Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
2001)
revoked this designation and named his sister, Kate MacLeod, as sole
beneficiary. After he died in 1997, Royce and MacLeod submitted competing
claims for the death benefit. Dovey's pension fund, the Equity-League Pension
Trust Fund (the "Fund"), determined that Royce was the proper beneficiary
because she had never consented to the change in beneficiary. In prudence,
however, the Fund filed this interpleader action, seeking a declaration that its
award of benefits to Royce was proper. The district court granted summary
judgment to the Fund.
2
BACKGROUND
3
The material facts are undisputed. The Fund is a multiemployer, defined benefit
pension plan for actors. As an "employee pension benefit plan," it is governed
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), ERISA 3(2)
(A), 3(3), 4(a), 29 U.S.C. 1002(2)(A), 1002(3), 1003(a). The terms of the
Fund are documented in the Equity-League Pension Plan (the "Pension Plan").
At the time of his death on December 5, 1997, Dovey was a fully vested
participant in the Fund who had not yet retired. The Pension Plan provides that
a pre-retirement death benefit is payable either to the deceased's spouse or--if
certain conditions are met--to another beneficiary designated by the participant.
Shortly after Dovey's death, Royce and MacLeod both claimed the death
benefit. The Fund determined that Royce was entitled to the money as Dovey's
"surviving spouse" under the Pension Plan and the Retirement Equity Act
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Butler
v. New York State Dept. of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 2000). Summary
judgment is appropriate only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106
S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986).
The REA is a 1984 amendment to ERISA designed "to ensure that individuals
whose spouses die before their retirement would nevertheless receive the
spouses' pension benefits." Lefkowitz v. Arcadia Trading Co. Ltd. Benefit
Pension Plan, 996 F.2d 600, 601 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Boggs v. Boggs, 520
U.S. 833, 843, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1761 (1997) (noting that Congress intended "to
ensure a stream of income to surviving spouses"). As amended by the REA, 29
U.S.C. 1055 requires the Fund to provide, "in the case of a vested participant
who dies before the annuity starting date and who has a surviving spouse, a
qualified preretirement survivor annuity ["QPSA"] . . . to the surviving spouse
of such participant." 1 29 U.S.C. 1055(a)(2).
A participant may waive his spouse's QPSA if "the spouse consents in writing
to the designation of another beneficiary, which designation also cannot be
changed without further spousal consent, witnessed by a plan representative or
notary public." Boggs, 520 U.S. at 842, 117 S. Ct. at 1761 (citing 29 U.S.C.
1055(c)(2)); see also Hurwitz v. Sher, 982 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting
that a waiver must follow "the explicit requirements of the statute"). The
language of the Pension Plan tracks 1055 in granting the QPSA entitlement to
surviving spouses and in describing the conditions necessary for a valid spousal
consent to a waiver. The Fund periodically sent Dovey and other participants
the following alert: "If you want someone other than your spouse to receive
[the death benefit,] you and your spouse must both sign a statement rejecting"
it.
10
It is undisputed that (1) Royce was Dovey's "surviving spouse" at the time of
his death and (2) Royce never consented to the designation of another
beneficiary. The statute also provides, however, in 29 U.S.C. 1055(c)(2), that
a valid waiver can be effected without spousal consent in "certain limited
circumstances." Boggs, 520 U.S. at 842, 117 S. Ct. at 1761. MacLeod argues
that the marital separation of Dovey and Royce is one of those "limited
circumstances," thus validating Dovey's 1990 revocation of Royce's rights as
well as his designation of MacLeod as the proper beneficiary.
11
12
...
13
14
15
The Pension Plan, however, does not provide that a legal separation amounts to
a spousal waiver sufficient to allow a redesignation of beneficiary to become
effective. At all relevant times, the Pension Plan provided that consent was
unnecessary only "if the Participant establishe[d] to the satisfaction of the Plan
Administrator that such written consent cannot be obtained because there is no
Spouse or the Spouse cannot be located." (MacLeod does not dispute that
Royce was Dovey's spouse and that Royce could have been found; for the last
several years of Dovey's life, Royce lived in an apartment across the hall from
him.)
16
MacLeod argues that the Treasury regulation applies to her claim because the
Pension Plan must be read to incorporate the final clause of 1055(c)(2)(B)
(i.e., that consent is not required if it cannot be obtained "because of such other
circumstances as the Secretary of the Treasury may by regulations prescribe").
Our precedents afford some support for MacLeod's argument.
17
18
The Treasury regulation provides in relevant part that "if the participant is
legally separated or the participant has been abandoned (within the meaning of
local law) and the participant has a court order to such effect, spousal consent is
not required." 26 C.F.R. 1.401(a)-20, A-27 (emphasis added).2 It is
undisputed that no court order was entered with respect to Royce and Dovey's
separation agreement. MacLeod therefore must contend that the phrase "and
the participant has a court order to such effect" qualifies only the term
"abandoned" and does not qualify the term "legally separated."
19
We conclude on textual evidence that the phrase "and the participant has a
court order to such effect" modifies "separated" as well as "abandoned." The
term "abandoned" is undeniably qualified by a phrase that is limited to
abandonment, and that limited qualification is achieved by parentheses, i.e.,
"abandoned (within the meaning of local law)." (A similar qualification is made
for separation by the adverb in "legally separated.") If the phrase "and the
participant has a court order to such effect" were intended to modify only the
term "abandoned," the drafters would not have closed the parenthesis after the
qualification concerning abandonment, and the ending phrase would have been
"abandoned (within the meaning of local law, and the participant has a court
order to such effect)." The drafters' decision to close the parenthesis after "of
local law" signals that the remainder of the sentence modifies both the
separation exception and the abandonment exception.
20
21
In arguing that separation is a proxy for consent under the Treasury regulation
regardless of whether the separation was pursuant to a court order, MacLeod
cites our paraphrase of that regulation in Mendez v. Teachers Insurance and
Annuity Association and College Retirement Equities Fund, 982 F.2d 783 (2d
Cir. 1992): "under the relevant Treasury Regulation, a non-consensual waiver
of spousal benefits accruing under ERISA occurs only if: (1) the participant is
legally separated; or (2) the participant 'has been abandoned (within the
meaning of local law) and the participant has a court order to such effect.'" Id.
at 787-88 (quoting 26 C.F.R. 1.401(a)-20, A-27 (1991)) (alteration in
original); see also id. at 785-86. Insofar as this paraphrase incidentally concerns
marital separation, it is at most non-binding dictum.3 See, e.g., Ross v. Artuz,
150 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1998). The circumstance in Mendez was
abandonment, not separation, see id. at 785-88, and the paraphrase supported
the conclusion that "a showing of legal abandonment, coupled with a court
order to that effect, would have presented a colorable claim [to death benefits
by a person other than the spouse] in the instant case." Id. at 788 (emphasis
added).
***
22
23
CONCLUSION
24
NOTES:
1
Section 1055 applies to the Fund because the Fund is structured as a "defined
benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. 1055 (b)(1)(A) ("This section shall apply to [inter
alia] any defined benefit plan . . . .").
legally incompetent to give consent, the spouse's legal guardian, even if the
guardian is the participant, may give consent." 26 C.F.R. 1.401(a)-20, A-27.
We do not read the convenient paraphrase in Mendez as a gloss on the
regulatory meaning of words and terms that were not at issue in that case.