Manalang v.

Bacani
GR No. 156995, January 12, 2015,
First Division, Bersamin, J.
[Topic: Boundary Dispute; Property]

Is a boundary dispute the proper subject of a case for unlawful detainer?

No, a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an
ejectment case. A boundary dispute is NOT about possession, but encroachment, that is,
whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiffs property.

NFF Industrial Corporation vs. G & L Associated Brokerage

G.R. No. 178169, January 12, 2015
Third Division, Peralta
[Topic: Delivery; Sales]

Respondent G & L Brokerage ordered 2,000 pieces of bulk bags from petitioner NFF
Company. In the said Purchase Order, an instruction was made that the bulk bags were for
immediate delivery to G & L Associated Brokerage, Inc., c/o Hi-Cement Corporation, Norzagaray,
Bulacan, specifically to one Mr. Raul Ambrosio. Petitioner indeed made deliveries on different
dates, and these were duly acknowledged by the representatives of respondent company. Later, G
& L failed to pay the price of its orders. As the demands of NFF remained unheeded, it filed a
complaint for sum of money against G & L.

G & L, on its defense, stated that there was no

delivery because although it was delivered to their premises, it was not specifically delivered to
Mr. Ambrosio.

Was there a valid delivery, and consequently an obligation of G & L to pay the

price?
YES, there is valid delivery. Ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from
the moment it is delivered to him (Art. 1496).

Further, the thing sold shall be understood as

delivered, when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee (Real or Actual
Delivery) (Art. 1497).

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner has actually

delivered the bulk bags to respondent company, albeit the same was not delivered to
the person named in the Purchase Order. In addition, by allowing petitioners employee to
pass through the guard-on-duty, who allowed the entry of delivery into the premises of HiCement, which is the designated delivery site, respondents had effectively abandoned whatever
infirmities may have attended the delivery of the bulk bags. Mr. Trinidad acknowledged receipt of

the first batch of the bulk bags and even followed up the remaining balance of the orders for
delivery.
Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. v. Judge Riel
GR No. 176508, January 12, 2015,
First Division, Bersamin, J.
[Topic: Reconstitution of Lost OCT; Land Titles and Deeds]

Saint Mary Crusade Inc. filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of Original Certificate of
Title No. 1609 before the Regional Trial Court. To support its petition, it submitted the following
documents: (1) copy of original application (2) the notice of initial hearing (3) the letter of
transmittal to the Court of First Instance in Quezon City; (4) the copy of the Spanish Testimonial
Title in the name of Eladio Tiburcio; (5) the copy of Tax Assessment and (6) the approved Plan
SWD-37457. Can the petition still prosper?
No, because the non-presentation of the duplicate or the certified copy of the
OCT disobeys Section 2 and Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26, the provisions that expressly
listed the acceptable bases for judicial reconstitution of an existing Torrens title.

Gutierrez v. COA, et al.

G.R. No. 200628, January 13, 2015.
En Banc, Leonen, J.
[Topic: Administrative Due Process; Negligence]
Gutierrez is a Cash Collecting Officer at the National Food Authority-National Capital
Region (NFA-NCR). She was administratively held liable by the CSC after a P10M worth of
collection, which was kept in a pearless box inside her cabinet instead of the safety vault, was
lost by reason of a robbery at NFA-NCR. Can she be held liable?
She is liable. A cashier who is found to have been negligent in keeping the funds in his or
her custody cannot be relieved from his or her accountability for amounts lost through robbery.

Almendras, Jr. vs. Almendras

G.R. No. 179491, January 14, 2015
First Division, Sereno, C.J.
[TOPIC: Damages; Privileged Communication]

Petitioner, a Congressman, sent letters to House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., and to Dr.
Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. The controversial portion of the first and second
letters reads as follows:

_________________________________________________________________
This is to notify your good self and your staff that one ALEXIS "DODONG" C. ALMENDRAS, a brother, is
not vested with any authority to liaison or transact any business with any department, office, or
bureau, public or otherwise, that has bearing or relation with my office, mandates or functions. . . . .
Noteworthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr. Alexis "Dodong" C. Almendras, a reknown
blackmailer, is a bitter rival in the just concluded election of 1995 who ran against the wishes of my
father, the late Congressman Alejandro D. Almendras, Sr. He has caused pain to the family when he
filed cases against us: his brothers and sisters, and worst against his own mother.
May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above information to concerned
officials and secretariat employees of the House of Representatives.

_______________________________________________________________________

Hence, the respondent filed an action for damages arising from libel and defamation.
Petitioner raised the defense that these are privilege communications thus cannot presume
malice. Are letters libelous in nature?
YES.

In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be

construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by the persons reading them, unless it appears
that they were used and understood in another sense. In the instant case, the letters tag
respondent as a "reknown black mailer," a vengeful family member who filed cases against his
mother and siblings, and with nefarious designs. Even an impartial mind reading these
descriptions would be led to entertain doubts on the person's character, thereby affecting that
person's reputation.
A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it
is published and circulated among the public. Examination of the letters would reveal that
petitioner himself intended for the letters to be circulated and they were so.

BPI v. Sps. Castro

G.R. No. 195272, January 14, 2015
First Division, Perez, J.
[Topic: Notice of Foreclosure Sale; Credit Transactions]

Does an error in the designation of the name of the mortgagor render the publication of
the notice of sale and the consequent foreclosure sale void?
No. Erroneous designation of an entity as the mortgagor does not invalidate the
notice of sale.

Cercado-Siga, et al. v. Cercado, Jr.

G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015
First Division, Perez, J.
[Topic: Family Code; Paternity and Filiation]
Petitioners claimed that they are legitimate children of Vicente and Benita Castillo. They
read from a newspaper a notice that the estate of Vicente and a Leonora Ditablan had been
extrajudicially settled in a Deed executed by respondents. Petitioners insist that Vicente and
Leonora were not married, or if they were, then said marriage was null and void by reason of the
subsisting marriage between their own parents. They prayed for the declaration of the Deed as
null and void. Did the different evidence presented by petitioners prove a prior marriage and the
filiation of petitioners to Vicente?
No.

The

Contrato

Matrimonial

(marriage

contract)

issued

by

Iglesia

Filipina

Independiente church is a private document. The church registries (including those of

marriages) made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and Act No. 190 are
no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. Their authenticity
must be proved, which petitioners failed to do. The same is not an ancient document that is
outside the requirement of authentication, though it is more than 30 years old, as it does not
meet the requirement that it is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine.
Simplicia presented a baptismal certificate. The same is conclusive only as to the
sacrament administered and does not prove the statements contained concerning the relationship
of the person baptized.
Ligayas document is a Joint Affidavit by two persons to the effect that she was born to
Vicente and Benita. The affiants were never presented in court and their statements are thus
hearsay evidence.

Gepulle-Garbo v. Sps. Gabarato

G.R. No. 200013, January 14, 2015
Third Division, Villarama, J.
[TOPIC: Opinion of Handwriting Experts in Forgery Cases; Sales]

The parcel of land in this controversy was originally owned by spouses Nick and Eduviges
which was later transferred to Florence (daughter) by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed between
Eduviges and Florence. Subsequently, another Deed of Sale was executed between Florence and
her son Victorey (respondent). Petitioner Betty (former concubine of Nick but later became the

latters wife upon death of Eduviges) questioned the transfer to Victorey after Nicks death
alleging forgery of Nicks signature. Petitioner presented a handwriting expert to support
her claim. Is the petition meritorious?
No. Petition is without merit. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved
by clear, positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery
and he must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
The opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court,
the experts function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its
own opinion. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting
experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned
signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity

Honrado vs. GMA Network Films, Inc.

G.R. No. 204702 ,January 14, 2015
2nd Division, Carpio, J.
[TOPIC: Breach of Contract]
Respondent GMA Films entered into a "TV Rights Agreement" (Agreement) with petitioner
under which petitioner, as licensor of 36 films, granted to GMA Films, for a fee of P60.75 million,
the exclusive right to telecast the 36 films for a period of three years. Under Paragraph 3 of the
Agreement, the parties agreed that "all betacam copies of the [films] should pass through
broadcast quality test conducted by GMA-7," an affiliate of GMA Films. The parties also agreed to
submit the films for review by the MTRCB and stipulated on the remedies in the event that
MTRCB bans the telecasting of any of the films. In 2003, GMA Films sued petitioner in the trial
court to collect the fee it paid for Evangeline Katorse and a portion of the fee it paid for Bubot,
alleging that it rejected Evangeline Katorse because "its running time was too short for telecast".
Is Honrado liable for breach of the Agreement and breach of trust?
No. Under their stipulation, what triggers the rejection and replacement of any film listed
in the Agreement is the "disapproval" of its telecasting by MTRCB. GMA Network, testified during
trial that it was GMA Network which rejected Winasak na Pangarap because the latter considered
the film "bomba." In doing so, GMA Network went beyond its assigned role under the Agreement
of screening films to test their broadcast quality and assumed the function of MTRCB to evaluate
the films for the propriety of their content.

Kalaw v. Fernandez
G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
First Division, Del Castillo, J.
[TOPIC: Nullity of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity; Family Code]

In a complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties, petitioners

experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). The Supreme Court
dismissed the complaint on the basis that the experts based their findings on the transcript of the
petitioners testimony, as well as on her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his
son Miguel. Is the Court correct?

No. Although her findings would seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was
not right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into
consideration other factors extant in the records, including the own opinions of another expert
who had analyzed the issue from the side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled
that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of
the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article
36 of the Family Code the courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decisionmaking, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Sps. Jose Castura and Castuera

G.R. No. 203384 January 14, 2015
2nd Division, Carpio, J.
[TOPIC: Proof of Alienable and Disposable Character of Land; Registration; Land Titles and
Deeds]

Spouses Castuera filed with the RTC an application for original registration of title over the
property. To support their application, they presented documentary including tax receipts and an
advance plan with a notation, Checked and verified against the cadastral records on file in this
office and is for registration purposes. This survey is within the Alienable and Disposable land.

There was also a certification from CENRO certifying that the land is alienable and disposable.
Are the advance plan and the CENRO certification sufficient proofs of the alienable and disposable
character of the property?
NO. The advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable
and disposable character of the property. The Spouses Castuera, as applicants for registration of
title, must present a certified true copy of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Secretarys declaration or classification of the land as alienable and disposable.

Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) and Betia v. Rebesencio, et al.

[G.R. No. 198587 | January 14, 2015]
Second Division, Leonen, J.
[Topic: forum non conveniens; conflict of laws]

Respondents are flight attendants of petitioner airline (Saudia). When respondents got
pregnant, they were told to resign; otherwise, respondent airline will terminate them all the
same. The threat of termination entailed the loss of benefits such as separation pay and ticket
discount entitlements. Hence, respondents resigned. After their resignation, they filed a case for
illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Saudia raised the defense of forum non conveniens and that it
was agreed that it was the Saudi Arabian Law that shall govern the employment contract. May
the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission may exercise jurisdiction over
Saudi Arabian Airlines and apply Philippine law in adjudicating the present dispute?
Yes, the LA and NLRC may exercise jurisdiction for the all of the considerations for
assumption of jurisdiction by Philippine tribunals have been satisfied.
A- The Court is a convenient forum to adjudicate the case.
(1) First, all the parties are based in the Philippines and all the material incidents
transpired in this jurisdiction.

Saudia, while a foreign corporation, has a Philippine

office. Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 7042, otherwise known as the Foreign
Investments Act of 1991 provides that the phrase doing business shall include opening
offices, whether called liaison offices or branches. As such, Saudia may be sued in the
Philippines and is subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine tribunals.
(2) Second, Philippine tribunals are in a position to make an intelligent decision as
to the law and the facts.
(3) Third, Philippine tribunals are in a position to enforce their decisions. There is no
compelling basis for ceding jurisdiction to a foreign tribunal. Quite the contrary, the
immense public policy considerations attendant to this case behoove Philippine tribunals

to not shy away from their duty to rule on the case.

B - Contractual choice of law is not determinative of jurisdiction. Stipulating on the laws of a
given jurisdiction as the governing law of a contract does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction
by tribunals elsewhere.
C Forum non conveniens is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Forum non conveniens is
not a ground for a motion to dismiss. It would be improper to dismiss an action pursuant to
forum non conveniens based merely on a perceived, likely, or hypothetical multiplicity of fora.
Thus, a defendant must also plead and show that a prior suit has, in fact, been brought in
another jurisdiction. Saudia failed to do this.
Syjuco v. Bonifacio and VSD Realty & Development Corporation
G.R. No. 148748, January 14, 2015
First Division, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
[Topic: Quieting of Title; Direct Attack; Property; Land Titles and Deeds]

Petitioners are co-owners of a subject land. The land had 2 encumbrances, particularly
the lease to Manufacturer's Bank and another lease agreement to a certain Chen Heng. However,
petitioners learned that the land was offered for sale by Felisa Bonifacio who is a sub-lessee of
Manufacturer's Bank. Bonifacio was also able to register the land under her name. The
petitioner's filed for an action for quieting of title praying for the declaration of nullity of
Bonifacio's title. Bonifacio alleged that the complaint is prohibited since is constitutes as a
collateral attack on a certificate of title. Is Bonifacio correct?
No.

This is a direct attack.

The attack is direct when the object of an action or

proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgement, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand,
the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgement is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. The instituted action in this case is
clearly a direct attack on a certificate of title to real property.

Ungay Malobago Mines Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 187892, January 14, 2015,
Third Division, Peralta, J.
[Topic: Reconstitution of Title; Land Titles and Deeds]

Petitioner filed for reconstitution of the lost OCT of a mining patent granted to it. But, the
Republic assailed the action claiming that it is not the registered owner of the same, as it is
already given to Rapu-Rapu Inc. Can he still ask for reconstitution of title?
No. The persons who can file for reconstitution of a lost certificate are only the registered
owner, his assigns or persons in interest in the property. In this case, petitioner admitted that it
was not the owner of the land on which the mining patent was issued. Additionally, its reliance on
Art. 11 of R.A 26 is misplaced because this provision is only applicable to registered interest
noted on an additional sheet of a certificate of title, not of a lost certificate.
Jusayan v. Sombilla
GR 163928, Jan. 21, 2015
First Division, Bersamin
[Topic: Agricultural Lease]

Wilson entered into an agreement with Jorge wherein Wilson designated Jorge as agent to
supervise the tilling and farming of his riceland (therefore, having possession over the land).
Subsequently, Wilson sold his land to Timoteo, who now wants the return of the parcels of land.
Jorge objects because as an agricultural tenant, he has the right to security of tenure. Is this a
case of a civil law lease, or of an agricultural lease?
This is a case of agricultural lease, also termed as leasehold tenancy, as all of its elements
have been met, to wit:
(1) the object of the contract or the relationship is an agricultural land that is leased or
rented for the purpose of agricultural production;
(2) the size of the landholding is such that it is susceptible of personal cultivation by a
single person with the assistance of the members of his immediate farm household;
(3) the tenant- lessee must actually and personally till, cultivate or operate the land,
solely or with the aid of labor from his immediate farm household; and
(4) the landlord-lessor, who is either the lawful owner or the legal possessor of the land,
leases the same to the tenant-lessee for a price certain or ascertainable either in an amount of
money or produce.
The one claiming to be the agricultural tenant has to prove all the requisites of his
agricultural tenancy by substantial evidence.

Ruks Konsult and Construction v. Adworld Sign and Advertising Corporation and
Transworld Media Ads, Inc.
GR 204866, Jan. 21, 2015

First Division, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

[TOPIC: Proximate Cause; Quasi-Delict; Torts and Damages]

Adworld owned a billboard structure which was misaligned and its foundation impaired
when the adjacent billboard owned by Transworld collapsed and crashed against it. Transworld
admitted the damages caused to the former, but filed a third-party complaint against Ruks, which
built the upper structure of Transworlds billboard (Transworld constructed the lower structure),
and alleged that the structure had a weak foundation not suited for billboards, thus, prone to
collapse, and as such, Ruks should ultimately be held liable. Who should be held liable for the
damage done to Adworlds billboard structure?
Both Transworld and Ruks should be held jointly and severally liable. They committed acts
resulting in the collapse of Transworlds billboard, which in turn, caused damage to the adjacent
billboard of Adworld. Transworlds initial construction of its billboards lower structure without the
proper foundation, and that of Rukss finishing its upper structure and just merely assuming that
Transworld would reinforce the weak foundation are the two (2) successive acts which were the
direct and proximate cause of the damages sustained by Adworld. Where several causes
producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would
not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be
had against any or all of the responsible persons.

Vias vs. Parel-Vias

G.R. No. 208790 January 21, 2015
Third Division, Reyes, J.
[Topic: Psychological Incapacity; Family Code]

Glenn filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife, Mary
Grace, alleging psychological incapacity on the part of Mary Grace. Evidence presented showed
that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to perform household chores. A
Clinical Psychologist also assessed Mary Grace's personality through the data she had gathered
from Glenn and his cousin, who knew her way back in college. The Psychologist diagnosed Mary
Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag
concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn's relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect,
commitment and fidelity to each other. Further, they only lived together for 7 years, after which
Mary Grace left for Dubai and has not returned since. Should the petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage be granted?
No. The cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary
evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Grace's
condition. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible personalities, the latter's acts and

10

traits do not necessarily indicate psychological incapacity. Mary Grace's departure from their
home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with
her obligation to live with her husband.

Ofilada v. Sps. Andal

G.R. No. 192270. January 26, 2015
Second Division, Del Castillo, J.
[Topic: Agrarian Law; Termination of Tenancy Relationship by Sale]
Respondents, who brokered the sale of the lands to between the petitioner and a certain
Teresita Liwag, executed days prior to the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Sale
her Pagpapatunay that they already received a sufficient consideration (P1.1M) for her to release
her former landlord and the purchaser of the lot from liability. Is the sale valid?
Yes.

While a tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished by the sale, alienation, or

transfer of the legal possession of the landholding, the same may nevertheless be terminated due
to circumstances more advantageous to the tenant and his/her family. The sufficient
consideration was adequate enough for the respondents to relinquish their rights as tenants.

Aguilar v. Siasat
G.R. No. 200169. 28 January 2015.
Second Division, Del Castillo, J.
[Topic: Primary Proofs of Filiation; Family Code]

Rodolfo Aguilar, claiming as the sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, filed a
complaint for mandatory injunction against Edna Siasat to surrender to him the owners duplicate
copies of the subject titles to the property in her possession. Siasat, in her answer, claimed that
Rodolfo is not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses. Rodolfo argued that Alfredo
Aguilars SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the

11

Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Does the SSS Form E-1 satisfies the
requirement of proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar Spouses?
Yes, Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said
document constitutes an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

Dela Cruz v. Sps. Hermano

G.R. No. 160914. March 25, 2015
First Division, Sereno, C.J.
[TOPIC: Forcible Entry]

Is a complaint for forcible entry sufficiently pleaded if the petitioner failed to establish his
prior physical possession in the property?
No. In actions for forcible entry, it must be alleged that the complainant was deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that
the action was filed anytime within one year from the time the unlawful deprivation of possession
took place. This requirement implies that in those cases, possession of the land by the
defendant has been unlawful from the beginning, as the possession was obtained by
unlawful means. Further, the complainant must allege and prove prior physical
possession of the property in litigation until he or she was deprived thereof by the
defendant.

First Optima Realty Corporation v. Securitron Security Services, Inc.

G.R. No. 199648. 28 January 2015.
Second Division, Del Castillo, J.
[TOPIC: Policitation; Sales]

Looking to expand its business and add to its existing offices, Securitron Security
Services, Inc. offered to purchase a parcel of land of First Optima Realty Corporation. Later on,
Eleazar personally went to First Optimas office offering to pay for the subject property in cash.
However, Young declined to accept payment, saying that she still needed to secure her sisters

12

advice on the matter and prior approval of First Optimas Board of Directors. On a later date,
Securitron sent a letter accompanied by PNB check issued for P100,000 payable to First Optima
as earnest money for the property. Thereafter, Securitron demanded that First Optima proceed
with the sale of the property. However, First Optima replied by not accepting the offer to buy the
property. Hence, Securitron filed a complaint for specific performance to compel First Optima to
push through with the sale. Will the complaint prosper?

No, the complaint will not prosper as there was no perfected contract of sale.
Respondents offer to purchase the subject property was never accepted by the
petitioner at any instance, even after negotiations held between them. Thus, as between
them, there is no sale to speak of. When there is merely an offer by one party without
acceptance of the other, there is no contract. In the present case, the parties never got past
the negotiation stage. Nothing shows that the parties had agreed on any final
arrangement containing the essential elements of a contract of sale.

Home Guaranty Corporation v. La Savoie Development Corporation

G.R. No. 168616, January 28, 2015
Second Division, Leonen, J.
[TOPIC: Pactum Commisorium; Credit Transactions; Preference of Credits]

La Savoie filed a "petition for the declaration of state of suspension of payments with
approval of proposed rehabilitation plan. Historically, La Savoie obtained financing for some of its
projects through a securitization process which resulted in the issuance of asset participation
certificates dubbed as the "La Savoie Development Certificates" (LSDC certificates). The nominal
issuer is Planters Development Bank (PDB).

The assets pooled are under a Trust Agreement,

wherein the redemption of the LSDC certificates upon maturity and the interest payments on
them were "backed/collateralized by the assets that were conveyed by La Savoie to the Trust.
Before the rehabilitation proceedings commenced, Home Guaranty Corporation approved and
processed the call on its guaranty and proceeded to pay the holders of LSDC certificates.
Pursuant to their Contract of Guaranty, Planters Development Bank executed in favor of Home
Guaranty Corporation a Deed of Assignment and Conveyance, transferring to HGC the ownership
and title to the assets.
Home Guaranty Corporation filed an Opposition. Home Guaranty argued that it and the
investors on the LSDC certificates had "preferential rights over the properties making up the
Asset Pool as these "were conveyed as security or collaterals for the redemption of the [LSDC
certificates]." Should the properties comprising the Asset Pool be excluded from the proceedings
on La Savoie Development Corporation's Petition for Rehabilitation?

13

No. Its execution is in violation of a fundamental principle in the law governing credit
transactions. We find the execution of a Deed of Conveyance without resorting to
foreclosure to be indicative of pactum commissorium. Hence, it is void and ineffectual and
does not serve to vest ownership in Home Guaranty Corporation.

Republic of the Philippines v. Roasa

G.R. No. 176022, February 2, 2015

Third Division, Peralta, J.
[Topic: Alienable and Disposable Character of Land Registration; Land Titles and Deeds]

When should the Alienable and Disposable character of the agricultural land be reckoned
from in an application for original registration of title under PD 1529?

From the time it was

adversely possessed and occupied since June 12, 1945 or earlier, or only from the time of the
application for the registration of title?
The reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application
for registration of title is filed. As long as it was occupied and possessed openly, continuously,
exclusively and notoriously under bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier and
was classified as alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration, then the
requirements of the law are satisfied.

Caubang v. Sps. Crisologo

G.R. No. 174581, February 4, 2015
Third Division, Peralta, J.
[Topic: Foreclosure of Mortgage; Publication Requirement]
For failure of the respondent spouses to pay the loans obtained from a mortgagee bank,
the mortgaged land was foreclosed.

The notice of foreclosure sale was just made in a local

14

newspaper not even on the list of newspapers accredited to publish legal notices, as recorded in
the Office of the Clerk of Court. It also has no paying subscribers and it would only publish
whenever there are customers. Was there a proper foreclosure?
No. The newspaper was not of general circulation which the law requires. Rules regarding
publication must be strictly complied with and slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice
and render the sale, at the very least, voidable. Since there was no proper publication of the
notice of sale, the respondent spouses, as well as the rest of the general public, were never
informed that the mortgaged property was about to be foreclosed and auctioned.

BBB v. AAA,
G.R. No. 193225. February 9, 2015,
Third Division, Reyes.
[TOPIC: Prohibition on Compromise Agreements for RA 9262 Cases; estoppel in acknowledging a
person as his child; support]

In a VAWC case, BBB now alleges that he and AAA entered into a compromise agreement
anent the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of their common children and
ask that judgment be rendered based on such compromise agreement. BBB is also asking that
the directive relative to the award of support in favor of CCC who is AAAs child from a previous
relationship, which BBB voluntarily but erroneously acknowledged as his own, be deleted because
such child is not his biological son. 1.) May cases filed under the provisions of R.A. 9262 be
subjects of compromise agreements? 2.) Is CCC entitled to receive support from BBB?
1.

No. Cases filed under the provisions of R.A. 9262 cannot be subjects of compromise
agreements. Sec. 23 (d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC explicitly prohibits compromise on any act
constituting the crime against women. AM No. 10-4-16-SC, on the other hand, directs the
referral to mediation of all issues under the Family Code and other laws in relation to
support, custody, visitation, property relations and guardianship of minor children, excepting
therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.

2.

Yes. BBB voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. His admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon him, and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon [see Art. 1431, NCC]. The principle of estoppel finds

15

application and now bars BBB from making assertions

contrary

to

his

previous

representations.

Sps. Salvador v. Sps. Rabaja and Gonzales

G.R. No. 199990, February 04, 2015
Second Division, Mendoza, J.
[Topic: Agency]

In a contract to sell transaction involving a parcel of land, the Salvadors introduced

Gonzales to the Rabajas as their agent. Payments were made religiously by the respondents to
Gonzales, who presented a valid SPA to the former to show his authority to receive the said
payments. However, later, the petitioners complained to the respondents that the former has not
received any of the payments the latter has made. This, thus, prompted the respondents to stop
paying Gonzales. Thereafter, an action for ejectment was filed against the respondents. Should
the ejectment case be sustained because the Salvadors were not able to receive the payments,
and arguably they were not paid by the Rabajas?
No.

The Salvadors themselves introduced Gonzales to the Rabajas as their agent. By

their own ostensible acts, Spouses Salvador made third persons believe that Gonzales was duly
authorized to administer, negotiate and sell the subject property. Considering that there was a
valid SPA, then Spouses Rabaja properly made payments to Gonzales, as agent of
Spouses Salvador; and it was as if they paid to Spouses Salvador. It is of no moment,
insofar as Spouses Rabaja are concerned, whether or not the payments were actually
remitted to Spouses Salvador. Any internal matter, arrangement, grievance or strife
between the principal and the agent is theirs alone and should not affect third persons.

16

GEMASCO v. NHA and GMAWD

G.R. No. 175417 and 198923, February 9, 2015,
Third Division, Peralta, J.
[Topic: Properties of Public Dominion not subject to attachment or execution; Property]

A labor case for illegal dismissal was filed against GEMASCO. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled
that the complainants have been illegally dismissed. The ruling became final and the LA issued a
Writ of Execution. Some of the properties attached to be sold at a public auction include three
water tanks, devoted for public use, which was once operated, maintained and managed by
GEMASCO. Is the attachment valid?
No. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution
or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy.

De Guzman, et. al. vs. Filinvest Development Corporation

G.R. No. 191710. January 14, 2015.
Second Division, Del Castillo, J.
[Topic: property, easement, right of way]

This case involves the extent of the easement of right of way granted to petitioners and
the amount of the indemnity for the same. The right of way traverses the already-constructed
subdivision roads owned by respondent Filinvest.

Petitioners insisted that the right of way

pertains only to the road (Road Lot 15) where the fence separating their property from
respondents subdivision is located. Petitioners are only willing to pay the stretch pertaining to
such road, notwithstanding the fact that it already admitted during the proceedings that that the
right of way granted to them affects several road lots within respondents subdivision (i.e. Road
Lots 3, 10, 6, 4, 2 and 1, all the way to Marcos Highway). On the other hand, it was respondents
contention that the right of way covers the whole stretch from petitioners property all the way to
its subdivisions gate leading to Marcos Highway.
The right of way granted to petitioners covers the network of roads within
respondents subdivision and not merely Road Lot 15. Logically speaking, if petitioners
would indemnify respondent only for Road Lot 15, it follows then that said particular road lot
should be the only road lot for which they shall be allowed access. They cannot be allowed access
to the other road lots leading to and from the highway as they are not willing to pay indemnity for
it. In such a case, the purpose of the right of way, that is, for petitioners to have access to the
highway, would thus be defeated.

17

On the amount of indemnity: Art. 649 of the Civil Code categorically provides for the
measure by which the proper indemnity may be computed: value of the land occupied plus the
amount of the damage caused to the servient estate. Nonetheless, it is the needs of the dominant
estate which ultimately determines the width of the passage, as provided on Article 651 of the
Civil Code.
According to their complaint, petitioners were simply asking for adequate vehicular and
other similar access to the highway. The 10-meter width of the already constructed affected road
lots (which was the basis for the computation of the indemnity by the Court of Appeals) is
unnecessary and inordinate for the intended use of the easement. At most, a 3-meter wide right
of way can already sufficiently meet petitioners need for vehicular access.
Apart from the costs for the removal of the fence in Road Lot 15, petitioners must also
pay the monthly homeowners association dues in respondents subdivision, in an
amount equivalent to half of the rate of the monthly dues that the subdivision residents are being
assessed. This is because the road lots affected would be used by the dominant estate in common
with the subdivision residents.
Dona Adela Export International, Inc. v. TIDCORP and BPI
G.R. No. 201931, February 11, 2015
Third Division, Villarama, Jr.
[Topic: Relativity of Contracts]

Respondents stipulated in their Joint Motion to Approve Agreement that petitioner shall
waive its rights to confidentiality under the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration and claimed that respondents agreement imposes on it several
obligations but it is not a party and signatory to the said agreement. Is the petitioner bound by
it?
No. the agreement was executed by respondents only. There was no written consent
given by petitioner or its representative waiving the confidentiality of its bank deposits. The
waiver of the confidentiality of petitioners bank deposits was merely inserted. Therefore,
petitioner is not bound by it since it was without the express consent of petitioner who was not a
party and signatory to the said agreement.

Reyes v. Sps. Francisco Valentin and Anatalia Ramos

G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015
Second Division, Leonen, J.

18

[TOPIC: Easement of Right of Way; Property]

Reyes is owner of a property, which she claims to be isolated, and asks for a compulsory
easement of right of way on the respondents property it being closer to the public road and more
convenient to traverse as compared to that of another outlet to another public road but with an
irrigation canal in between her property and the public road. May she be granted an easement of
right of way?
No. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis
of setting up a compulsory easement. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must
prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation.

Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, et al.

G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015
Second Division; Mendoza, J.
[Topic: Psychological Incapacity; Family Code]
Robert alleged that his wife Luz was suffering from psychological and mental incapacity
and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and
responsibilities. He also avers that the Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that Luz exhibited
grave lack of discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations mutually
given and accepted in marriage. The said decision was affirmed by the NAMT. Was Psychological
Incapacity proven in this case?
NO. The basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT is not the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second
paragraph which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted.
Therefore the decision of the Tribunal should not be given weight.

R Transport Corporation v. Yu

19

G.R. No. 174161, February 18, 2015

Third Division, Peralta, J.
[Topic: Quasi-Delict; Doctrine of Vicarious Liability; Solidary Liability]
In a case of culpa aquiliana, can the employer be held liable for the established negligence of
his employee even if: 1.) It was not established that the employer was negligent, and 2.) that the
employer was not the registered owner of the bus that hit the victim?
1.) Yes. Employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks. Once negligence on the part of the employee is established,
a presumption instantly arises that the employer was remiss in the selection and/or
supervision of the negligent employee.

Failure to show proof that it exercised due

diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee
makes the employer liable.
2.) Yes.

It is for the better protection of the public for both the owner of record and the

actual operator to be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the driver.

Sps. Guevarra vs The Commoner Lending Corporation

G.R. No. 204672, February 18, 2015
First Division, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
[Topic: Foreclosure, Repurchase Price in Banking Institutions]
Defendants contend that the repurchase price should be only the purchase price at the
auction sale plus interest of 1% per month and other assessment fees only. The Bank opposed
and maintained that it is entitled to its total claims under the promissory note and the mortgage
contract, including a penalty charge of 3% which is not stipulated in the mortgage contract. Who
is correct?
The Bank is partly correct. As a lending institution it is governed by the General Banking
Law which provides that the repurchase price includes not only the principal and interest but also
all the expenses of foreclosure. However, an action to foreclose is limited to the amount

20

mentioned in the mortgage. Since the penalty charges were not stipulated in the mortgage, the
banks claim as to them has no basis.

Yulim International Company Ltd., James Yu, Jonathan Yu, and Almerick Teng Lim
v. International Exchange Bank (now Union Bank of the Philippines)
G.R. No. 203133, February 18, 2015
Third Division, Reyes, J.
[Topic: Suretyship; Credit Transactions]

iBank granted a P5M loan to Yulim that is secured by a Chattel Mortgage. As further
guarantee, the petitioners, namely, James, Jonathan and Almerick, executed a Continuing Surety
Agreement in favor of iBank wherein they "jointly and severally with the principal, hereby
unconditionally and irrevocably guarantee full and complete payment when due, whether at
stated maturity, by acceleration, or otherwise, of any and all credit accommodations that have
been granted to Yulim by iBank. Did the petitioners enter into a contract of guaranty or a
contract of suretyship?
They entered into a contract of suretyship. If a person binds himself solidarily with the
principal debtor, he executes a contract of suretyship. Moreover, it is well settled that when the
obligor or obligors undertake to be "jointly and severally" liable, it means that the obligation is
solidary, as in this case.

New World Developers and Management Corp. v. AMA Computer Learning Center
G.R. No. 188250; G.R. No. 187930, 23 February 2015
First Divison, Sereno, C.J.
[Topic: Pre-termination; Breach of Contract; Lease]

AMA leased the entire second floor of the building owned by New World. It was provided
in their lease agreement that AMA may preterminate the contract by sending notice in
writing at least 6 months before the intended date, otherwise AMA shall also be liable
for liquidated damages in case of pretermination. One evening, AMA removed all its office
equipment and furniture from the leased premises. The following day, New World received a letter
from AMA stating that the latter decided to preterminate the contract on the ground of business
losses. Is AMA liable to pay 6 months worth of rent as liquidated damages?

21

YES. Pretermination is effectively the breach of a contract, that was originally intended to
cover an agreed upon period of time. The drastic decrease in AMAs enrollment has been
unfolding since 2002. Thus, it cannot be said that the business losses had taken it by surprise.
AMA forced New world to share in the formers loses causing the latter to scramble for new
lessees while the premises remained untenanted and unproductive.

DOH v. Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Inc.

G.R. No. 202943. March 25, 2015.
First Division, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
[Topic: Tobacco Sales Promotion Activities]

Did the DOH commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent Philip Morris
Philippines Manufacturing, Inc.s (PMPMI) permit applications for its tobacco sales promotions?
Yes. RA 9211 is a special legislation which exclusively deals with the subject of tobacco
products and related activities. On the other hand, RA 7394 is broader and more general in
scope, and treats of the general welfare and interests of consumers vis--vis proper conduct for
business and industry. As such, lex specialis derogate generali. As it stands now, it is the IACTobacco and not the DOH which has the primary jurisdiction to regulate sales promotion
activities. As it stands, the present applications filed by PMPMI are thus remanded to the IACTobacco for its appropriate action.

Sps. Norberte v. Mejia, et al.

G.R. No. 182886, March 09, 2015
Third Division, Peralta, J.
[TOPIC: Sales; Unlawful Detainer]

Spouses Norberte filed a case of unlawful detainer in 2003 with the MeTC against the
Spouses Mejia. The MeTC dismissed the case conteding that it had no jurisdiction since the action
for unlawful detainer was no longer available. The 1-year period within which the action should
have been filed commenced from the execution of the Deed of Conditional Sale by the owners of
the lot, in their favor in 1988. Is the court correct?

22

Yes. Although the sale was denominated as conditional, the deed of sale is absolute in
nature in the absence of any stipulation reserving title to the seller until full payment of the
purchase price. Thus the Norbertes were deemed to have been unlawfully deprived of the lawful
possesison of the property by the Mejias in 1988. They filed their complaint only in 2003, way
beyond the one-year period within which the action should be commenced.

Swire Realty Development Corporation v. Yu

G.R. No. 207133 March 9, 2015
Third Division, Peralta, J.
[Topic: Delay; Breach of Contract; Rescission of Contract; Obligations and Contracts]

Yu entered into a contract to sell of a condominium resident unit with Swire Realty. Yu
fully paid the purchase price but petitioner failed to complete and deliver the subject unit on time.
This prompted respondent to file a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Will rescission prosper?
Yes. Article 1191 of the Civil Code sanctions the right to rescind the obligation in the
event that specific performance becomes impossible. Incontrovertibly, petitioner had incurred
delay in the performance of its obligation amounting to breach of contract as it failed to finish and
deliver the unit to respondent within the stipulated period. The delay in the completion of the
project as well as the delay in the delivery of the unit are breaches of statutory and
contractual obligations which entitle respondent to rescind the contract, demand a refund and
payment of damages.

Aquino, et. al. v Quiazon, et al.

G.R. No. 201248, 11 March 2015
Second Division, Mendoza, J.
[Topic: Quieting of Title]

A complaint for annulment and quieting of title was filed by Aquino, et. Al. alleging that
they are the heirs of Makam and Bautista who acquired a house and lot by virtue of a Deed of
Sale and since then, they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
adverse and notorious possession for more than a hundred years, constructing houses and paying
real estate taxes on the property. The history behind the complaint is that they received demand

23

letters from Quiazons to vacate and the Register of Deeds confirmed that the property had been
titled in the name of the Quiazons.

The lower courts held a preliminary hearing to determine

whether there is a cause of action or none, which is one of the grounds in a motion to dismiss.
Did Aquinos complaint state sufficient cause of action?
Yes. In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.
Here, it is readily apparent from the complaint that petitioners alleged that (1) they had
an interest over the subject property by virtue of a Deed of Sale; and that (2) the title of
respondents under TCT No. 213777-R was invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable.

BPI v. Guevarra
G.R. No. 167052, March 11, 2015
First Division, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
[TOPIC: Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Laws]

A domestic corporation instituted an action to collect a sum against a foreign corporation in a

foreign country. Unfortunately, the foreign court considered such action as frivolous and as a
consequence, the court imposed a pecuniary sanction against the plaintiff.
I.

To prevent the recognition and enforcement, the domestic corporation attempts to

convince the Court that it is necessary to look into the merits . Is the domestic
corporation correct?

II.

He further claims that he was deprived of his right to refute the enforcement of a
foreign judgment because the court rendered a decision by merely copying
verbatim the allegations of the other party in its Memorandum before the said court.
Is the he deprived of his right to refute the foreign judgment?

ANSWERS:
I.

No. Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on
grounds external to its merits, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,

24

collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. To ask a Philippine court to pass
upon the admissibility or weight of evidence is violative of our public policy not to
substitute our judgment for that of a competent court of another jurisdiction.

II.

No. the judge may adopt and incorporate in his adjudication the memorandum or the
parts of it he deems suitable, and yet not be guilty of the accusation of lifting or
copying from the memorandum. The frequency of similarities in argumentation,
phraseology, expression, and citation of authorities between the decisions of the
courts and the memoranda of the parties, which may be great or small, can be fairly
attributable to the adherence by our courts of law and the legal profession to
widely known or universally accepted precedents set in earlier judicial actions
with identical factual milieus or posing related judicial dilemmas.

Casumpang, et al. vs. Cortejo

G.R. No. 171127, March 11, 2015
Second Division, Brion, J.
[Topic: Medical Malpractice; Doctrine of Ostensible Authority; Torts and Damages]

The parents brought their son to the Hospital because of difficulty in breathing, chest
pain, stomach pain, and fever. Using only a stethoscope and no laboratory examination
conducted, the doctor diagnosed the patient with Bronchopneumonia.
Queries:
I.

For determining the existence of medical malpractice, is the patient-doctor

II.

relationship is present?
Can the hospital be held liable even in the absence of employee-employer
relationship? If the doctor can be held liable, what could be the basis?

Answers:
I.

Yes. Physician-patient relationship is created when a patient engages the services of a

physician, and the latter accepts to provide care. The establishment of this
relationship is consensual and the acceptance by the physician essential.

It

may be implied from the physicians affirmative action to diagnose and/or treat a
patient, or in his participation in such diagnosis and/or treatment.

25

II.

Yes. Although as a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent
contractors, it may be found liable if the physician or independent contractor acts as
an ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the doctrine of
apparent authority.
In sum, a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician
(or an independent contractor) providing care at the hospital if the plaintiff can prove
these two factors: first, the hospitals manifestations; and second, the patients
reliance.

Sinamban v. China Banking Corporation

G.R. No. 193890, March 11, 2015
Third Division, Reyes, J.
[TOPIC: Solidary Liability of Co-maker; Promissory Note; Credit Transactions]

Spouses Manalastas secured a loan from Chinabank and executed a real estate mortgage
over two of their properties in favor of Chinabank. They executed several promissory notes in
favor of Chinabank. In two of the PNs, Spouses Sinamban signed as co-makers. Chinabank filed a
complaint for sum of money against the two spouses when they reneged on their obligation to
pay. May a Co-maker be asked to pay solidarily with the principal debtors?
Yes. A co-maker of a PN who binds himself with the maker "jointly and
severally" renders himself directly and primarily liable with the maker of the debt,
without reference to his solvency. The spouses Sinamban expressly bound themselves to be
solidarily, liable with the principal makers of the PNs, spouses Manalastas. Article 1216 of the Civil
Code provides that "[t]he creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some
or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to
those which may subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been
fully collected."

SM LAND, INC. v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority, et al.

G.R. No. 203655, March 18, 2015,
Special Third Division, Velasco, Jr., J.
[Topic: Perfection of Contracts; Contracts]

26

SMLI submitted to the BCDA unsolicited proposals for the development of the latters
Bonifacio Southroad Property through a public-private joint venture agreement. BCDA, through
Joint Venture Selection Committee it created after following NEDA JV Guidelines, issued a
Certification of Successful Negotiations pursuant to which it subjected SMLIs proposal to a
competitive challenge in order to determine whether or not there are other Private Sector Entities
that can match its proposal. For some reasons, BCDA terminated the Competitive Challenge
altogether and likewise caused the publication of an "Invitation to Bid" for the development of the
subject property. Do BCDA and SMLI have a contract that would bestow upon the latter the right
to demand that its unsolicited proposal be subjected to a competitive challenge?
Yes. In the case at bar, there is, between BCDA and SMLI, a perfected contract, reduced
into writing through the Certification of Successful Negotiations. BCDA not only accepted SMLIs
Unsolicited Proposal and declared SMLI eligible to enter into the proposed JV activity but also
agreed to subject SMLIs Original Proposal to Competitive Challenge. The elements of a valid
contract being present, there thus exists between SMLI and BCDA a perfected contract, embodied
in the Certification of Successful Negotiations, upon which certain rights and obligations spring
forth, including the commencement of activities for the solicitation for comparative proposals.

Banguis-Tambuyat v. Balcom-Tambuyat
G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015
Second Division, Del Castillo, J.:
[TOPIC: Amendment and Correction in Certificates of Title; Land Titles and Deeds]

Adriano and respondent Wenifreda were married on September 16, 1965. Adriano
acquired a parcel of land on 1991. The deed of sale over the said property was signed by Adriano
alone as vendee; one of the signing witnesses to the deed of sale was petitioner Rosario Banguis
who signed therein as Rosario Banguis. When the TCT covering the subject property was issued,
however, it was made under the name of ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E.
BANGUIS. After Adriano died, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of the TCT, which was
assigned to the RTC of Malolos, to correct the error. In her Opposition, Banguis claimed among
others that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation, which is merely a
summary proceeding considering that a thorough determination will have to be made to resolve
her claims of ownership. Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the case?
Yes.

The RTC has jurisdiction. Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the

erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances,

one of which is when (3) any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate

27

or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate and (7) when there is
reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.

In the present case, the only

issue that needed to be resolved is who should be included in the title to the subject property
as Adrianos spouse, Banguis or Wenifreda? Was there error in placing Banguiss name in the title
as Adrianos spouse? All that is required in resolving this issue is to determine who between them
is Adrianos spouse; it was unnecessary for Banguis to prove that she is the actual owner of the
property. Title to the property is different from the certificate of title to it. Evidence of
Banguiss ownership is irrelevant in Wenifredas petition.

BPI v. Domingo (deceased),

substituted by his children, Joann Moya, et al.
G.R. No. 169407, March 25, 2015
First Division, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
[Topic: Novation - Personal; Obligations]

BPI (which acquired FEBTC) has been assigned and ceded with all the rights on a
Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage executed by the Domingo spouses over a car they have
just bought. The Spouses defaulted in their installment.

As the vehicle was already sold to

Carmelita, BPI filed a Complaint for Replevin. Carmelita expressed that she was also willing to
assume the mortgage. Was there a novation of the loan obligation with chattel mortgage of the
spouses Domingo to BPI so that the spouses Domingo were released from said obligation and
Carmelita was substituted as debtor?
No. Novation consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one, may be
made even without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, but not without the consent of
the creditor. The creditors consent to the novation is indispensable. That BPI (or FEBTC)
had a copy of the Deed of Sale and Assumption of Mortgage executed between Mercy and
Carmelita in its file does not mean that it had consented to the same. No new promissory note or
chattel mortgage had been executed between BPI (or FEBTC) and Carmelita. Even the account
itself is still in the names of the spouses Domingo. The absence of objection on the part of BPI (or
FEBTC) cannot be presumed as consent.

CLT Realty Development Corp. v. Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corp, et al.
G.R. No. 160728, March 11, 2015
First Division, Leonardo-De Castro, J.

28

[TOPIC: Quieting of Title]

A corporation owned a land as evidenced by a land title and another corporation claimed
ownership over the same land. What is the remedy of the former?
QUIETING OF TITLE per Article 476, NCC.

Action for quieting of title requires that: (1)

the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.

Republic of the Philippines v. Lualhati

G.R. No. 183511, March 25, 2015
Third Division, Peralta, J.
[TOPIC: Proof of Land Classification; Land Titles and Deeds]

To support her contention that the lands subject of her application is alienable and
disposable, respondent submitted certifications from the DENR-CENRO, Region IV, Antipolo City,
stating that no public land application or land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are
the lots embraced by any administrative title. Will the respondents application prosper?
No. Respondents reliance on the CENRO certifications is misplaced. The certifications
are not sufficient. Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within
the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The CENRO is not
the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary
declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an
official publication of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable. Thus, as it now stands, an application for original registration must be accompanied
by:
(1) CENRO or PENRO certification; and
(2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records, in order to establish
that the land is indeed alienable and disposable.

29