Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
2d 176
J. Alan Johnson, U.S. Atty., Anthony M. Mariani, Asst. U.S. Atty., Pittsburgh,
Pa., for appellee; Beverly Dennis, III, Regional Atty., John E. Newton, Jr.
(argued), Asst. Regional Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel.
Before ADAMS and HUNTER, Circuit Judges and FISHER, District Judge* .
This appeal raises a novel issue concerning the scope of the review which may
be undertaken by the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration
where a claimant, aggrieved by only one aspect of the determination of the
administrative law judge (ALJ), requests review of a narrow aspect of the
ruling. Also in question is the notice to which the claimant is entitled, if any,
where the Appeals Council's review goes substantially beyond the question
originally presented. For the reasons which follow, we reverse. Our decision
here makes it unnecessary to reach other questions suggested by the record,
particularly whether the determination below is supported by substantial
Appellant is a 59-year old former steel foundry worker with a seventh grade
education. He stopped working on August 27, 1981, when his foundry was
closed, and applied for disability benefits on November 30, 1981, alleging a
history of respiratory ailments. The record contains references to
pneumoconiosis, silicosis, asbestosis, and bronchitis.
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1. The Appeals Council erred in reversing the ALJ's decision which was
2. The Appeals Council erred by failing to limit its evaluation to the single
issue raised by appellant.
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As noted previously, we do not reach the issue, so frequently the focus of this
type of appeal, of whether the Secretary's determination is supported by
substantial evidence or the issue pertaining to appellant's new medical evidence
and compensation award. Instead, we reverse and remand, because the Appeals
Council was wrong in extending the scope of review without proper notice to
the claimant.
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The point is made by the facts of this case. When nine months passed without
notification of the broad scope of review intended by the Appeals Council,
appellant had no reason to suspect that his disability determination would not
be accorded the full repose to which it was entitled upon the running of the
prescribed 60-day period. Moreover, the wholesale reassessment of the record
ostensibly generated by the limited application for reconsideration effectively
reduced whatever notice appellant might have had to a nullity. The fact that the
Council entirely ignored the original issue raised by appellant succinctly
underscores the point. If the Secretary had intended that a claimant's notice of
appeal should invite full review of all aspects of the underlying administrative
determination, she could easily have reserved this right and expressed her
intention in the regulation, thereby warning applicants of the risk they take
when seeking review. In the absence of such an articulation, it would be
improper for us to construe the regulation to mean what the Secretary might
have intended but did not adequately express. Usery v. Kennecott Copper
Corp., 577 F.2d 1113, 1117 (10th Cir.1977). "In fairness to the regulated, the
provisions of the regulations should not be deemed to include what the
administrator, exercising his delegated power, might have covered but did not
cover." Tobin v. Edward S. Wagner Co., 187 F.2d 977, 979 (2d Cir.1951).
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Finally, the Secretary is still not without recourse should she conclude, even
after 60 days, that an error has been committed at a lower administrative level.
As mentioned above, the regulations authorize the Secretary to institute
procedures for the suspension or termination of benefits in certain situations
and impose no time limitations on such action. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. Sec.
416.1321 et seq.
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The Secretary has brought to our attention the holding in DeLong v. Heckler,
771 F.2d 266 (7th Cir.1985). There the claimant was granted disability benefits
until August 18, 1981. On August 12 he testified at a hearing that he was then
ready to return to work and, on the basis of this and other evidence, the ALJ
concluded that the disability had ended.5 Apparently, DeLong later decided to
file a new application for benefits but actually submitted an application, under
section 404.967, to appeal from the decision to grant him benefits only until
August 18. The matter was duly referred to the Appeals Council where it was
decided that DeLong had never been disabled and the ALJ's ruling was
reversed. "So far as appears, the Social Security Administration is not seeking
repayment of any disability benefits that may actually have been paid DeLong
pursuant to the administrative law judge's decision." 771 F.2d at 267.
The issue in DeLong was
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whether
the Appeals Council has the power, when reviewing an administrative law
judge's decision at the behest of an applicant for social security disability benefits
who believes the administrative law judge did not make a sufficiently generous
award, to throw out the entire award if contrary to the law or facts of the case.
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Id. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that "no statute or regulation deals with
the question." Id. We also agree that the analysis must therefore turn on
sections 404.967 and 404.969. The similarity of our views, however, ends there.
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For the reasons set forth at length above, we respectfully disagree with the
rather abrupt conclusion that "it would be a quite pointless exercise in shuffling
paper for the Council, having received the claimant's notice of appeal within 60
days, to then have to issue its own notice of intent to review the case." 771 F.2d
at 268. As we have explained, it is no empty gesture to put claimants on fair
and prior notice that an appeal of a discrete and narrow issue may jeopardize an
entire benefits award. Moreover, in this particular case, counter notice would
have been neither "pointless" nor "redundant," since petitioner had no idea
during the intervening nine months that he had endangered the entire award.
The Seventh Circuit itself notes that proceedings before the Social Security
Administration are not strictly adversarial in nature; all the more reason why
fundamental fairness requires that partly dissatisfied claimants like petitioner be
apprised of the risks inherent in their projected appeals.
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Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed and the District
Court is directed to remand the matter to the Secretary with instructions to
reinstate the decision of the ALJ and conduct further proceedings consistent
with this opinion for the purpose of resolving the original appeal pertaining to
appellant's date of onset.
Hon. Clarkson S. Fisher, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, sitting by designation
Anytime within 60 days after the date of a hearing decision or dismissal, the
Appeals Council itself may decide to review the action that was taken. If the
Appeals Council does review the hearing decision or dismissal, notice of the
action will be mailed to all parties at their last known address.
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