Safety

Crude Unit Fire of February 17, 2012 - MIA

Sharingtheexperience
Type of Incident: Fire/Explosion
Business Unit: Cherry Point Business Unit
Country: USA
Location of Incident: Crude Unit
Date of Incident: February 17, 2012
Investigation Start Date: February 18, 2012
Date of MIA Notification: February 18, 2012
Date of 1-pager: June 20, 2012
Traction Number: 2012-IR-4062638
BRIEF ACCOUNT OF INCIDENT
On February 17th, at 14:20 a 6 inch 9Cr vacuum bottoms
recirculation line (line 733) to the North vacuum heater
ruptured and the hot vacuum residue released under
pressure and auto-ignited. The resultant fire burnt for
approximately 55 minutes. The failed line was a
recirculation line and therefore under normal operating
conditions had no flow. The investigation determined that
the failure was as a result of high temperature
sulphidation.
WHAT WENT WRONG (CRITICAL FACTORS)
1. The vacuum bottoms 6 inch recirculation line to the
North vacuum heater ruptured 9 feet from the main line
take off point and released hot vacuum residue under
pressure above the auto ignition temperature.
2. The recirculation Line to North vacuum heater stayed
continuously fed by reverse flow from the Coker
Fractionation Tower, feeding the fire for approximately 33
minutes.
SUMMARY OF IMMEDIATE CAUSES
6.1 - Plant/equipment malfunction
The conditions in line 733 resulted in non-uniform
corrosion
1.4 - Procedure not available
The increased non uniform corrosion went undetected
5.9 - Protective systems other; There was no battery unit
emergency shutdown system.
Backflow continued from the Coker Unit after the
Crude Unit was shut down and fed the fire for an
additional 33 minutes.
SUMMARY OF SYSTEM CAUSES
There was sufficient sulfur present in the line due to
replenishment of line contents as a result of a thermo
siphon.
There was low or stagnant flow in the line. (CLC 18.8)
There was vapor generated and accumulated in line
733.(CLC - 18.8)
There was high temperature in line 733. (CLC - 18.8)
The thickness measurement location (TML) was not a
location representative of the non-uniform corrosion
mechanism that occurred.(CLC - 16.11, 22.2)
The Crude Unit emergency shutdown procedure did
not isolate the unit from reverse flow from other units
or tankage (CLC - 22.1,16.10)

Photo of Ruptured Recirculation Line

SUMMARY OF LOCAL ACTIONS
Immediate Response:
Emergency responders arrived at the scene
Activated the Incipient Command
Shutdown the Crude Unit
Shutdown other units in the refinery as necessary
Investigation corrective actions address:
Review of design (both of the north and south lines
and the heat tracing system).
Inspection of lines in similar service.
Monitoring (both operationally and inspection).
Review of dead-leg inspection practices.
Review of emergency procedures.
Review of ESD systems.
Review of mitigations in High Hazard Fire Areas.
Sharing of lessons learned.
For further information, contact:
Sam Norwood - (310-847-5677)
(sam.norwood@bp.com)

LESSONS LEARNED:

Thermal Siphoning in dead legs can result

in conditions that support high temperature
sulphidation.
Vapour generation can occur in dead legs
leading to increased corrosion at high
points.
Dead leg definition needs to include
infrequently used lines such as recirculation
lines.
Dead leg inspection procedures should
include high temperature sulphidation
corrosion mechanism in horizontal runs and
high points.