Lapid vs CA

Posted on October 3, 2012

GR 142261
June 29, 2000
Facts:
Gov.Manuel Lapid & 5 other government officials were charged with alleged dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for allegedly having conspired
among themselves in demanding & collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control
fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per truckload of sand, gravel or other quarry material, without
a duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for
such collection.
The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty for misconduct, which meted out the
penalty of 1yr suspension without pay pursuant to Sec.25(2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).
The DILG implemented the said Ombudsman decision.
Proceeding from the premise that the Ombudsman decision had not yet become final, petitioner argued
that writs of prohibition & mandamus may be issued against the DILG for prematurely implementing the
assailed decision.
Issue:
WON the Ombudsmans Decision finding petitioner administratively liable for misconduct & imposing
upon him a penalty of 1yr suspension without pay is immediately executory pending appeal.
Held:
Sec.27 of RA 6770 provides that Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one months salary shall be final and unappealable.
The Rules of Produce of the Office of the Ombudsman likewise contains a similar provision. Section 7,
Rule III of the said Rules provides: where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In
all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of 10 days from receipt thereof by the
respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as
prescribed in Section 27of R.A. 6770.
The punishment imposed upon petitioner is not among those listed as final and unappealable. The legal
maxim inclusion unius est exclusio alterus finds application. The express mention of the things
included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken together is that
all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties not enumerated in the said
section are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one
filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision.
A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives
parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions
pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered
nugatory.
The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory only after it has become
final and executory, execution pending appeal being an exception to this general rule.
There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are
immediately executory.
Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is immediately
final and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so provides.
Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not stay the award,
judgment,final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.finalorder or resolution unless the law
directs otherwise.
Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the

Ombudsman Act should apply in his case.

It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case,
that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other. Considering however, that
petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should govern his case.
It is suffice to note that the Ombudsman rules of procedure, Administrative Order No. 07, mandate that
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary or fine equivalent to one month salary are still
appealable and hence, not final and executory.
+++++
Decision Not Final and Executory. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding respondent
administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of one (1) year suspension
without pay is not among those listed in the Ombudsman Act of 1989 as final and unappealable, hence,
immediately executory. There is no general legal principle which mandates that all decisions of quasijudicial agencies are immediately executory. Section 68 of the Local Government Code only applies to
administrative decisions rendered by the Office of the President or the appropriate Sanggunian against
elective local government officials. Similarly, the provision in the Administrative Code of 1987
mandating the execution pending review applies specifically to administrative decisions of the Civil
Service Commission involving members of the Civil Service. There is no basis in law for the proposition
that the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code on execution
pending review should be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is
nothing in the Ombudsman Act which pro- 2001] 155 SC DECISIONS - POLITICAL LAW vides for
such suppletory application. Courts may not, under the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a
statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time
of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may
recommend the inclusion. (Governor Lapid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000)