PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE V.

COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 83578
FACTS:
The petitioner is the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the
President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar
salting" activities in the country.
On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned
with the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force hereinafter
referred to as PADS Task Force, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157,
158, 159, 160 and 161 against the petitioners Karamfil Import-Export
Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans
Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation,
Philippine Construction Development Corporation, Philippine Lauan
Industries Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino),
Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises.
The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by
Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a
deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said
application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative
and investigator of the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is
likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the
application for the issuance of the six (6) search warrants involved in
this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and
deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March 12, 1985.

properties and documents seized by them from the petitioners by

virtue of the aforementioned search warrants.
On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went
to the respondent Court of Appeals to contest, on certiorari, the twin
Order(s) of the lower court.
In ruling initially for the Task Force, the Appellate Court held:
Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers
enumerated under PD 1936 to prosecute foreign exchange violations
defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883.
The petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the
Regional Trial Courts, and the latter in the case at bar had no
jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null and void.
Besides as correctly pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor General the
decision of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is
appealable to the Office of the President.
On November 12, 1986, Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. sought a
reconsideration, on the question primarily of whether or not the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is "such other responsible
officer' countenanced by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of
search and seizure.
As we have indicated, the Court of Appeals, on Karamfil's motion,
reversed itself and issued its Resolution, dated September 1987, and
subsequently, its Resolution, dated May 20, 1988, denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner below) went

to the Regional Trial Court on a petition to enjoin the implementation
of the search warrants in question. On March 13, 1985, the trial court
issued a temporary restraining order [effective "for a period of five (5)
days notice and set the case for hearing on March 18, 1985.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is a
quasi-judicial body, and one co-equal in rank and standing with the
Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction.

The Court hereby declared Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159,
160, and 161 to be null and void. Accordingly, the respondents are
hereby ordered to return and surrender immediately all the personal

RULING:
In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the petitioner states that
it is endowed with "express powers and functions under PD No. 1936,

to prosecute foreign exchange violations as defined and punished

under PD No. 1883." "By the very nature of its express powers as
conferred by the laws," so it is contended, "which are decidedly quasijudicial or discretionary function, such as to conduct preliminary
investigation on the charges of foreign exchange violations, issue
search warrants or warrants of arrest, hold departure orders, among
others, and depending upon the evidence presented, to dismiss the
charges or to file the corresponding information in court of Executive
Order No. 934, PD No. 1936 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations effective August 26, 1984), petitioner exercises quasijudicial power or the power of adjudication ."
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution now assailed, was of the
opinion that "[t]he grant of quasi-judicial powers to petitioner did not
diminish the regular courts' judicial power of interpretation. The right
to interpret a law and, if necessary to declare one unconstitutional,
exclusively pertains to the judiciary. In assuming this function, courts
do not proceed on the theory that the judiciary is superior to the two
other coordinate branches of the government, but solely on the theory
that they are required to declare the law in every case which come
before them."
This Court finds the Appellate Court to be in error, since what the
petitioner puts to question is the Regional Trial Court's act of
assuming jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition below and
its subsequent countermand of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force's orders of search and seizure, for the reason that the
presidential body, as an entity (allegedly) coordinate and co-equal
with the Regional Trial Court, was (is) not vested with such a
jurisdiction. An examination of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force's petition shows indeed its recognition of judicial review
(of the acts of Government) as a basic privilege of the courts. Its
objection, precisely, is whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the
superior courts, that may undertake such a review.
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of
certain administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that
such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of
rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.

As we have observed, the question is whether or not the Presidential

Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is, in the first place, a quasi-judicial
body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before the
regular courts, other than the higher tribunals the Court of Appeals and
this Court.
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights
of private parties through either adjudication or rule making."
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate
claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision are
seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same
attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No.
1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the
Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial
functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments.
As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar
salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is
tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such
activities, but nothing more.
The Court sees nothing in the aforequoted provisions (except with
respect to the Task Force's powers to issue search warrants) that will
reveal a legislative intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial
responsibilities relative to offenses punished by Presidential Decree
No. 1883. Its undertaking, as we said, is simply, to determine whether
or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the
proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a
judicial recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate
authorities". It is not unlike a fiscal's office that conducts a
preliminary investigation to determine whether or not prima facie
evidence exists to justify haling the respondent to court, and yet, while
it makes that determination, it cannot be said to be acting as a quasicourt. For it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal.

It is not unlike the Presidential Commission on Good Government

either, the executive body appointed to investigate and prosecute cases
involving "ill-gotten wealth". It had been vested with enormous
powers, like the issuance of writs of sequestration, freeze orders, and
similar processes, but that did not, on account thereof alone, make it a
quasi-judicial entity as defined by recognized authorities. It cannot
pronounce judgement of the accused's culpability, the jurisdiction to
do which is exclusive upon the Sandiganbayan.
If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a
quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with
the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that
would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.
In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of
Appeal's resolution sustaining the assumption of jurisdiction by the
court a quo.

COJUANGCO, JR. V. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD

GOVERNMENT (PCGG)
GR NO. 92319-20
FACTS:
On November 28, 1989, President Aquino directed the Solicitor
General to prosecute all persons involved in the misuse of the coconut
levy funds. The Solicitor General created a task force for the purpose.
On January 12, 1990, the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG the
first two criminal complaints for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, bearing on the anomalous use and/or misuse of
the coconut levy funds docketed as I.S. Nos. 74 and 75. Among the
respondents were the petitioner and intervenors Lobregat and Eleazar.
The PCGG assigned assistant prosecutor Cesario del Rosario to
conduct the preliminary investigation.
As hereinabove related, a subpoena was issued by the said prosecutor
for the preliminary investigation on January 29, 1989 insofar as
intervenors are concerned while that of petitioner, de la Cuesta and
Herminigildo Zayco was scheduled on January 31, 1990. In the same
subpoena, respondents were required to submit their counter-affidavits
and other supporting documents to controvert the complaint within ten
(10) days from notice.
On the scheduled investigation dated January 29, 1990, intervenors
appeared through counsel and moved to dismiss the complaints for
lack of jurisdiction of the PCGG to conduct the preliminary
investigation but this was denied by said prosecutor. They were asked
by the prosecutor if they will submit their counter-affidavits but
intervenors' counsel replied that they were not yet ready to file the
same because of their pending motion. Thus, the cases were
considered closed insofar as they are concerned.
The intervenors contested the prosecutor's action before the
Sandiganbayan through a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as Criminal Case No. 0093. On March 13, 1990, the
Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision wherein it declared the
preliminary investigation conducted by del Rosario null and void,

enjoined the PCGG from filing an information on the basis thereof

and directed the PCGG to conduct another preliminary investigation
of I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 as to the intervenors and to assign another
investigating prosecutor.

corresponding to the complaints in I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 which are

docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 14398 and 14399, respectively, at
the Sandiganbayan. The PCGG recommended bail as P100,000.00 for
each case.

Earlier however, that is, on February 27, 1990, the PCGG, overruling
prosecutor del Rosario's order, gave the intervenors in I.S. Nos. 74 and
75 another period of five (5) days from notice within which to submit
their counter-affidavits and supporting evidence. Based on this action
the PCGG filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision
of the Sandiganbayan which had not been resolved.

Meanwhile, the Solicitor General filed two other complaints against

the petitioner with the PCGG accusing the petitioner of violation of
Republic Act No. 3019 and other penal laws in connection with the
coconut levy funds, namely, I.S. No. 79 which concerns an alleged
arbitration award in favor of Agricultural Investors Inc., and I.S. No.
82 which concerns the acquisition of coconut oil mills.

As to petitioner, on the day of the preliminary investigation dated

January 31, 1990, his counsel filed a motion to disqualify or inhibit
the PCGG, an alternative motion to dismiss, and a motion to have the
PCGG itself hear and/or resolve the motion to disqualify or inhibit
itself alternatively a motion to dismiss. The preliminary investigation
presided by prosecutor del Rosario started at 2:00 o'clock P.M. with
eight other respondents duly represented by their counsel. The said
motion was denied and the preliminary investigation was adjourned.

Several other complaints were filed by the Solicitor General with the
PCGG against petitioner for preliminary investigation petition, to wit:
(a) I.S. No. 80 which concerns the acquisition of the First United
Bank, now United Coconut Planters' Bank; (b) I.S. No. 81 concerning
shares of the United Coconut Oil Mills Inc.; (c) I.S. No. 83 regarding
the acquisition of coconut oil mills and certain indebtedness thereof;
and (d) I.S. No. 84 regarding settlement of an Anti-Graft suit in the
United States. All of these complaints were for alleged violation of
Republic Act No. 3019.

Immediately thereafter petitioner brought the matter to Chairman

Mateo A.T. Caparas of the PCGG and in several communications
sought resolution of the motion by the PCGG. On February 27, 1990,
the PCGG issued an order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction but did not resolve the motion to disqualify.
Therein, the PCGG directed petitioner to submit his counter- affidavits
within five (5) days from receipt of notice.
On March 12, 1990, the same day this petition was filed in this Court,
the petitioner, instead of filing the counter-affidavit, filed with the
PCGG an urgent motion to defer proceedings in I.S. Nos. 74 and 75
for at least until March 22, 1990 within which to seek judicial relief
from the order of February 27, 1990. Upon the filing of this petition,
petitioner filed a supplemental urgent motion to defer proceedings
with the PCGG informing it of the filing of this petition.
Nevertheless, on March 14, 1990, the PCGG filed two informations

The question that arises, therefore, is whether under the circumstances

of this case, it would be fair and just for the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation of the said complaint instead of the
Ombudsman or any other duly authorized investigating agency.
On July 6, 1990, Maria Clara Lobregat and Jose R. Eleazar, Jr. filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and a Motion to Admit Petition to
Intervene wherein they ask that the PCGG desist from further
proceeding with the preliminary investigation. The intervenors
question the authority of the PCGG to conduct a preliminary
investigation of the said cases. They maintain that even assuming that
the PCGG has such authority, the same cannot be delegated to a
prosecutor or his assistants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) has the power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the
anti-graft and corruption cases filed by the Solicitor General against
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other respondents for the alleged misuse
of coconut levy funds.
Whether under the circumstances of this case, it would be fair and just
for the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation of the said
complaint instead of the Ombudsman or any other duly authorized
investigating agency.

court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A

preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a
judicial proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity
to be heard and for, the production and weighing of evidence, and a
decision is rendered thereon.
The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered
to preside or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that
of a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge. 16 While the
investigating officer, strictly speaking is not a "judge," by the nature
of his functions he is and must be considered to be a quasi judicial
officer.

RULING:
Under Section 15(l) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any stage from any
investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such
cases. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include the
PCGG and the provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants, the
state prosecutors and the judges of the municipal trial courts and
municipal circuit trial courts.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, an indispensable requisite of
due process is that the person who presides and decides over a
proceeding, including a preliminary investigation, must possess the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not
intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair.
The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts
concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of
determining whether or not an information may be prepared against
the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic
judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt
of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial

Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the
authority to grant provisional remedies of (1) sequestration, (2)
freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is indispensable that,
as in the case of attachment and receivership, there exists a prima
facie factual foundation, at least, for the sequestration order, freeze
order or takeover order, an adequate and fair opportunity to contest it
and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both are assured
under the foregoing executive orders and the rules and regulations
promulgated by the PCGG.
Insofar as the general power of investigation vested in the PCGG is
concerned, it may be divided into two stages. The first stage of
investigation which is called the criminal investigation stage is the
fact-finding inquiring which is usually conducted by the law
enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence and interview
witnesses after which they assess the evidence and if they find
sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose of preliminary
investigation. The second stage is the preliminary investigation stage
of the said complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed, where it is
ascertained if there is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial.
In the petition before this Court, it is not denied that the PCGG
conducted the appropriate criminal investigation of petitioner and
intervenors as a law enforcer. In the process it sequestered all the
properties of the petitioner after a prima facie finding that the same

amount to ill-gotten wealth and/or were acquired in relation to

allegedly anomalous disposition or misuse of the coconut levy funds.

SANTIAGO, JR. V. BAUTISTA

GR NO. 25024

The Court cannot close its eyes to the glaring fact that in earlier
instances, the PCGG had already found a prima facie case against the
petitioner and intervenors when, acting like a judge, it caused the
sequestration of the properties and the issuance of the freeze order of
the properties of petitioner. Thereafter, acting as a law enforcer, in
collaboration with the Solicitor General, the PCGG gathered the
evidence and upon finding cogent basis therefor filed the aforestated
civil complaint. Consequently the Solicitor General filed a series of
criminal complaints.

FACTS:

It is difficult to imagine how in the conduct of such preliminary

investigation the PCGG could even make a turn about and take a
position contradictory to its earlier findings of a prima facie case
against petitioner and intervenors. This was demonstrated in the undue
haste with which I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 was investigated and the
informations were filed in court even as the petitioner and intervenors
questioned its authority, invoked the denial of due process and
promptly informed the PCGG of the filing of this petition.
In our criminal justice system, the law enforcer who conducted the
criminal investigation, gathered the evidence and thereafter filed the
complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation cannot be
allowed to conduct the preliminary investigation of his own
complaint. It is to say the least arbitrary and unjust.

The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was
commenced in the court below, appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a
pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary School
in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end,
the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" was
constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of
selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the school
Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista,
Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin,
Aida Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named
committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia
Ligat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors,
respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for
May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer"
Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father
as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students"
thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court
of First Instance of Cotabato, against the above-named committee
members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic
Supervisor of the place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said committee of teachers falls within the
category of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions
contemplated by Rule 65.
RULING:
'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult,
if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial
acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard
thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to the writ of
certiorari. It is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be

performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it,
that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or
quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings should
be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is
used when applied to the courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they
are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making
their decision, whatever may be their public character. ...' "In State ex
rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn. 301, 304), the following
statements were made:
'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what
are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to
determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the
performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the
performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure,
involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that
the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and
what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority,
and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called
committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are
questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial
functions in the performance of its assigned task. From the abovequoted portions of the decision cited, it will be gleaned that before
tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it
is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of
persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are
made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn,
before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority
to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective
rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by appellees, however,
there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that
when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils
for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the
determination of what the law is and that they are therefore
automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse
still, this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the
pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public

Schools appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the

committee they constituted thereunder, and, in the performance of that
committee's duties.

SMART
COMMUNICATIONS,
INC.
V.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC)
GR NO. 151908

NATIONAL

FACTS:
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and
regulations on the billing of telecommunications services.
The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days
after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation and three
certified true copies thereof furnished the UP Law Center. It was
published in the newspaper, The Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000.
Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to
the sale and use of prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular
mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of
the Memorandum Circular.
On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular
mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained
measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing
of cellular phone units. The Memorandum directed CMTS operators
to:
a. strictly comply with Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000 requiring the
presentation and verification of the identity and addresses of prepaid
SIM card customers;
b. require all your respective prepaid SIM cards dealers to comply
with Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000;
c. deny acceptance to your respective networks prepaid and/or
postpaid customers using stolen cellphone units or cellphone units
registered to somebody other than the applicant when properly
informed of all information relative to the stolen cellphone units;
d. share all necessary information of stolen cellphone units to all
other CMTS operators in order to prevent the use of stolen cellphone
units; and
e. require all your existing prepaid SIM card customers to register and

present valid identification cards.

This was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000
addressed to all public telecommunications entities, which reads:
This is to remind you that the validity of all prepaid cards sold on 07
October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from
date of first use pursuant to MC 13-6-2000.
In addition, all CMTS operators are reminded that all SIM packs used
by subscribers of prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond
shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use. Also, the
billing unit shall be on a six (6) seconds pulse effective 07 October
2000.
For strict compliance.
On October 20, 2000, petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and
Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National
Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago,
Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner
Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the
NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC
has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the
prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of
Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that
the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the
viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the
validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the
requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance
announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing
Circular be declared null and void ab initio.
On October 27, 2000, the trial court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the NTC from implementing Memorandum Circular
No. 13-6-2000 and the Memorandum dated October 6, 2000.
In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil action for certiorari and

prohibition with the Court of Appeals: the instant petition for

certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED, in that, the order of the court
a quo denying the petitioners motion to dismiss as well as the order
of the court a quo granting the private respondents prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction, and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued thereby, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
A.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NTC and not the regular courts have jurisdiction
over the case.
RULING:
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of
an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions
of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act
which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where
the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and
draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies
only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies
made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the

exhaustion doctrine.
Even assuming arguendo that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies apply in this case, the records reveal that
petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement.
In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where
the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice
has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special
competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The
courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining
whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect
of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies
where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.
However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of
a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts.