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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation The 5th GTA Report


With the return to economic growth of many industrialised economies in
either late 2009 or the first half of 2010, combined with sustained expansions
in the emerging market economies, came the hope that protectionist
Africa Resists the
pressures would ease in the world economy through 2010. If anything, the
period since our last report was published in January 2010 has been one of the
busiest for the Global Trade Alert team. Protectionist Temptation
Nothing short of a mountain of evidence has been uncovered in recent
months concerning state measures announced after the start of our reporting
window, November 2008. A total of 247 new reports on implemented or
announced and pending state measures have been added to the Global Trade
Alert database since our last report was published, expanding the total
The 5th GTA Report
number of reports to 960. This 40% expansion in the GTA's database provides
for a more comprehensive assessment of contemporary
protectionism and, as this Report makes clear, some of our previous findings
have been revised. A Focus on Sub-Saharan Africa
Like our two previous reports, the fifth Report also has a regional focus. This
time our focus is on Sub-Saharan Africa, whose development significance is
evident. What may be less well known is that Sub-Saharan African govern-
ments have not resorted to protectionism on the scale of industrialised
countries and some developing country peers during the recent global
economic downturn. Sub-Saharan Africa is also the recipient of preferential
access to the markets of many industrialised countries. This Report contains
two papers on the likely reforms to the United States and European Union
trade preference regimes and their potential implications for Sub-Saharan
Africa. These papers will also be of interest to those following the West's
policies towards Sub-Saharan Africa.

Edited by Simon J. Evenett

Centre for Economic Policy Research


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www.cepr.org
Africa Resists the Protectionist
Temptation
The 5th GTA Report
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Centre for Economic Policy Research


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53-56 Great Sutton Street
London EC1V 0DG
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Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801


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© Centre for Economic Policy Research 2010


Africa Resists the Protectionist
Temptation
The 5th GTA Report
Edited by Simon J. Evenett
About Global Trade Alert (GTA)

Global Trade Alert provides information in real time on state measures taken during the current
global economic downturn that are likely to discriminate against foreign commerce. Global
Trade Alert is:
Independent: GTA is co-ordinated by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, an independent
academic and policy research think-tank based in London, UK. GTA draws upon expertise and
analysis from 7 independent research institutions around the world.
Comprehensive: GTA complements and goes beyond the WTO and World Bank's monitoring
initiatives by identifying those trading partners likely to be harmed by state measures.
Accessible: The GTA website allows policy-makers, exporters, the media, and analysts to search
the posted government measures by implementing country, by trading partners harmed, and
by sector. Third parties will be able to report suspicious state measures and governments will be
given the right to reply to any of their measures listed on the website.
Transparent: The GTA website allows policymakers, government officials, exporters, the media,
and analysts to report discriminatory measures, but also will provide data for all stakeholders
on the posted government measures by implementing country, by trading partners harmed,
and by sector.
Timely: The up-to-date information and informed commentary provided by Global Trade Alert
will help ensure that the G20 pledge not to "repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism of pre-
vious eras" is met, by maintaining confidence in the world trading system, deterring beggar-thy-
neighbour acts, and preserving the contribution that exports could play in the future recovery
of the world economy.
For further information, visit www.GlobalTradeAlert.org

About the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

The Centre for Economic Policy Research is a network of over 700 Research Fellows and
Affiliates, based primarily in European universities. The Centre coordinates the research activi-
ties of its Fellows and Affiliates and communicates the results to the public and private sectors.
CEPR is an entrepreneur, developing research initiatives with the producers, consumers and
sponsors of research. Established in 1983, CEPR is a European economics research organization
with uniquely wide-ranging scope and activities.

The Centre is pluralist and non-partisan, bringing economic research to bear on the analysis of
medium- and long-run policy questions. CEPR research may include views on policy, but the
Executive Committee of the Centre does not give prior review to its publications, and the
Centre takes no institutional policy positions. The opinions expressed in this report are those
of the authors and not those of the Centre for Economic Policy Research.

CEPR is a registered charity (No. 287287) and a company limited by guarantee and registered in
England (No. 1727026).

Chair of the Board Guillermo de la Dehesa


President Richard Portes
Chief Executive Officer Stephen Yeo
Research Director Mathias Dewatripont
Policy Director Richard Baldwin
Contents

Foreword vii

Executive Summary 1
Simon J. Evenett

Section 1: Crisis-related Discrimination Against Foreign


Commercial Interests
A Global Overview of Protectionism through to May 2010 19
Simon J. Evenett

Section 2: Sub-Saharan Africa, Commercial Policy


Discrimination and the Global Economic Downturn
Effects of Post-Crisis Foreign Trade Policy Measures on Economic and 35
Trade Performance in Africa
Eric Kehinde Ogunleye
Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Trade and Economic 49
Policy Making in Africa
Felix Fofana N’Zue
Transforming Africa’s Structure and Composition of Trade after the 63
Global Economic Crisis
Nana Amma Afari-Gyan
Towards More Balanced Trade within the Framework of the Forum for 75
China-Africa Cooperation: The Impact of China on Africa’s Trade
Sarah Jane Danchie
How Much Did Africa’s Top Exports Fall During the Crisis? 93
A Comparison with East Asia and Africa
Martin Wermelinger
US Trade Policy Towards the Least Developed Countries: 103
Are these Countries’ Interests Congruent or in Conflict?
Craig vanGrasstek
Reform of the EU GSP Regime and its Potential Impact on Sub-Saharan 113
Africa
Malwina Nowakowska
Section 3: Country-by Country Reports
Angola 139
Benin 142
Botswana 145
Burkino Faso 148
Cameroon 151
Cape Verde 154
Central African Republic 157
Chad 160
Comoros 163
Congo 166
Democratic Republic of The Congo 169
Cote d’Ivoire 172
Eritrea 176
Ethiopia 179
Gabon 183
Gambia 186
Ghana 189
Guinea 193
Guinea-Bissau 196
Kenya 199
Lesotho 203
Liberia 206
Madagascar 209
Malawi 213
Mali 216
Mauritania 219
Mauritius 222
Mayotte 225
Mozambique 228
Namibia 231
Niger 234
Nigeria 238
Rwanda 243
Sao Tome and Principe 246
Senegal 249
Seychelles 253
Sierra Leone 256
Somalia 259
South Africa 262
Sudan 266
United Republic of Tanzania 269
Togo 272
Uganda 276
Zambia 280
Zimbabwe 284
Foreword

Global Trade Alert is now almost a year old. Over the past year it has received 960
reports of state measures taken during the global downturn that are likely to affect
foreign commerce. The flow of reports about these measures shows no signs of abat-
ing: we have received 247 reports since the publication of the fourth GTA Report in
January 2010. Each report is carefully scrutinized by our independent team of trade
policy analysts based around the globe before it is published on the GTA website. The
GTA team has concluded that 496 'beggar thy neighbour' measures have been intro-
duced since November 2008. Almost a third (31%) involve bailouts and state aids: sur-
prisingly, many of these are not in the financial sector but instead in smokestack,
declining industries or in agriculture. Anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard
measures are also popular, and represent 20% of the measures. There is a glimmer of
good news, however: tariffs are becoming less important, and only represent 12% of
the measures introduced. There is other good news as well: the ratio of 'beggar thy
neighbour' to liberalizing measures has fallen recently, and was less than three to one
in the latest reporting period.
This report, the fifth produced by the GTA team over the past year, examines the
'global dynamics' of protectionism: whether a return to growth has altered govern-
ments' tendencies towards protectionism, and the extent, nature and possible harm
done by discriminatory state measures taken since November 2008.
Like its two predecessors, this GTA report has a regional focus, this time on Sub-
Saharan Africa. The report includes seven papers on the commercial policy challenges
facing Sub-Saharan Africa. First, there are three papers on Africa's trade relations with
its leading trading partners: China, the European Union, and the United States. This
is followed by detailed information on each nation in Sub-Saharan Africa: the extent
to which its commercial interests have been harmed by the actions of other countries,
and the extent to which measures it has introduced have affected its trading partners.
On Sub-Saharan Africa, there is some encouraging news: governments in that
region have not resorted to protectionism on the scale of industrialised countries and
some of their developing country peers. If anything, governments in Sub-Saharan
Africa have continued to pursue policies of openness, intensifying their drive to
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) through changes to tax, investment, and other
policies designed to lure foreign firms.
At the global level, however, the picture is still mixed: a few rays of sunshine break-
ing through a sombre background. The G20 countries are typical. To their credit, they
implemented 33 of the 41 benign or liberalising measures discovered since the last
GTA report was published in January 2010. On the other hand, since we published

vii
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

our report, we have discovered 96 more discriminatory measures implemented by


G20 countries: a 40% increase!
So the evidence we have from the GTA database suggests the importance of con-
tinued vigilance. Such vigilance would not be possible without Simon Evenett and
the unbounded energy and enthusiasm he has shown in leading GTA initiative.
Thanks are also due to his hard-working team at the Swiss Institute for International
Economics and Applied Economic Research in St. Gallen, who prepared the summa-
ry tables and maps and provided general research support – namely, Johannes Fritz,
Darya Gerasimenko, Malwina Nowakowska, and Martin Wermelinger. CEPR's
Publications Team – Anil Shamdasani and Samantha Reid, provided invaluable sup-
port, as ever. The task of collecting and analysing the data has been conducted very
efficiently and professionally by GTA's regional network partners, notably, the African
Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET), the Centre for International
Governance Innovation (CIGI), the Gulf Research Center (GRC), the Latin American
Trade Network (LATN), and the Research and Information System for Developing
Countries (RIS). We also owe thanks to GTA's supporters: the Centre for International
Governance Innovation, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the
International Development Research Center, the Trade Policy Unit of the UK
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Department for International
Development. In particular we would like to acknowledge financial support from the
Global Trade and Financial Architecture project (an initiative of the UK Department
for International Development and the World Bank). Indeed, the support from all our
partners has been generous and most welcome, but they of course play no role in the
operation of GTA, nor do they necessarily endorse the opinions expressed in this
Report.
We have been very much encouraged by the overwhelmingly positive reaction to
Global Trade Alert from the world's media, policymakers and the international trade
community in general. This response has convinced us that an independent initiative
such as GTA is necessary, valuable and can sit comfortably alongside, and comple-
ment, other such monitoring initiatives that are taking place around the world. In
this spirit, we trust that the contents of this report, and the ongoing work of GTA, will
continue to be of interest to trade policymakers, commercial organisations, NGOs
and analysts following developments in the world trading system.

Stephen Yeo
Chief Executive Officer, CEPR
London, 26 May 2010

viii
Executive Summary

Simon J. Evenett
University of St. Gallen and CEPR

Revisiting contemporary protectionism on the basis of a far greater


evidential base

With the return to economic growth of many industrialised economies in either late
2009 or the first half of 2010, combined with sustained expansions in the emerging
market economies, came the hope that protectionist pressures would ease in the
world economy through 2010. If anything, the period since our last report was pub-
lished in January 2010, has been one of the busiest for the Global Trade Alert team.
Nothing short of a mountain of evidence has been uncovered in recent months
concerning state measures announced after the start of our reporting window,
November 2008 (corresponding to the date of the first crisis-related G20 summit held
in Washington DC.) A total of 247 new reports on implemented or announced and
pending state measures have been added to the Global Trade Alert database since our
last report was published, expanding the total number of reports to 960. This 40 per-
cent expansion in the GTA's database provides for a more comprehensive assessment
of contemporary protectionism and, as will become clear, some of our previous find-
ings have had to be revised accordingly.
The purpose of this fifth report of the Global Trade Alert is to provide an overview
of the state measures taken during the current global economic downturn and nas-
cent recovery1 that might affect international commerce. The principal findings of
the report are summarised below and a global overview of contemporary commercial
policies is provided in the next chapter.
Like our two previous reports, this report also has a regional focus. This time our
focus is on Sub-Saharan Africa, whose development significance is evident. What may
be less well known is that Sub-Saharan African governments have not resorted to pro-
tectionism on the scale of industrialised countries and some developing country peers
during the recent global economic downturn (see Map 1.1). Indeed, the contest for
foreign direct investment (FDI) appears to be in full swing in Sub-Saharan Africa, with

1 The recent downturn in business sentiment in Europe and the dislocation in the financial markets asso-
ciated with the solvency of certain Eurozone governments are discussed in the next chapter. Should the
world economy ultimately succumb to another bout of contraction then the past six months may well
have been a lull before the storm, with attendant implications for the corporate demand for protection
from foreign competition. The Global Trade Alert does not make macroeconomic forecasts, instead its
team stands ready to monitor the potential cross-border implications of state measures taken over the
coming months irrespective of macroeconomic conditions.

1
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

governments making repeated changes to tax, investment, and other policies to lure
foreign firms to establish facilities.2
Sub-Saharan Africa is also the recipient of preferential access to the markets of
many industrialised countries. This report contains two papers on the likely reforms
to the United States and European Union trade preference regimes and their poten-
tial implications for Sub-Saharan Africa. These papers will, therefore, also be of inter-
est to those following the West's policies towards Sub-Saharan Africa.

A contribution to policy dialogue through independent monitoring of


state measures
Global Trade Alert (GTA) has always operated on the assumption that in current cir-
cumstances the most practical approach to resisting protectionism is to combine peer
pressure with high-quality, current information about state measures and their actu-
al or potential effects on foreign commercial interests. Governments, the media, and
civil society are the key sources of the former; the job of Global Trade Alert and other
monitoring exercises is to provide the latter.
An assessment as to the extent and changes over time in protectionist dynamics is
also provided for in this Report, by considering not just the quarter-by-quarter
changes in the numbers of protectionist measures implemented but also the number
of pending measures that have been announced and are expected to implemented in
the future. Information on the pending measures provides policymakers with an
"early warning" of what is to come, a feature unique to the GTA's monitoring initia-
tive.

Principal findings of the Fifth Report concerning crisis-era


protectionism
The substantial expansion in the GTA's database permitted a re-evaluation of the key
aspects of crisis-era protectionism. Below is our latest assessment of these dynamics.
1. Since the first G20 crisis-related summit in November 2008, the governments of
world have together implemented 496 beggar-thy-neighbour policy measures;
that is, more than one for every working day. Add in another 86 implemented
measures that are likely to have harmed some foreign commercial interests, the
total reaches 582; that is, more than one for every actual day since the first G20
summit in November 2008.
a. Of those 247 new entries in the Global Trade Alert, 131 government
measures been implemented that almost certainly discriminated against
foreign commercial interests. The total number of implemented (almost)
discriminatory measures in the Global Trade Alert database rose then to 496
measures, just over half of the total number of reports (960).

2 Some of the best evidence for this sustained policy of openness can be found in the budget speeches of
various finance ministers from Sub-Saharan Africa over the past two years.

2
Executive Summary

b. Since our last report was published in January 2010, the number of beggar-
thy-neighbour measures reported (131) was less than three times the
number of benign or liberalising measures reported (53). This ratio was
considerably more favourable to market opening than in the previous GTA
reports, and constitutes some good news.
2. Since the first G20 crisis-summit, bailouts and state aids are the most frequent
source of discrimination against other nations' commercial interests. Thirty-one
percent of all discriminatory measures were bailouts. By now 96 out of the 166
discriminatory state aid/bail out measures in the Global Trade Alert database are
in sectors other than the financial sector; many governments have taken the
opportunity of the crisis to bail out manufacturers and farmers.
3. Although there are a lot of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures
in the pipeline, they still account for only 99 of the 496 harmful measures
implemented since November 2008. The large numbers of discriminatory
measures reported in the Global Trade Alert database are, therefore, not driven
by so-called unfair trade actions.
4. Relatively speaking tariff measures--the trade barrier most associated with the
1930s--continue to decline further in numerical importance. Tariff increases
account for only one in eight of the total number of discriminatory state
measures imposed in the current global economic downturn.
5. No doubt to the embarrassment of those who systematically talked down the
incidence of protectionism during 2009, the evidence continues to mount as to
the extent to which governments discriminated against foreign commercial
interests.
a. Since our last report was compiled the GTA team has found evidence of
more harmful state measures that were imposed in the last quarter of 2008
and the first half of 2009. This evidence forces us to revise upward by
approximately 10 percent the number of beggar-thy-neighbour measures
imposed in the first six months of 2009, to at least 115 measures per quarter.
6. By May 2010, no four-digit product line, no UN classified economic sector, and
no jurisdiction has emerged unscathed by crisis-era protectionism.
7. Since November 2008 China's commercial interests have been hit 221 times by
protectionist measures. Only if the 27 members of the European Union are
counted together, does any other jurisdiction come close to absorbing
comparable harm (the EU27 group being hit 206 times).
a. There have been substantial increases in the number of times certain
jurisdictions' commercial interests have been harmed since the last GTA
report was published in January 2010. Since that last report, everyone of the
10 ten targets have been hit by at least another 28 beggar-thy-neighbour
policies. China has been hit by 60 more measures (the most again), followed
by the EU 27 (53 more adverse measures) and the USA (38 more hits).
8. Despite taking their no-protectionism pledge the G20 members have imposed
316 beggar-thy-neighbour policies since November 2008. Since our last report
was published in January 2010, a total of 96 more discriminatory measures
implemented by G20 countries have been discovered, representing at least a 40
percent increase.

3
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

a. The G20 countries also implemented 81 of the 107 benign or liberalising


measures recorded in the GTA database. To their credit, 33 of the 41 benign
or liberalising measures discovered since the last GTA report was published
were implemented by G20 countries.
9. Unlike recent GTA reports, by May 2010 it was not longer the case that the
Russian Federation was in the top 5 of offending nations on all four criteria
(number of harmful measures implemented, tariff lines affected, sectors affected,
or trading partners affected). Now, taken together, the EU 27 has this dubious
distinction. See Table 1.1. below.
a. On all four metrics, Argentina, China, Indonesia, and Russian Federation are
always in the top 10 worst offending nations.
b. The Russian Federation has the dubious distinction of raising trade barriers
against the most tariff lines (40 percent of all product categories.) Still,
Algeria takes the prize for measures that harm foreign commercial interests
in the largest number of economic sectors; Indonesia for harming the most
trading partners (165).
c. When nations are ranked by the number of trading partners their state
measures have harmed, every one of the top-10 worst offenders has hurt the
commercial interests of over 120 nations.
10.In the last GTA report it was stated that only five jurisdictions had taken
discriminatory measures that affected more than a quarter of all the possible
traded product categories; interestingly that number has now risen to nine.3
Still, only six (or five if one does not count the EU 27 as a group) jurisdictions
have taken measures that affect more than a third of all possible product
categories. The latter demonstrates that the across-the-board measures seen in
the 1930s have not been repeated in the recent global economic downturn.
11.Our expansion of the database confirms one long-standing GTA finding: Despite
all the talk about measures to bolster green industries, innovation, and future
growth poles of the economy, the great majority of the discrimination is in
favour of domestic firms is in smokestack, declining industries and in
agriculture.
12.In January 2010 the GTA reported there were 188 suspicious protectionist
measures in the pipeline4; by May 2010 that total has risen to 237. As in our
previous reports, if every one of these measures were eventually implemented it
would be equivalent just under half a year's more protectionism.

3 The Russian Federation, Brazil, Ukraine, EU 27, Indonesia, China, Ecuador, Argentina, and India. See
Table 2.5 in the next chapter for more details.
4 For the purposes of this report (and the last one) the protectionist pipeline is said to include all those
state measures that (i) have been publicly announced, (ii) that have yet to be implemented and (iii) upon
examination are likely to harm foreign commercial interests. Such measures are classified amber in the
GTA database until implemented, whereupon their classification may change (depending on the details
about the potential discriminatory impact available at the time of implementation.)

4
Executive Summary

Table 1.1 Which countries have inflicted the most harm?

Metric, Country in specified rank, Number


Ranked by the
Ranked by the
number of tariff Ranked by the
number of trading
Ranked by number of lines (product number of sectors
Rank partners affected
(almost certainly) categories) affected by (almost
by (almost
discriminatory affected by (almost certainly)
certainly)
measures imposed certainly) discriminatory
discriminatory
discriminatory measures
measures
measures
1. Russian
EU 27 (140) Federation (487) Algeria (54) Indonesia (165)
2. Russian Federation (48) Brazil (440) EU 27 (52) EU 27 (163)
3. Argentina (37) Ukraine (389) Indonesia (31) China (152)
4. Germany (28) EU 27 (371) Ecuador (30) Argentina (145)
5. India (27) Indonesia (346) China (26) India (144)
6. Russian Federation Russian Federation
UK (22) China (335) (25) (137)
7. Indonesia (20) Ecuador (316) Mexico (24) Belgium (132)
8. China (19) Argentina (299) Argentina UK (128)
9. Italy (18) India (282) Belarus (23) Germany (124)
10. Austria (17) Belguim (203) Belgium France (121)

Note: There is no single metric to evaluate harm. Different policy measures affect different numbers of
products, economic sectors, and trading partners. GTA reports four measures of harm.
The EU27 refers to the sum of all of the measures taken by the 27 national governments of the European
Union and the measures taken by the European Commission. To be included in this total a state measure
must have involved discrimination against the commercial interests of another state, including potentially
another member of the European Union.

5
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

How GTA built its extensive database on contemporary protectionism

Since GTA was launched on 8 June 2009 just under 1000 state initiatives have been investigated
by our independent team of trade policy analysts located around the globe. These initiatives
vary from packages of wide-ranging public measures, with many implications for trade and
investment policy instruments, to temporary tariff increases on single product lines. GTA's goal
is to provide the most comprehensive online database of state measures taken since the first
crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008 that might affect foreign commercial interests. The
latter are broadly conceived by the GTA team to include not just trade flows and foreign
investments but also intellectual property rights and migrant workers deployed abroad. It is
through careful, multi-faceted investigations of these initiatives that a rich evidential base was
built, from which the contours of contemporary protectionism can be discerned. Users can
access this evidence at the website: www.globaltradealert.org
One of the most important steps in a GTA investigation is to establish whether the
implementation of a state initiative has, or is likely, to alter the relative treatment of domestic
and foreign commercial interests in the markets where the initiative's effects will be felt. In
common parlance, GTA checks whether a state initiative tilts the playing field against foreign
firms. GTA, therefore, does not opine on the WTO legality of a measure or whether a measure
is "appropriate," "fair," "reasonable" or "crisis-related" (there being no agreed definitions of these
terms.)
State initiatives that almost certainly (or certainly) introduce or change asymmetries of
treatment to the detriment of some foreign commercial interests are deemed by the Global Trade
Alert to be contrary to the no-protectionism pledges made at the November 2008 G20 summit
in Washington, DC, and London summit in April 2009. In this Executive Summary, the phrases
discriminatory and protectionist are used synonymously.
Without attempts to carefully enumerate the different types of state measures used and their
various effects, any assessment of contemporary protectionism is likely to overlook key trends
and is of diminished value to policymakers. That is why GTA goes beyond providing an
assessment of the discriminatory impact of state initiatives. Examination of the tariff lines,
sectors, and trading partners that are likely to be affected by each state initiative are carefully
conducted so as to provide some indication of a public initiative's impact in what is still a
relatively interdependent global economy even though, strictly speaking, there may be some
circumstances where some form of discrimination is needed to attain a non-protectionist
government objective.
No doubt purists will argue that a complete understanding of the consequences of crisis-era
protectionism requires a detailed economic analysis of each state initiative. Such analyses could
indeed be very useful, indeed the GTA team is and would gladly cooperate with experts
interested in conducting such studies. But, leaving aside the question of resources and the
availability of all the necessary data, quite frankly it is utopian to believe that just under 1000
such analyses could be conducted in the timeframe necessary to influence policymaking. In
short, we should not make the perfect the enemy of the very good. GTA's investigations go a
long way towards indicating the scale of an initiative's effects by making extensive use of
publicly available trade, investment, migration, and other data. Still, the GTA team welcomes
suggestions that will result in further improvements in the coverage and assessment of state
initiatives.

Note: See Evenett (2009a) for an overview of the GTA's methodology and Evenett (2009b) for a
discussion of the concerns some have raised about the GTA's approach.

6
Executive Summary

Mapping crisis-era protectionism

Sometimes averages and totals obscure interesting variation across countries. To


counter this, and to facilitate comparisons across jurisdictions, in each report of the
Global Trade Alert several world maps will be included. These maps are reproduced at
the end of this Executive Summary. Map 1.1 shows how many almost certainly dis-
criminatory measures have been implemented by each jurisdiction since November
2008. There is considerable variation across countries. Almost every major trading
nation has implemented 10 or more such measures since the first G-20 crisis meeting.
In contrast, with the exception of Nigeria, every African nation has implemented less
than 10 discriminatory measures.
Some government initiatives affect very few trading partners, others many. Map
1.2. reports the total number of trading partners that - on the basis of existing flows
of goods, investments, and people across borders - are likely to have been harmed by
the implementation of a government's discriminatory measures. More than a dozen
national governments have already taken measures that harm 100 or more of their
trading partners. Maps 1.3. and 1.4. report the number of product categories (4 digit
tariff lines) and economic sectors affected by the discriminatory measures that have
been put in place since the first crisis-related G-20 summit in November 2008.
Maps were also generated for the number of times that each jurisdiction's com-
mercial interests have been harmed by other countries' discriminatory measures. The
number of countries whose state measures have adversely affected a given jurisdic-
tion's commercial interests is reported in Map 1.5. Map 1.6 shows how many times a
jurisdiction's commercial interests have been harmed by the discriminatory state
measures taken by other governments.
Given the enduring interest in whether the G-20 member states have lived up to
their no-protectionism pledge, Map 1.7. may be of particular interest. This map
demonstrates the almost global reach of the harm done when G-20 governments vio-
lated their own no-protectionism pledges.
Map 1.8. shows that the overwhelming majority of nations will find their coun-
tries' commercial interests harmed if the discriminatory measures in the pipeline are
actually implemented. Forward-looking trade policymakers may find this map and
the related information in the Global Trade Alert database helpful in identifying
those pending foreign measures whose implementation could be usefully influenced.

The organisation and contents of the remainder of this Report


The rest of this Report is organised as follows. The large number of state measures
investigated by the GTA team provide the evidential base from which trends in con-
temporary protectionism can be assessed. Next an account of the protectionist
dynamics worldwide is provided, drawing on the substantial expansion in the GTA's
database since our last report was published in January 2010. This global perspective
is complemented by seven papers on contemporary commercial policy challenges fac-
ing Sub-Saharan Africa. Three of these papers specifically address African trade rela-
tions with leading trading partners, namely, China, the European Union, and the
United States. Finally, for each nation in Sub-Saharan Africa information is presented

7
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

on the extent to which its commercial interests have been harmed by the actions of
other countries. Symmetrically, information is presented on the extent to which each
nation's state measures have affected other trading partners.

References
Evenett (2009a). Simon J. Evenett. "What can be learned from crisis-era
protectionism? An Initial Assessment." Business & Politics. October.
Evenett (2009b). Simon J. Evenett. " Crisis-era protectionism one year after the
Washington G20 meeting: A GTA update, some new analysis, and a few words of
caution." In Richard E. Baldwin (ed.). The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences
and Prospects. VoxEU.org publication. December 2009.

About the author

Simon J. Evenett is Professor of International Trade and Economic Development,


University of St. Gallen, Switzerland; Co-Director of the International Trade and
Regional Economics Programme, CEPR; and Coordinator of Global Trade Alert.

26 May 2010

8
Map 1.1 Number of disciminatory measures implemented by each jurisdiction since the first G20 crisis related summit

9
Executive Summary
Map 1.2 Number of trading partners harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures

10
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report
Map 1.3 Number of (4 digit) tariff lines harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures

11
Executive Summary
Map 1.4 Number of sectors harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures

12
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report
Map 1.5 Number of trading partners affecting a jurisdiction's commercial interests

13
Executive Summary
Map 1.6 Number of times a jurisdiction's commercial interests are harmed by trading partners

14
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report
Map 1.7 Number of harmful measures implemented by G20 countries affecting each jurisdiction

15
Executive Summary
16
Map 1.8 Number of pending discriminatory measures likely to harm a jurisdiction
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report
Executive Summary

Simon J. Evenett
University of St. Gallen and CEPR

Revisiting contemporary protectionism on the basis of a far greater


evidential base

With the return to economic growth of many industrialised economies in either late
2009 or the first half of 2010, combined with sustained expansions in the emerging
market economies, came the hope that protectionist pressures would ease in the
world economy through 2010. If anything, the period since our last report was pub-
lished in January 2010, has been one of the busiest for the Global Trade Alert team.
Nothing short of a mountain of evidence has been uncovered in recent months
concerning state measures announced after the start of our reporting window,
November 2008 (corresponding to the date of the first crisis-related G20 summit held
in Washington DC.) A total of 247 new reports on implemented or announced and
pending state measures have been added to the Global Trade Alert database since our
last report was published, expanding the total number of reports to 960. This 40 per-
cent expansion in the GTA's database provides for a more comprehensive assessment
of contemporary protectionism and, as will become clear, some of our previous find-
ings have had to be revised accordingly.
The purpose of this fifth report of the Global Trade Alert is to provide an overview
of the state measures taken during the current global economic downturn and nas-
cent recovery1 that might affect international commerce. The principal findings of
the report are summarised below and a global overview of contemporary commercial
policies is provided in chapter 2 of this report.
Like our two previous reports, this report also has a regional focus. This time our
focus is on Sub-Saharan Africa, whose development significance is evident. What may
be less well known is that Sub-Saharan African governments have not resorted to pro-
tectionism on the scale of industrialised countries and some developing country peers
during the recent global economic downturn (see Map 1.1). Indeed, the contest for
foreign direct investment (FDI) appears to be in full swing in Sub-Saharan Africa, with

1 The recent downturn in business sentiment in Europe and the dislocation in the financial markets asso-
ciated with the solvency of certain Eurozone governments are discussed in the next chapter. Should the
world economy ultimately succumb to another bout of contraction then the past six months may well
have been a lull before the storm, with attendant implications for the corporate demand for protection
from foreign competition. The Global Trade Alert does not make macroeconomic forecasts, instead its
team stands ready to monitor the potential cross-border implications of state measures taken over the
coming months irrespective of macroeconomic conditions.

1
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

governments making repeated changes to tax, investment, and other policies to lure
foreign firms to establish facilities.2
Sub-Saharan Africa is also the recipient of preferential access to the markets of
many industrialised countries. This report contains two papers on the likely reforms
to the United States and European Union trade preference regimes and their poten-
tial implications for Sub-Saharan Africa. These papers will, therefore, also be of inter-
est to those following the West's policies towards Sub-Saharan Africa.

A contribution to policy dialogue through independent monitoring of


state measures
Global Trade Alert (GTA) has always operated on the assumption that in current cir-
cumstances the most practical approach to resisting protectionism is to combine peer
pressure with high-quality, current information about state measures and their actu-
al or potential effects on foreign commercial interests. Governments, the media, and
civil society are the key sources of the former; the job of Global Trade Alert and other
monitoring exercises is to provide the latter.
An assessment as to the extent and changes over time in protectionist dynamics is
also provided for in this Report, by considering not just the quarter-by-quarter
changes in the numbers of protectionist measures implemented but also the number
of pending measures that have been announced and are expected to implemented in
the future. Information on the pending measures provides policymakers with an
"early warning" of what is to come, a feature unique to the GTA's monitoring initia-
tive.

Principal findings of the Fifth Report concerning crisis-era


protectionism
The substantial expansion in the GTA's database permitted a re-evaluation of the key
aspects of crisis-era protectionism. Below is our latest assessment of these dynamics.
1. Since the first G20 crisis-related summit in November 2008, the governments of
world have together implemented 496 beggar-thy-neighbour policy measures;
that is, more than one for every working day. Add in another 86 implemented
measures that are likely to have harmed some foreign commercial interests, the
total reaches 582; that is, more than one for every actual day since the first G20
summit in November 2008.
a. Of those 247 new entries in the Global Trade Alert, 131 government
measures been implemented that almost certainly discriminated against
foreign commercial interests. The total number of implemented (almost)
discriminatory measures in the Global Trade Alert database rose then to 496
measures, just over half of the total number of reports (960).

2 Some of the best evidence for this sustained policy of openness can be found in the budget speeches of
various finance ministers from Sub-Saharan Africa over the past two years.

2
Executive Summary

b. Since our last report was published in January 2010, the number of beggar-
thy-neighbour measures reported (131) was less than three times the
number of benign or liberalising measures reported (53). This ratio was
considerably more favourable to market opening than in the previous GTA
reports, and constitutes some good news.
2. Since the first G20 crisis-summit, bailouts and state aids are the most frequent
source of discrimination against other nations' commercial interests. Thirty-one
percent of all discriminatory measures were bailouts. By now 96 out of the 166
discriminatory state aid/bail out measures in the Global Trade Alert database are
in sectors other than the financial sector; many governments have taken the
opportunity of the crisis to bail out manufacturers and farmers.
3. Although there are a lot of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures
in the pipeline, they still account for only 99 of the 496 harmful measures
implemented since November 2008. The large numbers of discriminatory
measures reported in the Global Trade Alert database are, therefore, not driven
by so-called unfair trade actions.
4. Relatively speaking tariff measures--the trade barrier most associated with the
1930s--continue to decline further in numerical importance. Tariff increases
account for only one in eight of the total number of discriminatory state
measures imposed in the current global economic downturn.
5. No doubt to the embarrassment of those who systematically talked down the
incidence of protectionism during 2009, the evidence continues to mount as to
the extent to which governments discriminated against foreign commercial
interests.
a. Since our last report was compiled the GTA team has found evidence of
more harmful state measures that were imposed in the last quarter of 2008
and the first half of 2009. This evidence forces us to revise upward by
approximately 10 percent the number of beggar-thy-neighbour measures
imposed in the first six months of 2009, to at least 115 measures per quarter.
6. By May 2010, no four-digit product line, no UN classified economic sector, and
no jurisdiction has emerged unscathed by crisis-era protectionism.
7. Since November 2008 China's commercial interests have been hit 221 times by
protectionist measures. Only if the 27 members of the European Union are
counted together, does any other jurisdiction come close to absorbing
comparable harm (the EU27 group being hit 206 times).
a. There have been substantial increases in the number of times certain
jurisdictions' commercial interests have been harmed since the last GTA
report was published in January 2010. Since that last report, everyone of the
10 ten targets have been hit by at least another 28 beggar-thy-neighbour
policies. China has been hit by 60 more measures (the most again), followed
by the EU 27 (53 more adverse measures) and the USA (38 more hits).
8. Despite taking their no-protectionism pledge the G20 members have imposed
316 beggar-thy-neighbour policies since November 2008. Since our last report
was published in January 2010, a total of 96 more discriminatory measures
implemented by G20 countries have been discovered, representing at least a 40
percent increase.

3
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

a. The G20 countries also implemented 81 of the 107 benign or liberalising


measures recorded in the GTA database. To their credit, 33 of the 41 benign
or liberalising measures discovered since the last GTA report was published
were implemented by G20 countries.
9. Unlike recent GTA reports, by May 2010 it was not longer the case that the
Russian Federation was in the top 5 of offending nations on all four criteria
(number of harmful measures implemented, tariff lines affected, sectors affected,
or trading partners affected). Now, taken together, the EU 27 has this dubious
distinction. See Table 1.1. below.
a. On all four metrics, Argentina, China, Indonesia, and Russian Federation are
always in the top 10 worst offending nations.
b. The Russian Federation has the dubious distinction of raising trade barriers
against the most tariff lines (40 percent of all product categories.) Still,
Algeria takes the prize for measures that harm foreign commercial interests
in the largest number of economic sectors; Indonesia for harming the most
trading partners (165).
c. When nations are ranked by the number of trading partners their state
measures have harmed, every one of the top-10 worst offenders has hurt the
commercial interests of over 120 nations.
10.In the last GTA report it was stated that only five jurisdictions had taken
discriminatory measures that affected more than a quarter of all the possible
traded product categories; interestingly that number has now risen to nine.3
Still, only six (or five if one does not count the EU 27 as a group) jurisdictions
have taken measures that affect more than a third of all possible product
categories. The latter demonstrates that the across-the-board measures seen in
the 1930s have not been repeated in the recent global economic downturn.
11.Our expansion of the database confirms one long-standing GTA finding: Despite
all the talk about measures to bolster green industries, innovation, and future
growth poles of the economy, the great majority of the discrimination is in
favour of domestic firms is in smokestack, declining industries and in
agriculture.
12.In January 2010 the GTA reported there were 188 suspicious protectionist
measures in the pipeline4; by May 2010 that total has risen to 237. As in our
previous reports, if every one of these measures were eventually implemented it
would be equivalent just under half a year's more protectionism.

3 The Russian Federation, Brazil, Ukraine, EU 27, Indonesia, China, Ecuador, Argentina, and India. See
Table 2.5 in the next chapter for more details.
4 For the purposes of this report (and the last one) the protectionist pipeline is said to include all those
state measures that (i) have been publicly announced, (ii) that have yet to be implemented and (iii) upon
examination are likely to harm foreign commercial interests. Such measures are classified amber in the
GTA database until implemented, whereupon their classification may change (depending on the details
about the potential discriminatory impact available at the time of implementation.)

4
Executive Summary

Table 1.1 Which countries have inflicted the most harm?

Metric, Country in specified rank, Number


Ranked by the
Ranked by the
number of tariff Ranked by the
number of trading
Ranked by number of lines (product number of sectors
Rank partners affected
(almost certainly) categories) affected by (almost
by (almost
discriminatory affected by (almost certainly)
certainly)
measures imposed certainly) discriminatory
discriminatory
discriminatory measures
measures
measures
1. Russian
EU 27 (140) Federation (487) Algeria (54) Indonesia (165)
2. Russian Federation (48) Brazil (440) EU 27 (52) EU 27 (163)
3. Argentina (37) Ukraine (389) Indonesia (31) China (152)
4. Germany (28) EU 27 (371) Ecuador (30) Argentina (145)
5. India (27) Indonesia (346) China (26) India (144)
6. Russian Federation Russian Federation
UK (22) China (335) (25) (137)
7. Indonesia (20) Ecuador (316) Mexico (24) Belgium (132)
8. China (19) Argentina (299) Argentina UK (128)
9. Italy (18) India (282) Belarus (23) Germany (124)
10. Austria (17) Belguim (203) Belgium France (121)

Note: There is no single metric to evaluate harm. Different policy measures affect different numbers of
products, economic sectors, and trading partners. GTA reports four measures of harm.
The EU27 refers to the sum of all of the measures taken by the 27 national governments of the European
Union and the measures taken by the European Commission. To be included in this total a state measure
must have involved discrimination against the commercial interests of another state, including potentially
another member of the European Union.

5
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

How GTA built its extensive database on contemporary protectionism

Since GTA was launched on 8 June 2009 just under 1000 state initiatives have been investigated
by our independent team of trade policy analysts located around the globe. These initiatives
vary from packages of wide-ranging public measures, with many implications for trade and
investment policy instruments, to temporary tariff increases on single product lines. GTA's goal
is to provide the most comprehensive online database of state measures taken since the first
crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008 that might affect foreign commercial interests. The
latter are broadly conceived by the GTA team to include not just trade flows and foreign
investments but also intellectual property rights and migrant workers deployed abroad. It is
through careful, multi-faceted investigations of these initiatives that a rich evidential base was
built, from which the contours of contemporary protectionism can be discerned. Users can
access this evidence at the website: www.globaltradealert.org
One of the most important steps in a GTA investigation is to establish whether the
implementation of a state initiative has, or is likely, to alter the relative treatment of domestic
and foreign commercial interests in the markets where the initiative's effects will be felt. In
common parlance, GTA checks whether a state initiative tilts the playing field against foreign
firms. GTA, therefore, does not opine on the WTO legality of a measure or whether a measure
is "appropriate," "fair," "reasonable" or "crisis-related" (there being no agreed definitions of these
terms.)
State initiatives that almost certainly (or certainly) introduce or change asymmetries of
treatment to the detriment of some foreign commercial interests are deemed by the Global Trade
Alert to be contrary to the no-protectionism pledges made at the November 2008 G20 summit
in Washington, DC, and London summit in April 2009. In this Executive Summary, the phrases
discriminatory and protectionist are used synonymously.
Without attempts to carefully enumerate the different types of state measures used and their
various effects, any assessment of contemporary protectionism is likely to overlook key trends
and is of diminished value to policymakers. That is why GTA goes beyond providing an
assessment of the discriminatory impact of state initiatives. Examination of the tariff lines,
sectors, and trading partners that are likely to be affected by each state initiative are carefully
conducted so as to provide some indication of a public initiative's impact in what is still a
relatively interdependent global economy even though, strictly speaking, there may be some
circumstances where some form of discrimination is needed to attain a non-protectionist
government objective.
No doubt purists will argue that a complete understanding of the consequences of crisis-era
protectionism requires a detailed economic analysis of each state initiative. Such analyses could
indeed be very useful, indeed the GTA team is and would gladly cooperate with experts
interested in conducting such studies. But, leaving aside the question of resources and the
availability of all the necessary data, quite frankly it is utopian to believe that just under 1000
such analyses could be conducted in the timeframe necessary to influence policymaking. In
short, we should not make the perfect the enemy of the very good. GTA's investigations go a
long way towards indicating the scale of an initiative's effects by making extensive use of
publicly available trade, investment, migration, and other data. Still, the GTA team welcomes
suggestions that will result in further improvements in the coverage and assessment of state
initiatives.

Note: See Evenett (2009a) for an overview of the GTA's methodology and Evenett (2009b) for a
discussion of the concerns some have raised about the GTA's approach.

6
Executive Summary

Mapping crisis-era protectionism

Sometimes averages and totals obscure interesting variation across countries. To


counter this, and to facilitate comparisons across jurisdictions, in each report of the
Global Trade Alert several world maps will be included. These maps are reproduced at
the end of this Executive Summary. Map 1.1 shows how many almost certainly dis-
criminatory measures have been implemented by each jurisdiction since November
2008. There is considerable variation across countries. Almost every major trading
nation has implemented 10 or more such measures since the first G-20 crisis meeting.
In contrast, with the exception of Nigeria, every African nation has implemented less
than 10 discriminatory measures.
Some government initiatives affect very few trading partners, others many. Map
1.2. reports the total number of trading partners that - on the basis of existing flows
of goods, investments, and people across borders - are likely to have been harmed by
the implementation of a government's discriminatory measures. More than a dozen
national governments have already taken measures that harm 100 or more of their
trading partners. Maps 1.3. and 1.4. report the number of product categories (4 digit
tariff lines) and economic sectors affected by the discriminatory measures that have
been put in place since the first crisis-related G-20 summit in November 2008.
Maps were also generated for the number of times that each jurisdiction's com-
mercial interests have been harmed by other countries' discriminatory measures. The
number of countries whose state measures have adversely affected a given jurisdic-
tion's commercial interests is reported in Map 1.5. Map 1.6 shows how many times a
jurisdiction's commercial interests have been harmed by the discriminatory state
measures taken by other governments.
Given the enduring interest in whether the G-20 member states have lived up to
their no-protectionism pledge, Map 1.7. may be of particular interest. This map
demonstrates the almost global reach of the harm done when G-20 governments vio-
lated their own no-protectionism pledges.
Map 1.8. shows that the overwhelming majority of nations will find their coun-
tries' commercial interests harmed if the discriminatory measures in the pipeline are
actually implemented. Forward-looking trade policymakers may find this map and
the related information in the Global Trade Alert database helpful in identifying
those pending foreign measures whose implementation could be usefully influenced.

The organisation and contents of the remainder of this Report


The rest of this Report is organised as follows. The large number of state measures
investigated by the GTA team provide the evidential base from which trends in con-
temporary protectionism can be assessed. Next an account of the protectionist
dynamics worldwide is provided, drawing on the substantial expansion in the GTA's
database since our last report was published in January 2010. This global perspective
is complemented by seven papers on contemporary commercial policy challenges fac-
ing Sub-Saharan Africa. Three of these papers specifically address African trade rela-
tions with leading trading partners, namely, China, the European Union, and the
United States. Finally, for each nation in Sub-Saharan Africa information is presented

7
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

on the extent to which its commercial interests have been harmed by the actions of
other countries. Symmetrically, information is presented on the extent to which each
nation's state measures have affected other trading partners.

References
Evenett (2009a). Simon J. Evenett. "What can be learned from crisis-era
protectionism? An Initial Assessment." Business & Politics. October.
Evenett (2009b). Simon J. Evenett. " Crisis-era protectionism one year after the
Washington G20 meeting: A GTA update, some new analysis, and a few words of
caution." In Richard E. Baldwin (ed.). The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences
and Prospects. VoxEU.org publication. December 2009.

About the author

Simon J. Evenett is Professor of International Trade and Economic Development,


University of St. Gallen, Switzerland; Co-Director of the International Trade and
Regional Economics Programme, CEPR; and Coordinator of Global Trade Alert.

26 May 2010

8
Map 1.1 Number of disciminatory measures implemented by each jurisdiction since the first G20 crisis related summit

9
Executive Summary
Map 1.2 Number of trading partners harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures

10
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report
Map 1.3 Number of (4 digit) tariff lines harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures

11
Executive Summary
Map 1.4 Number of sectors harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures

12
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report
Map 1.5 Number of trading partners affecting a jurisdiction's commercial interests

13
Executive Summary
Map 1.6 Number of times a jurisdiction's commercial interests are harmed by trading partners

14
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report
Map 1.7 Number of harmful measures implemented by G20 countries affecting each jurisdiction

15
Executive Summary
16
Map 1.8 Number of pending discriminatory measures likely to harm a jurisdiction
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report
Section 1
Crisis-related Discrimination Against Foreign
Commercial Interests
A Global Overview of Protectionism through
to May 2010

Simon J. Evenett
University of St. Gallen and CEPR

What a difference six weeks make. During the first quarter of 2010 business appeared
to gain confidence across both sides of the Atlantic, most large industrialised
economies were no longer contracting, and much valued upward momentum was
provided to the world economy by the Asian powerhouses, China and India.
Towards the end of May 2010, however, sentiment has markedly shifted, partly as
a result of insolvency risks in the eurozone, concerns about the overheating of the
Chinese and Indian economies, and recognition that cross-border bank lending and
the carry trade has reached such levels that other parts of the world economy knew
they could quickly be drawn into further turmoil.
Only time will tell if the first quarter of 2010 was a really turning in point in glob-
al economic fortunes or a false dawn. For purposes of monitoring contemporary pro-
tectionism, however, the state of the business cycle and the confidence of business
persons are important because they affect the pressure on governments to impose fur-
ther restrictions on foreign commerce. As an economy rallies, the benefits of the
upturn spread to further sectors, pressures to restrict commerce tend to abate, or so
prior experience has shown. But, if first quarter was the calm before another storm,
then protectionist pressures may intensify.
Rather than rely solely on the regularities of yesteryear to inform policy delibera-
tions, one advantage of systematically collecting data on the state measures that may
have (positive, negative, or no) implications for foreign commercial interests is that
up to date summaries of the extent of protectionism and trade liberalisation can be
presented. Indeed, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a global overview of
developments into the first five months of 2010, taking careful account of the fact
that some of evidence collected in recent months refers to state measures taken or
announced in 2009. Given this Report's focus on developments in the Sub-Saharan
African region, developments in that region are described and analysed in the next
section.
A substantial update and extension of the Global Trade Alert database has been
undertaken since the Fourth Report was published at the end of January 2010. From
mid-January 2010 to mid-May 2010 a total of 247 new reports were added to the
Global Trade Alert database, equivalent to approximately a 40 percent expansion of
the database. Of those 247 new entries, 131 government measures been implement-
ed that almost certainly discriminated against foreign commercial interests. The total
number of implemented (almost) discriminatory measures in the Global Trade Alert
database rose then to 496 measures, just over half of the total number of reports
(960).

19
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA report

While more details can be found in the pages that follow, once again it was found
that many less transparent--or murky--forms of protectionism take time to be discov-
ered, investigated, and reported. Therefore each of these published reports not only
provides evidence on what has happened in recent months but also updates findings
for previous quarters. This is significant for two reasons.
First, the first reading of protectionism implemented in a given quarter has turned
out to be a serious underestimate. For example, in our last report our first estimate of
the number of almost certainly or likely discriminatory measures implemented in the
first quarter of 2009 was only 7. Now, our estimate of the number of such measures
implemented in that quarter has risen nine-fold to 63.1 Followers of contemporary
protectionism are, therefore, cautioned against putting too much weight on any
instantaneous readings of protectionism. This observation reinforces the need for a
longer-term effort to monitor protectionism; short term efforts mobilised in response
to sirens may not serve decision-makers well.
With the publication of each Global Trade Alert report, the record for 2009 keep
getting worse and worse. No doubt to the embarrassment of those who systematical-
ly talked down the incidence of protectionism during 2009, the evidence continues
to mount as to the extent to which governments discriminated against foreign com-
mercial interests. Presumably trade ministry officials, who keep an eye on the cases
where their country's commercial interests have been hurt, prefer a comprehensive
perspective. In this regard, the substantial update in the number of entries in the GTA
database, will make for unwelcome reading in some jurisdictions. Since our last report
was published we have identified 60 more discriminatory measures that have harmed
China's commercial interests, 53 definitely hurting the EU 27 countries (taken togeth-
er) and 38 measures harming American commercial interests.2
What follows is a systematic account of the various facets of contemporary pro-
tectionism. The sections used typically follow those of previous reports, facilitating
comparisons across reports and over time.

Evidence of discrimination against foreign commercial interests continues


to mount
1. Since the first G20 crisis-related summit in November 2008, the governments of
world have together implemented 496 beggar-thy-neighbour policy measures;
that is, more than one for every working day. Add in another 86 implemented
measures that are likely to have harmed some foreign commercial interests, the
total reaches 582; that is, more than one for every actual day since the first G20
summit in November 2008. See Tables 2.1. and 2.2.
2. Since our last report was published in January 2010, the number of beggar-thy-
neighbour measures reported (131) was less than three times the number of
benign or liberalising measures reported (53). This ratio was considerably more
favourable to market opening than in the previous reports, and constitutes some
good news. See Table 2.1.

1 One could argue that our last report was published in January 2010 so we must have known that 7 was
an understimate. This is true, however, the extent to which the initial report was an underestimate could
not be known.
2 The GTA website provides such data for each jurisdiction.

20
A Global Overview of Protectionism through to May 2010

3. Although there are a lot of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures


in the pipeline, they still account for only 99 of the 496 harmful measures
implemented since November 2008. The large numbers of discriminatory
measures reported in the Global Trade Alert database are, therefore, not driven
by so-called unfair trade actions. See Table 2.1.
4. No four-digit product line, UN classified economic sector, or jurisdiction has
emerged unscathed by crisis-era protectionism. See Table 2.2.
5. Despite taking their no-protectionism pledge the G20 members have imposed
316 beggar-thy-neighbour policies since November 2008. Since our last report
was published in January 2010, a total of 96 more discriminatory measures
implemented by G20 countries have been discovered, representing at least a 40
percent increase. See Table 2.3 and Figure 2.1.
6. The G20 countries also implemented 81 of the 107 benign or liberalising
measures recorded in the GTA database. To their credit, 33 of the 41 benign or
liberalising measures discovered since the last GTA report was published were
implemented by G20 countries. See Table 2.3.
7. Typically, since the first G20 summit in November 2008, every other day a G20
government has broken the no-protectionism pledge. In contrast a benign or
liberalising measure is implemented by a G20 government on average every 6
days. See Table 2.3.
8. While G20 governments have implemented many of the beggar-thy-neighbour
policies since the Washington DC summit, just over a third (184) of
protectionist measures have been implemented by other governments. See
Tables 2.2. and 2.3.

Reporting lags must be taken into account when interpreting quarterly


estimates of the rate of implementation of discriminatory measures
9. In terms of raw numbers, there appears to be a reduction in the total number of
almost certainly and probably discriminatory measures imposed from the
second half of 2009 compared to the first half of 2009. See Figure 2.2.
10.Since our last report was compiled the GTA team has found evidence of more
harmful state measures that were imposed in the last quarter of 2008 and the
first half of 2009. This evidence forces us to revise upward by approximately 10
percent the number of beggar-thy-neighbour measures imposed in the first six
months of 2009, to at least 115 measures per quarter. See Figure 2.2.
11.Compared to the last report, the total number of discriminatory measures
implemented in the third and fourth quarters of 2009 and in the first quarter of
2010 have been revised upwards substantially. See Figure 2.2. Readers are
cautioned to expect further upward revisions in estimates for these quarters.
12.As in previous reports, the total number of reported estimates per quarter do not
appear to be settling down. Nor has been there been enough time to be sure that
reporting lags have worked through and the quarterly totals can be usefully
compared. These findings suggest that it is too soon to declare victory over
protectionism; too premature to say that any recovery is reducing the number
of trade restrictions imposed. See Figure 2.2.

21
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA report

The protectionist in the pipeline keeps growing – no respite there


13.In January 2010 the GTA reported there were 188 suspicious protectionist
measures in the pipeline3; by May 2010 that total has risen to 237. As in our
previous reports, if every one of these measures were eventually implemented it
would be equivalent just under half a year's more protectionism. See Tables 2.1
and 2.2.

China remains the most frequent target of crisis-era protectionism, but


other nations are hit often too
14.Since November 2008, China's commercial interests have been hit 221 times by
protectionist measures. Only if the 27 members of the European Union are
counted together, does any other jurisdiction come close to absorbing
comparable harm (the EU27 group being hit 206 times). See Table 2.4.
15.Other than China, the top 10 targets jurisdictions hit by the most number of
harmful foreign measures are all industrialised countries. Brazil, Korea,
Thailand, Turkey, and India are in the top 20 most frequently hit jurisdictions.
See Table 2.4 and GTA website.
16.There have been substantial increases in the number of times certain
jurisdictions' commercial interests have been harmed since the last GTA report
was published in January 2010. Since that last report, everyone of the 10 ten
targets have been hit by at least another 28 beggar-thy-neighbour policies.
China has been hit by 60 more measures (the most again), followed by the EU
27 (53 more adverse measures) and the USA (38 more hits). See Table 2.4.
17.Seventy trading partners have imposed measures harmful to Chinese
commercial interests. Only the EU 27 countries together equals that total.
France alone comes close, with 67 countries harming its commercial interests.
See Table 2.4.
18.In addition, 122 of the measures in the protectionist pipeline are likely to harm
Chinese commercial interests, should those measures be implemented.
Interestingly the EU27 and the USA each saw the number of pending
discriminatory measures against their commercial interests rise by 20 since the
last GTA report was published in January 2010, twice the rate for the Chinese.
See Table 2.4.

Which nations have inflicted the most harm?

Since protectionist acts can affect different numbers of products, sectors, and trading
partners, there is no single metric to identify the worst offending nations. The GTA
reports four indicators of harm.4 Compared to the last report, there have been a num-
ber of notable changes in the rankings.

4 Previous comparisons of the rankings of countries on the basis of these four rankings have shown a
remarkably high degree of correlation. The Spearman rank correlations between the four rankings lied
within the range 0.68-0.81.

22
A Global Overview of Protectionism through to May 2010

19.Unlike recent GTA reports, by May 2010 it was not longer the case that the
Russian Federation was in the top 5 of offending nations all four criteria
(number of harmful measures implemented, tariff lines affected, sectors affected,
or trading partners affected). Now, taken together, the EU 27 has this dubious
distinction. See Table 2.5.
20.On all four metrics, Argentina, China, Indonesia, and Russian Federation are
always in the top 10 worst offending nations. See Table 2.5.
21.The Russian Federation has the dubious distinction of raising trade barriers
against the most tariff lines (40 percent of all product categories.) Still, Algeria
takes the prize for measures that harm foreign commercial interests in the largest
number of economic sectors; Indonesia for harming the most trading partners
(165). See Table 2.5.
22.When nations are ranked by the number of trading partners their state measures
have harmed, every one of the top-10 worst offenders has hurt the commercial
interests of over 120 nations. Given the conservative methodology used to
identify the harmed jurisdictions5, this finding indicates the scale of the adverse
impact of many governments' crisis-era state measures. See Table 2.5.

A repeat of the 1930s protectionism has – to date – been avoided


23.In the last GTA report it was stated that only five jurisdictions had taken
measures that affected more than a quarter of all the possible imported product
categories; interestingly that number has now risen to nine. Still, only six (or
five if one does not count the EU 27 as a group) jurisdictions have taken
measures that affect more than a third of all possible product categories. The
latter demonstrates that the across-the-board measures seen in the 1930s have
not been repeated in the recent global economic downturn. See Table 2.5.

Which types of beggar-thy-neighbour policies are used the most?


24.Since the first G20 crisis-summit, bailouts and state aids are the most frequent
source of discrimination against other nations' commercial interests. Thirty-one
percent of all discriminatory measures were bailouts. By now 96 out of the 166
discriminatory state aid/bail out measures in the Global Trade Alert database are
in sectors other than the financial sector; it is a mistake to associate the
discriminatory bailouts of the recent past solely to banks and insurance
companies and the preservation of financial stability.6 See Table 2.6. and Figure
2.3.
25.The implementation of discriminatory trade defence instruments are the second
most common form of protectionism. Given that a large number of trade
remedy investigations are ongoing, in the next 12 months it would not be
surprising if the number of bailouts loses its number one slot. See Table 2.6. and
Figure 2.4.

5 In short, identification is on the basis of an existing non-trivial trade, investment, or other commercial
flow, not indicators of potential harm.
6 This latter finding can be confirmed by going on to the "Advanced Search" page of the GTA website and
searching for the bailout measures that do not affect sector 81, namely, financial intermediation servic-
es and auxiliary services thereof.

23
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA report

26.Since our last report was published, bailouts and trade defence measures account
for the overwhelming majority of new discriminatory state measures that the
GTA has uncovered. Recently, it seems, the action is in these two policy
instruments, with tariff increases running a poor third. See Table 2.6.
27.Relatively speaking, tariff measures appear to decline further in numerical
importance. Tariff increases account for only one in eight of the total number of
discriminatory state measures imposed in the current global economic
downturn. This calls into question how representative of contemporary
protectionism, the much-studied, easy-to-measure, and typically transparent
tariff increase is. See Table 2.6. and Figure 2.3.
28.Export taxes or restrictions, bailouts, export subsidies, buy national policies,
tariff measures, trade defence measures, plus a rag-bag of non-tariff barriers
imposed since November 2008 are each conservatively estimated to have
harmed over 100 countries' commercial interests. See Table 2.6.

Which sectors are most affected by protectionism?


29.Setting state measures that benefit the financial sector to one side, like its recent
predecessors, this Report confirms a finding in the second GTA report. Namely,
despite all the talk about measures to bolster green industries, innovation, and
future growth poles of the economy, the great majority of the discrimination is
in favour of domestic firms is in smokestack, declining industries and in
agriculture. See Table 2.7.
30.Looking ahead, the basic metals and basic chemical sectors could be affected by
over 30 pending measures. Should this come to pass then over the next year or
so, both sectors will eclipse the financial sector as the principal sectors most
affected by contemporary era protectionism. See Table 2.7.

24
A Global Overview of Protectionism through to May 2010

Table 2.1 Total number of state measures reported in the GTA database

This report Increase from previous report


Statistic (May 2010) (January 2010)
Total Total except unfair Total Total except unfair
trade and safeguards trade and safeguards
investigations investigations
Total number of
measures in 960 658 247 182
GTA database
Total number of measures 141 121 53 43
coded green
Total number of measures 323 140 63 41
coded amber
Total number of measures 496 397 131 98
coded red

How does the GTA colour code measures?

Colour code Criteria


Red (i) The measure has been implemented and almost certainly discriminates
against foreign commercial interests.
Amber (i) The measure has been implemented and may involve discrimination
against foreign commercial interests; OR
(ii) The measure has been announced or is under consideration and would
(if implemented) almost certainly involve discrimination against foreign
commercial interests.
Green (i) The measure has been announced and involves liberalization on a
non-discriminatory (i.e., most favored nation) basis; OR
(ii) The measure has been implemented and is found (upon investigation) not to
be discriminatory: OR
(iii) The measure has been implemented, involves no further discrimination,
and improves the transparency of a jurisdiction's trade-related policies.

25
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA report

Table 2.2 Measures implemented since first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008,
totals for all jurisdictions and change since last report

This report Increase from previous report


Statistic (May 2010) (January 2010)
Total Total except unfair Total Total except unfair
trade and safeguards trade and safeguards
investigations investigations
Total number of
measures in 688 548 195 148
GTA database
Total number of measures 107 94 41 34
coded green
Total number of measures 86 57 24 20
coded amber
Total number of measures 496 397 131 98
coded red
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines
affected by almost certainly 1214 1214 0 0
discriminatory measures
Total number of 2-digit sectors
affected by almost certainly 79 79 0 0
discriminatory measures
Total number of trading partners
affected by almost certainly 233 233 0 0
discriminatory measures

Table 2.3 Measures implemented by G20 countries in the year since the first crisis-related G20
summit in November 2008, totals for all G20 jurisdictions and change since last
report

This report Increase from previous report


Statistic (May 2010) (January 2010)
Total Total except unfair Total Total except unfair
trade and safeguards trade and safeguards
investigations investigations
Total number of
measures in 459 331 155 112
GTA database
Total number of measures 81 70 33 27
coded green
Total number of measures 64 36 26 19
coded amber
Total number of measures 314 225 96 66
coded red
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines
affected by almost certainly 1119 1116 141 148
discriminatory measures
Total number of 2-digit sectors
affected by almost certainly 61 61 3 3
discriminatory measures
Total number of trading partners
affected by almost certainly 207 207 11 11
discriminatory measures

26
A Global Overview of Protectionism through to May 2010

Figure 2.1. The G20 members implement a higher share of beggar-thy-neighbor policies than
other countries.

Implemented
Worldwide

Implemented by the
G20

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

Number of measures coded red Number of measures coded amber Number of measures coded green

Figure 2.2. Q1 2010 protectionism is on trend to match 2009 levels; murky protectionism
continues to generate sizeable reporting lags

140 120111 115


120 100 101
100 86 84
80 55 54 63
60 42
40 15
20 7
0
08

09

09

09

09

10

..
20

20

20

20

20

20

5.
.0
Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

12
(to
10
20
Q2

Latest report Previous report

In Figure 2.2. a harmful measure is taken to be one which has been implemented
since November 2008 and is almost certainly discriminatory (coded red) or likely to
be discriminatory (coded amber).

27
Table 2.4. The top 10 biggest targets of discriminatory measures face even more pain

28
Target Number of discriminatory measures Number of trading partners Number of pending measures,
imposed on target imposing discriminatory measures which if implemented,
would harm target too
Increase Increase Increase
This report from last This report from last This report from last
(May report (May report (May report
2010) (January 2010) (January 2010) (January
2010) 2010) 2010)
China 221 60 70 9 122 11
EU27 206 53 70 27 77 20
USA 166 38 60 9 51 20
Germany 158 34 57 21 53 11
France 145 33 67 31 45 11
UK 134 29 55 22 41 10
Italy 132 29 58 9 48 17
Japan 131 28 56 22 42 14
Belgium 129 27 52 17 39 12
Netherlands 128 28 55 23 37 1
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA report
A Global Overview of Protectionism through to May 2010

Table 2.5 Which countries have inflicted the most harm?

Metric, Country in specified rank, Number


Ranked by the
Ranked by the
number of tariff Ranked by the
number of trading
Ranked by number of lines (product number of sectors
Rank partners affected
(almost certainly) categories) affected by (almost
by (almost
discriminatory affected by (almost certainly)
certainly)
measures imposed certainly) discriminatory
discriminatory
discriminatory measures
measures
measures
1. Russian
EU 27 (140) Federation (487) Algeria (54) Indonesia (165)
2. Russian Federation (48) Brazil (440) EU 27 (52) EU 27 (163)
3. Argentina (37) Ukraine (389) Indonesia (31) China (152)
4. Germany (28) EU 27 (371) Ecuador (30) Argentina (145)
5. India (27) Indonesia (346) China (26) India (144)
6. Russian Federation Russian Federation
UK (22) China (335) (25) (137)
7. Indonesia (20) Ecuador (316) Mexico (24) Belgium (132)
8. China (19) Argentina (299) Argentina UK (128)
9. Italy (18) India (282) Belarus (23) Germany (124)
10. Austria (17) Belguim (203) Belgium France (121)

Note: There is no single metric to evaluate harm. Different policy measures affect different numbers of
products, economic sectors, and trading partners. GTA reports four measures of harm.
The EU27 refers to the sum of all of the measures taken by the 27 national governments of the European
Union and the measures taken by the European Commission. To be included in this total a state measure
must have involved discrimination against the commercial interests of another state, including potentially
another member of the European Union.

29
Table 2.6. Ten most used state measures to discriminate against foreign commercial interests since the first G20 crisis meeting; bailouts and trade

30
defence measures remain the preferred tools of commercial discrimination.
Ranked by number of discriminatory measures imposed.

State measure Number of Number of measures Number of jurisdictions that Number of jurisdictions
discriminatory (red) implemented (red imposed these discriminatory harmed by these
measures imposed amber, or green) measures discriminatory measures
Increase Increase Increase Increase
This report from last This report from last This report from last This report from
(May report (May report (May report (May report
2010) (January 2010) (January 2010) (January 20010) (January
2010) 2010) 2010) 2010)
1. Bail out / state aid measure 166 25 177 33 43 2 182 5
2. Trade defence measure 99 32 141 43 53 5 74 16
(AD, CVD, safeguard)
3. Tariff measure 62 14 130 37 30 9 138 16
4. Public procurement 27 6 31 6 18 3 133 0
5. Export subsidy 25 11 21 5 43 10 184 39
6. Non tariff barrier 23 10 35 13 14 5 136 27
(not otherwise specified)
7. Migration measure 20 8 29 12 17 5 64 18
8. Export taxes or restriction 16 6 37 19 35 24 146 -1
9. Import ban 14 4 17 8 12 4 54 12
10. Local content requirement 14 4 16 2 10 1 114 -1
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA report
A Global Overview of Protectionism through to May 2010

Figure 2.3 Top 10 implemented measures used to discriminate against foreign commercial
interests since the first G20 crisis meeting.

Other 1. Bail out / state aid


12% measure
10. Local content 30%
requirement
3%

9. Import ban
3%

8. Export Subsidy
3%

7. M igration measure
4%

6. Non tariff barrier


(not otherwise
specified)
4%
2. Trade defence
5. Export taxes or measure (AD, CVD,
restriction safeguard)
5% 19%
4. Public procurement 3. Tariff measure
5% 12%

Figure 2.4 Top 10 pending measures that target foreign commercial interests.
Other
Technical barrier to
10%
trade
2%
Non tariff barrier (not
otherwise specified)
2%
Export taxes or
restriction
Trade defence measure
2%
(AD, CVD, safeguard)
Bail out / state aid
52%
measure
3%
Other service sector
measure
4%
Local content
requirement
4%

Public procurement
5%

Investment measure
Tariff measure
6%
10%

31
Table 2.7 Top 20 sectors most affected by discriminatory measures

32
CPC code, Affected Sector Number of discriminatory Number of implemented Number of jurisdictions Number of pending
(red) measures affecting measures affecting implementing measures measures affecting
commercial interests in this sector specified sector affecting specified sector specified sector
and classified as red
81 (Financial intermediation services and auxiliary 69 76 23 2
services therefor)
41 (Basic metals) 51 75 49 33
44 (Special purpose machinery) 47 78 22 13
49 (Transport equipment) 43 73 46 23
42 (Fabricated metal products, except machinery 39 58 19 22
and equipment)
01 (Products of agriculture, horticulture and 38 60 25 15
market gardening)
34 (Basic chemicals) 38 64 15 40
21 (Meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats) 37 55 22 12
23 (Grain mill products, starches and starch products; 31 51 44 12
other food products)
02 (Live animals and animal products) 30 41 46 7
22 (Dairy products) 30 39 41 8
38 (Furniture; other transportable goods n.e.c.) 27 37 17 8
27 (Textile articles other than apparel) 25 44 17 15
43 (General purpose machinery) 24 44 14 10
46 (Electrical machinery and apparatus) 23 37 15 9
47 ( Radio, television and communication equipment 23 42 13 5
and apparatus)
36 (Rubber and plastics products) 22 37 17 12
28 (Knitted or crocheted fabrics; wearing apparel) 21 37 15 7
35 (Other chemical products; man-made fibres) 20 41 13 20
29 (Leather and leather products; footwear) 19 32 12 5
The Global Overview: Has Stabilisation Affected The Landscape of Crisis-Era Protectionism?
Section 2
Sub-Saharan Africa, Commercial Policy
Discrimination, and the Global Economic
Downturn

33
Effects of Post-Crisis Foreign Trade Policy
Measures on Economic and Trade
Performance in Africa

Eric Kehinde Ogunleye


African Center for Economic Transformation
1 Introduction

The role of free trade in rapid socio-economic development of African countries


cannot be overemphasized; it is a major source of the strong economic performance
of most African countries in recent times. The importance of trade for global
development and especially for developing African countries is underscored by the
fact that Goal eight of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) centers on trade,
aiming to "develop further an open, rule-based predictable, non-discriminatory
trading and financial system". Thus, improved market access through reduced
unilateral trade restrictive measures is a very important step for African countries in
sustaining its recent progress in economic performances and consolidating on this
success to improve the livelihood of its people and move closer to realizing the
MDGs.
Trade expansion by African countries has been achieved at the heels of vigorous
trade liberalization and export orientation coupled with relatively benign global trade
policies by multilateral institutions such as the WTO and bilateral trade agreements.
Some of the bilateral and multilateral market initiatives that have helped African
countries gain better market access include the African Growth and Opportunities Act
(AGOA), Everything But Arms, New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD),
Aid for Trade, Integrated Framework for LDCs, Enhanced Integrated Framework for
LDCs and Blair Initiative. It is hoped that the current round of WTO talks (Doha
Development Agenda) will be completed soon with a view to further improving the
integration of African countries into the global trading system and strengthen the
capacity of the countries to make best use of the increased market access created
through these initiatives.
However, the recent financial crisis has led to a proliferation of protectionist trade
policies. Restrictive measures emanating from these actions threaten the foundation
of the successes recorded by African countries in trade expansion, market access and
economic progress of African countries. Several trading partners of African countries
have adopted and implemented discriminatory and restrictive trade policy measures
that significantly hurt African countries. These measures tend to push the burden of
recovery to African countries at the expense of the developed countries. It also further
exerts negative pressure on the countries, pushing them further below current
economic performance and poverty lines, thus threatening quick recovery from the
effects of the global financial crisis. These negative effects are worsened by the fact
that African countries do not have the required resources to counteract the

35
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

discriminatory policy measures of their developed, richer trading partners. The main
objective of this paper is to articulate the nature of post-crisis trade measures adopted
and implemented by Africa trading partners and assess the nature and extent of their
influence on macroeconomic performance and commercial interest of countries in
the continent. The analyses are based primarily on the qualitative policy measures in
the GTA database.
Following this introduction, section two provides evidence on the post-crisis
protectionist and restrictive measures adopted and implemented by Africa trading
partners, classified under green, amber and red1. Section three provides an evidential
assessment of the effects of foreign trade policy measures adopted during the
financial crisis on commercial interests and economic performance of African
countries with focus on both positive and negative effects of these measures. Section
four offers some policy reflections for African countries while section five presents the
concluding remarks.

2 Evidence of protectionist and restrictive measures of trade


during the crisis
The advent of the global financial and economic crisis has led to a proliferation of
trade restrictive and trade distorting policy measures, especially by developed
countries such as the European countries, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United
States. Unfortunately, the emerging economies are joining this league as countries
like Brazil, China, Mexico, India, Indonesia, South Africa and the Russian Federation
have also implemented some forms of trade restrictive measures. Putting the figures
in perspective, a total of 297 beggar-thy-neighbor policy measures have been adopted
by governments of the world within one year, with the list increasing to 353 when
measures that are likely to have harmed some foreign commercial interests are added
(Evenett 2009). By May 2010, a total of 959 measures have been implemented, out of
which only 141 are non-discriminatory2. In brevity, this demonstrates the attitude
and policy response of African trading partners oblivious of the negative impact of
their response on African countries.
Table 1 shows the nature of trade policy measures implemented by selected trading
partners of African countries. A cursory look at the table reveals that more trade
restricting and discriminatory measures were implemented vis-à-vis liberalization and
trade enhancing measures. One notable observation from this data reveals that as
individual countries, most African trading partners developed and implemented very

1 Red measures refer to policy measures that have been implemented and almost certainly discriminates
against foreign commercial interest. Amber measures are: (i) Policy measures that have been
implemented and may involve discrimination against foreign commercial interests; OR (ii) Measures that
have been announced or is under consideration and would, if implemented, almost certainly involve
discrimination against foreign commercial interests. Green measures are: (i) Measures that have been
announced and involves liberalization on a non-discriminatory (i.e., most favored nation) basis; OR (ii)
Measures that have been implemented and is found , upon investigation, not to be discriminatory: OR
(iii) The measures have been implemented, involves no further discrimination, and improves the
transparency of a jurisdiction's trade-related policies.
2 http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics#

36
Effects of Post-Crisis Foreign Trade Policy Measures on Economic and Trade
Performance in Africa

Table 1 Post-crisis trade policy measures implemented by selected Africa trading partners

Partner Green Amber Red Total Tariff lines Sectors Trading


measures measures measures measures affected by affected by partners
red measures red measures affected by
red measures
G8 29 91 135 255 674 52 181
G20 90 227 292 609 1119 61 233
EU27 7 19 140 166 371 52 163
Argentina 5 28 35 68 276 23 145
Austria 4 10 17 31 41 10 105
Belgium 4 10 11 25 203 23 132
Brazil 15 15 17 47 440 22 232
China 6 17 19 42 335 26 152
European Communities 4 16 10 30 23 7 103
Finland 4 10 12 26 19 8 103
France 5 13 14 32 88 17 121
Germany 5 12 28 45 23 23 124
India 8 35 27 70 282 23 144
Indonesia 5 11 20 36 346 31 165
Italy 4 10 18 32 26 11 104
Netherlands 4 10 16 30 47 10 104
Portugal 4 9 14 27 19 8 107
Russian Federation 14 18 48 80 487 25 137
Spain 4 11 17 32 48 15 115
UK and N. Ireland 4 10 22 36 134 12 128
United States 4 44 14 62 127 20 120

Source: GTA Database (accessed 18 May, 2010) and can be found at http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-
statistics/table/3

limited liberalizing measures that impacted positively on African countries. For


instance, given their purported support for non-restrictive policy measures, one
would expect the UK and US to implement more liberalizing trade policy measures.
On the contrary, the UK and US implemented respective 4 liberalizing policy
measures as at May 2010, while 22 and 14 respective discriminatory measures have
been implemented. A closer look reveals that the UK and US have another respective
10 and 44 measures that have the potential for discriminating against the interests of
their trading partners3. As a group, the G20 has implemented 292 discriminatory
measures with additional 227 measures that have the potential for restricting foreign
interests. It is interesting to note, however, that the G20 has also implemented 90
measures that are favorable to foreign trading partners, including African countries.
Up to 18th May 2010, discriminatory measures remain the most prominent post-
crisis policy response of most Africa trading partners, representing 52% of total trade
policy measures implemented. If the potential discriminatory measures are added to
this, they both represent 87% of total post-crisis policy measures while positive,
liberalizing measures was paltry 13% (see Figure 1). This has serious implications for
African countries that depend highly on foreign trade and investment for post-crisis
recovery and for re-launching the economies on the path of sustained growth.
The G8 countries alone have 226 trade restrictive measures in the GTA database.
These measures have affected no less than 181 trading partners and 674 tariff lines.

3 http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics/table/3

37
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Figure 1 Post-crisis measures implemented by selected Africa trading partners

Green Measures
13%
Red Measures
52% Amber
Measures
35%

Source: Based on GTA database (accessed 18 May 2010).

Considering the G20 countries, they have a total of 519 trade restrictive measures
that affected 233 trading partners and 1,119 tariff lines. Comparatively, less
developed countries have a total of mere 21 trade restrictive measures affecting only
31 trading partners and 15 sectors. This demonstrates that developed countries are
more prone to using restrictive trade measures during the crisis as opposed to
developing countries. At country level, Russian Federation implemented more
discriminatory measures as both red and amber measures numbered 66. Noteworthy,
however, is the fact that the same country implemented more liberalizing measures
that exceeds those implemented by the US, UK and Germany put together. The use
of protectionist measures by these traditional economic partners of Africa is a cause
for serious worry. Another important cause for worry is the use of discriminatory
trade measures by African emerging economic and trading partners such as Brazil,
China, India and Indonesia. By May 2010, these countries have implemented red and
amber measures totaling 161. This is a cause for worry because such protectionist
measures could jeopardize sustainability of the emerging relationship and limit the
real and potential benefits accruable to African countries from the partnerships.
Most of the measures implemented by Africa trading partners are affecting, and in
most cases hurting the developing and emerging African economies more than they
hurt the developed countries. Liberalizing trade policy measures by trading partners
of African countries remain very minimal while there is a proliferation of hurting
measures (See Table 2). South Africa tops the chat of African countries on the number
of discriminatory measures being faced with 80 measures and another 39 measures
that have the potential for discrimination. This is followed at some distance by Egypt,
Tunisia, Morocco and Kenya, which are facing 56, 40, 33 and 31 red measures,
respectively. A notable observation is that relatively advanced economies, especially
those of Northern Africa are more affected by these discriminatory measures. Similar
trends could be gleaned from the potentially discriminatory measures. This suggests
that the trade policy measures of several African trading partners were aimed at
protecting their domestic economies and shielding them from possible foreign
competition from African countries.

38
Effects of Post-Crisis Foreign Trade Policy Measures on Economic and Trade
Performance in Africa

Table 2 Post-crisis trade policy measures affecting African countries

Country Green Amber Red Implemented measures Total pending Number of


measures measures measures affecting country measures classified pending
as amber and red measures
Algeria 5 10 24 34 4 5
Angola 5 8 10 20 3 3
Benin 4 5 7 13 3 3
Botswana 6 5 7 15 2 3
Burkina Faso 4 3 6 12 1 1
Burundi 4 4 7 13 2 2
Cameroon 8 6 7 17 3 4
Cape Verde 4 5 5 13 1 1
CAR 4 3 2 8 1 1
Chad 4 4 2 8 2 2
Comoros 3 3 3 8 1 1
Congo 4 7 10 18 3 3
DR Congo 6 7 13 25 1 1
Cote d'Ivoire 5 9 23 32 5 5
Djibouti 5 5 6 13 3 3
Egypt 18 23 56 80 14 17
Equatorial Guinea 4 6 3 10 3 3
Eritrea 3 3 3 8 1 1
Ethiopia 5 7 22 31 3 3
Gabon 4 5 5 12 2 2
Gambia 4 3 8 14 1 1
Ghana 7 9 21 31 5 6
Guinea 4 5 12 19 2 2
Guinea-Bissau 4 4 6 13 1 1
Kenya 9 9 31 45 4 4
Lesotho 4 4 4 10 2 2
Liberia 3 3 4 9 1 1
Libya 4 7 17 24 4 4
Madagascar 6 8 16 27 3 3
Malawi 4 7 14 22 3 3
Mali 5 3 15 22 1 1
Mauritania 4 4 11 17 2 2
Mauritius 6 10 17 29 4 4
Morocco 8 13 33 45 8 9
Mozambique 4 9 14 21 6 6
Namibia 4 7 17 25 3 3
Niger 4 5 11 18 2 2
Nigeria 7 11 22 33 6 7
Rwanda 5 4 7 13 2 3
Sao Tome and Principe 3 2 5 10 0 0
Senegal 6 9 23 33 5 5
Seychelles 3 5 4 9 3 3
Sierra Leone 4 4 4 11 1 1
Somalia 4 3 4 10 1 1
South Africa 26 39 80 122 20 23
Sudan 5 7 16 24 4 4
Swaziland 5 9 8 17 4 5
Togo 4 4 15 21 2 2
Tunisia 8 12 40 53 5 7
Uganda 5 9 18 28 4 4
Tanzania 6 11 19 30 6 6
Zambia 5 7 15 24 3 3
Zimbabwe 4 9 17 25 5 5

Source: GTA Database (accessed 18 May, 2010).

39
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Figure 2 Post-crisis trade policy measures affecting African countries

Green Measures
20%

Red Measures
53% Amber
Measures
27%

Source: Based on GTA database (accessed 18 May 2010).

Taking a holistic view of the effects of post-crisis policy measures on African


countries, red measures are of utmost prominence, accounting for 53% of total
measures. If we combine this with the potential restrictive measures, they represent
80% of total measures affecting African countries. This leaves only 20% of the total
measures as liberalizing. Again, this suggests the heavy and unexpected additional
burden being heaped on African countries during the financial crisis and recovery
period in addition to those emanating from the traditional channels.
In terms of impact, the restrictive policy measures can be broadly classified into
two: minor and temporary measures targeted at specific products and complex
measures that have the potential for significant, long-term effect on trade generally
and especially trade activities of developing and emerging African countries. Viewed
by classification, these measures take the forms of subsidies, support packages, tariff
and border measures. While the developed countries apply subsidies, bail-out and
support packages to restrict the engagements of other countries in their economies,
developing and emerging economies adopt border and tariff measures to achieve the
same aim.
It is discouraging to note that African countries are at serious disadvantage because
existing laws automatically allows for price supports in form of increased subsidies
with declines in agricultural prices. Such subsidies are prominent among the
developed countries such as Canada, EU countries, UK, US, Japan and South Korea.
To illustrate, in the US alone, trade restricting subsidies valued at over $8 billion was
recorded with a projection for a rise to about $10 billion in 2009 (Gamberoni and
Newfarmer 2009).
African trading partners have adopted varying and diverse restrictive and
discriminatory trade policy measures during the period of financial crisis. Some of
these are local content requirement, bailouts, export subsidies, export restrictions,
investment measures, public procurement, trade defense measures, import duties,
import ban, import licensing, price referencing, and other services, technical and
trade defense measures.
One key observation on the response of African countries to these trade restrictive
measures is that only relatively developed African countries are able to respond with

40
Effects of Post-Crisis Foreign Trade Policy Measures on Economic and Trade
Performance in Africa

retaliatory measures. These countries are usually the North African countries and
South Africa. For instance, South Africa has used both border and behind border
measures aimed at restricting trade, especially from the developed countries. The
country has a significant support package for the local clothing and textile industry
that include procurement provisions. This general support is extended to border
measures that include a planned increase in import tariffs for to up to 45 percent for
35 categories of textiles and clothing. Again, this is worrisome given the role of South
Africa in intra-African trade and the fact that the restrictions do not exclude African
countries.

3 Evidence of the effects of foreign trade policy measures


adopted during the financial crisis on economic performance in
Africa

The trade policy measures implemented by trading partners of most African countries
have had both positive and negative impact on economic performance of African
countries. While there are a pocket of measures that have impacted positively on
these economies through increased exports, imports of critical inputs, domestic
employment creation and increased investment opportunities, most of the measures
have had severe adverse effects on the economy. Some of these negative effects
include sharp decline in exports, FDI, private capital flows, national savings, rise in
unemployment, worsened terms of trade and current account balance. In this section,
we provide selected specific discriminatory policy measures adopted by some African
trading partners and encapsulate their effects on these economies by examining the
trends in some basic macroeconomic and trade indicators.
The elimination of export duties or interim export duties by China in January 2010
on 17 tariff lines involving minerals, iron and steel has had a positive effect on some
African countries4. It is noteworthy that several African countries depend on China
for supply of cheap processed iron and steel for infrastructure projects development.
Some of these countries include Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South
Africa. China's policy to eliminate tariff on these commodities has further reduced
the cost of imports of these materials, thereby helping African countries to benefit
from the relatively cheaper materials for both private and public infrastructure and
construction projects. The reduction in cost of processed iron and steel resulting from
this move has also strengthened China's engagements in infrastructure development
in Africa given the relatively lower cost of iron and steel and with potential increase
in number of projects. Given the high infrastructure gap in Africa, this policy measure
is a welcome development as it holds the potential for closing this gap through cost
reduction.
On the other hand, Indonesia issued a new policy measure aimed at the contrary.
Effective 31st December 2009, the country introduced a new regulation on domestic
market obligation aimed at prioritizing mineral and coal for use in the domestic

4 http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/china-elimination-export-duties-certain-mineral-and-iron-or-
steel-products

41
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

economy5. The regulation requires that producers of these resources allocate certain
minimum percentage for domestic consumption at the expense of exports. Strict
compliance is required as extreme sanctions are imposed on firms for non-
compliance. Such restrictive measure could starve developing African countries of
these requisite resources for use in infrastructure development. Earlier and beginning
from November 2009, Indonesia imposed stricter regulation on fruits and vegetable
imports, demanding checks on imports for hazardous chemical residues6. While this
may seem good when viewed from health point of view, it could be easily abused and
used in controlling general imports, especially imports from African countries under
the guise of non-compliance. If so abused, this will have severe effect on employment
and general welfare given that almost all African countries are engaged in and depend
on agriculture exports, with greater percentage of their workforce engaged in this
sector.
The US "American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009" is a major foreign
partner policy with very strong negative effect on African economic performance,
especially trade and investment. Signed into law in February 2009, the
comprehensive bailout and procurement package provides support for the American
economy to the tune of $787 billion with provisions for "Buy American"7. This
provision extends to commodities usually exported by African countries to the US,
prominent among which are textiles and textile fibers, yarns and spun silk yarn,
fabrics, etc. While this might not override the AGOA Initiative, the implication for
African countries is that the competitiveness of fledging agriculture and industrial
products and its potential entry into the American market is temporarily diminished.
On February 18, 2010, the French government exerted pressure on the
management of Philips to restart dialogue with staff to ensure jobs are saved for those
employed in the firm in France8. This move portends a negative effect on South Africa
where Philips has a major factory and office that employs several local people. This
negative effect emanates from the fact that employment protection for Philips'
employees at home might require reduction in foreign subsidiary operations,
including South Africa. This would result in lower foreign direct investment and
possible divestment by the company in South Africa, employment will reduce,
welfare loss will follow as those who lose their jobs would experience higher poverty.
In February 2010, the French government exerted pressure on Total to rethink its
decision to close the refinery in Dunkirk because this would lead to loss of both direct
and indirect jobs9. Caving in to this pressure, Total was forced to guarantee jobs for
the workers, confirming its decision against earlier move to close the refinery.
However, this was achieved at the expense of foreign commercial interest because
Total will most likely transferred the cost to its subsidiaries abroad through reduced
investment and general operations in foreign subsidiaries. One of the African
countries that would bear the brunt of this reduced investment and operations is

5 http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/indonesia-domestic-market-obligation-dmo-mineral-and-coal-
producers
6 http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/indonesia-stricter-regulation-fruit-and-vegetable-imports
7 http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/united-states-america-expanded-buy-american-provisions-
public-projects
8 http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/france-government-pressurises-philips-preserve-jobs-dreux
9 http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/france-government-pressurises-total-preserve-jobs-dunkirk

42
Effects of Post-Crisis Foreign Trade Policy Measures on Economic and Trade
Performance in Africa

Nigeria where Total is involved in oil exploration and marketing. This could involve
scaling down on staff and complete hold on new investment and jobs. This could also
have significant impact on oil production in the country, worsening the declining oil
production resulting from insecurity in the Niger Delta region of the country.
The comprehensive bailout package of the Russian Federation that was approved
in June 2009 has also had negative effects on African countries10. The discriminatory
support the package provided for agriculture, textile and timber processing sectors are
the main channels through which the negative effects spring. About €5 billion worth
of support was provided for the agriculture sector in 2009, about 45% higher than the
support provided in 2008. This support includes subsidy for bank credits to farmers
and provision of agricultural machines and equipment. In addition, €7.6 million was
allocated for subsidizing interest rates on banking credits for the wood sector, and to
create seasonal reserves of rough wood and fuels. This move further restricts and
limits exports from several African countries to the Russian Federation.
In response to the effects of the financial crisis and fundamental structural
problem facing the agriculture sector, the French government provided a rescue
package worth €1.65 billion for its farmers in October 2009 with the intent of
defending the 'French national identity'11. This rescue package consists of €1 billion
subsidized bank loans with a range of just 1% to 1.5% interest rates and €650 million
in land and energy tax cuts coupled with reduced social charges. The measures are
aimed at activities meant for exports, thus discriminating against foreign farmers.
Earlier, the same country implemented similar discriminatory policy that focused on
improving international competitiveness of the fruits and vegetables sector with
financial support worth €15million in August 200912. The EU countries took similar
step in July 2009 when the European Commission approved 16 programs in 12
member countries13 aimed at supporting EU's agriculture production in organic
products, dairy products, meat, wine, fruit and vegetables, olive oil, honey and
flowers14. The program valued at €62.1 million was aimed at strengthening EU's
agriculture product competitiveness in the international market. This is a direct
competition and discrimination against agriculture products from African countries
as the negative effects of this protectionist policy measure on African exports into the
EU and third market is easily discernible.
Switzerland has adopted similar discriminatory policy aimed at protecting its
agriculture sector15. In October 2009, the Swiss Federal Council approved 28 million
Swiss franc aimed at supporting agriculture production, increasing credit price
compensation by 18 million Swiss francs. The objective of the credit was to ensure
that local raw materials including butter, milk powder and grain are used in food

10 http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/russia-programme-anti-crisis-measures-russian-government-
2009
11 http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/france-immediate-eur-165-billion-rescue-package-french-
farmers
12 http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/france-new-subsidies-fruits-and-vegetables-sector
13 The member countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Latvia, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
14 http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/ec-support-promotional-activities-agricultural-products-12-
member-states
15 http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/switzerland-federal-council-approves-chf-28-million-
agricultural-sector

43
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

manufacturing instead of foreign ones. In addition, subsidy for cattle breeding and
productive livestock exports was increased to a maximum level of 1.5 million Swiss
francs with the aim of stabilizing the milk and meat markets. Furthermore, the
amount of direct payments for open farmland was increased from 620 Swiss francs to
640 Swiss francs per hectare, bringing the total financial commitments to 6 million
Swiss francs.
Developed countries have also responded to the financial crisis by adopting
protectionist immigration and employment policies that discriminate against
foreigners, including Africans (McCabe, Lin and Tanaka 2009). There have been
restrictions on immigration in these countries with many of them announcing
changes to work permits for foreigners. Some of these countries that earlier proposed
'carrot' measures have resorted to using 'stick' to achieve their protectionist policy. In
February 2009, Czech Republic adopted a protectionist immigration policy measure
targeted at the non-EU migrants to return home. In Italy, illegal immigration was
recently made a criminal offense. Moreover, France and Italy are encouraging other
European Union countries to adopt tighter border patrolling measures, especially
along the Mediterranean Sea. These protectionist measures affect migrant Africans
more than other nationals given the large number of Africans in these countries.
The United Kingdom announced changes to its high-skilled migration criteria in
2009. Beginning April, highly skilled immigrants (Tier 1) seeking to enter the United
Kingdom are required to hold master's degree and earn at least 20,000 pounds per
annum (approximately US$31,000)16. This is a significant upward revision from the
previous conditions that required a bachelor's degree and 17,000 pounds annual
income (approximately US$26,400). In the same vein, employers seeking to bring
skilled workers into the UK are mandated to advertise such job to resident workers
through a government-run job web site for two weeks, with extension to four weeks
as of mid-December 2009. This is to be complemented by one other permitted
method before a non-European Union worker can be brought into the UK. Moreover,
the government has reduced the list of jobs on the skilled shortage occupation list
from 700,000 to about 500,000 over the last year. This policy seriously discriminates
against African migrants who are generally of lower qualifications and skills. It also
tend to discourage the migration of African youths that are interested in seeking
educational qualifications at vocational, technical, bachelor's and master's levels. This
could seriously hamper skills and educational development that are required for the
long-term economic growth and transformation of African countries.
Ireland instituted similar policy measures when the Minister for Enterprise, Trade
& Employment announced changes to the work permit and green card regimes on 15
April 200917. Effective 1st June 2009, the Irish government began restricting eligibility
and imposed tougher tests for the issuance and renewal of work permits. Specific
various middle-level jobs were declared ineligible for green cards. The new policy is
premised on the decision "to allow the maximum opportunity for any available job
vacancies to be filled from within the Irish labor market and wider EEA". Jobs in
healthcare, financial services and industry/service that pays between €30,000 and
€60,000 have been removed from the Green Card list. Issuance of new work permits

16 http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=759
17 http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=740

44
Effects of Post-Crisis Foreign Trade Policy Measures on Economic and Trade
Performance in Africa

for low-paid jobs was scrapped, stiffer penalties in form of higher fees and labor
market requirements are required for work permits renewal, jobs such as domestic
workers and low-paid jobs are classified as ineligible for new work permits. The
perceived negative effects of this policy development on African countries is through
loss of job and remittances of emigrant Africans in this country to family members
left behind at home.
Table 3 provides an encapsulation of the effects of protectionist trade, investment
and migration policy measures on African countries. A major highlight of the
negative effects of the post-crisis trade policy measures on African countries is decline
in imports, exports and net FDI and worsened terms of trade and current account
balance. It is hoped that as the global economy recovers and partners of African
countries relax and desist from the current protectionist measures, Africa will
gradually recover from its current weak economic condition, as demonstrated by the
projections for most economic and trade indicators.
Recent studies have endeavored to analyze the impact of foreign trade policy
measures on African trade. For instance, using sectoral bilateral trade data for 1976-
2002 and a gravity equation approach, Berman and Martin (2010) quantify the
deviation of exports from their "natural" level generated by financial crises. They find
that African exports are more sensitive to large negative income movements in the
countries they trade with, and this hold true for both manufacturing and primary
goods exports. The study concludes that disruption effect is the main channel
through which a given fall in income and demand by African trading partners
adversely affect African exports.

Table 3 Pre- and post-crisis performance of Africa in selected indicators

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Investment 17.4 18.1 19.5 19.3 19.7 19.4 20.3 21.5 22.0 21.7 22.6 22.8
(% GDP)
Savings 18.1 16.8 16.1 16.7 18.3 19.2 24.8 22.6 23.3 20.3 21.6 21.5
(% GDP)
Inflation rate (%) 15.4 14.1 11.2 10.9 7.6 8.9 7.3 7.1 11.6 10.6 8.0 6.9
Import goods -1.6 8.1 8.2 7.4 6.9 11.7 6.8 15.6 11.1 -7.9 11.9 6.8
& services
(% change)
Export goods 9.3 2.1 2.1 6.7 7.7 6.6 3.8 7.3 0.3 -7.0 7.0 6.2
& services
(% change)
Terms of trade, 6.4 -2.6 0.0 3.1 3.9 10.0 8.0 2.0 10.2 -14.8 10.6 1.0
goods & services
(% change)
Current account 0.6 -1.6 -3.9 -3.0 -1.6 -0.4 4.3 1.2 0.9 -2.1 -1.7 -2.0
balance
(% GDP)
Net FDI 6.2 17.9 10.7 12.7 11.8 16.7 9.0 22.9 32.6 22.8 25.4 30.8
($billion)

Source: World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010.

45
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

4 Policy reflections

One major policy reflection on the actions of African trading partners during the
crisis is the need to further broaden economic based and exports of African countries.
As earlier observed, African countries were affected most through the policy measures
that discriminate against entry of African agricultural commodities into the markets
of trading partners and into third market. Continued and intensified production and
exports of primary commodities will deepen the competitive problems facing African
countries with limited room to maneuver in times of crisis like this. On the other
hand, capacity for economic and export diversification into higher value products
will provide some latitude for African countries and better negotiating power in its
trading relationships.
Specific policy actions are required to help diversify economic base and trade in
African countries. One, countries should work to improve productivity of agriculture
through value-added processing of existing commodities as opposed to the current
trend of exporting them in their raw forms. For instance, instead of continuing to
export tomatoes, corn, cocoa, vegetables in their raw form, efforts should be made to
ensure movement up the value chain by processing them into paste, thus improving
their value and lifespan. In addition, countries should vigorously work at adopting
high yield products and improved use of technology to increase quantity and quality
production of existing products and include new products. Two, the re is need for
innovation in services through better technology to reach more people. A classical
example here is mobile banking. A good percentage of Africans remain unbanked.
Such innovation in e-banking as demonstrated in the case of Kenya has a very high
potential for broadening economic base for self-reliance. Finally, resource-rich African
countries need to invest a good chunk of the revenues accruing from resources in
other sustainable activities such as agriculture and industry. Moreover, they need to
invest more in resource exploration and development than in exploitation. This will
help in the discovery of new untapped resources while improving the level of
exploitation of existing ones.
The post-crisis policy actions of African trading partners also drive home the
imperatives for domestic resource mobilization. Most African countries were, to some
extent, helpless in the face of the crisis due to limited resources and thus could not
do much to rescue their sinking economies nor counter the discriminatory measures
adopted by their trading partners. Worse still, many of these that depend on foreign
aid could not receive the pledged aid commitments from their development partners
who were busy bailing out their own economies. The crisis has revealed the futility of
continued dependence on developed countries and development partners in
providing the required financial resources for financing long-term economic growth.
African countries need to intensify efforts aimed at looking inwards and developing
strategic policies for mobilizing domestic resources for long-term economic growth.
There is also need to concentrate on reducing supply-side and cost raising
constraints. For instance, the elimination of import tariff on natural rubber18 and
reduction of import tariff on articles of apparel, clothing accessories and other articles

18 http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/russia-elimination-import-tariff-natural-rubber

46
Effects of Post-Crisis Foreign Trade Policy Measures on Economic and Trade
Performance in Africa

of furskin19 by the Russian Federation provides excellent opportunity for several


African countries producing this commodity to deepen market entry in to the Russian
market. However, the supply-side constraints largely limit the extent to which this
opportunity could be exploited. Put together, supply-side constraints increase cost of
production, worsening the competitiveness of African products in the international
market. Some of the constraints that require urgent attention are infrastructure
deficiency that includes roads, railroads, electricity, port infrastructure and
management, installed industrial and manufacturing capacity. In addition, there is
need to improve electricity generation in most African countries as this continue to
represent a major operating cost for producers. This can be done through public-
private partnership initiative as there are several local and foreign private firms that
are interested in such projects. Reducing these constraints will further reduce the cost
of production and ease market entry for African commodities vis-à-vis their
competitors.
Finally, the policy actions of Africa trading partners have demonstrated the need
to act swiftly to conclude the WTO's Doha Development Agenda. Developed
countries will continue to effectively exploit discriminatory tariffs and subsidies on
agriculture products as deemed fit without consideration for developing trading
partners. Concluding the negotiations and finalizing on import and export rules as
they relate especially to agriculture commodities will provide safeguards for
developing African countries.

5 Conclusion
This paper sets out to examine the nature of post-crisis trade measures adopted and
implemented by Africa trading partners and assess the nature and extent of impact
on trade and commercial interests of African countries based primarily on the
qualitative policy measures in the GTA database. Pre-crisis liberal and benign global
trade regime has been a major positive for the encouraging economic performance of
African countries in recent times. However, discriminatory and restrictive post-crisis
trade policy measures implemented by most Africa trading partners seriously
undermine the successes achieved and threaten post-crisis recovery. This paper has
enhanced our understanding on the nature of policy measures implemented by Africa
trading partners during the crisis. A very clear finding is that most Africa trading
partners have resorted to protectionist and discriminatory trade policy measures that
are of great disadvantage to African countries. The effects of these measures on trade
and economic performance of the continent has also been elicited. Among other
things, the policy measures have resulted in sharp decline in imports and net FDI
coupled with worsened terms of trade and current account balance. The policy
reflections reveal what urgent actions are required to correct the current factors
discriminating against competitiveness of African economies and exports in the
markets of partners and in the third market. To correct these perceived negative
effects and ensure quick recovery, African countries must work at broadening their

19 http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/russia-reduction-import-tariff-articles-apparel-clothing-
accessories-and-other-articles-furs

47
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

economy and export base, significantly improve domestic resource mobilization as


described above.

References
Berman, Nicolas and Philippe Martin (2010) "The vulnerability of Sub-Saharan
African countries to financial crises: the case of trade", CEPR Discussion Paper
7765.
Evenett, S. (2009) The Unrelenting Pressure of Protectionism: The 3rd GTA Report. Centre
for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).
Gamberon, Elisa and Richard Newfarmer (2009) Trade Protection: Incipient but
Worrisome Trends. Trade Notes No 37, March 2. International Trade Department,
PREM, The World Bank.
McCabe, Kristen, Yi-Ying Lin, and Hiroyuki Tanaka (2009) Pay to Go: Countries Offer
Cash to Immigrants Willing to Pack Their Bags. Migration Policy Institute, Piotr
Plewa, European University Institute. Available at http://www.migration
information.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=749.

About the author

Eric Kehinde Ogunleye is an open economies macroeconomist with strong


background in macroeconomics, econometrics, international trade and finance. Eric
holds a Ph. D and M. Sc. in Economics from the University of Ibadan and a B.Sc. in
economics, (Suma cum Laude) from the University of Calabar. As a PhD student, Eric
was a recipient of the prestigious African Economic Research Consortium's
scholarship for the Collaborative Ph.D. programme in Economics for sub-Saharan
Africa. Eric was at the University of Cambridge in 2008 to attend the Cambridge
Advanced Programme on Rethinking Development Economics. He was a Ph. D
research intern at the United Nations University's World Institute for Development
Economics Research in Helsinki, Finland where he worked on exchange rate and
foreign direct investment issues. He has work experiences at the WTO and UNCTAD
in Geneva. At UNCTAD he worked with the team that prepared the UNCTAD's
flagship publication, World Investment Directory for Africa in 2008. He has published
a number of articles in reputable economic and business journals in addition to active
participation in international research conferences.

48
Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Trade
and Economic Policy Making in Africa

Felix Fofana N'zue


African Center for Economic Transformation

1 Introduction

The financial crisis has inspired writings from many scholars since 2008. The
orientation given in their different writings varies widely. Indeed, while some focused
on the causes of the financial crisis, others have tried to assess its impact.
Although, at its onset, many thought that it will not have any bearing on Africa
given the negligible connectivity of African markets to the world economy, time has
now shown that those who made these initial statements were wrong. Indeed, the
financial crisis hit the African economies both directly and indirectly and it has even
been argued that African countries suffer and will continue to suffer more from the
financial crisis and its aftershocks than other countries. This is so because according
to a number of scholars, African countries are not only ill-prepared to resist the shock
but also, they do not have the resources (financial as well as human) to bail out
troubled companies and even if they did, could they sustain such actions if the crisis
was to last longer than expected?
Despite these views on the incapability of African countries to seriously and
effectively address possible impacts of the financial crisis, countries have taken
measures (individually or collectively). The main objective of this paper is to
contribute to the understanding of the impact of the financial crisis on African
economies (especially trade) and how it was dealt with. More specifically, the paper
assesses the impacts of the crisis then identifies measures taken to address / mitigate
issues arising from the financial crisis (i.e. protecting their economies from the
possible shocks emanating from the direct and indirect impacts) and identifies
lessons that can be learnt from African policy makers' actions or inactions.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents an overview of the
possible impacts of the financial crisis on African economies; section 3 presents the
measures taken by different countries to address the challenges posed by the financial
crisis with a brief analysis; section 4 draws possible lessons from the crisis and
concludes the paper.

2 Brief overview of the possible impacts of the financial crisis


The impacts of the financial crisis on Africa are manifold. There are direct as well as
indirect impacts. The impacts vary from one cluster of countries to another. In what
follows, we look at the impacts of the financial crisis from different angles i.e.
resource rich vs. resource poor.

49
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

2.1 Impact on resource-rich countries


Resource rich countries experienced rapid growth prior to the crisis (as a result of the
commodity boom). It is argued that these countries are the one who suffered the most
from the financial crunch due to terms of trade deterioration. Indeed, with global
demand shrinking, prices of most commodities dropped to significantly lower levels.
Exporting countries were therefore losing exports revenues and at the same time
losing much needed foreign exchange. The consequences of such losses on the
economy are huge. Indeed, as the IMF's World Economic Outlook Report in April
2008 stated, 1% point slowdown in global growth, which in turn shrinks global
demand, can lead to an estimated 0.5 percentage point slowdown in Sub-Saharan
African countries. In figure 1 below, resource-rich countries registered a sharp drop in
their exports of goods and services from 2008 to 2009. Although these countries are
expected to recover in 2010, this recovery is not expected to bring them up to their
level before the crisis. These countries are therefore worse-off than before the crisis.
In addition to the above impacts, the financial crisis has built up pressure on
developed countries. As a reaction to that pressure/stress, they have moved to tighten
global credit availability and this has in turn hit trade finance and other capital flows
to developing countries especially those in sub-Saharan Africa that rely heavily on
these resources to finance their development plans and address poverty and
employment related issues. The African Development Bank summarized some of
these impacts in its policy briefs on the financial crisis in 2009. The relevant one to
this work are presented below1.
In South Africa for instance, the financial sector experienced a collapse of asset
prices, dramatic increases in the cost of capital and a severe contraction in lending.
This led to sharp downturns in the retail and manufacturing sectors. Between May
2008 and March 2009, South Africa's JALSH index fell by about 46% and the Rand
depreciated by 23% against the dollar. The South African mining sector also
experienced a large fall in output and employment as a result to lower world demand
for commodities. About 32,000 mining workers were retrenched in the third quarter
of 2008 in South Africa.
In Nigeria, investments, output and government revenues also fell significantly
due to declining prices of hydrocarbons (oil and gas). In that country, oil and gas
extraction accounts for 30% of the economy's GDP, over 90% of its exports and a
large share of government revenues. Consequently, any significant drop of revenues
emanating from oil/gas could be disastrous to the country's economic stance. The
weak performance of the oil and gas sector caused a slowdown of the banking sector
and the economy at large.
In Botswana, diamond exports represent about 35 to 50% of government revenues.
The rapid fall in mineral revenues due to the financial downturn has limited the
government's ability to finance economic recovery plans and increased the high
vulnerability of the country's economy to external shocks. The consequences on the
rest of the economy could be devastating since limited resources meant that social
sectors (health and education) will face financial rationing (budget cuts). This can
also lead to massive unemployment in the sector as companies are forced to adjust to
the crisis for their own survival.

1 AfDB (2009), Policy Briefs on the Financial Crisis: Impact of the crisis on African Economies Sustaining
growth and poverty reduction No 8.

50
Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Trade and Economic Policy Making in Africa

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, around 61 foreign mining companies have


been forced to scale back, postpone or abandon their investment plans. These mining
companies have taken various actions for their survival including the suspension of
operations and / or the withdrawal of exploration agreements. Figure 1, shows a sharp
decline of the country's exports of goods and services from 2007 onward. By
December 2008, the DRC Ministry of Mines had reported that more than 200,000
jobs had been lost in the sector and further 200,000 were expected to be lost in 2009
(African Development Bank 2009-1). The victims of this retrenchment will surely
inflate the poverty profile of the country in the coming year. It is good to also
mention that as a result of the financial crisis foreign reserves in that country were
down and could barely cover one month of imports of goods and services in 2008.
In Angola, an oil-producing country, government revenues are on the decline due
to falling oil price. This can be observed on figure 1, where we have a sharp drop of
the country's exports of goods and services from 2008 to 2009. The non-oil sectors
(construction, manufacturing and services) heavily dependent on public sector
demand are also experiencing slowdowns leading to global slowdown of the
economy which is expected to contract by 7% following a growth rate of 15.8% in
2008.
In Sudan, oil accounts for about 65% of government revenue and 90% of exports.
The decline in oil exports certainly exert pressure on investments and put at risk
expenditures on social sectors including health and education.
The negative terms of trade shock to commodity exporters will continue to widen
their current account deficit although it will be done at a slower pace. This will
exercise constraint on their external accounts. Indeed, as the figure 2 on external
account shows, the resource-rich countries experienced a worsening of their external
account balance from 2007 to 2009. Although the oil producing countries i.e. Angola
and Nigeria will be recovering in 2010 due to recent rising price of oil. The depression
is expected to continue for the other resource-rich countries. Similar trend is observed
for their fiscal balance (see figure 3). Indeed, with the exception again of the Oil
producing countries (Nigeria and Angola) that are expected to recover in 2010, the
others will continue to feel the impact of the financial crisis on their fiscal balance.

Figure 1 Exports of goods and services from 2003 to 2010 for resource-rich countries (% GDP)

100

80
% GDP

60
40

20
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Angola Nigeria Botswana South Africa DR Congo

51
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

In total, it results from the above that for all the resource-rich countries, the crisis
has underscored the imperative need for export diversification in reinforcing the
resilience of their economies to external shocks.

2.2 Impact on resource-poor countries


Although resource-poor countries benefited from falling oil prices, these gains were
largely offset by declining prices of other commodities such as cotton, cocoa, and
coffee (just to cite a few), declining tourism earnings, foreign direct investments and
declining remittances thereby negatively affecting foreign exchange reserves in these
countries. In Burkina Faso for example, export growth dropped from 6.9% in 2007 to
3.5% in 2008, following the fall in cotton production and the decline in lint cotton
export. The balance of trade sharply deteriorated under the combined impact of
falling agricultural production and declining lint cotton export (Kasekende et al.,
2009).

Figure 2 External account including grants for resource-rich countries (% GDP)

30
20
10
% GDP

0
-10 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-20
-30

Angola Nigeria Botswana


South Africa DR Congo

Figure 3 Overall fiscal balance including grants for resource-rich countries (% GDP)

20
15
10
%GDP

5
0
-5 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-10
-15

Angola Nigeria Botswana


South Africa DR Congo

52
Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Trade and Economic Policy Making in Africa

Figure 4 Overall fiscal balance including grants for resource-poor countries (% GDP)

0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
% GDP

-5

-10

-15

Ghana Kenya Ethiopia Gambia

The financial crisis has also amplified the impacts of the food crisis. Indeed, the
depreciation of national currencies against major reserves currencies as a result of the
financial crisis has raised the cost of food imports and this is harder on economies
(mostly resource-poor countries) that have large deficits in food trade. In these
countries, attempts to subsidize food and oil prices have proved unsustainable due to
low government revenues and falling exchange reserves.
In Ethiopia for instance foreign reserves have been reduced and credit to private
sector is declining considerably as government increased its domestic borrowing to
finance the oil subsidy bill. In Kenya, total usable reserves (official plus commercial
banks holding) fell from $5,287 million to $4,726 million in just six months (August
2008 to February 2009). By the end of February 2009, the Kenyan Shilling had
depreciated by 15.7% against the dollar2. With the exception of Ethiopia, figure 4,
below shows that fiscal balance of Ghana, Kenya and the Gambia registered and
sharp decline from 2007 onward. Ghana recovered a bit in 2009 after a continuous
widening of its fiscal balance but that recovery is not expected to last.
Countries where the tourism sector is one of the drivers of growth also suffered
from the financial crisis. These countries experienced declines in tourism arrivals and
receipts, hotel bookings and air travel. They include Kenya, Tanzania, and Tunisia,
etc. In Kenya, tourism receipts were down 13% in the 4th quarter of 2008 compared
to 2007. Kenya Airways reported a decline in profits by 62.7% for the six months
ending September 2008. In 2008 the number of tourist arrival drop to 1.1 million
compared to the 2 million arrivals registered in 2007 (Kenya 2010). Although this
drop was primarily due to the post election violence in that country, the financial
crisis also added its toll in the later part of 2008.
For these countries, the decline in the tourism sector is reversing recent gains
thereby undermining the countries efforts to build up their foreign exchange reserve
base. It is clear that any slowdown of the tourism sector directly affects the
employment situation in these countries since this is a sector with very high job
creating potential. Reduced tourist arrivals also threatened tourist dependent
economies like Djibouti and the Gambia. With the exception of Ghana where 2009

2 Report from the Committee of African Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors established to
monitor the crisis (march 2009).

53
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Figure 5 External account including grants for resource-poor countries (% GDP)

5
0
-5 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
% GDP

-10
-15
-20
-25

Ghana Kenya Ethiopia Gambia

registered a slight recovery (which could be due mainly to the visit of the American
President Obama to the country), other non resource-rich countries will continue to
experience widening deficit of the external account (see figure 5).
Other areas of impact include remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI)
although their importance varies considerably across the continent. Countries
(mostly resource-poor) with high dependency on remittances (as percentage of export
earnings) include Lesotho (60%), Uganda (40%), Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Togo, Benin
and Burkina Faso (15-25%). Workers' remittances are important source of household
income and key in poverty alleviation strategies in these countries. Remittances to
Africa were estimated to about $25 billion in 2008 (African Development Bank 2009.).
Since these remittances originated from migrant workers in developed countries, the
mounted pressure of the financial crisis on these countries has resulted in a slowdown
in remittances flow. Indeed, as global demand shrinks, so does the demand for
unskilled labor (mostly migrant) a survival strategy but aiming also at protecting
domestic jobs. Resource poor countries suffered the most from such slowdown
although due to the absence of alternative sources o income to compensate for the
losses. The drying up of remittances also affects countries that are not necessarily
resource-poor. For instance in Egypt remittances represent more than 32% of total
service receipt in the balance of payment account (AfDB 2009).
Although the bulk of remittances to Africa originate from Europe and North
America, Intra-African remittances are not negligible especially in countries sharing
borders with mineral rich countries. These intra-African remittances are also
declining due to losses in the mining sector. Indeed, the decline in prices of
commodities such as Gold, Platinum and Diamonds has affected demand for labor
which led to the laying-off of migrant workers from neighboring countries, thereby
reducing remittances flow to countries of origin. Declines in remittances contribute
to foreign exchange shortages and increased poverty, as some of the most vulnerable
and poorest populations lose a significant source of income (Ali, 2009).
For FDI and Aid, it is clear that with the pressure of the financial crisis on
developed countries they are less inclined to generosity. Thus, international Aid flow
has dropped as a consequence to the crisis. Moreover, the tightening of global credit
has led to a significant reduction in private investment flows and bank financing,
resulting in reduced capital flows and a curtailing of the availability of trade finance

54
Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Trade and Economic Policy Making in Africa

and also reduced foreign direct investment (Balchin 2009). The reduction of FDI has
a medium and long term impact on infrastructure investments in African States.
Indeed, investments were stalled in many countries (DRC, South Africa just to cite a
few).
It results from the above that the financial crisis has caused (although some other
factors also contributed to it) decline of domestic demand in both resource-rich and
resource-poor countries. This in turn has reduced income and inhibited efforts for job
creation thereby endangering prospects for sustainable growth. Since a significant
reduction in growth will reverse the modest gains made over the past years which will
worsen the poverty situation. It is critical that actions are taken to mitigate the
impacts of the financial crisis on these economies. What are some of these actions
taken?

3 Policymakers' reaction and brief analysis of measures taken


Although, at the onset many scholars thought that Africa was protected from the
impact of the financial crisis and that there was nothing to fear, the empirical
evidence gathered show that after all Africa was not immune. As the impacts started
to be felt policymakers did not stay idle. Indeed, a number of African governments
took initiatives to mitigate the impact of the financial crisis despite their limited and
inadequate resource endowment in relation to the scale of the impact. Central Banks
in Africa (BCEAO for the CFA zone, Central Bank of Nigeria just to name a few) and
the African Development Bank including some governments set up special units to
monitor and identify the advance of the crisis and formulate targeted policy
responses. The range of intervention was very wide going from stimulus package to
regulations in the banking sector, capital and exchange controls, budget revision etc.
The main measures taken as a response to the financial crisis are presented below with
a brief analysis.

3.1 Stimulus packages


Following the footsteps of developed and emerging economies, some African
countries implemented fiscal stimulus plans when others were forced to undertake
contractionary fiscal policies. The countries that opted for stimulus plans include (but
not limited to) the following: Mauritius, Nigeria and South Africa.
In Mauritius, the Government announced a package worth 10.4 billion of
Mauritian Rupees (US$ 0.3 billion), approximately 3% of Mauritius GDP to boost
domestic demand and increase job creation.
In Nigeria, the Central Bank adopted a 400 billion naira (US$ 2.7 billion) bail out
for 5 banks after sacking the CEOs and executive directors of the banks (Measure
#0386 | Published 18 Aug 2009)3. The banks are Oceanic bank, Intercontinental bank,
Finbank, Union Bank and Afribank. Acting CEO's were immediately appointed and
the central bank has guaranteed foreign loans and corresponding banking lines of the
banks. The five banks account for 40% of banking sector credit in the country. In

3 For details of this and subsequent measures cited, see http://www.globaltradealert.org.

55
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

addition, the Central Bank injected 200 billion naira (US$ 1.3 billion) into four banks
that an investigation revealed were in a "grave situation." The four banks were: Spring
Bank Plc, Equatorial Trust Bank Ltd., Wema Bank Plc and Bank PHB Plc. A fifth bank,
Unity Bank Plc, was found to have insufficient capital for its current level of
operations but has a healthy liquidity position and no indication of poor corporate
governance practices.
In South Africa, the Department of Trade and Industry made loans available to
distressed companies in manufacturing sectors identified in the National Economic
Development and Labor Council (Nedlac) Framework Agreement, as distresses. The
sectors included: Automotives, Clothing and Textiles, Capital Equipment, Transport
Equipment and Metals Fabrication. In addition, the Industrial Development
Corporation (IDC) made 6 billion rand available over two years to a number of firms
in different sectors and has approved loans to 11 companies to the value of 644
million rand.
These measures although criticized to some extent (especially the Nigerian
decision to bail out 5 banks) enable these countries to harness trust and confidence
in their business environment and demonstrated if need be that African policymakers
can be up to the task of taking difficult decisions when challenged.

3.2 Budget revision


Unlike the above countries that opted for stimulus plans, a number of other countries
preferred to revise their budget thus:
In Zambia, the Budget was revised to address issues related to changes in some
taxes and VAT treatment of certain items to stimulate growth and ensure the
availability of adequate funds for government (Measure #1047 | Published 29 Dec
2009). The measures included: an increase in income tax rate on profits from export
of cotton to 35% from 15%; Reduction of excise duty on clear beer from 75% to 60%
to prevent tax evasion; Increase in export levy on cotton-seed from 15% to 20%;
Increase in customs duty on cellular phone handsets from 5% to 15%; in the mining
sector, the Government removed the windfall tax and retained the variable profit tax
and increased capital allowance to 100% as an investment incentive. The
Government also reduced customs duty on heavy fuel oil from 30% to 15% and
removed customs duty on copper powder, copper flakes and copper blisters. For
developers and investors in the Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZ) and Industrial
parks, the Government agreed to the removal of withholding tax on management
fees, consultancy fees and interest re-payments to foreign contractors; Zero rate
supplies to developers of MFEZ and industrial parks; Foreign suppliers to the MFEZ
and industrial parks were exempted from reverse VAT charge; Equipment and
machinery imported for the development of MFEZ and industrial parks were
exempted from customs duty. The Government removed import duty and zero-rated
insecticide-treated curtains for VAT purposes and customs duty on cranes and garbage
dumpers to encourage investment in keeping the country clean
In Namibia, the Government adopted a new budget that lowered Corporate tax for
non-mining operators from 35% to 34%; increased excise duties on Malt beer
(increased by 7 cents to 79 cents per 340ml can), on unfortified wine (increased by 14
cents to N$1.98 per liter), on fortified wine (increased by 32 cents to N$3.72 per liter),

56
Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Trade and Economic Policy Making in Africa

on spirits (increased by N$3.21 to N$25.05 per 750ml) and on cigarettes (increased by


88 cents to N$7.70 per packet of 20"), with the view to generating additional revenue
(Measure #0251 | Published 13 Jul 2009).
In Tanzania the 2009/10 budget included i) zero-rating for certain services when
exported; ii) zero-rating VAT on locally manufactured bags; iii) exempting import
duty on hand hoes and other imported agricultural inputs; iv) exempting VAT on the
services of loading and unloading into local vessels of incoming cargo from outside
the country provided that the initial service of unloading the cargo from a foreign
going ship at the first point of disembark was charged VAT; v) increasing prices of beer
made from local un-malted cereals from shilling 194 per liter to shillings 209 per liter,
other beers from shillings 329 per liter to shillings 354 per liter, wine produced with
more than 25% imported grapes from shillings 1,053 per liter to shillings 1,132 per
liter"; vi) increasing excise duty on cigarettes made with less than 75 percent domestic
tobacco content ; vii) reviewing all tax exemptions granted to private companies
(Measure #0373 | Published 17 Aug 2009). These measures are clearly discriminatory
and aim at protecting companies using more domestic input content.
In Zimbabwe the 2010 budget included the following measures: i) Reduction in
corporate tax rate from 30% to 25%; ii) Increase in mineral royalties on precious
metals such as gold and platinum from 3% to 3.5%; iii) Export tax rate of 15% on
exports of unprocessed chrome to foster domestic processing of chrome ore; iv)
Extension by six-months the suspension of duties on imported foodstuffs, until mid-
2010; and v) Reduction in duty on small imported motor vehicles from 40% to 25%
(Measure #0994 | Published 3 Dec 2009).
In the Gambia the 2010 budget restored a 5% sales tax on imported rice (Measure
#1046 | Published 29 Dec 2009). In Ghana, the 2010 budget rationalized import duty
on imported textiles and poultry products to check dumping of these goods on the
Ghanaian market and increased royalty payment to 6% as an initial step in re-
engaging all mining companies to review the mining industry's fiscal regime (Measure
#0973 | Published 26 Nov 2009).
In Uganda the 2009 budget included provisions to i) remit import duties on
specially designed tourist vehicles imported by licensed tourist operators; ii) remit
import duties on spare parts of certain industrial machinery imported by registered
manufacturers, under the condition that the parts in question are not resold or used
for any other commercial purpose other than the replacement of a worn-out part; iii)
remit import duties on equipment and other inputs imported by licensed firm
engaged in oil, gas, or geothermal exploration; iv) exempt from import duty heat
insulated milk tanks; v) remit import duties on film equipment; and vi) remit import
duty from 25 percent and apply 10 percent for trucks of carrying capacity of 5 tons
and above, for one year for Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda (Measure #0390 | Published
19 Aug 2009; Measure #0393 | Published 20 Aug 2009).
It is clear from the above sampled countries that the concern of policymakers in
the different countries was to generate additional revenue no matter whether the
proposed actions hurt trade in neighboring countries or not (with the exception of
the EAC countries).

57
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

3.3 Targeted assistance to sectors


In addition to budget revisions several countries implemented targeted assistance
plans to support sectors that they considered to be driving their economic
performance.
In Sierra Leone the Government imposed a 15% export tax on diamonds worth
more than US$50,000. The tax took effect on December 28 2009 in addition to an
already existing increase in taxes on diamonds from 5% to 6.5% and an increase in
taxes on gold and other minerals from 4% to 5%. A ban has also been imposed on
the transport and export of logs. This is in a bid to crackdown on illegal logging in
the country (Measure #1103 | Published 20 Jan 2010; Measure #1104 | Published 20 Jan
2010).
In a similar move the Gabonese Government imposed a ban on unprocessed logs
beginning January 2010. The ban is aimed at encouraging the local processing of
wood and exportation of finished and semi-finished wood products (Measure #1120 |
Published 2 Feb 2010).
In Ghana, the Government re-introduced airport tax for international travel
outside West Africa and increased it from US$50 to US$75. The purpose of this
increase is to raise revenues and pay for improvements in security at the airport
(Measure #0255 | Published 13 Jul 2009).
In Nigeria, possible lifting of ban on foreign ownership of banks is being
considered In addition, the Customs Service has introduced a uniform import duty
rate on imported vehicles based on ex-factory prices. The uniform import duty rate is
to do away with variances in the calculation of duty on vehicles (Measure #0307 |
Published 23 Jul 2009). Also, a progressive reduction in import duty on vehicles
ranging from 3 months in age to four years and above was introduced. Moreover, the
Government has increased tariffs on imported tires from 10 percent to 40 percent
(Measure #0290 | Published 21 Jul 2009).
To encourage local production of cement, the Nigerian government approved a
series of measures. In addition to the reinstatement of the policy of banning the
importation of bagged cement and restrictions on the issuance of cement import
licenses, the following measures were introduced: i) A levy of 500 naira (US$3.37) per
ton on all cement imports to assist in the development of local capacity through the
establishment of a cement training institute in Nigeria (Measure #0807 | Published 21
Oct 2009); ii) Reinstatement of tariff incentive for imported spare parts and
machinery to cement manufacturers; iii) Two to three years duty-free period of
importation for machinery, equipment and spare parts to cover the plant building
phase and the first two years of commencement of production; iv) Tax deductible
incentives on investments in system conversion to coal firing; v) Removal of all forms
of restrictions on the importation of gypsum; vi) Reduction of import duty on
gypsum to a maximum of 5% until local production on commercial basis is achieved.
The Central Bank through a circular signed on 13 November 2009 has banned with
immediate effect the importation of aluminum roofing sheets less than 0.50mm in
thickness and cold roll steel of less than 0.20mm thickness.
In Cote d'Ivoire the Government reduced export taxes on cocoa (its highest foreign
exchange earner) in the 2009/10 season by 5% from CFA francs 220/kg to CFA francs
210/kg to meet the debt relief terms of the World Bank (Measure #0308 | Published 23
Jul 2009).

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Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Trade and Economic Policy Making in Africa

In South Africa, the Treasury has relaxed exchange controls in an effort to lower
the cost of doing business, while managing risks in a volatile international
environment and to contribute in making South Africa an attractive investment
destination. The measures adopted include: i) Removal of various restrictions on rand
conversion of export proceeds and advance payments for imports; ii) Increases in the
rand thresholds applicable to outward investments by South African companies; The
rate of duty on shovels and spades with a maximum blade width of 150mm but not
more than 200mm have been increased from free of duty to 20% ad valorem. Anti-
dumping duties have been imposed on stainless steel sinks imported from or
originating in the People's Republic of China. Depending on the export company, the
duties could be either from 10.84%, 20.62% or 62.41%. If the stainless steel sinks are
imported from or originating from Malaysia, depending on the export companies the
anti-dumping duties could be either from 10.74% or 95.86%. In addition to the
above, the International Trade Administration Commission of South Africa has
recommended a reduction in the rate of duty on synthetic filament yarn classified
under tariff heading 54.01 and 54.02. The rate of duty has been reduced from 15% ad
valorem to free of duty. Description of items under the tariff heading include: Sewing
thread of synthetic filament, high tenacity yarn of polyester and textured yarn of
polyester.
In Angola the Government banned banana and vegetable imports from Kenya,
Uganda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and
Rwanda with the aim of containing a bacterial wilt disease affecting bananas in these
countries (Measure #0879 | Published 5 Nov 2009).
In Uganda the National Bureau of Standards introduced a pre-export verification
of conformity (PVoC) of imported used vehicles into the country. Fees to be paid
upon inspection are dependent on the country of origin: Japan (US$ 145), Singapore
(US$180), United Kingdom (125 pounds), and South Africa (1685 Rand), Dubai-UAE
(US$125). There is a penalty of 15% CIF value on used vehicles entering the country
without an inspection certificate and then an inspection takes place.
In Kenya, Ports Authority made the following changes in fees associated with the
Port of Mombasa: i) Elimination of payments for scanning, verification, inspection
and associated stripping or stuffing currently set at Sh5,850 ($75) and Sh8,580 ($110)
for 20 foot and 40 foot containers, respectively; ii) Reduction in license fee for private
mooring, buoys and jetties from Sh39,000 ($500) to Sh15,600 ($200) per annum; and
iii) Free storage period will be 5 and 11 consecutive days for domestic and transit
containerized traffic respectively (Measure #0224 | Published 8 Jul 2009) . The Kenyan
Government also adopted a ban on the export of raw cashew nuts in a bid to revive
the industry (Measure #0334 | Published 6 Aug 2009).
In Sudan the Government imposed an import tariff equivalent to 12 Egyptian
pounds per square meter on ceramic tiles from Egypt. Ceramic tiles from Egypt are
said to represent 10% of Egypt's exports to Sudan (Measure #1033 | Published 16 Dec
2009).
At the regional level, the East African Community (EAC) agreed to i) Exempt
import duty on heat insulated milk cooking tanks for dairy industry; ii) Tanzania to
continue the stay of application of CET rate of 35% and apply 10% on wheat grain of
HS codes 1001.90.20 and 1001.90.90 for 1 year as the wheat production in the region
cannot meet demand; iii) Tanzania to remove the 10% import duty on

59
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

pharmaceuticals and start applying the CET rate of 0% like other EAC Partner States;
iv) Tanzania to remove the 10% import duty rate on crude palm oil and start applying
CET rate of 0% like other EAC Partner States; v) Exempt import duty on industrial
spare parts subject to conditions that will be developed by the Secretariat of the EAC
in collaboration with the partner states. The measure intends to reduce the cost of
production and promote investment in the industrial sector; vi) Exempt import duty
on four wheel drive vehicles specially designed and built for tourist purposes in order
to promote tourist business in the region; vii) Exempt import duty on equipments
and inputs, excluding motor vehicles, imported by a licensed company for direct and
exclusive use in oil, gas or geothermal exploration and development upon
recommendation by a competent authority of a Partner State; viii) Exempt import
duty on raw materials used for the manufacture of sanitary towels and tampons in
order to enable users to get these hygienic products at affordable price; ix) Reduce
import duty rate from 25% to 0% for asbestos fibers of HS codes 6812.80.00 and
6812.99.00 used for manufacture of brake linings and pads as these inputs are not
available in the region; x) Reduce import duty rate from 25% to 0% on television
cameras, digital cameras and video camera recorders of HS code 8525.80.00 in order
to promote filming industry and create employment and income for the youth; xi)
Reduce import duty rate on worn clothing from 45% or US$0.30 per kilo to 35% or
US$0.20 per kilo whichever is higher for a period of 1 year; xii) Increase import duty
rate on yoghurt and other buttermilk of HS codes 0403.10.00 and 0403.90.00 from
25% to 60% to protect the dairy sector from stiff competition arising from
importation of these products; xiii) Grant duty remission on raw materials for use by
paper and paperboard mills; xiv) Reduce import duty rate on light trucks of at least 5
tons carrying capacity under HS code 8704.22.90 from 25% to 10% for a year for
Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania. Also remove import duty on heavy trucks of more
than 20 tons carrying capacity under HS codes 8704.23.90 for one year for Tanzania,
Uganda and Rwanda while verification mission is being undertaken to establish
Kenya's capacity and price competitiveness in manufacturing of trucks in relation to
demand and usage in the region; xv) Remove import duty rate on synthetic yarn in
order to reduce production costs to the producers who uses synthetic yarn for
blending with cotton yarn.
The above are number (not exhaustive) of actions taken by individuals countries
as a reaction to the financial crisis. All these measures whether of the stimulus type
or of budget revision type aimed at designing ways to enable government mobilized
additional financial resources to compensate for the losses caused by the financial
crisis. In most cases governments succeeded to some extent (although a full
evaluation is yet to be undertaken) to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis on the
economies.

4 Lessons from the crisis and concluding remarks


What lessons could be learnt from the review of impacts and the sample of measures
taken by African countries? Several lessons could be learnt:
1. In the face of world economic challenges, Africa needs to be pro-active and
engage in serious home-based research and macro as well as micro simulations

60
Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Trade and Economic Policy Making in Africa

to ascertain impacts of possible external shocks. The financial crisis showed that
without rigorous analysis and sound home-based research, decision - makers
could be misled (as illustrated by initial writings arguing that Africa was
protected from the financial crisis because of its insufficient connection with the
world economy).
2. Although African countries do not have resources to the size of developed
countries that enabled them bail out troubled companies, initiatives taken by
some African countries showed that the impacts of an external shock could be
mitigated with well thought targeted measure. These targeted measures could
take different forms including but not limited to stimulus package, budget
revision, specific short run tariff and/or non tariff barriers.
3. The crisis brought to the spotlight the fragility of regional groupings. Indeed,
apart from the EAC's initiative to bring its members to agree on possible actions,
the responses of African countries in general have been country specific. Here it
is clear that countries could have achieved better results in terms of mitigating
the impact of the financial crisis and also in terms of increasing intra-African
trade if decisions were taken within the regional economic communities (RECs).
This calls therefore for a re-dynamization of the RECs.

It results from the above analysis that African countries were severely hit by the
financial crisis. The impacts included: for resource rich-countries i) falling exports of
minerals and other natural resources due shrinking global demand, leading to loss of
export revenues and foreign exchange; ii) Loss of jobs due to retrenchment in the
extractive resource sector; iii) Widening fiscal deficit; iv) Declining investment
putting at risk socio-economic infrastructural projects in these countries. For
resource-poor countries i) an amplification of the food crisis; ii) declining tourism
earnings; declining FDI; declining remittances; and declining foreign exchange
reserves.
Some of the impacts are cross cutting and not limited to a given cluster of
countries. In their responses, African countries used measures spanning from
stimulus package to specific targeted measures and budget revision. Although, it is
quite early to assess the effectiveness of the measures taken, it could be argued that
these measures provided some kind of cushion to the countries that adopted them. It
resulted from the analysis that African countries need to be pro-active to prevent their
economies to suffer a full blow of external shocks. Moreover African countries need
to put the existing RECs to play in dealing with these external shocks rather than
engaging in solitary actions.

References
Ali Shimelse (2009), Impact of the financial crisis on Africa, International Economic
Bulletin,
African Development Bank (2009-1), Impact of the Financial Crisis on African
Economies: an interim Assessment, Policy Briefs on the Financial Crisis N°1.
African Development Bank (2009-2), The Global Financial crisis and Fragile States in
Africa, Policy Briefs on the Financial Crisis N°9.

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Balchin Neil (2009) The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis in Africa, Africa Growth
Agenda, July-September.
Global Trade Alert (2009), http://www.globaltradealert.org
Global Trade Alert (2010), http://www.globaltradealert.org
Holmqvist Goran (2008) How is Africa affected by the financial crisis and by the
global recession? Nordic Africa Institute (May).
International Monetary Fund (2009), World Economic Outlook (October 2009):
Sustaining the Recovery, Publication Services 700 19th Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C.
International Monetary Fund (2008), World Economic Outlook (April 2008),
Publication Services 700 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
Kenya (2010), Kenya Tourism Report, http://www.bharatbook.com/Market-Research-
Reports/Kenya-Tourism-Report.html (consulted on 24/03/10).
Kasekende Louis, Ndikumana Léonce, Rajhi Taoufik (2009), Impact of the Global
Financial and Economic Crisis on Africa, Working Papers Series N° 96, African
Development Bank, Tunis, Tunisia. 36 pp
Osakwe, N. Patrick (2008) Sub-Saharan Africa and the Global financial crisis, Trade
Negotiations Insights Vol. 7 N° 10
UNECA (2009), Economic Report on Africa: Developing African Agriculture through
Regional Value Chains

About the author


Felix Fofana N'zue is a Senior Research Fellow at the African Center for Economic
Transformation (ACET). Prior to joining ACET, he was the Manager of Collaborative
Research Projects at the African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi (AERC) from
January 2008 to June 2009. He was the Director General of Employment in the
Ministry of Public Service and Employment of Cote d’Ivoire from 2004 to 2007. He
chaired the Scientific Committee of the Presidential task force set up to reflect on the
re-instauration of a National Civic Service. He was the Technical Advisor on
Employment and Professional Training Policies of the Office of the Prime Minister of
Cote d’Ivoire from 2002-2004. He also worked for the International Labour
Organization as a Senior Expert in Agriculture and Rural Employment from 1999 to
2001. He is a permanent member of the research community of the Ivorian Center
for Social and Economic Research (CIRES).

62
Transforming Africa's Structure and
Composition of Trade after the Global
Economic Crisis

Nana Amma Afari-Gyan


African Center for Economic Transformation
1 Introduction

Efforts at structurally transforming trade in Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)


have achieved limited success. During colonization and the period immediately after,
the structure of external trade of African countries were mainly determined by the
needs of the colonial masters. African countries mainly exported natural resources
such as timber and minerals and imported manufactured goods. About six decades
later, this structure of trade has not been significantly altered. Invariably, African
countries have continually and consistently not managed to diversify trade into
manufactured products although world trade has undergone changes due to
liberalization and globalization. Reasons for the lack of export diversification have
included a lack of sound macroeconomic policies, high tariffs and supply-side
constraints. Since the 1980s, African countries have undertaken various reforms
aimed at ensuring economic stability and improving trade.
From 2000-07, real GDP growth averaged between 5 and 6 percent but in 2009,
GDP growth averaged only 1.1 percent and per capita income declined for the first
time in a decade.1 The turn of events was as a result of the global crisis. Though the
continent did not fall into a recession, the crisis severely impacted on economic
growth and trade volumes. The dependence of African countries on revenues from
the export of primary commodities led to shortfalls in export revenues2, current and
budget deficits.3 In response to the impact of the crisis, several developed and
developing countries have imposed protectionist measures which negatively affect
the interests of African countries.4 As world trade recovers in 2010, how can Africa
transform its structure and composition of trade in a bid to sustain economic growth
and development?

1 Global Economic Prospects, 2010


2 The African Development Bank estimated a loss of US$251 billion in export revenues in 2009 and
US$277billion in 2010 for the entire continent. Also, projected 2010 current account balance as a
percentage of GDP are -17.86, -22.90, -16.30 and -17.28 for Ghana, Madagascar, Nigeria and Zambia
respectively.
3 According to the Global Economic Prospects, 2010, current account balances of oil exporting countries
declined from 9.7 percent to 1.4 percent of GDP. Also, the crisis resulted in lower tourism revenues,
remittances and foreign direct investment for many African countries.
4 The Global Trade Alert Database contains measures imposed by governments all around the world
during and after the global economic crisis. (http://www.globaltradealert.org)

63
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

This paper discusses the potential for this transformation after the global economic
crisis by looking at future trade agreements, trade with other developing countries
and intra-regional. The paper is structured as follows: section 1 gives an introduction
to the paper; section 2 is an overview of Africa's structure and composition of trade;
section 3 is an overview of prominent new trading partners; section 4 analyses the
potential for change with a conclusion in section 5.

2 Structure and composition of Africa’s trade


Africa is dependent on the export of primary products. According to Collier and
Dollar (2001) in Collier (2002), three quarters of developing country exports in 1980,
were primary commodities but at the time of writing, about 80 percent were
manufactures. Sadly, Africa had not been part of the transformation. Between 2000
and 2008, primary commodities continued to dominate Africa's merchandise exports,
compared with Southeastern Asia - another developing region of the world. (See
figures 1 and 2 below). Also, while Africa's share of world merchandise exports has
been declining the share of fuels and mining products in primary exports and total
merchandise trade has been increasing.5

Table 1 Average percentage share of world merchandise trade in value terms (1995 - 2008)

Primary commodities Primary commodities Manufactured goods


(SITC 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 68, 667, 971) excluding fuels (SITC 5 to 8, less 667 and 68)
Developing Africa* 1.25 0.48 1.11
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.84 0.38 0.67
South Eastern Asia** 1.46 0.75 3.89
Developing America 1.76 1.3 3.27
Developed Europe 8.59 5.91 29.4

Notes: * Consists of Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde,
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti,
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Sao Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of
Tanzania, Western Sahara, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
** Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam
Source: Author's calculations based on data in UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2009

5 The share of fuels and mining products in total merchandise exports from Africa increased from 48.4
percent in 2003 to 70.6 percent in 2008 while the share of fuels and mining products in primary
products exports increased from 70.3 percent in 2003 to 91.2 percent in 2008. (WTO, International
Trade Statistics, 2003 and 2009)

64
Transforming Africa's Structure and Composition of Trade After The Global Economic Crisis

Figure 1 Share of SSA merchandise exports in total world merchandise exports, 2000-08
share of SSA merchandise exports (in value terms)

2
1.8
1.6
1.4 primary commodities
1.2
(%)

1
0.8 Primary commodities
0.6 excluding fuels
0.4 Manufactured goods
0.2
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year

Figure 2 Share of Southeastern merchandise exports in world merchandise exports, 2000-08


(in value terms)
Share of Southeastern Asia merchandise

5
Primary Commodities
4
exports (%)

3 Primary commodities
excluding fuels
2
Manufactured goods
1

0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year

Least Developed African countries are becoming more commodity-dependent than


before. Out of 49 countries classified by the United Nations as least developed, 33 are
in Africa. Of concern is the increasing nature of their dependence on commodity
exports. Gayi (2010) shows that least developed countries (LDCs) in Africa have
become more commodity-dependent over the 2000-08 period. As a share of total
merchandise exports, in 2008 primary commodities made up 82 percent, up from 69
percent in 2000. Also, while the concentration index from 2000-08, for African LDCs,
increased by 73 percent, that of Asian LDC's decreased by 39 percent (Gayi, 2010).
The increasing dependence has implications for the countries ability to cope with
negative macroeconomic shocks arising from volatile commodity prices, thereby
worsening the already existing low standard of living.
Diversification into manufactured goods has been limited in African economies
but a few countries have managed to do so. Very few countries in Africa have been
able to diversify into manufacturing. From 2000 - 06, only 8 out of 35 countries had
manufacturing exports representing 10 percent or more of GDP and Africa had the
lowest share of manufacturing exports to total merchandise exports at 26 percent,
compared with 92 percent, 56 percent and 54.5 percent for East Asia, South Asia and

65
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Latin America, respectively.6 Countries like Mauritius, Morocco, Swaziland, South


Africa and Tunisia have managed to diversify into manufactured exports such as
electronic components and textiles. For example, manufacturing as a percentage of
GDP in Tunisia is about 20 percent and in 2008, Tunisia was the fifth largest textile
exporter to the EU, with a 3.6 percent market share.7 Similarly, in 2008, textiles
constituted 30.5 percent of Mauritius's merchandise exports.8
Since the 1990s, African countries have diversified into non-traditional exports. As
a result of trade liberalization programmes and reforms, African countries have also
managed to diversify into the export of non-traditional products, especially fruits and
vegetables. Kenya and Uganda export large amounts of cut flowers and vegetables
while Ghana has increased exports of pineapples. However, a major barrier to Africa's
trade in non-traditional exports, hindering an increase in market share and export
destinations, is compliance with strict Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS).
This serves as a hindrance due to a lack of capacity in African countries.

3 New players in Africa’s trade with the world


Other developing countries have become important partners of trade in Africa.
Consistently, Africa's largest trading partners over the years have been the European
Union, the United States of America and France. However, since the early 2000's,
other developing countries have become important trading partners, overtaking
'traditional' trading partners. The new key partners are China and India. The so called
'new players' in Africa's international trade are not really new in the region. However,
their importance to and influence on the region has broadened rapidly over the last
decade. The growth in Africa's exports to China and India is because of large domestic
demand for natural resources as a result of high economic growth rates. Compared
with world averages of 2.7 percent in the 1990s and 3 percent from 2000 to 2008,
China's economic growth has averaged 10 percent per annum in the 1990s, with
some annual rates as high as 14 percent and has continued to average 9.8 percent
from 2000 to 2008.9 Similarly, India's growth rate averaged 5.7 percent in the 1990s
increasing to an average of 7 percent from 2000 to 2008.10
Like, the older partners, the new partners (China and India) are predominantly
interested in obtaining natural resources from Africa and exporting manufactured
goods to Africa. In 2008, 79.5 percent of total imports of the USA from SSA were
crude oil imports while 92.3 percent of all imports under AGOA were petroleum
imports.11 SSA's natural resource exports to China rose from $3 billion in 2001 to $22
billion in 2006, representing over 600% increase, with crude oil making up 80% of
this total figure (Foster et al, 2009). In 2008, Africa accounted for 31% of total Chinese
oil imports with Angola, Sudan and Nigeria being important suppliers of crude oil to

6 UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa Report, 2008


7 African Development Bank, Country Strategy Paper 2007 - 2011 and European Commission Trade (n.d)
8 WTO, 2009.
9 World Development Indicators
10 World Development Indicators
11 Department of Commerce, USA, US-African Trade Profile 2009

66
Transforming Africa's Structure and Composition of Trade After The Global Economic Crisis

China.12 Other raw materials of interest to China from Africa are wood products (logs)
from Gabon and Mozambique.
Similarly, the share of crude oil in total imports of India from Africa increased from
46 percent to 53 percent from 1999 to 2006.13 In 2008, Nigeria supplied about 11
percent of India's oil needs.14 Trade in general with Africa has increased significantly.
Africa's exports to India grew by over 300 percent from about USD$380million in
1999 to about USD$16 billion in 2008 while imports from India also increased by
about 700 percent from about USD$1.8 billion in 1999 to about USD$14 billion in
2008.15 Both China and India export manufactured products such as textiles,
footwear, pharmaceuticals, machinery and equipment to African countries.

4 Prospects for a Change in Africa’s Structure of Trade


The global economic crisis resulted in public finance problems for African countries.
Although economic growth and trade in Africa is expected to begin recovering in
2010, it is reliant on demand from others. Due to significant commodity price
declines and low demand, African countries which generally depend on export
revenues to finance their economies were faced with shortfalls in government
revenues which impacted on government public sector projects and programmes.
According to the 2010 Global Economic Prospects Report the world economy is
projected to grow at 2.7 and 3.2 percent in 2010 and 2011, after shrinking by 2.2
percent in 2009. SSA economies are expected to grow at 3.8 percent in 2010 but this
growth will be slower than that of other developing countries due to the reliance on
commodities. In addition, SSA economies will grow by 4.6 percent in 2011 while
other developing countries will on average grow by 5.2 percent in 2010 and 5.7
percent in 2011. However, Africa's growth is dependent on export demand from trade
partners such as China, the European Union and the United States.
African countries participate in WTO negotiations, are signatories to a number of
existing trade agreements, are contemplating future agreements, all in an effort to
improve trade and most importantly, change the structure of trade. Both bilateral
and multilateral trade negotiations have been embarked upon by African countries
and their trade partners. Initiatives like Aid for Trade, Everything but Arms (EBA),
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) have been implemented in an effort to
improve upon market access for African products and increase the benefits of trade.
Currently, there are multilateral negotiations in the WTO and with the EU to further
improve market access for Africa's products. Aside from the potential welfare gains
these trade agreements may provide for Africa, the agreements might help diversify
Africa's exports, if trade facilitation measures are well considered, negotiated for, and
effectively implemented.
The Doha Development Round(DDA) proposes to reduce poverty and help the
development of developing countries through improved market access and removal

12 Camody and Taylor, 2009


13 Tralac,2006.
14 US Energy Information Administration
15 IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics

67
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

of subsidies and domestic support but structural challenges existing in developing


countries serve as constraints. DDA deals with a number of issues significant to the
development of African countries. These range from trade in agricultural goods, non-
agricultural goods, trade facilitation to intellectual property rights and trade in
services. One of the most important issues is the improvement in market access for
African agricultural products to the developed markets. Since July 2008, discussions
have stalled over reduction in export subsidies and other domestic support measures
by developed countries as well as the extent to which developing countries would
open up their markets to developed countries. It is said that a concern of policy
makers of developing countries is that, the Doha Round would force them to make
significant reductions in tariffs on non-agricultural products but no real benefits in
terms of access to the markets of developed countries because of the slow removal of
export subsidies.16 Since the agricultural sector serves as the backbone of many African
countries - employing about 60% of the population and contributing about 40
percent to GDP -it is not surprising that African policy makers are very interested in
the final outcome of the negotiations.
What does increased market access mean for Africa? Global welfare gains of the
Doha Round, ranging from US$32 billion to US$55 billion have been simulated in
work by various authors such as Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005);
Bouet, Mevel and Orden (2006); Decreux and Fontagné (2006). But, with the
exception of the Bouet, Mevel and Orden study, these studies show that sub-Saharan
African countries will actually make the smallest gains or actually lose income from
both agriculture and manufactures liberalization because of low capacities in these
countries. Nonetheless, some individual African countries are to make gains from the
successful conclusion of the round. A study by Zepeda et al (2009) said Kenya is likely
to specialize in agriculture and processed food if the Doha Round is successful and the
ODI (2008) supposes that a more generous interpretation of the rules of origin by
developed countries would help least developed countries in Africa to diversify their
economies out of low value-added products.
Hence, for the Doha Round to offer Africa a chance of reforming its structure of
trade, the agriculture sector has to be modernized. With a large number of small-scale
farmers and low productivity, as well as the erosion of trade preferences, African
countries will be unable to compete in the international market. Constraints to high
productivity including lack of investment in agricultural technology generation and
dissemination, land tenure concerns, inaccessibility of finance will have to be
addressed.
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) may improve market access through the
elimination of tariff barriers but non-tariff barriers, if not dealt with, are likely to
impose challenges. EPA negotiations between the EU and African countries began in
2002 and were to be concluded in 2007. EPAs are said to foster regional integration.
Subsequently, negotiations are conducted with six regional economic groupings on
the continent. The EPA focuses among other things on development, market access
and regional integration. Due to several challenges, the initial deadline for an
agreement passed without a consensus and in its stead, interim EPAs have been
signed between the EU and Cote d'Ivoire, the Southern Africa Development

16 Woolfrey, 2009

68
Transforming Africa's Structure and Composition of Trade After The Global Economic Crisis

Community (SADC) while Ghana has initialed an agreement.


Several studies have commented on the potential benefits and costs of the EPA to
Africa. The potential of the EPAs in assisting the transformation of trade in Africa is
summarized in AU (2006) which calls for a focus on agriculture and building
competitiveness of African countries, for African countries to fully take advantage of
benefits from market access opportunities. The EU in negotiating with African
countries wants binding provisions relating to investments, competition and
government procurement. But these are likely to constrain the policy space available
for governments to implement development programmes to promote local industry
competitiveness. Moreover, subsidies on agricultural products maintained by the EU
make African products uncompetitive while overly strict health, sanitary and
phytosanitary standards result in revenue loses to African farmers and governments.
The worry therefore is that, improved market access without building up production
and supply capacity minimises or erodes the benefits that can be achieved.
According to the AU (2007), the EU and African countries have differing opinions
of how development in Africa can be achieved.17 Contentious issues in the
negotiation process are not limited to rules of origin regulations, extent of tariff
removal and abolishing of export restrictions. With reference to export restrictions,
they are generally used by developing countries to limit the export of raw materials
and rather encourage value-addition or processing. Removal of these restrictions
could reinforce a continuation of trade in natural raw materials and commodities.
The interim EPAs allow the protection of infant industries in African countries, when
imports from the EU threaten or cause disturbances to an infant industry producing
like or directly competitive products.18 However, many African countries are unable
to effectively use the safeguard mechanism due to a lack of capacity. Kwa (n.d) notes
that safeguard mechanisms provided in the interim EPAs are more restrictive than the
Special Safeguard Mechanisms enjoyed by the EU under the WTO.
Therefore, though EPAs might increase consumer welfare in African countries, (and
without full knowledge of what the comprehensive EPA will contain), for the EPA to
be a truly development tool for Africa, measures which might negatively impact on
local industry competitiveness, do nothing to improve supply-side constraints and
trade facilitation problems must be appropriately addressed to ensure a win-win
situation for all parties. Otherwise, African countries might sink deeper into trade in
commodities as they become less competitive on the international market.
It is necessary that intra-regional trade is improved upon, especially after the
decline in demand for commodities from Africa during the economic crisis. Intra-
regional trade in Africa is low, accounting for only 9.6 and 8.7 percent of imports and
exports, respectively, from 2004-06, compared with developing Asia's 48.1 and 45.5
percent for imports and exports, respectively.19 Several reasons for this include the
similar goods and services traded and difficulty with moving goods across borders in
Africa. Furthermore, as stated above, African countries have to negotiate for improved

17 The EU negotiators view development mainly as trade liberalisation and adopting rules prohibiting
discrimination against foreign investors and against foreign bidders for government contracts while
Africa views development as full duty free and quota free market access to global markets, subject to
special arrangements for sensitive products.
18 Ghana-EU Interim EPA
19 Economic Development in Africa Report 2009

69
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

market access to that of other African countries and other developing countries. This
is evidenced by the Economic Development in Africa Report 2009, which stated that
intra-regional trade in agricultural goods are less trade-intensive than manufactured
products, accounting for 19 percent of total intra-African exports, thereby suggesting
the possibility of increasing intra-African trade in agricultural goods.
Africa has to be proactive in its trade relationship with China and India. Africa's
share of trade with China was 3.8 percent between 2000 and 200720 with China
increasingly dependent on African countries for crude oil and other key natural
resources to fuel its economic growth. While most of Africa's trading partners,
suffered from low or negative economic growth rates in 2009, China grew by 8.4
percent and is projected to grow at 9 percent in 2010.21 In dealing with Africa, China
and India usually blend trade with foreign direct investment and aid. This mix if well
evaluated and assessed will enable Africa increase its benefits from trading with China
and India. For example, Africa's agricultural products such as cocoa and cotton face
tariff escalation in China.22 Policymakers may be able to persuade China to open up
its market to agricultural products from Africa in negotiating trade, investment and
aid agreements.

5 Conclusion
The main purpose of the paper was to discuss the potential of structurally
transforming trade in Africa after the global crisis, with respect to trade agreements
and intra-regional trade. A constant and important reminder of the crisis to African
policymakers is the need to diversify Africa's exports so as to minimize the impact of
external shocks on African economies. Various reforms to improve trade have not
yielded the expected results though trade initiatives like AGOA and EBA has
improved market access for African countries to developed markets and is helping to
deal with supply-side constraints. Despite this, a large proportion of the products
exported under these initiatives have continued to be primary commodities. The
global economic crisis has offered African policymakers a chance to reconsider
whether the development path chosen. Wood and Mayer (1998) in examining the
structure of Africa's trade suggested that a medium-term solution was to follow the
development path of resource-abundant America rather than resource-scarce Asia by
increasing the level of processed and unprocessed primary exports.
Increasing the amount of processed primary exports in the medium term is
definitely a step in the right direct as the potential of agriculture in transforming
African economies has not been fully exploited. From the aforementioned,
agriculture is important to African economies since it employs about 60 percent of
the population and contributes about 40 percent to GDP. Supply-side constraints
including inaccessibility of finance, low agricultural extension services, inadequate
funding for research and lack of infrastructure must be addressed to help the
transformation. Countries can modernize the sector by processing primary products,

20 Looking East Vol. II, 2009


21 Global Economic Prospects 2010
22 Looking East Vol. II, 2009.

70
Transforming Africa's Structure and Composition of Trade After The Global Economic Crisis

taking note of the barriers which processed goods face in developed and developing
countries. Hence, in considering future trade agreements, policymakers must strive to
balance this objective with the benefits that can be attained from trade liberalization.
Lastly, strengthening regional integration by linking physical infrastructure such as
roads and harmonizing quality standards will be integral to increasing intra-regional
trade and potentially contribute to the transformation of Africa's trade.

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About the author

Nana Amma Afari-G Gyan is a Research Analyst at the African Center for Economic
Transformation. She has an MPhil in Economics and a B.A. in Economics with
Geography and Resource Development from the University of Ghana. She previously
worked as a teaching assistant in the Department of Economics, University of Ghana
and with KPMG Ghana as a tax trainee. Her research interests lie in Development
Economics and International Finance.

73
Towards More Balanced Trade within the
Framework of the Forum for China-Africa
Cooperation: The Impact of China on Africa's
Trade

Sarah Jane Danchie


African Center for Economic Transformation
The renewed importance of Africa in China's foreign policy became apparent in the
mid 1990s during Chinese President Jiang Zemin's tour of Africa. On this visit, he
announced the creation of the Forum for China - Africa Cooperation (FOCAC),
ministerial level meetings to be held every three years between China and African
countries with diplomatic ties with China. The first FOCAC meeting was held in
2000, and indeed this marked the launch of a new phase in Africa - China
cooperation (Alden, 2010). FOCAC provides the framework for Africa - China
relations. Since 2000 especially, trade between African countries and China has grown
at a phenomenal rate1 (Figure 1). China's transformation from an agricultural
producer in the 1970s to an industrial economy, a dominant producer of
manufactured goods and the fastest growing consumer of commodity products
(ACET 2009a) has necessitated China's massive demand for Africa's commodities to
fuel its economic growth. Subsequently, by 2009, trade between China and Africa was
valued at just over $90bn (although a drop of 16% from its high in 2008 at $106bn).
Trade is the largest dimension in economic engagements between China and Africa,
as it eclipses total investment and economic and technical cooperation (ACET 2009a).

Figure 1 China-Africa Trade, 1995–2009 ($billions)

120,000.00

100,000.00

80,000.00

60,000.00

40,000.00

20,000.00

0.00
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

Source: Tralac, 2010

1 Therefore, this paper will focus on China-Africa relations between 2000 and 2009, when data is
available

75
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

This paper seeks to explore the impact that increased relations between China and
Africa within the FOCAC framework are having on Africa's trade. The paper will
highlight that China's trade-specific FOCAC commitments will merely serve to
facilitate increased trade between Africa and China however, this is not sufficient for
balanced trade, as it will still be dominated by Africa's exports of low value primary
commodities in exchange for China's higher value manufactures imports thus
widening the trade imbalance. Although both China and Africa have implemented
protectionist post financial crisis trade measures that will negatively impact the level
of China-Africa trade, there are other interventions that could potentially improve
Africa's capacity to trade. Cooperation in other areas has greater potential to ensure
that the increased trade will be more balanced by increasing Africa's capacity to
produce and trade more value-added exports. Further cooperation as outlined in the
FOCAC process will provide Africa with an opportunity for greater value-added
export production to take advantage of emerging developments in China and shifts
in global production.
Section one will look at general trends in China-Africa trade, between 2000 and
2009. Section Two will look at specific trade-related FOCAC commitments made by
China to improve Africa-China Trade and assesses their impact. Section Three looks
at other areas of cooperation within the FOCAC framework that already have and will
have the potential to impact Africa-China trade. And Section Four will look at
emerging developments for Africa to take advantage of that could provide
opportunities for "more balanced trade" with China. The final section will conclude.
This paper will draw on primary and secondary research undertaken by the African
Center for Economic Transformation (ACET) during 2009 as well as a review of up to
date literature on China-Africa relations.

1 Trends in Africa-China trade


This section will look at emerging trends in Africa-China trade. It will highlight that
China-Africa trade has grown exponentially, more than both sides' traditional trading
partners; it has provided affordable manufactures for African consumers and industry
and a welcomed capital injection to fuel Africa's growth especially during the global
crisis when relations with Africa's traditional partners declined. However, increased
Africa-China trade has grown in an unbalanced way - the gains from trade are limited
to a few African resource rich countries exporting oil and mineral products to China
which have proved vulnerable during the commodity price bust in 2008. Indeed
Africa's trade surplus with China reversed to an overall trade deficit by 2009. The
majority of African countries are suffering from mounting trade deficits and Africa
continues to depend on exports of low value primary products. China Africa trade has
become more and more unbalanced and thus unsustainable.
China-Africa two way trade between 2000 and 2009 has risen by an unprecedented
750% (at its peak in 2008, it rose by just over 900%) using data from China Customs
(Tralac 2010). China-Africa trade represents an opportunity for both to diversify their
export partners. During the global recession, China was especially hit hard as its
exports to its top six trading partners represented 70% of its exports in 2007. All of
these partners experienced economic contraction and thus decreased import demand

76
Towards More Balanced Trade within the Framework of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation

Figure 2 Africa's top imports from China

100%

80%
Plastic products
60% Footwear
Textiles and clothing
40%
Transport equipment
20% Machinery

0%
D2000
D2001
D2002
D2003
D2004
D2005
D2006
D2007
D2008
D2009
during the global financial crisis (Hong Kong Trade and Development Center 2009).
Similarly for Africa, after the global crisis, in 2009, China overtook the US to become
Africa's top trading partner of the year with trade volumes of $90.8bn compared to
the US-Africa trade volume of $88.9bn. This dropped a dramatic 39%. According to
the Global Trade Alert database, 20% of its total trade policy measures were "red"
measures which "almost certainly discriminated against" African exports and 80% of
the EU27's measures implemented were red2 thus negatively impacting African
exports. Meanwhile, the drop in Sino-Africa trade was only 15% (International Trade
Centre data). Manufactures constitute the largest share of African imports from China
86% (Tralac 2009), with machinery the fastest growing component. Chinese imports
provide affordable manufactured exports and thus welfare gains for the African
consumer and for African industry. Machinery imports have become increasingly
important among Africa's imports from China over the last decade (figure 2),
compound average growth rate of 62% between 2000-09, more than any other
category of manufactures imports. Dominated by machinery and other light
industrial products, these imports build up Africa's production capabilities.
However, the gains from increased Sino-African trade over the past decade, have
been limited to a few African countries. Using data from China Customs (Tralac
2010), China's top ten African trading countries (two-way trade) include; Angola,
South Africa, Sudan, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, Congo, Libya, Morocco and Equatorial
Guinea. Trade is highly concentrated among these countries, accounting for nearly
77% of total China-Africa two-way trade during 2000 - 2009. Furthermore, China's
top ten African exporting countries (these include Angola, South Africa, Sudan,
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Gabon, Algeria, Nigeria and the
Democratic Republic of Congo) account for almost 90% of Africa's exports to China.
Just four African countries account for 93% of China's oil supply from Africa - these
countries include; Angola (51%); Sudan (18%); Republic of Congo (13%); and
Equatorial Guinea (11%). Other minor sources include Nigeria (3%); Gabon and Chad
(1% each) (Alden and Alves 2009).

2 Global Trade Alert database accessed 18 May 2010)

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

China is becoming more and more dependent on Africa's supply of oil and mineral
exports from a few African countries. Africa is China's second largest oil supplier
(supplying 26% of China's oil) after the Middle East (which provides a 39% share).
Similarly, China is Africa's second largest major destination for its oil exports (19%)
after the US (37%) (Alden and Alves 2009). Similarly in minerals exports, China's
imports of mining products from Africa have increased from $286m in 2000 to
$2.6bn in 2006. In some cases, China has become dependent on Africa's mineral
exports. These include manganese from Gabon, South Africa, Ghana and Zambia
which provide 40% of Chinese import needs and cobalt from the DRC supplies 80%
of China's needs (Alden and Alves 2009). Thus Africa is an increasing important
source for China's insatiable demand for natural resource products.
Although Africa ran an overall trade balance surplus with China during the period,
(in 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2008), the surplus is dominated by only 13 African
countries that run a trade surplus with China. Also, the size of these surpluses is
reducing. Indeed, Africa's trade surplus in 2008 of $5, 014m was almost completely
reversed into a deficit for Africa in 2009 into -$5, 442.48 (Sandrey et. al 2010). But the
majority (just over 80%) of African countries is running worsening trade deficits with
China, that have increased on average by almost 1500% between 2000 and 2009. In
the case of Cameroon, China's share of its trade deficit was more than 80%. The
"Asian-induced" oil price boom, (which China has contributed significantly to) has
exacerbated trade deficits for African net oil importing countries, fueled domestic
inflation, severely compromising the competitiveness of African firms.
The vulnerability of the structure and composition of China-Africa trade was
exposed following the global economic crisis and the subsequent commodity price
decrease in 2008. While Sino-African trade has grown substantially, the composition
and structure of exports have not changed, reinforcing Africa's low value primary
commodity production as this mirrors Africa's trade with its traditional trading
partners (ACET 2009b). Africa overwhelmingly exports fuels, minerals and metals to
China. During 2000 - 2009, these products accounted for more than 84% of total
exports to China (Tralac 2009 and 2010). Additionally, these products have become
more and more important in Africa's export basket to China - figure 3 shows the
increasing importance of mineral products during the period. Moreover, Africa's
export of primary commodities to China made up 86% during 2000 - 2009. These
products experienced a boom in 2008, thus Africa's top exporters to China saw a
much welcome increased injection of capital. However, Africa's exports to China were
severely impacted by the commodity price decline in 2009, when the value of African
exports to China declined by $25.9bn in 2009. The price of Africa's main
commodities to China - crude oil and minerals decreased on average by -39.18
(Sandrey et. al 2010).

2 Trade-related FOCAC commitments


Section two looks at trade specific FOCAC commitments. It will evaluate their impact
on Africa-China trade. It concludes that these pledges will merely serve to, at best,
increase Africa China trade, however, Africa-China trade will remain unbalanced. The
granting of preferential access to exports from least developed countries with

78
Towards More Balanced Trade within the Framework of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation

Figure 3 Percentage share of Africa's top exports to China, 2000–2009


0% 000 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009
2 2 2

Mineral products
2

Base metals
Precious stones and metals
2

Wood products
2

Textiles and clothing


2 2 2 2

0%
50

10

Source: Tralac, 2010

diplomatic relations with Africa represents the most direct measure aimed at
improving Africa-China trade. This section will highlight that even this measure has
resulted in limited gains for preference recipient countries and has only really
facilitated the export of primary products again from resource-rich LDC countries.
Although the preferences provide the opportunity for access to more value added
exports, the export supply response from LDCs has been limited due to more binding
non-tariff barriers. Other measures are "best-endeavor" pledges and subsequently
indirect measures that will also only at best facilitate increased rather than more
balanced trade.
Since the first FOCAC in 2000, China has made commitments to Africa focusing
on Sino Africa trade with the aim of increasing it. These commitments have included
the following; "grant[ing] zero-tariff treatment to some commodities of African LDCs for
access to Chinese market. The Chinese side will, starting from 2004, negotiate lists of tariff-
free goods and the rules of origin with the countries concerned on a bilateral basis." At the
end of the second FOCAC in 2003, the Chinese Government announced that it
would give zero-tariff treatment to 190 kinds of commodities imported from least
developed countries in Africa having diplomatic relations with China with a view to
increasing Chinese imports from Africa (Yafei 2005). And in the last FOCAC, the
Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan has promised to; "to further open its market to African
countries. ...in a phased manner, grant tariff exemption treatment to 95% of exports from
the least developed countries (LDCs) in Africa having diplomatic relations with China. As
the first step, the goal of zero tariff treatment for 60% of products originating therefrom will
be met in 2010." Preferential treatment to exports from Africa's LDC's represents
China's most direct effort to increase Africa-China trade.
The impact of the preferences is at best limited to a small group of resource-rich
LDC exporters. Since 2005, when the preferences came into effect, just six out of the
313 eligible African LDCs provided 92% of the total exports from African LDCs. These
countries include; Angola, Sudan, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Libya and the

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Democratic Republic of Congo. The total value of exports from African preference
recipients was just over $130, 000 (using data from Tralac 2010). Again their exports
were overwhelmingly petroleum and crude oil products - these accounted for almost
9x% of total exports. Minerals take second place - accounting for x% of total exports.
There has not been a significant export supply response to the preference receiving
products. Since the preferences came into effect, there has not been a significant
export supply response from the preference receiving countries as pre-preferences,
exports from LDCs had a compound average growth rate of 25% between 2000 and
2005, since the beginning of the preferences until 2009, the CAGR only increased
slightly to 28%. From 2000 to 2005, without any preferential treatment, 93% of the
African LDCs' exports to China were entering China duty-free anyway as China had
already drastically reduced or eliminated Most Favored Nation tariffs on these
exports. Moreover, these exports were largely primary products essential for fueling
China's economic growth (Minson 2007). Interestingly, as the Chinese ambassador in
Chad pointed out, Chad exports none of the products on the list (Minson 2007).
Furthermore, despite including a wide range of products, LDC exports have
remained primary products thus underutilizing the preferences. The preferences have
failed to transform the structure of exports from African LDCs. They remain primary.
Based on LDCs current export capacity, the most economically valuable Chinese
preferences are for primary products, including sesamum seeds, cocoa beans, cashew
nuts and cobalt materials (Minson 2007). African LDCs have not been able to take
advantage of the diversity of the products receiving preferences, characteristically,
still only exporting a few products. The preference receiving products include;
agricultural products - food, plants, animals; minerals - precious stones, raw and
simply transformed; manufactures - processed foods, light consumer manufactures,
light industrial products and textiles. Figure 4 shows the percentage share of the main
category of products. The list includes a larger proportion of manufactures, almost
three-quarters. However, the manufacturing export supply response has been
negligible.
The ability of LDCs to benefit from the preferential access to China has been
hindered by a number of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Several African stakeholders both
private and public have expressed their difficulty in obtaining the list has thus
hindered their ability to benefit. African LDCs manufacturing capacity is low also.
Further NTBs include China's inaccessible sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS)
requirements; cold chain sterilization requirements; and cultural differences.
Discretionary import prohibitions could also potentially hinder an export response,
given African LDCs low levels of health and sanitation capacity (Freemantle et. al,
2010). African LDCs face competition from Asian LDCs who export 301 of 440
products for which China has afforded special treatment to African LDCs (Alves
2008). The Chinese rules of origin are stricter than for AGOA, they state that at least
40% of the value must be added in the country as compared to AGOA which allows
for 35% regional value added. Thus the Chinese preferences impede intra-regional
production for manufactures especially.

3 African LDCs with diplomatic ties with China include; Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia

80
Towards More Balanced Trade within the Framework of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation

Figure 4 Share of preference receiving groups (%)

Source: Authors own calculations using the list provided by Standard Bank, 2010

However, with support to address the NTBs and investment, preferential access to
China would be more advantageous for LDCs. There are some significant advantages
to be maximized from these preferences. Without considering SPS requirements,
China's NTBs are much lower in agriculture than for the US or EU or even other Sub-
Saharan African countries. The average margin of preference for the products
exported by the African LDCs is quite significant at 10.4% (Minson 2007). Textile
products such as yarn, thread etc. provide higher valued opportunities with a 9.4%
margin of preference and even represents tariff de-escalation as China scandalously
has not included cotton in the list - a vital export for many African LDCs (Minson
2007). As mentioned above, at the last FOCAC held in Egypt, China has offered to
increase this list, within the next three years to 4, 700 products, this is almost ten
times the current amount. However, the extended list should be better tailored to
address LDCs supply-side constraints.
Other trade-specific commitments are focused on increasing trade through greater
trade facilitation. The last FOCAC in Egypt provided the most trade-specific measures
thus far with the main aims of facilitating greater Africa-China trade. China has
pledged to establish an African Commodities trade Center in China to promote
export of African commodities to China. The Sharm El Sheik Action Plan 2012 states
that "Preferential policies such as fees reduction and wavering will be adopted for
participating African enterprises". This will provide a good opportunity for resource rich
African countries to market themselves as a credible alternative source for China's
rampant commodity demand. Africa has still a lot of Chinese market share to gain as
currently Africa holds a small share of China's global demand in agriculture - between
2000 and 2008, it held just 1.7% (ACET 2009b); in forestry the share is 2.9%; in oil
and gas it is 26% behind the Middle East. However, this would merely increase trade
in primary commodities, not necessarily allow it "to grow in a more balanced
manner" for Africa. Further pledges are "best endeavor" measures, aimed at "greater
cooperation" in "customs, taxation, inspection, and quarantine"; "establishment of

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

three to five logistic centers to help improve business facilities in African countries";
and greater bilateral trade dispute settlement mechanisms.

3 Other areas of FOCAC cooperation


This section will look at other areas within the FOCAC framework, which are
impacting and have the potential to impact China-Africa Trade. It will highlight that
these developments are and have greater potential than the trade-specific FOCAC
measures to not only increase Africa-China trade, but also more importantly, these
have potential to enable China-Africa trade to "grow in a more balanced manner" if
sufficient local content requirements be included. These other areas include
investment and economic and technical cooperation and interventions in Africa's
infrastructure, agriculture and tourism sectors. These interventions are focused on the
production of value-added exports; import substitution; and represent a
diversification of China's interest beyond Africa's natural resources into
manufacturing and services. Thus an opportunity for resource-poor African countries
to benefit from the continents' increased relations with China. Thus African
governments should encourage greater cooperation in these areas.
Chinese investment is becoming more significant, driven not only by resources, it
is also market seeking and increasingly private investment is more significant As well
as trade, investment is playing an increasing role in the China Africa partnership.
FOCAC 3 China declared a $5bn China-Africa development fund, established to
encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa and a further $3bn in preferential
loans, as well as investment credit and export buyer's credit. Subsequently, Chinese
FDI flows into Africa, although small (as a share of China's global investment,
Chinese FDI to Africa was just 7% between 2003 and 2008), FDI flows have grown
rapidly by over 7,000% to reach almost $5.5bn by 2008. Similarly, Chinese FDI stock
in Africa rose by over 7,000% (just 3% of China's global FDI stock between 2003 and
2008) and reached $7.8bn by 2008 (MOFCOM 2008). As with trade, Chinese FDI
flows are concentrated in a few African countries, the top ten recipients account for
92% of total FDI flows between 2003 and 2008. These include; South Africa, Nigeria,
Zambia, Algeria, Sudan, Congo DR, Niger, Madagascar, Mauritius and Egypt. The
presence of non-resource rich countries within the top recipients such as Mauritius
and Egypt suggests that China's interest in Africa goes beyond Africa's natural
resources. In 2008, by volume, manufacturing and services together accounted for
86% of Chinese investment (46% and 40% respectively). China's "landmark"
investment of $5bn in South Africa's Standard Bank represents one of China's largest
single investments in Africa. China's Exim Bank conservatively estimated that in
2006, 85% of Chinese enterprises in Africa were private investors thus looking for
market opportunities, fleeing intense competition within China.
Chinese market seeking investment is also largely export orientated and could
impact positively on Africa's trade balance Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are
designated geographic areas with liberal policies and tax incentives to attract foreign
enterprises. First established in China during the late 1970s and early 1980s, they are
said to be the "backbone" of China's phenomenal growth over the past 20 years
(Davies, 2008 and Freemantle et. al, 2010). At FOCAC 4, China committed to

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Towards More Balanced Trade within the Framework of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation

establish five zones across Africa and later in 2007, China committed to establishing
a further five zones. The World Bank states that, the zones are seen as a key facilitator
to creating employment opportunities and generating greater foreign exchange
reserves through more diversified sources of income. Five projected zones have been
announced and are currently at differing stages of progress and are expected to focus
on value-added industries (Sandrey and Edinger 2009). Table 1 provides information
on Chinese-initiated SEZs across Africa and shows how these could substantially
contribute to local job creation; skills, knowledge and technology transfer;
infrastructure development; and production for local, regional and international
export markets. China has also made various other continent-wide investments in
production of manufactures for the local and regional markets.
The Chinese are also investing in Africa's agriculture which could potentially
increase its exports of agricultural products and improve African countries' food
import bills Country-level data suggests that China is increasing investment in agri-
business across Africa for production for export and for the local market (ACET
2009b). There is more evidence that China's investment interest in agriculture is
orientated towards gaining a foothold in the local market or regional markets
through Africa's duty-free trade arrangements with the EU and the US. Table two
provides some examples of typical Chinese investments across the continent. There
is less evidence of investment in agricultural goods for export back to China thus that
China is a part of the "land grabbing" phenomenon of land and water constrained
economies of Middle-East and South East Asia (Keely 2008). Indeed, Africa runs a
trade deficit with China in agriculture, between 2001 and 2007, Africa imported three
times the value of agricultural products from China than it exported (ACET 2009b).
China has also diversified its interests and begun investing in Africa's agriculture for
bio-fuel production, securing the right to grow palm oil for bio-fuel on 2.8 million
hectares in the Republic of Congo, the world's largest palm oil plantation (The
Economist 2009). China is also negotiating with Zambia to plant 2 million hectares
of jatopha for bio-fuel (Sandrey and Edinger 2009).
Sufficient local content requirements must be included in the terms and
conditions of investment agreements to ensure that economic benefits accrue to
Africa Chinese private firms with financial backing from the Chinese government are
emerging as the key drivers in Africa's manufacturing and to a lesser extent
agriculture (ACET 2009b). The local equity content in joint ventures varies in African
countries. For example, in Ethiopia the two largest Chinese investments are in
manufacturing in joint ventures in 50%-50% share and a 49% Ethiopian owned; in
Nigeria, there is an example of a joint venture of equal equity among the Nigerian
government, a Chinese electronic firm and a US investor. While local equity has been
very low in some countries - for example in Ghana, foreign equity and foreign loans
account for 95% of costs; and 100% in Kenya thus the benefits of such foreign
investments do not accrue to the recipient African countries, profits are expatriated
back to China (ACET 2009b).
Chinese cooperation in Africa's agriculture and infrastructure sectors is significant
for building Africa's long-term trade and production capacity At the last Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation, China committed to greater cooperation in these sectors.
China's provision of economic and technical cooperation to African agriculture over
the past decade has occurred against the backdrop of declining support from

83
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Table 1 Chinese initiated Special Economic Zones in Africa

Recipient Status Focus of Activity Details of Engagement Expected Outcomes


Country
Zambia February, 2007, Construction “Industrial and $250m-$300m Copper For domestic and
began 2007 to be economic development smelter constructed by export-orientated
Completed by 2011 in the manufacturing China Nonferrous business
sector Metal mining Secure China’s supply
company line of copper and
other minerals, to
facilitate the transport
of goods
Mauritius Announced mid 2007 Textiles and apparel, $500-$750m Production for export
Construction began in light engineering, some investment to South Asia,
September, 2009 key high tech COMESA and SADC
operations. 34,000 new jobs
Egypt Construction began in 2007 Light manufacturing, A joint venture to be A strategic chance for
logistics and value- developed and China to showcase its
added services also an managed by the work to African
area dedicated to Chinese Tianjin governments in Egypt
Economic- during FOCAC IV and
Technological Zone to create a regional
and the Egyptian hub for trade with the
General Authority of European Union and
Investment and Free the Middle East.
Zones. Expected to triple
bilateral trade
between China and
Egypt to $10 billion by
2010, to attract $2.5
billion in foreign
direct investment and
to attract 100 Chinese
firms with investment
of $100 million.
Nigeria Announced in 2007 Manufacturing and Expected to produce
assembly operation goods for local,
hub for Chinese firms regional and EU
markets.
Ogun State, Announced in 2007. Free trade zone for Co-financed by China Production of goods
Nigeria about 100 Chinese Development Bank for local, regional and
firms and Nigeria’s United EU markets.
Bank of Africa
Sierra Leone In operation. Economic and Established by the Produces
cooperation zone that Guoji Group, which is manufactures of
has so far attracted 20 based in China’s “necessities” as spring
Chinese small and Henan Province. mattresses, roofing
medium-sized tile, hair lotions and
enterprises other light
manufactures
Tanzania Under construction. Trans-shipment hub for Considered highly
commodities mined in strategic for Tanzania
the Chambishi copper and Zambia as well as
belt. the whole Southeast
African infrastructure
corridor because it
will reduce
dependence on
Southern Africa for
transport.

Source: ACET (2009b) and Sandrey and Edinger (2009).

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Towards More Balanced Trade within the Framework of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation

traditional donors (ACET 2009b). Aid from traditional donors to African agriculture
fell from $1,450 million in 1982 to $713 million in 2003, and over 1980-2005 the
share of official development assistance to agriculture declined 35% (Cabral 2007).
One of Africa's main traditional aid sources, the United States Agency for
International Development, slashed its agricultural aid to Africa 75% over the past
decade (CCS 2008). Even African government spending in this sector has declined,
though not as dramatically (Cabral 2007). Many African governments spend less than
1% of their national budgets on agriculture (CCS 2008). Meanwhile, China has
provided $600 million in assistance since 2002, and according to the Chinese
Ministry of Commerce, 1,134 Chinese agricultural experts are working across Africa.
Its support includes cooperation in land development, agricultural plantation,
breeding technologies, food security, agro-processing machinery, experimental and
demonstrative projects, and training (table 3) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People's Republic of China 2006). The Chinese Ministry of Agriculture has pledged to
assist Africa in creating a "green revolution" (Horta 2009).
Recognizing the importance of infrastructure in aiding Africa's development,
FOCAC III's Beijing Plan pledged to make infrastructure "a key area of cooperation"
Support to infrastructure lowers the cost of doing business, and facilitates trade. The
seminal World Bank study on Africa's infrastructure (World Bank 2010) highlights
China's substantial contribution to addressing Africa's infrastructural deficit. The
World Bank puts Africa's infrastructure spending needs at $93bn a year and the
funding gap is $31bn a year mostly in the power sector. Chinese investment in
Africa's infrastructure peaked at $22bn in 2006, thus at 22%, it is contributing to
addressing the gap. The report highlights the power and the transport subsectors as
the most deficient, the majority of China's infrastructure financing to Africa is
concentrated in power and transportation, between 2001 and 2007 these were 34%
and 33% respectively of total Chinese infrastructure financing (Foster et al 2009).
China is financing 10 major hydropower projects with a combined capacity of 6, 000
megawatts, which will increase SSA's total hydropower generation capacity by 30%.
Chinese firms are rehabilitating 1 350 km of existing railways and building 1 600 km
of new railways to add to Africa's 50 000km of railways (Alden and Alves 2009).
China-Africa Tourism has seen an increase during the period largely thanks to
FOCAC commitments Since FOCAC IV, China announced that it would grant
"Approved Destination Status" (ADS) to African countries. To date around 27 African
countries4 have been granted this status. Since then the number of Chinese tourists
travelling to Africa has increased to 322, 000 by 2008, up by almost 200% since 2005.
Although still small compared to Africa's traditional tourists from Britain and North
America, Chinese tourists are growing at a faster rate than traditional tourists - at
about 30%, (China.org, 2005). Similarly, Chinese embassies increased the number of
visas granted to Africans to go to China. South Africa is the most successful African
country to attract Chinese tourists. In 2008, Chinese arrivals shot up by 11%, making
South Africa one of the fastest growing tourist destinations for Chinese tourists
(VOAnews.com, 2008). For South Africa, this is revenue of almost $1bn (China.org
2005). "Business tourism" is a prominent characteristic of China-Africa tourism. The

4 Some of the African Countries under the ADS scheme include; Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde,
Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Table 2 Examples of Chinese agricultural investments across the continent

Country Details of investment Target market


Angola A $40 million investment is expected to relaunch a Local market and export markets
5,000-hectare irrigated cotton productino plant in
Kwanza. During the post-colonial period the area
produced 21,835 hecatres of cotton a year and was
the second most productive province
Ethiopia Although there are several planned investments in Pivotal energy source for the
agriculture, only one Chinese company is engaged domestic economy
in agriculture, in the production of charcoal
Guinea-Bissau Chinese investors pledged $60 million in the Increased production for export
country’s cashew nut industry – one of the biggest to international markets
on the continent
Tanzania China transferred some of its best technology to Local market and export markets
rehabilitate 5,900 hectares of sisal farm
Zambia Chinese investments from 25 companies total Mainly for local market
$10 million, mainly for market gardening and
poultry farming projects around Lusaka
Other African In Ghana, South Africa and Togo, 11 agricultural Production for local and regional
countries production, processing and sales projects and markets
16,000 hectares of farmlands have received
Chinese investment

Source: ACETb 2009

Table 3 Country examples of Chinese cooperation

Country Type of support Details


Angola Technology transfer Donation of $1 million worth of agricultural
equipment to the government.
Benin, Cameroon, Skills transfer Establishment of agricultural centers
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, focusing on seed technologies;
Liberia, Mozambique one in operation in Madagascar, 16 in
Rwanda, South Africa, progress. Some 10,000 agricultural experts
Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, are reported to have been dispatched to
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe African countries to train local farmers.
Cameroon Technology transfer Supply of tractors to Ministry of Agriculture.
Gabon Skills and knowledge Chinese agricultural experts sent to assist
transfer small-scale farmers in improving crop and
crop and animal production.
Guinea Skills and knowledge Chinese experts sent to introduce high-yield
transfer hybrid rice. Establishment of a hybrid rice
cultivation center in Guinea to alleviate
grain shortages.
Kenya Technology transfer for Advanced coffee processing equipment.
agro-processing
Nigeria Skills and knowledge Deployment of 400 (out of pledged 500)
transfer Chinese experts to help with food
production and water conservancy.
Uganda Skills and knowledge Aid to Kibimba (now Tilda) and Doha rice
transfer schemes.

Source: ACETb 2009

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Towards More Balanced Trade within the Framework of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation

growth of China Africa business cooperation with a subsequent increase in


investments by Chinese companies, as well as Chinese and Africa government
officials seeking to consolidate their cooperation consequently there has been an
increase in visitors on both sides (ACET 2009b). Also the number of people-to people-
youth-women and cultural and technical exchanges has gone up as the China-Africa
relationship has intensified since 2000. These will continue to increase.

4 Emerging developments that could impact Africa-China trade


relations
There are a number of emerging developments that could increase Africa-China trade
if Africa with greater cooperation with China or indeed other partners could position
itself to take advantage of. Although both Africa and China have implemented a
number of post financial crisis protectionist trade policy measures, there are a number
of developments that could potentially see more balanced trade. Just some of these
salient developments include; an unprecedented rise in China's internal consumer
demand and a continued rise in Chinese investment to establish business in Africa by
enterprises seeking to take advantage of more competitive labor costs in Africa than
in the maturing economy of China.
Post financial crisis, Africa has implemented more protectionist policies than
China and China is less protectionist than Africa's traditional partners Both Africa
and China have implemented a number of post-financial crisis trade policy measures
which are having an impact on Africa-China trade. According to the GTA database,
the majority of trade policy measures implemented by African countries have been
highly discriminatory - red measures - 53% while green liberalizing measures only
totaled 20% (26% amber). South Africa represents one of the most protectionist
African countries as it had implemented the highest amount of red measures - 80,
moreover, 65% of its total trade policy measures implemented were red measures.
Other relatively protectionist African countries included the more developed African
countries such as Egypt which implemented 56 red measures (70% of its total policy
measures were red); Morocco which implemented 33 (73% of its total policy measures
were red) and Tunisia which implemented 40 red measures (75% of its total policy
measures were red). While China implemented 19 red measures (45% of its total
policy measures were red). Africa's traditional partners are more protectionist - EU27
has implemented 140 red measures (84% of its total policy measures were red). And
although the US only implemented 14 (only 22% of its total policy measures were
red) it has implemented 44 amber measures which represent 70% of its total policy
measures (Ogunleye 2010).
The PRC government recognizes that China's next phase of economic expansion
requires internal structural transformation given the nature and scale of its impressive
export-driven growth which has caused a number of macroeconomic imbalances.
This transformation will involve (inter alia) the reduction in reliance on exports for
GDP. In 1978, the total value of imports and exports was 9.7% of GDP by 2009 the
ratio skyrocketed to 80%. The transformation will also require the reversal of China's
low consumption and high savings rate. In the past, China's economic policies
emphasized investment and export rather than consumption, consequently, its ratio

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

of consumption to GDP fell from 50% in 1978 to 35.3% in 2007 and has risen slightly
to 38% currently. Additionally, domestic savings has increased by just over 50% since
1979 to reach 49% in 2009.
"Natural and policy induced consumerism" (Freemantle et. al 2000 p. 1) is set to
increase as incomes grow rapidly in China - an annual growth rate of 8% for the next
two decades; the gradual appreciation of the national currency to an estimated 10%
by 2011 will further empower Chinese consumers; also with financial deepening and
credit growth as the share of credit cards to bank cards is set double to 15% by 2013.
Subsequently, Chinese consumption is expected to expand by over 700% by 2020 to
$15tr, thus increasing China's global consumption share from 5% to approximately
15% - the world's largest consumer in just a decade. This economic restructuring
presents a number of opportunities for Africa (Freemantle et. al 2010).
Given that China's wages are expected to increase and subsequently there will be
a rise in production costs in China, China is expected to become less competitive.
Many expect that could result in the need for production to shift to more competitive
environments - this is the "flying geese" theory (Brautigam 2009). Coupled with the
continued state-backed "encouragement" to invest abroad from the announcement at
the last FOCAC to "increase the size of the China-Africa Development Fund to $3bn to
support the expansion of investment from Chinese businesses to Africa", this could be
Africa's opportunity to take advantage of the shift in global production.
African countries should begin to position themselves as potential destinations for
Chinese investment to take advantage of opportunities to produce for the local
market and preferential access to regional and international markets This will enable
China to take advantage of preferential access afforded to African countries into
international markets, which China traditionally face barriers to developed country
markets. As this investment is market-seeking, joint ventures with African firms will
ensure that trade gains will accrue to the local economy and local content
requirements for knowledge and technology transfer will help to build local capacity
and ensure a more mutually beneficial gain from Chinese investments in Africa. This
provides an opportunity for resource-poor African countries to benefit from China's
growing presence in Africa. Furthermore, LDC African countries can market
themselves to countries wanting to enjoy preferential access to export to China.

Conclusions
The structure of China-Africa trade is growing more unbalanced with gains mainly
limited to a few resource-rich African countries, dependent on exports of a few
primary commodity exports vulnerable to volatile global price fluctuations. Section
one looked at emerging trends in Africa China trade. Despite increasing trade
relations than Africa's traditional partners during the crisis, this section demonstrated
that China-Africa trade is unfortunately dominated by Africa's export of a few low
value primary exports and Chinese imports of higher value manufactures. The
vulnerability of the structure and composition of China-Africa trade was exposed
following the global economic crisis and the subsequent commodity price decrease in
2008. Furthermore, the majority of African countries are experiencing widening trade
deficits with China. Thus the current structure of Africa-China is unbalanced and

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Towards More Balanced Trade within the Framework of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation

unsustainable.
The impact of China's trade-specific FOCAC commitments will only increase
Africa-China trade thus reinforce the unbalanced structure of trade. Section two
considered China's trade-specific FOCAC commitments to improving Africa-China
trade. The granting of preferences to African LDC exports represents the most direct
commitment to improving Africa's exports, however, given more prohibitive non
tariff barriers to trade such as LDCs low capacity to meet health and sanitation
requirements, LDCs export supply response to these preferences has not been
significant, limited to resource-rich LDCs exporting oil and mineral products.
Therefore preferences only facilitate de facto primary oil and mineral products that
are currently in the LDCs export supply capacity, thus reinforcing the unbalanced
structure of trade. The preferences provide preferential access to export more value-
added products such as manufactures, and simply transformed minerals, and
represent tariff de-escalation on cotton and textile products. Thus investment in
addressing the NTBs would make the preferences very advantageous for preference
receiving LDC exporters as they offer a significant margin of preference. The other
trade-specific FOCAC commitments are less direct than the preferences, best -
endeavor measures aimed at facilitating trade thus will only increase Africa-China
trade rather than make trade more balanced.
Other areas of cooperation within FOCAC have greater potential to make Africa-
China trade more balanced as they are focused on value-added export production and
represent a diversification in export production beyond primary production of
Africa's oil and mineral commodities and thus opportunities for resource-rich
countries. Section three looked at other areas within the FOCAC framework for
Africa-China cooperation such as investment and economic and technical
cooperation. In investment cooperation, following FOCAC commitments to support
Chinese business to invest in Africa - through for example the China Development
Fund, Chinese FDI to Africa has also grown rapidly in the last decade. Section three
highlighted that Chinese investment is diversifying beyond natural resources,
increasingly in manufacturing, services and agriculture also (albeit to a lesser extent),
thus providing opportunities for non-resource rich countries to benefit from Africa-
China relations, unlike China-Africa trade. Similarly, FOCAC commitments in
tourism provide an opportunity for resource-poor African countries. In
manufacturing, investment is largely focused in value-added production for the local,
regional and international markets and seeks to take advantage of Africa's preferential
market access arrangements. Similarly investment in Africa's agribusiness provides an
opportunity to reduce Africa's high food import bills. However, as investment is
largely private and market-seeking sufficient local content requirements that increase
and build the capacity of local participation must be put in place to ensure that
economic benefits are accrued to Africa and that profits are not only expatriated by
Chinese businesses. FOCAC commitments on economic and technical cooperation in
agriculture and infrastructure contribute to building the foundation for the structural
transformation of Africa's production capabilities and thus enhancing Africa's trade
capacity.
With greater cooperation with China, Africa can position itself to take advantage
of emerging developments in China and shifts in global production Section four
provided some examples of opportunities for enhancing Africa's trade. Although

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

China and Africa have implemented a number of protectionist post crisis trade policy
measures, other emerging developments in the relations could positively impact
Africa's trade. China's internal structural transformation which requires an increase in
Chinese consumerism; the expected rise in China's wages provides a huge potential
market for African products. Furthermore, given the rise in production costs in China,
and the continued "state-backed encouragement" to invest in Africa, African countries
can position themselves as potential destinations for investment. Given the margin
of preferences provided to value-added exports from LDCs, African countries are an
attractive opportunity for investors who want to take advantage of preferential access
to China.
This paper sought to look at the impact that increased Africa-China relations
within the FOCAC framework is having on Africa's trade. The paper provided
evidence of the unbalanced trend in Africa-China trade and highlighted the need for
it to grow in a more balanced way. The paper further highlighted that China's trade
specific commitments will only serve to increase China Africa trade and thus
reinforce the unbalanced trend. Africa-China trade will be negatively impacted by
protectionist post-crisis trade policy measures, however, other areas in the FOCAC
framework such as in investment, economic and technical cooperation and
interventions in tourism, infrastructure and agriculture sectors should contribute
significantly to enhancing Africa's trading capacity to take advantage of the emerging
trading opportunities in China and shifts in global production and thus maximize
opportunities for value added export production in China and globally.

References
ACET (African Center for Economic Transformation), 2009a "Looking East - A Guide
to Engaging China for African Policymakers: Volume One: Positive Impacts and
Key Challenges - With Recommendations", Accra
ACET (African Center for Economic Transformation), 2009b "Looking East - A Guide
to Engaging China for African Policymakers: Volume Two: Key Dimensions of
Chinese Engagements in African Countries", Accra
Alden, C. 2010. "Background Notes on FOCAC" In China & Africa: Assessing the
Relationship on the Eve of the Fourth Forum on China - Africa Co-operation (FOCAC IV)
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Brautigam, D 2009. The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford
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Davies , M. J. 2008. "Special Economic Zones: China's Developmental Model Comes


to Africa" In China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence, ed. Robert I. Rotberg.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press
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plan, 2010 - 2012" 2010, 11, 12 Sharm El Sheikh
Foster, V., W. Butterfield, C. Chen, and N.Pushak. 2009 "Building Bridges: China's Role
as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa" Washington DC: World Bank
Freemantle, S. Stevens, J. 2010 "Economics BRIC and Africa: The Rise of the Chinese
consumer: Opportunities for Africa presented by the next phase of China's
economic growth" April, Standard Bank
Minson, A. 2007 "Will Chinese Trade Preferences Aid African LDCs?" December, South
African Institute for International Affairs, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johanesburg
MOFCOM (Ministry of Commerce of People's Republic of China), 2008 "2008:
Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment" Ministry of
Commerce of People's Republic of China and National Bureau of Statistics of
People's Republic of China, /state Administration of Foreign Exchange
Ogunleye E 2010 forthcoming "Effects of Post Crisis Foreign Trade Policy measures on
economic trade performance in Africa"
Sandrey R, and Edinger, H. 2009. "China's Manufacturing Sector and Industrialisation
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Prepared for the African Development Bank (AfDB)
Sandrey R, and Edinger, H. 2010 "China-Africa Merchandise Trade: What was the
Impact of the 2009 commodity price decline?" February, Tralac Working paper
No.02/2010, Stellenbosch
Tralac (Trade and Law Centre for Southern Africa) 2010 "Tralac China Africa data",
Stellenbosch, South Africa
VOAnews.com, 2008 "Chinese Visitors help South Africa's Tourist Industry"
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World Bank, 2010 "Africa's Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation" Vivien Foster
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Yafei, H. 2005 "Follow-up Actions of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation"
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embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t257860.htm

About the author

Sarah Jane Danchie is a Policy Analyst at the African Center for Economic
Transformation. She has Undergraduate and Master’s degrees in Economics from the
University of London. She has worked in a number of organizations including the
Commonwealth Secretariat (Economic Affairs Division) and the United Nations
Development Program (Ghana Country Office) where she worked on economic
research and analysis. She also worked on program design, planning and
administration at national and international levels on an array of development issues
ranging from economic management, trade and debt to climate change for
developing, transition and emerging economies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
91
How Much Did Africa's Top Exports Fall
During the Crisis? A Comparison with East
Asia and within Africa

Martin Wermelinger
University of St. Gallen
1 Introduction

One significant development question asked at the onset of the global financial crisis
was whether Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)--with its low integration in world's financial
markets--would be shielded from the ensuing sharp economic downturn in the
industrialised world. Over time it became readily apparent that the answer was no.
Noting the increasing export reliance of the region (Wim, 2010), this chapter
examines the apparent vulnerability of exports in SSA during the crisis years of 2008
and 2009 in a major overseas market, the United States.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section describes
the factors that are likely to have driven SSA's exports during the recent global
economic downturn and why African exports could have been more affected than
exports from other developing regions of the world economy. Section 3 describes the
data which is used in section 4 to calculate the extent to which the top 20 African
export sectors changed during the crisis. SSA export performance in a given sector is
then compared, on a variety of measures, to that of East Asia (EA). Section 5
summarises the findings of an investigation as to whether a crisis-era reshuffling of
export shares within Africa has generated another source of winners and losers.
Section 6 concludes and discusses the implications of this chapter's findings.

2 Two channels affecting African exports during the recent global


economic downturn
Much expert comment focuses on two channels through which the effects of the
crisis affected Sub-Saharan African exports. First, lower global growth, particularly in
the United States (USA) and the European Union (EU), reduced the demand for
African exports, pushed commodity prices down, and curtailed the flow of
remittances from abroad. Estimating sectoral gravity equations, Berman and Martin
(2009) show that SSA exports are more sensitive to large negative income movements
in the countries they export to, compared to other exporters from other developing
regions of the world economy.
Two factors are said to make Africa particularly vulnerable to this "demand
channel": low destination diversity and high export concentration. Although trade
with China and other emerging economies have increased in recent years, the
diversity of Africa's export destinations is still limited. More than 60% of exports go

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

to the EU and the USA. Exports are highly concentrated in primary goods sectors, in
particular the oil and gas sector. Comparing export concentration indexes of different
developing country regions, one can see that export concentration is three to four
times higher in SSA compared to EA or Latin America and the Caribbean (Wim, 2010).
Even so, Draper and Biacuana (2009) argue that the decline in export volumes
experienced by African economies during the crisis was not as severe as in Asian
economies.
Secondly, tighter credit market conditions have resulted in a greater scarcity and a
higher cost of trade finance. While the precise magnitude of the "trade finance gap"
in Africa is still unknown and the impact of such a gap on the collapse of exports has
not convincingly been identified, various experts are convinced that trade finance
constraints played a key role in the African trade collapse. Moreover, such experts
content that the trade finance problem in Africa is more acute compared to other
developing regions. For example, while perceived trade finance-related risks rose
during the crisis, it is sometimes implied that the risks associated with African trade
were thought to have grown more than for other parts of the developing world.
Berman and Martin (2009) have showed that - what they call - the "disruption"
effect of a financial crisis is more important and longer lasting for African countries
than for exporters of other developing regions. They find also that the high
dependence on trade credit of African export markets may explain part of the fragility
of African exports to the financial crisis. Alternatively, Humphrey (2009) reports the
results of a firm survey in the garment and horticulture sectors in SSA. The
interviewed firms did not face problems with trade finance (at least up to March
2009). The generality of these findings may be called into question because of the
limited number of interviews conducted (about 30) and the study's exclusive focus on
the garment and horticulture sectors. Most of the interviewed firms reported that
they had well-established businesses that remain good risks for domestic banks, or
operated in long-standing value chains, which are responsible for the financing of
trade. Humphrey also reports anecdotal evidence from West African countries, where
the shortage of credit in the domestic market curtailed pre-financing of trade in
cocoa.
The relative importance of these two channels during the recent global economic
downturn remains an open question and will no doubt stimulate future research. This
study, however, investigates whether or not African exporters were indeed more
severely hit than exporters from other developing regions. In addition, it is studied
whether reshuffling within Africa has produced another source of winners and losers
from the recent global economic downturn.

3 Monthly data of the top 20 export sectors in manufacturing and


agriculture
This paper uses detailed monthly data of US imports from 2007 through 2009 made
available online by the U.S. Census Bureau. Sub-Saharan Africa's top 20 export sectors
to the US in manufacturing and agriculture were identified and listed with their total
value for exports in 2009 (see Table 1, columns 1 to 3). The total amount of trade
accounted for by the 20 largest sectors exceeded more than 80% of SSA exports in

94
How Much Did Africa’s Top Exports Fall During the Crisis?

manufacturing and agriculture to the US. As described above, the US remains the
leading destination (besides the EU) of African exports, and these exports can
therefore be taken as an indicator for exports to the world1. Besides, it is interesting
to look at the US data as the crisis had its origins there and the US was one of the
most severely hit importing countries.
There were several reasons for the focus here on manufacturing and agricultural
exports- even though the primary goods sectors of many SSA economies account for
a large proportion of trade. First, export unit values in primary goods depend heavily
on world commodity prices, which were generally in sharp decline during the crisis
(Wim, 2010). Hence, investigating these sectors would require careful corrections for
price changes. Secondly, primary goods sectors are geographically restricted to few
African countries making a region-wide analysis less meaningful.
Thirdly, it has been argued that Africa's sustainable development is dependent on
a diversified set of exports (in particular manufacturing), which leads to less volatile
export flows (Haddad, Lim, and Saborowski, 2010). Focusing on sectors that - if
sufficiently diversified - promise more stability is therefore of particular interest.
Finally, most of the country-by-country data for the primary sectors (including oil
and gas, mineral and ores, petroleum and coal products, and chemicals) are missing
and thus their investigation could yield to biased conclusions. Nevertheless, readers
should be aware that 75% of total African exports are in the oil and gas sector in 2009.
Excluding oil and gas exports, manufacturing and agriculture make up 70% of
remaining total exports by SSA.

4 Benchmarking recent export developments in Sub-Saharan


Africa to that of East Asia
This section examines how badly SSA leading exports were affected during the recent
global economic downturn and to what extent SSA's experience was worse than that
of East Asia. The analysis distinguishes between an export growth measure (which
indicates the percentage change in a region's exports of a particular sector's products)
from a volatility measure (which captures the degree of export fluctuations within a
given year). Data on both measures form the basis of the empirical assessment made
in this section.
To assess the fall in exports, for each of the top 20 exports from SSA to the USA,
the monthly year-on-year export growth (or reduction) for the year 2008 (before the
global export collapse) and for the year 2009 (after the global export collapse) were
calculated for the entire SSA region.2 Statistics reported in Table 1 show that Africa's
top 20 export sectors were severely hit. To give a sense of the SSA export performance
at its worst, the weighted average of maximum monthly export fall in 2009 is 72%

1 Due to former colonial relationships between certain EU member states and Africa, export patterns to
the EU are likely to be different than to the US. Hence, an independent study with EU data would also
be of interest.
2 Intra-regional differences, ie. cross-country differences in export performance in a given sector in the
SSA region, are examined in section 5 below. For a chapter seeking to assess the overall impact on the
SSA region's exports it is appropriate to consider at some point in the analysis the effects on total exports
of a particular sector from that region.

95
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

compared to 33% in 2008, reinforcing the impression that--at its worst--2009 was
markedly worse than 2008.
To get a sense of average performance among the top SSA exports, the weighted
average of the medians of monthly sectoral export change of the top 20 SSA exports
was calculated. In 2008, that average grew by a massive 113% for SSA; in 2009 the
comparable average export figure pointed to a fall of around 30%! The high average
growth in 2008 is influenced by the five-fold expansion in the exports of the
automobile industry, which is the second largest SSA export and is located primarily
in South Africa. Eight of the 20 sectors had negative growth figures in 2008, compared
to 13 sectors in 2009. While Africa's biggest manufacturing sector, primary smelting
and refining of nonferrous metals (except copper and aluminum), was back on a
positive growth path in the fourth quarter of 2009, most other sectors still reported
negative numbers at the end of last year.
To provide some comparative perspective, the above SSA export performance was
compared with that of the developing countries of East Asia (EA), taken here to be all
of the countries in EA except Japan, Singapore, and South Korea. The statistics in
Table 1 confirm that SSA's most important exports in manufacturing and agriculture
are similarly affected by the crisis than the same sectors in EA. Both regions had
positive weighted average growth across the 20 sectors in 2008 and negative numbers
in 2009. In fact, Africa performed relatively better than EA on several grounds: (i) the
weighted average growth in exports was higher (or export reduction lower) in SSA in
both years; (ii) the number of sectors reporting negative export growth in 2009 in EA
was 18 compared to 13 in SSA; and (iii) EA exports are taking longer to recover to their
previous levels. The weighted average export reduction in the 4th quarter of 2009 was
27% in EA.
Overall, then, while SSA exporters came under considerable pressure during the
recent global economic downturn, their East Asian counterparts fared worse at least
in terms of average export performance. Further research may want to account for
any regional differences in crisis-era export performance for a given sector, examining
for example whether differences in discriminatory measures taken against different
regions' exporters can account for some, or all, of the observed differences in sectoral
export performance.
However, as noted above, large fluctuations in economic activity--including in
exports--are a long-standing development challenge in SSA. Columns 9, 10 and 13,14
in Table 1 report an index of export volatility for SSA and EA, respectively.3 These
numbers report a measure of month-by-month export fluctuation within a year.
Comparing the figures for weighted average volatility across years and regions, an
increase in volatility in both regions is observed during 2009, with the index being in
general slightly higher in SSA. However, none of these differences are statistically
significant at conventional levels, which leads to the conclusion that Africa's most

3 The following formula is used to calculate the index of export volatility:


12

∑ (s m, y
i,R − c) 2
Vol y
i,R = m

12
where s m, y is the export share (in %) in sector i, region R, and month m of year y. and c is a constant
i, R
corresponding to 100/12, equal to the average monthly export share (in %) in a particular year.

96
Table 1 Africa's top 20 export sectors to the US in manufacturing and agriculture (in 2009): Descriptive Statistics
Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia (excluding Japan, South Korea, Singapore)
NAICS Description SSA Exports Max Export Max Export Median Median Average Volatilty Volatilty Max Export Max Export Median Median Average Volatilty Volatility
(6digit) to the US Fall 2008 Fall 2009 Growth Growth Growth (in 2008) (in 2009) Fall 2008 Fall 2009 Growth Growth Growth (in 2008) (in 2009)
(in 1000's of $) 2008 2009 Q4 2009 2008 2009 Q4 2009
331419 Primary Smelting and Refining of 1591943 -71% -88% -18% -61% 99% 79 90 -26% -75% 82% -65% -41% 73 70
Nonferrous Metals (except Copper and
Aluminum)
336111 Automobiles and Light Duty Motor 1393543 30% -83% 488% -23% -9% 77 80 -74% -86% -40% -56% -42% 73 102
Vehicles, Including Chassis
339913 Jewelers' Material and Lapidary Work 937482 -46% -71% 2% -39% -12% 71 75 -41% -69% -13% -40% -16% 75 72
315239 Women's and Girls' Other Outerwear 366166 -27% -64% -1% -42% -54% 74 72 -9% -11% 0% -3% 4% 72 71
331112 Electrometallurgical Ferroalloy Product 306063 -44% -98% 87% -80% -35% 76 123 -80% -96% 62% -91% -54% 94 80
315223 Men's and Boys' Shirts 197922 -1% 27% 63% 87% 80% 70 71 19% -13% 28% -4% 0% 70 70
(except Work Shirt)
111339 Other Noncitrus Fruits 161513 -31% -56% 99% -40% -32% 75 71 -32% -31% 9% -13% 0% 71 70
336399 Motor Vehicle Parts, Nesoi 157714 -46% -75% -21% -44% -30% 72 75 -20% -50% -1% -26% 3% 69 69
111335 Tree Nuts 150981 -22% -67% 55% 22% 32% 103 101 -17% -23% 3% 17% 31% 79 80
315224 Men's and Boys' Trousers, 143981 -15% -7% 20% 41% 40% 75 73 -31% 3% -5% 13% 5% 74 74
Slacks, and Jeans
339911 Jewelry (except Costume) 131737 -71% -59% 13% 26% -48% 112 81 -33% -26% -14% -7% 22% 72 73
113210 Forestry Products 128326 -42% -80% 57% -44% -13% 72 77 -14% -79% 36% -57% -41% 70 76
331315 Aluminum Sheets, Plates, and Foils 122005 -50% -82% 6% -38% -9% 74 79 -50% -68% -29% -43% -40% 75 84
315232 Women's and Girls' Blouses And Shirts 114677 -29% -5% -7% 27% 3% 70 72 -6% -7% 4% -1% 5% 69 69
331111 Iron and Steel 108903 -73% -84% -12% -47% -24% 80 99 -26% -95% 30% -92% -93% 79 149
331312 Primary Aluminum 106235 -100% -100% -100% -83% -65% 233 231 -91% -100% -56% -94% -44% 120 106
315228 Men's and Boys' Other Outerwear 83820 -42% -43% -14% -29% -27% 74 72 -25% -18% -14% -3% -10% 76 74
333618 Other Engine Equipment 58797 22% -53% 159% -5% -16% 84 84 8% -21% 32% -2% -7% 69 69
111910 Tobacco 49794 -80% -69% -9% 56% -34% 145 92 -23% -75% 90% -58% -46% 105 117
311320 Chocolate and Confectionery Products 46424 -42% -4% 23% 50% 92% 76 80 -17% -55% 75% -25% -24% 74 71
Weighted Average of Top 20 Sectors -33% -72% 113% -33% 16% 81 86 -40% -64% 15% -45% -27% 75 81
NAICS Description
(3digit)
331 Primary Metal Manufacturing -68% -89% -6% -63% 61% 86 101 -38% -79% 64% -70% -45% 78 77
336 Transportation Equipment 22% -82% 436% -25% -11% 77 80 -69% -82% -36% -53% -38% 73 98
339 Miscellaneous Manufactured -49% -70% 3% -31% -17% 76 76 -40% -64% -13% -36% -11% 74 72
Commodities
315 Apparel and Accessories -24% -29% 16% 11% 0% 83 82 -9% -10% 6% -1% 2% 82 82
111 Acricultural Products -34% -62% 66% -1% -6% 96 86 -25% -34% 18% -7% 7% 79 80
113 Forestry Products, Nesoi -42% -80% 57% -44% -13% 72 77 -14% -79% 36% -57% -41% 70 76
333 Machinery, excet Electrical 22% -53% 159% -5% -16% 84 84 8% -21% 32% -2% -7% 69 69
311 Food and Kindred Products -42% -4% 23% 50% 92% 76 80 -17% -55% 75% -25% -24% 74 71

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, author's calculations

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How Much Did Africa’s Top Exports Fall During the Crisis?
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

important export sectors are not more exposed to continued ups and downs than the
same sectors in East Asia.
Another distinct assessment of the potential relationship between African and East
Asian export performance was performed. The purpose of this particular empirical
analysis was to examine whether the fluctuations in African and East Asian export
performance to the USA were in fact similar but with one region's exports tending to
lag another region's in the same sector. Since the lag structure is not known, a wide
range of possibilities were considered (the results are available from the author.)
Simple ordinary least squares regressions with SSA monthly export growth as the
dependent variable and EA export growth (using negative, zero, and positive lags) as
the independent variable. This procedure would reveal if, for example, in a given
sector a recessionary demand shock in the USA affected East Asian exports before they
affected SSA exports, or visa versa. Such analysis might also reveal little by way of
common dynamics of SSA and EA exports in a sector.
Table 2 reports the information on the specification in each export sector that
generated the highest explanatory power (R-squared)4. In 12 export sectors a positive
and statistically significant correlation exists between SSAs and EAs paths, in four
sectors negative and significant correlations were found, and in the remaining four
sectors none of the specifications revealed a significant relationship between the
export paths of the two regions. It is quite surprising that 40 percent of the
investigated sectors show a negative or no temporal relationship between SSA and EA
exports. One explanation could be that same sectors in SSA and in EA differ
substantially with respect to the type (quality?) of products that are shipped to the
USA.
For those 12 African export sectors whose intertemporal variation correlates with
that of East Asian counterparts, eight sectors are such that SSA exports lagged those
by EA (typically between one to three months). This illustrates that demand trends in
the US are likely to affect EA before SSA. Focusing on the R-squares for the reported
relationships, it appears that African and East Asian export paths can explain around
50% of each other's variation given that the correlation is positive (except for apparel
where this number is around 20%).
Interestingly, the one major exception to the finding that "SSA exports lag EA
exports" is in the largest Sub-Saharan African export sector considered here, namely,
Primary Smelting and Refining of Non-ferrous Metals (except Copper and
Aluminum). In this particular sector, a specification where SSA exports lead EA
exports by three months best fit the data. These last two paragraphs suggest their exist
economically meaningful differences in the temporal sequence through which
demand shocks from the USA affected the exports of leading sectors in Sub-Saharan
Africa and East Asia during the recent global economic downturn. No doubt as more
monthly and quarterly data becomes available, it will become possible to examine
these intertemporal dynamics in greater detail, not least because these dynamics may
shed light on any regional differences in the temporal sequence of any potential
export recovery.

4 This investigation is not done for separate years due to the small number of observations (a maximum
of 24 observations can be used, which corresponds to 2x12 months.

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How Much Did Africa’s Top Exports Fall During the Crisis?

Table 2 Correlations between African and East Asian export paths

NAICS Description Correlation Sign Specification with Highest R2


(6digit) highest R2
331419 Primary Smelting and Refining of Nonferrous + plus-3-months 0.61
Metals (except Copper and Aluminum)
336111 Automobiles and Light Duty Motor Vehicles, + minus-2-months 0.52
Including Chassis
339913 Jewelers' Material and Lapidary Work + minus-1-month 0.46
315239 Women's and Girls' Other Outerwear + minus-3-months 0.12
331112 Electrometallurgical Ferroalloy Product + minus-2-months 0.76
315223 Men's and Boys' Shirts (except Work Shirt) not sig.
111339 Other Noncitrus Fruits + minus-1-month 0.31
336399 Motor Vehicle Parts, Nesoi + minus-3-months 0.46
111335 Tree Nuts not sig.
315224 Men's and Boys' Trousers, Slacks, + plus-2-months 0.23
and Jeans
339911 Jewelry (except Costume) - minus-1-month 0.28
113210 Forestry Products + instantaneous 0.63
331315 Aluminum Sheets, Plates, and Foils not sig.
315232 Women's and Girls' Blouses And Shirts + minus-2-months 0.22
331111 Iron and Steel + minus-1-month 0.36
331312 Primary Aluminum - minus-1-month 0.29
315228 Men's and Boys' Other Outerwear - plus-1-month 0.19
333618 Other Engine Equipment + minus-3-months 0.51
111910 Tobacco - plus-3-months 0.27
311320 Chocolate and Confectionery Products not sig.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau; author's calculations

5 Within Africa reshuffling of export patterns

Rather than examine the changes in the total exports of a given sector in SSA to the
USA, as was done in the last section, here the goal is to investigate whether export
shares within Africa have changed during the crisis. Table 3, column 3 reports a index
of reshuffling in each sector5; the higher the value of the index the larger the changes
in the intra-regional distribution of that sector's exports to the US market. The
reported indices reveal that between 2008 and 2009 in four of the top 20 largest
export sectors more than 10 percent of the total value of that sector's exports were
reshuffled among SSA nations between 2008 and 2009.6 For example, Lesotho's share
of total SSA exports of Mens and Boys' Other Outerwear fell 14.59% and Madagascar's
share rose 12.32% (Columns 4-6 of Table 3 list the top three exporters from a
particular sector and indicate their share in 2009 as well as the change of this share
from 2008 to 2009.) Table 3 further illustrates that for 8 of the 20 sectors almost all
of the SSA exporters are located in South Africa. This finding shows South Africa's
dominant position in non-primary (manufacturing) industries.

5 The reshuffling index is calculated as follows


IoRi = ∑ si08,c − si09,c
where syi, c is the export share of country c in sector i in year y.
6 Given the construction of the reshuffling index, where each 1% shift in production is going to create a
2% increase in the index,

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Table 3 Within Africa reshuffling


Naics (6digit) Commodity Desc Index of Top 3 Exporters given that export share
Reshuffling >= 5% either in 2008 or 2009
331419 Primary Smelting and Refining of Nonferrous 1.67% South Africa
Metals (except Copper and Aluminum)
100.00%
0.00%
336111 Automobiles and Light Duty Motor Vehicles, 0.01% South Africa
Including Chassis
100.00%
0.00%
339913 Jewelers' Material and Lapidary Work 10.80% South Africa Botswana Angola
70.88% 12.67% 5.17%
-2.77% -1.13% 2.83%
315239 Women's and Girls' Other Outerwear 14.96% Kenya Madagascar Lesotho
28.92% 24.49% 24.15%
-3.69% -2.25% 3.57%
331112 Electrometallurgical Ferroalloy Product 15.36% South Africa Zimbabwe
100.00% 0.00%
7.68% -7.68%
315223 Men's and Boys' Shirts (except Work Shirt) 15.97% Mauritius Lesotho Madagascar
33.27% 28.86% 19.60%
3.20% 2.17% -4.97%
111339 Other Noncitrus Fruits 36.93% Ethiopia Kenya Madagascar
22.77% 19.98% 16.49%
-17.56% 1.42% 0.83%
336399 Motor Vehicle Parts, Nesoi 0.26% South Africa
100.00%
0.00%
111335 Tree Nuts 19.44% IvoryCoast Ghana Nigeria
77.65% 8.53% 7.03%
-8.02% 6.84% 1.34%
315224 Men's and Boys' Trousers, Slacks, and Jeans 19.14% Lesotho Kenya Madagascar
46.54% 16.72% 16.51%
2.57% -3.75% -5.53%
339911 Jewelry (except Costume) 3.73% South Africa
100.00%
0.00%
113210 Forestry Products 21.39% Liberia IvoryCoast Nigeria
51.84% 15.44% 8.89%
-7.10% 2.45% -1.34%
331315 Aluminum Sheets, Plates, and Foils 0.00% South Africa
100.00%
0.00%
315232 Women's and Girls' Blouses And Shirts 13.12% Lesotho Kenya Madagascar
31.68% 20.92% 19.28%
-0.90% 3.17% 2.19%
331111 Iron and Steel 0.38% South Africa
100.00%
0.00%
331312 Primary Aluminum 15.36% South Africa Mozambique Nigeria
73.93% 16.75% 9.32%
-26.07% 16.75% 9.32%
315228 Men's and Boys' Other Outerwear 35.83% Lesotho Madagascar Kenya
28.98% 38.66% 17.30%
-14.59% 12.32% 3.06%
333618 Other Engine Equipment 0.91% South Africa
100.00%
0.00%
111910 Tobacco 8.53% Malawi Cameroon South Africa
92.06% 2.48% 2.39%
-2.77% -0.19% 1.49%
311320 Chocolate and Confectionery Products 25.65% IvoryCoast Ghana Cameroon
75.44% 17.64% 6.15%
-10.29% 12.15% 0.63%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau; author's calculations


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How Much Did Africa’s Top Exports Fall During the Crisis?

Overall, though, the degree of reshuffling across SSA appears to be quite limited, at
least in respect of exports to the US market. If all SSA exporters in a given sector faced
the same aggregate demand shocks, then it would seem from the paucity of
reshuffling that there were few crisis-induced shifts in the relative supply side
performance. An alternative interpretation of these results is as follows: in SSA's
leading export sectors the aggregate demand shock from the crisis appears to have hit
most export sources relatively evenly and any discriminatory commercial policy
measures7 undertaken by SSA nations or by the USA do not appear to have reshuffled
exports much between SSA nations.

6 Implications of this chapter's findings


The purpose of this paper has been to construct some sensible benchmarks against
which to compare SSA export performance during the recent global economic
downturn. Such benchmarks may be useful in stimulating further research and
coming to some necessarily interim assessments on certain policy matters. For
example, while concerns about trade finance holding back SSA exports were given
plenty of attention during the past 18-24 months, it should be borne in mind that
leading SSA exports to the USA fell less than comparable exports from East Asia,
where fewer concerns about trade finance were expressed. Of course, other factors
may account for these regional differences in export performance, but if trade finance
really was a particularly important factor holding backing SSA exports, then what
other factor or factors were reduced EA exports further? Or, were our original
assumptions about the impact of trade finance on SSA exports correct in the first
place?
Comparing the temporal sequence of SSA and EA exports of the same goods to the
US market was revealing too. It seems that Sub-Saharan African exporters of non-
ferrous metals saw their exports fall to the US market about three months before their
East Asian counterparts. Whereas, for many of the other top 20 exports to the US
market, East Asian total exports began to fall one to three months before those from
Sub-Saharan Africa. Such findings, if accurate, reveal a lot about the spread of the
aggregate demand shock from the United States to the developing regions of the
world economy. One might also ask what is it about the nonferrous metals exported
by SSA, or the contracts that SSA exporters sign, that accounts for importer demands
affecting sales faster than in East Asia. Are any changes in contracting clauses or
export specialization called for?
Finally, perhaps the most important implication of the analysis of the potential
reshuffling of African exports to the USA is that there appears, on the basis of the
measure developed here, to be little by way of intra-regional redistribution of sectoral
exports during the crisis. Such a finding is consistent with there being little by way of
supply side shifts (or comparative advantage) changes between 2008 and 2009 and,
perhaps encouragingly, little evidence of commercial policies being implemented that
discriminated between Sub-Saharan African exporters.

7 Including incentives to export.

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

References
Wim, N. (2010). ‘Africa and the global economic crisis: a risk assessment and action
guide’. MPRA Paper No. 19856. Munich Personal RePEc Archive.
Berman, N. & Martin, P. (2009). ‘The vulnerability of sub-Saharan Africa to the
financial crisis: the case of trade’. European University Institute and Sciences-Po,
mimeo.
Draper, P. & Biacuana, G. (2009). ‘Africa and the trade crisis’. VoxEU
(http://www.voxeu.org/ index.php?q=node/4268).
Humphrey, J. (2009). ‘Are exporters in Africa facing reduced availability of trade
finance?’. IDS Bulletin. Volume 50 (5).
Haddad, M., Lim, J., & Saborowski, C. (2010). ‘Does openness increase volatility? Not
if countries are sufficiently diversified’. VoxEU
(http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4268).

About the author

Martin Wermelinger is a member of the Global Trade Alert team at the Swiss Institute
for International Economics and Applied Economic Research, University of St.
Gallen, Switzerland. He is also doctoral student in the Department of Economics
conducting applied and theoretical research on trade flows.

102
US Trade Policy Towards the Least Developed
Countries: Are these Countries' Interests
Congruent or in Conflict?

Craig VanGrasstek
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Introduction

Trade relations between the United States and the least developed countries (LDCs)
are problematic. Even more than the developing countries as a group, the LDCs are
widely thought to need preferential access to industrialized countries' markets. And
while the United States and the rest of the world have agreed to extend duty-free,
quota-free (DFQF) access to imports from these poorest countries, that promise has
yet to be fulfilled in its entirety. Ironically, one of the barriers to the fulfillment of that
pledge is a dispute within the LDC group: Those countries that already enjoy DFQF
treatment, or at least something approximating it, see the extension of similar
treatment to the other LDCs as a threat to their own interests. Those concerns, which
are expressed principally by the LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa as well as Haiti, are shared
by some policymakers in the United States.
The LDCs are the poorest of the world's poor countries. Taken as a group, the 49
LDCs comprise roughly 11% of the world's population, but account for barely one
percent of the world's GDP. These countries are granted special recognition in the
systems of both the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The LDCs are so designated by the UN on the basis of objective criteria.1 The circles
of African countries and LDCs overlap significantly. Thirty-three of the 49 LDCs are
located in Africa. This means that Africa accounts for just over two-thirds of the
world's LDCs, and that just over-two-thirds of the 47 independent countries in sub-
Saharan Africa are LDCs. Haiti is the only LDC in the Western Hemisphere, with all
of the other countries in this category being located in Asia and the Pacific.
Although the LDCs share many common concerns, they are often divided over
issues affecting access to the US market. Those divisions are rooted in three facts: (1)
apparel products dominate the exports of many LDCs to the United States, (2) Haiti
and most of the African LDCs currently enjoy preferential access to the US market for
these products under special preference programs, and (3) those LDCs that already
enjoy preferential access to the US market fear that any reductions of their margins
of preference, whether through erosion (i.e., multilateral liberalization in the Doha
Round) or dilution (i.e., through the extension of preferential treatment to other
countries) will come at their expense. From their perspective, LDCs such as

1 While the benchmarks have evolved over the decades, these criteria are based on three tests: a low
income, as measured by the gross domestic product per capita; weak human resources, as measured by
a composite index of indicators; and a low level of economic diversification, as measure by another
composite index. The criteria are periodically examined to adjust the list. For more information see
http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/.
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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Bangladesh and Cambodia pose the same sort of threat as China, Vietnam, and other
apparel-exporting powerhouses in Asia. By contrast, the Asian LDCs that do not
currently enjoy preferential access to the US market would like either to obtain
treatment that is comparable to that enjoyed by Haiti and African LDCs or, failing
that, multilateral reduction in the US tariffs.
This paper advances two arguments regarding the interests of the African LDCs.
The first is that while it is in the interests of these countries to maintain and seek
improvements in the preferential access that they enjoy to the US market, the
competitive threat that they face from the Asian LDCs is vastly exaggerated. While it
is true that access to the US apparel market tends to be seen in zero-sum terms, and
that any benefit extended to one country might come at the expense of others, the
actual value of apparel imported from the Asian LDCs is far below that of other
countries with which all of the apparel-exporting LDCs must compete. Simply stated,
the Asian LDCs comprise an almost negligible share of the threat posed to the other
LDCs.
The second point is that the LDCs as a whole, including those from Africa and
other regions, have allowed this dispute to undercut their effectiveness in multilateral
trade negotiations by producing an unneeded rift within the group. It is in the
interests of all LDCs for these countries to cooperate effectively, and they would all
benefit from healing that rift. It would serve their collective interests if the LDCs were
to encourage the United States to take three steps to enhance the effectiveness of
preferential trade programs for developing countries in general, and for the LDCs in
particular. The first is the renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences, which is
currently scheduled to expire at the end of 2010. Second, the United States should
also enact of a new trade program that would extend enhanced preferences to those
Asian LDCs that do not currently benefit from the regional programs now in place for
LDCs in Africa and the Americas. Third, the renewal and expansion of these
preferential programs offers an opportunity to reform of the rules of origin for the
preferential trade programs in order to make them more user-friendly for the
beneficiary countries and their partners in the United States. These reforms would
help to fulfill a commitment made by the United States and other industrialized
countries, and benefit not only the LDCs but also the producers and consumers in the
United States.

The commitment to extend duty-free, quota-free treatment to LDCs


The United States and the rest of the world community have made a commitment to
extend DFQF treatment to imports of products from the LDCs. While that
commitment has largely been met with respect to imports from most LDCs located
in Africa or the Americas, there remain many imports from Asian LDCs that are still
subject to very high average tariffs.
The DFQF initiative was originally made in the 1996 WTO Singapore Declaration2

2 See paragraph 14 of the Declaration, in which the ministers agreed to a Plan of Action that includes
"provision for taking positive measures, for example duty-free access, on an autonomous basis, aimed
at improving their overall capacity to respond to the opportunities offered by the trading system"

104
US Trade Policy Toward the Least Developed Countries

and reiterated as a commitment in 2000 at the United Nations Millennium Summit.


In the Summit's Millennium Declaration, world leaders agreed to a set of measurable
goals and targets for combating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental
degradation, and discrimination against women. Among these Millennium
Development Goals was one that "call[ed] on the industrialized countries … [t]o
adopt, preferably by the time of [the Third United Nations Conference on the Least
Developed Countries to be held in May 2001], a policy of duty- and quota-free access
for essentially all exports from the least developed countries." That deadline was not
met, but the commitment was reiterated when the Doha Development Agenda (also
known as the Doha Round) was launched in 2001. In paragraph 42 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration of 2001, the ministers "recognize[d] that the integration of the
LDCs into the multilateral trading system requires meaningful market access, support
for the diversification of their production and export base, and trade-related technical
assistance and capacity building." In that same paragraph, the ministers stated that
they "commit[ted them]selves to the objective of duty-free, quota-free market access
for products originating from LDCs."
There are two reasons why the Doha Round per se is not likely to produce a deal
that will fulfill the DFQF pledge. The first is that the outcome of the round itself is
uncertain: A series of deadlines have been missed, the talks have repeatedly broken
down, and no one can say whether or when the round will ever be concluded. The
second is that the deals now on the table for LDCs fall far short of true,
comprehensive DFQF treatment.
At the Hong Kong (2005) ministerial meeting of the WTO the ministers agreed that
"developed-country Members shall … [p]rovide duty-free and quota-free market
access on a lasting basis, for all products originating from all LDCs by 2008 or no later
than the start of the implementation period in a manner that ensures stability,
security and predictability." That commitment was nevertheless restricted by a further
proviso allowing countries to limit provision of DFQF to "at least 97 per cent of
products originating from LDCs, defined at the tariff line level." This is a potentially
crippling restriction. The 97% figure may appear at first glance to require substantial
coverage, but it is significant that this proportion is to be counted by tariff lines and
not on a trade-weighted basis. Depending on how the exclusions are selected, they
could ensure that the DFQF initiative represents little change from the status quo.3
Because the Doha Development Agenda negotiations are not likely to produce
commitments that fulfill the DFQF commitment, the United States should instead
follow the precedent set by other industrialized countries that have enacted special
programs that extend DFQF treatment to the LDCs on an autonomous basis. Australia
offers completely DFQF treatment by both tariff lines and actual imports, and all
imports from the LDCs are covered in Canada, New Zealand, Singapore and the EU
(with the exception of arms). The United States is among the countries that offers
DFQF access for most, but not all, imports from the LDCs.

3 In 2008 the United States imported goods from the LDCs under 4479 separate eight-digit lines in the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule. If one were to exclude the maximum 3% of those lines from the DFQF
initiative, that would come to some 134 lines. Excluding that number of tariff lines could easily mean
something approaching a 100% exclusion for the apparel sector.

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Treatment of imports from LDCs under current US preference


programs

The United States has extended preferential access to developing countries ever since
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) entered into effect in 1976. The scope of
GSP benefits was expanded in 1997 for the LDCs, including duty-free access for
petroleum. Other programs that offer preferential access to the LDCs, as well as other
developing countries, include the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which was first
extended under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) in 1983 and
then expanded under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) of 2000; the
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which came into effect in 2001; and
the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act
(HOPE), which came into effect in 2007.
Under these programs the United States does extend close approximation of DFQF
treatment to several LDCs. As can be seen in Table 1, nineteen of the 49 LDCs receive
comprehensive preferences under either the CBI or AGOA. Another seven African
LDCs, none of which are major textile and apparel exporters, receive free access for
the vast majority of their exports. The DFQF access to the US market is much more
important to the countries that depend upon apparel exports (which would otherwise
face very high tariffs) than it is to those countries that export oil (which would
otherwise face very low tariffs).

Table 1 Designations of LDCs under US preferential programs


(Status as of 1 May 2010; countries listed according to highest preferences received)

Apparel-dependent All other LDCs Oil-dependent


Comprehensive Haiti, Lesotho, Benin, Burkina Faso, Dem. Rep. Chad
preferences Madagascar, Malawi of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gambia,
Mali, Mozambique, Niger,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia
Partial AGOA – Burundi, Djibouti, Guinea, Angola,
preferences Central African Republic,* East Equatorial Guinea
Timor, Kiribati, Liberia,* Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Somalia,*
Togo,* Tuvalu, Vanuatu
Regular GSP – Eritrea* –
preferences
No preferences Laos Maldives, Myanmar, SUdan* –

Notes: * = The country is potentially eligible for the African Growth and Opportunity Act but has not been
designated. Comprehensive Preferences = Full AGOA benefits for Africa, or CBI, CBTPA, and HOPE for
Haiti. The apparel- and oil-dependent countries are those for which these commodities account for at least
20% of their exports to the United States.

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US Trade Policy Toward the Least Developed Countries

Figure 1 Average tariffs on US imports from selected partners, 1996-2009


(calculated duties as a percentage of the value of goods)
16

14

12

10

4
Four Asian LDCs
China
2 Rest of World
OECD Members
0
All Other LDCs
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Source: Calculated from US International Trade Commission data.

This still leaves many countries that receive only GSP preferences, which cover
only a limited range of products,4 or no preferences at all. The problem is greatest for
the countries that are in regions outside the scope of the African and Caribbean
programs. All of the other LDCs have at least a path to DFQF-like treatment. These
programs, together with the phase-in of the results of multilateral liberalization in the
Uruguay Round, produced a substantial expansion in the share of imports from LDCs
that enter on a duty-free basis. At the start of this decade about half of the goods
imported from LDCs entered the United States on a dutiable basis. That share fell
steadily as a result of new, preferential programs.
As can be appreciated from the data illustrated in Figure 1, the differing treatment
extended to distinct LDCs has produced a real irony: LDCs are subject to either the
lowest or the highest average tariff rates, depending on the group. Four apparel-
dependent LDCs in Asia are denied preferential treatment for their most important
exports, and are subject to tariffs that average 15-16%. Those average have in fact
increased since the Uruguay Round results began to take effect in the mid-1990s, even
though average tariffs on most other countries have decreased curing that period. The
decrease has been especially notable for all other LDCs. Those countries had faced
somewhat higher than average tariffs prior to 2000, when new preferences were
enacted, but since then they have dropped to almost nothing.

4 The range of goods that are eligible for duty-free treatment under the GSP is wider for the LDCs than it
is for other developing countries, but the law does not specify the standards by which the LDCs are to
be determined. Forty-four of the LDCs are designated for GSP-LDC treatment. Four LDCs are denied
basic GSP treatment, and hence are excluded from the GSP-LDC program as well, and one LDC benefits
only from the regular GSP program.

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Table 2 Treatment of US imports from LDCs, 2009


(Imports for consumption, customs value, thousands of dollars and percentages)

All LDCs Share 4 Asian LDCs Share All other LDCs Share
MFN Dutiable 6,499,444 30.2% 5,500,854 96.2% 998,590 6.3%
MFN Duty-Free 2,048,479 9.5% 183,906 3.2% 1,864,573 11.8%
AGOA 5,987,667 27.8% 0 0.0% 5,987,667 37.8%
GSP 6,620,530 30.7% 34,951 0.6% 6,585,579 41.6%
Eligible for GSP-LDCs 6,515,171 30.2% 11,227 0.2% 6,503,944 41.1%
Eligible for regular GSP 105,359 0.5% 23,724 0.4% 81,635 0.5%
Caribbean Basin Initiative 388,845 1.8% 0 0.0% 388,845 2.5%
Eligible for CBTPA 373,967 1.7% 0 0.0% 373,967 2.4%
Eligible for CBERA 14,878 0.1% 0 0.0% 14,878 0.1%
Total 21,544,965 100.0% 5,719,711 100.0% 15,825,254 100.0%

Note: The "4 Asian LDCs" are Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, and Nepal.
Source: Calculated from US International Trade Commission data.

The differences in the tariff treatment extended to the Asian and other LDCs is
further shown by the data in Table 3. The vast majority of the imports from the four
Asian LDCs were subject to duties in 2009, compared to just 6.3% of the imports from
other LDCs. Just over one-tenth of the imports from Haiti and sub-Saharan African
countries were duty-free on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis, and the rest received
preferential treatment under various programs.
As can be seen from the data in Table 2, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, and Nepal
were dutiable on a normal trade relations (NTR) basis. The only preferences that these
countries receive come under the GSP (to which Laos is not yet designated); that
program accounted for only one-half of one percent of US imports from these
countries. By contrast, all but 3.16% of the imports from the other 44 LDCs entered
on a duty-free basis, primarily under AGOA and the GSP.
The LDCs face not only higher average tariffs, but also higher average shipping
costs. Those higher shipping costs offer a rough estimate of the actual dollar costs that
are imposed on LDCs by some of their structural disadvantages, including some that
are immutable (i.e. distance from the US market) and others of which can be changed
only slowly and with great effort (e.g. costly and inefficient port facilities and
transportation networks). On average, it costs $3.93 to ship $100 worth of goods from
an LDC to the United States in 2008. When this is added to the average tariff of $2.90,
that comes to total costs of $6.57.5 That is almost two and a half times more than the
costs that one would need to pay in order to import $100 worth of goods from the
average industrialized country ($2.64). Put another way, even if all the tariffs on the
LDCs were to be removed, and all of the tariffs on industrialized countries were to
remain in place, it would still cost substantially more to import goods from an LDC
than it does to import goods from an industrialized country.

The need for a new preferential program


The data presented above demonstrate that while the DFQF pledge has largely been
fulfilled for the LDCs in Africa and the Americas, the United States falls far short of

5 Author's calculations, based on US International Trade Commission data.

108
US Trade Policy Toward the Least Developed Countries

meeting that goal for the apparel-exporters among the Asian LDCs. That inequity
could be resolved by enacting a new preferential program that would extend
treatment to these countries that is comparable to that now enjoyed by LDCs in other
regions.
Those who oppose such a program often raise the objection that any benefits
extended to the Asian LDCs will necessarily come at the expense of the AGOA
beneficiaries and Haiti. These fears, however, are not borne out by trade data. While
it is true that the apparel-exporting LDCs do compete with one another in the US
market, it would be a vast exaggeration to suggest that the Asian suppliers among
them have taken significant shares from Haiti and the African countries. To the
contrary, all of the apparel-exporting LDCs – whether or not they currently receive
preferential access to the US market – are instead in competition with middle-income
countries in Asia.
This point is clear from the data reported in Table 3, which shows countries' shares
of the US apparel-import market from 2000 through 2009. The most significant event
for apparel trade that occurred during this period was the end of the import-quota
system that had been established under the MultiFibre Arrangement (MFA). The
expiration of the final MFA quotas in 2005 meant that most imports from large, Asian
developing countries such as China and Vietnam were no longer constrained. These
countries had already been increasing their shares of the US apparel-import market in
the years before that watershed, but that process accelerated rapidly after the quotas
disappeared. In 2009 six Asian developing countries (i.e. China, Vietnam, Indonesia,
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) supplied 60.82% of US apparel imports, which is a
27.90 percentage point increase since the end of the MFA quotas. That is nearly ten
times greater than the increase in imports from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, and
Nepal during the same period (2.99 percentage points). Moreover, imports from the
other LDCs have fared better than many expected would be the case: The share of US
apparel imports originating in Haiti and the African LDCs in 2009 (1.53%) was only
0.23 percentage points lower than it was in 2004 (1.76%).
The bottom line is simple: The LDCs in Africa and the Americas have fared much
better in the post-MFA period than many had expected, and to the limited extent that
they have lost market share it can be attributed much more to middle-income Asian
countries than to the poorest Asian countries. Granting preferential treatment to
apparel imported from Asian LDCs will not come at the expense of LDCs in other
parts of the world.

The need for reform


The effectiveness of the LDC group as a negotiating instrument in Geneva has been
greatly undercut by disputes between those LDCs that receive DFQF access to the US
market and those who hope to get it. One consequence of that dispute is that it has
degraded the ability of these countries to work together on issues of common interest.
While differences over their trade relations with the United States have been an
important source of discord within the LDC group, the current debate in Washington
over reform of US preference programs offer these countries an opportunity to work

109
Table 3 Shares of the US import market for apparel, 2000-2009

110
(Percentage shares of total US imports of NAIC category 315;
change calculated in percentage-point shifts; 2009 data are January-September)

Change Change
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2000-04 2004-09
Least developed 6.55 6.96 6.59 6.72 6.72 7.08 8.07 8.52 9.09 9.48 0.17 2.76
Four Asian LDCs 4.93 5.12 4.87 4.85 4.96 5.57 6.63 7.05 7.71 7.95 0.03 2.99
Bangladesh 3.36 3.37 3.03 2.78 2.80 3.19 3.78 3.93 4.52 5.10 -0.56 2.30
Cambodia 1.28 1.50 1.67 1.86 2.02 2.30 2.77 3.07 3.12 2.80 0.74 0.78
Laos 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.03
Nepal 0.28 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.14 -0.12
Other LDCs 1.62 1.84 1.72 1.87 1.76 1.51 1.44 1.47 1.38 1.53 0.14 -0.23
Haiti 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.44 0.47 0.55 0.58 0.57 0.54 0.77 0.06 0.30
Lesotho 0.22 0.35 0.52 0.59 0.65 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.45 0.42 0.43 -0.23
Madagascar 0.17 0.29 0.14 0.30 0.46 0.37 0.31 0.37 0.37 0.32 0.29 -0.14
All other LDCs 0.82 0.83 0.71 0.54 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.64 -0.16
All other partners 93.45 93.04 93.41 93.28 93.28 92.92 91.93 91.48 90.91 90.52 -0.17 -2.76
Asian non-preferential 23.82 24.67 26.82 30.47 32.92 41.71 46.52 52.15 54.73 60.82 9.10 27.90
China 13.20 13.77 14.84 16.54 18.58 25.91 29.09 33.37 34.33 39.12 5.38 20.54
Vietnam 0.07 0.08 1.44 3.57 3.64 3.67 4.19 5.54 6.87 7.60 3.57 3.96
Indonesia 3.39 3.66 3.37 3.27 3.41 3.86 4.77 5.05 5.29 5.79 0.02 2.38
India 3.20 3.11 3.31 3.26 3.36 4.24 4.32 4.18 4.20 4.41 0.16 1.05
Pakistan 1.61 1.63 1.58 1.66 1.72 1.80 1.95 2.00 2.08 2.07 0.11 0.35
Sri Lanka 2.35 2.42 2.28 2.17 2.21 2.23 2.20 2.01 1.96 1.83 -0.14 -0.38
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Latin preferential 29.63 28.82 28.33 26.28 25.28 22.68 19.99 17.60 17.12 15.90 -4.35 -9.38
CAFTA-DR 14.50 14.64 14.75 13.95 13.62 12.33 11.05 10.12 10.09 9.35 -0.88 -4.27
ATPA 1.30 1.19 1.19 1.54 1.83 1.88 1.78 1.54 1.52 1.25 0.53 -0.58
Mexico 13.83 12.99 12.39 10.79 9.83 8.47 7.16 5.94 5.51 5.30 -4.00 -4.53
Rest of world 40.00 39.55 38.26 36.53 35.08 28.53 25.42 21.73 19.06 13.80 -4.92 -21.28
World 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 – –

Note: "Rest of World" consists solely of non-LDCs, including some developing and some developed countries, and some that receive preferential access to the US mar-
ket as well as others that do not..
Source: Calculated from US International Trade Commission data.
US Trade Policy Toward the Least Developed Countries

together. With the authorization for the GSP and another preferential trade program6
due to expire at the end of 2010, Congress has taken preliminary steps towards wider
reforms in the preference programs.7 There are three steps that the LDCs could urge
Washington to take.
The first is the renewal of the GSP, including the expanded list of goods that are
eligible for duty-free treatment when imported from LDCs. As was shown in Table 2,
close to one-third of US imports from the LDCs enter duty-free under this program.
It will disappear, however, unless Congress acts to renew it before the end of 2010.
A second step would be to create a new program that extends AGOA-like treatment
to imports from the Asian LDCs that do not currently enjoy duty-free access to the
US market. That would fulfil the promise that the United States and the rest of the
world made to extend DFQF treatment to imports from LDCs, and also establish
parity in the treatment of the different countries in this group.
A third step would be to reform the rules of origin (ROOs) of all of the existing and
potential preferential programs. ROOs are one of the more problematic aspects of
preferential trade programs in both the United States and other industrialized
countries, as is especially true in the case of apparel. As part of the Hong Kong
Ministerial Decision, the ministers agreed that developed countries shall "[e]nsure
that preferential rules of origin applicable to imports from LDCs are transparent and
simple, and contribute to facilitating market access." This commitment to reform of
unilateral preferential ROOs is a matter of high priority for the LDCs, as expressed in
a joint submission that they made to the WTO in mid-2006. In its own analysis of the
matter, the US International Trade Commission concluded that tariffs and quotas are
less trade-distorting than stringent ROOs.8 Any initiative to complete the process of
extending DFQF treatment should thus be accompanied by reform of ROOs in the
existing programs. Both the programs that are now in place, as well as new benefits
that may be created, should meet the Hong Kong Ministerial Decision's standard of
being "transparent and simple, and contribut[ing] to facilitating market access" for
the LDCs.
Many members of Congress and other policymakers in Washington have often
expressed their eagerness to promote the trade and development interests of the
African LDCs. That is one reason why the proposals made in recent years for the
creation of a new, preferential trade program for the Asian LDCs have gone nowhere:
Pro-African policymakers in the United States have shared the mistaken belief that
increased imports from the Asian LDCs come at the expense of the Africans. For
reasons discussed in the preceding pages, the LDCs as a whole would benefit if they
were to put these differences behind them, renew their earlier calls for DFQF for all
LDCs, and make these views known to those US policymakers who hope to promote
these countries' development through trade.

6 The Andean Trade Preferences Act, which is due to expire at the end of 2010, does not cover any LDCs.
7 Congress already acted in May, 2010 to reauthorize for ten years the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity
through Partnership Encouragement Act and the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, both of which
were due to expire this year.
8 US International Trade Commission, The Economic Effects of Significant US Import Restraints: Fifth
Update 2007 USITC Publication 3906 (February, 2007), page 80.

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

About the author

Craig VanGrasstek teaches courses on the political economy of trade policy in both
the executive education and degree programs of the John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University. He is also on the faculty of Georgetown University,
where he teaches an innovative course on literature and foreign policy. His firm,
Washington Trade Reports, specializes in monitoring and analyzing current issues in
trade policy. Dr. VanGrasstek has worked as a consultant for the World Trade
Organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the World Bank, and other
international organizations, as well as government agencies and private firms. Dr.
VanGrasstek received his doctorate in Politics from Princeton University in 1997. He
also holds the degree of Master of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown
University (1983), and received a bachelor's degree in International Relations from
the University of Minnesota (1981). In addition to numerous reports to international
organizations, book chapters, and journal articles, Dr. VanGrasstek's publications
include (with Stephen Lande) The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: Trade Policy in the
Reagan Administration (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1986).

112
Reform of the EU GSP Regime and its
Potential Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa

Malwina Nowakowska
University of St. Gallen

1 Introduction

Coinciding with the ongoing economic and financial crisis and with the many
contemporary protectionist measures undertaken by industrialized countries that
have restricted their trade with the developing countries, one of the most important
schemes of non-reciprocal market access for the latter, the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) of the European Union (EU), is due to expire on December 31,
2011. To ensure that developing country trade is not further disrupted by the lapse of
the EU's GSP regime, a proposal for a new GSP regulation needs to be made during
2010, that is, during the current strained macroeconomic circumstances. The
forthcoming revision of the EU GSP scheme raises several questions about its scope
and contents and whether the depth and uncertain duration of the economic
downturn might influence the generosity of those industrialized countries offering
preferences.
On March 16, 2010 the EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht launched a public
consultation on the future of the European Union's trade policy towards the
developing countries, which includes a review of EU's GSP scheme. In his opening
address to that meeting the EU Trade Commissioner stated:1

"The fundamental question for the review is whether the current GSP objectives
remain valid and whether GSP preferences are still the best tool to achieve them.
That implies asking the hard questions: is it right that GSP continues to be
available to traders who have in the meantime become major global players in
international trade with very significant and wide-ranging exports to the EU?
Should the EU give preferences to countries which already benefit from other
preferences granted by the EU? Should the architecture of GSP, - which includes
GSP, GSP+ and EBA - be changed? And should the current arrangements for
monitoring compliance be reinforced?"

This suggests that there is the political will to question several elements of the current
GSP regulation, which might result in economically-meaningful reforms to the GSP
regulation that, in turn, could affect Sub-Saharan African commercial interests
(amongst others). The European Parliament, now involved in GSP matters and
associated legislation, has called on the European Commission to submit a revised
regulation proposal by June 1, 2010 and this is when concrete proposals will be

1 Opening speech, Karel de Gucht, European Commissioner for Trade, Conference on the EU trade policy
towards Developing Countries, Brussels, March 16, 2010.

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

available for evaluation. Having provided an overview of the current EU GSP regime
and its evolution since 2001, this paper then examines the lessons from past GSP
revisions made under similarly strained economic circumstances in the early 1980s.
Then, on the basis of what is known today about the potential reform options, this
paper assesses their possible impact on Sub-Saharan African countries. Ultimately, the
goal then is to examine what is at stake for Sub-Saharan African nations from certain
leading proposals to reform the EU's GSP regime, bearing in mind that the recent
global economic crisis may well inform the reform of that regime.

2 Overview of the EU GSP since 2001


The Generalized System of Preferences is a voluntary opening of markets by the
industrialized countries to imports from the developing countries through the
elimination or reduction of import tariffs. All major trading countries offer such
schemes, although significant differences exist between the amount of incremental
market access offered. In 1971 the EU GSP was the first one implemented in response
to a UNCTAD proposal of that time and has been extended a number of times since
then, each time with a limited duration.
The European Union's unilateral preferences are broad in scope. The EU GSP
currently covers 176 countries and offers different level of preferential treatment to
groups of countries at different stages of development. In total 49 Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) (more than half of them Sub-Saharan African countries) are
provided with the most preferential treatment as all of their exports enter the EU
market duty-free, apart from exports of arms and several products temporarily
excluded such as rice, bananas, and sugar2. All other countries fall under the general
GSP scheme. Optionally, since July 1, 2005 those countries that are deemed
"vulnerable" in terms of size or poor export diversification but that assume obligations
arising from the ratification of a number of international accords (on labor standards,
good governance, human rights, and environmental protection) can participate in
the GSP+ system (the Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development
and Good Governance) and, thereby, receive duty-free access for most products
covered, which is an extension of preferences as compared with the general GSP-
treatment.
Also other major preference-giving countries including Canada, Japan, and the US
have significantly extended their GSP schemes over time, especially with regards to
the African LDCs. The US AGOA extended US preferences to African countries by
adding 1837 tariff lines. Thus, the period since 2001 can be regarded as relatively
progressive in terms of granting further preferential access to the EU market and
markets of the developed countries in general. However, in 2001 some higher income
developing countries lost preferences on a wide range of products due to new so-
called graduation criteria introduced by the EU. Indeed, as will seen below, it is the
differences in treatment across developing countries that is a recurring theme in
discussions about the effects of GSP regimes and their reforms over time.

2 Banana and rice were covered by the scheme in 2006 and sugar in 2009, the inclusion of the latter was
delayed by three months due to a change in the EC's marketing year.

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Reform of the EU GSP Regime and its Potential Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa

3 The current EU GSP Regulation 2009-2011

Compared to its predecessor, the implementation of the GSP scheme for the years
2009-2011 did not introduce any fundamental changes. The only adjustments were
those resulting from the in-built graduation mechanism, which applies when the
average imports of a section from a country exceeds 15% of GSP imports of the same
products from all other GSP beneficiary countries over a period of three years. Thus,
the current scheme introduced de-graduation (i.e. restoring preferences) of six
countries/product sections (in the case of Algeria, India, Indonesia, Russia, South
Africa and Thailand) and only one graduation (Vietnam/footwear). Due to the de-
graduations and other technical changes the additional preferences were worth 160
million Euros per year. The product coverage of the GSP varies according to the type
of the arrangement. Of the 9568 existing tariff lines under the Community's
Combined Nomenclature (2405 carrying a zero MFN tariff rate) the general GSP
arrangement covers 6244 tariff lines, the GSP+ 6336 tariff lines, and the EBA covers
the broadest range of products 7140 tariff lines3.
The current scheme is operating on the legal basis of Council Regulation No.
732/2008 of 22 July 2008, for a period of three years and, as mentioned above, it is
due to expire on December 31, 2011. In the absence of the new regulation, most
imports from the developing countries would revert to their MFN treatment under
the EU's tariff schedules at the WTO, which means their tariff preferences in the EU
market would disappear. Only countries covered by the Everything But Arms scheme
(EBA), signed for an unlimited period of time, would keep their preferential
treatment. As the expiry date is drawing closer, the shape of the new GSP regulation
is becoming a more widely discussed issue. Whether the scheme will follow in the
progressive direction of extending and deepening preferences, as was the case since
2001, or whether they will rather be limited as result of the strained economic
circumstances from the current economic crisis remains to be seen.
The duration of the legislative process in the case of the current GSP revision could
be longer than usual due to the enhanced role of the European Parliament
concerning the ordinary legislative procedure applicable to the common commercial
policy since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Commission has
signaled its intention to propose a time-limited extension of the current Regulation
at first while the work on the new Regulation progresses.
The shape of the previous, current, and the next GSP schemes are a part of a larger,
10-year plan for 2006-2015 that seeks to provide the scheme with more stability,
predictability, and coherence. Although this document sets objectives and
instruments for the whole period, it does not constitute a guarantee that the scheme
would not be altered in a direction of limiting preferences. Thus, each review of the
GSP creates the chance, or risk, of major alteration. In order to consider how the GSP
scheme might be revised under crisis-era conditions and when there is above-trend
levels of protectionism, it is useful to turn to prior contemporary experience to see if
any lessons can be discerned. With this in mind, we know turn to the GSP revision
undertaken during the sharp economic slowdown of the 1980s.

3 Generalized System of Preferences, Notification by the European Communities, Addendum, March 3,


2009.

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

4 The EU GSP during the global economic slowdown of the


1980s

The 1980s saw many countries turn inward, reversing many reforms. This followed a
very sharp global economic downturn in 1980-1, itself a consequence of attempts to
"squeeze inflation out of the system" by the adoption of restrictive monetary policies
in the United States and the United Kingdom, higher worldwide interest rates, and
previous oil price surges. Such was the level of concern among trade diplomats at the
time that the GATT secretariat was charged with monitoring developments, and their
reports make for sorry reading. Here, however, our concern is that the effects of the
EU GSP regime were directly or indirectly affected by discriminatory measures taken
by European governments or by the European Commission.
The first GSP scheme applied from 1971 to 1980 and was marked by moderate
utilization rates of between 55% to 60% and a very limited number of recipients,
since just 13 countries accounted for approximately 70% of goods imported at
preferential rates. Although criticisms could be applied, the scheme progressed
towards improved preferential access with each of its periodical reviews in the 1970s.
The second scheme, operating from 1980 to 1985, brought about a simplification
through the introduction of a single list of sensitive and non-sensitive products,
removing quotas on imports under GSP, and introducing the differentiation (or
modulation) of the scheme, which aimed at making the scheme more selective to the
level of development and competitiveness of the beneficiaries. However, it was the
sharp global recession of the 1980s that resulted in both a slowing down in the pace
for GSP extensions and a significant increase of the certain restrictive features of the
GSP regime. The latter therefore countered the liberalizing momentum that existed
when the second GSP scheme came into force. The remainder of this section describes
some of the high profile restrictive changes in the EU GSP regime introduced in the
1980s.

4.1 Restrictions on preference extension on the grounds of economic


difficulty
Since the inception of the GSP by the EU in 1971, the scheme was supposed to be
extended over time to cover more products, gradually remove quotas. and extend
preference margins. However, already before the end of the first GSP phase 1971-
1980, a document titled European Communities Scheme of Generalized Preferences
circulated in March 1979, states "In a climate of growing industrial protectionism the
Community's maintenance of the GSP is of particular importance. However, the
situation in a number of major industries is such that a prudent approach must be
adopted"4 and "For certain sectors where the European Community is going through
serious difficulties, it has not been possible to apply any increase [in the volume of
the offer on duty free imports] in 1979"5.
Withdrawals of the commitment to extend and deepen preferences followed. The

4 The European Communities Scheme of Generalized Preferences, Europe Information, External Relations,
No. 18/79, March 1979.
5 Op. cit.

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Reform of the EU GSP Regime and its Potential Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa

extension of GSP product coverage such as, for example, to cover basmati rice,
proposed originally by the European Commission in 1980 to be included in the
scheme for 1981, were not in the end adopted. Granting preferential access for this
product would have had large developmental consequences for some of the least
developed GSP beneficiaries, but the move was strongly opposed by some member
states. Similarly, in the spirit of deepening preferences, the European Commission
submission for GSP in 1982 proposed a general across-the-board increase of 10% for
quotas, but after opposition from some member states a smaller or zero rate increase
was adopted for sectors in economic difficulty. These covered, amongst others, the
ECSC products, shoes, and certain chemical products. The move to protect these
sectors was criticized for being overly protective and the Committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament called it a restrictive policy, voicing
doubts about its validity.6

4.2 Increase in the number of "sensitive" goods


Until 1980 the products for which preferential access was less generous due to their
"sensitivity" were classified into four categories. Only non-sensitive products received
full preferences and towards the end of the first EU GSP regime the share of sensitive
products enjoying preferential treatment amounted to only 3-4% of the Community
imports. The 1980 renegotiation, which sought to simplify the system by dividing all
products into just two categories, sensitive and non-sensitive, in fact largely increased
the number of sensitive products7. Strict controls were imposed on imports of
sensitive products and occasionally the Commission subjected the imports of some
of the products from this list to additional monitoring and import conditions. In
1984 the Commission imposed such stricter controls on preferential imports of three
products already on the list of sensitive products -- carbonates of sodium, gelatin, and
tableware of porcelain - specifically motivating this move with reference to the
deteriorating economic situation.

4.3 Oil case and the 20% share in EU imports rule


In 1986 the EU considered excluding Saudi and Libyan petrochemical exports
completely from the GSP8. This was in fact achieved by introducing adjustments to
the GSP eligibility conditions in 1988, specifically by adopting new utilisation rules
for the GSP. Developing countries which supply more than 20% of any one product
imported by the EU were to be automatically removed from the system of preferences.
In fact the new utilisation rules resulted in the removal of preferences for Saudi

6 Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, European Parliament Working Documents, 1981-1982,
Report on the proposals from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council (Doc-1-
450/81) for regulations fixing the Community's scheme of generalized preferences for the period
1982-1985 and opening the scheme applicable in 1982, Document No. 1-641/81, November 11, 1981.
7 Page, S.A.B. (1981), The Revival of Protectionism and its Consequences for Europe, Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. XX, No. 1, September 1981. In 1984 there were 128 sensitive products, 64 of them
industrial.
8 EC Agrees on Plan for Automatic Saudi, Libyan Petchem Exports over quota, Platt's Oilgram News,
November 26, 1986.

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Arabia. According to an account of remarks made by an EC official in 1998 "By


achieving such impressive performance, a country shows that it no longer needs the
GSP to maintain its competitive edge on EU markets9". With this decision of the
European Commission, duty-free quotas for Saudi petrochemical exports were halved
by 1989 and completely excluded from the GSP in 1990.

4.4 First GSP benefits suspension case


The 1980s also marked the first time that the EU suspended benefits under the GSP .
In 1987 it withdrew the GSP preferences for South Korea because the government in
South Korea refused to give EU exporters the same legal protection against
counterfeiting as their U.S. counterparts had received10. The GSP suspension measure
became effective on January 1, 1988 and adversely affected most of the major South
Korean export products to the EU, such as textiles, microwave ovens, and electronic
items.

4.5 GSP differentiation/modulation


Another development in the GSP scheme during the recession in the 1980s were
moves to restrict the number of beneficiaries. The argument of limiting preferences
to those beneficiary countries gaining economic strength was first made in mid-
1970s. The European Commission stated in its Communication to the Council of
1975 that there was a need to review the eligibility criteria to account for such
changes in the economic strength of GSP beneficiaries11. The economic crisis in the
early 1980s contributed to a faster hardening of views on this issue. When the
proposals for the second GSP scheme were being drawn up, the European
Commission intended to divide beneficiary countries into three categories depending
on their level of development12:
• the newly industrialized countries, whose preferences would be restricted due to
their aggressive export policies and in order to improve the preferential
advantage for the other, less developed beneficiaries;
• the least developed countries (LDCs) whose preferences will be continued and
further improved;
• and the developing countries that fall in neither of these categories, for whom
the preferences will be continued and extended but to a lesser extent than for
LDCs.

9 International EU Ministers Meeting Nov. 21 May End Saudi Preferential Trade Status, Platt's Oilgram
News, November 21, 1988.
10 EC Suspends Benefits For Korean Exports, Special to The Wall Street Journal, 21.12.1987, The Wall Street
Journal.
11 The Future Development of the European Community's Generalized Tariff Preferences, Communication
by the Commission to the Council, COM(75) 17 final, February 3, 1975.
12 Guidelines for the European Community's Schema of Generalized Tariff Preferences for the Post-1980
Period, Commission Communication to the Council, COM (80) 104 final, March 7, 1980.

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Reform of the EU GSP Regime and its Potential Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa

Although the Commission stated that the changes proposed were not supposed to
exclude some highly competitive countries or protect some sensitive products, it also
admitted that the new rules were made to exercise selective control over exports of
sensitive industrial products originating in certain beneficiary countries.
The list of beneficiaries of the GSP is based on "self selection" as the definition of
the developing countries for the purpose of GSP eligibility was countries equated with
the list of the Group 77 in UNCTAD. The applications from other countries were
selected on their merits.13 The removal by the EU of their benefits from "newly
industrialised countries" was motivated by the fact that by differentiating the access
to preferences by country, a better allocation of the preferential advantages could be
achieved as the least developed countries would receive more a favorable targeted
offer of preferences. As can be seen in the 1983 report of the European Parliament on
the proposals from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council,
the Parliament "supports the differentiation applied within the system, whereby
certain restrictions are imposed on the most competitive supplier countries in order
to allow other countries, especially the least developed, better access to the
Community market14". Consequently, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Macao were
excluded from the improvements of preferential access in the GSP 1984.
Additionally, global quotas and ceilings were replaced by individual preferential
ceilings for each country at the product level to prevent single countries from
accounting for a large part of the total product imported. This move again constituted
a withdrawal of certain preferences on a product/country basis, principally for the
more developed remaining beneficiaries15,16. In 1985 the European Commission
suggested for the year 1986 twenty-six product/country exclusions (twelve products
in the case of Hong Kong, ten South Korea, one in the case of Brazil and one in the
case of Singapore.)

4.6 Lessons for GSP review from the 1980s.


The reversal of liberalisation and the protectionist elements that were incorporated
into the Generalized System of Preferences in the 1980s were induced and accelerated
by two specific circumstances: the global economic slowdown in the early 1980s and
the upcoming expiry of the first GSP scheme. At the beginning of the 1980s it has
become clear that no economic recovery could be expected for some time,
postponing further the recovery from the sharp downturn due to the oil shock of the
late 1970s. As support for further GSP extension deteriorated among the member
states in the face of economic difficulties and the expiry of the first GSP scheme

13 Romanian and Chinese applications were accepted and the Bulgarian one rejected. In 1985 the GSP
covered 128 countries and 22 dependent territories additionally included in the scheme.
14 Report on the proposals from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council (Doc. 1-
635/83 - COM (83) 441 final) for regulations fixing the Community's generalized system of preferences
scheme for 1984, European Parliament Working Documents 1983-84, Document 1-1007/83, November
14, 1983.
15 Opinion of the Committee on External Economic Relations on the Commission proposal fixing the
Community's generalized tariff preferences scheme for 1984 (Doc. COM (83) 441 final - Doc 1-635/83).
16 Review of the European Community's Generalized Tariff Preferences Scheme, Communication of the
Commission to the Council, COM (85)203 final, May 6, 1985.

119
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

approached, it was seen and used as a chance to balance several improvements in the
operation of the scheme with a protectionist slide towards limiting the preferences
offered especially to those countries that were its largest and most successful users.
The parallels to circumstances today are very strong, where both considerations apply
considerable force.

5 EC GSP and Sub-Saharan Africa


The preferences granted by the EU are said by many to play a central role in
conditioning Sub-Saharan African countries' access to European markets. However it
is important to appreciate that these countries do not form a homogeneous group of
beneficiaries. Under the current GSP Regulation 2009-2011, 33 of the 48 Sub-Saharan
African countries enjoy the Everything But Arms treatment (furthermore referred to
as the SSA EBA group), while the 15 more developed countries (Botswana, Cote
d'Ivoire, Congo, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa,
Swaziland, Seychelles, Namibia, Nigeria, Mayotte and Mauritius) fall under the
general GSP (the SSA GSP group). None of the Sub-Saharan African countries is
eligible for extended preferences of GSP+. Thus, any changes to the GSP scheme
influences the 15 SSA countries directly and the remaining 33 indirectly by changing
the relative competitiveness of the preferences offered under EBA. The central point
here is the relative benefit of one type of preferences must be compared to the
generosity of other preference regimes. Moreover, the unlimited duration of the EBA
scheme is an advantage in comparison to the general GSP, as it provides the EU
importers from the 33 SSA countries with more stability and predictability, which
increases the attractiveness of sourcing goods from SSA EBA beneficiaries. The general
GSP involves more uncertainty for its Sub-Saharan African beneficiaries as the
preferences can be changed unilaterally by the European Commission without notice.
The years 2000-2007 had been a period of remarkable optimism regarding the
prospects for economic growth and poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
undermined in 2008 and on by the global financial and economic crisis. Although to
a lesser degree integrated in the global financial infrastructure than most of its trading
partners, the crisis has had a strong negative impact on SSA primarily due to
recessions in the importing countries and the resulting decrease in imports and
collapse of commodity prices. Downward trends in foreign direct investment and
migrant worker remittances were also observed17. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) predicted in 2009 that the growth rate for SSA would slow down to 1% from
recent pre-crisis levels of 6% and then rebound again to 4% in 2010. Many analysts
point to the strong resilience of African countries during the crisis in terms of
economic growth rates as compared with the rest of the world and highlight the fast
recovery observed already at the beginning of 2010. Although this is true, the impact
of the crisis on Africa's exports was strong and some aspects of the crisis may have
longer term effects. This is worrisome as many African countries need high economic
growth rates to compensate for population increases if their populations are ever
going to escape from poverty.

17 Osakwe, Patrick, N. (2008), Sub-Saharan Africa and the global financial crisis, Trade Negotiations
Insights, Volume 7, Number 10, December 2008.

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Reform of the EU GSP Regime and its Potential Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa

EU's imports from both groups of the Sub-Saharan African countries fell
significantly during the recent crisis, see Figure 1. The decrease in imports level
between October 2008 and January 2009, that is in the first three months of the
global economic downturn, was stronger for the Sub-Saharan countries covered by
both schemes than for the whole of EU's imports (Figure 2). Before the crisis, export
of both groups to the EU were gradually increasing over 2006, 2007, and most of
2008, but after the crisis hit, SSA GSP group's exports to the EU fell below its early
2006 level and did not recover over most of 2009. The SSA EBA group's exports to the
EU were growing at an even faster pace before and then experienced an even stronger
decrease, although a little more spread out over time. In general EU's imports from
Sub-Saharan African countries exhibit a higher volatility than EU's total imports with
higher growth rates during times of economic prosperity and larger slump during the
downturns and crises (Figures 3 and 4).

Figure 1 Imports of the EU from the two groups of Sub-Saharan countries, EBA and GSP
beneficiaries (2006-2010, monthly data, Millions EUR).

6000
Imports value (Millions EUR)

5000

4000

3000
SSA EBA
SSA GSP
2000

1000

0
Nov.

Nov.

Nov.

Nov.
Sep. 2006

Sep. 2007

Sep. 2008

Sep. 2009
Jan. 2006

May.
Jul. 2006

Jan. 2007

May.
Jul. 2007

Jan. 2008

May.
Jul. 2008

Jan. 2009

May.
Jul. 2009

Jan. 2010
Mar.

Mar.

Mar.

Mar.

Source: Author's own calculation on the basis of Eurostat data.

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Figure 2 Percentage change of EU imports from two Sub-Saharan countries groups under EBA
and GSP vis-a-vis total EU imports (2005-2009, year-to-year % change).

0.4

0.3
% change, year-to-year

0.2

0.1

0
-0.1

-0.2

-0.3

-0.4
Jan.-Dec. 2006 Jan.-Dec. 2007 Jan.-Dec. 2008 Jan.-Dec. 2009

SSA EBA SSA GSP Total

Source: Author's own calculation on the basis of Eurostat data.

Figure 3 Imports of the EU from Sub-Saharan African countries under EBA and GSP and total
EU imports (% change, three quarter moving average

15%
10%
% change, moving average

5%
0%
3Q2006

4Q2006

1Q2007

2Q2007

3Q2007

4Q2007

1Q2008

2Q2008

3Q2008

4Q2008

1Q2009

2Q2009

3Q2009

4Q2009

-5%
-10%
-15%
-20%
-25%

SSA EBA SSA GSP Total

Source: Author's own calculation on the basis of Eurostat data.

122
Reform of the EU GSP Regime and its Potential Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa

Figure 4 Volatility of EU imports from the two groups of Sub-Saharan African countries and
total EU imports (2006-2009, % change of three months moving average).
% change, three months moving averages

15.0%

10.0%

5.0%

0.0%

-5.0%

-10.0%

-15.0%
n. 6

n. 7

n. 8

n. 9
r. 7

r. 8

r. 9
c. 6

c. 7

c. 8

c. 9
g. 6

g. 7

g. 8

g. 9
t. 6

t. 7

t. 8

t. 9
b. 6

b. 7

b. 8

09
Ju 200

Ju 200

Ju 200

Ju 200
Ap 200

Ap 200

Ap 200
D e 200

D e 200

D e 200

D e 200
Au 200

Au 200

Au 200

Au 200
Oc 200

Oc 200

Oc 200

Oc 200
Fe 200

Fe 200

Fe 200

20
r.
Ap

SSA EBA SSA GSP Total


Source: Author's own calculation on the basis of Eurostat data.

6. Utilisation of EU preferences by Sub-Saharan African countries

The evaluation of effectiveness of EU preferences raises several methodological


difficulties. First, there are a number of overlapping preferential agreements granted
to the Sub-Saharan African countries such as the GSP, EBA, and the Cotonou
Partnership Agreement, currently in the process of being replaced by Economic
Partnership Agreements. Secondly, the statutory rate of protection, i.e. preferential
access available to exporters, does not always reflect the effective level of protection,
which includes also technical and administrative requirements, SPS and TBTs in place
as well as the rules of origin. The utilisation rates reported here have been calculated
on the basis of Eurostat dataset for EU imports by corresponding tariff regime, which
reveals a country's eligibility for preferential or MFN market access and provides
information on regime under which the products were in fact imported18.
Overall, in terms of utilisation rates, Sub-Saharan African countries under EBA are
making better use of EU preferences than those under the general GSP regime. This
can be due to the higher preferential margin under EBA, which makes it more
worthwhile to fulfill all the requirements necessary for obtaining preferences rather
than pay the MFN tariff. Although preference utilisation has been growing steadily
over 2005-2007, 2008 saw a slight decrease for both groups (see Figure 5).

18 The Eurostat dataset "Adjusted EU-EXTRA Imports by tariff regime" provides only information on
preferential or non-preferential access and not on the exact import regime (GSP, GSP+ or EBA). Since
these schemes differ in the level of preferential access offered and/or in country coverage it is possible
to assume that Sub-Saharan African countries go for the most generous preferential scheme they are
eligible for.

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Figure 5 Utilisation rates of EU preferences by two groups of Sub-Saharan countries


(2005-2008).
Utilisation rate (%)
100%
95%
90%
85%
80%
75%
2005 2006 2007 2008

SSA EBA SSA GSP


Source: Author's own calculation on the basis of Eurostat data.

Figure 6 Average utilisation rates of EU preferences by two groups of Sub-Saharan African


countries (2005-2008).
Utilisation rate (%)

100.0%

80.0%

60.0%

40.0%

20.0%

0.0%
Machinery
Transportation
Mineral

Footwear and
Wood and

Stone and
Foodstuffs
Animal and
Vegetable

Chemical and

Total
Raw hides,

Metals
Plastics and

Miscellaneous
Textiles

SSA GSP SSA EBA


Source: Author's own calculation on the basis of Eurostat data.

Significant differences are observed at section level of the Harmonised System in


utilisation rates between the two groups. Although the countries under EBA have
overall higher utilisation rates, their exports are concentrated in fewer products.
Thus, SSA EBA countries exhibit slightly higher preference utilisation rates only for a
few categories, all of them primary products such as "Animal and animal products",
"Vegetable products", "Foodstuffs" and "Metals". In "Wood and wood products" as well
as "Textiles" both groups of countries use more than 90% of the preferences. However,
under all other product sections, including those more advanced like "Plastics and

124
Reform of the EU GSP Regime and its Potential Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa

Figure 7 Percentage change in utilisation rates of EU preferences by two groups of Sub-


Saharan African countries between 2008 and 2005.

268.1%

Series1 Series2
268.1
100% %
80% 56.1%
60% 45.8%
33.2% 27.2%
40%
% change

20%
0%
-20%
-40%
-60% -35.8%
-80%
-100% -84.6%

l
ne d s

Tr ele tals
hi Pla lied rod fs

s
la n
an M ss
W s, sk s a dus ts

ta
r ds s

w t h e ers

d r
Te cts
St d he tile

M por ical
ro ts

ou
ro rs
nd lea ubb s
l a Min Foo uct

el tio
an gea
al al p tuf
c

gla
r ie

To
e p uc

d p fu
d e st i n u

e
du

ne
oo in nd tr

isc ta
x

s r
d
bl d

an ct
oo r,
ta ro

a
ge al p

d
n
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o
ra
d a s,
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an

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ea

ne
d

w
an

hi
ot

ac
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al

ica

M
im

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An

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Ra
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Source: Author's own calculation on the basis of Eurostat data.

rubbers","Transportation" and especially "Machinery and electrical" countries under


the general GSP take a clear lead in preferences utilisation (Figure 6). It is apparent
that the utilisation rates are correlated with the level of MFN tariff in the EU and are
higher in sectors where the EU's trade is traditionally less liberalised, such as
agricultural or textile products.
For many sectors, especially those with high preference utilisation, there has not
been any significant change in the level of utilisation between 2005 and 2008.
However, in some other sectors, with lower utilisation rates, SSA EBA countries largely
increased them, which probably shows a development of the corresponding
manufacturing industry, stronger contractual relations with EU importer, better
results of Aid for Trade initiative, further potential export diversification, and
resulting investment in fulfilling preferential market access conditions, such as
standards or organising production in a way so as to secure originating status. This
was the case for "Chemical and allied industries", where the SSA EBA countries
increased their preference utilization by almost threefold, by 268.1% between 2005
and 2008, "Machinery and electrical" (56.1%), "Plastic and rubbers" (33.2%) (Figure 7).
No such large changes were observed for the countries under GSP, with some
moderate growth of utilisation rates in chemical and machinery sectors. Overall, EBA
countries seem to utilise their preferences better than the countries under the GSP,
although the former does so in fewer sectors. The volatility and variance of utilisation

125
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

rates is also much higher, with both large increases as significant decreases. Overall,
it appears that many more changes are happening in the exporting sector of the EBA
beneficiaries than those under the GSP.
Important insights into the potential problems utilising existing preferences were
given by Eurocommerce/Business Europe. This group represents European business
and stresses the importance of making the GSP not only more attractive to exporters
from beneficiary countries, but most of all to EU importers that in fact decide where
to import from. Major outstanding issues, according to this group, involve the lack of
stability in the scheme, unanticipated changes, such as annual graduation or
withdrawal, that cannot be dealt with on a short-term basis without prior notice,
three different incentive regimes that importers need to manage, and late
consultations for each GSP revision which result in the details of the next scheme
being known much less than a year before implementation. These factors can be to
blame for lowering the potential for exports and utilisation rates' growth under the
EU's general GSP, less so under the more stable EBA.

7 Potential GSP reform options and impact on the Sub-Saharan

African countries

A number of potential reform options can be found in the literature on the EU GSP
regime, European Commission documents, and the contributions to the "EU Trade
Policy towards Developing Countries" conference in Brussels on March 16, 2010. The
majority of proposals for the reform can be grouped into the following broader
categories: 1) changes in graduation and eligibility rules to exclude high income
developing countries so as to better concentrate preferences on the LDCs, 2) a slightly
extended product coverage, 3) measures to strengthen the supply side of exporters 4)
changes in the list of sensitive/non-sensitive products and 5) some new proposals,
such as import subsidies for products originating from the GSP countries. Other
proposals, such as agricultural liberalisation in the EU and extending the duration of
the GSP regulations, can be identified but due to their unlikely adoption we leave
them outside of the scope of this discussion. It is also on purpose that we leave aside
a discussion of the separate but complex matter of the GSP rules of origin reform,
although it is often contended that such rules are an important and influential
element of the GSP scheme performance. Let us turn now to the discussion of the
impact of each of these proposals on the Sub-Saharan African countries and, finally a
more detailed evaluation of changes to eligibility rules.
As neither eligibility criteria nor graduation criteria were explicitly established in
the UNCTAD proposal for the GSP or the Enabling Clause of the WTO, they remain
largely at the discretion of the countries granting preferences. This leaves open the
opportunity for unilateral changes to the list of GSP beneficiaries and potential
manipulation of the schemes in response to economic and political difficulties, just
as it happened in the 1980s. The statement by Mr Vital Moreira, Chair of the
Committee on International Trade of the European Parliament on the occasion of the
opening of consultation for the new GSP scheme is instructive in this regard:

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Reform of the EU GSP Regime and its Potential Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa

"GSP must be revised to take into account the changing landscape in the
developing world" and that "we consider that the GSP schemes continue to be
most helpful tools but they must target the developing countries that most need
them. The list of beneficiary countries should reflect the actual economic situation
of developing countries and the graduation among them19".

Also Karel de Gucht in his opening address cited above mentioned that "major global
players in international trade with very significant and wide-ranging exports to the
EU" and whether it is right that the preferences should continue to be available to
them. Potential exclusion of certain higher-income developing countries from the
current GSP coverage (possibly through a change of graduation criteria) is thus
becoming an actively discussed policy option. The apparent rationale here is that
preferences for these countries have already achieved the goal of increasing their
involvement in trade and the high level of diversification of their exports and are
thus no longer necessary. Removal of preferences offered to the high-income
developing countries should also serve to concentrate the EU's resources on other GSP
beneficiaries in two ways - by deepening the competitive preference margins by
freeing up resources that can be used for export capacity building. On the other hand,
although it is difficult to support this hypothesis with documentary evidence of the
European Commission's intentions, the move to exclude countries such as China and
Russia from the preferences can also be influenced by the many protectionist
measures introduced by these countries during the current economic and financial
crisis (and documented in the Global Trade Alert database). Thus, the exclusion here
would be a form of retaliation.
Second, with respect to product coverage changes, if it was limited for the general
GSP scheme, the direct impact in Sub-Saharan Africa would be on the 15 GSP-covered
countries. But it would also mean improved relative market access for EBA
beneficiaries as their preferential margins versus the preferential margins enjoyed by
other beneficiaries would increase. However, if the coverage of GSP is extended, as
discussed by some researchers,20 the countries eligible for GSP may gain and those
under EBA lose in relative terms. However, these changes are not automatic for any
extension or limitation of product coverage - the export structure of the Sub-Saharan
African countries to the EU matters and the impact would only exist if changes to
product coverage concern products that the African countries indeed export to the
EU. For the 33 African countries under the EBA there is literally no scope for
extending product coverage as the scheme already covers quota-free and duty free
access for almost all products (exceptions were in place until 2006 for rice and banana
and until 2009 for sugar). Thus, when speaking about deepening preferences for the
least developed countries in Africa, the only way forward is through channels other
than product coverage, such as: Aid for Trade, import subsidies, or limiting
production subsidies in the EU on sensitive products.
Third, there is evidence that EBA and GSP help developing countries increase their
exports but do not contribute much to domestic transformation and export

19 Statement by Mr Vital Moreira, Chair of the Committee on International Trade of the European
Parliament, EU Trade Policy towards Developing Countries conference, Challenges and opportunities for
the next years, Brussels March 16, 2010.
20 Making the GSP fit for the 21st Century, Dr Christopher Stevens, Overseas Development Institute,
Presentation at the EU Trade Policy for the Developing countries conference, Brussels, March 16, 2010.
Mr. Stevens also sees the problem of the beneficiary competitiveness.

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

diversification. Thus, many parties participating in the public consultation on the


new GSP scheme suggested that there is a need to strengthen the link between the EU
preferential market access and trade-related capacity building21 in order to increase
the utilisation rates and, secondly, to support exports by improving the domestic
institutional and physical infrastructure. Most authors suggest more resources be
allocated to the Aid for Trade scheme in order to not only increase the volume of
exports in existing export sectors but to facilitate export diversification. This could be
done by investing in market intelligence services to research the import trends in the
EU market, support capacity building in the identified potential sectors, and
providing country specific analyses indentifying constraints to export22.
Fourth, an additional channel of impact of the GSP reform on the Sub-Saharan
African countries are changes introduced to the list of sensitive/non-sensitive goods
which are unique to the EU GSP scheme. Non-sensitive goods enjoy a larger
preference margin than sensitive ones, the latter being also additionally protected by
import restrictions under certain circumstances such as economic difficulty. The list
can be changed arbitrarily by the EU, shifting products between the two categories
and thus limiting or extending preferences. Capacity building support would also
involve help in complying with high EU standards, TBTs and SPS.
Fifth, there is an innovative proposal to introduce import subsidies for products
originating from the GSP countries. The idea was first put forward in a paper by
Limão and Olarreaga (2006)23 and discussed again by Michael Gasiorek at the "EU
Trade policy towards developing countries" conference in March 2010 as a potential
option for EU GSP24. This proposal requires careful attention as, in contrast to
strengthening the supply side support, it concentrates on the demand side which as
such has not been receiving support yet in the previous GSP regulations. A large
advantage of import subsidies over unilateral preferences is that they may help
diversify exports into sectors where preferential margins are small due to a low level
of EU tariffs. Preferential access in such sectors does not constitute much of an
incentive for exporters. The proposal also partly addresses the issues raised by the
European importers from Sub-Saharan Africa concerning too much focus of the GSP
scheme on the supply side. However, structure for supply side support is in place
through Aid for Trade scheme and requires only further development of use of this
tool, unlike in the case of import subsidies where an entirely new system must be
developed and cleared for WTO compatibility. This probably makes its
implementation a rather lengthy process.

21 EU GSP Scheme is a key tool for increasing trade of developing countries, especially in the context of
the global economic crisis, Bonapas Onguglo, Senior Economic Affairs Officer, UNCTAD, Presentation
at the EU Trade Policy towards Developing countries conference, Brussels, March 16, 2010.
22 Proposals for EU GSP reform brought up at the conference opening the public consultations (16 March
2010) Mid-Term Evaluation of the EU's Generalized System of Preferences, Michael Gasiorek
23 Limão, Nuno and Marcelo Olarreaga (2006), Trade Preferences to Small Developing Countries and the
Welfare Costs of Lost Multilateral Liberalization, World Bank Economic Review 2006, 20 (2), pp. 217-
240.
24 Proposals for EU GSP reform brought up at the conference opening the public consultations (16 March
2010) Mid-Term Evaluation of the EU's Generalized System of Preferences, Michael Gasiorek

128
Reform of the EU GSP Regime and its Potential Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa

8 Evaluation of the potential impact of changes to GSP eligibility


rules for Sub-Saharan African countries

Limiting the eligibility to GSP treatment was used by the European Commission
during the period of slow economic growth in the 1980s and, as today's conditions
for GSP revision largely resemble those earlier times, one cannot dismiss the
possibility that similar contemporary proposals will not gain enough political support
to pass. To assess the implications for Sub-Saharan African countries of the potential
withdrawal of preferences from the higher-income GSP beneficiaries, such as Brazil,
China, India, Indonesia, Russian Federation, Thailand and Viet Nam,25 a good starting
point is to examine any overlap between the imports structure of the EU from these
countries and from the Sub-Saharan African countries under the general GSP (SSA
GSP group) and EBA (SSA EBA group). Plausibly one might conjecture that the greater
the overlap, the higher the chance that the withdrawal of preferences comparatively
improves the value of the preferential access to the EU market for the two SSA groups.
Knowing that the imports of the EU from the SSA countries are concentrated in
relatively few tariff lines, as a first step the top 20 products imported by the EU from
the two groups of the Sub-Saharan African countries were identified using 6-digit
tariff lines classified according to the Harmonised System 2002. In total these top 20
exports amount to 67.07% of the total imports of the EU from the group of 15 SSA
countries under GSP and to 81.44% in the case of SSA countries under EBA. It comes
as no surprise that exports of the EBA group, being the least developed countries, are
less diversified than for the SSA GSP group. In both cases however the analyzed top
20 products cover a large fraction of their exports to the EU. Table 1 below summaries
the overlap of the Sub-Saharan African countries exports to the EU as compared with
top 100 products exported to the EU by the high-income developing countries at risk
of losing the GSP preferential access. These 100 products account for a little more
than 50% of their total exports to the EU.
The overlap between top exports products is classified in four categories (Table 1):
overlap between the top 20 exported products by Sub-Saharan Africa and the top 20
exported products by the high income developing countries is shaded "black", overlap
between top 20 African exported products and the top 20-100 export products of the
high income GSP beneficiaries is shaded "dark gray" and any overlap between the top
20 African export products to the EU and any product exported under the GSP by the
high income beneficiaries outside the top 100 is shaded "light gray". "White" (no
shading) refers to no overlap at all or the fact that the given tariff line is not covered
by the GSP regulation at all. As it can be observed from Table 1 most of the top 20
products from SSA GSP and SSA EBA groups would be affected in one way on another
by the withdrawal of preferences from GSP high income beneficiaries.
The direct overlap at the level of top 20 products imported by the EU from Sub-
Saharan African countries and the top 20 or top 100 products imported from the high
income developing countries is approximately 40% of import value for the SSA GSP
group and 58% for the SSA EBA group (Table 2). This is where the largest impact on
improving comparative preferential access under the GSP scheme is to be expected if

25 The list of high income developing countries that might lose the preferences was compiled on the basis
of suppositions found in literature. It is in no way binding or confirmed by the EU.

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

preferences are withdrawn from the high income GSP beneficiaries. However, it must
be noted that oil products account for a high share of this overlap in export structure.
Increasing the competitive position of oil exports does help the current account
balance of African countries but plays no or a limited role in fostering their
manufacturing capabilities. If we exclude oil products, the share of imports with this
highest level of impact is reduced to around 15% for both SSA groups. This is not a
large figure, implying that the Sub-Saharan African exporters don't export the very
goods necessary to gain from the elimination or erosion of any preference margins of
the higher income developing countries that may lose their EU GSP eligibility.
Further potential for the improved access lies in the products exported by high
income developing countries to the EU which are covered by the GSP scheme, but
their import share places them outside the list of top 100 for which the overlap with
the top export products of the SSA exists. This concerns additional 23.45% of EU
imports from the SSA GSP countries and 8.88% of the SSA EBA countries. Only 4%
and 13.86 % of SSA GSP and SSA EBA exports to the EU countries respectively (only
the top 20 products concerned) would not be affected as they are not covered by the
GSP scheme anyway and thus no preferences concerning them can be withdrawn.
Table 2 summarises these findings.
In order to compare the value of imports from SSA countries with the respective
value of imports from those countries that might lose their GSP preferences we
calculated a ratio of EU imports from high income GSP beneficiaries to the value of
imports from the given SSA countries group (imports value calculated as a sum over
2005-2008). The results are reported in columns 6 and 12 of Table 1. The higher the
ratio the smaller the fraction of the EU's imports from the SSA as compared to imports
of the same product from the high income developing countries and thus the higher
the potential for gain from the discussed preference withdrawal. If preferences are
withdrawn from its current high income beneficiaries, the potential for improvement
of relative preferential status would concern a higher value of exports competing
directly with the SSA EBA groups' exports than with exports of the SSA GSP group.
The ratio of overlapping exports value for all products exported to the EU (i.e. all
products but those marked white), is about four times larger for the SSA EBA than for
the SSA GSP group (respective ratios 9.34 and 2.62). Partially, this can be explained
by a broader product coverage under EBA and thus a larger fraction of exports
competes directly with exports of other countries enjoying the GSP same preferences.
This means that EBA group will be by far more influenced by an eventual withdrawal
of preferences from high income GSP beneficiaries than the GSP group, which is in
line with the assumptions of the proposed changes in eligibility rules. Still, given the
paucity of product overlap, the overall impact of any reductions in eligibility of high
income developing countries to the EU GSP regime is not likely to offer many
opportunities for improving the competitiveness of exports of non-oil products from
the Sub-Saharan African countries.

130
Table 1 Top 20 products imported by the EU from Sub-Saharan African countries (under GSP and EBA) and from the high income GSP
beneficiaries and type of overlap between them (HS 2002, 4-digit, based on sum of trade value for the period 2005-2008).
15 Sub-Saharan African countries under general GSP 33 Sub-Saharan African countries under EBA
Ratio of EU
Value of EU Ratio of EU imports
% of Value of EU Value of EU imports from high % of Value of EU
imports from from high income
Product code total EU imports from imports from high income GSP Product code total EU imports from
N high income GSP GSP beneficiaries to
No. (HS 2002 4- imports this group income GSP beneficiaries to (HS 2002 4- imports this group
o. beneficiaries imports from this
digit) from this over 2005- beneficiaries group imports from this digit) from this over 2005-
group 2005-2008 group (imports value,
group 2008 (sum) 2005-2008 (sum) group (imports value, group 2008 (sum)
(sum) sum over 2005-2008)
sum over 2005-2008)

1 H2-270900 24.23% 56489821646 349320138706 6.18 1 H2-270900 43.63% 32195393342 349320138706 0.09
2 H2-710231 9.21% 21476186885 6606987941 0.31 2 H2-760110 6.54% 4823736635 9219455340 0.52
3 H2-271111 5.22% 12166945371 0 - 3 H2-710231 5.32% 3927273909 6606987941 0.59
4 H2-180100 4.02% 9370161243 63654924 0.01 4 H2-890190 3.55% 2617459143 6220549734 0.42
5 H2-270112 3.96% 9227926006 15148183906 1.64 5 H2-090111 3.26% 2403242473 12654786595 0.19
6 H2-842139 3.11% 7247776778 264558479 0.04 6 H2-260111 3.00% 2215022975 18328090630 0.12
7 H2-270119 2.23% 5203955718 7509307245 1.44 7 H2-260600 2.41% 1781389339 837954316 2.13
8 H2-711011 2.02% 4711547493 445901257 0.09 8 H2-240120 1.76% 1296941433 2970232066 0.44
9 H2-710812 1.98% 4628062823 1467115496 0.32 9 H2-740311 1.56% 1150160935 7830942246 0.15
10 H2-720241 1.93% 4498771337 682204415 0.15 10 H2-890120 1.42% 1047592128 2208619871 0.47
11 H2-999999 1.21% 2824884311 34688137669 12.28 11 H2-030613 1.38% 1019356503 3684262478 0.28
12 H2-261690 1.16% 2696281928 1083918670 0.40 12 H2-030410 1.24% 917763315 94954818 9.67
13 H2-160414 1.09% 2547296693 1026905752 0.40 13 H2-180100 1.22% 899206506 63654924 14.13
14 H2-440729 1.06% 2461493059 963037072 0.39 14 H2-170111 0.99% 732554741 1128421557 0.65
15 H2-170111 0.82% 1907802920 1128421557 0.59 15 H2-810520 0.92% 676078249 574052332 1.18
16 H2-060310 0.82% 1903502982 132736057 0.07 16 H2-999999 0.91% 671323363 34688137669 0.02
17 H2-260111 0.80% 1874256511 18328090630 9.78 17 H2-290511 0.62% 457427488 1440473414 0.32
18 H2-080300 0.76% 1779576338 204115946 0.11 18 H2-060310 0.59% 435505809 132736057 3.28
19 H2-080610 0.73% 1704061928 702990868 0.41 19 H2-440349 0.56% 412642702 7069696 58.37
20 H2-711031 0.71% 1662603962 692684467 0.42 20 H2-880240 0.55% 407913229 2767421902 0.15
Total Top 20 67.07% Total Top 20 81.44%

“Black and dark grey” 92397890255 378584617798 4.10 “Black and dark grey” 43312886305 386317667700 8.92

“Light grey” 54681800007 6645904733 0.12 “Light grey” 6551070859 79571835494 12.15

All not “white” 147079690262 385230522531 2.62 All not “white“ 49863957164 465889503194 9.34

x Overlap between top-20 products of the high income countries and any of the SSA countries (under EBA or general GSP)
x Overlap between top 20-100 products of the high income countries and top 20 of the SSA countries (under EBA or general GSP)
x Any overlap but no general GSP preferences on the certain product

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Reform of the EU GSP Regime and its Potential Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa

x Overlap between top 20 products imported by the EU from SSA and products exported from high income developing countries (not top 100)
Table 2 Type of overlap between EU imports from Sub-Saharan African countries under EBA or GSP and the high income GSP beneficiaries at HS

132
6-digit

Overlap type Overlap description The % EU imports from Sub-Saharan African Sub-Saharan African
(colour) Sub-Saharan African countries where countries under GSP countries under EBA
the elimination of preferences for
high income GSP beneficiaries would result in:
% of "black and dark "Black or dark gray": where there is an overlap between strongest increase of the competitive 39.63% 58.70%
gray" products 1) top 20 (black) and top 100 (dark grey) products preference margin (oil products included)
exported to the EU by high income developing countries
covered by GSP and 2) top 20 products exported by
SSA countries under EBA or GSP to the EU
% of "light gray" "Light grey": there is an overlap between 1) products increase of the competitive preference margin 23.45% 8.88%
products exported by high income developing countries to the EU in a less significant way
covered by GSP, which are not in the top 100 export
products and 2) top 20 products exported by SSA
countries under EBA or GSP to the EU
% of "white" "White": top 20 SSA export products to the EU which no impact 3.99% 13.86%
products are not covered by the general GSP (which means high
income developing countries anyway do not enjoy any
preferences or they do not export it at all)
% of "black and "Black or dark gray": see "black or dark gray" products, strongest increase of the competitive 15.40% 15.07%
dark grey" products oil products excluded preference margin (oil products excluded)
minus oil products
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report
Reform of the EU GSP Regime and its Potential Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa

9 Concluding remarks.

Experience from the 1980s shows that when an EU GSP revision coincides with a
pronounced economic downturn or prolonged slow growth, protectionist
considerations can influence the reform of the preferential market access scheme.
This suggests that the forthcoming revision of the EU GSP scheme under essentially
similar economic conditions might bear significant risks for certain developing
countries. Candidates for removal from the EU GSP regime are the higher income
developing countries, rather than the Sub-Saharan African countries. Overall, for the
latter, the EU preferences have been functioning well. Sub-Saharan African countries
attain high utilisation rates and a sustained increase in export value to the EU market,
although these gains are limited to relatively few sectors suggesting little progress
towards export diversification. Sub-Saharan African countries' exports to the EU were,
however, reduced considerably during the recent global economic crisis and restoring
their values to pre-crisis levels will take a while. This is where improved preferences
could help, by their deepening for African countries under a reformed general GSP
and by other means, such as technical assistance, for African countries eligible for
EBA.
Does Sub-Saharan Africa have much to fear from the forthcoming revision of the
EU GSP scheme? There are a large number of proposals being made during the current
revision of the EU GSP regime and care must be taken that the more protectionist in
nature are not adopted. The most likely development--changes in the eligibility
criteria, although motivated by the concentration of preferences on low income
developing countries, would widen the differences in treatment across developing
countries. However, as shown here, the overlap between the exports structure to the
EU of SSA countries and those higher income developing countries likely to lose their
EU GSP preferences is (at the product level) relatively low. Consequently, what higher
income developing countries might lose in terms of preferential access to the EU is
unlikely to be offset by a substantial gain in relative competitiveness and exports
from Sub-Saharan African countries.

References
"EC Agrees on Plan for Automatic Saudi, Libyan Petchem Exports over quota," Platt's
Oilgram News, November 26, 1986.
"EC Suspends Benefits For Korean Exports", Special to The Wall Street Journal,
21.12.1987, The Wall Street Journal.
"Guidelines for the European Community's Schema of Generalized Tariff Preferences
for the Post-1980 Period", Commission Communication to the Council, COM (80)
104 final, March 7, 1980.
"International EU Ministers Meeting Nov. 21 May End Saudi Preferential Trade
Status", Platt's Oilgram News, November 21, 1988.
"Making the GSP fit for the 21st Century", Dr Christopher Stevens, Overseas
Development Institute, Presentation at the Conference on the EU trade policy
towards Developing Countries, Brussels, March 16, 2010.
"Mid-Term Evaluation of the EU's Generalized System of Preferences", Presentation of

133
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA Report

Michael Gasiorek, Conference on the EU trade policy towards Developing


Countries, Brussels, March 16, 2010.
"Opinion of the Committee on External Economic Relations on the Commission
proposal fixing the Community's generalized tariff preferences scheme for 1984",
COM (83) 441 final - Doc 1-635/83.
"Report on the proposals from the Commission of the European Communities to the
Council (Doc-1-450/81) for regulations fixing the Community's scheme of
generalized preferences for the period 1982-1985 and opening the scheme
applicable in 1982", Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, European
Parliament Working Documents, 1981-1982, Document No. 1-641/81, November
11, 1981.
"Report on the proposals from the Commission of the European Communities to the
Council (Doc. 1-635/83 - COM (83) 441 final) for regulations fixing the
Community's generalized system of preferences scheme for 1984", European
Parliament Working Documents 1983-84, Document 1-1007/83, November 14,
1983.
"Review of the European Community's Generalized Tariff Preferences Scheme",
Communication of the Commission to the Council, COM (85)203 final, May 6,
1985.
"The European Communities Scheme of Generalized Preferences", Europe
Information, External Relations, No. 18/79, March 1979.
"The Future Development of the European Community's Generalized Tariff
Preferences", Communication by the Commission to the Council, COM(75) 17
final, February 3, 1975.
Limão, Nuno and Marcelo Olarreaga (2006), "Trade Preferences to Small Developing
Countries and the Welfare Costs of Lost Multilateral Liberalization", World Bank
Economic Review 2006, 20 (2), pp. 217-240.
Osakwe, Patrick, N. (2008), "Sub-Saharan Africa and the global financial crisis", Trade
Negotiations Insights, Volume 7, Number 10, December 2008.
Page, S.A.B. (1981), "The Revival of Protectionism and its Consequences for Europe",
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. XX, No. 1, September 1981.
Presentation of Bonapas Onguglo, Senior Economic Affairs Officer, UNCTAD,
Conference on the EU trade policy towards Developing Countries, Brussels, March
16, 2010.
The opening address of Karel de Gucht, European Commissioner for Trade,
Conference on the EU trade policy towards Developing Countries, Brussels, March
16, 2010.
The statement by Mr Vital Moreira, Chair of the Committee on International Trade
of the European Parliament, Conference on the EU trade policy towards
Developing Countries, Brussels, March 16, 2010.

About the author


Malwina Nowakowska is a member of the Global Trade Alert team at the Swiss
Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research, University of
St. Gallen, Switzerland. She is a doctoral student in the Department of Economics at
the same university.

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Reform of the EU GSP Regime and its Potential Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa

Appendix

Table A.1 EU preference utilisation rates for two groups of Sub-Saharan African countries at HS
section level (2008 and % change 2005-2008).

SSA GSP SSA EBA


2008 % Change 2008 % Change
2005-2008 2005-2008
Animal and animal products 88.6% -7.5% 98.3% 2.9%
Vegetable products 90.7% 5.9% 97.7% 4.6%
Foodstuffs 92.0% 5.2% 88.8% -5.6%
Mineral products 73.8% -4.1% 44.8% -35.8%
Chemical and allied industries 80.5% 25.7% 99.3% 268.1%
Plastics and rubbers 85.8% 0.4% 33.1% 33.2%
Raw hides, skins, leather, furs 87.0% 0.6% 90.6% 6.2%
Wood and wood products 97.1% 1.8% 93.6% -1.6%
Textiles 93.8% -0.3% 96.2% 3.7%
Footwear and headgear 68.5% 0.5% 95.0% 8.4%
Stone and glass 84.3% 0.4% 79.9% -3.5%
Metals 96.9% 8.3% 99.4% 27.2%
Machinery and electrical 91.3% 21.9% 4.8% 56.1%
Transportation 76.6% 14.0% 4.4% -84.6%
Miscellaneous 84.2% 1.8% 44.3% 45.8%
Total 90.3% 7.1% 92.1% 6.8%

135
Section 3
Country-by-Country Reports
ANGOLA

Table 1 Foreign state measures affecting Angola’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Angola’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions
Total number of measures affecting Angola’s 22 21
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Angola’s 5 4
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Angola’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 8 8
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Angola’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 9 9
against Angola’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 19 18
Angola’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 3 3
Angola’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Angola’s 3 3
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 6 6
that harm Angola’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Angola" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
ANGOLA

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA report

Table 2 Angola’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Angola’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions
Total number of Angola’s measures affecting other 2 1
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Angola’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Angola’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 1 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Angola’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 1 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Angola that harm foreign commerical 15 15
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Angola that harm foreign commerical 2 2
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 7 7
implemented by Angola that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Angola" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
ANGOLA

140
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 3 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Angola's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


Argentina 3
India 2
Indonesia 1
Portugal 1
Republic of Korea 1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 1

Table 4 Foreign jurisdictions commerical interests affected by Angola’s state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected Number of measures


Burundi 1
Congo 1
Ethiopia 1
Kenya 1
Rwanda 1

Table 5 Implemented measures that harm Angola’s commercial interests, by typeinterests

Type of measure. Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out / state aid measure 3 17.6%
Tariff measure 3 17.6%
Trade finance 3 17.6%
Export subsidy 2 11.7%
Export taxes or restriction 2 11.7%
Import ban 1 5.8%
Investment measure 1 5.8%
Migration measure 1 5.8%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 1 5.8%
Total 17 100.0%

Table 6 Angola's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure. Number of measures As percentage of measures


ANGOLA

Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure 1 100.0%


Total 1 100.0%

141
Benin

Table 7 Foreign state measures affecting Benin’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Benin’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Benin’s 15 13
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Benin’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Benin’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 5 4
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Benin’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 6 6
against Benin’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 12 11
Benin’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 3 2
Benin’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Benin’s 3 2
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 4 4
that harm Benin’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Benin" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
BENIN
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 8 Benin’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Benin’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Benin’s measures affecting other 1 1
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Benin’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Benin’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 1 1
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Benin’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Benin that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Benin that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Benin that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Benin" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
BENIN

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA report

Table 9 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Benin’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


India 3
Argentina 1
France 1
Indonesia 1

Table 10 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Benin's state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 11 Implemented measures that harm Benin’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out / state aid measure 2 25.0%
Export subsidy 2 25.0%
Trade finance 2 25.0%
Export taxes or restriction 1 12.5%
Non tariff barrier not otherwise specified 1 12.5%
Total 8 100.0%

Table 12 Benin's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


BENIN

144
Botswana

Table 13 Foreign state measures affecting Botswana’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Botswana’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Botswana’s 17 16
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Botswana’s 6 5
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Botswana’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 5 5
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Botswana’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 6 6
against Botswana’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 14 13
Botswana’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 3 3
Botswana’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Botswana’s 2 2
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 5 5
that harm Botswana’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Botswana" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
BOTSWANA

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA report

Table 14 Botswana’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Botswana’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Botswana’s measures affecting other 2 2
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Botswana’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Botswana’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 1 1
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Botswana’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 1 1
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Botswana that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Botswana that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Botswana that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Botswana" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
BOTSWANA

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Country-by-Country Reports

Table 15 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Botswana’s commercial


interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


Indonesia 2
China 1
India 1
Nigeria 1
United States of America 1

Table 16 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Botswana's state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 17 Implemented measures that harm Botswana’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out / state aid measure 2 20.0%
Export subsidy 2 20.0%
Export taxes or restriction 2 20.0%
Local content requirement 1 10.0%
Public procurement 1 10.0%
Tariff measure 1 10.0%
Trade finance 1 10.0%
Total 10 100.0%

Table 18 Botswana's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type
BOTSWANA

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Local content requirement 1 50.0%
Public procurement 1 50.0%
Total 2 100.0%

147
Burkino Faso

Table 19 Foreign state measures affecting Burkino Faso’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Burkino Faso’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Burkino Faso’s 12 11
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Burkino Faso’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Burkino Faso’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 3 3
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Burkino Faso’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 5 5
against Burkino Faso’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 11 10
Burkino Faso’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 1 1
Burkino Faso’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Burkino Faso’s 1 1
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 5 5
that harm Burkino Faso’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
BURKINO FASO

"Burkino Faso" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 20 Burkino Faso’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Burkino Faso’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Burkino Faso’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Burkino Faso’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Burkino Faso’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Burkino Faso’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Burkino Faso that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Burkino Faso that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Burkino Faso that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
BURKINO FASO
"Burkino Faso" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Table 21 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Bukrino Faso’s commercial


interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


Argentina 1
Belgium 1
France 1
India 1

Table 22 Foreign jurisdiction’s commercial interests affected by Burkino Faso’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 23 Implemented measures that harm Burkino Faso’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out/state aid measure 3 42.8%
Non tariff barrier (not elsewhere specified) 2 28.5%
Export subsidy 1 14.2%
Trade finance 1 14.2%
Total 7 100%

Table 24 Burkino Faso’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


BURKINO FASO

150
Cameroon

Table 25 Foreign state measures affecting Cameroon’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Cameroon’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Cameroon’s 20 19
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Cameroon’s 8 7
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Cameroon’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 6 6
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Cameroon’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 6 6
against Cameroon’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 16 15
Cameroon’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 4 4
Cameroon’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Cameroon’s 3 3
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 6 6
that harm Cameroon’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Cameroon" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
CAMEROON

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Table 26 Cameroon’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Cameroon’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Cameroon’s measures affecting other 2 2
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Cameroon’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 1 1
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Cameroon’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Cameroon’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 1 1
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Cameroon that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Cameroon that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Cameroon that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Cameroon" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
CAMEROON

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

152
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 27 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Cameroon’s commercial


interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


Argentina 1
Belgium 1
France 1
Indonesia 1
Republic of Korea 1
Russian Federation 1

Table 28 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Cameroon's state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 29 Implemented measures that harm Cameroon’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out/state aid measure 4 44.4%
Tariff measure 2 22.2%
Export subsidy 1 11.1%
Export taxes or restriction 1 11.1%
Trade finance 1 11.1%
Total 9 100%

Table 30 Cameroon's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type
CAMEROON

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out/state aid measure 1 100%
Total 1 100%

153
Cape Verde

Table 31 Foreign state measures affecting Cape Verde’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Cape Verde’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Cape Verde’s 13 12
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Cape Verde’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Cape Verde’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 5 5
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Cape Verde’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 4 4
against Cape Verde’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 12 11
Cape Verde’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 1 1
Cape Verde’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Cape Verde’s 1 1
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 3 3
that harm Cape Verde’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Cape Verde" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
CAPE VERDE

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 32 Cape Verde’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Cape Verde’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Cape Verde’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Cape Verde’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Cape Verde’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Cape Verde’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Cape Verde that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Cape Verde that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Cape Verde that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Cape Verde" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
CAPE VERDE

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Table 33 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Cape Verde’s commercial


interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


Indonesia 2
China 1
Portugal 1

Table 34 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Cape Verde’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 35 Implemented measures that harm Cape Verde’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out/state aid measure 2 25.0%
Export taxes or restriction 2 25.0%
Export subsidy 1 12.5%
Migration measure 1 12.5%
Tariff measure 1 12.5%
Trade finance 1 12.5%
Total 8 100.0%

Table 36 Cape Verde’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


CAPE VERDE

156
Central African Republic

Table 37 Foreign state measures affecting Central African Republic’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Central African Republic’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Central African Republic’s 8 7
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Central African Republic’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Central African Republic’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 3 3
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Central African Republic’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC


implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 1 1
against Central African Republic’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 7 6
Central African Republic’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 1 1
Central African Republic’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Central African Republic’s 1 1
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 1 1
that harm Central African Republic’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Central African Republic" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Table 38 Central African Republic’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial
interests

Summary statistic of Central African Republic’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Central African Republic’s measures affecting 0 0
other jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Central African Republic’s measures found
to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests [1]
Total number of Central African Republic’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Total number of Central African Republic’s measures that 0 0


have been implemented and which almost certainly
discriminate against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Central African Republic that harm foreign 0 0
commerical interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Central African Republic that harm foreign 0 0
commerical interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Central African Republic that harm foreign
commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Central African Republic" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

158
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 39 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Central African Republic's


commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


Indonesia 1

Table 40 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Central African Republic’s state
measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 41 Implemented measures that harm Central African Republic’s commercial interests, by
type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export subsidy 1 33.3%
Tariff measure 1 33.3%

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC


Trade finance 1 33.3%
Total 3 100%

Table 42 Central African Republic’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial
interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

159
Chad

Table 43 Foreign state measures affecting Chad’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Chad’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Chad’s 9 8
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Chad’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Chad’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 4 4
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Chad’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 1 1
against Chad’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 7 6
Chad’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 2 2
Chad’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Chad’s 2 2
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 1 1
that harm Chad’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Chad" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
CHAD
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 44 Chad’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Chad’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Chad’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Chad’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Chad’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Chad’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Chad that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Chad that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Chad that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Chad" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
CHAD

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Table 5 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Chad’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


Argentina 1

Table 46 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Chad’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 47 Implemented measures that harm Chad’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out/state aid measure 1 33.3%
Export subsidy 1 33.3%
Trade finance 1 33.3%
Total 3 100.0%

Table 48 Chad’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


CHAD

162
Comoros

Table 49 Foreign state measures affecting Comoros’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Comoros’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Comoros’s 8 8
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Comoros’s 3 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Comoros’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 3 3
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Comoros’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 2 2
against Comoros’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 7 7
Comoros’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 1 1
Comoros’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Comoros’s 1 1
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 2 2
that harm Comoros’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Comoros" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
COMOROS

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Table 50 Comoros’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Comoros’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Comoros’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Comoros’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Comoros’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Comoros’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Comoros that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Comoros that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Comoros that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Comoros" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
COMOROS

164
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 51 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Comoros’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


Algeria 1
Argentina 1

Table 52 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Comoros’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 53 Implemented measures that harm Comoros’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out/state aid measure 1 25.0%
Export subsidy 1 25.0%
Investment measure 1 25.0%
Trade finance 1 25.0%
Total 4 100.0%

Table 54 Comoros’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


COMOROS

165
Congo

Table 55 Foreign state measures affecting Congo’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Congo’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Congo’s 20 19
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Congo’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Congo’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 7 7
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Congo’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 9 9
against Congo’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 17 16
Congo’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 3 3
Congo’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Congo’s 3 3
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 8 8
that harm Congo’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Congo" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
CONGO
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 56 Congo’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of v state measures All measures All measures except


affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Congo’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Congo’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Congo’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Congo’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Congo that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Congo that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Congo that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Congo" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
CONGO

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Table 57 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Congo’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


India 2
Angola 1
Argentina 1
Belgium 1
Republic of Korea 1

Table 58 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Congo’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 59 Implemented measures that harm Congo’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out/state aid measure 3 23.0%
Export subsidy 2 15.4%
Export taxes or restrictions 2 15.4%
Tariff measure 2 15.4%
Trade finance 2 15.4%
Investment measure 1 7.7%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary measure 1 7.7%
Total 13 100%

Table 60 Congo’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


CONGO

168
Democratic Republic of The Congo

Table 61 Foreign state measures affecting Democratic Republic of The Congo’s commercial
interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Democratic Rep. of The Congo’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO


Total number of measures affecting Democratic Rep. of The Congo’s 15 14
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Democratic Rep. of 4 3
The Congo’s commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Democratic Rep. of The Congo’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 7 7
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Democratic Rep. of The Congo’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 4 4
against Democratic Rep. of The Congo’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 11 10
Democratic Rep. of The Congo’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 4 4
Democratic Rep. of The Congo’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Democratic Rep. of 4 4
The Congo’s foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 3 3
that harm Democratic Rep. of The Congo’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Democratic Republic of The Congo" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Table 62 Democratic Republic of The Congo’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions'
commercial interests

Summary statistic of Democratic Rep. of The Congo’s state All measures All measures except
measures affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Total number of Democratic Rep. of The Congo’s measures 0 0


affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Democratic Rep. of The Congo’s measures
found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of 0 0
other jurisdictions’ commercial interests [1]
Total number of Democratic Rep. of The Congo’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Democratic Rep. of The Congo’s measures
that have been implemented and which almost certainly 0 0
discriminate against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Democratic Rep. of The Congo that harm foreign 0 0
commerical interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Democratic Rep. of The Congo that harm foreign 0 0
commerical interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Democratic Rep. of The Congo that harm foreign
commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Democratic Republic of The Congo" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

170
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 63 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Democratic Republic of The


Congo’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


Argentina 2
Belgium 1
Russian Federation 1

Table 64 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Democratic Republic of The


Congo’s state measures

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO


No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 65 Implemented measures that harm Democratic Republic of The Congo’s commercial
interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out/state aid measure 3 42.8%
Export subsidy 1 14.3%
Export taxes or restriction 1 14.3%
Public procurement 1 14.3%
Trade finance 1 14.3%
Total 7 100.0%

Table 66 Democratic Republic of The Congo’s implemented measures that harm foreign
commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

171
Cote d’Ivoire

Table 67 Foreign state measures affecting Cote d’Ivoire commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Cote d’Ivoire’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Cote d’Ivoire’s 36 34
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Cote d’Ivoire’s 5 4
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Cote d’Ivoire’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 9 8
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Cote d’Ivoire’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 22 22
against Cote d’Ivoire’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 31 30
Cote d’Ivoire’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 5 4
Cote d’Ivoire’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Cote d’Ivoire’s 5 4
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 39 39
that harm Cote d’Ivoire’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
COTE D’IVOIRE

"Cote d’Ivoire" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 68 Cote d’Ivoire’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Cote d’Ivoire’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Cote d’Ivoire’s measures affecting other 1 1
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Cote d’Ivoire’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 1 1
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Cote d’Ivoire’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Cote d’Ivoire’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Cote d’Ivoire that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Cote d’Ivoire that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Cote d’Ivoire that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Cote d’Ivoire" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".
COTE D’IVOIRE

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Table 69 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Cote d’Ivoire’s commercial


interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


France 4
Indonesia 4
India 3
Spain 3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 3
Austria 2
Belgium 2
Bulgaria 2
Cyprus 2
Czech Republic 2
Denmark 2
Egypt 2
Estonia 2
European Communities 2
Finland 2
Germany 2
Greece 2
Hungary 2
Ireland 2
Italy 2
Latvia 2
Lithuania 2
Luxembourg 2
Malta 2
Netherlands 2
Poland 2
Portugal 2
Romania 2
Russian Federation 2
Slovakia 2
Slovenia 2
Sweden 2
Argentina 1
China 1
COTE D’IVOIRE

Japan 1
Malaysia 1
Switzerland 1
Thailand 1
United States of America 1

174
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 70 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Cote d’Ivoire’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 71 Implemented measures that harm Cote d’Ivoire’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out / state aid measure 9 30.0%
Export subsidy 8 26.7%
Export taxes or restriction 5 16.7%
Trade finance 2 6.8%
Consumption subsidy 1 3.3%
Import subsidy 1 3.3%
Local content requirement 1 3.3%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 1 3.3%
Public procurement 1 3.3%
State-controlled company 1 3.3%
Total 30 100.0%

Table 72 Cote d’Ivoire’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

COTE D’IVOIRE

175
Eritrea

Table 73 Foreign state measures affecting Eritrea’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Eritrea’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Eritrea’s 8 8
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Eritrea’s 3 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Eritrea’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 3 3
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Eritrea’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 2 2
against Eritrea’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 7 7
Eritrea’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 1 1
Eritrea’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Eritrea’s 1 1
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 2 2
that harm Eritrea’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Eritrea" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
ERITREA
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 74 Eritrea state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Eritrea’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Eritrea’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Eritrea’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Eritrea’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Eritrea’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Eritrea that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Eritrea that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Eritrea that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Eritrea" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
ERITREA

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Table 75 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Eritrea’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


Algeria 1
Egypt 1

Table 76 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Eritrea’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 77 Implemented measures that harm Eritrea’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export subsidy 1 25.0%
Export taxes or restriction 1 25.0%
Investment measure 1 25.0%
Trade finance 1 25.0%
Total 4 100.0%

Table 78 Eritrea’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


ERITREA

178
Ethiopia

Table 79 Foreign state measures affecting Ethiopia’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Ethiopia’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Ethiopia’s 33 33
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Ethiopia’s 5 5
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Ethiopia’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 7 7
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Ethiopia’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 21 21
against Ethiopia’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 30 30
Ethiopia’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 3 3
Ethiopia’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Ethiopia’s 3 3
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 40 40
that harm Ethiopia’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Ethiopia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
ETHIOPIA

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Table 80 Ethiopia’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Ethiopia’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Ethiopia’s measures affecting other 1 1
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Ethiopia’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Ethiopia’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Ethiopia’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 1 1
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Ethiopia that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Ethiopia that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Ethiopia that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Ethiopia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
ETHIOPIA

180
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 81 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Ethiopia’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


France 3
India 3
Indonesia 3
Belgium 2
China 2
Germany 2
Switzerland 2
Angola 1
Austria 1
Bulgaria 1
Cyprus 1
Czech Republic 1
Denmark 1
Egypt 1
Estonia 1
European Communities 1
Finland 1
Greece 1
Hungary 1
Ireland 1
Italy 1
Kenya 1
Latvia 1
Lithuania 1
Luxembourg 1
Malaysia 1
Malta 1
Netherlands 1
Poland 1
Portugal 1
Republic of Korea 1
Romania 1
Russian Federation 1
Slovakia 1
Slovenia 1
Spain 1
Sweden 1
Thailand 1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 1
United States of America 1
ETHIOPIA

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Table 82 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Ethiopia’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 83 Implemented measures that harm Ethiopia’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out / state aid measure 10 33.3%
Export subsidy 6 20.0%
Export taxes or restriction 5 16.7%
Local content requirement 2 6.7%
Tariff measure 2 6.7%
Trade finance 2 6.7%
Import subsidy 1 3.3%
Public procurement 1 3.3%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure 1 3.3%
Total 30 100.0%

Table 84 Ethiopia's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Competitive devaluation 1 100.0%
Total 1 100.0%
ETHIOPIA

182
Gabon

Table 85 Foreign state measures affecting Gabon’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Gabon’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Gabon’s 13 12
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Gabon’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Gabon’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 5 5
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Gabon’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 4 4
against Gabon’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 11 10
Gabon’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 2 2
Gabon’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Gabon’s 2 2
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 3 3
that harm Gabon’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Gabon" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
GABON

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Table 86 Gabon’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Gabon’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Gabon’s measures affecting other 1 1
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Gabon’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Gabon’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Gabon’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 1 1
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Gabon that harm foreign commerical 1 1
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Gabon that harm foreign commerical 1 1
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Gabon that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Gabon" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
GABON

184
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 87 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Gabon’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


India 2
Argentina 1
Indonesia 1

Table 88 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Gabon’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 89 Implemented measures that harm Gabon’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export subsidy 2 28.55%
Trade finance 2 28.55%
Bail out/state aid measure 1 14.3%
Export taxes or restriction 1 14.3%
Investment measure 1 14.3%
Total 7 100.0%

Table 90 Gabon's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export taxes or restriction 1 100.0%
Total 1 100.0%
GABON

185
Gambia

Table 91 Foreign state measures affecting Gambia’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Gambia’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Gambia’s 14 13
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Gambia’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Gambia’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 3 3
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Gambia’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 7 7
against Gambia’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 13 12
Gambia’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 1 1
Gambia’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Gambia’s 1 1
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 5 5
that harm Gambia’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Gambia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
GAMBIA
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 92 Gambia’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Gambia’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Gambia’s measures affecting other 1 1
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Gambia’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Gambia’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 1 1
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Gambia’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Gambia that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Gambia that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Gambia that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Gambia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
GAMBIA

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Table 93 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Gambia’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


India 2
Indonesia 2
Argentina 1
Egypt 1
Russian Federation 1

Table 94 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Gambia’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 95 Implemented measures that harm Gambia’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export taxes or restriction 3 37.5%
Export subsidy 2 25.0%
Trade finance 2 25.0%
Bail out/state aid measure 1 12.5%
Total 8 100.0%

Table 96 Gambia’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


GAMBIA

188
Ghana

Table 97 Foreign state measures affecting Ghana’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Ghana’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Ghana’s 36 34
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Ghana’s 7 6
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Ghana’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 9 8
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Ghana’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 20 20
against Ghana’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 30 29
Ghana’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 6 5
Ghana’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Ghana’s 5 4
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 38 38
that harm Ghana’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Ghana" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
GHANA

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Table 98 Ghana’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Ghana’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Ghana’s measures affecting other 3 3
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Ghana’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 1 1
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Ghana’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 1 1
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Ghana’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 1 1
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Ghana that harm foreign commerical 11 11
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Ghana that harm foreign commerical 4 4
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 22 22
implemented by Ghana that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Ghana" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
GHANA

190
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 99 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Ghana’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


Indonesia 4
India 3
Belgium 2
Egypt 2
France 2
Italy 2
Spain 2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 2
Argentina 1
Austria 1
Bulgaria 1
Cyprus 1
Czech Republic 1
Denmark 1
Estonia 1
European Communities 1
Finland 1
Germany 1
Greece 1
Hungary 1
Ireland 1
Japan 1
Latvia 1
Lithuania 1
Luxembourg 1
Malaysia 1
Malta 1
Netherlands 1
Poland 1
Portugal 1
Republic of Korea 1
Romania 1
Russian Federation 1
Slovakia 1
Slovenia 1
Sweden 1
Thailand 1
United States of America 1
GHANA

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Table 100 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Ghana's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected Number of measures


Argentina 1
Belgium 1
Canada 1
China 1
Egypt 1
France 1
Germany 1
Hong Kong 1
India 1
Indonesia 1
Japan 1
Malaysia 1
Netherlands 1
Pakistan 1
Singapore 1
Switzerland 1
Thailand 1
Togo 1
Turkey 1
United States of America 1
Uruguay 1
Viet Nam 1

Table 101 Implemented measures that harm Ghana’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out / state aid measure 10 38.5%
Export taxes or restriction 5 19.2%
Export subsidy 3 11.5%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 2 7.7%
Public procurement 2 7.7%
Trade finance 2 7.7%
Import subsidy 1 3.8%
Local content requirement 1 3.8%
Total 26 100.0%

Table 102 Ghana's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type
GHANA

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Tariff measure 1 100.0%
Total 1 100.0%

192
Guinea

Table 103 Foreign state measures affecting Guinea’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Guinea’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Guinea’s 20 19
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Guinea’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Guinea’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 5 5
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Guinea’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 11 11
against Guinea’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 18 17
Guinea’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 2 2
Guinea’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Guinea’s 2 2
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 8 8
that harm Guinea’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Guinea" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
GUINEA

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Table 104 Guinea’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Guinea’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Guinea’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Guinea’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Guinea’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Guinea’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Guinea that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Guinea that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Guinea that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Guinea" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
GUINEA

194
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 105 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Guinea’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


India 2
Indonesia 2
Republic of Korea 2
Argentina 1
Belgium 1
China 1
Egypt 1
Russian Federation 1

Table 106 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Guinea’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 107 Implemented measures that harm Guinea’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export taxes or restriction 4 28.6%
Tariff measure 3 21.4%
Bail out/state aid measure 2 14.3%
Export subsidy 2 14.3%
Trade finance 2 14.3%
Public procurement 1 7.1%
Total 14 100.0

Table 108 Guinea’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


GUINEA

195
Guinea-Bissau

Table 109 Foreign state measures affecting Guinea-Bissau’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Guinea-Bissau’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Guinea-Bissau’s 13 12
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Guinea-Bissau’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Guinea-Bissau’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 4 4
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Guinea-Bissau’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 5 5
against Guinea-Bissau’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 12 11
Guinea-Bissau’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 1 1
Guinea-Bissau’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Guinea-Bissau’ 1 1
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 5 5
that harm Guinea-Bissau’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
GUINEA-BISSAU

Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Guinea-Bissau" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 110 Guinea-Bissau’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Guinea-Bissau’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Guinea-Bissau’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Guinea-Bissau’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Guinea-Bissau’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Guinea-Bissau’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Guinea-Bissau that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Guinea-Bissau that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Guinea-Bissau that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
GUINEA-BISSAU
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Guinea-Bissau" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Table 111 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Guinea-Bissau’s commercial


interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


Argentina 1
Egypt 1
Indonesia 1
Portugal 1
Republic of Korea 1

Table 112 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Guinea-Bissau’s state


measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 113 Implemented measures that harm Guinea-Bissau’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export taxes or restriction 2 20.0%
Tariff measure 2 20.0%
Bail out/state aid measure 1 10.0%
Export subsidy 1 10.0%
Import ban 1 10.0%
Migration measure 1 10.0%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 1 10.0%
Trade finance 1 10.0%
Total 10 100.0%

Table 114 Guinea-Bissau’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by
type
GUINEA-BISSAU

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

198
Kenya

Table 115 Foreign state measures affecting Kenya’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Keyna’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Keyna’s 48 47
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Keyna’s 9 8
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Keyna’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 9 9
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Keyna’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 30 30
against Keyna’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 44 43
Keyna’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 4 4
Keyna’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Keyna’s 4 4
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 42 42
that harm Keyna’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Keyna" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
KEYNA

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Table 116 Kenya’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Kenya’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Kenya’s measures affecting other 6 6
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Kenya’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 1 1
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Kenya’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 4 4
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Kenya’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 1 1
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Kenya that harm foreign commerical 3 3
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Kenya that harm foreign commerical 2 2
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 3 3
implemented by Kenya that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Keyna" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
KENYA

200
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 117 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Kenya’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


France 5
Indonesia 5
Belgium 3
Egypt 3
India 3
Russian Federation 3
Spain 3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 3
Austria 2
Bulgaria 2
Cyprus 2
Czech Republic 2
Denmark 2
Estonia 2
European Communities 2
Finland 2
Germany 2
Greece 2
Hungary 2
Ireland 2
Italy 2
Latvia 2
Lithuania 2
Luxembourg 2
Malta 2
Netherlands 2
Poland 2
Portugal 2
Romania 2
Slovakia 2
Slovenia 2
Sweden 2
United States of America 2
Angola 1
Belarus 1
China 1
Japan 1
Malaysia 1
Republic of Korea 1
Switzerland 1
Thailand 1
Uganda 1
KENYA

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Table 118 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Kenya's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected Number of measures.


Ethiopia 1
India 1
United Republic of Tanzania 1

Table 119 Implemented measures that harm Kenya’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out / state aid measure 9 22.5%
Export taxes or restriction 9 22.5%
Export subsidy 8 20.0%
Public procurement 3 7.5%
Tariff measure 3 7.5%
Trade finance 2 5.0%
Consumption subsidy 1 2.5%
Import ban 1 2.5%
Import subsidy 1 2.5%
Local content requirement 1 2.5%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 1 2.5%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure 1 2.5%
Total 40 100.0%

Table 120 Kenya's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export taxes or restriction 2 66.66%
Tariff measure 1 33.33%
Total 3 100.0%
KENYA

202
Lesotho

Table 121 Foreign state measures affecting Lesotho’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Lesotho’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Lesotho’s 11 10
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Lesotho’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Lesotho’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 4 4
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Lesotho’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 3 3
against Lesotho’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 9 8
Lesotho’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 2 2
Lesotho’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Lesotho’s 2 2
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 2 2
that harm Lesotho’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Lesotho" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
LESOTHO

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Table 122 Lesotho’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Lesotho’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Lesotho’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Lesotho’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Lesotho’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Lesotho’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Lesotho that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Lesotho that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Lesotho that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"xxxx" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
LESOTHO

204
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 123 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Lesotho’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


India 2
United States of America 1

Table 124 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Lesotho’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 125 Implemented measures that harm Lesotho’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export subsidy 2 33.33%
Trade finance 2 33.33%
Local content requirement 1 16.66%
Public procurement 1 16.66%
Total 6 100.0%

Table 126 Lesotho’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


LESOTHO

205
Liberia

Table 127 Foreign state measures affecting Liberia’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Liberia’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Liberia’s 9 9
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Liberia’s 3 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Liberia’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 3 3
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Liberia’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 3 3
against Liberia’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 8 8
Liberia’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 1 1
Liberia’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Liberia’s 1 1
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 4 4
that harm Liberia’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Liberia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
LIBERIA
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 128 Liberia’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Liberia’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Liberia’s measures affecting other 1 1
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Liberia’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 1 1
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Liberia’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Liberia’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Liberia that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Liberia that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Liberia that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Liberia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
LIBERIA

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Table 129 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Liberia’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


Argentina 1
Belarus 1
China 1
Russian Federation 1

Table 130 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Liberia’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 131 Implemented measures that harm Liberia’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out/state aid measure 1 20.0%
Export subsidy 1 20.0%
Export taxes or restriction 1 20.0%
Tariff measure 1 20.0%
Trade finance 1 20.0%
Total 5 100.0%

Table 132 Liberia’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


LIBERIA

208
Madagascar

Table 133 Foreign state measures affecting Madagascar’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Madagascar’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Madagascar’s 29 28
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Madagascar’s 6 5
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Madagascar’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 8 8
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Madagascar’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 15 15
against Madagascar’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 26 25
Madagascar’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 3 3
Madagascar’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Madagascar’s 3 3
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 34 34
that harm Madagascar’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Madagascar" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".
MADAGASCAR

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Table 134 Madagascar’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Madagascar’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Madagascar’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Madagascar’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Madagascar’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Madagascar’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Madagascar that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Madagascar that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Madagascar that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Madagascar" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".
MADAGASCAR

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

210
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 135 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Madagascar’s commercial


interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


France 3
India 3
Indonesia 3
China 2
Spain 2
Argentina 1
Austria 1
Belgium 1
Bulgaria 1
Cyprus 1
Czech Republic 1
Denmark 1
Estonia 1
European Communities 1
Finland 1
Germany 1
Greece 1
Hungary 1
Ireland 1
Italy 1
Japan 1
Latvia 1
Lithuania 1
Luxembourg 1
Malta 1
Netherlands 1
Poland 1
Portugal 1
Romania 1
Slovakia 1
Slovenia 1
Sweden 1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 1
United States of America 1
MADAGASCAR

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Table 136 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Madagascar’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 137 Implemented measures that harm Madagascar’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out / state aid measure 5 20.8%
Export subsidy 5 20.8%
Export taxes or restriction 4 16.6%
Tariff measure 3 12.5%
Trade finance 2 8.3%
Consumption subsidy 1 4.2%
Local content requirement 1 4.2%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 1 4.2%
Public procurement 1 4.2%
State-controlled company 1 4.2%
Total 24 100.0%

Table 138 Madagascar’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


MADAGASCAR

212
Malawi

Table 139 Foreign state measures affecting Malawi’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Malawi’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Malawi’s 24 23
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Malawi’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Malawi’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 7 7
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Malawi’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 13 13
against Malawi’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 21 20
Malawi’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 3 3
Malawi’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Malawi’s 3 3
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 12 12
that harm Malawi’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Malawi" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
MALAWI

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Table 140 Malawi’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Malawi’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Malawi’s measures affecting other 1 1
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Malawi’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Malawi’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 1 1
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Malawi’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Malawi that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Malawi that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Malawi that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Malawi" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
NALAWI

214
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 141 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Malawi’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


India 3
Indonesia 2
Argentina 1
Belgium 1
China 1
Egypt 1
Russian Federation 1
Spain 1
Thailand 1
United States of America 1

Table 142 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Malawi’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 143 Implemented measures that harm Malawi’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out/state aid measure 4 21.0%
Export taxes or restriction 4 21.0%
Export subsidy 3 15.8%
Public procurement 2 10.5%
Trade finance 2 10.5%
Import subsidy 1 5.3%
Local content requirement 1 5.3%
Non tariff barrier (not elsewhere specified) 1 5.3%
Tariff measure 1 5.3%
Total 19 100.0%

Table 144 Malawi’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type
MALAWI

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

215
Mali

Table 145 Foreign state measures affecting Mali’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Mali’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Mali’s 22 21
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Mali’s 5 4
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Mali’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 3 3
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Mali’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 14 14
against Mali’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 21 20
Mali’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 1 1
Mali’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Mali’s 1 1
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 11 11
that harm Mali’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Mali" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
MALI
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 146 Mali’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Mali’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Mali’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Mali’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Mali’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Mali’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Mali that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Mali that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Mali that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Mali" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
MALI

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Table 147 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Mali’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


India 2
Indonesia 2
Switzerland 2
Argentina 1
Belgium 1
Bolivia 1
China 1
Egypt 1
France 1
Spain 1
United States of America 1

Table 148 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Mali’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 149 Implemented measures that harm Mali’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out / state aid measure 6 30.0%
Export subsidy 4 20.0%
Export taxes or restriction 3 15.0%
Local content requirement 2 10.0%
Trade finance 2 10.0%
Import subsidy 1 5.0%
Public procurement 1 5.0%
Tariff measure 1 5.0%
Total 20 100.0%

Table 150 Mali’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


MALI

218
Mauritania

Table 151 Foreign state measures affecting Mauritania’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Mauritania’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Mauritania’s 18 17
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Mauritania’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Mauritania’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 4 4
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Mauritania’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 10 10
against Mauritania’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 16 15
Mauritania’ss commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 2 2
Mauritania’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Mauritania’s 2 2
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 8 8
that harm Mauritania’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Mauritania" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".
MAURITANIA

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Table 152 Mauritania’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Mauritania’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Mauritania’s measures affecting other 1 1
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Mauritania’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Mauritania’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Mauritania’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 1 1
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Mauritania that harm foreign commerical 1 1
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Mauritania that harm foreign commerical 1 1
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 7 7
implemented by Mauritania that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Mauritania" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".
MAURITANIA

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Country-by-Country Reports

Table 153 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Mauritania’s commercial


interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


India 2
Indonesia 2
Russian Federation 2
Algeria 1
Argentina 1
Belarus 1
China 1
Republic of Korea 1

Table 154 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Mauritania's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected Number of measures


Belgium 1
France 1
Japan 1
Netherlands 1
Senegal 1
Spain 1
United Arab Emirates 1

Table 155 Implemented measures that harm Mauritania’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export taxes or restriction 4 33.3%
Bail out / state aid measure 2 16.7%
Export subsidy 2 16.7%
Trade finance 2 16.7%
Investment measure 1 8.3%
Tariff measure 1 8.3%
Total 12 100.0%
MAURITANIA

Table 156 Mauritania's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 1 100.0%
Total 1 100.0%
Mauritius

Table 157 Foreign state measures affecting Mauritius’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Mauritius’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Mauritius’s 32 31
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Mauritius’s 6 5
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Mauritius’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 10 10
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Mauritius’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 16 16
against Mauritius’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 28 27
Mauritius’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 4 4
Mauritius’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Mauritius’s 4 4
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 12 12
that harm Mauritius’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Mauritius" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
MAURITIUS

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 158 Mauritius’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Mauritius’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Mauritius’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Mauritius’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Mauritius’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Mauritius’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Mauritius that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Mauritius that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Mauritius that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Mauritius" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
MAURITIUS

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Table 159 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Mauritius’s commercial


interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


India 4
Indonesia 2
Argentina 1
Belgium 1
China 1
Egypt 1
France 1
Japan 1
Russian Federation 1
Switzerland 1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 1
United States of America 1

Table 160 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Mauritius’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 161 Implemented measures that harm Mauritius’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out / state aid measure 5 20.8%
Export taxes or restriction 5 20.8%
Export subsidy 4 16.7%
Tariff measure 3 12.6%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 2 8.4%
Trade finance 2 8.4%
Local content requirement 1 4.1%
Public procurement 1 4.1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas) 1 4.1%
Total 24 100.0%
MAURITIUS

Table 162 Mauritius’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

224
Mayotte

Table 163 Foreign state measures affecting Mayotte’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Mayotte’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Mayotte’s 6 6
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Mayotte’s 3 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Mayotte’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 2 2
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Mayotte’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 1 1
against Mayotte’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 6 6
Mayotte’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 0 0
Mayotte’ss commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Mayotte’s 0 0
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 1 1
that harm Mayotte’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Mayotte" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
MAYOTTE

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Table 164 Mayotte’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Mayotte’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Mayotte’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Mayotte’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Mayotte’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Mayotte’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Mayotte that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Mayotte that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Mayotte that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"xxxx" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
MAYOTTE

226
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 165 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Mayotte’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


Egypt 1

Table 166 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Mayotte’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 167 Implemented measures that harm Mayotte’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export subsidy 1 25.0%
Export taxes or restriction 1 25.0%
Import subsidy 1 25.0%
Trade finance 1 25.0%
Total 4 100.0%

Table 168 Mayotte’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


MAYOTTE

227
Mozambique

Table 169 Foreign state measures affecting Mozambique’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Mozambique’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Mozambique’s 26 25
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Mozambique’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Mozambique’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 9 9
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Mozambique’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 13 13
against Mozambique’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 20 19
Mozambique’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 6 6
Mozambique’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Mozambique’s 6 6
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 9 9
that harm Mozambique’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Mozambique" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".
MOZAMBIQUE

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 170 Mozambique’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Mozambique’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Mozambique’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Mozambique’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Mozambique’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Mozambique’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Mozambique that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Mozambique that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Mozambique that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Mozambique" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".
MOZAMBIQUE

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Table 171 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Mozambique’s commercial


interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


India 3
Indonesia 3
Argentina 1
China 1
Egypt 1
Japan 1
Russian Federation 1
Zambia 1
Zimbabwe 1

Table 172 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Mozambique’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 173 Implemented measures that harm Mozambique’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export taxes or restriction 4 23.6%
Export subsidy 3 17.7%
Bail out / state aid measure 2 11.7%
Tariff measure 2 11.7%
Trade finance 2 11.7%
Import subsidy 1 5.9%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 1 5.9%
Public procurement 1 5.9%
Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measure 1 5.9%
Total 17 100.0%
MOZAMBIQUE

Table 174 Mozambique’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by
type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

230
Namibia

Table x175 Foreign state measures affecting Namibia’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Namibia’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Namibia’s 27 26
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Namibia’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Namibia’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 7 7
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Namibia’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 16 16
against Namibia’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 24 23
Namibia’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 3 3
Namibia’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Namibia’s 3 3
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 13 13
that harm Namibia’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Namibia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
NAMIBIA

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Table 176 Namibia’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Namibia’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Namibia’s measures affecting other xx
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Namibia’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ xx
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Namibia’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented xx
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Namibia’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate xx
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Namibia that harm foreign commerical xx
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Namibia that harm foreign commerical x
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures x
implemented by Namibia that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Namibia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
NAMIBIA

232
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 177 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Namibia’s commercial


interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


Indonesia 4
Russian Federation 2
Switzerland 2
Argentina 1
China 1
Egypt 1
France 1
Japan 1
Malaysia 1
Republic of Korea 1
Spain 1
Thailand 1
United States of America 1

Table 178 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Namibia’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 179 Implemented measures that harm Namibia’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out / state aid measure 7 29.2%
Export taxes or restriction 4 16.7%
Export subsidy 3 12.5%
Tariff measure 3 12.5%
Local content requirement 2 8.4%
Public procurement 2 8.4%
Import subsidy 1 4.1%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 1 4.1%
Trade finance 1 4.1%
Total 24 100.0%
NAMIBIA

Table 180 Namibia's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Tariff measure 1 100.0%
Total 1 100.0%

233
Niger

Table 181 Foreign state measures affecting Niger’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Niger’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Niger’s 19 18
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Niger’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Niger’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 5 5
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Niger’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 10 10
against Niger’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 17 16
Niger’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 2 2
Niger’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Niger’s 2 2
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 34 34
that harm Niger’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Niger" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
NIGER
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 182 Niger’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Niger’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Niger’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Niger’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Niger’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Niger’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Niger that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Niger that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Niger that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Niger" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
NIGER

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Table 183 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Niger’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


India 3
Indonesia 2
Argentina 1
Austria 1
Belgium 1
Bulgaria 1
China 1
Cyprus 1
Czech Republic 1
Denmark 1
Estonia 1
European Communities 1
Finland 1
France 1
Germany 1
Greece 1
Hungary 1
Ireland 1
Italy 1
Latvia 1
Lithuania 1
Luxembourg 1
Malta 1
Netherlands 1
Poland 1
Portugal 1
Romania 1
Russian Federation 1
Slovakia 1
Slovenia 1
Spain 1
Sweden 1
Switzerland 1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 1

Table 184 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Niger’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


NIGER

236
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 185 Implemented measures that harm Niger’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export subsidy 5 35.7%
Bail out/state aid measure 3 21.4%
Export taxes or restriction 3 21.4%
Trade finance 2 14.3%
Public procurement 1 7.2%
Total 14 100.0%

Table 186 Niger’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

NIGER

237
Nigeria

Table 187 Foreign state measures affecting Nigeria’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Nigeria’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Nigeria’s 39 36
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Nigeria’s 7 6
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Nigeria’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 11 9
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Nigeria’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 21 21
against Nigeria’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 32 31
Nigeria’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 7 5
Nigeria’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Nigeria’s 6 4
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 40 40
that harm Nigeria’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Nigeria" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
NIGERIA
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 188 Nigeria’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Nigeria’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Nigeria’s measures affecting other 14 14
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Nigeria’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 2 2
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Nigeria’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 2 2
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Nigeria’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 10 10
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Nigeria that harm foreign commerical 7 7
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Nigeria that harm foreign commerical 5 5
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 29 29
implemented by Nigeria that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Nigeria" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
NIGERIA

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Table 189 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Nigeria’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


Indonesia 4
India 3
Argentina 2
Germany 2
Ireland 2
Republic of Korea 2
Russian Federation 2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 2
Austria 1
Belarus 1
Belgium 1
Bolivia 1
Bulgaria 1
China 1
Cyprus 1
Czech Republic 1
Denmark 1
Egypt 1
Estonia 1
European Communities 1
Finland 1
France 1
Greece 1
Hungary 1
Italy 1
Japan 1
Latvia 1
Lithuania 1
Luxembourg 1
Malaysia 1
Malta 1
Netherlands 1
Poland 1
Portugal 1
Romania 1
Slovakia 1
Slovenia 1
Spain 1
Sweden 1
Thailand 1
NIGERIA

240
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 191 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Nigeria's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected Number of measures.


Belgium 3
Brazil 3
France 3
Germany 3
United States of America 3
China 2
India 2
Israel 2
Japan 2
Netherlands 2
Republic of Korea 2
South Africa 2
Spain 2
United Arab Emirates 2
Albania 1
Algeria 1
Antigua and Barbuda 1
Australia 1
Austria 1
Barbados 1
Belize 1
Botswana 1
Egypt 1
Italy 1
Russian Federation 1
Swaziland 1
Turkey 1
Ukraine 1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 1

Table 192 Implemented measures that harm Nigeria’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out / state aid measure 9 33.3%
Export taxes or restriction 6 22.2%
Export subsidy 4 14.9%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 2 7.4%
Tariff measure 2 7.4%
Trade finance 2 7.4%
NIGERIA

Investment measure 1 3.7%


Migration measure 1 3.7%
Total 27 100.0%

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Table 192 Nigeria's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out/state aid measure 3 20.0%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 3 20.0%
Tariff measure 3 20.0%
Import ban 2 13.3%
Local content requirement 2 13.3%
Competitive devaluation 1 6.7%
Public procurement 1 6.7%
Total 15 100.0%
NIGERIA

242
Rwanda

Table 193 Foreign state measures affecting Rwanda’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Rwanda’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Rwanda’s 15 14
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Rwanda’s 5 4
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Rwanda’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 4 4
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Rwanda’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 6 6
against Rwanda’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 12 11
Rwanda’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 3 3
Rwanda’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Rwanda’s 2 2
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 6 6
that harm Rwanda’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Rwanda" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
RWANDA

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Table 194 Rwanda’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Rwanda’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Rwanda’s measures affecting other 3 3
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Rwanda’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 2 2
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Rwanda’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 1 1
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Rwanda’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Rwanda that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Rwanda that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Rwanda that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Rwanda" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
RWANDA

244
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 195 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Rwanda’s commercial


interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


Angola 1
Belgium 1
China 1
Egypt 1
Indonesia 1
Russian Federation 1

Table 196 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Rwanda’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 197 Implemented measures that harm Rwanda’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export taxes or restriction 3 30.0%
Bail out /state aid measure 1 10.0%
Export subsidy 1 10.0%
Import subsidy 1 10.0%
Public procurement 1 10.0%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary measure 1 10.0%
Trade finance 1 10.0%
Total 10 100.0%

Table 198 Rwanda's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


RWANDA

Export taxes or restriction 1 50.0%


Tariff measure 1 50.0%
Total 2 100.0%

245
Sao Tome and Principe

Table 199 Foreign state measures affecting Sao Tome and Principe’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Sao Tome and Principe’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Sao Tome and Principe’s 9 9
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Sao Tome and Principe’s 3 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Sao Tome and Principe’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 2 2
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Sao Tome and Principe’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 4 4
against Sao Tome and Principe’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 9 9
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Sao Tome and Principe’s commercial interests


Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 0 0
Sao Tome and Principe’ss commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Sao Tome and Principe’s 0 0
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 4 4
that harm Sao Tome and Principe’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Sao Tome and Principe" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 200 Sao Tome and Principe’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial
interests

Summary statistic of Sao Tome and Principe’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Sao Tome and Principe’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Sao Tome and Principe’s measures found to
benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests [1]
Total number of Sao Tome and Principe’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Sao Tome and Principe’s measures that have
been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE


Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Sao Tome and Principe that harm foreign 0 0
commerical interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Sao Tome and Principe that harm foreign 0 0
commerical interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Sao Tome and Principe that harm foreign
commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Sao Tome and Principe" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Table 201 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Sao Tome and Principe’s
commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


Argentina 1
China 1
Indonesia 1
Portugal 1

Table 202 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Sao Tome and Principe’s state
measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 203 Implemented measures that harm Sao Tome and Principe’s commercial interests, by
type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export taxes or restriction 2 33.3%
Bail out/state aid measure 1 16.6%
Export subsidy 1 16.6%
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Migration measure 1 16.6%


Trade finance 1 16.6%
Total 6 100.0%

Table 204 Sao Tome and Principe’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial
interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

248
Senegal

Table 205 Foreign state measures affecting Senegal’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Senegal’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Senegal’s 37 35
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Senegal’s 6 5
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Senegal’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 9 8
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Senegal’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 22 22
against Senegal’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 32 31
Senegal’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 5 4
Senegal’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Senegal’s 5 4
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 39 39
that harm Senegal’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Senegal" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
SENEGAL

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Table 206 Senegal’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Senegal’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Senegal’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Senegal’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Senegal’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Senegal’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Senegal that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Senegal that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Senegal that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Senegal" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
SENEGAL

250
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 207 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Senegal’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


Indonesia 5
France 4
India 3
Belgium 2
Egypt 2
Spain 2
Argentina 1
Austria 1
Bulgaria 1
China 1
Cyprus 1
Czech Republic 1
Denmark 1
Estonia 1
European Communities 1
Finland 1
Germany 1
Greece 1
Hungary 1
Ireland 1
Italy 1
Latvia 1
Lithuania 1
Luxembourg 1
Malaysia 1
Malta 1
Mauritania 1
Netherlands 1
Poland 1
Portugal 1
Republic of Korea 1
Romania 1
Slovakia 1
Slovenia 1
Sweden 1
Switzerland 1
Thailand 1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 1
United States of America 1
SENEGAL

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Table 208 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Senegal’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 209 Implemented measures that harm Senegal’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out / state aid measure 9 31.0%
Export subsidy 7 24.1%
Export taxes or restriction 5 17.2%
Trade finance 2 6.9%
Consumption subsidy 1 3.4%
Import subsidy 1 3.4%
Local content requirement 1 3.4%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 1 3.4%
State-controlled company 1 3.4%
Tariff measure 1 3.4%
Total 29 100.0%

Table 210 Senegal’s implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


SENEGAL

252
Seychelles

Table 211 Foreign state measures affecting Seychelles’ commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Seychelles’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Seychelles’ 11 11
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Seychelles’ 3 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Seychelles’ commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 5 5
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Seychelles’ interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 3 3
against Seychelles’ interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 8 8
Seychelles’ commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 3 3
Seychelles’ commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Seychelles 3 3
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 3 3
that harm Seychelles’ commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Seychelles" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
SEYCHELLES

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

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Table 212 Seychelles’ state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Seychelles’ state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Seychelles’ measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Seychelles’ measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Seychelles’ measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Seychelles’ measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Seychelles that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Seychelles that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Seychelles that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Seychelles" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
SEYCHELLES

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

254
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 213 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Seychelles’ commercial


interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


China 1
Indonesia 1
Japan 1

Table 214 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Seychelles’ state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 215 Implemented measures that harm Seychelles’ commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export taxes or restriction 2 40.0%
Export subsidy 1 20.0%
Non tariff barrier (not elsewhere specified) 1 20.0%
Trade finance 1 20.0%
Total 5 100.0%

Table 216 Seychelles’ implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction


SEYCHELLES

255
Sierra Leone

Table 217 Foreign state measures affecting Sierra Leone’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Sierra Leone’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Sierra Leone’s 11 10
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Sierra Leone’s 4 3
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Sierra Leone’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 4 4
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Sierra Leone’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 3 3
against Sierra Leone’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 10 9
Sierra Leone’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 1 1
Sierra Leone’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Sierra Leone’s 1 1
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 3 3
that harm Sierra Leone’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Sierra Leone" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".
SIERRA LEONE

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 218 Sierra Leone’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Sierra Leone’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Sierra Leone’s measures affecting other 3 3
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Sierra Leone’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Sierra Leone’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Sierra Leone’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 3 3
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Sierra Leone that harm foreign commerical 17 17
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Sierra Leone that harm foreign commerical 8 8
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 5 5
implemented by Sierra Leone that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Sierra Leone" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".
SIERRA LEONE

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

257
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA report

Table 219 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Sierra Leone's commercial
interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures.


Argentina 1
Belgium 1
Ukraine 1

Table 220 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Sierra Leone's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected Number of measures.


Algeria 1
China 1
Estonia 1
Republic of Korea 1
Turkey 1

Table 221 Implemented measures that harm Sierra Leone's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out/state aid measure 3 50.0%
Consumption subsidy 1 16.7%
Export subsidy 1 16.7%
Trade finance 1 16.7%
Total 6 100.0%

Table 222 Sierra Leone's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by
SIERRA LEONE

type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Export taxes or restriction 2 66.6%
Tariff measure 1 33.3%
Total 3 100.0%

258
Somalia

Table 223 Foreign state measures affecting Somalia’s commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures All measures All measures except
affecting Somalia’s commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of measures affecting Somalia’s 10 10
commercial interests
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of Somalia’s 4 4
commercial interests [1]
Total number of foreign measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
Somalia’s commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 3 3
and which almost certainly discriminate
against Somalia’s interests [2]
Total number of foreign measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 3 3
against Somalia’s interests [3]
Total number of implemented measures affecting 9 9
Somalia’s commercial interests
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect 1 1
Somalia’s commercial interests.
Total number of pending foreign measures that,
if implemented, are likely to harm Somalia’s 1 1
foreign commercial interests
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures 3 3
that harm Somalia’s commercial interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Somalia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
SOMALIA

259
Africa Resists the Protectionist Temptation: The 5th GTA report

Table 224 Somalia’s state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests

Summary statistic of Somalia’s state measures All measures All measures except
affecting other jurisdictions’ commercial interests anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard actions.
Total number of Somalia’s measures affecting other 0 0
jurisdictions’ commercial interests
Total number of Somalia’s measures found to benefit or
involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions’ 0 0
commercial interests [1]
Total number of Somalia’s measures that
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm
commercial interests or
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented 0 0
and which almost certainly discriminate
against foreign interests [2]
Total number of Somalia’s measures that have been
implemented and which almost certainly discriminate 0 0
against foreign interests [3]
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures
implemented by Somalia that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures
implemented by Somalia that harm foreign commerical 0 0
interests
Total number of trading partners affected by measures 0 0
implemented by Somalia that harm foreign commercial
interests

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change.
Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics, and selecting
"Somalia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.
[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.
SOMALIA

260
Country-by-Country Reports

Table 225 Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Somalia’s commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures Number of measures


Algeria 1
Germany 1
India 1

Table 226 Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Somalia’s state measures

No measures have been reported for this jurisdiction

Table 227 Implemented measures that harm Somalia’s commercial interests, by type

Type of measure Number of measures As percentage of measures


Bail out/state aid measure 1 20.0%
Export subsidy 1