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CA
G.R. No. 107112
FACTS:
NATELCO Entered into contract with Camarines Sur II Electric Cooperative for the use in
operation of its telephone service, electric light posts of CASURECO II and in return, there will
be free use of 10 telephone connections as long as NATELCO needs electric light posts. The
contract will terminate when they are forced to stop, abandon operation and remove light posts.
After 10 years, CASURECO files for reformation of contract with damages, not conforming to
the guidelines of National Electrification Administration of reasonable compensation for use of
posts. Compensation is worth P10, but the consumption of telephone cables costs P2630
NATELCO, who used 319, without the contract of P10 each, refused to pay. The latter barred by
the prescription.
ISSUE:
WON the filing of reformation of contract prescribed
RULING:
Contract eventually became unfair due to increase in volume of subscribers without increase of
telephone connections which are free of charge to CASURECO. ARTICLE 1267 is applicable,
since the contract is subject to a potestative condition, the agreement is void.
Petitioners failed to properly discharge their burden to show that the debts are liquidated and
demandable. Consequently, legal compensation is inapplicable.
The petitioners attempted to prove that they spent for the repair of the roofing, ceiling and
flooring, as well as for waterproofing. However, they failed to appreciate that, as per their lease
contract, only structural repairs are for the account of the lessor, herein respondent SPI. In
which case, they overlooked the need to establish that aforesaid repairs are structural in nature,
in the context of their earlier agreement. It would have been an altogether different matter if the
lessor was informed of the said structural repairs and he implicitly or expressly consented and
agreed to take responsibility for the said expenses. Such want of evidence on this respect is
fatal to this appeal. Consequently, their claim remains unliquidated and, legal compensation is
inapplicable.
commission on the subject sale to Dole Philippines, Inc. is vigorously disputed. This
circumstance prevents legal compensation from taking place.
276. FRANCIA V CA
G.R.No. 67649 June 28, 1998
FACTS:
Engracio Francia is the registered owner of a residential lot and a two-story house built
upon it situated at Barrio San Isidro, now District of Sta. Clara, Pasay City, Metro Manila. On
October 15, 1977, a 125 square meter portion of Francia's property was expropriated by the
Republic of the Philippines for the sum of P4,116.00 representing the estimated amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the aforesaid portion.Since 1963 up to 1977 inclusive,
Francia failed to pay his real estate taxes. Thus, on December 5, 1977, his property was sold at
public auction by the City Treasurer of Pasay City pursuant to Section 73 of Presidential Decree
No. 464 known as the Real Property Tax Code in order to satisfy a tax delinquency of
P2,400.00. Ho Fernandez was the highest bidder for the property. Francia was not present
during the auction sale since he was in Iligan City at that time helping his uncle ship bananas.
On March 3, 1979, Francia received a notice of hearing of LRC Case No. 1593-P "In re: Petition
for Entry of New Certificate of Title" filed by Ho Fernandez, seeking the cancellation of TCT No.
4739 (37795) and the issuance in his name of a new certificate of title. On March 20, 1979,
Francia filed a complaint to annul the auction sale. He later amended his complaint on January
24, 1980.
ISSUE:
Whether or not francias tax delinquency of P2,400.00 has been extinguished by legal
compensation.
RULING:
There is no legal basis for the contention. By legal compensation, obligations of persons,
who in their own right are reciprocally debtors and creditors of each other, are extinguished (Art.
1278, Civil Code). The circumstances of the case do not satisfy the requirements provided by
Article 1279, to wit:
"(1) that each one of the obligors be bound principally and that he be at the same time a
principal creditor of the other;
We have consistently ruled that there can be no off-setting of taxes against the claims that the
taxpayer may have against the government. A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground
that the government owes him an amount equal to or greater than the tax being collected. The
collection of a tax cannot await the results of a lawsuit against the government.
A claim for taxes is not such a debt, demand, contract or judgment as is allowed to be
set-off under the statutes of set-off, which are construed uniformly, in the light of public policy, to
exclude the remedy in an action or any indebtedness of the state or municipality to one who is
liable to the state or municipality for taxes. Neither are they a proper subject of recoupment
since they do not arise out of the contract or transaction sued on. "The general rule based on
grounds of public policy is well-settled that no set-off admissible against demands for taxes
levied for general or local governmental purposes. The reason on which the general rule is
based, is that taxes are not in the nature of contracts between the party and party but grow out
of duty to, and are the positive acts of the government to the making and enforcing of which, the
personal consent of individual taxpayers is not required
On the receipt of February 5, 1992 did not create a new obligation incompatible with the old one
under the promissory note that was issued. It was only a payment of the obligation of Servando
and did not establish a new obligation. The Court ruled that the payment of the obligation does
not novate the instrument that only expressly recognize the old obligation, or changes only the
terms of the payment, or adds other obligation that is not incompatible with the old ones, or the
new contract merely supplements the old one. The new contract that is a mere reiteration,
acknowledgement or ratification of the old contract with slight modifications or alterations as to
the cause or object or principal conditions can stand together with the former
one, and there can be no incompatibility between them. Moreover, a creditors acceptance of
payment after demand does not operate as a modification of the original contract. Novation is
not presumed by the parties, there should be an expressed agreement that would abrogate the
old one in favor of the new one. In the absence of the express agreement, the old and the new
obligation should be incompatible on every point. The incompatibility of the obligation is that the
two obligations cannot stand together, each one having independence from each other. Thus,
the court affirms the decision of the CA promulgated on March 19, 2003.
users and to have a complete determination or settlement of the claim. As this Court is not a
trier of facts, we deem it proper to remand this factual issue to the RTC for determination and
computation of the actual amount RBG owes to Metrobank, plus the corresponding interest and
penalties.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari.
284. SWAGMAN V CA
G.R.No. 161135 April 8, 2005
FACTS:
Sometime in 1996 and 1997, petitioner Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., through Atty.
Leonor L. Infante and Rodney David Hegerty, its president and vice-president, respectively,
obtained from private respondent Neal B. Christian loans evidenced by three promissory notes
dated 7 August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July 1997. Each of the promissory notes is in the
amount of US$50,000 payable after three years from its date with an interest of 15% per annum
payable every three months. In a letter dated 16 December 1998, Christian informed the
petitioner corporation that he was terminating the loans and demanded from the latter payment
in the total amount of US$150,000 plus unpaid interests in the total amount of US$13,500. On 2
February 1999, private respondent Christian filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 59, a complaint for a sum of money and damages against the petitioner corporation,
Hegerty, and Atty. Infante. The petitioner corporation, together with its president and vicepresident, filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of cause of action and novation of the
principal obligations. According to them, Christian had no cause of action because the three
promissory notes were not yet due and demandable.
ISSUE:
Where there is a valid novation, may the original terms of contract which has been
novated still prevail?
HELD:
The receipts, as well as private respondents summary of payments, lend credence to
petitioners claim that the payments were for the principal loans and that the interests on the
three consolidated loans were waived by the private respondent during the undisputed
renegotiation of the loans on account of the business reverses suffered by the petitioner at the
time.
There was therefore a novation of the terms of the three promissory notes in that the
interest was waived and the principal was payable in monthly installments of US$750.
Alterations of the terms and conditions of the obligation would generally result only in
modificatory novation unless such terms and conditions are considered to be the essence of the
obligation itself.[25] The resulting novation in this case was, therefore, of the modificatory type,
not the extinctive type, since the obligation to pay a sum of money remains in force.
Thus, since the petitioner did not renege on its obligation to pay the monthly installments
conformably with their new agreement and even continued paying during the pendency of the
case, the private respondent had no cause of action to file the complaint. It is only upon
petitioners default in the payment of the monthly amortizations that a cause of action would
arise and give the private respondent a right to maintain an action against the petitioner.
respondents for having successfully handled the civil case filed by Chong against Spouses de
Guzman. The award of attorneys fees by the RTC in the amount of P10,000.00 in favor of
Spouses de Guzman, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA and this Court, is of no
moment. The said award, made in its extraordinary concept as indemnity for damages, forms
part of the judgment recoverable against the losing party and is to be paid directly to Spouses
de Guzman (substituted by respondents) and not to petitioner. Thus, to grant petitioners motion
to determine attorneys fees would not result in a double award of attorneys fees. And, contrary
to the RTC ruling, there would be no amendment of a final and executory decision or variance in
judgment. With respect to petitioners entitlement to the claimed attorneys fees, it is the Courts
considered view that he is deserving of it and that the amount should be based on quantum
meruit. The Court, however, is resistant in granting petitioner's prayer for an award of 25%
attorney's fees based on the value of the property subject of litigation because petitioner failed
to clearly substantiate the details of his oral agreement with Spouses de Guzman. A fair and
reasonable amount of attorney's fees should be 15% of the market value of the property.
case well within the territory of the 10 year prescriptive bar to suits based upon a written
contract under Article 1144 (1)of the Civil Code.
293. SPOUSES PATRICIO and MYRNA BERNALES vs. HEIRS OF JULIAN SAMBAAN
G.R.No. 163271
Facts:
Spouses Julian and Guillerma Sambaan were the registered owner of a property located in
Bulua, Cagayan de oro City. The respondents and the petitioner Myrna Bernales are the
children of Julian and Guillerma. Myrna, who is the eldest of the siblings, is the present owner
and possessor of the property in question. Julian died in an ambush in 1975. Before he died, he
requested that the property in question be redeemed from Myrna and her husband Patricio
Bernales. Thus, in 1982 one of Julians siblings offered to redeem the property but the
petitioners refused because they were allegedly using the property as tethering place for their
cattle. In January 1991, respondents received an information that the subject property was
already transferred to Myrna Bernales. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1970
bore the forged signatures of their parents, Julian and Guillerma. On April 1993, the
respondents, together with their mother Guillerma, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of
Absolute Sale and cancellation of TCT No. T-14204 alleging that their parents signatures were
forged. The trial court rendered a decision on August 2, 2001 cancelling the TCT and ordering
another title to be issued in the name of the late Julian Sambaan. Petitioners went to the CA and
appealed the decision. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. A motion for
reconsideration of the decision was, likewise, denied in 2004. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale is authentic as to prove the ownership of the
petitioners over the subject property.
Held:
It is a question of fact rather than of law. Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts. Factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect on
appeal, and in fact accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the record.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. But to erase any doubt on
the correctness of the assailed ruling, we have carefully perused the records and, nonetheless,
arrived at the same conclusion. We find that there is substantial evidence on record to support
the Court of Appeals and trial courts conclusion that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma in
the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged. Conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent
reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. The fact that the CA
adopted the findings of fact of the trial court makes the same binding upon this court.
Thus, we hold that with the presentation of the forged deed, even if accompanied by the owners
duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner did not thereby lose his title, and neither does
the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the said property.
In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL). In
1982 however, SAL was hit by recession and so it had to lay off some employees. Laureano
was one of them. Laureano asked for reconsideration but it was not granted. Aggrieved,
Laureano filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against SAL. But in 1987, he withdrew the labor
case and instead filed a civil case for damages due to illegal termination of contract against
SAL. Laureano filed the case here in the Philippines. SAL moved for the dismissal of the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the
termination of Laureano is valid pursuant to Singaporean law.
The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the case raising the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, non applicability of Philippine laws, and estoppel, among others. The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this case.
HELD:
No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is not proved in
court. As such, the trial court cannot make a determination if the termination is indeed valid
under Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore.
SAL has the burden of proof. SAL failed to prove such law hence Philippine law shall apply.
However, the case must be dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Under our laws, all money
claims arising from employer-employee relationships must be filed within three years from the
time the cause of action accrued. Laureanos cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was
terminated but he only filed the money claim in 1987 or more than three years from 1982.
Hence he is already barred by prescription.
On the other hand, Rule 45 as a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment which
include errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings. All errors committed in the
exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.
In the case, Banco Fils allegations that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion were only
bare allegations since Banco Fil even admitted that the CA labored out a 33-page rationale on
the decision of their case, thus, the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
Note that, the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive. Hence, the availability to Banco Fil of the remedy under Rule 45 effectively
foreclosed its right to resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Also note that certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy of appeal.
In the case, Banco Fils recourse under Rule 65 cannot be taken, because when it filed a
petition for certiorari to the SC, the reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Rule
45 to the CA had already lapsed.
Prescription based on written contracts, the filing of action for reconveyance is within 10 years
from the time the condition in the Deed of Donation was violated. The petitioner herein filed only
24 years in the first action and 43 years in the second filing of the 2nd action.
The action for reconveyance on the alleged excess of 33, 607 square meter mistakenly
included in the title was also prescribed Article 1456 of the Civil Code states, if property is
acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefits of the person from whom the property comes, if within
10 years such action for reconveyance has not been executed.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that an action for quieting of title is imprescriptible especially if
the plaintiff is in possession of the property being litigated. One who is in actual possession of a
land, claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before making steps to vindicate his right because his undisturbed possession gives
him a continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to ascertain the nature of the adverse claim
and its effect on his title. Moreover, the Court held that laches is inapplicable in this case. This is
because, as mentioned earlier, petitioners possession of the subject lot has rendered their right
to bring an action for quieting of title imprescriptible.