FORUM

ENERGY AND SOCIAL THEORY

ENERGY AND THE EXPERIENCE OF MODERNITY

For most of hum;ln history, the amount of work (in the physical sense of the word
performed was roughly identical to the amounr of work needed for survival and
reproduction. As suggested by research on hunter-gatherers, e.g. Marshal I Saldins' famot.
thesis on the 'original affiuenr society', this correspondence might have been a cultur.
choice. Thus, the surplus work created by the utilisation of fossil fuels stands our J.S
miraculous. Since the earl y days of che indusrri<Jl revolution, the use of coal, oil and
natural gas h<1s meanr that the work performed, globally, is orders of magnitude bigg...-r
than rhe work needed for su rvival and reproducLion. Most work in industrial civilisations
is performed by burning fossil fuels, 1 and, for the past 150 years, the utilisation of fOss
labour has increased decade by decade.
lf there is reason to believe chat material circumstances like tech nology, mode of
production, housing and so on, influence culture and experience, then there is reaso
ro believe that a continually increasing input of non-human work has similar effecr..s..
In Fact, the suggestion is practically compelling, since whether <lS Hesh and blood or .as
thoughts and feelings, humans arc in consmnt conracr with energy and labour, or. e..-cn
more directly, they are energy and labour. Wh en we talk of modernity, energy inputs
are existentially in a different category than its other dimensions- spiritual,- ~oc
technological. This difference has th ree facers: i) Given the orher conditions, bur withou
surplus energy, neither the world economy nor population would have grown the "'
they have. Th is means that, almost by defaulr, part of the credit (or blame) given ro dK
other conditions belongs to fossil fuels; ii) Unlike rhe other conditions, fossi l fuels are n
created by humans. C onsequently, part of rhe credir for modernity that is given to hlllllAn
endeavour belongs to something non-human; iii) Fossil fuel resources are non-renewa.b
Hence, some of the characteristics believed to be systematically and irreversibly p.u-.5
modernity are likely robe one-time occurrences.
As suggesred by i) and ii), the importance of fossil energy has been radically unJeTanalysed. 'This is especially embarrassing for theoretical commentators who have ~
themselves as concentrating on material facts. When Marx and Engels observe in rhtCommunisr Manifesto that in capitalism 'all that is solid melts into air', they correahdescribe a prevalent experience, bur fail to notice rh:1t the claim concerns capitalism that lS
able to increase energy inputs. Likewise, philosophical crit iques of industrial civilisacion
such as Heidegger's view that a technological understanding of Being encounters
everything as raw m<~terial, are often partial. Heidegger is unwiningly calking about iosill
labour: without work there are no raw materials, neither concretely or as a concept. ~

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Suomm Amro~l~: /Oifmal oftl~ Finnish Amhro~~iMI Son''l

J8{3) Aumonn 2013

1'0 Box 59, 00014 University of l ldsinki. Finbnu

FORUM. F.'\F.RGY Mill SOCIAL TlffiORY

fact rhar fossil energy is in <l blind spot of social choughr is in itself remarkable, as many
of the experiential characteristics of modernity are directly connected to fossil fuels. 1 he
experience of speed and <Jcccleration, celebrated by futurists and modernisers, fascists
and communists alike, derives lrom the use of fossil fuels. M;Jny commentators have
lauded an independence from, or even a vicrory over, narure. Ironically, the impression of
independence is made possible by a unique namral endowment, namely, amassed highquality hydrocarbons. This ironic t:wist gives modernity its characteristic, epistemologically
delusional nature. A good example is the orthodox economic axiom according to which
the market will find a replacement for any commodity through the mechanism of supply
and demand. 3 Even a rudimentary material intelligence will indicate chat the doctrine is
possible only under circumstances of considerable surplus work, and that energy is an
exception ro the rule: ir is no1 only a commodity on rhe marker, but a condition for irs
existence. Investment and in teres! are both based on the premise that more work will be
performed in the future.
Phenomenologically, the b lind spot appears in both everyday and crirical experience as
necessary surprises. Physicist and Nobellaureate Svanre Arrhenius had alre-ady calculated
the climate effects of burning copious amoums of hydrocarbons by the late-ninereemh
cemury. 4 Nevertheless, climate change persists in facing difficulties in emering the
consciousness of industrial civilisations. Likewise, it is easy to deduce char producing
large quantities of petrochemical products, such as different kinds of plastics, wiU result
in recalcitrant waste. And yet, the plastic gyres in the oceans and the microscopic plastic
particles in mammal blood are treated as surprising. Maybe rhe crowning achievement
of the self-delusio n is chc neglect of the facl char industrial civilisation has always
depended on the extraction of non-renewable resources and is, in effect, Raubwi rthsch;lll:
plunder economy. The energy conrenr of the resources grew so large, so swiftly, rhar d1e
LUJsustainability of the system disappeared from view for several generations.
The necessity and unpredictability of the surprises poinr ro the difficulty of gaining a
sober view offossil fuels. The bounty ofsurplus labour has produced a kind of intoxication
that hinders rather than promotes material intelligence. 1 he obstruction functions by
cutting and covering up feedback-loops. Production and consumption, raw materials
and waste, are separated by long distances so that their connection disappears from view. 5
Aided by other features of modern production, the surplus has created a situation in
which iL is virtually impossible LO know the past and Lhc future of a mass-produced
artei:Kr. Likewise, a minutely defined djvision of labour is a phenomenon of broken
feedback-loops: the reverse side of it is w1precedented dc-skilling and hierarchi1..alion.
Let us consider a culrure chat inhabits <~n ecological region for several generations in a
way that is socially and ecologically sustainable. Often, the artefacts of such a culture
are characterised by a unity of functionality and beauty: what is useful is aesthetic, and
vice versa. The unification may proceed so far that particular features of the material
environment are recognised as sacred. In contrast, modern artefacts separate utility and
function (and supposed ly obliterate rhe sacred). The funcrion of something is largely
a resLJt of production processes (e.g. a car door has clear indications of iLs robotic
manufaccure and of calculations of cost-effectiveness), and rhc aesth etic aspect is added
separately (designers spending months fine-runing the sound of the door closing). 1l1is
separation has also an epistemological aspect. The ecological susrai nability of a non~uomen

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I'OilUM: liNEilGY AND SOCIAL TH EOitY

industrial culture is based on a kind of knowledge that is, typically, rransmicted in an

embodied way, through customs, ma~erial culture, oral traditions, rhe sacred and so on.
The holistic narure of this type of knowledge makes ir hard to capture within the forms
of modern scientific expenise. In F<~ct, precisely because of its energy-based self delusion,
modern experience carries little embedded knowledge about sustained ecological relations.
Modern knowledge does not know rhe cond itions of its existence,6 and even if it did, the
modern person or group has few ways of implememing that knowledge.
Fmefully, the epistemic d estruction contains a self-fulfi ll ing prophecy. The ecological
sustainability of a culture is dependent on the inhabited bioregion's recurring feedbackloops, such as weather and soil conditions, migrations of animals, plant successions and
so on. Once ind ustrial civilisation has destroyed these feedback-loops- through creating
borders, promoting extinction, producing climate change and so on-it begins ro seem
as if the knowledge concerning ecological sustainability was a fluke. Indusrrialisarion
destroys both the material conditions of environmemal knowledge, and rhe knowledge
itself: so that, in the end, it seems as if modernity has destroyed nothing real at all.
As noted by several amhropologists (e.g. David Graeber 2012), in a hierarchy people
on the lower rungs are likely to do most of the necessary interpretive labour. Women
know what men think, servants are aware of rhe mood shifts of rheir masrers, bur the
opposite is nor rrue. Coupled with the culture of experrise made possible by fossil fuels,
rhis bias in interpretive labour creates a situation in which communal understanding ;md
knowledge relating eo extended rime-scales {lo nger than o ne generation) gets fragmented .
If susrainability is, in Linus Torvald's words/ essentially open source, the episremological
condirions of modernity are amirherical to ic, <md the attempts to expertly design
susta inable lifesryles must be considered illusory. The utilisation of huge amounts of
surplus labour srructmally bars rhe crearion of embedded knowledge of susrainability.
Our argumem has been that ever increasing energy inputs created a hisrorical stare
of exception. A separation between human freedom and natural resources is possible
only if copious amounts of d1eap energy are available. Likewise, human cognitive and
technological abilities can be seen as abstract reifications only under circumstances of
increasing energy inputs. This experience of reification, and the connected individualism
can, in its peak form, be label led modernism. I lowever, we are al rendy enteri ng a new
state of exception: since 2005, rhe growrh of oil production has stalled, and economic
growth is, at present, created through an increase in burning coal. The fact that rhe
energy resou rce that comes after o il is the S<lme rhat preceded it is yet another necessary
surprise.
NOTFS
1
Vaclav Smil {2008} estimates rhat in 200S fossil fuels performed with rhe power of 12 terawarrs. If
there arc seven billion people and each of them works at 100 wans, we get, as a rhcorcrimlmaximum,
0.7 tcrawarrs of muscle labou r.
2
his credir, Max Weber point~ our the unique importance of fossil fuels in 'flu: Prottstl/1/f J;ibic 11nd
the Spirit oJCapittllism.
' Indeed, it has been argued (e.g. by'Timorhy Mirchell201 1), thar econom ic.~ as a ~cicnce was possible
on ly afrer rhe fossil inrcns icy o( 1he carly-rwcnricLh ccmury.

lo

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I'OKI ~I L..\I.RGY \.\1> SOCL\1. TIIJ:OK'I

' I he rnathcm.nic rebrion given in Arrlu:niu~ 1896 forrnubtiou , ' it' the <JU<mt ity of carbonic acid
incn.t~c~ in geometric progress io n, the :~~tgulcntatiou of the tcmpcr:uurc will incrc.t~c uearly in aridmlctic
p rogrt,~io n', i:- still used in cl im ~ tc modellin g, M.:c: <h trp://en.wikipeJi a.tlrg/wi ki/Svamc_Arrhe n ius>.
' ElmJr Al tv:ncr (2007) has un dct the ru bric ' foss il ca pitalism' an.tly~cd how fo,,i] fuds and ca pi wlist
productio n rlr like a hand a nd a glove: prod uct io n c:tn be scparared frorn loc.1 l com litions, raw m:n.:rial~.
pan:- ,tnd products can be rranspontd lo ng distJnces, and so on.
He re even natural science has been unable to do its job: publicly acccs::.iblc, peer-reviewed ~nd reli.1blc
da ta on glohal hydrocarbon reserve., docl> not cxisr.
- ~cc du t p://www.open p2ptbign .org/2007/opcn-p2p-design/l in UHorvalds-on-design-:md-complexiry-in-opetHource>.

RIWERENCES
Altvat er, El mar 2007. 'Jhc Social and Natur:t l l~nvironmcnt

or Fossil C.tpir:tlimt. Socinlist Negister Vol.

-13: 37- 59.

Grac he r, Oavid 2012. Otad / ..ones of the Imagination. HAU: jwrmtlofFtlmo.~mphic '!heOlJ' 1 (2):

lOS 128.
Mit cheU, Timothy 2011 . Ci1rbon /)nnomuy. London: Verso.
Smil , Vaclav 2008. Gwhnl Cu,t,troplm mu/ f'rmds. Cambridge. ~lA: ~1fT l'r<">>.
T ERE VADEN. Ph. D .
J>ROF I.~SOR (FIXED Tl::lu\11)
I)EPM\TM ENT OF ART
AA I TO UN I VERSI TY, HEI.S INK I

acre. vadc lt ((i)~,, ) 1o.fi

A 'I 1'1 SAJ,MI EN. J>h.D.

INOEPENDENT RESE.ARC I 11 R
TA~ IPERJ:

Anui.r .~almincneura.fi

EN ERGY: A TOTAL SOCIAL PHENO MENON

RES PONSE TO VADEN AND ALM IN EN

I w.ts e>..rrcmdy intrigued by the oflcr to commem on the summary of this new work
by Terc Vaden and Anrti Salmi ncn, and h:w ing now had rhc chance eo th in k abo ut it,
am very sorry that J am u nable tO read f innish and enjoy the l'ull argument! As I am
writ ing today on the American holiday of La bor Day (commemorating the cHorcs of
Lab or Movem ent wo rker!\ for the energy they expended in ensuring that the modem
ind ttstrial com plex at leasr comes with a ser of basic righ rs to app ropriate compensatio n,
safety, anJ a maxim um workd:ty) , .urentio n to the topic of how foss il fuel-based energy

Suomcn ""'''I"''"~ ' Jnum.al olth~ l uuaiSh Amhmpol~i<.ll :.O.:iccy .11201.1

53

fORUM: ENERGY AND ~OCIAL THEOitY

came ro replace and extend human work in such surplus capacities is appropriate. By
asking how 'the conrinually increasing input of non-human work' affects our culwres and
experiences as che very embodiments o f 'energy and labour', Yaden and Sal minen direct
our anemion to a key aspect of rhe condition of modernity that has indeed received little
anenfion, certainly far less than is needed.
O ne point that must be made from the outset is that Leslie White, a prominem
anthropological cl1eorist of the m iddle 20 th cenwry, did in fact build a major theorelical
framework based on the significance of energy in general, and fossil fuel energy in
particular. In 1943, Whire presented 'the law of cultural evolution: culture develops
when the amoum of energy harnessed by man per capita per year is increased; or as the
efficiency of the tech nological means of puLLing m is energy to work is increased; or, as
both facrors are simultaneously increased' (1943: 338), but his effort to define cultural
evolution through energy use in mathematical terms was not widely taken up. In a
posthumously published work, Whire pointed out:
A cuiiUral system, like all material sy~te ms, is a dynamic system, a thermodynamic system. lr requires
energy with which to operate. Every event rhar rakes place, whether ir is chipping an arrow head,
c;aching a fish, avoiding one's mother-in-law, or tlllcring a prayer, requires e nergy. We conceive of
cull ural systt:ms as means of harnessi ng e nergy and of p utting it to work in the service of human
beings. Au accoum of rh~.: evolutiou of' cultu re, therefore, consists of a recita l of rhc significant events
in the long history of harnessing and utilizing energy. (2008: 14)

H is d evelopmen t of the ideas regard ing whar he c:llled the ' Fuel Revolutio n' is therefore
worth a look in rhe context of evaluating where we might go next with Vadcn and
Saln1inen's callw induJc energy in the theorizing of modernity.
I find particularly inceresting rheir suggestion that fossil fuel energy ' is nor a commodity
on th e market, b ut a cond ition for irs exisrence.' Certai nly, the unwillingness of the
world to acknowledge the 'lim irs to growrh' of both population and economies makes
it easy ro see why rhe structural invisibility of me fossil fuel basis for modern society
has driven our imagina ries as well as our material possibilities, all rhe wh ile keeping
hidden the 'cond itions of its existence' th rough the corporate privileging of fossil fuel
reserves data. It would be nice, however, ro have more detail regarding their assertion
that 'human cognitive and technological abilities can be seen as abstract reifications only
under circumstances of increasing energy inputs'. While I acknowledge the importance
of recogn izing the ' historical state of exception' that Yadcn and Salminen have brought ro
our arrent ion, I am not sure that all of their conclusions are necessarily valid, though wim
such a short and sketchy summary of their book in hand, I may simply be missing some
of the pieces needed ro be convinced.
To begin, 1 would suggest thar rheir claim rhat 'utilization oflarge amounts of surplus
labour structurally bars the creation of embedded knowledge of susrainability may hold
at the global or even national scale, but nor ar all at the local or regional scale. lr is only
if we reserve the notion of'moderniry' fo r those Euro-Americans who first harnessed the
power of lossil fu els, and fail to recognize rhe many alternative modernities (cf Gaon~
[ed.] 200 I) that have evolved over time and in conjunction with rhe various impen:d.
industrial, and colonial regimes rhar have deployed fossil fuel resources, that we can inri~
on the singularity of a fossil-fuel driven modernity. If, insread, we consider the ran~e oi
54

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FORUM: li.\ERGY A.\1) SOCIAL THEORY

scales ar which the contemporary world operates, and the innovative and often subversive
ways chat those who are nor in power manage ro move their interests forward 'under the
radar' of national or global scalisrics, we might paint a rufferenr pic ture of what it means
tO be modern under the cond itions or fossil fuel dominance. For example, when I was
conducting fieldwork on renewable energy transitions in India last year, one practice that
I saw frequently across the country was the use of road traffic as a threshing machine:
grain was harvested and laid out in the middle of a rural road to dry and be run over by
the traffic, which could not a\"oid it except by going off into a ditch. The drivers thus
became complicit in the sharing or energy resources to help feed the farmers, who were
more than completd~- aware of the alremad\"e- paying for their own fuel and machinery,
or compler !lg the LJSk by h.uui This solution was far more sat isr.1c1ory, in many differenr
ways~

I dunk that thti IS v.-here a renewed focus on an anth ropology of energy can provide
- ts imo
challenge tO social sciences laid ou t by Vaden and Salminen.
_ Otta.i!ed ethnographic analyses of the relationship between rhe production of
-c. the deploymenr of fossil fuels over time, as well as in-depth historical
e that otTrm ~ficchel l with Carbon Democracy, we will acquire the rools ro
~
the '-ar:ierv of strucmral constraints and opporrunirics in operation (now and
e past :1round the world. One of the ways that this type of more nuanced analysis
~ - J he p is in che elaboration of presumed 'traditional' lifeways- identified by Vaden
and alminen as having 'sustainable' cultures that show a total unity of aestl1etic form
and function, as opposed to the separation of Lhese elements under modernity-a rather
sim plistic assessmem that disregards the kinds of comp lexities tllar smaller-scale cultures
have been shown over and over to contain . Indeed, tlleorizing energy under conditions of
modernity becomes a more interesting and relevant task when accompanied by more data
abour rhe variable ways in which people in commu nities make use of the range of energy
resources ro which they have access.
ln 2000, anthropologist Hal Wilhirc and his colleagues published a plea for those
concerned with the development ofenergy policy and the conservation ofenergy resources
to move away from an inruvidual consumer behavior model of energy demand, grounded
in econom ic and psychological theory, and inro a framework based on comparative
undcrsrandings of social behavio rs related to 'normal standards of comfort, cleanliness,
and convenience (and so energy demand)', dllls linking individual bchaviors with social
norms and cultural values (Wilhite er al. 2000: 120). By studying the practices of everyday
life, in which we use energy to achieve desired ends (it is not the energy itself we desire,
buc wha1 it can do for us), greater insights into the theoretical significance of energy for
life under conditions of various modernities might be achieved.
Finally, I want to suggest, by way of taking up the challenge offered by Vaden and
Salminen, that we perhaps should consider energy to be a roral social phenomenon, as
defined by Marcel Mauss. Energy, like the concept of 'tile gifr' rhar was his primary
example. is

usdid

me

at oucc legal, economic, religious, acsrhcric, morphologic<tl, and so o n. (. .. ) fir is I at once poli tical
and do mestic, being of inrcrcsr borh to classes and to clans and fami lies. (. .. ) economic, for the
not ions of va lue, u!ili ry, inrercsr, luxury, wealth, acquisitio n, accum ulation. consumpcion ( ...) and
[has) an important aesthetic side. (Mauss 1967[ 1925]: 76-77)

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FORUM: Et\'tmCY AND SOCIAL TILEORY

Is there any part of everyday life in the world today that is nor couched by energy,
especially-but nor only-that derived from fossil fuels? There are places that are
desperately energy-poor, bur even in those locales, awareness of their lack is palpable.
I have often asked students in my Culture Change course (subtitled 'Moderniry and
Modernization') to conduct a thought experiment, imagining cl1emselves in our world,
somewhere, anywhere--having suddenly lost all fossil fuels. Where would they be, what
would they be doing and wearing? ll1e answer, unless they have a very unusual skill
set, is sitting naked in rhe middle of a foresr; rhe pervasiveness of not only fossil fuel
energy, but d1e material products and technologies derived from it, is incalculable. The
value placed on electronic technologies like cell phones and music/video players-even,
or especially, in the most remote societies on eanh; the use ollarge dams and power planrs
by nation-states to assert their colleclive manhood, or electric well-pumps in rural villages;
the 'comforts of home' facilimred by conrrol of interio r climates; the transponar.ion and
communications technologies and networks that fac ilitate and expedite social rel;Jtions;
the metaphorical use of rhe words power and energy that pervade our daily lives, from
health managemem to warmongering: all of rhese amounr ro a rota! social phenomenon
in the Maussian sense.

lmFEI~ENCF.S

Gaonkar, D. (ed.) 200 I. Alunutlil't Modtmitits. Durham: Duke Universicy Press.

Mauss, M. 1967 [1 925]. 7ht Gift. New York: W.W. Nonon & Company.
Wilhite, H., E. Shove, L. Lutzcnhiser and W.Kempton 2003. 1he Legacy ofTwency Years of Energy
Demand Managemenr: We Know More abour Individual Behaviour bur Ncxr ro Norhing abour
Demand. In E. Jochem er al. (eds), Sociny, Bfbnviour, and G1imntt CIJnngt Mitigation. Dordrechr:
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
White, L 1943. Energy and the Evolution of Culture. Amtrican Anthropologist, N.S. 45 (3):

335-356.
White, L 2008. Modem C11pitnlist Culmrt. Edited and foreword by Roberr L. Carneiro, Ben Urish,
and Button J. Brown. Walnm Creek, CA: Lefr Coas1 Pres:..
SARArl STR.AUSS, Ph.D.
DEPARTMENT OF ANTIIROPOLOGY
UNIVERS ITY OF WYOMING
srrauss@uwyo.cdu

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FOill'\1 I~EilGY 1\J':D SOClAI.liiEOil\

MODERN FOSSILS
RESPONSE TO VADEN A D Si\LM TNE
SI MQI'(E 1\nRAM

Vaden and S.tlminen want ro bring fossil fuels back into sociological and hisroricaJ
rhoughr. 1 hey argue rhat l he use of lc>ssil fuels has cffecred an unprecedented amoum of
s urplus 'wo rk' th:H has b,1d p ro fo und c:rft>cts on human experience and human culrurc,
and that social s<..ientists have overlooked this fundamenm l d imension ofsoci:1l experience
for over two hundred years or more. Vaden and Sa l mincn'~ core focus js on paradoxes and
rhe human capaciry to live wirh rhcm. We know tha1 burning fossil fuels produces C02.
and mosr of us know rhar rhis affect~ rhe eanh's climare, bll[ we can'r seem m srop doing
ir. We know chm consumerism produces waste rhar causes harm ro ourselves ,tnd w orher
species, but we still pick up o ur supermarket goods in plastic can ons. We know one of the
most impon:un Etctors in children's morbidiry is the motor ve hicle, yer millions of parents
d ri ve rhcir chi ldren to school- si nce they imagine their own ch ildren wi ll be p rOJected
from orhcr parenrs' C<Jrs, even ifir puts orhers' children in danger. And rhe results include
increased obesiry, poor ht ness :1nd lack ofstreet awareness .tmong the chauAcurcd children.
1 he paradoxe~ we humans subject ourselves ro are myriad, :111d the comempor.try world
of global capitalism keeps heaping rhcm upon us. We know ir's bad for rhe planet ro drive
:t Glr, bur how do WC get ro work rh ere'~ no public fl'<lllsporr and ir's roo r:n tO cycle? We
k now thal flying aeropla nes pollute:. the atmosphere bu 1 we (well , rarher a lot of' us) feel
we should go to imern:nionaJ conlcn:nces. Whi le much cnvironmenral pressmc has been
directed ar comumcr behaviour (lall<:rly supponed in 1he U K by currenr government
policy1), orhers .trgu<: rhar consumer- pressure or consumer responsibility i ~ not really rhe
way forwa rd with these issues. lnsre.1d, n.trional and international regular ion should make
the right choices the <:asy ones. lor(..e companies ro produce less waste, ban them from
burning more fossil fuels than the planet can accommodall:, and so on.
Bur Vadcn :tnd S.tlm inen arc going in a diAerem d irection. ' lh::y sec rhc problem as
rhe fragmenting
knowledge t h:tr prevenrs us from seeing rhc consequences or our use
of fossil fuels. as we b.tsk in 1 he comfort of the life rhcy afford us. Knowledge abou t rhe
connecrions between labour, surplus, lifesryle and consumption needs w be put back
rogerher, and in this, Vadcn and S.tlminen have isolated th<: work of imcrpretarion as
crucial. H. we we re to srop doing the imerprc[;1ti vc work thar h ides rhc: links between
reso urce-use and efrects, rhey argue, and iC we cAcctivcl y rcsro re rhc lccdback loops
berween enerb'Y sustainability :tnd consumption, then perhaps we will see 1 hat :t ny lifesryle
based on the use or fossil fuels will never be sustainable. We need tO re-evaluate our lives
and accept rhar we cannot fulfllthc crireria of a 'succes~ful life' umil we recognise that if
it is based on oil-derived energy, rhen our definition of' su cce~s is flawed. Implici tly, they
suggest thar once we know this, we will change our bclwviours.
W hether yo u side with rhe con~u na e r -power ad voca tes o r the starisrs, or whether you
side wi th Vadcn and SaJmincn p:arrly depends on your undemanding of power and
governance and your concept or rite state and supr:t-sratcs. Should it be ttp to citizens

or

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FORUM: ENEilGYAND SOCIAL TIIEORY

10 change 1heir own behaviour in the light of macro-problems in the world, or shou ld
they be fo rced/enabled to change by state <lcrions? How much can sr:ues do these days
when so much commercial activity is beyond the reach of state agencies, be rhey policies,
pol ice or politicaJ pressure? And if states cannot control commerce, who can? Individual
srares c:mnoL :~ct unilaterally to curtail econom ic ac ti vities without withd rawing from
global markers on which all free states currently depend . So should states be negotiating
toget her LO find ;1 solution fo r everyone? ldeaJiy yes. but just look <U 1he problems in the
Eurozone to see how well that works in practice. Governmenrs are increasingly m;1dc up
or politicians with an eye primarily on public relations and elections and w ith dwindling
confidence in their civil serva nts-and it has aJways been the civil servams who keep
rhings going as governmem s come and go. If civiJ servan ts are emasculated and populist
politicians do n't want robe seen w be doing unpopu lar th ings (making life harder, that
is, in everyday terms- t:ither mo re expensive or mo re inconvenien t), who will take act ion
fo r che pla net? And if no-one rakes concerred ac1io n for the p laner, the srallls q uo is not
rhat rhings rema in as Lhey :~ re, bur rhat sup ra-narional corporarions pmsue profit at rhe
expense of everything else. Enviro nm ent:ll acrivisrs have wo rked rirelessly ro ho ld them to
acco unl, and to persuade consu mers and citize ns to acr, bur they're a small David ro rhe
commercial Goliath-and Goli:11h has most governmen rs o n his side. Hence rhe current
stalemate and our slide rowa rds glo baJ climan.: crisis.
'The q uestion must then be: is Vaden and Salmi nen's version of consciousness-raising
the answer? It doesn't seem to be wo rking so lar. ma inly because ir undcresLimarcs its
enemy, but perhaps Ma rx :1ncl Engels' frie nds mer the same response. 1 heir revolution
cook rime; Marx, born after 1he French Revolution, was de;1d before the Russian one.
Unforrunarely, climate change acrivists and sciemists keep reminding us that rime is o ne
thing we c<~n'r affo rd. But while we may be lisren ing in an ind ividua l, rarhcr di~persed
way, and doing whar we can ro lower our personaJ use, whar the revolutions had to power
them was solidarit y :Hnong the subjugared. lhey were powered by real s uCfering among
rhe m ajority of the people subject. tO those sr:11es r h;~r were ovenu rned-elemems so far
missing from the pote nriaJ f-or a global revolut ion againsr furrhcr fossil fuel explo iration.
On the contrary, as Vaden and Salminen seem to be implying, it is the ve ry people who
enjoy the benefits of fossil fi.1cls who should be the ones to revol t agai nst rheir use, and
thar is someth ing of a taJ l order.
Despite th is, a head of steam seems ro be rising, and this is pardy through the wo rk
of people who are constanrl y puuing back together the fragmen 1ed knowledge :~bout the
wo rld that Vaden and S:1 lminen see as the source oF the problem . Will it be enough eo
coumer the shore-term econom isric panic rh at seems to be carry ing curren r govern menrs
in to re-in vesting in coal, or going all our for shale-gas, a[Jnospheric consequences be
damned? 1 his work of inre rpreration sounds s uspiciously li ke a remedy for wh:H Marx
called 'alienarion'.2 No r only are we alienated from the effects of ou r labour, we are
al i en :~ red from the effecrs or ou r consumprio n. And whet her o r nor we feel al ie n <~ red, WC
are more o r less impot en t to cha nge our w:.ys, other than by withdrawing from society,
and few of us acruaJ iy want ro do rhat. Like ;~ n y add ict, corr:dled in to the circumsr<wces
of our own addiction, we need a way our- actual th ings we can do ro change the way
the socio-marerial world aff(>rds us possibilities, or act ual ch:1ngcs in rhe socio-mareriaJ
world rhat offer us ways ro acr differently. Popular environmenral protest asks how we can

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I'ORUM: ENERGY AND SOCIAL THEOI~Y

stop the supermarkets over- packaging things, o r how we can persuade rhe government to
invest in electrified public u:mspon, prioricisc cycle lanes or enable non-fossil-fuel energy
sources. So is it really lack of knowledge rhat is the problem here?
The arguments a1 this broad level don't make sense for a good reason, and char's the
problem of scale. What's true for society in general is often not rrue for people in particular.
Many people are changing their habits ro become less dependent on fossi l fuels. Many
people actively protest against further exploitation of gas and oil fields, and responses to
new approt1ches such as fracking are widely differem in different countries- quiescence
in the US, feverish protest in rhe UK, outrage in France. fr is clearly a set of eo-dependen t
relations between oil companies and investors who are driving further exploracion and
exploitation, even as global agreements confirm rhat we cannot afford to burn any morc, 3
and individuals try to minimise their environmental impact.
Bur Vaden and Salm inen arc not really telli ng us much about what to do, or even really
abour the politics of energy. In rhis very short text, they range extremely widely over a
number of arguments. First, rhat energy use is a key factor in the characrer of modernity
and that industrial modernity relied on energy surplus; second, that the importance of
fossil energy has been under-analysed (ir is a 'bli nd spot' in social rhoughr); third, char
this b li nd spot also appears in everyday thought; fourth, that surplus energy allows a
separation between form and function (aesthetic and use). Along the way, they make
various assertions: that the knowledge of non-industrial society is transmitted in an
embodied way but that modern knowledge does not know the conditions of its existence;
that ecology secs limits ro development; rhat people low on social hierarchies do the most
in terpretive labou r. All this, according to rhem, adds up ro us currently living in a state of
hiswrical exception, while moving back from oil ro coal.
Much of these details one could tal<c um brage with. Most importantly, to say that
socia.l sciences have not analysed fossil fi.,ef use is to ignore the many books and articles
published in recent years. My short reading list on fuels, energy and society has more
than a hundred entries including titles such as 'Oi l, power <tnd politics', 'The Econom ics
of avoiding dangerous climate change', 'The fmpact of Electricity', 'Oil', ' Energy and
Society', 'Fossilisation', 'Cultures of Energy'.
Vaden and Salminen want to reil us that we ignore the role of fossil fuels at our peril.
Who would disagree? And indeed , I strongly urge my fellow researchers to pay attenrion
ro energy as one of the most important material conditions of our existence. Capiralisr
developmenr since rhe 18'h cenrury has been increasingly botmd up in modern technology
largely relianr on fossil fuels. From d1e steam rai lway to 1he aeroplane, &om coal-fired
power stario ns eo gas lighting and central heating, fossil fuels power contemporary
capitalism. Bur capitalism didn't begin with fossil h.tels, and they don't explain everything
about modernity. Nor can the use of fossil fuels alone explain economic expansion, nor
the drive to produce surplus, as Vaden and Salminen suggest. Remember that the early
industrial cotron mills of Manchester, and the steel industry of Sheffield, were waterpowered; coal-powered steam appeared quire late on in historical rerms. The industrial
revolution in Norway was powered by hydro-power, then hydro-electric power, well
before gas and o il were discovered in rhe Norrh Sea. 1n Gteen Imperialism, Roben Grove
argues rhat European empires grew in search of forest resources-mainly timber, and
th:u the search for timber primarily motivated colonial exp<msion. And Mitchell remi nds

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us rhar hydrocarbon-fuelled industrialisation expansion prompted colonisation in search

of the agriculcural produce d isplaced by the urbanising industrial societies of the home
countries, rather than in search of fossil fuels themselves-a neat example of sophisticated
social analysis of fossil fuels. Yet imperialism, and resomce-imperia.lism were nothing
new (remember the Romans?) and inequality was ar least as pronounced pre-indusrrial
revolurion as afrer. If 'for mosr of human history, the amount of work (in the physical
sense of the word) performed was roughly idemical to the amo unt of work needed for
survi val and reproduction' rh en what we really need ro consider is whose work was needed
for whose survival. Centuries (if not millennia) of hierarchical society from Ancient
China and G reece ro Modern Europe-in which the aristocracy worked little while the
peasants and serfs worked as much as they were forced to-can't be swept aside so easily.
11, as Vadcn and Salminen argue, fossil energy extended rhe work potenrial in relation
to labour, that only makes sense on a grand scale-for rhe 'ordinary' worker, the work
required has famously exp:mded to fi ll the time available wh ile the wealth accessible by
the privileged expands our all proportion. On the level of social experience, their grand
generalisations bear lit de relarion ro everyday realities or hisrori c:~ l de t :~ il.
Is it pedantry to pick holes in the rhetoric if the argument is valuable? Quire the
contrary: we wilJ never convince detractors of a c..<tse if our enthusiasm for an argument
leaves massive holes in it. One might reasonably argue, for instance, that there is no
necessary connection berween foss il fuel use, economic expansion, industry and moderni ty,
but this doesn't stop us idemifying a historically sufficient connection, and that is probably
enough lO fuel this argument. Certainly the wi lfu l reliance on oil and carbon fuels for
contemporary global capitalism is rhe key crisis of our times. Oi l producers are intent on
continuing their reign. n,ey have constructed :1 global system in wh ich they make rhc
ru les, and iL is becom ing harder for the rest of us ro rejccr rheir model. Governmenrs arc
c<J ughr in the energy gap, and few countries have the confidence of Sweden or Germany
to invest enough research on alternatives ro attempt ro reduce their reliance on fossil fuels,
even if they are not yet arrempring to escape them altogerher. Others treat fossil fuels as
a tool for international relations, such as the way d1at Russia has halted gas Aows ro the
Baltic coun tries to bring them ro heel (see Grigas 20 13), and rhe USA has repeatedly tried
to w1dermine Latin American economies to secure rheir black gold. I lere we are really
in trouble. It's hard ro see how any <Lmoum of inrerprerive work will deter authori r:~rian
regimes from their cools of power.

or

NOTES
1

Bcncr Choices: Bcncr Deals: Consu mers Powering Growth. UK Departrnem for Business Tnnovadon
and Skills and the Cabinet Office 'Behavioural lnsights 1eam' (20 I I hups://www.gov.uk/governmcm/
uploads/systcrnluploads/arrachment_data/filc/60540/better-choices-bettcr-dl.-als.pdf)
' 1hc authors' jibe at the Communist Manifesto for not referencing the power of fossi l fuels is
u ngcncrous, at besc.
J See Ca rbon Tracker Jnidadve and Gnmtham Research Jnstiture (20 13).

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Amropolo!\o: Journal of rhe Fuutish Anrhropologic:rl Soe~cry J/2013

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REFERENCES
Carbon Tracker Initiative and Grantham Research Institute 20 13. Unbumable Carbo n 20 13:
Wasted Capiral nnd Stranded Assets. Avai lable ac: <http:/lcarbontracker.live.k iln. it/UuburnableCarbo n-2-Web-Version.pdf>.
Grigas, A. 20 13. '/he Politics ofEnngy rmd Memory between the Baltic States and Russia. ram ham:
Ashg:ue.
Grove, R. 1995. Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropiettl Mand Edens and the Origiw of
Enviromnmtalism. 1600-1860. Swdies in Environment and History. C.lmbridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Mitchell, T. 20 I I. Ctrbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age ofOil. London: Verso.

SI M ONE ABRAM, Ph.O.

READER IN ENERGY STUDIES
DEPARTMENT Or ANTHROPOLOGY
DURHAM UNIVERSITY
simone.abram@durham.ac.uk

NUCLEAR ENERGY'S LONG NOW: INTRANSIGENT WASTES

AND RADIOACTIVE GREENS
RESPONSE TO VADEN AND SALMINEN
VINC!*I' F. W.ENTI

On 30 June 2013, Barack Obama anno unced a $7b pledge to provide Liberia, Kenya,
Ethiopia, Tan7..ania, Uganda, Mozambique and Nigeria with 'the energy ro lifr people
out of poverty' and 'lighr where currencly there is darkness'. He portrayed the semimem
underlying his coumry's new 'Power Africa' initiative as follows.
Access to eleccricity is fundamenral ro opporruniY in mis age. It's the light that children srudy by, the
energy that allows an idea ro be transformed into a real business. It's the lifeline for families ro meer
their most basic needs, and it's the connection that's needed to plug Africa into the grid of the global
economy. (England 20 13)

ll1e imagery tapped here is telling. Providing 'access' to electricity is eo enable 'opportunity'.
It is to lay down a 'lifeline' w fulfil 'basic needs' or to transform abstract 'ideas' inro
operable things-in-rhe-world, into 'real' businesses. It is depicted as a 'con necrion' that
could serve eo 'plug' a now-unplugged Africa ' into rhe grid of the global economy', casting
the ' light' of elect rical energy as a solution ro the problem of Africa's 'darkness'.
Obama's right coupli ng of imageries of energy and imageries of moderniry- in
positioning access ro electrical energy infrastructures, rightly or wrongly, as a prerequisite
for the cultivation of' ed ucation, business, subsistence and global integration- underscores
t.he timeliness ofVadcn and Salminen's contribution. Indeed, as amhropologist Dominic

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Boyer put it, where would, say, the 'biopolitical projects of Foucault's modern prisons,
factories <md schools' be 'without the harnessing and transformation of energy into their
lighting and electricity, into thei r heat, even into their bricks and cemenr?' (20 11: 5). In
rheir compelling account, Yadcn and Salminen have transformed these blind spots into
objects of analysis upon which new light can be shed, illuminating energy's consriturive
role in shaping rhe experience of modernity from a standpoinr plugged into some of the
most influential philosophical and social-theoretical commenraries of our day.
Yet w hile I admire turns cowards energy in conrriburio ns like Timothy Mitchell's Carbon
Democracy or Vaden and Salminen's presemanalysis, I alsoseegre-.n risk insidcliningnuclear
energy's constitutive effects on the experience of modernity by giving disproportionate
consideration to fossil energy. I thus wish to poinr here w some distinctions that cx:empliY
how nuclear energy technologies may have shaped the ideational purview and hence
experiential realities of industrial and post-industrial socieries in w:-~ys th:u fossil fi1el
tech nologies may not have. Of course, at some level of generaliry, these distinctions are
almost moot: the radical surplus ofenergy generation upon which modernity's expansions
are premised can, after all, maintain its 'epistemological self-delusions', reificarions and
decouplings of'urili cy' and 'function' regardless of the specifics of rhe energy 'inputs' upon
which rhe 'historical stale of exception' is predicated. That being sa id, making explicir the
disrinC[ions berween , say, a nuclear-inAected versus a carbon-inAected analysis of energy's
role in instantiating the modern experience, could lead to imporrant complements or
counterpoints ro inspiring trajectOries like those of Vaden an d Salminen. To this end,
rhc following rhrec distinctions perhaps illustrate how nuclear energy has consrirured the
ideational and hence experiential realiries of contemporary life in a way that is distinctly
d1eir own.

1) RtldioflCfir,e Green. With over sixty new reacrors under construction and many more
1111dergoing life extension updates across che world (WNA 20 13), and with low carbon
emissions relative to che plentiful baseload supply of energy it produces, many see
a 'n uclear renaissance' on the horizon (Sec Kaur 20 11). 1l1is is fue led by nuclear
energy technologies' potential to bolster energy independence, fight climate change
and ensure security of energy supply. In rhis conrcxr, inA uential figures like scienrisrenviro nmcntalist James Lovelock, G reen peace eo-founder Patrick Moore, and Whole
Earth Callllogm: founder Stewart Brand push forward what has been called the 'rise of
the nuclear greens' (Bryce 20 13; Walsh 20 13). Meanwhile, others d igest Robert Stone's
2013 documentary Pandora's Promise's 'intensely personal stories of environmentalists
and energy experts who have undergone a radical conversion from being 1-iercely <lntiro strongly pro- nuclear energy', asking whether 'the one technology we fear most could
save our pl:mer from a climate catastrophe, while providing rhe energy needed to lift
billions of people in the developing wo rld out of povercy'. W ill such real ignments reveal
roday's forecasts in which, to use Yaden and Salminen's words, the 'energy resource
rhat comes after oil is the same that preceded ir' as inopportune as nuclear energy
comes to s upplant coal as a core post-oil energy solutio n? O r w ill the tricky fina ncial
arrangernems accompanying nuclear reactors' distinctly long-term project lives and
capiral-inrensive invcslmenr profiles render coal, rcnewables or shale gas mo re viable
alternarives?

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FOllUM: ENERGY A!IID SOCIAl. TI IEOI!Y

2) Deep Time rtnd thf' Long Now. 1\r the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle are highlevel radioactive wastes (I I LW) Lhar, if nor adequately managed, remain hazardous for
rimespans extending millenn ia into the furure. Even as the strategy of burying HLW
in geologica l disposal faci lities emplaced deep beneath rhe E;mh'~ surface has achieved
substan tial internationa l acceptance-a nd even as some countries (e.g. Sweden and
Finland) have made notable progress with iniriatives ro manage their HLW- no
country has yet pUL such a f.JCil iry into operation. 1l1erefore, much of the J 0,000
m3 of H LW generated globally every yea r can be expected to grad ually accumulate
in surface-level imerim storage faci li ties located on-sire at many of rhe world's 435
nuclear power plams for the foreseeable future (l/\EA 20 13) . At the same rime, novel
practices o f long-r.erm scenario forecas1 ing, risk analysis and stewardship are being
developed in H LW d isposal regimes across rhe world : in Fi nland, fo r insta nce, experts
model d ista nt fu1me geological, ecological and social cond itions in the vicin ity of the
country's p rospective HLW reposito ry ro p roject interacrions that could plausibly occu r
there over rhe millenn ia- examining, for examp le, 'Cli mate Scenarios for O lkiluoto
on a T ime-Scale of 120,000 Yea rs' (Pimenoff er al. 20 11) and potential earrhqual<es
thar may arise as massive glaciers retreat from the region following rhe next ice age.
Perhaps then I-1 LW disposal projeers rake form as un ique zones of engagement wirl1
what physicist ;111d science fiction au rhor Gregory Benford (2000) and historian
Marrin Rudwick (1992) mighr call deep time, and hence implicate the h istorically
novel rangle of ethical, episrcmological and rec hnologiod cll<tllenges of w hat Srew:m
Brand might call rhe long now (1999) . From rhis standpoint, HLW dispos<d regimes
emerge as idiosyncraric scenes of engagemen1 wirh disra nc fu[Ure societies, bodies,
and envi ronments-as sires in which relations bervveen livi ng societies of the p resent
and unborn societies imagined to inhabit dista nt fmure worlds are imagined and
reimagined .
3) Intmnsigent WaJtes. Confronting h istorically 11nprt;cedenred pl<1nning horizons, HLW
disposal regimes hlCC the possibility 1har far future societies, groups or ind ividwtls w ill
inadverrend y reopen, destroy o r Lin ker w ith u1e HLW repositories presem-day h umans
leave buried deep beneath Earth's surface. 1 hese novel effons 10 pttsh H LW outside
the cntropic becomings of Eanh's biosphere for its m ulci-m illenn i:d decay-cycle are
responses to H LW's sroicism in maintaining its position as 'matter Ol tt of p lace', LO
use Mary Douglas' terms-its porencial ro resist all bur th e most elaborate arrempts
ro remove it from rite very human 'srrucrures' and ecological systems rhat posit it as
unwelcome. H ence, one might cas1 H LW as a d isrincrly intransigent form of pollu tion
chat is m arkedly difficult ro sequester from human socialities or ecosysrems for rhe
en tire interval between i rs presen r-day genesis and (to recall Douglas' terminology once
again) irs d istanr future 'final srage of toral disinregrarion', when iLbecomes benign o r
'unrliffe.r<"nl i<1re.rl' nn~e. m or<" (2005 [1 %()]) .
have ral.ked of non-carbon-based energy, suppl ied plentifully with Fairly minimal
emissions. of the rise of regimes reckon ing disram futu re worlds and of uniquely stoic
HlW producrs thar are markedly difficult ro sequester perma.nencly. The positive and
n~tne e:x:rern.alities char emerged with nucle-.ar energy are differenr from those thar

I'Oill T,\ 1: EN Ell()\' A'lD SOCIAL TIIJ!Oil\'

emerged w ith Lhe adve nt of fossil energy in ways we should no1 ignore. In LU ning illlo
r.hcse d is ti nctions, we lay betrer gro und for analyzing rhese diverge nt energy technologies'
dispa rate idc<J rio nal an d/o r experienti;d effects. Firs tly, in instantiating a comcmporary
experience in which the most d istant futures can no lo nger be extricated fro m its waste
prod ucrs, nuclear energy h as effecLUated fascinating modes ofscenario lorecasri ng, technical
modelli ng and future-gazing that have insencd inw p resent-day imaginations new visions
of dis ranc future worlds. Second ly, ;u the nexus of three uniquely lo ngsiglned discourses
(climate ch:m ge, H LW disposal and sustainable develo pment), d iscussions of nuclear
energy in form how enrire populations situate l hemselves in ever wide ning tim escales of
imergenerarional inOuence and responsibility. Thirdly. occupying an im ersritial position
as a non-renewable, rnoSLiy non-em it ring, yer abundanr energy tech nology, nuclear
occupies someth ing of a third spacr berween 'clean' (lower-erniLLi ng, lower- prod ucing)
energies like hyd ropower, wind, or sola r and 'diny' (higher-emi tting, higher- prod uci ng)
carbon-emini ng foss il em:rgy techno logies like o il, CO<l l, o r narud gas. As such, nuclt:ar
energy has fo rged <l novel discursive p ivor poinr arou nd w hich both environmen tal and
energy l'u tu res are now made and remadt:.
Of course, given rhar contem porary ind ust ri<ll a nd post-indusrrial societies' fo remost
aim a p pe;~ rs w be LO keep d1e engines poweri ng Lhei r growrh ru nning at all costs, debares
a bout which partic ular energy resources-n uclear, carbon , renewablcs o r a combination
of the three- are r:1 pped eo power rhem Lakes o n <1 critical, bur inescapably seconda ry,
signifi cance. rlllat being said , a closer look at the d isparate ide;.~r i o na l alignments and realignments consLi rured by disparate energy tech nologies could reveal h ow shifts in th e
conceptual settle ments of the co nt emporary wo rld emanare di ffe rend y from d ifferen t
energy techno logy choices. Such an exercise could p rovide a fru itful supplement to
compelling carbo n-inflected research rr:1jecrories like those of M irchell or Vaden and
S<dm ine n in a rnomc nr in which many lll rn crirical social analysis' gaze increasingly
roward energy issues.

REFERENCES
BeoJord, G. 2000. Dup Time: How Humrtnity Cormmmimtes Across Millennia. New York: H arper
Perennial.
Boyer, D. 201 1. l:::ncrgopolirics and rhc Anthropology of Ene rgy. Anthropology News 52 (5): S.
Brand, S. 1999. The Clock ofthl' l.ong Now: llme rmd Respowibility. New York: B;1sic Books.
Bryce, R. 20 1.~ . Rise.: of rhc Nucbr C rec ns. \'(lasbington Exflntiner, 7 March 2013. Available at:
<h n p://washingwncxarn incr.com/ rob err -brycc-rise-of~ rhc-nuclcar-grccns/an iclc/2S23 S70>.
England, A. 2013. O bama Unveils $7bn Africa Power Initiative.:. h111mrilll Times, 30 ju 11c
20 13. Available :u: <hnp://www.fcco m/crns/s/O/Ic423b34-c 183-ll e2-b796-00 144fcabdc0.
lu ml #ax7.7.2Yj I:::BZsju>.
lAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). 20 1.3. Facrshec.:c Managing R~di oacrivc: Waste. !Af;A
Publicfltiom. J\vaiIable ar: <hrtp://www. iaca.org/PublicaLions/Facrshc.:ers/ELLglish/ ma n radw<L.hrrn l>.
Kauc, R. 201 1. A 'Nuclear Renaissance', Climate Change, and rh e Stare of E.xccprion. 7/Je Auumlirm
JoumaL ofAnthropoLogy 22 (2): 273 277.
Pimenoff, A., A. Vcualaiocn aod H. Jarvincn 20 I J. Clim arc Scenarios for Olkiluoro on a Time-Scale.:
of 120,000 Years. Posi/Jft Oy D11tt1brmk. Available <11 : <http://www. posiva.fi/filcs/2763/l'OS JVA_20 I 1-

04wcb.pdf>.

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FORUM: ENERGY AND SOCW. THEO RY

Rudwick, M. 1992. Scenes from /Jeep Time: &zrly Pictori({l Repml'llltlfions oftbl' Prehistoric

~florid.

Chicago: University of Chicago l'resl>.

Stone, R. 2013. Pmulom's Promisl'. lm pacr l'arrners and C:N N Film~.
WaJsh , B. 2013. Radioactive Green: Pandora's Prom be Rethinb Nuclear Power. Time, 21 June 2013.
Available at : <http://science.timc.com/20 13/06/2 1/ radioacrive-grt."Cn-pandoras-promise-rethinksnuclear-powcrl>.
WNA {World Nuclear Association) 20 I;). Plans for cw Nucl~:ar Reactor~ Worldwide, Updatnl
March 20 13. Availab le at: <1111 p://www. world-nudear.org/in(o/Currcnl and-Fu ture-Generation/ PlansFor-New-Reacto rs-Worldwide/# .Udv-EMOXgso>.
VINCENT F. !A LENTI, I'h. l). Ca nd.
IJEPARTME T OF ANTIIROPOI.OGY
COR 1ELL U IVERS ITY
vli2@corud l.edu

!>uoucu 1\uorupologi: Journal of 1hc Fiu nish Anof,opolo!(il.ll ~odc1 y .1/20 IJ

GS