wield a collective power; and Second, there is the Presidential
Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the
manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, the Court shall delimit
the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund.
Same; Separation of Powers; The principle of separation of
powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government.To the legislative branch of
government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to
the executive branch of government, through the President, belongs
the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government,
through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws. - The principle
of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel
in Angara v. Electoral Commission, it means that the "Constitution has
blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." To
the legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power
to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President,
belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government,
through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three
great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect,
"each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters

within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere." Thus, "the
legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has
no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to
make or execute the law." The principle of separation of powers and its
concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the
powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these
powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single
branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To
achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in
exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in
the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or selfinterest assertions of another or others.
Same; Same; From the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional." It must be clarified, however, that since the
restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight
function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the
Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress
role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactmentmeasure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft
of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive functions.- The
Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not
cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier
stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona,
Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or
acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the
exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act
precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which
specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance
with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA,
Congress law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the
Executives role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur
the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern
itself with details for implementation by the Executive." The foregoing
cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court
held that "from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision
of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the

principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional." It

must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still
exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances
that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress
role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure
allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any
constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference
and/or assumption of executive functions.
Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; Post-enactment measures
which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and
fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution;
Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in
Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification
on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such,
respondents reliance on the same falters altogether. - Clearly, these
post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification,
fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.
Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or
another, authorized to participate in as Guingona, Jr. puts it "the various
operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and
release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The
fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be
overstated from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore
abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator
identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as
such, respondents reliance on the same falters altogether.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF); The Supreme Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article
as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators

to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation

or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight,
as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.- The Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well
as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any
form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of
the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto,
informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into
the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence,
accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices
do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years
has not been substantially disputed here.
Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; Congress; As an adjunct to
the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be
exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has
conferred the same. It is clear that only Congress, acting as a
bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative
and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no
other; Exceptions. - As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,
legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the
Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision
on initiative and referendum. Based on this provision, it is clear that only
Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no
other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated
legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are
allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted
exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war
or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF); The Supreme Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article,

insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to

individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since
said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in
Congress.- In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF
Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress. That
the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear
from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular
Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the
setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a
specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual
legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to
dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts
comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon,
and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to
perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the
power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus,
keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court
hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification
feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Checks and Balances; Veto Power; A prime
example of a constitutional check and balance would be the
Presidents power to veto an item written into an appropriation,
revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval
through a process known as "bill presentment." - A prime example of a
constitutional check and balance would be the Presidents power to veto
an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted
to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill
presentment." The Presidents item-veto power is found in Section 27(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows: Sec. 27. x x x. x x x
x (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items
in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the
item or items to which he does not object. The presentment of appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of
item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively

considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the

Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making
process is the "submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once
approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication."
Same; Same; Same; Same; The justification for the Presidents
item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent
log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature,
as well as to fortify the executive branchs role in the budgetary
process; It is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the
community against the passing of bad laws, through haste,
inadvertence, or design." - The justification for the Presidents item-veto
power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify
the executive branchs role in the budgetary process. In Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the
Presidents item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body,
calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions,
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may
happen to influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant
to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of
bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."
Same; Same; Same; What beckons constitutional infirmity are
appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum
amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. What beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely
provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of
funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates
the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and
the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the
multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation
law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money and hence, without
a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the
President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the
entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable,
or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its
legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such
arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the
implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual
amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since
the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to
appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising
legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.

Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund

(PDAF); The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment
roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them
to
become
disinterested
"observers"
when
scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation
law; Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases
of project implementation a matter before another office of
government renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage
of their own office. - The fact that individual legislators are given postenactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for
them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or
monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent,
the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested
with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in
which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very
same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: Sec. 14. No Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account
of his office. (Emphasis supplied)Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in
the various phases of project implementation a matter before another office
of government renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their
own office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without
taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the
district
the
legislator
represents.
In
this
regard,
the
allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine
parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators
have been taken into consideration.- The Court, however, finds an
inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of
"making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the
gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact
of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the

allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of

equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a
far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped"
compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even
Senators and Party-List Representatives and in some years, even the VicePresident who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the
Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the
Congressional Pork Barrels original intent which is "to make equal the
unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under
the effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole
account of their office.
Same; "An appropriation made by
law under the
contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or
determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a
particular public purpose.- "An appropriation made by law under the
contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists
when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable
amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public
purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem
from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot,
assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if
written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to
appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be made by law, "
an appropriation law may according to Philconsa be "detailed and as
broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may
be gleaned from the same.
Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The 2013
PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation
under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier
stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively
create a system of intermediate appropriations.- It is apropos to note
that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal
appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as
earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a
system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are
the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by
individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As

such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013
PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather
the post-enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which
are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF
Article does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its
truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation
of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.
Same; Delegation of Powers; Malampaya Funds; The Court
agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of
PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar
as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.- The Court
agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya
Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President
wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he
may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate
public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase
may be confined only to "energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem
generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to
include or be restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons:
first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government" states a singular and general class and
hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from
which the general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second,
the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government;250 and, third, the Executive
department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related
purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own
position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government."251 Thus, while
Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy
of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the
same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as
unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard

of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the

rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told,
the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an
assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used as it should be used
only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO); Words and Phrases; A Special
Allotment Release Order( SARO), as defined by the DBM itself in its
website, is "a specific authority issued to identified agencies to
incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified
period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the
release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or
regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by
competent authority."- The Court agrees with petitioners posturing for the
fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be
"released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in
its website, is "a specific authority issued to identified agencies to incur
obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the
purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is
subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to
separate approval or clearance by competent authority." Based on this
definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an
obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does
not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the
control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn
under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds.
On the other hand, the actual release of funds is brought about by the
issuance of the NCA, which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may
be determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the
Oral Arguments
Same; Same; Same; Notice of Cash Allocation; Unless an NCA
has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which
have been "released;" The disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which
are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any
corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decisions
promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the
unappropriated surplus of the general fund.- Unless an NCA has been
issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been
"released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds
which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding

NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decisions promulgation, be

enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of
the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the
2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be
disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the
dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source. This same
pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which
have been obligated but not released meaning, those merely covered by a
SARO under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds
sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court
as unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the
general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their
corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
Same; Operative Fact Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine
exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate
case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act,
such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience
and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with.- It
must be stressed that the Courts pronouncement anent the
unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions,
(b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the
phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view
of the operative fact doctrine. To explain, the operative fact doctrine
exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case,
declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is
presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and
should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent
case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,
the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary
is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed
before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness
and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to
such adjudication." "In the language of an American Supreme Court decision:
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of

unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which

cannot justly be ignored."
Same; Pork Barrel System; The Supreme Court must strike
down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the
inherent defects in the rules within which it operates.- In the final
analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it
operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying
gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget
execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers;
insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by
giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund
specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated
the principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has
created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of
presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to
veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional
oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an
aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the
system has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has
authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of
purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has
likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has
conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for
energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as
other public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure
development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of nondelegability.

2. Disini, Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice

G.R. No. 203335
February 18, 2014
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; Strict
Scrutiny Standard; According to the Strict scrutiny standard, a
legislative classification that impermissiblyinterferes with the
exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiarclass
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.- The
Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American
constitutional construct, useful in determining the constitutionality of laws
that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a
legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of

fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect

class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove
that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and
that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. Later, the strict
scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.
Same; Same; The challenge to the constitutionality of Section
4(a) (6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.- There is
no real difference whether he uses Julio Gandolfo which happens to be his
real name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he
uses the name that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing
him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy
reputation, or deprive others who are not ill motivated of the rightful
opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 4(a) (6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.
Same; Right to Privacy; The right to privacy, or the right to be
let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of
the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures. - Petitioners claim that Section 4(b) (3) violates the
constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and
transgresses the freedom of the press. The right to privacy, or the right to be
let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. But
the Court acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, it
ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its identification with
liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection. Relevant to
any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the Zones of
Privacy. The Court explained in In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of
Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon the relevance of these
zones to the right to privacy: Zones of privacy are recognized and protected
in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless
excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The
meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our
conviction that the right to privacy is a constitutional right and the right
most valued by civilized men, but also from our adherence to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy and everyone has the
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
Same; Right to Privacy; Spams; Transmitting spams amounts
to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending out spams

enters the recipients domain without prior permission. - The term

spam surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games.
One who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a
spam. The term referred to a Monty Pythons Flying Circus scene in which
actors would keep saying Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam when reading
options from a menu. The Government, represented by the Solicitor General,
points out that unsolicited commercial communications or spams are a
nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service
providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes
with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams
amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending out spams
enters the recipients domain without prior permission. The OSG contends
that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
Same; Freedom of Expression; Unsolicited advertisements are
legitimate forms of expression.- To prohibit the transmission of
unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a
separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of
protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him
of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Same; Freedom of Speech; When a penal statute encroaches
upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the
void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable.- When a penal statute
encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the
void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine
must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his
dissent in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, we must view these
statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as these
doctrines are used to mount facial challenges to penal statutes not involving
free speech.
Same;One can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only
if he asserts a violation of
his own rights. It prohibits one from
assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. - In an
as applied challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his
constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground absence of due
process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or
vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if

he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the
constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of
third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition
against third-party standing. But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner
may for instance mount a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed
statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or
vagueness of the statute. The rationale for this exception is to counter the
chilling effect on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free
speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime
under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking
in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus
chills him into silence.
Same; Freedom of Speech; Section 5 with respect to Section
4(c) (4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on
the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on
the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or
abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy
way.- Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c) (4) is unconstitutional. Its
vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its
obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the
crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a
fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as
libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation
tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in
other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)
(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
Same; Right to Privacy; The Court recognizes in Morfe v. Mutuc
that certain constitutional guarantees work together to create zones
of privacy wherein governmental powers may not intrude, and that
there exists an independent constitutional right of privacy.Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Section 12 are too broad
and do not provide ample safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and
invading the peoples right to privacy. The concern is understandable. Indeed,
the Court recognizes in Morfe v. Mutuc that certain constitutional guarantees
work together to create zones of privacy wherein governmental powers may
not intrude, and that there exists an independent constitutional right of
privacy. Such right to be left alone has been regarded as the beginning of all
freedoms. But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe,the United
StatesSupreme Court classified privacy into two categories: decisional
privacy andinformational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right

toindependence
in
making
certain
important
decisions,
while
informationalprivacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters. It isthe latter rightthe right to informational privacythat those
who opposegovernment collection or recording of traffic data in real-time
seek to protect.Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have
privateinformation disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance
andintrusion. In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right
toprivacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a
subjectivetest, where one claiming the right must have an actual or
legitimateexpectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an
objective test,where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is
prepared toaccept as objectively reasonable.
Same; The Supreme Court must ensure that laws seeking to
take advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and
definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution
guarantees.- This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the
government and kindred institutions to monitor individuals and place them
under surveillance in ways that have previously been impractical or even
impossible. All the forces of a technological age x x x operate to narrow the
area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity
to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society. The Court must ensure that
laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written with
specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the
Constitution guarantees.
Same; Illegal Searches and Seizures; Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in ones
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable.- Computer
data may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well
as files that contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings. Without having
to go into a lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital space, it is
indisputable that computer data, produced or created by their writers or
authors may constitute personal property. Consequently, they are protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while stored in their
personal computers or in the service providers systems. Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in ones papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the

computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The
Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
Same; Delegation of Powers; In order to determine whether
there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has
adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test.- In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of
legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to determine the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot.

3. Imbong vs. Ochoa

G.R. No. 204819
April 8, 2014
Consitutional Law; Separation of Powers; The separation of
powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government
which obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution.- In many cases involving the determination of the
constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often
sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due
respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of
separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; The Constitution impresses upon
the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done
within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time,
allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited
and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive
and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken
with grave abuse of discretion.- In times of social disquietude or political
instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In order to address this, the Constitution
impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch
done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time,
allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and
specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the

legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse
of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an
attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The
Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those
cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the
power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz :
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners
must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.- In the scholarly
estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of
powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of
authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief,
indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of
the judiciary in that balancing operation.
Same; Same; An actual case or controversy means an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion.- An actual case or controversy means an
existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In
other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a
legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it
must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue.
There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Same; Same; Same; For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and
the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury
to himself as a result of the challenged action.- Corollary to the requirement
of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is

ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and
the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury
to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained of.
Same; Same; Facial Challenges; While the Supreme Court has
withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal
statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speec, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights.- In this jurisdiction, the application of
doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under
its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of
Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Reproductive Health Law; The RH Law drastically
affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health,
the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional
rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep
division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no
doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication.-In view of the seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the
bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all.
After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the
right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division
among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the
petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate

court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of

the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not
wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
Same;
Statutes;
One-Subject-One-Title
Rule;
The
one
subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law
must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would
not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry
as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of
the real subject or scope of the act.-The one subject/one title rule
expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that
the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either
in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the
real subject or scope of the act."Considering the close intimacy between
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; It is
apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the
State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the
unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female
ovum.-It is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to
ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. Contraceptives that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus
prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior
to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible.
Same; Same; Consistent with the constitutional policy
prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should
be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the
RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each
other in prohibiting abortion.-Indeed, consistent with the constitutional
policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and

its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting

abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR
should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the
RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of
being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.
Constitutional Law; Generally, the State cannot meddle in the
internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and
dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another.- Verily, the principle of separation of Church
and State is based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in
the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or
dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another.
On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on
the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow
its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be
preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes
the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque,
an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a
religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations
collectively.
Same; Religious Freedom; Free Exercise Clause; Establishment
Clause; The constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides
two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause. The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from
sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It
mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."Essentially, it
prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources
for the support or prohibition of a religion.On the other hand, the basis of the
free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.
Same; Same; Doctrine of Benevolet Neutrality; In case of
conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court
adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality.- This has been clearly
decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated
"that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or
permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution." In the same case, it was further explained that" The benevolent
neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,

accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's

favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a
burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."
"What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the
courts."In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the
compelling state interest test is proper. Underlying the compelling state
interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that
laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.
Same; Reproductive Health Law; Religious Freedom; While the
Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine
whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious
freedom.- In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to
determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the
support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious
standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma
or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice,
doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ...
are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of
the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at
bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical
matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine
whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
Same; Same; Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its
legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the
policies of any one religion.- In the same breath that the establishment
clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause
the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor
can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and,
thus, establishing a state religion.Consequently, the petitioners are
misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population
control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not
precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes

simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between
Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's
Same;
Same;
Same;
Compelling
Interest
Test;
The
conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an
exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state
interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective.- In
a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by
government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line
with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor,
finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious
freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law,
unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state
interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily
so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
Same; Same; In case of conflict between the religious beliefs
and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest
of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to
enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of
the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the
religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private,
should be accorded primacy.- In case of conflict between the religious
beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of
the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive
health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the
Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers,
whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates
of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief
and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion"
enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Same; Same; Right to Life; No person should be denied the
appropriate medical care uregently needed to preserve the
primordial right, that is, the right to life.- As in the case of the
conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases
that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life
of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse

should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be
emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care
urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.In
this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) should be struck
down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in
elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save
for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as
provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not
be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of
this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family.
Statutes; Principle of Void for Vagueness; A statute or act
suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
its meaning and differ as to its application.- A statute or act suffers
from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as
to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining
whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken
in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other
parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be
construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.
Constitutional Law; Reproductive Health Law; Equal Protection
of the Law; To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of
the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct
necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing
that they be given priority in addressing the health development of
the people.- Thus: Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.It should be noted that

Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore,
no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to
reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it
does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains,
the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental
to the advancement of reproductive health."
Same; Same; Involuntary Servitude; Clearly, therefore, no
compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono
service against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does
not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a
necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a
perceived legitimate state interest.- The OSG counters that the rendition
of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as
forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service
providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono
services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the
powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with
PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.The point of the OSG is welltaken.It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably
imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like
the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged
burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A
fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the
qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public
welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to
regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking
such right altogether.
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude
connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means
of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive
healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than nonaccreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service
providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they
wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it
all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to
render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service
was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not
consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary

incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate

state interest.
Same; Same; The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the
autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM.
The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy.-Moreover, Article III,
Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM,
alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the
RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the
guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the
petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional
government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by
the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general
welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the
Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the
notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and
the regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations
imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise
its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all
matters of general concern or common interest.
Same; Same; In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as
unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medicallysafe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality
reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies.
However, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be
trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve.- After all,
the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man
stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.In conformity with
the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be
allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem
society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone
should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may
continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It is not the province of
the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the
policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of
this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from
the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact
remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises.Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State
should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law
against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the

Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.x x x. But this Court cannot

go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law
is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the
law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is
not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to
question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business
of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the
application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial
legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt
judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate
function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing
legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is
therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of
saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.
4. Araullo v. Aquino
G.R. No. 209569
July 1, 2014
Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; Courts; The Constitution
vests judicial power in the Supreme Court and is such lower courts
as may be established by law.- Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power
in the Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. In
creating a lower court, Congress concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of
that court, and that court, upon its creation, becomes by operation of the
Constitution one of the repositories of judicial power.25 However, only the
Court is a constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress
in its exercise of the legislative power.
Same; Same; The Constitution states that judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was
confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving
rights that were legally demandable and enforceable.

Disbursement Acceleration Program; The implementation of

the DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of
public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated,
disbursed or utilized by reason or on account of such challenged
executive acts gave rise, th erefore, to an actual controversy that is
ripe for adjudication by the Court.- An actual and justiciable controversy
exists in these consolidated cases. The incompatibility of the perspectives of
the parties on the constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant issuances
satisfy the requirement for a conflict between legal rights. The issues being
raised herein meet the requisite ripeness considering that the challenged
executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there are
averments by the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to the
letter and spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP
entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact
that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on
account of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual
controversy that is ripe for adjudication by the Court.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review;
Locus Standi; Legal
Standing as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to a
right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.- Legal
standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to "a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question." The concept of legal
standing, or locus standi, was particularly discussed in De Castro v. Judicial
and Bar Council, where the Court said:In public or constitutional litigations,
the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the
petitioners due to the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the
intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to
avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and offices
involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must
have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in
Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:The question on
legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Accordingly, it has been
held that the interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute
must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law
or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege
to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

Same; Same; Same; The Court has cogently observed in Agan,

Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.46 that
"[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in
some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest."- The Court has cogently observed in
Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. that "[s]tanding is a
peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not
brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a
law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or
voters who actually sue in the public interest."Except for PHILCONSA, a
petitioner in G.R. No. 209164, the petitioners have invoked their capacities as
taxpayers who, by averring that the issuance and implementation of the DAP
and its relevant issuances involved the illegal disbursements of public funds,
have an interest in preventing the further dissipation of public funds. The
petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) also
assert their right as citizens to sue for the enforcement and observance of
the constitutional limitations on the political branches of the Government. On
its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recognized its
legal standing to bring cases upon constitutional issues.48 Luna, the
petitioner in G.R. No. 209136, cites his additional capacity as a lawyer. The
IBP, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209260, stands by "its avowed duty to work for
the rule of law and of paramount importance of the question in this action,
not to mention its civic duty as the official association of all lawyers in this
country." Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has
established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer
locus standi on each of them.In addition, considering that the issues center
on the extent of the power of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate
public funds, whether appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose
issues that are of transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the
petitioners included. As such, the determination of such important issues call
for the Courts exercise of its broad and wise discretion "to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving
the serious constitutional questions raised.
Budget; Words and Phrases.- In the Philippine setting,
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 246 (Budget Act) defined "budget" as the
financial program of the National Government for a designated fiscal year,
consisting of the statements of estimated receipts and expenditures for the
fiscal year for which it was intended to be effective based on the results of
operations during the preceding fiscal years. The term was given a different
meaning under Republic Act No. 992 (Revised Budget Act) by describing the

budget as the delineation of the services and products, or benefits that would
accrue to the public together with the estimated unit cost of each type of
service, product or benefit. For a forthright definition, budget should simply
be identified as the financial plan of the Government, or "the master plan of
government."
Same; The budget preparation phase is commenced through
the issuance of a Budget Call by the DBM.- The budget preparation
phase is commenced through the issuance of a Budget Call by the DBM. The
Budget Call contains budget parameters earlier set by the Development
Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) as well as policy guidelines and
procedures to aid government agencies in the preparation and submission of
their budget proposals. The Budget Call is of two kinds, namely: (1) a National
Budget Call, which is addressed to all agencies, including state universities
and colleges; and (2) a Corporate Budget Call, which is addressed to all
government-owned and -controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government
financial institutions (GFIs).
Same; Public or government expenditures are generally
classified into two categories, specifically: (1) capital expenditures
or outlays; and (2) current operating expenditures.-Capital
expenditures are the expenses whose usefulness lasts for more than one
year, and which add to the assets of the Government, including investments
in the capital of government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. Current operating expenditures are the purchases of goods and
services in current consumption the benefit of which does not extend beyond
the fiscal year. The two components of current expenditures are those for
personal services (PS), and those for maintenance and other operating
expenses(MOOE).Public expenditures are also broadly grouped according to
their functions into: (1) economic development expenditures (i.e.,
expenditures on agriculture and natural resources, transportation and
communications, commerce and industry, and other economic development
efforts); (2) social services or social development expenditures (i.e.,
government outlay on education, public health and medicare, labor and
welfare and others); (3) general government or general public services
expenditures (i.e., expenditures for the general government, legislative
services, the administration of justice, and for pensions and gratuities); (4)
national defense expenditures (i.e., sub-divided into national security
expenditures and expenditures for the maintenance of peace and order); and
(5) public debt.
Same; Sources of Public Revenues- In the Philippines, public
revenues are generally derived from the following sources, to wit: (1) tax
revenues(i.e., compulsory contributions to finance government activities); 80

(2) capital revenues(i.e., proceeds from sales of fixed capital assets or scrap
thereof and public domain, and gains on such sales like sale of public lands,
buildings and other structures, equipment, and other properties recorded as
fixed assets); 81 (3) grants(i.e., voluntary contributions and aids given to the
Government for its operation on specific purposes in the form of money
and/or materials, and do not require any monetary commitment on the part
of the recipient);82 (4) extraordinary income(i.e., repayment of loans and
advances made by government corporations and local governments and the
receipts and shares in income of the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and other
receipts);83 and (5) public borrowings(i.e., proceeds of repayable obligations
generally with interest from domestic and foreign creditors of the
Government in general, including the National Government and its political
subdivisions).
Same; Budget Legislation Phase; The Budget Legislation Phase
covers the period commencing from the time Congress receives the
Presidents Budget, which is inclusive of the NEPand the BESF, up to the
Presidents approval of the GAA. This phase is also known as the Budget
Authorization Phase, and involves the significant participation of the
Legislative through its deliberations.
Same; Reenacted Budget; If, by the end of any fiscal year, the
Congress shall have failed to pass the GAB for the ensuing fiscal
year, the GAA for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the GAB is passed
by the Congress.- The House of Representatives and the Senate then
constitute a panel each to sit in the Bicameral Conference Committee for the
purpose of discussing and harmonizing the conflicting provisions of their
versions of the GAB. The "harmonized" version of the GAB is next presented
to the President for approval.90 The President reviews the GAB, and prepares
the Veto Message where budget items are subjected to direct veto,91 or are
identified for conditional implementation.
Same; Budget Execution Phase; The Budget Execution Phase is
primarily the function of the DBM.-With the GAA now in full force and
effect, the next step is the implementation of the budget. The Budget
Execution Phase is primarily the function of the DBM, which is tasked to
perform the following procedures, namely: (1) to issue the programs and
guidelines for the release of funds; (2) to prepare an Allotment and Cash
Release Program; (3) to release allotments; and (4) to issue disbursement
authorities.
Same; In order to settle the obligations incurred by the
agencies, the DBM issues a disbursement authority so that cash may

be allocated in payment of the obligations. In order to settle the

obligations incurred by the agencies, the DBM issues a
disbursement authority so that cash may be allocated in payment of
the obligations.- A cash or disbursement authority that is periodically
issued is referred to as a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA),97 which issuance is
based upon an agencys submission of its Monthly Cash Program and other
required documents. The NCA specifies the maximum amount of cash that
can be withdrawn from a government servicing bank for the period indicated.
Apart from the NCA, the DBM may issue a Non-Cash Availment
Authority(NCAA) to authorize non-cash disbursements, or a Cash
Disbursement Ceiling(CDC) for departments with overseas operations to
allow the use of income collected by their foreign posts for their operating
requirements.
Same; The national budget the Executive prepares and
presents to Congress represents the Administrations "blueprint for
public policy" and reflects the Governments goals and strategies.As such, the national budget becomes a tangible representation of the
programs of the Government in monetary terms, specifying therein the PAPs
and services for which specific amounts of public funds are proposed and
allocated. Embodied in every national budget is government spending.
Same; The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully
execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of
the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys
economic situation.127 He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the
purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be
funded under the DAP.- The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and
the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve
appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set
apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions,
the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section
29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Same; Transfer of funds; The power to transfer funds can give
the President the flexibility to meet unforeseen events that may
otherwise impede the efficient implementation of the PAPs set by
Congress in the GAA.- We begin this dissection by reiterating that Congress
cannot anticipate all issues and needs that may come into play once the
budget reaches its execution stage. Executive discretion is necessary at that
stage to achieve a sound fiscal administration and assure effective budget
implementation. The heads of offices, particularly the President, require
flexibility in their operations under performance budgeting to enable them to
make whatever adjustments are needed to meet established work goals

under changing conditions. In particular, the power to transfer funds can give
the President the flexibility to meet unforeseen events that may otherwise
impede the efficient implementation of the PAPs set by Congress in the GAA.

Same; Same; Requisites for a Valid Transfer of Appropriated

Funds- The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5),
supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds
within their respective offices;(2) The funds to be transferred are savings
generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The
purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices.
Same; same; Constitutional Law; Scetion 25(5), Article VI, not
being a self-executing provision of the Constitution, must have an
implementing law for it to be operative.- Section 25(5), supra, not being
a self-executing provision of the Constitution, must have an implementing law
for it to be operative. That law, generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To
comply with the first requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize the
transfer of funds.
Same; Savings; For us to consider unreleased appropriations
as savings, unless these met the statutory definition of savings,
would seriously undercut the congressional power of the purse,
because such appropriations had not even reached and been used
by the agency concerned vis--vis the PAPs for which Congress had
allocated them.- For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings,
unless these met the statutory definition of savings, would seriously undercut
the congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had not
even reached and been used by the agency concerned vis--vis the PAPs for
which Congress had allocated them. However, if an agency has unfilled
positions in its plantilla and did not receive an allotment and NCA for such
vacancies, appropriations for such positions, although unreleased, may
already constitute savings for that agency under the second
instance.Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by
the first part of the definition of "savings" in the GAA, that is, as "portions or
balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any
obligation or encumbrance." But the first part of the definition was further
qualified by the three enumerated instances of when savings would be
realized. As such, unobligated allotments could not be indiscriminately
declared as savings without first determining whether any of the three

instances existed. This signified that the DBMs withdrawal of unobligated

allotments had disregarded the definition of savings under the GAAs.
Same; It is the President who proposes the budget but it is
Congress that has final say on matters of appropriation.- Congress
acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its power of
the purse whenever it deliberates and acts on the budget proposal submitted
by the Executive. Its power of the purse is touted as the very foundation of its
institutional strength, and underpins "all other legislative decisions and
regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and executive
branches of government." Such enormous power encompasses the capacity
to generate money for the Government, to appropriate public funds, and to
spend the money.179 Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the purse,
Congress wields control by specifying the PAPs for which public money should
be spent.It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that
has the final say on matters of appropriations. For this purpose, appropriation
involves two governing principles, namely: (1) "a Principle of the Public Fisc,
asserting that all monies received from whatever source by any part of the
government are public funds;" and (2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control,
prohibiting expenditure of any public money without legislative
authorization."181 To conform with the governing principles, the Executive
cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a PAP by
resorting to either public or private funds.182 Nor could the Executive
transfer appropriated funds resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP,
for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased.
The terms of both appropriations will thereby be violated.
Same; Cross-Border Augmentations; Funds appropriated for
one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in
the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call
such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border
augmentations.- By providing that the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be
authorized to augment any item in the GAA "for their respective offices,"
Section 25(5), supra, has delineated borders between their offices, such that
funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another
office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus,
we call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border
augmentations.To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section
25(5), supra, refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the President; the
Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of Representatives,
with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice;

the Constitutional
Chairpersons.

Commissions,

with

respect

to

their

respective

Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; Parties; DAP; The denial

of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only
by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such
parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been
discriminated against in the releases of funds under the DAP.- The
challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, which
focuses on the release of funds under the DAP to legislators, lacks factual and
legal basis. The allegations about Senators and Congressmen being unaware
of the existence and implementation of the DAP, and about some of them
having refused to accept such funds were unsupported with relevant data.
Also, the claim that the Executive discriminated against some legislators on
the ground alone of their receiving less than the others could not of itself
warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial
of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by parties
who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be the few
legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of
funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such
affected legislators could properly and fully bring to the fore when and how
the denial of equal protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in
their situation. The requirement was not met here. Consequently, the Court
was not put in the position to determine if there was a denial of equal
protection. To have the Court do so despite the inadequacy of the showing of
factual and legal support would be to compel it to speculate, and the
outcome would not do justice to those for whose supposed benefit the claim
of denial of equal protection has been made.
Constitutional Law; The doctrine of operative fact recognizes
the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination
of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced
consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded.
In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its
effects.- The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an
operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased,
ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but
sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or
unconstitutional law produces no effect.208 But its use must be subjected to
great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an
unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of
equity and fair play.209 It applies only to cases where extraordinary
circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have

met the stringent conditions that will permit its application.We find the
doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and implementation of
the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The
consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be
ignored or could no longer be undone.To be clear, the doctrine of operative
fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act. The term executive
act is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including
those that are quasi legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.
Same; Same; In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San
Roque Power Corporation,211 the Court likewise declared that "for
the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a legislative or
executive measure, meaning a law or executive issuance.- For the
operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a legislative or executive
measure meanin a law or executive issuance.The adoption and the
implementation of the DAP and its related issuances were executive acts.Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the
Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by
the Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given retroactive effect.
This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There must, however, be a
rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer
in good faith. A mere administrative practice, not formalized into a rule or
ruling, will not suffice because such a mere administrative practice may not
be uniformly and consistently applied. An administrative practice, if not
formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general public and can
be availed of only by those with informal contacts with the government
agency.It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the
implementation of the DAP and its related issuances were executive
acts.1avvphi1 The DAP itself, as a policy, transcended a merely
administrative practice especially after the Executive, through the DBM,
implemented it by issuing various memoranda and circulars. The pooling of
savings pursuant to the DAP from the allotments made available to the
different agencies and departments was consistently applied throughout the
entire Executive. With the Executive, through the DBM, being in charge of the
third phase of the budget cycle the budget execution phase, the President
could legitimately adopt a policy like the DAP by virtue of his primary
responsibility as the Chief Executive of directing the national economy
towards growth and development. This is simply because savings could and
should be determined only during the budget execution phase.
Same; Same; DAP; To declare the implementation of the DAP
unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation
constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the
real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to

be impractical and unfair.- The implementation of the DAP resulted into

the use of savings pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs that were not
covered in the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well
as to augment items pertaining to other departments of the Government in
clear violation of the Constitution. To declare the implementation of the DAP
unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted
an operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic
worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair.
Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the
offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo
everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That
scenario would be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity
alleviates such burden.
5. Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, et al.
G.R. No. 221697-221700 March 8, 2016
Election
Qualification

Law;

COMELECs

Jurisdiction

on

Candidates

COMELEC should restrain itself from going into the issue of qualifications of
the candidate. It cannot, in the same cancellation case, decide the
qualification or lack thereof of a candidate. Not one of the enumerated
powers of the COMELEC as stated in Art. IX-C, Sec. 2 of the Constitution
grants the Commission the power to determine the qualifications of a
candidate. Such powers are granted to the Electoral Tribunal as stated in
Article VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. Insofar as the qualification of the
candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and 23 of the COMELEC RULES do not allow /
are not authorization and not vestment of jurisdiction for the COMELEC to
determine the qualification of a candidate.

Election Law; Material Misrepresentation

The facts of jurisdiction must first be established in a prior proceeding before
an authority vested with jurisdiction. Prior determination of qualification may
be by statute, by an executive order or by a judgement of a competent court
or tribunal. Lacking this prior determination, the certificate of candidacy
cannot be cancelled or denied due course on the ground of false
representations regarding a candidates qualifications except if there exists
evident facts of questioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial
confessions. In this light the COMELEC cannot cancel POEs COC lacking prior
determination of her qualifications of a competent body.

Remedial; Burden of Proving Paternity;

Presumption regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unacceptable in the
Philippine Law. There is more than sufficient evidence that Poe has Filipino
parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Hence, the burden of proof
was on private respondents to show that the petitioner is not a Filipino
citizen. Private respondents should show that Poes parents were aliens. Her
admission that she was a foundling did not shift the burden to her because
such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos. In
fact, there is high probability that her parents were Filipinos. There are
disputable presumptions that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature. On this basis, it is safer to assume that Poes parents are
Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd.

Constitutional Law: Citizenship; Foundlings;

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the
1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. We find no
such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection
of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special
consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section
11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which
mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3
which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate
against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.

Constitutional Law: Citizenship; Foundlings under Intl Law;

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through
a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On the other hand,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the

incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted
principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding as a
result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread,
and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. "General
principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established
by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are
"basic to legal systems generally," 127 such as "general principles of equity,
i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle
against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights These are the same core principles which underlie the
Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Bill of Rights. The common thread of the UDHR,
UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth
and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the
time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present
naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No.
9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years
old. The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the
Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the
"nationality of the country of birth. The second is the principle that a
foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found,
contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness. xxx A foundling found in the territory of a
Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered
to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of
that State.

Constitutional Law: Poes Citizenship Based on GAPIL;

Although we are not a signatory to the Hague Convention, we are a signatory
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which affirms Article 14
of the Hague Convention. Likewise, the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness affirms Article 15 of the UDHR. By analogy, although the
Philippines has not signed the International Convention for the Protection of
Enforced disappearance, We (the SC) ruled that the proscription against

enforced disappearance was nonetheless binding as a generally accepted

principle of International Law.
Poes evidence shows that at least 60 Countries in Asia, North and South
America and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as
citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that foundlings are recognized as
citizens. Hence, there is generally accepted principle of international law to
presume that foundlings as having been born and a national of the country in
which it is found. Hence, Poe, as a founding, Poe is a natural born citizen.

Constitutional Law: Repatriation: Effect On Citizenship

The COMELEC arrogantly disregarded jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation which states that repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality. A natural born citizen born before he lost his Philippine
nationality will be restored to his former status as natural born after
repatriation (Benson vs. HRET, Pareno vs. Commission on Audit, etc.) In
passing R.A. 9225, Congress saw it fit to decree that natural born citizenship
may be reacquired even if it has been lost. It is not for the COMELEC to
disagree with the Congress determination.
Neither is repatriation an act to acquire or perfect ones citizenship. In the
case of Bengson, the Court Pointed out that there are only two types of
citizens in the 1987 Constitution: natural born and naturalized. There is no
third category of repatriated citizens. The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial
precedent. Hence, COMELECs decision is wrapped with grave abuse of
discretion.

Election Law: Establishing New Domicile: Requisites

There are three (3) requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or
bodily presence in a new locality; 2. Intention to remain (animus manendi),
and; 3. Intention to abandon the old domicile (animus revertendi). The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time, the change of residence must be voluntary and the residence
at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Constitutional Law: Election Law: Residency Requirement

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years'
residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the
forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been
a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years.

Election Law: Mistake In COC Not Conclusive: Constitutional

Requirement on Residency
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a
binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in
evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is
precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence
made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC, the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of
residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said
that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC
ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was
telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005.

Election Law: Mistake In COC Not Conclusive: Constitutional

Requirement on Residency: Grace Poes Case
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four
cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that
residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident
visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence
of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion
that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence and
permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her
residence here on 24 May 2005. Indeed, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when
petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.

1. 1 United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK) vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 206020
April 14, 2015

Constitutional Law: Admin Regulations: Statutes

It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution
is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution.

Constitutional Law: Freedom of Speech and Of Expression;

Prior Restraint
Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship
of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it
is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government.
Same: It is now deeply embedded in our jurisprudence freedom of speech
and of press enjoys a preferred status in our hierarchy of rights.
Same: A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or
manner, and under well-defined standards, constitutionally permissible, even
if it restricts the right to free speech. Requisites that must concur: First, the
government regulation is within the constitutional power of the government;
second, it furthers an important or substantial government interest; third, the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

Election Law: COMELEC

The Constitutional Grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the
COMELEC over franchises and permits to operate, though seemingly
unrestrained, has its limits.
Same: The COMELECs constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and
regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of public utility vehicles
(PUVs) and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate
the same.

Constitutional Law: Freedom of Speech and of Expression;

Prior Restraint

Regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a public utility vehicle (PUV),

through the posting of an election campaign material thereon, is not a
regulation of the franchise or permit to operate, but a regulation on the very
ownership of the vehicle.

COMELEC: Regulation
The COMELEC does not have the constitutional power to regulate public
transport terminals owned by private persons; A regulation of public transport
terminals based on extraneous circumstances, such as prohibiting the posting
of election campaign materials thereon, amounts to regulating ownership of
the transport terminal and not merely the permit to operate the same.

Constitutional Law: Freedom of Speech and of Expression;

Captive-Audience Doctrine
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a
practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted.
The captive-audience doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be
exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which the
communication cannot be avoided. A regulation based on the captiveaudience doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which undertakes selectively
to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are
more offensive than others.
Same: A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may
not be justified if the supposed captive audience may avoid exposure to the
otherwise intrusive speech.

Same: Equal Protection of The Law

The Constitution does not require that things, which are different in fact, be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause
does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. In order that
there can be a valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act
may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the
four requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) it must be
based upon substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it
must apply equally to all members of the class.

Same: Freedom of Speech and of Expression

It bears stressing that the freedom to advertise ones political candidacy is

clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression.

2. Resident Marine Mammals Of The Protected Seascape Taon Strait

vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 180771
April 21, 2015
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
requires that the President himself enter into any service contract
for the exploration of petroleum. Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution requires that the President himself enter into any
service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have
been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary,
Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement.
Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress
was subsequently notified of the execution of the said contract. Public
respondents implied argument that based on the alter ego principle, their
acts are also of then President Macapagal-Arroyos, cannot apply in this case.
In Jonson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279 (1998), we explained the concept of the
alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency and its limits in
this wise: Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where
the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
True to the constitutional policy that the State shall protect
and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature,
Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the perpetual existence of
all native plants and animals through the establishment of a
comprehensive system of integrated protected areas. True to the
constitutional policy that the State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature, Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the perpetual
existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment of a
comprehensive system of integrated protected areas. These areas possess

common ecological values that were incorporated into a holistic plan

representative of our natural heritage.
The system encompasses
outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that
are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals,
biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland, or
marine. It classifies and administers all the designated protected areas to
maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve
genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to
maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible. The
following categories of protected areas were established under the NIPAS Act:
a. Strict nature reserve;
b. Natural park;
c. Natural
monument;
d. Wildlife sanctuary;
e. Protected landscapes
and seascapes;
f. Resource reserve;
g. Natural biotic areas;
and h.
Other categories established by law, conventions or international
agreements which the Philippine Government is a signatory.
Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected area refers to
portions of land and water, set aside due to their unique physical
and biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity
and protected against human exploitation.Under Section 4 of the
NIPAS Act, a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due
to their unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance
biological diversity and protected against human exploitation. The Taon
Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a
protected area under the category of Protected Seascape. The NIPAS Act
defines a Protected Seascape to be an area of national significance
characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land while providing
opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism within the
normal lifestyle and economic activity of this areas; thus a management plan
for each area must be designed to protect and enhance the permanent
preservation of its natural conditions. Consistent with this endeavor is the
requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to
undertaking any activity outside the scope of the management plan. Unless
an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity inconsistent with the
goals of the NIPAS Act shall be implemented.
The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was
established in 1978 under Presidential Decree No. 1586. It prohibits
any person, partnership or corporation from undertaking or
operating any declared environmentally critical project or areas
without first securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly
authorized representative.The Environmental Impact Statement System
(EISS) was established in 1978 under Presidential Decree No. 1586. It
prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from undertaking or

operating any declared environmentally critical project or areas without first

securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative. Pursuant to the EISS, which called for the proper
management of environmentally critical areas, Proclamation No. 214698 was
enacted, identifying the areas and types of projects to be considered as
environmentally critical and within the scope of the EISS, while DENR
Administrative Order No. 2003-30 provided for its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR).
DENR
Administrative
Order
No.
2003-30
defines
an
environmentally
critical
area as an area delineated
as
environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental
impacts are expected if certain types of proposed projects or
programs are located, developed, or implemented in it;99 thus,
before a project, which is any activity, regardless of scale or
magnitude,
which
may
have
significant
impact
on
the
environment,100 is undertaken in it, such project must undergo an
EIA to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its stages on the
environment.-- DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an
environmentally critical area as an area delineated as environmentally
sensitive such that significant environmental impacts are expected if certain
types of proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or
implemented in it; thus, before a project, which is any activity, regardless
of scale or magnitude, which may have significant impact on the
environment, is undertaken in it, such project must undergo an EIA to
evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its stages on the environment.
An EIA is described in detail as follows: h. Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) - process that involves evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of a
project (including cumulative impacts) on the environment during
construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also includes
designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures
addressing these consequences to protect the environment and the
communitys welfare. The process is undertaken by, among others, the
project proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review Committee, affected
communities and other stakeholders.
While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law
upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and
extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this
energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a
law passed by Congress, since the Taon Strait is a NIPAS area.SC46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the
possible energy resources in the Taon Strait as it also provides for the
parties rights and obligations relating to extraction and petroleum production

should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While

Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which
a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be
authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in
the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Taon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no
such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the
Taon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be
done in said protected seascape.
3. Fernando vs. St, Scholasticas College
G.R. No. 161107
March 12, 2013
Constitutional law; Police Power;Police power is the plenary
power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety
and general welfare of the people. - "Police power is the plenary power
vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people." The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of
police power to local government units, as agencies of the State. This
delegation of police power is embodied in Section 1622 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), known as the General Welfare
Clause, which has two branches. "The first, known as the general legislative
power, authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make
regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by
law. The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the
municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the
health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of
their property."
Same; Same; Ordinances;For an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law,
it must also conform to the substantive requirements. - White Light
Corporation v. City of Manila, discusses the test of a valid ordinance: The test
of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City
of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within
the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution

or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Same; Same; Same; Rational Relationship Test; Strict Scrutiny
Test; To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the
rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the
imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by
the Court the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny
test .- To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for
the enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the Court the rational
relationship test and the strict scrutiny test: We ourselves have often applied
the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using
the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they
rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate
review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of
less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is
on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest
and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
Same; Same; Same;The State may not, under the guise of
police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic
appearance of the community. - Regarding the beautification purpose of
the setback requirement, it has long been settled that the State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial
use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance
of the community. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and
oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use
of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of
Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Points of law,
theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a
reviewing court, inasmuch as they cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.- The petitioners, however, argue that the invalidity of Section 5
was properly cured by Zoning Ordinance No. 303, Series of 2000, which
classified the respondents property to be within an institutional zone, under
which a five-meter setback has been required. The petitioners are mistaken.
Ordinance No. 303, Series of 2000, has no bearing to the case at hand. The
Court notes with displeasure that this argument was only raised for the first
time on appeal in this Court in the petitioners Reply. Considering that

Ordinance No. 303 was enacted on December 20, 2000, the petitioners could
very well have raised it in their defense before the RTC in 2002. The settled
rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot change the legal theory of this
case under which the controversy was heard and decided in the trial court. It
should be the same theory under which the review on appeal is conducted.
Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing
court, inasmuch as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This will
be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
Constitutional Law; Ordinances; Right to Property; Right to
Privacy;Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in
accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear
encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes
their right to decide how best to protect their property. - Compelling
the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed
ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which
necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their property. It
also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see-thru
fence is violative of their right to privacy, considering that the residence of
the Benedictine nuns is also located within the property. The right to privacy
has long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution
that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is
essentially the right to be let alone, as governmental powers should stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of its citizens. It is inherent in
the concept of liberty, enshrined in the Bill of Rights (Article III) in Sections 1,
2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The enforcement of
Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in an undue interference with the
respondents rights to property and privacy. Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192
is, thus, also invalid and cannot be enforced against the respondents.
Statutes; Retroactivity of Laws; Curative statutes are enacted
to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which
would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal
requirements. Curative statutes, by their very essence, are
retroactive. - "Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or
to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of
conformity with certain legal requirements. They are intended to supply
defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to
enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed or
intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some
statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that
which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to
give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws,

as if existing laws have been complied with. Curative statutes, therefore, by

their very essence, are retroactive."
Same;Where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
susceptible to being separated from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. - Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, as amended, are, thus,
invalid and cannot be enforced against the respondents. Nonetheless, "the
general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if susceptible to
being separated from the invalid, may stand and be enforced." Thus, the
other sections of the assailed ordinance remain valid and enforceable.
4. Chavez vs. Judicial Bar Council, et al.
G.R. No. 202242
April 16, 2013
Constitutional Law; The Constitution evinces the direct action
of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined and by which those
powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe
and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic; What the
Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance
and bars modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it. The
Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the
fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined and
by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for
their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic. The framers
reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate
expression of the principles and the framework upon which government and
society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional
provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the Framers
mean what they say. The language used in the Constitution must be
interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate
against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says,
according to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification even by the
branch tasked to interpret it.
Same; Legislative Department; A reading of the 1987
Constitution would reveal several provisions were indeed adjusted
as to be in tune with the shift of bicameralism; The bicameral nature
of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding
adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and
voted upon by its two Houses. A reading of the 1987 Constitution would
reveal that several positions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the
shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides

that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken by a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. Another is
Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to
be confirmed by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately. Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpusmay be
revoked or continued by Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members. In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of
Congress was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding adjustments were
made as to how a matter would be handled and voted upon by its two
Houses.
Same; Judicial and Bar Council (JBC); The lone representative
of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement
effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half
(1/2), between two representatives of Congress. Not only can this
unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is
clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized.
The lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This
pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into
half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress. Not only can this
unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is clearly
against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and
reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done cannot be done
indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is
clearly a constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the
Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one member of
Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation
carries with him one full vote.
Same; Operative Facts Doctrine; Under the doctrine of
operative
facts,
actions
previous
to
the
declaration
of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. It would not be amiss to
point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.
This rule, however is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts,
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.
To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil
Corporation: The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general
rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of
an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to
a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be

erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a

declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or
would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law
creating it.
5. Legaspi vs. City of Cebu, et al.
G.R. No. 159110
December 10, 2013
Local Government Units; Ordinances; A long line of decisions
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within
the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the substantive requirements. In City of Manila
vs Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA 308 (2005), the Court restates the test of a valid
ordinance thusly: The test of a valid ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not
be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
Local Government Code; Delegation of Powers; Congress
enacted the Local Government Code (LGC) as the implementing law
for the delegation to the various Local Government Units (LGUs) of
the States great powers, namely: the police power, the power of
eminent domain, and the power of taxation. Was the enactment of
Ordinance No. 1664 within the corporate powers of the LGU of the City of
Cebu? The answer is in the affirmative. Indeed, with no issues being hereby
raised against the formalities attendant to the enactment of Ordinance No.
1664, we presume its full compliance with the test in that regard. Congress
enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various
LGUSs of the States great powers, namely: the police power, the power of
eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to
delineate the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with by each
LGU in the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each
LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional
and statutory limitations.
Constitutional Law; Police Power; Police power is regarded as
the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs. In particular,

police power is regarded as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is
unquestionably the power vested in the legislature by the Constitution, to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subject of the same. According to Cooley: [The
police power] embraces the whole system of internal regulation by which the
state seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offenses
against itself, but also to establish for the intercourse of citizens with citizens,
those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to
prevent the conflict of rights and to insure to each uninterrupted enjoyment
of his own, so far as it is reasonably consistent with the right of enjoyment of
rights by others.
Same; Due Process; The guaranty of due process of law is a
constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of the
Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive,
or the Judiciary. The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional
safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of the Government, whether
committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a protection
essential to every inhabitant of the country, for, as a commentator on
Constitutional Law has vividly written: x x x. If the law itself unreasonably
deprives a person of his life, liberty, or property, he is denied the protection
of due process. If the enjoyment of his rights is conditioned on an
unreasonable requirement, due process is likewise violated. Whatsoever be
the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or merely a statute, its
unjustified withholding would also be a violation of due process. Any
government act that militates against the ordinary norms of justice or fair
play is considered an infraction of the great guaranty of due process; and this
is true whether the denial involves violation merely of the procedure
prescribed by the law or affects the very validity of the law itself.
Same; Same; Notice and Hearing; Notice and Hearing are the
essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there are
many instances under our laws in which the absence of one or both
of such requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of
due process; The immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by
clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors were
not around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance,
notice and hearing would be superfluous. Notice and hearing are the
essential requirements of due process. Yet, there are many instances under
our laws in which the absence of one or both of such requirements is not
necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process. Among the instances are

the cancellation of the passport of a person being sought for the commission
of the crime, the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing
administrative charges, the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing
administrative charges, the distraint of properties to answer for tax
delinquencies, the padlocking of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of
theaters showing obscene movies, and the abatement of nuisance per se.
Add to them the arrest of a person in flagrante delicto. The clamping of the
petitioners vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No. 1664 (and of the vehicles of
others similarly situated) was of the same character as the aforecited
established exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. As already said,
the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was
necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of
apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be
superfluous. Nor should the lack of a trial-type hearing prior to the clamping
constitute a breach of procedural due process, for giving the transgressors
the chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest could
equally satisfy the need for a hearing. In other words, the prior intervention of
a court of law was not indispensable to ensure a compliance with the
guaranty of due process.
6. Vivares vs. St. Theresas
G.R. No. 202666
September 29, 2014
Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which
such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.

Bill of Rights; Informational Privacy

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
individuals right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law
scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as a procedure designed to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.

The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the writ
requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Thus, the existence of a persons right to informational privacy and a
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation
of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable
before the privilege of the writ may be extended.
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only
to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above
underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data
situations, would not have been made. Habeas data, to stress, was
designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age. As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only.
In fact, the annotations to the Rule prepared by the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data
complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that: The writ of habeas
data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to
enforce ones right to privacy, more specifically the right to
informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can
include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database
or information or files in possession or in control of respondents. (emphasis
ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be
availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Bill Of Rights; Informational Privacy vis--vis Online Social

Networks (OSNs)
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact
and to stay connected to other members of the same or different social
media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among
others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a
room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or walls, the contents of
which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin
board, a user/owner can post anything from text, to pictures, to music and
videos access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one,
some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining
popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of
various social networking sites, including the one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people
use to stay connected with friends and family, to discover whats going on in
the world, and to share and express what matters to them.

Facebook connections are established through the process of friending

another user. By sending a friend request, the user invites another to
connect their accounts so that they can view any and all Public and
Friends Only posts of the other. Once the request is accepted, the link is
established and both users are permitted to view the other users Public or
Friends Only posts, among others. Friending, therefore, allows the user to
form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user
gives his or her Facebook friend access to his or her profile and shares
certain information to the latter.

Bill Of Rights; Informational Privacy vis--vis Online Social

Networks (OSNs); Privacy Tools
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN
activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of
petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or
to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace
through the utilization of the OSNs privacy tools. In other words, utilization
of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the
users invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is Public,
it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable
to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children
positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational
privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d, is
most instructive: [A] person who places a photograph on the Internet
precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such
imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant
did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled
access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
Also, United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, held that [t]he more open the
method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably
expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that
is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of
privacy.
That the photos are viewable by friends only does not necessarily bolster
the petitioners contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed
that the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the
confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following: (1) Facebook allows
the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to

interact and share in any conceivable way; (2) A good number of Facebook
users befriend other users who are total strangers; (3) The sheer number of
Friends one user has, usually by the hundreds; and (4) A users Facebook
friend can share the formers post, or tag others who are not Facebook
friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own
Facebook friends. It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a
posts or profile details privacy to Friends is no assurance that it
can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook
friends with the source of the content. The users own Facebook friend
can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not
with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged,
the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who
was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at
Friends.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more
precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature,
likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors
enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of
any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized
Facebooks privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them
or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject
of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot
now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the
photographs in question.
It has been said that the best filter is the one between your childrens ears.
This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet
consumers in general is the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations.
As a cyberspace community member, one has to be proactive in
protecting his or her own privacy. It is in this regard that many OSN
users, especially minors, fail. Responsible social networking or observance of
the netiquettes on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due
to the widespread notion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they
generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves
sensibly in a public forum.
Considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness, as well
as the dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in
view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the
parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital
citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is
believed that to limit such risks, theres no substitute for parental
involvement and supervision.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence

in their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in
protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from
the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care
in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated.
These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they
themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their
private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy
tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information private, and to keep
track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook,
especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the
sites layout often.

7. Villafuerte vs. Robredo

G.R. No. 195390
December 10, 2014
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review, Elements of
It is well-settled that the Courts exercise of the power of judicial review
requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy
In LaBugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 421 SCRA 148 (2004), the
Court characterized an actual case or controversy, viz.: An actual case or
controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion. The power does not extend to hypothetical questions
since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. (Citations
omitted) The existence of an actual controversy in the instant case cannot be
overemphasized. At the time of filing of the instant petition, the respondent
had already implemented the assailed memorandum circulars. In fact, on May
26, 2011, Villafuerte received Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No.
2011-009 dated May 10, 2011 from the Office of the Provincial Auditor of
Camarines Sur, requiring him to comment on the observation of the audit
team.

Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

There is likewise no merit in the respondents claim that the petitioners
failure to exhaust administrative remedies warrants the dismissal of the
petition. It bears emphasizing that the assailed issuances were issued
pursuant to the rule-making or quasi-legislative power of the DILG.
This pertains to the power to make rules and regulations which results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute. Not
to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In
challenging the validity of an administrative issuance carried out
pursuant to the agencys rule-making power, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not stand as a bar in
promptly resorting to the filing of a case in court.
Law on Public Corporation; Autonomy of Local Government
Units
(LGUs);
Decentralization
of
Administration;
Decentralization of Power
The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the autonomy
of LGUs. To highlight its significance, the entire Article X of the
Constitution was devoted to laying down the bedrock upon which this policy
is anchored. It is also pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution of
enhancing local autonomy that the LGC was enacted.
Verily, local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization. In Limbona v. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786 (1989), the Court
elaborated on the concept of decentralization, thus: [A]utonomy is either
decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden
the base of government power and in the process to make local governments
more responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress. At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. x x x. Decentralization of
power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape
its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
Constitutional Law; Law on Public Corporation; Presidents
Power of General Supervision overLGUs

To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution

confines the power of the President over LGUs to mere supervision.
The President exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law. He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Thus, Section 4, Article X of the Constitution, states:
Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by Local
Government Units (LGUs), they are still under the supervision of the President
and maybe held accountable for malfeasance or violations of existing laws.
Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline
and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to
authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local
officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
Constitutional Law; Law on Public Corporation; Local Fiscal
Autonomy of LGUs
A scrutiny of the contents of the mentioned issuances shows that they do not,
in any manner, violate the fiscal autonomy of LGUs. To be clear, [f]iscal
autonomy means that local governments have the power to create
their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the
national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to
allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to
the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within
the constraints thereof.
Constitutional Law; Declaration of Principles and State
Policies; Full Disclosure of Public and Official Information
The Constitution, which was drafted after long years of dictatorship and
abuse of power, is now replete with numerous provisions directing the
adoption of measures to uphold transparency and accountability in
government, with a view of protecting the nation from repeating its atrocious
past. In particular, the Constitution commands the strict adherence to
full disclosure of information on all matters relating to official
transactions and those involving public interest.
8. Moncayo Integrated Small-Scale Miners Association, Inc. (MISSMA)
vs. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp.
G.R. No. 149638; G.R. No. 149916
December 10, 2014
Mines and Mining; Jurisdiction and Power of DENR Secretary

Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7076 reiterates the DENR Secretarys power of
control over the program and the activities of the small-scale miners within
the peoples small-scale mining area: Section 26. Administrative Supervision
over the Peoples Small-scale Mining Program.The Secretary through his
representative shall exercise direct supervision and control over the program
and activities of the small-scale miners within the peoples small-scale mining
area. The Secretary shall within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this
Act promulgate rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions
of the same. Priority shall be given to such rules and regulations that will
ensure the least disruption in the operations of the small-scale miners.
Section 21.1 of DAO No. 34-2, the implementing rules and regulations of
Republic Act No. 7076, states that the DENR Secretary has direct supervision
and control over the program and the activities of the small-scale miners
within the peoples small-scale mining area.
Local Government Code; Enforcement of Small-Scale Mining
Law
League of Provinces v. DENR, 696 SCRA 190 (2013), discussed that the Local
Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale
mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the
supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in-charge, subject to
law and higher authority, of carrying out the States constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
countrys natural resources. Since the DENR Secretary has power of control
as opposed to power of supervision, he had the power to confirm with
modification the PMRBs decision
Constitutional Law; Executive Department
The Constitution provides that [t]he State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into coproduction, joint venture, or productionsharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens[.]
Moreover, [t]he President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country[.]
Chapter II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7942 known as the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995 also provides as follows: SEC.4.Ownership of Mineral
Resources.Mineral resources are owned by the State and the exploration,
development, utilization, and processing thereof shall be under its full control
and supervision. The state may directly undertake such activities or it may
enter into mineral agreements with contractors. The State shall recognize

and protect the rights of the indigenous cultural communities to their

ancestral lands as provided for by the Constitution.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942 on mineral reservations provides that
[m]ining operations in existing mineral reservations and such other
reservations as may thereafter be established, shall be undertaken by the
Department or through a contractor[.]
Apex Mining v. SMGMC discussed that Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942 is a
special provision, as it specifically treats of the establishment of mineral
reservations only. Said provision grants the President the power to proclaim a
mineral land as a mineral reservation, regardless of whether such land is also
an existing forest reservation.
In the 2002 case of Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation v. Balite
Portal Mining Cooperative108 involving the same Diwalwal gold rush area,
this court discussed that the State may not be precluded from considering a
direct takeover of the mines, if it is the only plausible remedy in sight to the
gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush.
Incidentally, we acknowledge that PICOP raised the validity of Proclamation
No. 297 in its memorandum. It argues that Proclamation No. 297 by then
President Macapagal-Arroyo was without congressional concurrence as
required by Republic Act No. 3092, thus, revocable.111 The validity of
Proclamation No. 297, however, is not an issue in these cases. This
subsequent development was not litigated, and this is not the proper case to
assail its validity.
9. In the Matter of the Petition For Habeas Corpus Of Datukan Malang
Sibo vs. Warden, Quezon City Jail
G.R. No. 197597
April 8, 2015
Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed
before the Court of Appeals. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may
be made through a petition filed before this court or any of its members, the
Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the
Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges. The court or judge grants
the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the person
allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the
return of the writ is then conducted.
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued
the writ. Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which
the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the
petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court
"acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition
for habeas corpus.]" Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision
appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the
lower court.

Habeas Corpus; Petition for Habeas Corpus is a decision of

Lower Court, not Superior Court
When a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only
resolves whether the respondent should be ordered to show cause why the
petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition was filed was being
detained or deprived of his or her liberty. However, once the superior court
makes the writ returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of Court,
the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a
recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of
effect[.]" The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the
lower court, not of the superior court.
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus,
making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The
trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the
Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power
and authority to determine the merits" of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The
decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the
trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court
with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts, respondent Warden
correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Nature of Habeas Corpus
Called the "great writ of liberty[,]" the writ of habeas corpus "was devised
and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom." The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in
nature, consistent with the law's "zealous regard for personal liberty."
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus
"shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The primary purpose of
the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal." "Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as
to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed
of as a post-conviction remedy or when there is an alleged violation of the
liberty of abode. In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the
implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty
in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. Habeas corpus being a remedy for
a constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level

of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed
in the labyrinth of other processes.
Difference between Writ of Habeas Corpus and Final Decision
on Petition for Issuance of Writ
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition
for the issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the
body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other
hand, it is in the final decision where a court determines the legality of the
restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its
issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the
writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any
deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even
if the petition for its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]" Although
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of
invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires it, the writ itself may
not be suspended.
Motion to Quash Information or Complaint as Remedy when
Writ of Habeas Corpus is no longer allowed
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person
allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of
the court. The restraint then has become legal, and the remedy of habeas
corpus is rendered moot and academic. Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court provides: SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of
a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the
writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be
held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges
have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if
a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is
charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of
a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or
order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the

usual remedies. This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the

information or the warrant of arrest. At any time before a plea is entered, the
accused may file a motion to quash complaint or information based on any of
the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or information filed against him [or her] for insufficiency on its face
in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information." If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to quash,
the accused "hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the
information." "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the information are
not to be considered."
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order [the]
amendment [of the complaint or information]." If the motion to quash is
based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do
not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution "an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment." If after amendment, the
complaint or information still suffers from the same defect, the trial court
shall quash the complaint or information.
However, Ilagan and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo was not
arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not
restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally
deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition
for Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 221, Quezon City in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal
Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and accused Butukan S. Malang,
not Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the
Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. It is
undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer
Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused
Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police
officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor
attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo
was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner
Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due
process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
Proper Remedy is not Motion to Quash Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash

Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the
defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused
appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S.
Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary
investigation in this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack of preliminary
investigation. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the
premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the same
person. There is evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of
these processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another person
named Datukan Malang Salibo.
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport, his
identification card from the Office on Muslim Affairs, his Tax Identification
Number card, and clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation all
bearing his picture and indicating the name "Datukan Malang Salibo." None of
these government-issued documents showed that petitioner Salibo used the
alias "Butukan S. Malang."
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on
November 23, 2009 when the Maguindanao Massacre occurred.
A Certification from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo
departed for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009 and arrived in the Philippines
only on December 20, 2009. A Certification from Saudi Arabian Airlines
attests that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi
Arabian Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that he arrived in the
Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on December 20, 2009.
Habeas Corpus as Remedy for person illegally deprived of his
liberty
To require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to further illegally
deprive him of his liberty. Urgency dictates that we resolve his Petition in his
favor given the strong evidence that he is not Butukan S. Malang.
In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor
his innocence. However, between a citizen who has shown that he was
illegally deprived of his liberty without due process of law and the
government that has all the "manpower and the resources at [its]
command" to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor
of the citizen.
Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue
the proper remedies against him as provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule
that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty.
10.
West Town Condominium Corporation vs.
Corporation, First Philippine Gen Corporation
G.R. No. 194239
June 16, 2015

First

Philippine

Real Party-in-Interest, Defined

As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real parties-in-interest. In other words, the action must be brought by the
person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.
Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially
ordained that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest.
In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL
affected all the condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in
fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning of July
23, 2010, when the condominium's electrical power was shut down. Until
now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still not return to
their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of
West Tower are real parties-in-interest.
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common
interest of its unit owners and residents, and has the legal standing to file and
pursue the instant petition. While a condominium corporation has limited
powers under RA 4726, otherwise known as The Condominium Act, it is
empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members. In the instant case,
the condominium corporation is the management body of West Tower and
deals with everything that may affect some or all of the condominium unit
owners or users.
Constitutional Law; Writ of Kalikasan
The filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1,
Rule 7of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that
a petitioner be directly affected by anenvironmental disaster. The rule clearly
allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons
whoseconstitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation.
Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the
Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women's Business
Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International Philippines,
Inc.San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Foundations, and the
Consolidated Mansions CondominiumCorporation, as petitioners in the case,
the Court already granted their intervention in the present controversy in
theadverted July 30, 2013 Resolution.
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by
anenvironmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the

petition on behalf of persons whoseconstitutional right to a balanced and

healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.
Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the
submissions to the Court, including the periodic reports of FPIC and the
results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL. Having disposed
of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of contention in the pending
motions. Suffice it to state in the outset that as regards, the substantive
issues presented, the Court, likewise, concurs with the other
recommendations of the CA, with a few modifications.
Administrative Law; Department of Energy; Jurisdiction
The DOE is specially equipped to consider FPIC's proper implementation and
compliance with its PIMS and to evaluate the result of the various tests
conducted on the pipeline. The DOE is empowered by Sec. 12 (b) (1), RA
7638 to formulate and implement policies for the efficient and economical
"distribution, transportation, and storage of petroleum, coal, natural gas."
Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the DOE possesses technical knowledge and
special expertise with respect to practices in the transportation of oil through
pipelines.
Administrative Law; Jurisdiction of Administrative Bodies
In a host of cases, this Court held that when the adjudication of a controversy
requires the resolution of issues within the expertise of an administrative
body, such issues must be investigated and resolved by the administrative
body equipped with the specialized knowledge and the technical expertise.
Hence, the courts, although they may have jurisdiction and power to decide
cases, can utilize the findings and recommendations of the administrative
agency on questions that demand "the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact."
Administrative Law; Department of Environment and Natural
Resources; Jurisdiction
DENR is the government agency tasked to implement the state policy of
"maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment"and to "promulgate rules and regulations for the
control of water, air, and land pollution."
Dissenting Opinion, J. Leonen
Political Law; Separation of Powers; View that the principle of
separation of powers is implied in the division of powers in the
Constitution among the three (3) government branches: the
executive, the legislative; and the judiciary.
The principle of separation of powers is implied in the division of powers in
the Constitution among the three (3) government branches: the executive,

the legislative, and the judiciary. "The principle presupposes mutual respect
by and between the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the
government and calls for them to be left alone to discharge their duties as
they see fit." "The executive power [is] vested in the President of the
Philippines." The President has the duty to ensure the faithful execution of
the laws. The President has the power of control over "all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices" including, among others, the Department
of Energy, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the
Department of Science and Technology, and the Department of Public Works
and Highways.
The Constitution vests legislative power in the Congress. The Congress enacts
laws. Meanwhile, judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and other
courts. Judicial power refers to the "duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights [that] are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether . . . there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." Essentially, the judiciary's
power is to interpret the law with finality. The powers specifically vested by
the Constitution in each branch may not be legally taken nor exercised by the
other branches. Each government branch has exclusive authority to exercise
the powers granted to it. Any encroachment of powers is ultra vires; it is void.
Administrative Agencies; Quasi-Judicial Powers
Administrative agencies determine facts as a necessary incident to their
exercise of quasi-judicial powers or to assist them in discharging their
executive functions. Quasi-judicial powers refer to the authority of
administrative agencies to determine the rights of parties under its
jurisdiction through adjudication. Registration, issuance of franchises, permits
and licenses, and determination of administrative liabilities are instances that
require an agency's exercise of quasi-judicial power. These acts require
administrative determination of facts, based on which the parties' rights shall
be ascertained and official action shall be made.
Administrative Law; View that in principle, findings of fact by
administrative agencies are not disturbed by this court when
supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming
or preponderant
Because of the administrative agencies' specialized knowledge in their fields,
we often defer to their findings of fact. Thus, in principle, findings of fact by
administrative agencies are not disturbed by this court when supported by
substantial evidence, "even if not overwhelming or preponderant."This Rule,
however, admits a few exceptions: First, when an administrative proceeding
is attended by fraud, collusion, arbitrary action, mistake of law, or a denial of
due process; Second, when there are irregularities in the procedure that has
led to factual findings; Third, when there are palpable errors committed; and

Lastly, when there is manifest grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or

capriciousness. If the actions of an administrative agency are made under
these circumstances, judicial review is justified even if the actions are
supported by substantial evidence.
11.
Velicaria-Garafil vs. Office of the President
G.R. No. 203372
June 16, 2015
Public Officers; Appointments; Midnight Appointments; All the
appointments in these cases are midnight appointments in violation
of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
This ponencia and the dissent both agree that the facts in all these cases
show that "none of the petitioners have shown that their appointment papers
(and transmittal letters) have been issued (and released) before the ban."
The dates of receipt by the MRO, which in these cases are the only reliable
evidence of actual transmittal of the appointment papers by President
Macapagal-Arroyo, are dates clearly falling during the appointment ban. Thus,
this ponencia and the dissent both agree that all the appointments in these
cases are midnight appointments in violation of Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.
Public Officers; Appointments
Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment to a government post is a
process that takes several steps to complete. Any valid appointment,
including one made under the exception provided in Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the President signing an appointee's
appointment paper to a vacant office, the official transmittal of the
appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the appointment
paper by the appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee
evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or her assumption to office.
Public Officers; Midnight Appointments
The 1986 Constitutional Commission put a definite period, or an empirical
value, on Aytona's intangible "stratagem to beat the deadline," and also on
the act of "preempting the President's successor," which shows a lack of
"good faith, morality and propriety." Subject to only one exception,
appointments made during this period are thus automatically prohibited
under the Constitution, regardless of the appointee's qualifications or even of
the President's motives. The period for prohibited appointments covers two
months before the elections until the end of the President's term. The
Constitution, with a specific exception, ended the President's power to
appoint "two months immediately before the next presidential elections." For
an appointment to be valid, it must be made outside of the prohibited period
or, failing that, fall under the specified exception. T
Public Officers; Appointments

Allowing the dissent's proposal that an appointment is complete merely upon

the signing of an appointment paper and its transmittal, excluding the
appointee's acceptance from the appointment process, will lead to the
absurdity that, in case of nonacceptance, the position is considered occupied
and nobody else may be appointed to it. Moreover, an incumbent public
official, appointed to another public office by the President, will automatically
be deemed to occupy the new public office and to have automatically
resigned from his first office upon transmittal of his appointment paper, even
if he refuses to accept the new appointment. This will result in chaos in public
service.
Public Officers; Midnight Appointments
The President exercises only one kind of appointing power. There is no need
to differentiate the exercise of the President's appointing power outside, just
before, or during the appointment ban. The Constitution allows the President
to exercise the power of appointment during the period not covered by the
appointment ban, and disallows (subject to an exception) the President from
exercising the power of appointment during the period covered by the
appointment ban. The concurrence of all steps in the appointment process is
admittedly required for appointments outside the appointment ban. There is
no justification whatsoever to remove acceptance as a requirement in the
appointment process for appointments just before the start of the
appointment ban, or during the appointment ban in appointments falling
within the exception. The existence of the appointment ban makes no
difference in the power of the President to appoint; it is still the same power
to appoint. In fact, considering the purpose of the appointment ban, the
concurrence of all steps in the appointment process must be strictly applied
on appointments made just before or during the appointment ban.
Public Officers; Elements of a Valid Appointment
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which
should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1)
authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2)
transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a
vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the
appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The
concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when
the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the
appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should always
concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the
process lacks even one step. And, unlike the dissent's proposal, there is no
need to further distinguish between an effective and an ineffective
appointment when an appointment is valid.

Public Officers; Possession of Appointment Papers

The possession of the original appointment paper is not indispensable to
authorize an appointee to assume office. If it were indispensable, then a loss
of the original appointment paper, which could be brought about by
negligence, accident, fraud, fire or theft, corresponds to a loss of the office.
However, in case of loss of the original appointment paper, the appointment
must be evidenced by a certified true copy issued by the proper office, in this
case the MRO.
Public Office; Appointment can only be made to a vacant office
An appointment can be made only to a vacant office. An appointment cannot
be made to an occupied office. The incumbent must first be legally removed,
or his appointment validly terminated, before one could be validly installed to
succeed him.
Public Office; Midnight Appointments
Paragraph (b), Section 1 of EO 2 considered as midnight appointments those
appointments to offices that will only be vacant on or after 11 March 2010
even though the appointments are made prior to 11 March 2010. EO 2
remained faithful to the intent of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution: the outgoing President is prevented from continuing to rule the
country indirectly after the end of his term.
Public Office; Appointments; Acceptance of Appointment
Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office
and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of
office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full
investiture of the office.
The inclusion of acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of the entire
appointment process prevents the abuse of the Presidential power to appoint.
It is relatively easy to antedate appointment papers and make it appear that
they were issued prior to the appointment ban, but it is more difficult to
simulate the entire appointment process up until acceptance by the
appointee.
Brion J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Public Officers; Midnight Appointments
Only part of Executive Order (EO) No. 2 is unconstitutional, i.e. insofar as it
unduly expands the scope of midnight appointments under Section 15, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Political Law; Executive Power
The Constitution, admittedly, does not contain an express definition of the
executive power reposed in the Chief Executive; it merely contains an
enumeration of the powers the President can exercise. Broadly understood,

however, executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws of
the land; it is the power to carry the laws into practical operation and to
enforce their due observance. As the country's Chief Executive, the President
represents the whole government; he carries the obligation to ensure the
enforcement of all laws by the officials and employees of his department. This
characterization of executive power is plainly evident from the presidential
oath of office.
Political Law; Executive Power; To fulfill the oath to preserve
and defend the Constitution and execute its laws
To fulfill the oath to "preserve and defend [the] Constitution, [and] execute its
laws," the President, in particular, and the Executive branch, in general,
necessarily must interpret the provisions of the Constitution or of the
particular law they are enforcing. This power of legal interpretation uniquely
arises from the legal principle that the grant of executive power tothe
President is a grant of all powers necessary for the exercise of the
powerexpressly given.
The scope of the presidential/executive interpretative power, however
broadly it may be interpreted, has to be read together with the principle of
checks and balances. In other words, the executive's broad interpretative
power does not signify that he possesses unfettered authority to exercise an
independent power of legal interpretation. The scope of the President's power
of executive interpretation is at its broadest when exercised clearly withinits
own sphere of power and diminishes when it involves the power of theother
branches of the government. The degrees of presidential legal interpretation
thus fluctuates from the very broad to the very narrow.
Doctrine of Contemporaneous Construction
To place my discussion in proper context and in simpler terms, when the
President interprets a constitutional provision that grants him full
discretionary authority to act on a matter, the Court generally defers to the
President's judgment on how the constitutional provision is to be interpreted
and applied. This is true in ordinary legal situations where a government
agency in the executive, tasked to implement a particular law, is given the
first opportunity to interpret and apply it even before a controversy as
regards its implementation reaches the courts.
In fact, the Executive branch is constantly engaged in legal interpretation in
performing its multifarious duties. In instances when the executive
interpretation finally reaches the judiciary, the courts may adopt a deferential
attitude towards the construction placed on the statute by the executive
officials charged with its execution. This reality is what we now know as the
doctrine of contemporaneous construction.

Public Officers; Midnight Appointments; Period of Appointment

Ban
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution also provides its own period of
effectivity of two months prior to the coming Presidential elections all the way
to the end of the outgoing President's term.
Public Officers; Appointments by Local Chief Executives after
Elections
The CSC-issued prohibition applicable to local chief executives is
jurisprudentially
significant
since
the
Constitution
does
not
expresslyprohibit an outgoing local chief executive from exercising
its powerto appoint or hire new employees after the elections (in the
manner that an outgoing President is prohibited under Section 15, Article VII).
Thus, the validity of an appointment by a local chief executive in the cited
cases was, in effect, determined by applying the CSC's regulations to the
facts surrounding each contested appointment. This is the import of Sales
and Nazareno. These cases, of course, are obviously inapplicable to the
present case, given the existence of a clear constitutional prohibition
applicable to an outgoing President.
Public Office; Appointments made by President
A plain reading of the Constitution alone shows that the term "appointment"
may pertain to the President's act of appointment as the President, on his
own, has the power to appoint officials as authorized under the Constitution
and the pertinent laws. This presidential appointmentpower should be
distinguished from the appointment process thatrequires the act of
the appointee for its efficacy. If these two concepts would be confused
with one another, the result could be havoc and absurdities in our
jurisprudence every time we resolve a case before us.
The President's power of appointment is sui generis.
It is intrinsically an executive act because the filling of an office created by
law is an implementation of that law.The power to appoint is the exclusive
prerogative of the President involving the exercise of his discretion;the wide
latitude given to the President to appoint is further demonstrated by the
constitutional recognition that the President is granted the power to appoint
even those officials whose appointments are not provided for by law.
Public Office; Acceptance by the Appointee
I conclude that for an appointment to be valid under Section 15,
Article VII, the appointment papers must have already been signed,
issued or released prior to the constitutional ban, addressed to the
head of the office concerned or the appointee himself. The appointee's
acceptance through an oath,assumption of office or any positive act does not
find any reference in Section15, Article VII as this part of the appointment

process is already outside thePresident's power of control and is wholly within

the appointee's discretion. The Constitution could not have envisioned a
prohibition on the President that is already beyond the sphere of his
executive powers.
Public Office; Appointment Ban
The appointment ban, however, limits the President's control over the
appointment process. When the appointment ban sets in, the President can
no longer exercise his appointment power, although the President may recall
a previously unaccepted appointment, or revoke an unaccepted one. The
President may likewise exercise his appointing power under the exception in
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Public Office; Acceptance still necessary
Thus, an acceptance is still necessary in order for the appointee to validly
assume his post and discharge the functions of his new office, and thus make
the appointment effective. There can never be an instance where the
appointment of an incumbent will automatically result in his resignation from
his present post and his subsequent assumption of his new position; or where
the President can simply remove an incumbent from his current office by
appointing him to another one. I stress that acceptance through oath or any
positive act is still indispensable before any assumption of office may occur.
Public Office; Failure to course an appointment through the
MRO is not fatal
However, contrary to the respondents' claim, failure to course an
appointment through the MRO for official release is not
fatal.Otherwise, an officein the Executive department particularly within
theOffice of the President can make or break an appointment by its own
inactionor even contrary to the instruction of the Chief Executive,
therebyemasculating the President's power of control and negating his power
ofappointment.
Release of appointment paper is not the only act signifying the
Presidents intent
The release of the appointment paper through the MRO is not the only act
that can signify the President's intent. The President may also cause the
issuance of the appointment paper and transmittal letter, if any, without the
need of forwarding it to the MRO so longas the date of actual issuance or
release of the appointment paper (and transmittal letter, if any) can
otherwise be established by other means and beproven with reasonable
certainty.
Assumption of office may take some
appointment papers have been issued

time

after

their

Consequently, assumption of office or taking of oath of office may take some

time after their appointment papers have been issued. Including these acts
within the phrase "make appointments" is a completely unwarranted
expansion of the text and a clear departure from the intent of the
Constitution. In this light, E.O. No. 2 is unconstitutional to the
extentthat it unduly expanded the scope of prohibition in Section 15,
ArticleVII.
12.
Mison vs. Gallegos
G.R. No. 210759
June 23, 2015
Constitutional Law; Writs of Amparo;On 25 September 2007, the
Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of
the Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people s
constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987
Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime.
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
"Extralegal killings" are killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand,
"enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate
or where about s of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law."
Same; Same;the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to
what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v.
Pardico42 enumerated the elements constituting "enforced disappearances"
as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9851, to wit: (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be
followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the
amparo petition; and (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the
subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

Same; Same;Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an

amparo petition should contain, among which is the right to life, liberty and
security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation
is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits, to wit: SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. The petition shall be signed
and verified and shall allege the following: (a) The personal circumstances of
the petitioner; (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or
uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; (c)
The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent,
and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; (d) The investigation
conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner
and conduct of the investigation, together with any report; (e) The actions
and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts
of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
threat, act or omission; and (f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include
a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.
Same; Same; Substantial Evidence;It is to be noted that the
Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish their claims by
substantial evidence.Other than making unfounded claims, however, Ku was
not able to present evidence that he was exposed to "life-threatening
situations" while confined at the BI Detention Center. On the contrary, the
records show that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he has access to his
counsel.
Same; Same;It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of
the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning the
extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As
Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the
issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at bar.
Administrative Law; Deportation;The Court clarified that under
Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the power to
deport aliens is vested in the President of the Philippines, subject to the
requirements of due process. The Immigration Commissioner is vested with
authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940, as amended. Thus, a party aggrieved by a Deportation Order issued
by the BOC is proscribed from assailing said Order in the RTC even via a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Conformably with ruling of the Court in

Domingo v. Scheer, such party may file a motion for the reconsideration
thereof before the BOC.
13.
Mactan-Cebu International Airport vs. City of Lapu-Lapu
G.R. No. 181756
June 15, 2015
Public Dominion; Like in MIAA, the airport lands and buildings of
MCIAA are properties of public dominion because they are intended for public
use. As properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the State or
the Republic of the Philippines, and are outside the commerce of man. This,
unless petitioner leases its real property to a taxable person, the specific
property leased becomes subject to real property tax; in which case, only
those portions of petitioners properties which are leased to taxable persons
like private parties are subject to real property tax by the City of Lapu-Lapu.
14.
Canceran vs. People
G.R. No. 206442
July 01, 2015
Constitutional Law; Right to be informed; No less than the
Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal
prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him.16 It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed
must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of
requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
15.
Arnado vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 210164
August 18, 2015
Public Officer; Qualifications.
Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5 (2)
of RA 9225 at the time he filed his CoC for the May 13, 2013
elections; subsequent compliance does not suffice.
Under Section 4 (d) n of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual
citizenship" is disqualified from running for any elective local position. In
Mercado v. Manzano,it was clarified that the phrase "dual citizenship" in said
Section 4 (d) n must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance."Subsequently, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason
of their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy
full civil and political rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law.
They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1)
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer

authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.

Thus: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain
or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:xxx xxx
xxx(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the
Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second
requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held in Maquiling v.
Commission on Elections,his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was
deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said
affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for
purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said
second requirement. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an
affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been belatedly executed.
Moreover, it cannot be validly argued that Arnado should be given the
opportunity to correct the deficiency in his qualification because at the time
this Court promulgated its Decision in Maquiling on April 16, 2013, the period
for filing the CoC for local elective office had already lapsed. Or, as Justice
Arturo D. Brion puts it in his Dissenting Opinion, "[t]o the extent that Arnado
was denied the chance to submit a replacement oath of renunciation in 2013,
then there was an unfair and abusive denial of opportunity equivalent to
grave abuse of discretion." Besides, shortly after learning of the Court's April
16, 2013 ruling in Maquiling or on May 9, 2013, Arnado substantially complied
therewith by executing an affidavit affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation. The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was
the first case dealing with the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the
qualification to run for public office of a natural-born Filipino citizen who was
naturalized abroad and subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225.
It was settled in that case that the use of a foreign passport amounts to
repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation. Yet, despite the issue
being novel and of first impression, plus the fact that Arnado could not have
divined the possible adverse consequences of using his US passport, the
Court in Maquiling did not act with leniency or benevolence towards Arnado.
Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that matters dealing with qualifications for public
elective office must be strictly complied with. Otherwise stated, the Court in
Maquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado from
strictly complying with the eligibility requirements to run for public office or to
simply allow him to correct the deficiency in his qualification by submitting

another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is with more reason that in this case, we
should similarly require strict compliance with the qualifications to run for
local elective office.
The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public
office during the May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for
emphasis, are the same. Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated
his oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of
Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his
CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his
qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and applicable to this case
following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere,
which means to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are
established.Under the doctrine, "[w]hen the court has once laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the
same."It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and bars relitigation of the
same issue.
Landslide
election
victory
cannot
override
eligibility
requirements.
In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado won by landslide
majority during the 2013 elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the
same "cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications."In Velasco v. Comelec,this Court
pronounced that election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to
bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws
pertaining to elections will become toothless. One of which is Section 39 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, which specifies the basic positive
qualifications of local government officials. If in Velasco the Court ruled that
popular vote cannot override the required qualifications under Section 39, 63
a fortiori, there is no reason why the Court should not follow the same policy
when it comes to disqualifications enumerated under Section 40 64 of the
same law. After all, " [t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39] are roughly
half of the requirements for election to local public offices. The other half is
contained in the succeeding section which lays down the circumstances that
disqualify local candidates.
BRION, J., dissenting:
Despite some commonalities, the present disqualification case, however, is
separate and substantively distinct from the Maquiling disqualification case.
The present case involves an election period (2013) separate and distinct
from the election period covered by the Maquiling ruling (2010). The factual
circumstances and consequent legal considerations also vary, as will be
explained below, so that the present case need not necessarily follow the

governing ruling in Maquiling. Thus, at the outset, I invite the Court: to keep
an open mind and remove any initial impression that the present case is a rerun of Maquiling; to recognize that at some point, the present case diverges
from and must be viewed independently of Maquiling; and to resolve it from
the perspective solely of the attendant factual and legal considerations
specific to it.
The Court must not also forget that this is an election case where the
electorate has its own separate interest to protect. This is an interest that the
Court must not ignore when the issues posed carry the potential of setting
aside the electorate's expressed choice.
Notably, the present controversy involves a candidate whose disqualification
(to run for elective office) has twice been sought based on the same cited
facts and grounds, but who nevertheless has twice been elected by a clear
and overwhelming majority of the voters in the May 2010 and May 2013
Elections. In 2013, he garnered 84% of the votes of the people of Kauswagan.
This clear and undeniably overwhelming voice of the electorate, to my mind,
renders it necessary for the Court to consider and apply deeper democratic
principles.The circumstances of the present controversy call for this kind of
consideration, particularly when the electorate's already limited democratic
decision making process runs the risk of being negated for no clear and
conclusive reason, as discussed below. To disregard the electorate's voice
once can perhaps be excused by invoking the rule of law; to ignore the
people's voice a second time can only be justified by clear reasons from this
Court that the people can readily understand. I submit this Dissenting Opinion
to object to the ponencia's conclusion that Arnado is disqualified from running
in the May 2013 Elections and that his proclamation as elected Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, should now be set aside.
LEONEN, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the ponencia's finding that petitioner's claim of procedural
infirmities that occurred during the proceedings before the Commission on
Elections is unsubstantiated. However, I cannot agree with the conclusion
that petitioner remained an American citizen in accordance with this court's
ruling in Maquiling. Petitioner was already a Filipino citizen at the time he filed
his Certificate of Candidacy on October 1, 2012. He was qualified to run in the
2013 Elections. The Petition should be granted Petitioner has performed all
the acts required by Republic Act No. 9225 2 in order to reacquire his Filipino
citizenship.
Under Section 39 (a) of the Local Government Code, a candidate for Mayor
must be a citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident in the
municipality or city where he or she intends to be elected for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of election, and be able to read and write
Filipino or any local language or dialect.
Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code expressly disqualifies those who
possess dual citizenship from running in any local elective position. These

provisions, however, do not disqualify candidates who might have lost their
citizenship but were able to reacquire it before running for public office.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides that "Philippine citizenship
may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law."
Those who lose their Filipino citizenship through naturalization in another
country may reacquire it through the procedure outlined in Republic Act No.
9225. This also applies to naturalized citizens who wish to reacquire their
Filipino citizenship in order to run for public office.
Petitioner's use of his American passport was an isolated act required by the
circumstances. At that time, he had not yet been issued his Philippine
passport. In the dissent in Maquiling led by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion,
it was pointed out that when Arnado traveled back to the United States, "he
had no Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the United
States to attend to the winding up of his business and other affairs in
America." The use of a foreign passport should not by itself cause the
immediate nullity of one's affidavit of renunciation. Its circumstances must
also be taken into account.
Election laws must be interpreted to give effect to the will of the people.
Petitioner garnered an overwhelming 8,902 votes, 84% of the total votes cast
in the 2013 mayoralty elections. If he is disqualified, Florante Capitan, his
opponent who garnered 1,707 votes, a mere 16% of the total votes cast, 31
will become the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. This
court will have substituted its discretion over the sovereign will of the people.
16.
Te vs. Breva
G.R. No. 164974
August 05, 2015
The issue for resolution is whether the People of the Philippines should be
impleaded as respondents in the petition for certiorari filed in the Court of
Appeals (CA) to annul and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
denying the petitioner's motion to quash the search warrant issued against
him.
People of the Philippines, indispensable party; failure to implead, fatal
Impleading the People of the Philippines in the petition for certiorari did not
depend on whether or not an actual criminal action had already been
commenced in court against the petitioner. It cannot be denied that the
search warrant in question had been issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, and that fact rendered the People of the Philippines indispensable
parties in the special civil action for certiorari brought to nullify the
questioned orders of respondent Presiding Judge. We also note that the
impleading is further expressly demanded in Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules
of Court, to wit: Section 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of noncompliance with requirements. - The petition shall contain the full names and
actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents. A concise statement

of the matters involved. The factual background of the case, and the grounds
relied upon for the relief prayed for. x x x x
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition. (n) (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the omission of the People of the Philippines from the petition
was fatal.
Search Warrant defined; Nature of Search Warrant
The requirement that the search warrant be issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines is imposed by Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:Section 1. Search warrant defined. -- A search warrant is an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge
and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the court.
We may agree with the petitioner that the application for the search warrant
was not a criminal action; and that the application for the search warrant was
not of the same form as that of a criminal action. Verily, the search warrant is
not similar to a criminal action but is rather a legal process that may be
likened to a writ of discovery employed by no less than the State to procure
relevant evidence of a crime. In that respect, it is an instrument or tool,
issued under the State's police power, and this is the reason why it must
issue in the name of the People of the Philippines.
Equally clear is that the sworn application for the search warrant and the
search warrant itself were upon the behest of the People of the Philippines. It
defies logic and common sense for the petitioner to contend, therefore, that
the application against him was not made by the People of the Philippines but
by the interested party or parties. The immutable truth is that every search
warrant is applied for and issued by and under the authority of the State,
regardless of who initiates its application or causes its issuance.
The petitioner could have quickly rectified his omission by the immediate
amendment of the petition. However, although made aware of the omission
as a fatal defect, he did not cause the amendment but continued to ignore
the need to amend. He thereby exhibited his adamant refusal to recognize
the People of the Philippines as indispensable parties, which impelled the CA
to aptly remark in its denial of his motion for reconsideration, thusly:
We note that while the petitioner furnished the OSG with copies of the
petition and the motion for reconsideration, he did not attempt to cure the
defect of the petition - i.e. the failure to implead the People of the Philippines
- by filing the appropriate motion or manifestation to amend the petition and
by amending the petition to implead the Republic of the Philippines as a party
to the proceedings. Hence, the first ground upon which we based our

dismissal of the petition still holds and we are left with no choice but to deny
the present motion. (Emphasis supplied)
With its dismissal of the petition for certiorari being proper and in accord with
the pertinent rules of procedure, the CA did not abuse its discretion, least of
all gravely. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the
writ of certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or hostility.
17.
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 213847
August 18, 2015
Constitutional Law; Bail; presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee
of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released
on bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any
punishment on the accused.
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from
committing additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial
court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accuseds interest in his provisional liberty before or
during the trial, and the societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence
at trial.
Same; Same; Matter of right or discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights)
of the Constitution, viz.: x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules
of Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be

admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of

the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the
law existing at the time of its commission and the application for admission
to bail, may be punished with death.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense,
or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed
under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can
claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he
retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the evidence
of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no
jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to
conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction
for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment
when evidence of guilt is not strong.
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by
the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a)That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b)That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence,
or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c)That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d)That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e)That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
Same; same; For offenses punished by death, life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial
discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or

offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within

the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned
Citizens v. Elma, such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing
called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of
whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. It is axiomatic,
therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion
on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to
the Prosecution. The indispensability of the hearing with notice has been
aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz.:
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled
in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can
be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case
without any hearing on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the
prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its
strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint
and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed
the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned
ruling was intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was
committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to
be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has
already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of
guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the
accused to due process.
xxxx
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among
them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and
reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused
is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in
other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the
trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of
the court, should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On
such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice
inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or

against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of
inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v.
Catral, to wit:
In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended);
Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence
to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
Same; Same; Poor health justifies admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of
two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely:
that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of
the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enriles
averment on the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle
him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable with
reclusionperpetua, simply because the determination, being primarily factual
in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court is
guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines
responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II
of our Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting
the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those

detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to

enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail.
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail
not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees
upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight
risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that
the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or
otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when
he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the
legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his
public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and historys
judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another
compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
xxxx
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his
health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his
health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The
Court has already held in Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court:
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the
following:
x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the
illness of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a
circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration
which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the
proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit
the prisoner to bail; x x x

xxxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the
effect that the petitioner is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable
type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis, and that
in said institute they have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance
stages when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail; taking
into consideration that the petitioners previous petition for bail was denied
by the Peoples Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from
quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the
Peoples Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical
examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently
to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order
to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further
that the said Peoples Court has adopted and applied the well-established
doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several cases, among them,
the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No.
3527), in which the said defendants were released on bail on the ground that
they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be
injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we
consequently hold that the Peoples Court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to release the petitioner on bail.
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then
enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better
attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will
not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly,
will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a
meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat
the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty
pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail
whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the
subject of judicial notice that the courts can already consider in resolving
the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus
balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through
ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing
for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the
objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and
unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and
advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying Enriles Motion to Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as
the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari, connotes whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of

jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an

evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
18.
Kabataan Partylist vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 221318
December 16, 2015
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review
Recognizing that the petition is hinged on an important constitutional issue
pertaining to the right of suffrage, the Court views the matter as one of
transcendental public importance and of compelling significance.
Consequently, it deems it proper to brush aside the foregoing procedural
barriers and instead, resolve the case on its merits. As resonated in the case
of Pabillo v. COMELEC, citing Capalla v. COMELEC 60 and Guingona, Jr. v.
COMELEC:
There can be no doubt that the coming 10 May 2010 [in this case, the May
2016] elections is a matter of great public concern. On Election Day, the
country's registered voters will come out to exercise the sacred right of
suffrage. Not only is it an exercise that ensures the preservation of our
democracy, the coming elections also embodies our people's last ounce of
hope for a better future. It is the final opportunity, patiently awaited by our
people, for the peaceful transition of power to the next chosen leaders of our
country. If there is anything capable of directly affecting the lives of ordinary
Filipinos so as to come within the ambit of a public concern, it is the coming
elections.
Thus, in view of the compelling significance and transcending public
importance of the issues raised by petitioners, the technicalities raised by
respondents should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the ends of justice
would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of procedure.
Thus, it would best subserve the ends of justice to settle this controversy not
only in order to enlighten the citizenry, but also so as not to stymy the
operations of a co-constitutional body.
[T]he bottom line is that the Court may except a particular case from the
operations of its rules when the demands of justice so require. Put a bit
differently, rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Accordingly, technicalities and procedural barriers
should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the ends of justice would not be
subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of procedure.
Election Law; Right to Vote, Elements of
The People of the Philippine Islands v. Corral, it has been recognized that
"[t]he right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage
is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most
likely to exercise it for the public good.

Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current

parameters for the exercise of suffrage:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
One must meet the following qualifications in order to exercise the right of
suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be
disqualified by law; and third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at
least one (1) year and in the place wherein he proposes to vote for at least
six (6) months immediately preceding the election.
Election Law; Right to Vote, Legal Disqualification Thereof
Along the contours of this limitation then, Congress, pursuant to Section 118
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, or the Omnibus Election Code, among others,
imposed the following legal disqualifications: Section 118. Disqualifications.
The following shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer
imprisonment for not less than one year, such disability not having been
removed by plenary pardon or granted amnesty: Provided, however, That any
person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire
the right to vote upon expiration of five years after service of sentence.
(b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court
or tribunal of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly
constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the antisubversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless
restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law: Provided,
That he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five
years after service of sentence.
(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority,
unless such disqualification has been subsequently removed by a declaration
of a proper authority that such person is no longer insane or incompetent;
d) Any person who did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular
elections as shown by their voting records. For this purpose, regular elections
do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections;
e) Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the Court;
and f) Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.
Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to
the right to voter, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police
power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and
peaceful election.

Election Law; Right to Vote, Qualification vs. Registration

A "qualification" is loosely defined as "the possession of qualities, properties
(such as fitness or capacity) inherently or legally necessary to make one
eligible for a position or office, or to perform a public duty or function."
Properly speaking, the concept of a "qualification", at least insofar as the
discourse on suffrage is concerned, should be distinguished from the concept
of "registration", which is jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by
which a person's qualifications to vote is determined.
In Yra v. Abao, citing Meffert v. Brown, it was stated that "[t]he act of
registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements
that makes the citizen a qualified voter [and] one may be a qualified voter
without exercising the right to vote." In said case, this Court definitively
characterized registration as a form of regulation and not as a qualification
for the right of suffrage: Registration regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.
The Omnibus Election Code; Necessity of Registration
Section 115. Necessity of Registration. In order that a qualified elector may
vote in any election, plebiscite or referendum, he must be registered in the
permanent list of voters for the city or municipality in which he resides.
Thus, although one is deemed to be a "qualified elector," he must
nonetheless still comply with the registration procedure in order to vote.
As the deliberations on the 1973 Constitution made clear, registration is a
mere procedural requirement which does not fall under the
limitation that "[n]o literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage."
This was echoed in AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC (AKBAYAN-Youth), wherein the
Court pronounced that the process of registration is a procedural limitation on
the right to vote. Albeit procedural, the right of a citizen to vote nevertheless
remains conditioned upon it:
Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of
all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other
repositories of law. Thus, as to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution provides:
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily
conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among
others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be
qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum
requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at
present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as
the Voters Registration Act of 1996.
RA 8189 primarily governs the process of registration. It defines "registration"
as "the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration
by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality

wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters
upon approval by the ERB. RA 8189 was passed in order "to systematize the
present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent and updated list of voters.
Topic: Election Law; Biometric, Validation, Deactivation, Definition of
"Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive
identification of an individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint,
signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable features."
"Validation" is defined as "the process of taking the biometrics of registered
voters whose biometrics have not yet been captured."
The consequence of non-compliance is "deactivation," which "refers to the
removal of the registration record of the registered voter from the
corresponding precinct book of voters for failure to comply with the validation
process as required by RA 10367."
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Strict Scrutiny Test
Petitioners assert that biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution,
considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a
compelling reason for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable
deprivation of the right to suffrage.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to
the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental
interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict
scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation
of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion
from its earlier applications to equal protection. As pointed out by petitioners,
the United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to
protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access, and interstate
travel.
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather
than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive
means for achieving that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to
prove the same.
The biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367 advances a
compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct
of orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing if not eliminating,
the perennial problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple
registrants. The objective of the law was to cleanse the national voter registry
so as to eliminate electoral fraud and ensure that the results of the elections
were truly reflective of the genuine will of the people. 96 The foregoing
consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.
Election Law; Biometrics validation, Procedure
Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation,
whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before

the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence of

identity; and (c) have his photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded. It is, in
effect, a manner of updating one's registration for those already registered
under RA 8189, or a first-time registration for new registrants. The reregistration process is amply justified by the fact that the government is
adopting a novel technology like biometrics in order to address the bane of
electoral fraud that has enduringly plagued the electoral exercises in this
country.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Due Process, alleged
violation thereof
COMELEC, through Resolution No. 10013, had directed EOs to: (a) "[p]ost the
lists of voters without biometrics data in the bulletin boards of the
City/Municipal hall, Office of the Election Officer and in the barangay hall
along with the notice of ERB hearing;" and (b) "[s]end individual notices to
the affected voters included in the generated list of voters without biometrics
data." The same Resolution also accords concerned individuals the
opportunity to file their opposition/objection to the deactivation of VRRs in
accordance with the period prescribed therein.
Meanwhile, Resolution Nos. 9721 and 9863 respectively state that
"[d]eactivation . . . shall comply with the requirements on posting, ERB
hearing and service of individual notices to the deactivated voters," 105 and
that the "[d]eactivation for cases falling under this ground shall be made
during the November 16, 2015 Board hearing.
While the proceedings are summary in nature, the urgency of finalizing the
voters' list for the upcoming May 2016 Elections calls for swift and immediate
action on the deactivation of VRRs of voters who fail to comply with the
mandate of RA 10367. After all, in the preparation for the May 2016 National
and Local Elections, time is of the essence. The summary nature of the
proceedings does not depart from the fact that petitioners were given the
opportunity to be heard.
Constitutional Law; Power of Congress vs. Judicial Scrutiny
In the exercise of its legislative power, Congress has a wide latitude of
discretion to enact laws, such as RA 10367, to combat electoral fraud which,
in this case, was through the establishment of an updated voter registry. In
making such choices to achieve its desired result, Congress has necessarily
sifted through the policy's wisdom, which this Court has no authority to
review, much less reverse. Whether RA 10367 was wise or unwise, or was the
best means in curtailing electoral fraud is a question that does not present a
justiciable issue cognizable by the courts. Indeed, the reason behind the
legislature's choice of adopting biometrics registration notwithstanding the
experience of foreign countries, the difficulties in its implementation, or its
concomitant failure to address equally pressing election problems, is
essentially a policy question and, hence, beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.

At this conclusory juncture, this Court reiterates that voter registration

does not begin and end with the filing of applications which, in
reality, is just the initial phase that must be followed by the approval
of applications by the ERB. Thereafter, the process of filing petitions for
inclusion and exclusion follows. These steps are necessary for the generation
of the final list of voters which, in turn, is a pre-requisite for the preparation
and completion of the Project of Precincts (POP) that is vital for the actual
elections. The POP contains the number of registered voters in each precinct
and clustered precinct, the names of the barangays, municipalities, cities,
provinces, legislative districts, and regions included in the precincts, and the
names and locations of polling centers where each precinct and clustered
precinct are assigned. The POP is necessary to determine the total number of
boards of election inspectors to be constituted, the allocation of forms and
supplies to be procured for the Election Day, the number of vote counting
machines and other paraphernalia to be deployed, and the budget needed.

1. Sagisag vs. Executive Secretary

GR 212426

Jan 12, 2016

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; Powers of the President: Defense,

Foreign Relations, and EDCA
A. The Prime Duty of the State and the Consolidation of Executive Power in
the President
The 1987 Constitution has "vested the executive power in the President of
the Republic of the Philippines. While the vastness of the executive power
that has been consolidated in the person of the President cannot be
expressed fully in one provision, the Constitution has stated the prime duty of
the government, of which the President is the head:
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and,
in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.
B. The duty to protect the territory and the citizens of the Philippines, the
power to call upon the people to defend the state, and the President as
Commander-in-Chief
The duty to protect the State and its people must be carried out earnestly
and effectively throughout the whole territory of the Philippines in accordance
with the constitutional provision on national territory. Hence, the President of
the Philippines, as the sole repository of executive power, is the guardian of
the Philippine archipelago,
including all the islands and waters
embraced therein and all other territories over which
it has sovereignty
or jurisdiction. These territories consist of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial
domains; including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas; and the waters around, between, and
connecting the islands
of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions.
To carry out this important duty, the President is equipped with authority over
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which is the protector of the people
and the state. The AFP's role is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the
integrity of the national territory. In addition, the Executive is constitutionally
empowered to maintain peace and order; protect life, liberty, and property;
and promote the general welfare.
In recognition of these powers, Congress has specified that the President
must oversee, ensure, and reinforce our defensive capabilities against
external and internal
threats and, in the same vein, ensure that the
country is adequately prepared for all national and local emergencies arising
from natural and man-made disasters.

C. The Presidents power and duty to conduct foreign relations.

The President also carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct
of foreign relations. Since every state has the capacity to interact with and
engage in relations with other sovereign states, 16 it is but logical that every
state must vest in an agent the authority to represent its interests to those
other sovereign states.
The role of the President in foreign affairs is qualified by the Constitution in
that the Chief Executive must give paramount importance to the sovereignty
of the nation,
the integrity of its territory, its interest, and the right of
the sovereign Filipino people to self-determination.18 In specific provisions,
the President's power is also limited, or at least shared, as in Section 2 of
Article II on the conduct of war; Sections 20 and 21 of
Article
VII
on
foreign loans, treaties, and international agreements; Sections 4(2) and 5(2)
(a) of Article VIII on the judicial review of executive acts; Sections 4 and 25 of
Article XVIII on treaties and international agreements entered into prior to the
Constitution and on the presence of foreign military troops, bases, or
facilities.
D. The relationship between the two major presidential functions and the role
of the Senate
Clearly, the power to defend the State and to act as its representative in the
international sphere inheres in the person of the President. This power,
however, does not crystallize into absolute discretion to craft whatever
instrument the Chief Executive so desires. As previously mentioned, the
Senate has a role in ensuring that treaties or international agreements the
President enters into, as contemplated in Section 21 of Article VII of the
Constitution, obtain the approval of two-thirds of its members.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
In order for the court to exercise its power of judicial review, the following
requisites must be present: (a) there is an actual case or controversy; (b)
petitioners possess locus standi; ( c) the question of constitutionality is raised
at the earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality is the lis
mota of the case.
A. Petitioners have shown the presence of an actual case or controversy.
We find that the matter before us involves an actual case or controversy that is
already ripe for adjudication. The Executive Department has already sent an
official confirmation to the U.S. Embassy that "all internal requirements of the
Philippines xxx have already been complied with. By this exchange of
diplomatic notes, the Executive Department effectively performed the last act
required under Article XII(l) of EDCA before the agreement entered into force.
Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, is clear that the presence of foreign

military forces in the country shall only be allowed by virtue of a treaty

concurred in by the Senate. Hence, the performance of an official act by the
Executive Department that led to the entry into force of an executive
agreement was sufficient to satisfy the actual case or controversy requirement.
B. Petitioners locus standi
In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as
citizens may dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct and
personal interest if they show that the act affects a public right. But here,
aside from general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a
public right, and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated,
the petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a particular public right
that would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so,
the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens suits that
would justify a disregard of the aforementioned requirements.
C. While petitioners Saguisag et.al, do not have legal standing, they nonetheless
raise issues involving matters of transcendental importance.
An exhaustive evaluation of the memoranda of the parties, together with the
oral arguments, shows that petitioners have presented serious constitutional
issues that provide ample justification for the Court to set aside the rule on
standing. The transcendental importance of the issues presented here is rooted
in the Constitution itself. Section 25, Article XVIII thereof, cannot be any
clearer: there is a much stricter mechanism required before foreign military
troops, facilities, or bases may be allowed in the country. The DFA has already
confirmed to the U.S. Embassy that "all internal requirements of the Philippines
xxx have already been complied with."142 It behooves the Court in this
instance to take a liberal stance towards the rule on standing and to determine
forthwith whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Executive Department.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EDCA; Entry of Foreign Troops; Power of
the President to enter into an executive agreement on foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities.
A. The role of the President as the executor of the law includes the duty to
defend the State, for which purpose he may use that power in the
conduct of foreign relations.
The duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent inexecutive
power and is intimately related to the other executive functions.These
functions include the faithful execution of the law in autonomousregions; the
right to prosecute crimes; 153 the implementation oftransportation projects;
the duty to ensure compliance with treaties, executive agreements and
executive orders; the authority to deport undesirable aliens; the conferment
of national awards under the President's jurisdiction;
and the overall
administration and control of the executive department.

It is the President's prerogative todo whatever is legal and necessary for

Philippine defense interests. It is nocoincidence that the constitutional
provision on the faithful execution clausewas followed by that on the
President's commander-in-chief powers, which are specifically granted during
extraordinary events of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. And this duty
of defending the country is unceasing, even in times
when there is no
state of lawlesss violence, invasion, or rebellion. At such times, the President
has full powers to ensure the faithful execution of the laws. It would therefore
be remiss for the President and repugnant to the faithful-execution
clause of the Constitution to do nothing when the call of the moment requires
increasing the military's defensive capabilities, which could include forging
alliances with states that hold a common interest with the Philippines or
bringing an international suit against an offending state.
B. The plain meaning of the Constitution prohibits the entry of foreign
military bases, troops or facilities, except by way of a treaty concurred in
by the Senate - a clear limitation on the President's dual role as defender
of the State and as sole authority in foreign relations.
Despite the President's roles as defender of the State and sole authority in
foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly limits his ability in instances
when it involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities. The
initial limitation is found in Section 21 of the provision on the Executive
Department: "No treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two thirds of all the Members of the
Senate."
The specific limitation is given by Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions, the
full text of which reads as follows:
SECTION 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the
Agreement between the
Republic of the
Philippines and the
United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in
by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum
held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State. It is quite plain that the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution
intended to add to the basic requirements of a treaty under Section
21 of Article VII. This means that both provisions must be read as
additional limitations to the President's overarching executive
function in matters of defense and foreign relations.
C. The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement on
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if (a)it is not the instrument

that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities; or

(b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
The EDCA is an executive agreement intended to implement the Mutual
Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement entered into between the
Philippines and the United States which were duly concurred in by the
Senate.
D. The President had the choice to enter into EDCA by way of an executive
agreement or a treaty
No court can tell the President to desist from choosing an executive
agreement over a treaty to embody an international agreement, unless the
case falls squarely within Article VIII, Section 25.
Accordingly, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court does not
look into whether an international agreement should be in the form of a
treaty or an executive agreement, save in cases in which the Constitution or
a statute requires otherwise. Rather, in view of the vast constitutional powers
and prerogatives granted to the President in the field of foreign affairs, the
task of the Court is to determine whether the international agreement is
consistent with the applicable limitations.
E. Executive agreements may cover the matter of foreign military forces if it
merely involves detail adjustments.
The practice of resorting to executive agreements in adjusting the details of a
law or a treaty that already deals with the presence of foreign military forces
is not at all unusual in this jurisdiction. In fact, the Court has already implicitly
acknowledged this practice in Lim v. Executive Secretary. In that case, the
Court was asked to scrutinize the constitutionality of the Terms of Reference
of the Balikatan 02-1 joint military exercises, which sought to implement the
VF A. Concluded in the form of an executive agreement, the Terms of
Reference detailed the coverage of the term "activities" mentioned in the
treaty and settled the matters pertaining to the construction of temporary
structures for the U.S. troops during the activities; the duration and location
of the exercises; the number of participants; and the extent of and limitations
on the activities of the U.S. forces. The Court upheld the Terms of Reference
as being consistent with the VF A. It no longer took issue with the fact that
the BalikatanTerms of Reference was not in the form of a treaty concurred in
by the Senate, even if it dealt with the regulation of the activities of foreign
military forces on Philippine territory.
F. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and framework of the MDT
and the VFA.

Admission of U.S military and civilian personnel into Philippine

territory is already allowed under the VFA.

EDCA does not provide the legal basis for admission of U.S
contractors into the Philippine territory; their entry must be sourced
from the extraneous regulations for the admission of alien
employees or business persons.
Authorized activities of U.S military and civilian personnel within
Philippine territory are in furtherance of the MDt and the VFA
EDCA seeks to be an instrument that enumerates the Philippine
approved activities of U.S. personnel referred to in the VFA.
EDCA allows U.S. military and civilian personnel to perform
"activities approved by the Philippines, as those terms are defined in
the VF A"278 and clarifies that these activities include those
conducted within the Agreed Locations:
1. Security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training
activities; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities; and
such other activities as may be agreed upon by the Parties
2. Training; transit; support and related activities; refueling of
aircraft; bunkering of vessels; temporary maintenance of vehicles,
vessels, and aircraft; temporary accommodation of personnel;
communications; prepositioning of equipment, supplies, and
material; deployment of forces and materiel; and such other
activities as the Parties may agree
3. Exercise Locations activity, of operational control over the Agreed
for construction activities and other types of including alterations
and improvements
4. Exercise of all rights and authorities within the Agreed Locations
that are necessary for their operational control or defense, including
the adoption of appropriate measures to protect U.S. forces and
contractors
5. Use of water, electricity, and other public utilities
6. Operation of their own telecommunication systems, including the
utilization of such means and services as are required to ensure the
full ability to operate telecommunication systems, as well as the use
of the necessary radio spectrum allocated for this purpose.

2. Ty-Delgado vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 219603
January 26, 2016
Under Section 78, a proceeding to deny due course to and/or cancel a
certificate of candidacy is premised on a person's misrepresentation of any of

the material qualifications required for the elective office. This is to be read in
relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or
eligibility for public office. In Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, we held that
if a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in
a criminal case from running for public office, and he still states under oath in
his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the
candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a
petition under Section 78.
A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course and/or
cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all,
because his certificate of candidacy is considered void ab initio and thus,
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes.
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower
court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. While it is well-recognized that the HRET has been empowered
by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check "whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In other words, when the HRET utterly
disregards the law and settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits
grave abuse of discretion.
3. National Power Corporation vs. Manalastas
G.R. No. 196140
January 27, 2016
Just Compensation; Inclusion of the Inflation rate of the
Philippine Peso
Petitioners maintain that such inclusion of the inflation rate in arriving at the
value of just compensation has no legal basis, and it was a palpable mistake
on the part of its representatives and counsel below to make a
recommendation factoring in the said inflation rate in the computation of just
compensation. None of the parties contest the finding that the fair market
value of the property at the time of the taking was Php 170 per sqm.
The valuation of the land for the purposes of determining just compensation
should not include the inflation rate of the Philippine peso because the delay
in payment of the price of expropriated land sufficiently recompensed
through the payment of interest on the market value of the land as of the
time of taking from the landowner.
Determination of Just Compensation; Submissions of the
parties does not control, only the court can determine
The fact that the petitioners own counsel recommended the inclusion of the
inflation rate in the determination of just compensation should not be taken

against the petitioner. After all, it is ultimately the courts mandated duly to
adjudge whether the parties submissions are correct. It is the courts, not the
litigants, who decide on the proper interpretation or application of the law
and thus, only the courts may determine the rightful compensation in
accordance with the law and the evidence presented by the parties.
Just Compensation; Exemplary Damages and Attorneys fees
In addition to the award for interests, Art. 2229 of the Civil Code provide that
the exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by the way of example or
correction for the public good and Art. 2208 of the same code states that the
attorneys fees may be awarded by the court in cases where such would be
just and equitable. Indeed, government agencies should be admonished and
made to realize that its negligence and inaction in failing to commence the
proper expropriation proceedings before taking private property, as provided
for by law cannot be countenanced by the court.
Just Compensation; Formula for Determination
To recapitulate, the formula for the determination of just compensation to
landowners does not include the factor for inflation rate, as inflation is
properly accounted for through the payment of interest on the amount due to
the landowner, and through the award of exemplary damages and attorneys
fees in cases where there was irregularity in the taking of property.