HABAEAS CORPUZ

G.R. No. 139789

July 19, 2001

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES
and JANE DOES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

FACTS:
Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived
together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed
and board for undisclosed reasons.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo
City a petition10 for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano
Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and
impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City,
Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at

Cleveland Condominium, Makati. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents refused petitioners
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo City.
ISSUE: Whether or not a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her
husband to live with her in conjugal bliss
HELD: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling
may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the
one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully
denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of
due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later
become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely
nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86
years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical
condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

G.R. No. 148468

January 28, 2003

ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 148769

January 28, 2003

EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 149116

January 28, 2003

EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:
Herein petitioner was charged with plunder together with former President
Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. Before the
arraignment, petitioner filed a series of motions and/or petitions before the
Sandiganbayan, among which are as follows: (1) petition for bail; (2) motion
to quash amended information; and (3) petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that the delay in proceeding with the bail hearing was caused by the
prosecution, thus, prosecution is deemed to have waive its right to question
the propriety of grant of bail.
Petitioner also assailed the decision of the Sandiganbayan in allowing the
joint hearing of petitioners petition for bail with that of President Estrada and
Jinggoys petition for bail.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of
his petition for bail may be conducted;
2. Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended
Information during the pendency of his petition for bail;
3. Whether or not petition for bail of two defendants may be heard jointly;

4. Whether or not petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus may be

availed of on the ground of delay in the hearing of a petition for bail
not as a matter of right.
HELD:
The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of
hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as
soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender. An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a
petition for bail.
To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to
place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to
quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash
can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing
of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be
released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put
on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him
with a crime and his right to bail.
These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to
each other. There is no inconsistency exists between an application of an
accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given
for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under
the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its purpose is to obtain the
provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction
while at the same time securing his appearance at the trial. As stated earlier,
a person may apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his
liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which
an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed
against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which
are apparent in the face of the Information. An accused may file a motion to
quash the Information, as a general rule, before arraignment.
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules
of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more
petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an
accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other
accused. The matter is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings of the petition for
bail of petitioner with the trial of the case against former President Joseph E.
Estrada is an entirely different matter as it will prejudice the petitioner.
Because although all defendants were charged with plunder, the alleged
specific violation as to each one of them is different. The petitioner is merely
charged with conspired with the other co-accused named in sub-paragraph
(a) by "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances,
money x x x from illegal gambling, x x x in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling
Thus, with respect to petitioner, all that the prosecution needs to adduce to
prove that the evidence against him for the charge of plunder is strong are
those related to the alleged receipt or collection of money from illegal
gambling as described in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended Information.
With the joinder of the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail and the trial of
the former President, the latter will have the right to cross-examine
intensively and extensively the witnesses for the prosecution in opposition to
the petition for bail of petitioner.
The joinder of the hearing of petitioner's bail petition with the trial of former
President Joseph E. Estrada will be prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly
delay the determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain
provisional liberty and seek relief from this Court if his petition is denied by
the respondent court.
The answer is in the negative. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus
will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in
custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to
do so. In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the
courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid
arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as "the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut through barriers
of form and procedural mazes." Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ
where the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under the law, had later
become invalid, and even though the persons praying for its issuance were
not completely deprived of their liberty.
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor
of petitioner. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same

applies, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest

issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the
Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against petitioner and
his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had
been issued.
A petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting
one's right to bail. It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail
not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has
not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even
exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail
with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings
thereon to proceed.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile that habeas corpus will lie where the
deprivation of liberty which was initially valid has become arbitrary in view of
subsequent developments finds no application in the present case because
the hearing on petitioner's application for bail has yet to commence. The
delay in the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail cannot be pinned solely
on the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that matter. Petitioner
himself is partly to be blamed with the series of pleadings filed before the
Sandiganbayan which totaled to 8 and 32 is those filed by other defendants
will be considered.

G.R. No. 147780

May 10, 2001

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO,

petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA,
and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
---------------------------------------G.R. No. 147781

May 10, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents.
----------------------------------------

G.R. No. 147799

May 10, 2001

RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA,
P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO
BERROYA, respondents.
---------------------------------------G.R. No. 147810

May 10, 2001

THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL DIOMEDIO
VILLANUEVA, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR
GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents.
MELO, J.:

FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38
declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region.
She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the
National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of
rebellion," which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, a
petition for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an
urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction) filed by Panfilio M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino,
and Cezar O. Mancao. They alleged that they are under imminent danger of
being arrested.
ISSUE: Whether or not petition for habeas corpus may be availed of against
an imminent danger from warrantless arrest.
HELD:

Petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781

(Defensor-Santiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are
under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their
resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an
individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies
in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary
investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce
evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to
determine whether or not he should remain under custody and
correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person subject of a
warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within
the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the
arresting officer could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained
persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested
can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without
prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer
under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other
remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for
prohibition and mandamus improper at this time.
The application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is not proper since
its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint a matter which
remains speculative up to this very day.
SANGCA VS. CITY PROSECUTOR OF CEBU
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts:
On January 4, 2007, petitioner Sangca filed the instant petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the release of Lovely Impal Adam
who was detained in the Cebu City Jail for alleged violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts are as follows:
In the first week of July 2006, the PDEA, Regional Office VII, received
information that a certain Adam was engaged in illegal drug trafficking
activities in Cebu City. After evaluating the information, Police Chief Inspector
Ligan, PDEA VII Asst. together with FO1 Yap and PO2 Tuliao planned an
entrapment operation. Adam was arrested by virtue of said operation.
On petition for review before the Department of Justice, Secretary Raul M.
Gonzalez found no probable cause to hold Adam liable for the offense
charged, to wit:

A very thorough and careful scrutiny of the records, particularly the affidavit
of arrest, reveals that no payment was ever made by the police
officers for the supposed object of the buy-bust operations. The
police officers have not even alleged in their affidavits that payment was
made to respondent in exchange for the shabu. No buy-bust money was
ever presented. The certificate of inventory does not show any buybust money. These stick out like a sore thumb in the case at bar.
Suffice it to say that one of the essential elements to be established in the
prosecution of the drug "buy-bust" cases, that is, "the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefore" is wanting. It was aptly said in
the case of People v. Alilin, 206 SCRA 773, that: "To sustain a conviction for
selling prohibited drugs, the same must be clearly and unmistakably
established.
The Justice Secretary thus directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to
withdraw the information. In his Comment, Judge Gabriel T. Ingles, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58, stated that at the
hearing of the motion to withdraw information on January 5, 2007, it was
found that In the affidavit of FO1 Yap and PO2 Tuliao, there is indeed no
mention of their preparation of a buy bust money before, during or
after their briefing prior to the alleged buy bust operation, nor is there any
mention of the price or consideration of the sale. What is merely stated is
that they had enough money.
Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime charged, Judge
Ingles issued an Order on January 26, 2007 granting the Motion to Withdraw
Information and ordering the release of the accused, unless otherwise held
for another valid ground.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention in which any person is deprived of his liberty, or in which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its
essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. The
singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the
basic freedom of physical liberty.
In the instant case, records show that Adam has been released upon
order of the trial judge on January 26, 2007. Therefore, the petition
has become moot.

G.R. No. 160739

July 17, 2013
MANGILA VS. PANGILINAN

BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Mangila et. al were charged with syndicated estafa, filed at the
Puerto Princesa MTCC.
On June 17, 2003, Respondent Judge Pangilinan, presiding judge of the MTCC,
conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining a
certain Palayon, one of the complainants, respondent judge issued a warrant
for the arrest of Mangila, et. al.
The entire records of the cases, including said warrant of arrest were
transmitted to the city prosecutor for further proceedings the following day.
Mangila was arrested. She then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
habeas corpus, averring that the remedy of habeas corpus was available to
her because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall
the warrant of arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan had already
forwarded the entire records of the case to the City Prosecutor who had no
authority to lift or recall the warrant.
The CA denied the petition, explaining that a writ of habeas corpus will not
be granted where relief may be had or could have been procured by resort to
another general remedy. The Court ratiocinated that if petitioner is detained
by virtue of a warrant of arrest, which is allegedly invalid, the remedy
available to her is not a petition for habeas corpus but a petition to quash the
warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the
Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.
Issue:
Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to
obtain the release of Mangila from detention?
Held:
No. There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged
against Mangila and her cohorts on June 16, 2003, Judge Pangilinan, as the
Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions."
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the
detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of
the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue
where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with
jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.

It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC and
MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was removed only
effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.
With Mangilas arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order
lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an
appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is
because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could
not be inquired into through habeas corpus.
G.R. No. 210636
July 28, 2014
TUJANMILITANTE VS. CADA-DEAPERA
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Facts:
Respondent Cada-Deapera filed before the RTC-Caloocan a petition for writ of
habeas corpus. In the said petition, respondent demanded the immediate
issuance of the special writ, directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante
to produce before the court respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda
M. Cada (Criselda), and to return to her the custody over the child.
The RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to bring
the child to court on March 28, 2011. Despite diligent efforts and several
attempts, however, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally serving
petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of the writ.
Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship
over the person of Criselda before the RTC, Branch 89 in Quezon City (RTCQuezon City). Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for
guardianship on the ground of litis pendentia, among others. Thereafter, or
on June 3, 2011, respondent filed a criminal case for kidnapping before the
Office of the City Prosecutor Quezon City against petitioner and her
counsel.
RTC-Quezon City granted respondents motion and dismissed the
guardianship case due to the pendency of the habeas corpus petition before
RTC-Caloocan.
Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus
before the RTC-Caloocan, which was granted by the trial court on August 8,
2011.
Petitioner moved for the quashal of the writ and prayed before the RTC
Caloocan for the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition, claiming, among
others, that she was not personally served with summons. Thus, as argued
by petitioner, jurisdiction over her and Criseldas person was not acquired by
the RTC Caloocan.

RTC Ruling:
Petitioner's motion dismissed. Writ of habeas corpus, being an extraordinary
process requiring immediate proceeding and action, plays a role somewhat
comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said
writ, the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, as
petitioner herein. Since the sheriff was able to personally serve petitioner a
copy of the writ, albeit in Quezon City, the RTC-Caloocan validly acquired
jurisdiction over her person
CA Ruling:
Jurisdiction was properly laid when respondent filed the habeas corpus
petition before the designated Family Court in Caloocan City. Service of
summons is not required under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,
otherwise known as the Rules on Custody of Minors and Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors. he rules on summons contemplated in
ordinary civil actions have no place in petitions for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, it being a special proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus
petition filed by respondent?
Petitioner's Argument: Habeas corpus petition should have been filed
before the family court that has jurisdiction over her place of residence or
that of the minor or wherever the minor may be found, per Section 3 of A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC.
[Note: Section 3. Where to file petition.- The petition for custody of minors
shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found.]
Respondent's Argument: Applicable rule is Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-0404-SC.
[Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ
of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family
Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.]
Held:
Respondent filed a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under
Section 20. Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial
region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they
be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs
within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought.

Under Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the National Capital Region consists
of the cities of Quezon xxx, Caloocan xxx. The filing of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of the cities
enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the
National Capital Judicial Region, as here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of
Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same
judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented
in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is
immaterial in view of the above rule.
Anent petitioner's contention, a plain reading of Section 3 reveals that the
provision invoked only applies to petitions for custody of minors, and not to
habeas corpus petitions.