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63
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR
REACQUIRED
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the
Philippines:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following
ways and/or events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more: Provided,
however, That a Filipino may not divest himself of
Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic
of the Philippines is at war with any country;
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission
in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided,That
the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country,
and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident
thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine
citizenship if either of the following circumstances is
present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive
and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign
country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of
the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen
concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or
acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of
allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only
in connection with his service to said foreign
country: And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen
who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the
armed forces of a foreign country under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall
not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election
of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of
his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of
said foreign country. Upon his discharge from the
service of the said foreign country, he shall be
automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil
and political rights as a Filipino citizen;
(5) By cancellation of the of the certificates of
naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a
deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war,
unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has
been granted; and
(7) In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a
foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husband's country, she acquires his nationality.1
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3.
4.
5.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
2.
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July 2, 2013
SERENO, J.:
RESOLUTION
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May 7, 2001
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who are from birth with out having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
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May 7, 2001
Main Issue
The main question here is: Did the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) commit
grave abuse of discretion in holding that, by reason of
his repatriation, Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz had
reverted to his original status as a natural-born citizen?
I respectfully submit that the answer is "No." In fact, I
believe that the HRET was correct in its ruling.
1. Repatriation Is Recovery of Original Citizenship
First, repatriation is simply the recovery
of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of RA 2630, a
person "who ha[s] lost his citizenship" may "reacquire"
it by " taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines." Former Senate President Jovito R.
Salonga, a noted authority on the subject, explains this
method more precisely in his treatise, Private
International Law.5 He defines repatriation as "the
recovery of the original nationality upon fulfillment of
certain condition."6 Webster buttresses this definition
by describing the ordinary or common usage
ofrepatriate, as "to restore or return to one's country of
origin, allegiance, or citizenship; x x x." 7 In relation to
our subject matter, repatriation, then,
means restoration of citizenship. It is not a grant of
a new citizenship, but a recovery of one's former or
original citizenship.
To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own
again."8 Ergo, since Cruz, prior to his becoming a US
citizen, was a natural-born Filipino citizen, he
"reacquired" the same status upon repatriation. To rule
otherwise that Cruz became a non-natural-born
citizen would not be consistent whit the legal and
ordinary meaning of repatriation. It would be akin to
naturalization, which is the acquisition of a new
citizenship. "New." Because it is not the same as the
with which he has previously been endowed.
In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship,
should always be in favor of [its] claimant x x
x."9 Accordingly, the same should be construed in favor
of private respondent, who claims to be a natural-born
citizen.
2. Not Being Naturalized, Respondent Is Natural Born
Second, under the present Constitution, private
respondent should be deemed natural-born, because
was not naturalized. Let me explain.
There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) naturalborn citizens and (2) naturalized citizens.10 While CA 63
provides that citizenship may also be acquired by
direct act of the Legislature, I believe that those who
do become citizens through such procedure would
properly fall under the second category (naturalized).11
Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who
had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to
adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they
possessed all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law in order to become
Filipino citizens. In contrast, as stated in the early
case Roa v. Collector of Customs,12 a natural-born
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EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
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The Facts
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PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998
and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission
on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition
for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo
R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao
Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in
Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native
of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left
Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez,
a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in
Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in
the electoral process not only as a voter but as a
candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao
Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor
of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her
opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto,
docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor
her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no
sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her
Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en
bancdismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis
the impugned resolution shows that respondent was
able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino
citizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove
her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the
Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the
petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged
important documents . . . no other evidence substantial
in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of
petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and
not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a
mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act
No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full
awareness of its significance and consequence. The
evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay
meager, to prove that respondent contemplated
renunciation of her Filipino citizenship.[1]
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao
Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition
for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before
the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino
citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed
by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision
in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again
raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as
governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998
elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein
petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
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In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact
that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate
stating that he is an American did not mean that he is
no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien
certificate of registration was not tantamount to
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was
held that the fact that respondent Manzano was
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and was holding an
American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year
before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor
of Makati, were just assertions of his American
nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport
and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts
constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and
do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the
loss of citizenship, the same must be express. [8] As held
by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an
application for an alien certificate of registration does
not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation
of ones citizenship. The application of the herein
private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her holding of an Australian passport,
as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts
of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she
effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most,
private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an
Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a
child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country
has not been included as a ground for losing ones
Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not
lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners
claim that respondent must go through the process of
repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption
that the private respondent had dual citizenship, still,
she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao
Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, which states:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxx....................................xxx....................................xx
x
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx....................................xxx....................................xx
x
Again, petitioners contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the
Court clarified dual citizenship as used in the Local
Government Code and reconciled the same with Article
IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
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xxxxxxxxx
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
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child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the
child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his
own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an
important public office is to punish him for the
indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor
rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor
rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
transgresses the equal protection clause and must be
reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a
former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane
and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed
similar views.The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately
hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as
taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for
the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino
nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in
line with the assumption that the mother had custody,
would exercise parental authority and had the duty to
support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child,
not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant
consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year
of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit
than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions,
the Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly
are none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R.
No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65,
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No.
161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for
alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack
of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has
prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from
running for the position of President in the 10th May
2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has
committed material representation in his certificate of
candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and
prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No.
161634 both having been directly elevated to this
Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to
resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election
contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary
jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only
after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave
abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father
of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not
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Petitioners,
Present:
CORONA,C.J.,
-versus-
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,*
LEONARDO-DE
PEREZ, JJ.
COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ,
JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARTHEL
B. CARONOGAN, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER JOSE DL. CABOCHAN,
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER TEODORO
B. DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA,
in their capacities as Chairman and
Members of the Board of
Commissioners (Bureau of
Immigration), and MAT G. CATRAL,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
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DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The Facts
Immediately upon reaching the age of twentyone, they claimed Philippine citizenship in
accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the
1935 Constitution, which provides that (t)hose
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship are citizens of the
Philippines.Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr.
executed his affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before
then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal Judge,
Surigao, Surigao del Norte.[6] On 14 January
1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty.
Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary Public, Surigao City,
Surigao del Norte.[7] In 1978, Valeriano took his
oath of allegiance before then Judge Salvador C.
Sering, City Court of Surigao City, the fact of
which the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7
March 2005.[8]
Having taken their oath of allegiance as
Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed
to have the necessary documents registered in
the civil registry as required under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing
the Manner in which the Option to Elect
Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a
Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was
only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30)
years after they elected Philippine citizenship
that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so.[9] On the
other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano
complied with the registration requirement.
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The Complaint
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2.
Issuance of a warrant of
deportation against Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix
Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann
Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma under
C.A. No. 613, Section 37(a);
3.
Inclusion of the names of Felix (Yao Kong)
Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma,
Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro
Ma in the Immigration Blacklist; and
4.
Exclusion from the Philippines of Felix (Yao
Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano
Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and
Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 613, Section 29(a)
(15). (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Ruling
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xxxx
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(1)
xxx.
MR. CONCEPCION. x x x.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
FR. BERNAS. x x x Precisely, the reason behind
the modification of the 1935 rule on citizenship
was a recognition of the fact that it reflected a
certain male chauvinism, and it was for the
purpose of remedying that this proposed
provision was put in. The idea was that we
should not penalize the mother of a child simply
because she fell in love with a foreigner. Now,
the question on what citizenship the child would
prefer arises. We really have no way of guessing
the preference of the infant. But if we recognize
the right of the child to choose, then let him
choose when he reaches the age of majority. I
think dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on
us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a
child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she
is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control. But
certainly it is within the jurisdiction of the
Philippine government to require that [at] a
certain point, a child be made to choose. But I do
not think we should penalize the child before he
is even able to choose. I would, therefore,
support the retention of the modification made
in 1973 of the male chauvinistic rule of the 1935
Constitution.[77]
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xxxx
SO ORDERED.
October 7, 2013
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Factual Antecedents
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition
for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga
del Sur. The case was docketed as Naturalization
Case No. 03-001 and raffled to Branch 29 of said
court.
Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes
in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution; that she has conducted herself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the
period of her stay in the Philippines, as well as in
her relations with the constituted Government
and with the community in which she is living;
that she has mingled socially with the Filipinos
and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace their customs, traditions, and ideals;
that she has all the qualifications required under
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473 (CA473);6 that she is not opposed to
organized government nor is affiliated with any
association or group of persons that uphold and
teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments; that she is not defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or assassination for the
success and predominance of mens ideas; that
she is neither a polygamist nor believes in
polygamy; that the nation of which she is a
subject is not at war with the Philippines; that
she intends in good faith to become a citizen of
the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and
particularly to China; and that she will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the time of
the filing of her Petition up to the time of her
naturalization.
After all the jurisdictional requirements
mandated by Section 97 of CA 473had been
complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground
that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged
in a lawful occupation or in some known
lucrative trade. Finding the grounds relied upon
by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC
denied said Motion.9 Thereafter, the hearing for
the reception of Azucenas evidence was then
set on May 18, 2004.10
Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing.
Hence, Azucenas counsel moved that the
evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC
granted. Accordingly, the RTC designated its
Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive
Azucenas evidence.11 During the November 5,
2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from
the OSG appeared despite due notice.12
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on
September 28, 1941 to Chinese
parents,13 Azucena has never departed the
Philippines since birth. She has resided in
Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur from 1941-1942;
in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur from 19421968; in Bogo City for nine months; in Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur from 1969-1972; in
Talisayan, Misamis Oriental from 1972-1976; and,
in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, thereafter,
up to the filing of her Petition.
Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan,
and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and
tertiary education were taken in Philippine
schools,i.e., Margosatubig Central Elementary
School in 1955,14 Margosatubig Academy
in1959,15 and the Ateneo de Zamboanga in
1963,16 graduating with a degree in Bachelor of
Science in Education. She then practiced her
teaching profession at the Pax High School for
five years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for two
years, and in Talisayan High School in Misamis
Oriental for another two years.17
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married
Santiago Batuigas18 (Santiago),a natural-born
Filipino citizen.19 They have five children, namely
Cynthia, Brenda, Aileen, Dennis Emmanuel, and
Edsel James.20 All of them studied in Philippine
public and private schools and are all
professionals, three of whom are now working
abroad.21
After her stint in Talisayan High School, Azucena
and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged
in the retail business of and later on in
milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As
proof of their income, Azucena submitted their
joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from
2000-200222 and from 2004-2005.23 The business
name and the business permits issued to the
spouses store, Azucenas General
Merchandising, are registered in Santiagos
name,24 and he is also the National Food
Authority licensee for their rice and corn
business.25 During their marital union, the
Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in
Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.26
To prove that she has no criminal record,
Azucena submitted clearances issued by the
Philippine National Police of Zamboanga del Sur
Provincial Office and by the National Bureau of
Investigation.27 She also presented her Health
Examination Record28 declaring her as physically
and mentally fit.
To further support Azucenas Petition, Santiago
and witnesses Eufemio Miniao and Irineo Alfaro
testified.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 31, 2005, the RTC found that Azucena
has amply supported the allegations in her
Petition. Among these are her lack of a
derogatory record, her support for an organized
government, that she is in perfect health, that
she has mingled with Filipinos since birth and
can speak their language, that she has never
had any transgressions and has been a law
abiding citizen, that she has complied with her
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