Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Facts:
I n t h i s p e t i t i o n f o r r e v i e w b y c e r t i o r a r i o f t h e judgment of
t h e C A d e c l a r i n g d e l F i e r r o a s t h e candidate-elect mayor of Paracale, Camarines
Norte with a majority vote over Moya. He contended that the CA committed errors in
admitting and counting in favor of del Fierro several ballots.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring de Fierro as elected mayor of
Paracale, Camarines Norte.
Held:
The SC dismissed the petition because in result even if the ballots contested are counted
in favor of Moya, del Fierro still wins by one vote. The SC avers that in republicanism, the
citizens have the voice in the government and whenever called upon to act in justifiable
cases to give it efficacy and not to stifle. This is the fundamental reason for the rule that
ballots should be read and appreciated if not with utmost, with reasonable liberality.
FACTS:
Badelles contested the election of CABILI as Mayor in the City of Iligan. On the other
hand, Legaspi and Barazon together with other five protestees were the registered candidates
voted for as councilors.
These protests lodged before the CFI were on grounds of flagrant violations of certain
mandatory provisions of the Election Code such as irregularities and misconduct. Wherein, more
than the allowed number of voters per precinct voted. However, evident that there was lack of
cause of action, the protests were dismissed.
ISSUE:
1
2
RULING:
1
Yes. CFI is the proper forum to seek annulment of an election based on terrorism,
frauds and other illegal practices. The duty to cure or remedy the resulting evil lies
with the proper courts and not with the COMELEC.
Protests before the CFI have causes of action. The cases were remanded to the lower
court to proceed with the trial to determine whether irregularities or serious violations
of the electoral law vitiated the conduct of elections.
Facts: After becoming president on January 2001, Gloria Arroyo nominated Senator Teofista
Guingona as vice-president. After confirmation as VP, Resolution 84 was passed by the
Senate calling the COMELEC to fill the vacancy with a special election tobe held
simultaneously with the 2001 May regular election. It also provided that the candidate
garnering the 13th highest vote will serve for the unexpired term of Guingona. Petitioners,
Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming the winner.
They contend that it is without jurisdiction because it failed to notify the electorate of the
position to be filled in (special election) due to this the people voted without distinction in
one election for 13 seats irrespective of term.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners have standing to maintain suit?
Decision: In questioning the validity of special election, petitioners assert harm classified as
generalized grievance. They failed to establish direct injury they suffered from the said
governmental act. However, the Court relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised
its discretion to give due course to voters suit involving the right of suffrage.
On 23 January 2007, Congress passed RA 9369 amending the first automated election law,
RA 8436.[2] Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, which amendment took effect
on 10 February 2007, authorized the COMELEC to:
Use an automated election system or systems in the same election in different provinces,
whether paper-based or a direct recording automated election system as it may deem
appropriate and practical for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidation and transmittal of results of electoral exercises: Provided, that for
the regular national and local election, which shall be held immediately after effectivity of
this Act, the AES shall be used in at least two highly urbanized cities and two provinces each
in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, to be chosen by the Commission x x x x In succeeding
regular national or local elections, the AES shall be implemented nationwide. (Emphasis
supplied)
The COMELEC did not use any automated election system in the 14 May 2007 elections, the
national and local elections held after RA 9369 took effect.
On 10 July 2009, the COMELEC, on the one hand, and TIM and Smartmatic (Provider), on
the other, signed the Contract for the automated tallying and recording of votes cast
nationwide in the 10 May 2010 elections. For P7,191,484,739.48, the COMELEC leased for
use in the 10 May 2010 elections 82,200 optical scanners (and related equipment) and hired
ancillary services of the Provider.
On 9 July 2009, petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens, filed this petition[4] to enjoin the
signing of the Contract or its implementation and to compel disclosure of the terms of the
Contract and other agreements between the Provider and its subcontractors.[5] Petitioners
sought the Contract's invalidation for non-compliance with the requirement in Section 5 of
RA 8436, as amended, mandating the partial use of an automated election system before
deploying it nationwide. To further support their claim on the Contract's invalidity,
petitioners alleged that (1) the optical scanners leased by the COMELEC do not satisfy the
minimum systems capabilities" under RA 8436, as amended and (2) the Provider not only
failed to submit relevant documents during the bidding but also failed to show "community
Issue
Whether or not, the COMELECgravely abuse its discretion when it entered to contract with
Smartmatic TIM Corporation and assailing to an automated election.
Ruling
Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the enabling automation law, RA 8436,
as amended by RA 9369, the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners invoked
as an afterthought, the Court finds the project award to have complied with legal
prescriptions, and the terms and conditions of the corresponding automation contract in
question to be valid. No grave abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of
respondent COMELEC. And surely, the winning joint venture should not be faulted for having
a foreign company as partner.
The COMELEC is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in our
scheme of government. In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair
elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it
should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an
organization of lesser responsibility.[103] It should be afforded ample elbow room and
enough wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the
great objective for which it was created--to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful
elections. This is as it should be for, too often, COMELEC has to make decisions under
difficult conditions to address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and
in the process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from
interfering with the COMELECs exercise of its power which, by law and by the nature of its
office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
on comelecs part, as here, the Court should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of
certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of that body.
There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are
necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of
the administration of the laws relative to the conduct of elections, x x x we must not by any
excessive zeal take away from the comelec the initiative which by constitutional and legal
mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the
Commission x x x requires that the power of this court to review the acts of that body
should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases.
offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended
to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest
conduct of elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was
reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested
exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same provision of law
the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been
conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority given
by the Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional bodys
independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and
prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.
SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal protection
clause.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection
Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the
investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint
Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials linked
to the Arroyo Administration.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not
all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were
investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties.
Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to
eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of
real differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all
persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.
DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 199082 July 23, 2013 JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 199082
NATURE:
These are separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in G.R.
No. 199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a second look
at our September 18, 2012 Decision3 dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions against
respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator
Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee
(Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.
FACTS:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases
In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May
14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was
indeed perpetrated. It recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage and manipulating the election results.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:
1. Fact- Finding Teams Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules
of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004
and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the
preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the
Comelec.
2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the
Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction
HELD:
1. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in
the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for
election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore, that we the the court cannot consider the creation of the
Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelecs independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
2.
The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction"
authorized by the amendatory law The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to
deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no
prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is
the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the
Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the refiling of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent
assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a
settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance
of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and
admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as
hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise
contends that there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not
given the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical
rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to achieve just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to
deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the
"newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given
every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when
Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution,
petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not
avail herself of the opportunity given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given
the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: The
petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by
verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than
oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules
of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process
cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his
motion for reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the
Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her
status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner,
imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not
lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however,
petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof
as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of
Representative of Marinduque.
Held:
Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For one to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of these requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2)
proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has not assumed office
yet. Also, the 2nd requirement was not validly complied with as a valid oath must be made (1)
before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she
made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or
in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed
complied.
Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of
discretion is alleged and proved to exist. For an act to be struck down as
having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross.
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show
that grave abuse of discretion exists.
That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be
allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent
to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must
be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to
vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2.
1.
There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically
reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as
understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is
a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place
where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for
purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does
not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
2.
The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to
allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and
presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to
usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential
elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by
virtue of RA 9189.
person who had all of thequalifications provided by law to be a voter and not a
personregistered in the electoral list. The Executive Bureau has held that theterm
qualified when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean thata person must be
a registered voter. To become a qualified candidate,a person does not need to
register as an elector. Registering does notconfer the right; it is a condition
precedent to exercise the right. Thefact that a candidate failed to register as an
elector in the municipalitydoes not deprive him of the right to become a candidate
and to bevoted for.
ISSUE: Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a
special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELECs
imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
HELD: The petitions are bereft of merit.As to the procedural limitation, the act of
registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in
the election process. Thus, contraryto petitioners argument, registration cannot
and should not be denigrated to thelowly stature of a mere statutory requirement.
Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the
right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power,
may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the
incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be
performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one
which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and
the prevalent circumstances of the times.Considering the circumstances where the
writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the present case, we are of the firm
belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they
are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel
respondent COMELEC toconduct a special registration of voters. For the
determination of whether or notthe conduct of a special registration of voters is
feasible, possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual date of
election, involves theexercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by
mandamus.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions for certiorari and
mandamus are hereby DENIED.
Frivaldo v. Comelec
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
Facts:
Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was
disqualified by the Court twice due to his alien citizenship. He claims to have reassumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation. Respondent Lee was the
second placer in the canvass and claimed that the votes cast in favor of petitioner
reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized
by law for the purpose.
3) No. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective provincial officials. Such power to annul a proclamation
must be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation. Frivaldo's petition
was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the
Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
4) No. The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will. Lee is just
a second placer. The rule is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to
be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to
the office.
The petition was DISMISSED for being moot and academic and has no merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The presence of the 2nd element represents moral turpitude as stated in the ruling of People v Atty. Fe
Tuanda where conviction for violation of BP 22 involves deceit and affects the good moral character of a
person.
Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged
the duties thereof. His proclamation was contested and resulted to declaring his opponent winning the
election and ordered Lonzanida to vacate the office. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed
his certificate of candidacy. His opponent filed a petition for disqualification on the grounds that it is a
violation of the three-term rule. COMELEC granted the petition. Petitioner filed a petition challenging the
validity of the COMELEC resolution.
Issue: Whether petitioners assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1, 1998 is considered full term
of office for the purpose of three-term rule
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that it cannot be considered a full term of office for two reasons, he
cannot be considered elected as the proclamation was void and he also did not voluntary renounce office,
but was involuntary severance from office.
The petition is granted and the resolution of the COMELEC declaring petitioner Lonzanida disqualified to
run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral elections are hereby set aside.
FACTS:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national
and local elections, Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the position of
municipal mayor. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the
winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In
the 2004 electoral derby, however, the municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as
winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of
mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually
declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his
assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30,
2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010
elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his
certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought
the formers disqualification to run.
The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010
elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, mayor. In its Resolution, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of RTC, which
affirmed by COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms.
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three successive,
continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004- 2007 term when he was
initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to
which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of
the electorate.
The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the
right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the
protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has been
substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there
was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to
have served the full 2004-2007 term.
Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors office and, in
fact, had no legal right to said position. During the pendency of the election protest, Abundo
ceased from exercising power or authority. Consequently, the period during which Abundo
was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service
because prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundos opponent, Torres, who
was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
Marquez vs COMELEC GR
112889 (April 18, 1995)
Posted on October 3, 2012
GR No. 112889
243 SCRA 538
April 18, 1995
FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a
petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution which
dismissed his petition for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being
allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy,
a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand
theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person who has
been convicted by final judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of
the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not
private respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice as such term must be
interpreted and applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is
understandable since the COMELEC outrightly dismissed the petition for quo
warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts,
is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of
this unresolved factual matter.
RANK
532
6389
6428
Consequently, John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of
Bugasong.
Considering that Pacete won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes, Casimira contends that
she would have clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC properly tallied or
added the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to
petitions to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance
candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a
certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause
confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for
the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of
the true will of the electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving money or
material consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials performing electoral functions,
election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or making prohibited contributions) of the OEC
or Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
In Fermin vs. COMELEC, this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section 68
and a petition to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said
proceedings are governed by different rules and have distinct outcomes.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or confused
with a "Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in
different eventualities. x xx
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or
68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false.
The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is
merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied
due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC .
Thus, in Miranda vs. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under
Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a
candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled
under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a
candidate. (Additional emphasis supplied)
Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to
valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled as he/she
is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC. But should these votes cast for the
candidate whose COC was cancelled or denied due course be considered stray?
The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such under a
final judgment was applied by this Court in Bautista vs. COMELEC where the name of the nuisance
candidate Edwin Bautista (having the same surname with the bona fide candidate) still appeared on the
ballots on election day because while the COMELEC rendered its decision to cancel Edwin Bautistas
COC on April 30, 1998, it denied his motion for reconsideration only on May 13, 1998 or three days after
the election. We said that the votes for candidates for mayor separately tallied on orders of the
COMELEC Chairman was for the purpose of later counting the votes and hence are not really
stray votes. These separate tallies actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite
the apparent confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate.
But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was not yet
final on electionday, this Court also considered those factual circumstances showing that the votes
mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to only the legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and
could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We further noted that the voters had constructive as
well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as a candidate for
mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the
voter. This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established that
by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of notification, the voters were informed of the
COMELECs decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate.
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Court likewise
applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance
candidate stray but to count them in favor of the bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the decision to
declare him as such was issued only after the elections.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election
day inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects
the voters will and frustrates the same. It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the
same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the electorate having been informed thereof
through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of election. Undeniably, however,
the adverse effect on the voters will was similarly present in this case, if not worse, considering the
substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for
Representative - over five thousand - which have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots
being more than sufficient to overcome private respondents lead of only 453 votes after the recount.
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the
basis of Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but
counted in favor of petitioner. COMELECs changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates
resulted in the invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private respondent
by a slim margin. We observed in Martinez:
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect
to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the
electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the
prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the
mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC
increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray
votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, still, election woes
brought by nuisance candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be
implemented in the May 2010 elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of
candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is the apparent failure of the HRET to give weight to
relevant circumstances that make the will of the electorate determinable, following the precedent in
Bautista. x xx
COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution
No. 4116 by enumerating those changes brought about by the new automated election system to the form
of official ballots, manner of voting and counting of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions between
manual and automated elections validly altered the rules on considering the votes cast for the disqualified
or nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez III, COMELEC opines that these find no
application in the case at bar because the rules on appreciation of ballotsapply only to elections where the
names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots.
The Court is not persuaded.
In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local elections, political
rivals or operators benefited from the usually belated decisions by COMELEC on petitions to
cancel or deny due course to COCs of potential nuisance candidates. In such instances, political
campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their
candidate on the ballot, but still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates
for the same position and putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified
by the new voting system where the voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of their
chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1,
2010, nine days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the names of disqualified candidates
not just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed, what use will it serve
if COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be deleted from list of official candidates if
the official ballots still carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance
candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has
the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, notstray but counted in favor of the latter,
remains a good law.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation of
COC of Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before election day. As we pronounced in
Bautista, the voters constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more
determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could have been
intended only for the legitimate candidate. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the
names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or
eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters who mistakenly
shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they
intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the same.
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule wellensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation
of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. Indeed, as our electoral experience had
demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance candidates from both the Certified
List of Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil sought to be prevented by the
exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections.
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015 ATTY. ALICIA RISOSVIDAL VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,
FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a
former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states
that He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political
arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, [10] this time vying for a local elective
post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor
Alfredo Lim garnered the second highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify
Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be
proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to
vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by
former President Arroyo.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The
arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or
legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a
whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or
refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or were so patent and gross as
to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis
civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective
office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise
unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the
same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded
in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the
prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows
any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by
final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold
any public office, whether local or national position.
FALLO:
Petition is dismissed
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was eligible to run for Mayor of
Uyugan, Batanes.
EFREN ARATEA
v.
COMELEC AND ESTELA ANTIPOLO
G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012, Carpio, J.
FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates
for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid
S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to
disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy on
the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for
four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections.
Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of
candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought
election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local
Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more
than three consecutive terms for the same position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolutionon 18 February 2010 cancelling
Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy.
Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending
during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest
number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of
Olongapo. On the same date, Aratea wrote the DILG and requested for an opinion on whether,
as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanidas
disqualification.
DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal conviction,
and as a consequence, his office was deemed permanently vacant, and thus, Aratea should
assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELECs
resolution of Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration.
In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath
of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo
allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the COMELEC.
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from
running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bancs resolution was based on
two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three
consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final
judgment of 10 counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced
for each count of falsification to imprisonment of 4 years and 1 day of prisin correccional as
minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prisin mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction
became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People, before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.
The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanidas removal. Whether Lonzanida
was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material
representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the
rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
HELD: Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanidas
certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All
votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 1 of the Omnibus Election Code
are specifically enumerated.
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited
acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." All the offenses
mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election
Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of
Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by
final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds
or offenses covered under Section 68.
On the other hand, Section 782 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of
candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the
contents of the certificate of candidacy:
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of
candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said
office x x x
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin mayor, disqualifies
him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public
1 Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for
any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
2 Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment
of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.
The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory
penalties
of
temporary
absolute
disqualification
and perpetual
special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any
popular elective office or to be elected to such office. The duration of temporary absolute
disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisin mayor.
On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification, which is perpetually. Both
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office.
A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public
office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes.
As the Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a
candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should
be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole
qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should
now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to
run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is
immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the
very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified
candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the highest
number of votes.
1wphi1
Petition dismissed.
administration of all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that
they would engage in the very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the
provisionthey would file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given that the
assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it
cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to
petitioners' candidacy.
2.
It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on
two fundamental freedoms, those of expression and of association.
Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by
Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil
servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the
first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who
hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental
act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the
four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is
not germane to the purpose of the law. Applying the four requisites to the instant
case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive
offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of
the law.
The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad. First,
the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without
distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Second,
the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether
they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national,
municipal or barangay level.
HELD:
1.
No. The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the
participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is
too plain to be mistaken.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom
only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their
office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as
officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in
any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under
the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral
activities.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected
officials vis--vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant
distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly
treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite
term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the
deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will.
In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that
they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were
elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore
germane to the purposes of the law.
2.
No. The view that the assailed provisions are overly broad because they apply
indiscriminately to all appointive civil servants regardless of position obviously fails
to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by the
partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic
abuse perpetuated by a "powerful political machine" that has amassed "the
scattered powers of government workers" so as to give itself and its incumbent
workers an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power."
[T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which could give an
emerging political machine an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power" is reason
enough to impose a restriction on the candidacies of all appointive public officials
without further distinction as to the type of positions being held by such employees
or the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto.
Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section 4(a) of
Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National
and Local Elections, which, it must be noted, are decidedly partisan in character.
Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the
candidacies of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections.
PEREZ, J.:
Facts
This case involves the election protest filed with the Commission on Elections
against Joselito R. Mendoza (Mendoza), who was proclaimed elected Governor of
Bulacan in the 14 May 2007 elections. Mendoza garnered 364,566 votes while
private respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan (Pagdanganan) got 348,834 votes,
giving Mendoza a winning margin of 15,732 votes.
After the appreciation of the contested ballots, the COMELEC Second Division
deducted a total of 20,236 votes from Mendoza and 616 votes from Pagdanganan.
As regards the claimed ballots, Mendoza was awarded 587 ballots compared to
Pagdanganan's 586 ballots. Thus, the result of the revision proceedings showed that
Pagdanganan obtained 342,295 votes, which is more than Mendoza's 337,974
votes. In its Resolution dated 1 December 2009 (Division Resolution), the COMELEC
Second Division annulled the proclamation of Mendoza and proclaimed
Pagdanganan as the duly elected Governor of Bulacan with a winning margin of
4,321 votes.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Division Resolution on 8 February 2010. On 4
March 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order denying Mendoza's Motion for
Ruling
Indeed, the grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is patent in the fact that
despite the existence in its books of the clearly worded Section 6 of Rule 18, which
incidentally has been acknowledged by this Court in the recent case of Marcoleta v
COMELEC,[5] it completely ignored and disregarded its very own decree and
proceeded with the questioned Resolution of 8 February 2010 and Order of 4 March
2010, in all, annulling the proclamation of petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza as the duly
elected governor of Bulacan, declaring respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan as the
duly elected governor, and ordering petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza to cease and
desist from performing the functions of the Governor of Bulacan and to vacate said
office in favor of respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan.
The grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is underscored by the fact that the
protest that petitioner Pagdanganan filed on 1 June 2007 overstayed with the
COMELEC until the present election year when the end of the term of the contested
office is at hand and there was hardly enough time for the re-hearing that was
conducted only on 15 February 2010. As the hearing time at the division had run
out, and the re-hearing time at the banc was fast running out, the unwanted result
came about: incomplete appreciation of ballots; invalidation of ballots on general
and unspecific grounds; unrebutted presumption of validity of ballots.
Under Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC, sitting en banc,
does not have the authority to decide election cases in the first instance as this
authority belongs to the divisions of the COMELEC Specifically.
Sec.3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of
the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election.
COMELECs First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit.
And COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is
qualified to run for mayor in the recall election.
Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution, which states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, which provides:
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official was elected.
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of
time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive
terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election
for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate
re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office.
What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002
is not an immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June
30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from
seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001.
period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature
campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate
retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of
Sta.Monica, Surigao del Norte in the last May 2007 elections. The former filed her
certificate of candidacy on the day before the prescribed campaign period. When
she went to the COMELEC Office for filing she was accompanied by her partymates.
Thereafter, they had a motorcade which was consist of two trucks and ten
motorcycles running around the municipality convincing the residents to vote for
her and the other candidates of their political party.
Due to this, private respondent filed a petition against her alleging premature
campaigning as provided in the Omnibus Election Code Section 80 which says:
Election or partisan political activity outside campaign period.--- It shall be unlawful
for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association
of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except
during the campaign period. She argued that she is not guilty since she was not
yet a candidate at that time and the campaign period has not yet started when the
motorcade was conducted.
While the petition was pending in the COMELEC, she was voted as mayor and
took her office thereafter. The COMELEC Second Division decided in favor of the
complainant and found her guilty of premature campaigning. Likewise, when she
appealed in the COMELEC En Banc, the previous decision was affirmed.
Subsequently, she filed with the Supreme Court which decided against her. It
held that the conduct of the motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan
political activity, falling under Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code which
says: [h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other
similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate[.] Furthermore, it was held
that she should vacate the position. Now, she comes for a motion for
reconsideration using the same arguments.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of premature campaigning?
RULING:
No, she is not.
Any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. It is enough that
Congress stated that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. So, it is lawful if done
before the start of the campaign period. This plain language of the law need not be
construed further.
Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate for. As
what was decided in the Lanot Case which says that prior to the campaign period,
even if the candidate has filed his/her certificate of candidacy, he/she is not yet
considered as a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Hence,
she cannot be guilty of premature campaigning for in the first place there is no
candidate to talk about. What she did was an exercise of her freedom of expression.
JUDGMENT: