ICASIANO VS PEOPLE & SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: On February 17, 1987, Romana Magbago filed an administrative complaint

with the Supreme Court against then acting Municipal Trial Court Judge at Naic, Cavite,
herein Aurelio G. Icasiano, Jr. for grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and
incompetence. In the administrative complaint, two orders arose, these orders are about
detention dated 18 and 27 November 1986 issued by the said acting judge against
Magbago for contempt of court because of her continued refusal to comply with a fifth
alias writ of execution. After evaluating, Sandiganbayan commented thereon and the
Court Administrator's recommendation, the Supreme Court dismissed the administrative
complaint for lack of merit in an en banc resolution dated 2 February 1988. On March
17, 1988, Magbago filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the same letter-complaint
earlier filed with the Supreme Court; this time, she claimed violation by Judge Icasiano,
Jr. of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019, sec. 3 par. [e]) and
Ombudsman docketed as TBP-87-00924. A resolution on April 7, 1988 made by Special
Prosecutor Evelyn Almogela-Baliton recommended dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit. The recommendation was approved by then Special Prosecutor/Tanodbayan
Raul M. Gonzales. It appears from the records of the Tanodbayan, which were
forwarded to the Supreme Court, upon order of the Court in connection with this case,
that the resolution dismissing the complaint was released on 14 April 1988.

ISSUE: Whether the Hon. Sandiganbayan cannot acquire valid

jurisdiction over the person of the accused and subject matter of this
instant case.
HELD: The Sandiganbayan would have jurisdiction over the criminal action arising
from the subject matter of the administrative case against the accused since it is only
the Sandiganbayan which may hear prosecutions for the violation of R.A. No. 3019. A
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence the present petition relying on
the sole ground that the respondent court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash the information, and that
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.

PEOPLE VS CITY COURT OF SILAY

FACTS: A petition was filed for a review, the City Fiscal of Silay City was joined by
Marcelino M. Paviera, and the Law Offices of Hilado, Hagad & Hilado, the latter as
private prosecutors, praying that an order of the City Court of Silay on December 19,
1975, issued by Judge Reynaldo M. Alon, dismissing Criminal Case No. 7124-C
entitled "People vs. Ernesto de la Paz, et al." be set aside and that the court be directed
to continue with the trial of the aforementioned case. The Office of the Solicitor General

filed its comment on October 13, 1974, joining the prayer that the order of the court of
Silay on December 19, 1975, be reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings. The case was about the charge of falsification by private individuals and
use of falsified document" under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. After the
prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, private respondents moved
to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidence presented was not
sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on this motion,
respondent court issued its order of December 19, 1975, dismissing the case with costs
de oficio principally on the ground that the acts committed by the accused as narrated
above do not constitute the crime of falsification as charged. The Court of Silay
commented that there was no error committed by the court in dismissing the case
against them for insufficiency of evidence and that for this Court to grant the present
petition would place said respondents in double jeopardy. The People asserts that the
plea of double jeopardy is not tenable inasmuch as the case was dismissed upon
motion of the accused but the Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. that the
plea of double jeopardy is not available in the instant situation.

ISSUE: Whether said acquittal was due to some "misrepresentation of

facts" as stated in the order of reconsideration
HELD: Misrepresentation is vigorously denied, to a misapprehension of the law or of
the evidence presented by the prosecution, the fact is that it was a valid order or
judgment of acquittal, and thereafter the respondent Judge himself advised the accused
in open court that he was a free man and could not again be prosecuted for the same
offense. The inherent powers of a court to modify its order or decision, under section 5,
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court claimed for the respondent to set aside his order of
dismissal, does not extend to an order of dismissal which amounts to a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case; and the power of a court to modify a judgment or set it aside
before it has become final or an appeal has been perfected, under section 7, Rule 116
of the Rules of Court, refers to a judgment of conviction and does not and cannot
include a judgment of acquittal.

PEOPLE VS TAMPAL
FACTS: On August 17, 1990, Luis Tampal and his co-accused were charged before
the Regional Trial Court ofZamboanga del Norte (Branch XI) with the crime of "Robbery
with Homicide and Multiple Physical Serious Injuries." The case was docketed as
Criminal case No.S-1902 and raffled to respondent Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding
judge. Luis Tampal is arrested with Samuel Padumon, Arsenio Padumon and Domingo
Padumon while the others remained at large. On May 17, 1991, Tampal and the others
upon arraignment were pleaded not guilty and the case was set for a hearing on July
26, 1991 but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero mover for

postponement on the ground that he failed to contact his material witnesses and the
case was moved to September 20, 1991 without any objection from the defense
counsel but when September 20, 1991 came the prosecutor was not present. The
respondent judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and
dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute. The prosecution moved for a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal claiming, inter alia, that the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office was closed on September 20, 1991 because it is a legal holiday for
the Muslims and despite the explanation the motion of reconsideration is denied.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right

of the accused to a speedy disposition of their cases.
HELD: In dismissing criminal cases based on the right of the accused to speedy trial,
courts should carefully weigh the circumstances attending each case. They should
balance the right of the accused and the right of the State to punish people who violate
its penal laws. Both the State and the accused are entitled to due process. In
determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings
of the case. What offends the right of the accused to speedy trial
are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time.
The facts in field in no way indicate that the prosecution of private respondents in
Criminal Case No. S-1902 had been unjustly delayed by the prosecution, hence, the
respondent judge should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its
case .The settled rule is that the right to speedy trial allows reasonable continuance so
as not to deprive the prosecution of its day in court.

MELO VS PEOPLE
FACTS: On December 27, 1949, Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin
Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different
parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and
incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. On
December 29, 1949, at 8am, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and
at 10:15pm of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. But the evidence of
death was available to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950, and on the following
day, January 4, 1950, an amended information was filed charging Melo with
consummated homicide. The accused filed a motion to quash the amended information
alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied by the respondent court; hence, the
instant petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further entertaining the
amended information.

ISSUE: Whether the information given is valid for a speedy trial.

HELD: Constitution and by the Rules of Court but is also obnoxious to the
administration of justice. If, in obedience to the mandate of the law, the prosecuting
officer files an information within six hours after the accused is arrested, and the
accused claiming his constitutional right to a speedy trial is immediately arraigned, and
later on new fact supervenes which, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a more serious offense, under the Tarok ruling, no way is open by which the
accused may be penalized in proportion to the enormity of his guilt. A ruling may open
the way to suspicions or charges of conclusion between the prosecuting officers and the
accused, to the grave detriment of public interest and confidence in the administration of
justice, which cannot happen under the Diaz ruling. When a person who has already
suffered his penalty for an offense, is charged with a new and greater offense under the
Diaz doctrine herein reiterated, said penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction
for the second offense.

LEJANO VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD: