4.

1 Changes in Power Distribution

- albeit America's economic dominance declined (1970s), GATT remained
- no competitive devaluations or wholesale protectionism
- Fuctions of regmines = reduction of uncertainty and insecurity
1) stabilize mutual expectations
2) reduce transaction costs
3) produce information, otherwise unavailable or high cost
4) reiterated transactions
- improve contractual environment
- regimes hold even if environment (or reason) no longer exists
- easier to maintain than build
4.2 Changes in Overall Relations
- if perform fuctions, persist even with deterioration of overall relations of p
articipants
> why? because of reiterated transactions - they provide insight as to how a
state may react on a repeated-issue based on how it has acted in the past, it al
so gives states a chance to re-evaluate their decisions to benefit them more
4.3 Inconvenient Commitments
- influence on decisions of individual governments, even if rules are inconvenie
nt
> regimes follow because they want to save face with the international commun
ity. It's in their national interest to maintain international cooperation with
states who are also part of the regime.
- non-compliance = endanger regime
- maintainance of regime = national interest
- defects on international reputation = barrier to noncompliance
4.4 Unsatisfying Outcomes
- problem: failure to solve problems
- changes to institutional dynamic to adapt rules to new knowledge
> not affected by poor performance
- allows the regime to evolve
- increace effectivity and robustness, from internal reforms
- Challenges
1) percieved costs and benefits
2) distribution of power
3) overall relationship of parties
- adapts over time through reform
- not eternal
> party dramatic change in political system
> loose key members
5. Consequences of effectiveness
5.1 The Meaning of Effectiveness
- Broad: constribution of institutions make to solving the problems that motivat
e actors to create them
- degree to shich a regime ameliorates the problem that prompted its creation
> does it solve the problem which caused its creation?
- Difficulties
1) ascribe observed changes to the operation
2) problems meriting a regime does not nesssarily solutions directly involvin
g the created-regime
> problem-solving = may be a sideshow
> problem-solving may cause its own limitations - hard to apply
- Other definitions of effectiveness
1) Legal - degree to which conflicts become regulated by the rule of law

> contractual obligations are met

> ignores non-contractual consequences
2) Policy-oriented - well-defined goals and asks what policy adjustments will
prove effective in attaining these goals
> relative efficiency of command-and-control regulations and tradable perm
its
> does not provide a basis for generalizations
3) Political definition - bahavior and bahavioral change
> effective: cause change in bahavior
> firm connection with real world
> loose sight of regime objectives
- STATE DEFINITIONS EXPLICITLY - avoid confusion
> relevant bodies of evidence, regardless of definition
5.2 Domain of Effectiveness
- dimensions
1) direct vs indirect - casual chain connection
> Direct - short casual chains, easier to trace
> Indirect - longer, produce grater effect
2) internal vs external
> normally outside issue-area
> External - physical and biological linkages
3) positive vs negative
> straight forward
- most research focus on: direct and positive
5.3 Casual Bases of Effectiveness
- connection between institution and bahavioral changes
- comparison: of the regime wasn't created
> casual link: operation and bahavior
- Analytical techniques - corelations not casual link
1)natural or quasi-experiments - comparisons across diff. areas or over time
within a single regime
> comparable situations, with or without regime (type of regime)
> unchanged situations, except altering regimes
- do not over estimate: concomitatant but unnoticed variables
2) thought experiment - recontruct events, removing or adding key factors, an
d compare results with what actually happened
> success: framing counter-factuals as precisely as possible
1) decision-making process with in regime
2) branching points
3) what would have happened if no regime?
- no single procedure but helps add details to bigger picture
5.4 Review of Hypothesis and Evidence
- Three bodies of literature
1) Exogenous Factors (external)
A. Patterns of Interest - changes have negative consequences for some inte
rests, while positive for others
>> negative and positive = constrain
B. Distribution of Influence - affect ability to succeed at its task
1>> distribution [of coercive power] = (influence) ability to bring bah
avioral changes
- no guarantee of success
- consenstrate from proponents (initiators)
a. Hegemonic Stability Theory - power to states that support goal
s needed for institutional success
-> why? because there needs to be an 'enforcer' to stop 'freeriders'
1>> distribution of capacity - adjustments on the part of actros who la

ck the capacity
2>> consentration influence [coercive] - individual leadership
- leader needed as something to bring together
2>> consentration influence [non-coercive] - 'epstemic communities'
- for success;
1) prescence of regional communited interested in goal
2) respect by political decision-makers for the authority
3) contact or influence between community and policy-makers
C. Nature of the Issue Area - issue area
>> unabiguous shocks and crises - early warning
>> sneak-up; galvanize too late - no warning (or late)
D. ability to monitor - direct ratio with compliance
- Concluding Thoughts: nothing incompatible with strong infleunce from exogen
ous forces and a positive role for institutions
2) Endogenous Factors (internal) - 'epstemic communities'
- good and bad wats to structure and administer
- determinants: right rules, secretariants, and programatic activities
- criticism: variation of factors = variation of interests, maning endo be
ars no independent explanatory weight
> DERIVATIVE - lies in interest and power capabilties of relevant actors
> avoid by control relevant endo
A. Design Features (institutional design) - the form affects ability to ca
rry out tasks
>> design priciples - help to account for success in sustaining common
pool resources and gaining compliance
>> non compliance - 'ambiguity and indterminancy of treaty language' an
d non-use of sanctions and conflict resolution mechanism
>> bahavior not laws - comparative studies
- bahavior changes
- improved legal rules with evasive action = underlying problem
unresolved
>> scientific and technical - non-gov't filled with experts
- common scientific knowledge
B. Programmatic Activities >> operational factors
a. recognizing and nurturing competence
b. emergence of dynamic leadership
c. ability to perform basic o rganizaional tasks
d. imagination and creativity
C. secretariat roles - improves compliance if done properly
- NOT: political role, to embarass or cajole laggards
- no definitie strategy, based on circumstance
D. flexibility and adaptability
- Concluding Thoughts: not as debated; hence, dvivide in how to study it
3) Bahavioral mechanisms- edo to alter exo
- edo + exo = studied together
- design features + programme activities = influence operation
- causal link between instiutional facts and bahavioral outcomes - make sense
of overall phenomenon
- Three Central Tasks (Haas et.al., 1993)
A. increase concern
B. improve contractual environment
C. increase capacity of government
> institutional strategies dependent on environment/situation
- Six Darthmouth Mechanisms *no name (Levy and Young, 1994)
A. as Unitility Modifiers - self-interested utility maximizer
> bahavior guided by arrangements to alter cost and benefits of
options
> change bahavior, if rules make it so
> LINKAGE - linking previously unlinked

> penalties and rewards system

B. as Enhancers of Cooperation
> collective-action problems - affect bahavior
> aleviate problems to achieve collective outsomes
> mitigate the collective-action problems that stand as a barrie
r
> principal fuction
C. as Bestowers of Authority - rooted in respect for authority,
> consequence of socialization
> follow if; authority is legitimate and deserving of respect
> out of 'habit of obedience' - are exceptions
> treat as achievement of goal (legitimacy)
> authoritativeness which trigger response
D. as Learning Facilitators - give rise to individual and social learnin
g
> new perspectives, ideas, insights, facts
>> reduce uncertainty
>> produce more accurate picture of issues or states
>> reassesment of values and redefine actor interests
> process not well understood
> improve gasp of roles of individuals in learning process
> changing information and values --> alter incentives and inter
ests
E. as Role Definers - shape identity of actors; thereby, influencing the
m
> actors take on new roles under institutional arrangement
> changes reflect evolution of underlying ideas
F. as Agents of International Alignment - members of international regim
es and other active actors need not be treated as unitary actors
> effect: new constituences or shifting balance
> ammunition to deal with others
5.5 Conclusions of Effectiveness
- Three Central Tasks (3Cs)and Six Dartmouth Mechanisms (6D) are complementary
- 3Cs = wide range of specific mechanisms; 6D pertains to each of the 3Cs
- high degree of overlap = 2-dimentional map of bahavioral mehcamisns
- not clear whehter devising such a two-dimensional map is most productive
- more work needed