Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
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Nathan Vardi, The Greatest Sports-Business Turnaround Ever, Forbes, May 18, 2009.
Bryan Smith, The Breakaway: Chicago Blackhawks Owner Rocky Wirtz, Chicago Magazine, November 2008.
3
Ibid.
2
2012 by the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. This case was prepared by Scott Kannry 11 under the
supervision of Professor James Shein. Cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as
endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. To order copies or request permission
to reproduce materials, call 800-545-7685 (or 617-783-7600 outside the United States or Canada) or e-mail
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transmitted in any form or by any meanselectronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwisewithout the permission of
Kellogg Case Publishing.
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The Blackhawks had once been the most popular sports team in Chicago, but in 2004 it had
been named by a leading sports website as the worst franchise in the country.4 Rocky knew he
and his team had to come up with an aggressive strategy to revive the teams fortunes.
$5.86 billion
$5.20 billion
$3.13 billion
$2.20 billion
Each of the four major leagues fielded a similar number of teams (NFL, 32; MLB, 30; NBA,
30; NHL, 30) that were geographically dispersed in major cities across the United States and, for
the NHL, Canada (see Exhibit 1). The length of the regular (or non-playoff) season varied
considerably across the leagues: NFL, 16 games; MLB, 162 games; NBA, 82 games; and NHL,
82 games. They were seasonally dispersed as well: the NFL played from September through
January; MLB from April through October; the NHL from early October through early June; and
the NBA from late October through mid-June, which meant that there were rarely more than two
leagues in operation at any given time.
4
The Mag: Ultimate Standings, ESPN.com, 2004, http://espn.go.com/sportsnation/teamrankings/_/year/2004#table (accessed June
15, 2012).
5
Jack W. Plunkett, Plunketts Sports Industry Almanac 2007 (Houston, TX: Plunkett Research, Ltd., 2006).
6
Ibid.
7
With the exception of the Montreal Canadiens, all of the other teams founded in 1917 had ceased operations.
8
In a best-of-seven game format, the first team to win four games advanced to the next round.
2
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winner of the final round became NHL champion and was awarded the Stanley Cup, a 105-yearold trophy well known not only for being large (it stands just under three feet tall) but also for
being the only trophy in professional sports engraved each year with the names of the
management, coaches, and players for the championship team.9 The Stanley Cup was also unique
because members of the championship team were allowed to take it for one day during the offseason to do with it whatever they liked. Most took the Cup to their hometowns to share it with
friends and family, which meant the Cup often traveled to several countries during the ten-week
off-season, always accompanied by the two caretakers employed by the NHL solely to guard it.
In the United States, the NHL appealed to fewer people than did other major sports.10 Several
explanations commonly were offered to explain professional hockeys relative lack of popularity.
First, hockey was a cold-weather sport, which made it more difficult for teams in the southern and
western United States to attract fans. Second, hockey was an expensive sport to play because it
required specialized equipment and dedicated facilities; as a result, many public schools and
municipalities that sponsored other youth sports did not have the budget to support hockey
programs,11 and fewer American youth played the sport and developed a lifelong interest in it.
Additionally, despite being one of the big four professional sports leagues, hockey simply did not
have the American Pastime attraction of baseball or football. Hockey attracted a much smaller
television audience than the other leagues; the value of the NHL television contract signed in
2005 was $207.5 million for three years, whereas the NFL contract signed in 2004 was worth $8
billion for six years.12 Forbes noted that nationally televised NHL games on NBC during the
200607 season drew a 1.1 Nielsen rating (which equals approximately 1 percent of total
television-viewing households), whereas NFL football games regularly reached 10 percent.13
Like other professional sports leagues in the United States, the NHL had experienced labor
problems between owners and their unionized players, but it was unique in being the only league
to have lost an entire season to a labor dispute. The 200405 season was canceled primarily
because the owners demanded a salary cap,14 which they ultimately were granted. Any negative
effects from the lockout were short-lived and the league had prospered since that season
according to Forbes, the average NHL franchise value increased 23 percent in the two years after
the dispute, and the league as a whole improved its performance from an operating loss of $96
million to a profit of $96 million.15 The report also stated that the average teams most recent
annual profit was $3.2 million on $81 million of revenue.
At 105 years old, the Stanley Cup was older than the NHL; it previously had been awarded to the champion of predecessor leagues.
According to a poll of sports fans, hockey was the favorite sport of 5 percent of Americans. Hockey was ranked sixth, behind
professional football (31 percent), baseball (16 percent), college football (12 percent), auto racing (8 percent), and mens pro
basketball (6 percent). Harris Interactive Poll, Professional Football Continues Dominance over Baseball as Americas Favorite
Sport, January 27, 2009, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Fave-Sport-2009-01.pdf.
11
Funding for public-school and community sports programs was primarily determined based on popularity; therefore, baseball,
basketball, and football received priority over hockey. Additionally, because federal legislation (known as Title IX) required that
funding be provided equally to boys and girls sports, hockey, a predominantly male sport, was further disadvantaged.
12
Richard Sandomir, Cable Companys Ambition for a Network Proves a Salvation for the N.H.L., New York Times, August 19,
2005; Leonard Shapiro, NFLs New Deals Worth $8 Billion, Washington Post, November 9, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A34844-2004Nov8.html.
13
Michael K. Ozanian and Kurt Badenhausen, The Business of Hockey, Forbes, November 8, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/2007/11/08/nhl-team-values-biz-07nhl_cx_mo_kb_1108nhlintro.html.
14
A salary cap was an agreement to limit the amount of money each team could spend on player salaries.
15
Ozanian and Badenhausen, The Business of Hockey.
10
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Finance
The Blackhawks were one of several businesses held by the Wirtz Family, whose Wirtz
Corporation also owned significant interests in the liquor distribution, real estate, banking, and
16
Bob Verdi, Chicago Blackhawks: Seventy-Five Years (San Diego, CA: Tehabi Books, 2000).
Ibid.
18
Chicago BlackhawksUnited Center, http://blackhawks.nhl.com/club/page.htm?bcid=fac_UnitedCenter (accessed May 10,
2012).
17
4
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insurance industries. Estimates put the annual revenue of the Wirtz Corporation at more than $1
billion.19
Shortly after assuming control, Rocky learned from the teams accountant that the
Blackhawks faced an immediate $6 million cash shortfall and did not have the funds to pay player
and management salaries. The teams financial performance had been in decline for the past
decade, as shown in Table 1. Rocky had no problem making a loan to the team from one of the
familys other businesses, but he knew this could not continue indefinitely.
Table 1: Blackhawks Financial Performance
a
Operating
Income
($ in millions)
Year
Value
($ in millions)
1998
180
1999
185
66
2000
197
70
12
2001
200
72
13
2002
218
78
2003
192
74
10
2004
178
10
71
13
2006
168
20
67
19
16
2007
179
16
69
19
(4)
19
2005
Rank
(out of 30)
Revenue
($ in millions)
Rank
(out of 30)
Rank
(out of 30)
The team value comprised the following components: value attributable to revenue shared among all teams, value attributable to the
franchises city and market size, value attributable to the stadium, and value of the brand.
b
The average revenue breakdown in the NHL was 50 percent ticket sales, 22 percent broadcasting and media, and 21 percent in-arena
revenue, such as concessions and parking.
Ticket prices were a major problem facing the team. As shown in Exhibit 3, the Blackhawks
had the sixth-highest average ticket price during the 200102 season, but by the 200708 season
the team ranked 28 out of 30. After the 200405 season, the team reduced the prices of seats
directly behind the goals on the 200 and 300 level; these seats were considered less desirable than
those on the sides, which provided a better view of the entire rink. The only ticket prices that
increased from 2001 to 2007 were for the first row of seats in the 100 level; prices were
substantially increased as part of re-branding them as platinum seats with the best view of the ice
and new in-seat food and beverage service. (See Exhibit 4 for full pricing details for the 200708
season.)
Unlike many other NHL teams whose arenas were owned by state or local governments, the
Blackhawks enjoyed the benefits of a home stadium that was privately owned in a 50-50 joint
venture with the Chicago Bulls. The Blackhawks also had a brand that was well known and
recognized. Despite these advantages and its location in a large and vibrant sports market, the
teams value decreased from $218 million in 2002 to $179 million in 2007. The Blackhawks had
19
Yahoo! Finance, Wirtz Beverage Group Company Profile, http://biz.yahoo.com/ic/43/43070.html (accessed June 15, 2012).
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regained the value lost in the wake of the 200405 cancelled season, but the teams total value in
2007 still lagged behind the average 23 percent two-year increase and $200 million average team
value as estimated by Forbes.20
Marketing
Fan interest in the Blackhawks followed the same downward trajectory as finances, starting
in the late 1990s. As Exhibit 5 shows, the team filled its stadium for home games through the
199596 season, after which attendance steadily declined to 62 percent of capacity during the
200607 season.21 This was the second-worst attendance record in the league, which averaged
attendance of 91.6 percent of capacity for home games (see Exhibit 6).22
Some of the decline in attendance could have been due to competition from other Chicago
sports teams. The strongest competition occurred during the 1990s, when Michael Jordan led the
Chicago Bulls to six NBA championships, but as shown in Exhibit 5, the Blackhawks still
achieved more than 100 percent capacity attendance during the first three Bulls championship
seasons (199193). The only other Chicago teams with significant achievements during that
period were the White Sox (MLB championship in 2005) and the Bears (played in NFL Super
Bowl in 2007). Sports fans, however, were generally known to be not only loyal and supportive
of their teams during losing seasons, but also partial to their sport of choicewhich meant that
Blackhawks fans typically would not have turned to supporting the Bulls when the hockey team
had a bad season.
One of the most commonly cited reasons for the decline in the Blackhawks popularity was
the teams refusal to televise home games. This practice was based on Bill Wirtzs belief that
televising games would result in local fans staying home and not attending games; it was a
continuation of the radio policy adopted by his father, which dictated that the first period of
games should not be broadcast.23 As a result, Blackhawks home games were rarely broadcast on
television, and then only when it was known in advance that a prime game would sell out. Most
games played in opponents stadiums were broadcast on Comcast, the teams cable television
affiliate, but most of these were played on the west coast and therefore started late in the evening,
which limited viewership in Chicago.
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he was the ultimate decision maker. His son Peter had been team vice president for twenty years
and had responsibility for all off-ice operations, including marketing, stadium concessions, and
community outreach. Lastly, Bob Pulford had been the teams senior vice president since 1990
and was responsible for all on-ice matters. Pulford, who was widely regarded as Bill Wirtzs
right-hand man, originally joined the team in 1977 and had served four times each as head coach
and as general manager. (See Exhibit 7 for biographies of top executives at the start of the 2007
08 season.)
The most important front-office position for any professional sports team was the general
manager. Team owners had ultimate authority, but most provided the general manager with a
budget for players and coaches and gave them nearly full autonomy to decide how to spend it.
General managers were expected to know player and coaching ability better than any other frontoffice executive and typically were held responsible for the teams overall performance. The
Blackhawks general manager situation was unique in two ways: first, Pulfords tenure was
unusually long; and second, even when Pulford was not serving as general manager, it was
widely believed he made all significant coaching and player decisions in accordance with Bill
Wirtzs preferences.
The member of the front-office staff most publicly associated with the teams success on the
ice was the head coach. The Blackhawks had employed nine head coaches since the early
1990swhich was not out of line with the two- to three-year average tenure of NHL coaches
but the team was known for its unwillingness to pay to hire coaches with past success. Of the nine
coaches employed during this period, only Mike Keenan (head coach from 1988 to 1992) had a
successful record with another team; Keenan had coached the Philadelphia Flyers to the Stanley
Cup finals in 1984 and 1987. The other eight either became head coaches for the first time with
the Blackhawks or lacked a record of significant success with other teams they had led. For
example, Dirk Graham, a popular former player and team captain, was hired almost immediately
after he retired from playing, despite having no coaching experience; the Blackhawks fired him
during his first season. Another example was Alpo Suhonen, a coach who had spent most of his
career in the European leagues and could barely speak English.
The Blackhawks had made other personnel decisions that proved unpopular with fans. One
example was the firing of national anthem soloist Wayne Messmer, whose legendary vocal talent
would keep the fans cheering throughout the entire song. One writer called this phenomenon
legitimately one of the keepsake moments in all of sports.24 Messmer was fired because he
joined the ownership group of the Chicago Wolves, a minor-league hockey team, which Bill
Wirtz and Pulford considered an act of treason. In 2006 and without any explanation, the team
released longtime popular radio and television announcer Pat Foley, who was immediately hired
by the Wolves to serve as the teams primary announcer. Some of Bill Wirtzs decisions were
almost comical, such as his firing of the team doctor during the middle of a game in 1996 after
accusing him of conspiring to aid the opposing team.25
24
George Johnson, Worst Franchise: Blackhawks, ESPN.com: Page 2, April 14, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/
story?page=johnson/060417_blackhawks
25
Brian McFarlane, The Blackhawks (Toronto, ON: Stoddart, 2000), 118120.
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Personnel OverviewPlayers
Any discussion of player personnel must mention the league-wide salary cap that was
instituted for the 200506 season. The NHL team owners demanded the salary cap as a way of
controlling escalating player salaries; previously, owners had no set limits on how much they
could spend on any player or the entire roster. With the salary cap in place, teams were limited to
$50.3 million for total player salaries, an amount that included performance bonuses but excluded
salaries of players affiliated with minor-league teams, so a player who was demoted to the minor
leagues during the season would not count against the salary cap.26 Proponents of the salary cap
argued that it promoted greater parity among teams and made the league more attractive to fans,
but it made the job of the general manager more difficult. Underperforming players became more
difficult to trade because other teams did not want those salaries to count against the teams
limited salary-cap space, and although teams had the option to send players to the minor leagues
to evade the salary cap, few owners wanted to pay major-league salaries to minor-league players.
Under Bill Wirtz, the Blackhawks had a history of action (and inaction) that alienated star
players. Among Blackhawks fans, the most egregious example was allowing Bobby Hull to
defect to the Winnipeg Jets of the startup World Hockey League. Hull, who had led the
Blackhawks to the Stanley Cup championship in 1961, was the most popular athlete in Chicago
and one of the best players in the entire league, but his relations with team management soured
during the process of negotiating a new contract. After Bill Wirtz offered only a fraction of what
Hull was asking, he left for a richer contract with the Jets that included a $1 million signing
bonus. The Blackhawks made a last-ditch effort to offer better terms, but Hulls mind was already
made up.27 Hullwho was widely regarded as one of the greatest ice hockey players of all
timenever reconciled with the Blackhawks. The estrangement was so significant that the team
later refused to consider signing his son Brett when he expressed an interest in playing for the
Blackhawks; Brett Hull, playing for other teams, went on to become the third-best scorer in NHL
history.28
The Blackhawks also had strained relations with several of the teams other former stars. Stan
Mikita and Tony Esposito, other star players from the 1960s and 1970s, rarely attended
Blackhawks games after they retired and had no formal relationship with the team. In 1996 the
Blackhawks traded all-star and fan favorite Jeremy Roenick to the Phoenix Coyotes after failing
to agree on a contract extension, despite Bill Wirtzs public promise to make Roenick a
Blackhawk for life. A few years later the Blackhawks traded Chris Chelios and Ed Belfour, the
other players who, with Roenick, were the core of the 1992 Stanley Cup finals team. All three
players continued to have successful careers with other teamsBelfour and Chelios won Stanley
Cup championships with the Dallas Stars and Detroit Red Wings, respectivelywhereas the draft
picks29 the Blackhawks received in return for the trades never achieved a comparable level of
success.
26
The salary cap was structured to increase (or decrease) each season based on overall league revenues; $50.3 million represents the
salary cap for the 200708 season.
27
McFarlane, The Blackhawks.
28
Ibid.
29
The draft was the process the NHL and other leagues used to allocate new players to teams. Teams took turns selecting from the
pool of eligible players, with the worst-performing teams picking first in each round. Once a player was drafted by a team, no other
team was allowed to negotiate with him.
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The Blackhawks who took the ice on opening night of the 200708 season did not include
any of the NHLs elite players. (See Exhibit 8 for statistics from the 200607 season, as well as
salary-cap and contract-length information.) The team did have several players with potential,
however: Martin Havlat was the teams best skater and biggest scoring threat, but he had been
limited by injuries throughout his career; Nikolai Khabibulin was the NHLs best goaltender
during the 200304 season when he led the Tampa Bay Lightning to the Stanley Cup and had had
five shutouts during the playoffs; Tuomo Ruutu was the ninth overall draft pick in 2001 and
scored twenty-three goals during his rookie season, but he had played only fifteen games during
the 200506 season because of injuries. Additionally, Brent Seabrook and Duncan Keith were
developing into solid defensemen.
Most important, the roster contained the teams highly prized rookies: Jonathan Toews and
Patrick Kane. Kane was the number one overall pick in the NHL draft, and Toews was number
three. Fans hoped the poor team performance that gave the Blackhawks the opportunity to draft
these young stars would finally pay some dividends.
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baseball despite the fact that the team hadnt won a World Series championship since 1908 and
was thought by many to be doomed to eternal failure. Rocky sensed an opportunity based on an
impending sale of the Cubs and was able to persuade McDonough, who was serving as the Cubs
president, to join the Blackhawks and take day-to-day responsibility for the franchise.
On the ice, the team was drawing more interest because of rookies Kane and Toews. Kane
had scored the winning goal on opening night and both had been playing very well. In the NHL,
teams were given a limited time at the beginning of the season to decide whether to keep rookie
players on the full-time roster or send them to the minor leagues for further development. That
window had passed, so Kane and Toews would stay on the Blackhawks roster for the entire
season.
Next Steps
Rocky knew that his initial moves and the success of Kane and Toews were not enough; he
and the teams management needed to answer some difficult questions:
The team was in a perilous financial state and needed to increase revenue, but what could
Rocky do when he felt the Blackhawks performance over the past few years did not
justify an increase in ticket prices?
Unquestionably, Bill Wirtz had completely alienated many of the teams fans. How could
Rocky and McDonough rebuildand growthe fan base?
Rocky had already used his liquor-business connections to secure sponsorship for the
home television broadcasts. How could he convince future potential partners that the
Blackhawks represented an attractive marketing opportunity?
When Rocky took over the team, fewer than twenty front-office personnel worked in
marketing, finance, and operations; most sports teams had close to one hundred. How
could the Blackhawks attract talented people to work for a barely-respected sports team?
Even with two promising rookies, a winning roster of players could not be built
immediately; in addition, the Blackhawks reputation made it hard to attract the leagues
top players. How could Rocky and his staff attract top athletes in this environment?
10
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NHL
Anaheim, CA
Ducks
Atlanta, GA
Thrashers
NBA
Bruins
Buffalo, NY
Sabres
Calgary, AB
Flames
Charlotte, NC
Chicago, IL
Hawks
Celtics
Braves
Ravens
Red Sox
Patriots
Bills
Bulls
Panthers
Cubs & White Sox
Bears
Reds
Bengals
Cavaliers
Indians
Browns
Cowboys
Cincinnati, OH
Cleveland, OH
Falcons
Orioles
Bobcats
Blackhawks
NFL
Angels
Baltimore, MD
Boston, MA
MLB
Columbus, OH
Blue Jackets
Dallas, TX
Stars
Mavericks
Rangers
Denver, CO
Avalanche
Nuggets
Rockies
Broncos
Detroit, MI
Red Wings
Pistons
Tigers
Lions
Edmonton, AB
Oilers
Houston, TX
Rockets
Astros
Texans
Indianapolis, IN
Pacers
Green Bay, WI
Packers
Colts
Jacksonville, FL
Jaguars
Kansas City, MO
Los Angeles, CA
Royals
Kings
Memphis, TN
Miami, FL
Chiefs
Dodgers
Grizzlies
Panthers
Milwaukee, WI
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN
Wild
Montreal, QC
Canadiens
Nashville, TN
Predators
New Jersey, NJ
Devils
New Orleans, LA
New York, NY
Marlins
Bucks
Brewers
Timberwolves
Twins
Oakland, CA
Orlando, FL
Vikings
Titans
Nets
Hornets
Dolphins
Saints
Knicks
Warriors
Athletics
Raiders
Magic
Ottawa, ON
Senators
Philadelphia, PA
Flyers
76ers
Phillies
Eagles
Phoenix, AZ
Coyotes
Suns
Diamondbacks
Cardinals
Pittsburgh, PA
Penguins
Pirates
Steelers
Portland, OR
Raleigh-Durham, NC
Trail Blazers
Hurricanes
Sacramento, CA
Kings
Jazz
San Antonio, TX
Spurs
San Diego, CA
Padres
Chargers
San Francisco, CA
Giants
49ers
San Jose, CA
Sharks
Seattle, WA
St. Louis, MO
Supersonics
Blues
Tampa Bay, FL
Lightning
Toronto, ON
Maple Leafs
Vancouver, BC
Canucks
Washington, DC
Capitals
Mariners
Seahawks
Cardinals
Rams
Devil Rays
Buccaneers
Raptors
Blue Jays
Wizards
Nationals
Redskins
117
92
103
200
243
145
207
225
Boston
Buffalo
Calgary
Carolina
Chicago
Colorado
Columbus
Dallas
Detroit
153
120
216
106
138
St. Louis
Tampa Bay
Toronto
Vancouver
Washington
69
94
64
42
63
27
15
76
25
94
54
64
38
30
11
56
65
43
56
20
51
28
28
58
55
69
52
49
50
48
90
53
64
63
64
39
90
50
103
44
70
53
70
56
73
64
43
83
70
60
93
72
52
46
56
80
58
-15.5
-3.0
15.4
2.9
-9.2
4.0
7.2
-13.9
12.6
-4.5
4.0
1.4
6.3
9.8
12.2
11.1
3.4
-3.2
2.5
-6.4
-4.3
11.3
5.9
13.3
-5.4
2.3
-9.7
10.5
6.6
-5.5
Op.
Incomec
38.5
29.5
45.9
21.8
44.6
39.1
36.3
38
45.1
32.7
60
26.2
37.7
24.1
32.8
18.4
37.7
38
28.8
56.3
52.9
24.4
53.5
32.4
34.3
27.8
39.8
33.5
24.7
37.9
Player
Exp
This document is authorized for use only in Managing Turnaround Strategies by Prof. R. Kannan, NMIMS from June 2015 to December 2015.
Forbes did not publish gate receipt data for 2002 and 2003 seasons.
Value of team without deduction for debt (other than arena debt).
148
San Jose
0
45
Rev
79
149
Pittsburgh
250
Phoenix
Philadelphia
96
277
NY Rangers
Ottawa
175
156
NY Islanders
131
Nashville
New Jersey
135
182
Montreal
189
Los Angeles
Minnesota
115
Florida
81
230
Atlanta
Edmonton
118
134
Anaheim
Team
Valuea
Debt
to
Valueb
Gate
Rectsd
140
110
241
124
148
158
137
117
262
95
263
156
159
132
187
139
205
127
86
266
254
150
250
218
128
94
92
243
134
111
Team
Valuea
61
86
26
40
65
29
29
51
25
98
95
64
42
30
32
113
64
40
37
17
54
27
23
47
28
170
49
39
Debt
to
Valueb
61
56
112
59
70
71
59
42
97
57
103
51
61
53
75
61
81
67
43
114
96
64
93
78
67
47
46
87
58
48
Rev
-25.4
-0.8
24.2
-1.3
-18.0
-0.8
3.0
-9.6
4.7
2.0
-2.3
-4.5
-3.6
9.0
6.4
12.1
7.1
-6.5
-0.8
-3.4
6.3
6.0
5.2
6.7
-4.6
-3.7
-11.5
6.7
2.9
-13.7
Op.
Incomec
58
32
52
29
61
44
36
34
60
31
66
38
45
25
40
24
43
39
32
71
58
28
56
43
37
31
35
42
28
43
Player
Exp
Gate
Rectsd
130
125
263
136
147
137
114
120
252
117
272
151
145
101
170
166
183
113
91
245
270
144
229
192
109
97
95
223
110
112
Team
Valuea
51
76
24
37
66
33
35
84
26
20
92
66
46
40
47
71
72
44
35
25
55
31
23
55
20
53
54
63
Debt
to
Valueb
62
66
105
65
67
65
57
43
101
59
113
56
73
46
71
79
78
57
48
89
108
66
88
74
57
51
50
84
57
59
Rev
-21.0
0.7
13.8
-0.7
-29.4
-8.6
4.5
-21.1
3.5
-2.0
-6.90
-10.9
-9.4
-2.8
-5.4
20.1
1.6
-9.2
-0.1
-13.7
5.6
3.6
-3.9
1.0
-13.0
-5.8
-5.3
2.8
-0.9
-10.8
Op.
Incomec
54
38
62
33
68
47
32
45
62
35
79
44
58
30
50
28
46
32
34
70
68
33
65
45
40
37
33
43
32
46
Player
Exp
12
30
55
49
22
32
30
28
20
55
24
42
23
45
19
27
39
32
19
23
42
56
32
52
24
20
19
20
36
23
27
Gate
Rects
KEL671
111
124
160
282
125
264
Nashville
New Jersey
NY Islanders
NY Rangers
Ottawa
Philadelphia
16
70
2.3
43
49
45
69
41
68
39
32
39
73
48
78
47
54
29
51
30
56
32
37
80
74
36
70
34
41
27
39
56
37
31
36
20
23
58
28
42
27
33
20
41
35
32
18
29
48
49
61
56
22
16
33
20
40
24
22
Gate
Rects
127
192
332
172
150
145
133
143
246
159
306
140
148
134
230
163
205
142
146
258
248
139
219
168
144
135
149
235
128
157
Team
Valuea
This document is authorized for use only in Managing Turnaround Strategies by Prof. R. Kannan, NMIMS from June 2015 to December 2015.
54
57
52
29
80
31
38
49
26
15
82
71
53
28
104
79
96
35
19
35
81
32
25
63
14
34
51
55
Debt
to
Valueb
Source: Aggregated from Forbess annual study of NHL franchises for 2002 through 2008.
-14.7
1.3
14.1
8.6
-28.8
1.3
-0.6
-7.8
-4.1
-5.0
-3.3
-9.5
-13.9
6.2
7.5
11.5
-5.3
-3.7
3.3
-16.4
-0.3
0.9
-1.1
9.4
-18.2
53
38
61
74
117
88
66
74
52
57
106
70
118
64
61
57
90
71
80
60
55
97
103
66
99
71
52
2.3
-10.5
58
33
59
75
39
33
69
30
40
44
25
19
89
63
64
33
41
78
69
33
19
25
57
32
21
90
95
51
0.9
-22.4
Player
Exp
Value of team without deduction for debt (other than arena debt).
Washington
51
49
54
59
Op.
Incomec
148
115
Vancouver
0
67
Rev
150
280
Toronto
St. Louis
Tampa Bay
149
140
San Jose
136
195
Montreal
101
163
Minnesota
Pittsburgh
193
Los Angeles
Phoenix
104
248
Detroit
121
259
Dallas
Florida
139
Columbus
Edmonton
178
246
Colorado
Carolina
Chicago
116
100
Calgary
236
103
Buffalo
Atlanta
Boston
108
106
Anaheim
Team
Valuea
Debt
to
Valueb
Exhibit 2 (continued)
63
80
119
82
66
69
63
63
88
76
109
56
62
61
90
71
82
65
75
89
89
66
81
67
72
68
70
86
64
75
Rev
4.6
1.1
41.5
5.0
1.0
1.8
4.8
-6.0
0.9
4.2
17.7
-9.2
-6.7
-1.1
17.5
4.7
7.1
-1.9
10.7
5.8
10.0
-4.0
5.9
3.1
0.5
2.3
4.6
4.8
-5.4
-0.2
Op.
Incomec
31
47
44
37
35
35
38
54
42
46
41
46
36
40
31
42
32
41
50
47
39
45
36
36
42
34
41
42
38
43
Player
Exp
22
41
36
20
29
25
16
47
33
43
21
32
18
45
35
30
20
43
38
42
28
41
15
25
34
24
35
24
27
58
Gate
Rects
145
211
413
199
144
165
155
147
244
186
365
149
195
143
283
180
209
151
157
293
254
150
214
179
156
164
162
243
148
197
Team
Valuea
47
52
39
25
83
27
65
61
27
59
67
128
26
85
71
91
33
19
31
79
30
24
58
12
31
49
48
Debt
to
Valueb
66
96
138
85
66
72
67
67
87
93
122
60
65
65
109
78
84
67
71
109
91
68
79
69
68
77
74
87
67
89
Rev
1.0
12.8
52.7
0.6
-5.5
-5.1
8.1
-11.4
5.7
10.4
25.4
-11.6
-15.3
-9.4
25.2
-1.7
2.0
-7.1
9.9
14.4
10.5
-5.6
6.6
-3.6
-7.5
-0.7
-4.9
-0.6
-6.5
6.6
Op.
Incomec
35
46
49
48
38
43
34
43
47
46
49
45
55
43
46
43
42
39
42
53
48
41
43
42
42
46
44
46
44
43
Player
Exp
13
22
49
62
35
19
30
27
19
44
45
51
22
31
22
51
39
29
23
40
58
38
28
40
16
25
38
28
32
26
34
Gate
Rects
KEL671
37.72
48.27
36.90
44.14
39.27
36.36
San Jose
St. Louis
Tampa Bay
Toronto
Vancouver
Washington
24
18
11
22
19
27
15
25
13
26
10
14
30
20
12
21
28
29
23
17
16
Rank
41.74
39.72
48.48
29.93
42.68
39.15
47.18
31.32
57.06
40.38
44.58
38.44
54.67
42.90
35.97
46.08
48.12
32.58
29.36
56.72
38.11
43.90
40.66
47.57
31.77
30.68
37.96
51.37
40.26
37.32
41.56
0203
14
18
29
13
19
27
16
10
20
12
24
25
30
21
11
15
26
28
22
17
23
Rank
43.85
50.03
56.90
36.25
42.78
39.15
41.65
31.32
57.06
52.36
44.58
53.14
54.67
42.50
40.84
49.72
46.63
29.76
36.59
57.11
38.34
41.77
42.18
50.00
31.77
36.46
35.46
54.10
34.87
41.25
43.57
0304
13
25
14
21
18
29
12
15
20
10
11
30
23
22
17
16
28
24
26
27
19
Rank
38.15
54.08
49.23
44.27
39.92
33.00
36.61
27.37
54.81
40.76
44.63
44.01
54.67
37.33
47.58
50.11
43.82
34.31
43.46
43.13
34.24
41.62
38.48
38.26
26.15
40.92
29.73
53.05
41.68
30.32
41.19
0506
21
18
26
23
29
17
10
22
11
24
12
13
25
15
19
20
30
16
28
14
27
Rank
38.15
58.96
49.52
44.27
28.23
33.00
36.61
25.41
55.66
45.95
45.83
44.01
54.67
40.78
56.82
51.37
45.98
44.28
51.76
43.13
36.36
44.08
38.48
34.88
37.91
47.35
30.07
56.44
43.54
30.32
43.13
0607
21
14
29
26
23
30
11
12
16
19
10
13
18
24
15
20
25
22
28
17
27
Rank
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47.18
Pittsburgh
NY Islanders
30.00
35.65
New Jersey
54.71
54.67
Nashville
Phoenix
43.58
Montreal
Philadelphia
31.52
Minnesota
44.58
44.45
Los Angeles
41.35
45.89
Florida
Ottawa
43.27
Edmonton
NY Rangers
56.72
27.72
Detroit
43.90
38.11
37.36
Colorado
Dallas
47.57
Chicago
Columbus
27.93
28.28
36.41
Buffalo
Carolina
49.29
Boston
Calgary
40.65
40.26
Atlanta
41.02
League average
Anaheim
0102
Team
38.47
71.39
88.32
43.94
25.48
39.23
46.81
39.94
55.93
53.41
50.33
50.43
64.17
45.75
67.65
57.62
45.98
52.14
61.69
40.51
36.85
45.53
39.55
34.88
34.89
60.09
32.56
56.44
41.50
40.65
48.72
0708
25
18
30
24
14
22
10
12
13
16
15
11
21
26
17
23
28
27
29
19
20
Rank
14
KEL671
http://web.archive.org/web/20071012151901/
9394
30
29
33
29
41
30
20
9798
9899
9900
0001
0102
0203
0304
31
0607
42
43
71
65
59
79
96
71
78
70
73
81
94
53
87
106
87
88
Total
Points
No post-season
No post-season
No post-season
No post-season
No post-season
No post-season
No post-season
No post-season
Notes
12,727
13,318
13,253
14,795
15,569
14,997
16,274
17,330
18,356
19,397
20,391
20,818
17,771
17,776
17,509
17,920
Average
Attendance
(Home)
20,500
20,500
20,500
20,500
20,500
20,500
20,500
20,500
20,500
20,500
20,500
20,500
17,317
17,317
17,317
17,317
Stadium
Capacity
62%
65%
65%
72%
76%
73%
79%
85%
90%
95%
99.5%
102%
102%
102%
101%
103%
Average
Attendance (%
of capacity)
KEL671
This document is authorized for use only in Managing Turnaround Strategies by Prof. R. Kannan, NMIMS from June 2015 to December 2015.
The 199495 season was shortened because of a labor dispute. This season was also the first in which the Blackhawks began playing in the United Center.
16
Starting during the 200506 season, ties were eliminated entirely and replaced with shootoutswhich awarded one point to the shootout loser (designated as shootout loss) and two points to the
winner (counted as a win).
11
13
13
10
12
13
13
14
12
15
Tie
Shootout
b
Loss
Starting during the 19992000 season, overtime losers were awarded one point (designated as overtime loss). Ties still counted as a tie and each team was awarded one point.
26
0506
43
33
27
40
37
41
39
35
28
19
36
25
29
23
Losses
34
9697
0405
40
9596
24
39
9293
9495
36
47
9192
49
Wins
9091
Year
Overtime
a
Loss
17,496
19,150
San Jose
St. Louis
13
11
20
12
22
29
15
27
19
26
16
18
17
10
23
24
21
14
25
28
30
Rank
15,787
18,396
19,240
16,454
18,570
17,350
14,750
13,229
19,325
17,198
18,148
14,930
14,858
13,228
20,672
18,500
17,569
15,428
16,657
20,058
18,532
17,744
18,007
14,798
15,682
16,239
13,776
15,029
13,476
13,988
0203b
18
16
13
25
29
14
22
23
30
12
20
15
11
10
24
19
17
27
21
28
26
Rank
14,720
18,630
19,376
17,820
18,560
15,835
11,877
15,467
19,375
17,758
18,080
13,693
15,059
13,157
20,555
18,530
17,889
15,936
17,677
20,066
18,355
17,369
18,007
13,253
12,330
16,579
15,290
15,133
15,121
14,987
0304c
This document is authorized for use only in Managing Turnaround Strategies by Prof. R. Kannan, NMIMS from June 2015 to December 2015.
17,341
17,712
19,279
15,722
18,968
17,422
15,649
13,165
19,569
16,919
18,038
14,548
15,925
14,788
20,027
18,455
16,756
16,074
16,592
20,058
18,532
18,136
18,007
15,568
15,508
15,718
17,206
15,403
13,668
12,002
0102a
18,277
16,940
Pittsburgh
Washington
17,125
Phoenix
18,630
19,537
Philadelphia
Vancouver
19,153
Ottawa
19,758
18,200
NY Rangers
18,800
16,234
NY Islanders
Toronto
17,625
New Jersey
Tampa Bay
21,273
17,113
Minnesota
Nashville
18,064
Los Angeles
Montreal
19,250
18,118
Florida
20,066
16,871
Edmonton
Dallas
Detroit
18,144
18,532
Columbus
18,007
19,289
Calgary
Colorado
18,690
Buffalo
18,700
17,565
Boston
20,500
18,545
Atlanta
Chicago
17,174
Anaheim
Carolina
Stadium
Capacity
Team
25
12
18
30
19
13
26
23
28
11
17
14
15
10
27
29
16
20
21
22
24
Rank
13,905
18,630
19,408
20,509
14,213
16,831
15,804
15,582
19,653
19,474
18,142
12,609
14,230
14,428
21,273
18,575
17,839
16,014
16,832
20,064
17,828
16,796
18,007
13,318
15,596
19,289
16,886
16,211
15,550
15,131
0506d
28
27
16
20
22
10
30
26
25
12
19
15
13
17
11
29
21
14
18
23
24
Rank
13,929
18,630
19,487
19,876
12,520
17,422
16,424
14,988
19,282
19,372
18,200
12,886
14,176
15,259
21,273
18,543
16,859
15,370
16,839
20,066
17,914
16,401
17,612
12,727
17,386
19,289
18,690
14,764
16,240
16,389
0607e
27
30
14
18
24
11
28
26
23
10
16
22
17
12
19
13
29
15
25
21
20
Rank
17
KEL671
KEL671
William Wirtz was a 1950 graduate of Brown University and immediately joined the Chicago
Blackhawks after his father, Arthur Wirtz, purchased the team in 1954. He became team president in 1966
and also served as chairman of the NHL board of governors, stepping down after the 199192 season.
Wirtz was inducted into the Hockey Hall of Fame in 1976 and the U.S. Hockey Hall of Fame in 1985 and
received the Lester Patrick trophy in 1978 (awarded for significant contributions to the game of ice
hockey). Wirtz also served on the 1980 and 1984 U.S. Winter Olympic Committees.
ROBERT J. PULFORD, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
Robert Bob Pulford had spent his entire life in hockey, first as a player and then in various levels of
management. His playing career began in 1956 with the Toronto Maple Leafs and went on to include 1,079
games, with Pulford winning Stanley Cups with Toronto in 1962, 1963, 1964, and 1967. Pulford
transitioned to management in 1972, when he became the head coach of the Los Angeles Kings. He spent
five seasons in Los Angeles before joining the Blackhawks in 1977 as head coach and general manager.
Pulford became senior vice president of the team in 1990, but returned often either to coach the team or to
act as its general manager during transitional periods. He also served as an alternate governor of the team
and was elected to the Hockey Hall of Fame in 1991.
PETER WIRTZ, VICE PRESIDENT
Peter Wirtz oversaw all off-ice operations for the Blackhawks in his role as vice president. Some of the
community programs initiated under Wirtzs guidance included: The Blackhawk CupIllinois High
School Finals, CBC Holiday Hockey Tournament, StreetHawks, Junior Hawks, RollerHawks, and
Blackhawk Hockey Camps. Since 1983 Wirtz had also owned and operated Bismarck Enterprises, the
entity that provided all food service, catering, and merchandising to the United Center.
DALE TALLON, GENERAL MANAGER
Dale Tallon was the Blackhawks general manager, having served in that role since June 2005. Tallon
originally was the Vancouver Canucks first-round draft pick (second pick overall) in the 1970 draft. He
went on to play for a total of ten years, scoring 98 goals with 238 assists in 642 games with Vancouver,
Chicago, and Pittsburgh. After retiring as an active player, Tallon returned to Chicago to serve as the
Blackhawks color television analyst for sixteen seasons before joining the front office as director of player
personnel in 1998. He also served as the teams assistant general manager between 2003 and 2005.
DENIS SAVARD, HEAD COACH
Denis Savard was the head coach of the Chicago Blackhawks and also ranked as one of the teams alltime most popular players. He was drafted by the Blackhawks in 1980 (third overall pick) and played two
separate tours with the team: 198090 and 199597. Savard was involved in one of the teams most
controversial trades, when he was sent to Montreal in exchange for Chris Chelios (who subsequently
became the team captain and one of the most popular players). Savard won a Stanley Cup there in 1993.
Overall, Savard played 1,196 regular-season games in the NHL, scoring 473 goals and 865 assists for a
total of 1,338 points, the twenty-ninth best player record of all time. After retiring in 1997, Savard
immediately became an assistant coach with the Blackhawks, and he was named head coach of the team in
2007.
Source: Adapted from biographies in the Chicago Blackhawks 200708 Media Guide.
18
KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
This document is authorized for use only in Managing Turnaround Strategies by Prof. R. Kannan, NMIMS from June 2015 to December 2015.
Havlat, Martin
F
D
F
Keith, Duncan
Koci, David
Sopel, Brent
This document is authorized for use only in Managing Turnaround Strategies by Prof. R. Kannan, NMIMS from June 2015 to December 2015.
F
D
D
GP
60
12
Williams, Jason
Wisniewski, James
Zyuzin, Andrei
Goalies
Khabibulin, Nikolai
Lalime, Patrick
Vandermeer, Jim
Sharp, Patrick
Seabrook, Brent
Toews, Jonathan
F
F
Perreault, Yanic
Samsonov, Sergei
Lapointe, Martin
Ruutu, Tuomo
F
F
Lang, Robert
Kane, Patrick
Burish, Adam
Johansson, Magnus
F
F
Bourque, Rene
Pos
Adams, Kevyn
Name
25
49
50
58
46
44
80
81
63
71
49
82
81
82
56
44
33
GP
26
11
20
17
19
13
19
25
Goals
OTL
15
19
15
20
17
21
14
11
33
29
32
10
Assists
SO
10
26
23
35
24
26
38
33
24
52
31
57
17
PTS
3.07
2.86
GAA
30
39
24
53
14
74
104
10
95
30
98
66
88
76
28
38
PIM
0.896
0.902
SV
-2
-3
-15
-6
-4
-2
-14
12
-3
15
-4
-4
-10
+/-
36
55
111
50
104
160
144
114
115
101
102
166
122
176
12
82
51
SOG
41,419,400
950,000
6,750,000
1,475,000
567,000
1,600,000
1,225,000
850,000
1,360,000
775,000
942,400
3,525,000
1,875,000
1,500,000
2,400,000
4,000,000
525,000
1,475,000
875,000
700,000
6,000,000
575,000
825,000
650,000
Salary
h
Cap Hit
TOTAL SALARY
Notes
19
KEL671
KEL671
Assists: The assist leader during the 200607 regular season had 92 assists. The tenth-highest assist provider had 59.
PTS: Points = Goals + Assists. The top point scorer during the 200607 regular season had 120 points. The tenth-highest point scorer had 95 points.
SOG = Shots on goal. During the 200607 regular season, the top SOG player had 392 SOG, and the tenth-highest player had 305 SOG.
SO = Shutout (applicable to goalies only). The shutout leader during the 200607 regular season had 12 shutouts. The tenth-highest goalie had 5 shutouts.
This document is authorized for use only in Managing Turnaround Strategies by Prof. R. Kannan, NMIMS from June 2015 to December 2015.
Source: Red Wings vs. Blackhawks, 10/06/2007, http://blackhawks.nhl.com/club/boxscore.htm?id=2007020031 (accessed May 10, 2012).
20
l
SV = Save percentage (applicable to goalies only). This stat is calculated as the number of saves made divided by total shots against. The leader for the 200607 regular season had a 0.929 SV%,
and the tenth-highest goalie had a 0.917 SV%.
GAA = Goals against average (applicable to goalies only). This stat is calculated as the number of goals allowed per sixty minutes played. The leader for the 200607 regular season had a 1.97
GAA, and the tenth-highest goalie had a 2.38 GAA.
Patrick Kane and Jonathan Toews were both in their rookie seasons in the NHL; therefore, comparable previous years statistics were not available.
Salary Cap Hit: The salary cap hit is determined by dividing the total value of a players contract by the duration (in years) of the contract. The aggregate salary cap for a team determines whether it
is compliant with the salary cap. The salary cap for the 200708 season was set at $50.3 million. Salary data from 200708 Chicago Blackhawks Salaries, http://content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/
hockey/nhl/Blackhawks/salaries/2007 (accessed May 10, 2012).
+/- (a.k.a. Plus-Minus) measures the differential of goals scored versus goals scored against while that player is in action. A player is awarded a + if an offensive goal is scored while he is on the
ice and a - if the opponent scores while he is on the ice. During the 200607 season, the +/- leader had a +47, and the tenth-highest +/- player had a +31.
Goals: The top goal scorer during the 200607 regular season had 52 goals. The tenth-highest goal scorer had 40.
a
GP = Games played. The regular season consisted of 82 games. Very few players played in all 82 regular-season games, but top performers usually played at least 75 games (not accounting for
injuries).
Exhibit 8 (continued)
Exhibit 9: ESPN Ranking Methodology and Summary of Top Ten and Bottom
Ten Teams
Bang for the Buck (BNG): Wins during the past three years (regular season plus post-season) per
revenues directly from fans, adjusted for league schedules
Fan Relations (FRL): Openness and consideration toward fans by players, coaches, and
management
Ownership (OWN): Honesty and loyalty to core players and local community
Affordability (AFF): Price of tickets, parking, and concessions
Stadium Experience (STX): Quality of arena and game-day promotions, as well as friendliness of
environment
Players (PLA): Effort on the field and likability off it
Coaching (CCH): Strength of on-field leadership
Title Track (TTR): Championships already won or expected in the lifetime of current fans
Team
BNG
FRL
12
20
24
18
17
44
19
11
18
21
48
19
13
11
21
16
57
44
41
44
41
Overall
OWN
AFF
STX
PLA
CCH
TTR
18
17
34
19
51
18
24
23
19
10
33
19
15
11
18
20
34
17
38
61
14
10
17
26
27
41
51
38
42
111
75
106
119
58
66
84
66
118
112
114
117
108
96
88
117
65
65
113
119
107
86
116
74
119
111
43
114
55
120
100
103
92
120
56
81
115
116
114
102
119
82
115
117
104
116
98
115
113
110
99
113
113
117
117
94
116
118
111
117
114
114
110
118
64
118
117
95
121
116
104
119
119
101
119
120
120
120
118
106
120
120
N/A
40
21
37
60