ARAES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M.

OCIANO

FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law,
via a sworn letter-complaint, for solemnizing the marriage between petitioner and her
late groom Ret. Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
license, among others.
Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioners right, upon Orobias death, to inherit the vast
properties left by Orobia was not recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of
receiving the pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against
respondent for his illegal acts and unethical misinterpretations, which caused her so
much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the Office of
the Chief Justice to the Court Administrator, which required the respondent to comment
on the complaint.
Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the ceremony, he examined the
documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not
possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery
of the provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of
human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the
marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the
license to him, but they never did. He attributed the hardships and embarrassment
petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and negligence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license
and outside his territorial jurisdiction.

RULING:
Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme Court held that a marriage, which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of
such license cannot render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in
cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when
he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

NAVARRO vs. DOMAGTOY

FACTS:

Navarro is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He has submitted evidence
in relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, respondent
judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the
knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Domagtoy claimed
that he merely relied on an affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadans
wife has been absent for seven years. The said affidavit was alleged to have been
sworn to before another judge. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage
ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his
courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy counters that he solemnized the
marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.

HELD:

Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the law.
Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to his former
wife. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to
have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of
the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue,
the request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdiction was only done by one
party, the bride not by both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle
underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one
of the formal requisites of marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of
the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers
only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of
the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
will not invalidate the marriage.

COSCA, et al. vs. HON. LUCIO PALAYPAYON JR.

FACTS:
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo and Apollo
Villamora. Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy. All work in MTCTinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of marriage
license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido; Eddie
Terrobias and Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario;
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples
did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts
and did not indicate the date of the solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the
marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage
ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano and Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code
thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to
complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil
registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized
the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was
then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because
Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It
was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The
alleged marriage of Selpo and Carrido, Terrobias and Gacer, Gamay and Belga, Sabater and Nacario
were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and
that the marriage of Bocaya and Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the
guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD:
Bocaya and Bismontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other
couples. The testimonies of Bocaya and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it
was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by
judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They
already started living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the
photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one.
However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of
the marriage certificates In front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano and
Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with
considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as
husband and wife for almost six years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that
Abellano was only 18 years, 2 months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6
years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less
than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have
been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have
executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was
celebrated without the knowledge of Castros parents. The marriage contract states that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24,
1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife.
Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant that the couple
decided to live together. Their cohabitation only lasted for four months and then the couple
parted ways. The baby was adopted by Castros brother, with the consent of Cardenas. It was
then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration
of their marriage as confirmed by a certification from the Civil Registrar of Pasay, Metro Manila.
Her husband was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition but he
chose to ignore it, thus, he was properly in default. The trial court denied her petition on the
ground that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage
license prior to the celebration of the marriage of the contracting parties. The appellate court
reversed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines now assailed the
decision of the appellate court and posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due
search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was
issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to
the celebration of the marriage or private respondent to Edwin Cardenas?
HELD:
The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a secret marriage, ordinarily used to
refer a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and or friends of the
contracting parties. At the time the marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law
governing marital relations was the New Civil Code which provides that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the
essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab
initio.
The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due search and inability
to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the
contracting parties. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was
collusion between the private respondent and her husband Cardenas. It is noteworthy to
mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties
is null and void for lack of marriage license does not discount that fact indeed, a spurious
marriage license, purporting to be issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, may have been
presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
This court holds that under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license. The petition is denied there being no showing of any reversible error
committed by respondent-appellate court.

MORIGO vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbiliran City, for a period of four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost
contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia
Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the
Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married.
Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant
which was granted by the court. Appellant Lucio Morigo married Jececha Lumbago at Tagbiliran
City.
Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with
bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbiliran City, with the Regional Trial Court
of Bohol.
Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good faith.

RULING:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as void.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their
own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without mere cannot
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for
bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstances in favor of the presumption of
innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case,
Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on the
issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
academic.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBIOS

FACTS:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before
Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City, as as
evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004- 1588. On December 6,
2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after marriage their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had intention of entering into
a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She
described their marriage as one made in jest, and, therefore, null and void ab initio. She
stated that in consideration of $2,000.00, Fringer will help her process her application
for American citizenship.
The RTC ruled that their marriage is one entered into in jest and therefore void. On
appeal by the OSG, the CA affirmed the trial courts decision.

ISSUE:
Whether a marriage contracted into by two individuals for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack
of consent.

HELD:
The marriage is valid. Under said Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be void, it
must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A freely
given consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into
the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Article 45 and 46 of the Family Code,
such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious
or intelligent, in that parties capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and
both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there
was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the
nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such
plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

ABBAS vs. ABBAS

FACTS:

It has been established from the case that petitioner Abbas filed before the RTC of
Pasay for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Abbas. A purported
marriage contract between Syed and Gloria stated that Marriage License no. 9969967,
issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993. In order to support his claim that there
was no valid marriage license obtained, Syed secured a certification from the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to which the latter attested that the said marriage
license was issued to a certain Arlindo Getaldo and Myra Mabilangan. Several
witnesses testified that there had been indeed a marriage ceremony held in the
respondents house who among others were the mother of respondent, the solemnizing
officer, and Atty. Sanchez.
The RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license. The CA reversed the trial court holding that based on the facts where
several people testified that a wedding ceremony actually took place and the signing of
the contracting parties of the marriage contract are proofs that a there was marriage
between petitioner and respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a valid marriage license exist thereby proving the validity of the marriage
of petitioner and respondent.

HELD:

Negative. All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
concluded and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of
a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides
that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the
same code.
Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus,
having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.

ENGRACE NIAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG

FACTS:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the second marriage is covered by the exception to the requirement
of a marriage license?
b) Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their
fathers marriage void after his death?
RULING:
The second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said
that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the
law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by
law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such
void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article
51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing

voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before
its annulment is legitimate.

GERONIMO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioner contends that the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and oppositor
Antonio A. Esman was null and void since there was no marriage license issued to the
parties at the time the marriage was celebrated. In fact, petitioner contends that a
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Pateros shows that the marriage
license number was not stated in the marriage contract and that the marriage contract
itself does now show the number of the marriage license issued. Moreover, marriage
license number 5038770 which was issued to the deceased and the oppositor by the
Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal was not really issued to Pateros before the marriage
was celebrated but to Pasig in October 1959. On the other hand, oppositor contends
that the arguments raised by petitioner are mere concoctions; that a close scrutiny of
the aforementioned documents would show that except for the phrases "not stated" and
"not recorded" the two certified copies of the marriage contract issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pateros, Rizal (now Metro Manila) and the Parish Church of San Roque
were the same as the certified copy of the marriage contract which was attached to the
original petition which named the oppositor as the husband of the deceased; that
petitioner simply asked that these phrases be incorporated to suit his ulterior motive;
that even the omission of the marriage license number on the Registry of Marriages in
the Local Civil Registrar is not fatal in itself and is not conclusive proof that no marriage
license was actually signed on January 7, 1955 to Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A.
Esman; and that the marriage license form issued to the Municipality of Pateros are
printed by the Bureau of Printing with serialized numbers and distributed to various
provinces or municipalities thru proper requisitions which serial numbers even if already
used in the printing of the marriage license forms in the past years are used again in the
printing of the same forms in the succeeding years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage was valid?

RULING:
It may be conceded that the evidences presented of the petitioner-appellant do not bear
the number of the marriage license relative to the marriage of Graciana Geronimo and
the herein oppositor-appellee. But at best, such non-indication of the number could only
serve to prove that the number was not recorded. It could not be accepted as
convincing proof of non-issuance of the required marriage license. On the other hand,
the marriage license number does appear in the certified archives copy of the marriage
contract. The non-indication of the license number in the certified copies presented by
the petitioner-appellant could not be deemed as fatal vis-a-vis the issue of the validity of
the marriage in question because there is nothing in the law which 6 Article 1-73 of the

Family Code of the Philippine Remulla, Jammy Kate S. June 23, 2009 Case Digests
requires that the marriage license number would be indicated in the marriage contract
itself. In Conclusion there was a valid marriage license issued, error in the recording of
the serial number of the license does not tantamount to an invalid marriage.
BUNAGAN-BANSIG vs. CELERA

FACTS:

Bansig, sister of Bunagan narrated that, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan,

entered into a contract of marriage. However, notwithstanding respondents marriage
with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz
Torres Alba, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage Bansig
stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full
legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first
marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his
marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a
member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation
of justice.

RULING:

For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these marriage certificates bearing the
name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed
bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is

subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO vs. AVENIDO

FACTS:
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to
the same man, now deceased. Tecla Hoybia Avenido instituted on 11 November 1998, a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido on
the ground that Tecla is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido. Tecla alleged that
her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites
officiated by the parish priest of the said town. While the marriage certificate was recorded with
the local civil registrar, the records of the LCR were destroyed during World War II. Tecla and
Eustaquio begot four children, but Eustaquio left his family in 1954. In 1979, Tecla learned that
Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims
must be declared null and void for being bigamous. In support of her claim, Tecla presented
eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the birth certificate of their children and certificates to the fact
that the marriage certificate/records were destroyed. Peregrina, on the other hand averred that
she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989, their marriage
having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 and showed the marriage contract between her and
Eustaquio. RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Teclas failure to present her certificate of
marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, RTC considered as useless the certification of
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon over the lack of records. The CA, on appeal, ruled in
favor of Tecla. It held there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio
as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four children. Such presumption,
supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the
RTC, and testimonial evidence created sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. The CA found
that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife of Eustaquio?

RULING:
TECLA. While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. It is
an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without the marriage certificate, no other proof can
be accepted. The execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by
those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. In this case, due
execution was established by the eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla herself as a party to the
event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of the officiating priest. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidencetestimonial and documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of

marriage. The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage. Every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law.

RONULO vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the
Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the
church's officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a
marriage license. With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they
headed to an Aglipayan Church. The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo,
conducted a ceremony on the same day where the couple took each other as husband
and wife in front of the guests. This was despite Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's
lack of marriage license. Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the
RPC for performing an illegal marriage ceremony. The MTC did not believe Petitioner's
defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was not tantamount to
solemnization of marriage and was found guilty. The decision was affirmed by both the
RTC and the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

RULING:
Yes. Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:
authority of the solemnizing officer; and his performance of an illegal marriage
ceremony.
The first element is present since petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to
solemnize a marriage. The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by
petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. There is no
prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the
Family Code provides that it shall be necessary: for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer; and declare in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. The first
requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is
likewise present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved
that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband
and wife. The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the
provision of the Marriage Law, specifically Article 44, which states that: Section 44.
General Penal Clause Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be

punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more
than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
As such, petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as
penalty.

LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA

FACTS:
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot seven
children, including Gregorio. After two decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and his wife agreed to live
separately as husband and wife, and executed an Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their conjugal property. On January 2, 1076, Atty.
Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the Dominican Republic. On the same
day, he married Soledad. In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several other lawyers. The
new law office thru Atty. Luna obtained a condominium unit which they bought on an installment basis.
After full payment, the condominium title was registered in the names of the lawyers with proindivisio
shares. When the law office was dissolved, the condominium title was still registered in the names of the
owners, with Atty. Lunas share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna established a new law firm with Atty. Dela Cruz.
After Atty. Lunas death in 1997, his share in the condominium unit, his law books and furniture were
taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first marriage. His 25/100 share in the condominium was also
rented out to Atty. Dela Cruz. Soledad, the second wife, then filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty.
Luna. According to him, the properties were acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage, and
because they had no children, 3/4 of the property became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and
the other half bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of Atty. Luna.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void.
2. Whether or not the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement is valid.
3. Whether or not property relations between Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad is governed by coownership.
DECISION:
1. Yes. From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The nonrecognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if
either or both of the spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions
under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of
the marriage.
2. No. Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time
of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered
into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so
provides, to wit: Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.

3. Yes. Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad was bigamous, and void from the very beginning, hence, their
property relations is governed by the rules on co-ownership: In the Philippines, marriages that are
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly states: Article 71. All
marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law. Bigamy is an illegal marriage
committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings. A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio. Due to the second
marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the
properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership,
conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code.

NOVERAS vs. NOVERAS

FACTS:
David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. They
have 2 children, Jerome and Jena. Leticia states that sometime in 2003, David abandoned his family to
live with his mistress. Further, she states that David executed an affidavit where he renounced all his
rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties in the Philippines. After learning of the extra-marital
affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce before the Superior Court of California. Upon issuance of the
judicial decree of divorce in June 2005, the US properties were awarded to Leticia. Leticia then filed a
petition for judicial separation of conjugal property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. The RTC regarded
the petition for judicial separation of conjugal property as a petition for liquidation of property since the
spouses marriage has already been dissolved. It classified their property relation as absolute community
because they did not execute a marriage settlement before their marriage ceremony. Then, the trial court
ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply
because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of
their national law. The court awarded the properties in the Philippines to David, subject to the payment of
the childrens legitimes. Upon Leticias appeal to the CA, the CA ruled that the Philippine properties be
divided equally between the spouses and that both should pay their children P520k. David argues that the
Court should have recognized the California judgment that awarded him the Philippine properties and that
allowing Leticia to share in the PH properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment considering she already
owns all the US properties.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved.
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper.

HELD:
1. No. the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage between
the parties. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or
tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody thereof. Such publication must be authenticated by a seal of a consular official. Section
25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state that the copy is a correct copy of the original. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer. Based on the records, only the divorce decree was
presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California
law on divorce were not presented. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the
parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation.

2. Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that: Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered
sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have
been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. Separation in fact for
one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial courts decision
because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of
properties. The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed
separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual
abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since
2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard
from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as
Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified
that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. Third and
more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

SANTOS vs. SANTOS

FACTS:

Upon prior petition by Ricardo that his wife, Celerina, be declared presumptively dead,
the RTC of Tarlac City granted it on July 27, 2007. According to Ricardo, he and his wife
were married in 1980; they first lived in San Juan, but after a year moved to Tarlac City.
Due to business reverses, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as domestic
worker in Hongkong, She applied in an employment agency, and left in February 1995,
never to be hard again. He exerted efforts to locate Celerina, but the same proved futile;
he inquired from his relatives but no one gave him any information; 12 years had since
passed between the time she left abroad and the filing of the petition. On November 17,
2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of the RTC decision declaring her
presumptively dead with the Court of Appeals.
According to her, she learned about Ricardos petition only in October, 2008, and she
could no longer avail of appeals, motion for reconsideration or new trial. She was
deprived of her day in court when Ricardo alleged she was a resident of Tarlac City,
when her true residence was in Quezon City, their conjugal home; Ricardo left the
conjugal home in May, 2008. She also never left abroad as a domestic worker. The
court also did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition since it was never published in a
newspaper of general publication; the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial
Prosecutor s Office was also not notified on the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment
declaring presumptive death.

DECISION:

Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment,
order, or resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic
fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper
remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. FLORES

FACTS:
This administrative case originated from an investigation conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) pursuant to two anonymous letters alleging certain irregularities being committed by
Judge Flores. The first letter dated April 28, 2011 was received on May 10, 2011 by the OCA and sent by
a certain "John Hancock"1 while the other was received on June 15, 2011 and sent by "Concerned
Citizens." Both letters accused Judge Flores of rendering favorable judgments in exchange for monetary
consideration; of taking cognizance of, and deciding cases on annulment of marriage even if said cases
were beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the courts he presided; and, that every time an audit team of the
OCA visits Iligan, Lanao del Norte and Marawi City, Judge Flores would meet them at the airport, act as
their driver, entertain them and even give presents for their return to Manila. In addition, "John Hancock"
alleged that Judge Flores demands P5,000.00 for special proceedings and notarial commissions; that he
maintains the services of four non-court personnel who regularly reported to him and acted as his errand
boys, bag-men, personal security and drinking buddies; and if Judge Flores is not with his mistress in
Cagayan de Oro City or Ozamis City, he is having drinking sprees from 3 p.m. until 7 or 8 p.m. with his
errand boys at "Randy's Place" in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. Judge Flores also allegedly claims to be
protected by one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court (SC) who is a former Free Legal
Assistance Group lawyer, and by a "Lawyer-Administrator" who is assigned in Lanao del Norte. Acting on
these anonymous letters, the Court, in a Resolution dated June 7, 2011, approved OCA's request for an
audit team (OCA team) to conduct an investigation and inspection of the pending and decided cases in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tubod, Lanao del Norte, Branch 7, where Judge Flores is the presiding
judge, and RTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, where Judge Flores presided in an acting
capacity. The authority included an "on-the-spot" investigation/examination of any available document in
other government offices which may have direct connection with the charges.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Allan Flores is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law.

RULING:
Judge Alan Flores is held GUILTY of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law.
When a law or a rule is basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply the law. "Anything less is gross
ignorance of the law. No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to
the laws and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. A judge
must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge
displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the competence of

our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the
public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of
incompetence. Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judge's hands.101The utter disregard
shown by Judge Flores displays not only a lack of familiarity with the law but a gross ignorance thereof.
What's more, Judge Flores rendered judgments in several cases for nullity of marriage in record time,
which ranged from six (6) months to one (1) year and seven (7) months from the date of filing, despite his
claim of being burdened by heavy caseload. According to Justice Francisco, this breeds a suspicion that
Judge Flores has personal interest in some of the cases before him. Eventually, the suspicion took a
foothold in the testimonies of Atty. Saligan-Basalo, Dayak and Quijano, who all bared the reasons for
Judge Flores' unusual interest in the cases before him, thus making him liable, in turn, for Gross
Misconduct. "Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard
of behavior in connection with one's performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross
misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate
the law, or a persistent disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and
not a mere error of judgment." No less than the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to
conduct his office and personal demeanor with integrity, competence and diligence.

PEREZ vs. CATINDIG

FACTS:
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16,
1968. The marriage produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered
marital problems that they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney
addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic,
appointing an attorney-infact to institute a divorce action under its laws. On July 14,
1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced
one offspring. During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree
issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between
Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan
was deemed void under Philippine law. Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she
received an anonymous letter in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindigs scandalous
affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter written and
signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty.
Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his impediment
is removed. On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he
moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo
was frequently seen.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo should be disbarred.

HELD:
Only Atty. Catindig should be disbarred. The facts gathered from the evidence adduced
by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindigs own admission, indeed establish a
pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but

reprehensible to a high degree. From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the
divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic was not
recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time.
He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless
his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent
marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing
circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindigs sense of social propriety and moral values.
It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage. With regards to Atty.
Baydo, there is a dearth of evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between
her and Atty. Catindig. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove
her claim were mere allegations, an anonymous letter informing her that the
respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo
that was signed by Atty. Catindig. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross
immorality and of violating the Lawyers Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is DISBARRED from the practice of law.

GO-BANGAYAN vs. BANGAYAN JR.

FACTS:
Benjamin Bangayan was married to Azucena Alegre in 1973 to which they begot three children.
In 1979, Benjamin had illicit relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan. In 1981, Azucena went to the
United States. On December of 1982, Benjamin and Sally contracted marriage despite
knowledge of the latter that the former still has a valid and subsisting marriage. Since Sallys
father was opposed to the relationship so in order to appease him, she brought Benjamin to an
office in Santolan, Pasig City to sign a purported marriage contract. In this marriage, they begot
two children and acquired real properties which mostly contain the words married to Sally.
The relationship between Sally and Benjamin soon ended in 1994 when the former went to
Canada together with their children. Sally therein filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as
evidence. Benjamin on the other hand, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to
Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
The trial court ruled that indeed, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is void and nonexistent. It further held that absent any showing that the real properties acquired during the cohabitation were acquired through their joint efforts, then the same is considered to belong to
Benjamin. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower courts ruling except with regard to proper
identification of some of the properties alleged to belong to Benjamin alone.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a marriage that is declared void ab initio by a trial court is inconsistent with the ruling
declaring it as non-existent as well?
2. Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is bigamous within the ambit of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code considering the fact that it was declared void ab initio due
to an irregularity in one of the formal requisites of marriage, i.e. a valid marriage license.
HELD:
1. We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary,
"shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was

solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to
them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers
issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly
falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or
inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning." Thus, the Court of Appeals
did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was null and void ab initio and non-existent. 2. The marriage is not bigamous. It is required that
the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena
shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is
no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second
marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such
as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. The daring and repeated stand of
respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained.
Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be
bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of
petitioner and Azucena.

GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN

FACTS:
Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma. Lourdes Belen. When
Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the RTC of Las Pias City in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent
the dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers
estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children, filed an Opposition/Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not
of Las Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no
factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. In
validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the
conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.
2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.

HELD:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of
his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration

granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of
the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is
evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said
city.
2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed
to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her
filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedents
estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is
founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts
of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

FUJIKI vs. MARINAY

FACTS:
On January 23, 2004, Petitioner Fujiki, a Japanese national, married respondent Marinay in the
Philippines. However, the marriage did not go well with them because of petitioners parents,
Fujiki could not therefore bring Marinay to Japan where he resides. Eventually, the two lost
contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese national, Maekara and in the same year, they got
married in Quezon City. Marinay went with Maekara to Japan. However, Marinay suffered
physical abuse in the hands of Maekara and so she left him and started to contact Fujiki again.
Marinay and Fujiki were able to establish their relationship again and through Fujikis help,
Marinay was able to obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared her
marriage with Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. In 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC
of Quezon City to the recognition of the said foreign judgment obtained in Japan.
The RTC dismissed the petition based on the ground that according to AM No. 02-11-10-SC
(Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages) because according to said court, the
petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. In this case, Fujiki was not considered be
the husband being referred to in the law thus, he has no legal personality.

ISSUE:
Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy.

HELD:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve his most intimate human relation, but also to
protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.
These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouses right
in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III (Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife) of the Family Code. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
diminish, increase or modify the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
marriage. In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by
limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.