Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
The doctrine of the "law of the case" is ordinarily a very wise rule of
action, but it is not a universal, inexorable command. For while the
doctrine is generally deemed applicable whether the former
determination is right or wrong, (Wills vs. Lloyd, 21 Cal. 2d 452,132 p.
20 471, 474; In re Taylor's Estate, 110 Vt. 80, 2 A. 2d 317, 319;
Greenwood Country vs. Watkins, 196 S.C. 51, 12 S.E. 2d 545, 550),
there are some cases which hold that the doctrine is in applicable
where [the] prior decision is unsound (Standard Oil Co. of California
vs. Johnson, 56 Cal. App. 2d 411, 132 P. 2d 910, 913; Atchison T.& S.F.
Ry Co. vs. Ballard, C.C.A. Tax 108 F. 2d 768, 772); or incorrect
principles were announced or [al mistake of fact was made on first
appeal. (Nation of Match Co. vs. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 227 Mo
Supp. 11 5, 58 S.W. 2d 997; Morris vs. E.I.Du Pont De Nemours & Com;
346 Mo. 126,139 S.W. 2d 984,986, 129 A.L.R. 352).
It is a peculiar virtue of our system of law that in the search for truth
through the process of inclusion and exclusion, it behooves us to
correct the application of the doctrine of "the law of the case" upon
such questions which prove to have been mistaken.
. . . [T]he Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Lucia Pajarito vs.
Hon. Alberto V. Seneris, et. al. (G.R. No. L-44627, December 14, 1978;
87 SCRA 275) has definitely set the rule that;
. . . considering that Felipe Aizon does not deny that he was the
registered operator of the bus . . ., it would serve no important
purpose to require petitioner to file a separate and independent action
against the employer for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary
civil liability . . . . At any rate, the proceeding for the enforcement of
the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the
proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an
execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit."
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
To underscore, Our deletion from Our decision in CA-G.R. No. 19077CR, therefore, of the trial court's pronouncement and directions on the
subsidiary liability of Maximiliano Alverez would have not prevented
the respondent court from issuing the writ of subsidiary execution and
all other matters now under question.
On the issue of the deprivation of the employer of due process, unless
he is allowed his day in court in the enforcement of his subsidiary
liability in a separate civil action, the Honorable Supreme Court, citing
relevant holdings in previous cases said:
In Miranda vs. Malate Garage & Taxicab Inc. this Court father
amplified the rule that the decision convicting the employee is binding
and conclusive upon the employer, "not only with regard to (the
latter's) civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the
liability of an employer can not be separated but following that of his
employee ... And this Court, in Miranda further explained that the
employer is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case,
considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law.
The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision
Plan Psd-37365 containing an area of 20,119 square meters and
situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot was acquired by
purchase from the late Luis Lancero on September 15, 1964 as per
Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of plaintiff and by virtue of
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4320 was issued to plaintiff
(DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel
from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed
by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the
back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lot
identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha 1/2
share and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and
Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the
whole area containing 48,122 square meters.
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived
by her six children aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha
on October 17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and
Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots,
among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement
and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot
2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd80450 duly approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then
alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966.
Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI (now
RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the partition made
by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the
land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.
Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by
the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the
land which it acquired, a portion of Lot 2476. Plaintiff proved that
before purchasing Lot 2476-A it first investigated and checked the title
of Luis Lancero and found the same to be intact in the office of the
Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City. The same with the
subdivision plan (Exh. "B"), the corresponding technical description
(Exh. "P") and the Deed of Sale executed by Ricardo Gevero all of
which were found to be unquestionable. By reason of all these,
plaintiff claims to have bought the land in good faith and for value,
occupying the land since the sale and taking over from Lancero's
possession until May 1969, when the defendants Abadas forcibly
entered the property. (Rollo, p. 23)
After trial the court a quo on July 18, 1977 rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of
that portion of Lot No. 2476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot
No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing an
area of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT (7,878)
square meters, more or less. The other portions of Lot No. 2476 are
hereby adjudicated as follows:
Lot No. 2476 B to the heirs of Elena Gevero;
Lot No. 2476 C to the heirs of Restituto Gevero;
Lot No. 2476 E to the defendant spouses Enrique C. Torres and
Francisca Aquino;
Lot No. 2476 F to the defendant spouses Eduard Rumohr and
Emilia Merida Rumohf ;
Lot Nos. 2476-H, 2476-I and 2476 G to defendant spouses
Enrique Abada and Lilia Alvarez Abada.
No adjudication can be made with respect to Lot No. 2476-A
considering that the said lot is the subject of a civil case between the
Heirs of Maria Gevero on one hand and the spouses Daniel Borkingkito
and Ursula Gevero on the other hand, which case is now pending
appeal before the Court of Appeals. No pronouncement as to costs, SO
ORDERED. (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 203; Rollo, pp. 21-22)
From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners
herein) appealed to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) which
subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision appealed
from.
Petitioners, on March 31, 1986, filed a motion for reconsideration
(Rollo, p. 28) but was denied on April 21, 1986.
Hence, the present petition.
This petition is devoid of merit.
Basically, the issues to be resolved in the instant case are: 1) whether
or not the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Luis Lancero is
valid; 2) in the affirmative, whether or not the 1/2 share of interest of
Teodorica Babangha in one of the litigated lots, lot no. 2476 under
OCT No. 7610 is included in the deed of sale; and 3) whether or not
the private respondents' action is barred by laches.
Petitioners
maintain
that
the deed
of sale is
entirely
invalid citing alleged flaws thereto, such as that: 1) the signature of
Ricardo was forged without his knowledge of such fact; 2) Lancero had
recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale when he signed
the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid the Litigation"; 3)
Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV11186 affirming with modification the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152
entitled "Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an action for
recovery of real property with damages is sought. in these
proceedings initiated by petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this
Court. It was however reinstated upon a second motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the respondents were
required to comment thereon. The petition was thereafter given due
course and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums.
These, together with the evidence, having been carefully considered,
the Court now decides the case.
First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on
record:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and
Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and
agricultural properties in the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After
his death, his estate was divided among his three (3) children as
follows:
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon,
were adjudicated to his daughter, Magdalena Locsin;
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of
the petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all
surnamed Locsin;
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong,
eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots
in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which
Mariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908.
Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties
which she had inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona
Anson. These were augmented by other properties acquired by the
spouses in the course of their union, 1 which however was not blessed
with children.
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under
the Torrens System. Those that Mariano inherited from his father,
Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name
of "Mariano Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife,
Catalina, as the sole and universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will
was drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney
10
1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio
Cornello
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian
1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco
5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio
Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian
6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto favor of Aurea B. Locsin
7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto favor of Aurea B. Locsin
15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto Aurea Locsin
16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson
Aurea Locsin M. Acabado
17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin
19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto favor of Mariano Locsin
1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000
Delfina Anson
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
Rosario whose maternal
grandfather was Getulio
Locsin
2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio
Illegible
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
Rosario but the rentals
11
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her
Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already received their legacies
and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial
Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the
properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime,
alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration,
and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who
were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the
plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive
part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and
against the defendants:
(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and
Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the
entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin,
being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan
and Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of
Catalina;
(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and
exchange and all other instruments conveying any part of the estate
of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those in the
inventory of known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and
void ab-initio;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to
cancel all certificates of title and other transfers of the real properties,
subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and derivatives
therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;
(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey
ownership and possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs,
together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and delivered,
and all the fruits and incomes received by the defendants from the
estate of Catalina, with legal interest from the filing of this action; and
where reconveyance and delivery cannot be effected for reasons that
might have intervened and prevent the same, defendants shall pay
for the value of such properties, fruits and incomes received by them,
also with legal interest from the filing, of this case
(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of
P20,000.00 each as moral damages; and
(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and
litigation expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to
any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.
Costs against the defendants. 9
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186)
which rendered its now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989,
affirming the trial court's decision.
The petition has merit and should be granted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private
respondents, nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin,
entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of
more than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did
not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and
transmissible rights and obligationsexisting at the time of (the
decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the
opening of the succession." 10 The rights to a person's succession are
transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs
until such time. 11 Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or
conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part
of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay
claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her
estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if
those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right
arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the
reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure
to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory
(or forced) heirs. 12
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa
Catalina, in transferring the properties she had received from her late
husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in
violation of the private respondents' rights to her succession. Said
respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that
she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could
conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her
lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in
nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate
subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which,
even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of
the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or
in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all
relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by
12
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some lots
not only to Don Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew,
Mariano
Locsin
II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was
competent to make that conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be
any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her other
pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II?
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire
estate to his wife, from a "consciousness of its real origin" which
carries the implication that said estate consisted of properties which
his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of Doa
Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to
33 are the private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and
forms (sic) part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the
surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties,
acquired during the marriage." She would have known better than
anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal
property so it is safe to assume that none was in fact included. The
inventory was signed by her under oath, and was approved by the
probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First
Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own
nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not
have prepared a false inventory that would have been prejudicial to
his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to inherit from her
eventually.
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony
that before Don Mariano died, he and his wife (Doa Catalina), being
childless, had agreed that their respective properties should
eventually revert to their respective lineal relatives. As the trusted
legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doa Catalina,
he would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice
his own interest.
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among
Doa Catalina's nephews and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her
lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and
companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and
Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando
Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and
undo the dispositions of property which she made in favor of the
Locsins, although it would have been to their advantage to do so.
Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doa Catalina acted
as a completely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor
13
Footnotes
14
5. That [as] of this time, the probate Court has not yet issued an order
either approving or denying the said sale. (p. 3, appealed Order of
September 15, 1992, pp. 109-112, record).
[Private respondents] submitted their evidence in support of the
material allegations of the complaint. In addition to testimonies of
witnesses, [private respondents] presented the following documentary
evidences: (1) Contract to Sell (Exh A); (2) machine copy of the last
will and testament of Demetrio Carpena (defendants father) to show
that the property sold by defendant was one of those devised to her in
said will (Exh B); (3) receipts signed by defendant for the
downpayment in the total amount of P300,000.00 (Exhs C, D & E);
and (4) demand letters sent to defendant (Exhs F & G).
It appears that [petitioner], instead of submitting her evidence, filed a
Demurrer to Evidence. In essence, defendant maintained that the
contract to sell was null and void for want of approval by the probate
court. She further argued that the contract was subject to a
suspensive condition, which was the probate of the will of defendants
father Demetrio Carpena. An Opposition was filed by [private
respondents]. It appears further that in an Order dated December 15,
1992 the court a quo granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed
the complaint. It justified its action in dismissing the complaint in the
following manner:
It is noteworthy that when the contract to sell was consummated, no
petition was filed in the Court with notice to the heirs of the time and
place of hearing, to show that the sale is necessary and beneficial. A
sale of properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested parties
must comply with the requisites provided by law, (Sec. 7, Rule 89,
Rules of Court) which are mandatory, and without them, the authority
to sell, the sale itself, and the order approving it, would be null and
void ab initio. (Arcilla vs. David, 77 Phil. 718, Gabriel, et al., vs.
Encarnacion, et al., L-6736, May 4, 1954; Bonaga vs. Soler, 2 Phil.
755) Besides, it is axiomatic that where the estate of a deceased
person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the
administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without
prior approval of the probate Court. (Estate of Obave, vs. Reyes, 123
SCRA 767).
As held by the Supreme Court, a decedents representative
(administrator) is not estopped from questioning the validity of his
own void deed purporting to convey land. (Bona vs. Soler, 2 Phil,
755). In the case at bar, the [petitioner,] realizing the illegality of the
transaction[,] has interposed the nullity of the contract as her
defense, there being no approval from the probate Court, and, in good
15
faith offers to return the money she received from the [private
respondents]. Certainly, the administratrix is not estop[ped] from
doing so and the action to declare the inexistence of contracts do not
prescribe. This is what precipitated the filing of [petitioners] demurrer
to evidence.[6]
The trial courts order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of
Appeals by private respondents who alleged:
1. The lower court erred in concluding that the contract to sell is null
and void, there being no approval of the probate court.
2. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] in good faith
offers to return the money to [private respondents].
3. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] is not under
estoppel to question the validity of the contract to sell.
4. The lower court erred in not ruling on the consideration of the
contract to sell which is tantamount to plain unjust enrichment of
[petitioner] at the expense of [private respondents].[7]
Public Respondents Ruling
Declaring the Contract to Sell valid, subject to the outcome of the
testate proceedings on Demetrio Carpenas estate, the appellate court
set aside the trial courts dismissal of the complaint and correctly ruled
as follows:
It is apparent from the appealed order that the lower court treated the
contract to sell executed by appellee as one made by the
administratrix of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena for the benefit of the
estate. Hence, its main reason for voiding the contract in question
was the absence of the probate courts approval. Presumably, what the
lower court had in mind was the sale of the estate or part thereof
made by the administrator for the benefit of the estate, as authorized
under Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires the
approval of the probate court upon application therefor with notice to
the heirs, devisees and legatees.
However, as adverted to by appellants in their brief, the contract to
sell in question is not covered by Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court
since it was made by appellee in her capacity as an heir, of a property
that was devised to her under the will sought to be probated. Thus,
while the document inadvertently stated that appellee executed the
contract in her capacity as executrix and administratrix of the estate,
a cursory reading of the entire text of the contract would unerringly
show that what she undertook to sell to appellants was one of the
other properties given to her by her late father, and more importantly,
it was not made for the benefit of the estate but for her own needs. To
16
Insisting that the above rule should apply to this case, petitioner
argues that the stipulations in the Contract to Sell require her to act in
her capacity as an executrix or administratrix. She avers that her
obligation to eject tenants pertains to the administratrix or executrix,
the estate being the landlord of the said tenants.[10] Likewise
demonstrating that she entered into the contract in her capacity as
executor is the stipulation that she must effect the conversion of
subject land from irrigated rice land to residential land and secure the
necessary clearances from government offices. Petitioner alleges that
these obligations can be undertaken only by an executor or
administrator of an estate, and not by an heir.[11]
The Court is not persuaded. As correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable,
because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as
an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the
contract, she represented herself as the lawful owner and seller of the
subject parcel of land.[12] She also explained the reason for the sale to
be difficulties in her living conditions and consequent need of cash.
[13]
These representations clearly evince that she was not acting on
behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into the Contract
to Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by petitioner has no
application to the instant case.
We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or
heirs from the moment of the decedents death. [14] Petitioner,
therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her
father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the
Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to
sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.
[15]
Thus, in Jakosalem vs. Rafols,[16] the Court resolved an identical
issue under the old Civil Code and held:
Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of hereditary
property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption
from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance
be accepted. And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a
person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole
estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be
adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed
among the coowners of the estate while it remains undivided. xxx And
according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may
assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of
such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the
The Issue
Petitioner raises only one issue:
Whether or not the Contract to Sell dated 03 February 1989
executed by the [p]etitioner and [p]rivate [r]espondent[s] without
the requisite probate court approval is valid.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Contract to Sell Valid
In a nutshell, petitioner contends that where the estate of the
deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate
proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction
involving it without prior approval of the Probate Court. [9] She
maintains that the Contract to Sell is void because it was not
approved by the probate court, as required by Section 7, Rule 89 of
the Rules of Court:
SEC. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or
otherwise encumber estate. The court having jurisdiction of the estate
of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell,
mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by
these rules and when it appears necessary or beneficial, under the
following regulations:
xxx
17
18
19
20
21
and the fees paid upon filing of this complaint that is subject to
adjustment and which may be subjected to a lien.
In the oft-quoted case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon.
Maximiano Asuncion,[22] this Court held that when the specific claim
has been left for the determination by the court, the additional filing
fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment and it shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. Clearly, the
rules and jurisprudence contemplate the initial payment of filing and
docket fees based on the estimated claims of the plaintiff, and it is
only when there is a deficiency that a lien may be constituted on the
judgment award until such additional fee is collected.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in not dismissing the
complaint outright despite their failure to pay the proper docket
fees. Nevertheless, as in other procedural rules, it may be liberally
construed in certain cases if only to secure a just and speedy
disposition of an action. While the rule is that the payment of the
docket fee in the proper amount should be adhered to, there are
certain exceptions which must be strictly construed.[23]
In recent rulings, this Court has relaxed the strict adherence to
the Manchester doctrine, allowing the plaintiff to pay the proper
docket fees within a reasonable time before the expiration of the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.[24]
In the recent case of National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
[25]
this Court held that:
The court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the
initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite
fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the
pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such
reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime.
It does not follow, however, that the trial court should have dismissed
the complaint for failure of private respondent to pay the correct
amount of docket fees. Although the payment of the proper docket
fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow the
plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time before
the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. If
the plaintiff fails to comply within this requirement, the defendant
should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be
considered in estoppel. In the latter case, the balance between the
appropriate docket fees and the amount actually paid by the plaintiff
22
23
24
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil
which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the
property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the
obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein
private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs
of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the
name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja
Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default
but on March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to
defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a
certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee
of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs,
arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to
the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No.
49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of
1989, more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in
any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during
December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this
is considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the
same manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next
succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and
1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs
as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into
consideration the composite price of sugar during each sugar crop
year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a
staggered cash installment, payable on or before the end of
December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year
1988-89;
25
26
27
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution
and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law
in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the
application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed
on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that
such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once
provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for
compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of
anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests,
if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to
in the preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated
by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous
to and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is
what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a
modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the
object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property
left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon
the heir.[18] A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee
but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. [19] On
the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the
condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be
entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not
obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. [20] To some
extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.[21]
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned
unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be
inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the
testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the
herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the
lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a
devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is
clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the
property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The
manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is
evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the
28
the obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of
subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free
act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his
death.[25] Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person
intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the
testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of
a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very
purpose of making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
29
30
31
We are not prepared to set aside the finding of the lower court
upholding Ricardo Tanedos testimony, as it involves a matter of
credibility of witnesses which the trial judge, who presided at the
hearing, was in a better position to resolve. (Court of Appeals
Decision, p. 6.)
In this connection, we note the tenacious allegations made by
petitioners, both in their basic petition and in their memorandum, as
follows:
1. The respondent Court allegedly ignored the claimed fact
that respondent Ricardo by fraud and deceit and with
foreknowledge that the property in question had already
been sold to petitioners, made Lazaro execute the deed of
January 13, 1981;
2. There is allegedly adequate evidence to show that only 1/2
of the purchase price of P10,000.00 was paid at the time
of the execution of the deed of sale, contrary to the
written acknowledgment, thus showing bad faith;
3. There is allegedly sufficient evidence showing that the
deed of revocation of the sale in favor of petitioners was
tainted with fraud or deceit.
4. There is allegedly enough evidence to show that private
respondents took undue advantage over the weakness
and unschooled and pitiful situation of Lazaro Tafledo . . .
and that respondent Ricardo Taedo exercised moral
ascendancy over his younger brother he being the eldest
brother and who reached fourth year college of law and at
one time a former Vice-Governor of Tarlac, while his
younger brother only attained first year high school x x x ;
5. The respondent Court erred in not giving credence to
petitioners
evidence,
especially
Lazaro
Taedos Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 27, 1982 stating
that Ricardo Taedo deceived the former in executing the
deed of sale in favor of private respondents.
To be sure, there are indeed many conflicting documents and
testimonies as well as arguments over their probative value and
significance. Suffice it to say, however, that all the above contentions
involve questions of fact, appreciation of evidence and credibility of
witnesses, which are not proper in this review. It is well-settled that
the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. In petitions for review under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised and passed upon. Absent any whimsical or capricious exercise
of judgment, and unless the lack of any basis for the conclusions
32
Thirteenth Division, composed of i. Minerva P. GonzagaReyes, ponenle, and JJ., Arturo B. Buena, Chairman and Quirino D.
Abad Santos, Jr., member.
3
CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 62.
4
At pp. 11-12; rollo, pp. 145-146.
5
Nuguidvs. Court ofAppeols, 171 SCRA 213 (March 13, 1989).
6
Court of Appeals Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 63.
7
GR. No. 112130, March 31, 1995; J. Flerida Ruth P. Romero, ponente.
[8]
G.R. No. 102253, June 2, 1995; J. Jose C. Vitug, ponente.
2
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul and set
aside the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 60450 entitled, Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina
Lumbao v. Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and Esperanza Lati, Spouses
Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and
Tadeo F. Santos, dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively,
33
deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property
inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been
partitioned.
No pronouncement as to costs.[12]
34
II.
THE
APPELLATE
COURT
COMMITTED
A
REVERSIBLE
ERROR
IN
ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO RECONVEY
THE
SUBJECT
[PROPERTY]
TO
THE
RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO] AND IN NOT
RULING THAT THEY ARE GUILTY OF LACHES,
HENCE
THEY
CANNOT
RECOVER
THE LOT ALLEGEDLY SOLD TO THEM.
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED
A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING HEREIN
PETITIONER[S] TO BE IN GOOD FAITH IN
EXECUTING THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT DATED [2 MAY 1986].
IV.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED
A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT
PETITIONERS ARE NOT LEGALLY BOUND TO
COMPLY WITH THE SUPPOSED BILIHAN NG LUPA
DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY
1981] THAT WERE SUPPOSEDLY EXECUTED BY
THE LATE RITA CATOC.
V.
THE
APPELLATE
COURT
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
FINDING
THAT
RESPONDENTS
[SPOUSES
LUMBAOS] ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE WITH
DAMAGES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED WITH AN
UNENFORCEABLE DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS THE
BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979]
AND [9 JANUARY 1981].
VI.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED
A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT
RESPONDENTS
[SPOUSES
LUMBAOS]
COMPLAINT
FOR
RECONVEYANCE
IS
DISMISSABLE (SIC) FOR NON COMPLIANCE OF
THE MANDATE OF [P.D. NO.] 1508, AS
AMENDED BY Republic Act No. 7160.
VII.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED
A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT
RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO] SHOULD BE
HELD LIABLE FOR PETITIONERS CLAIM FOR
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY[]S FEES.
35
Section 408 of the aforesaid law and Administrative Circular No. 1493[15] provide that all disputes between parties actually residing in the
same city or municipality are subject to barangay conciliation. A prior
recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or
any government offices. Non-compliance with the said condition
precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action
and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of
cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a
court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of
adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants failed to
object to such exercise of jurisdiction.[16]
II.
III.
While it is true that the present case should first be referred to the
Barangay Lupon for conciliation because the parties involved herein
actually reside in the same city (Pasig City) and the dispute between
them involves a real property, hence, the said dispute should have
been brought in the city in which the real property, subject matter of
the controversy, is located, which happens to be the same city where
the contending parties reside. In the event that respondents Spouses
Lumbao failed to comply with the said condition precedent, their
Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages can be dismissed. In this
case, however, respondents Spouses Lumbaos non-compliance with
the
aforesaid
condition
precedent
cannot
be
considered
fatal. Although petitioners alleged in their answer that the Complaint
for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses
Lumbao should be dismissed for their failure to comply with the
condition precedent, which in effect, made the complaint prematurely
instituted and the trial court acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case,
yet, they did not file a Motion to Dismiss the said complaint.
36
ATTY. BUGARING:
WITNESS:
A.
No, sir.
Q. I am showing to you this document, there is a signature at the
left hand margin of this document Virgilio Santos, will
you please go over the same and tell the court whose
signature is this?
A. I dont remember, sir, because of the length of time that had
passed.
never
appeared
before
Apolinario Mangahas?
this
notary
public
A. I dont remember.[20]
ATTY. CHIU:
Q. Now, you said, Mr. WitnessVirgilio Santos, that you dont know
about this document which was marked as Exhibit A for
the [respondents spouses Lumbao]?
37
In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been
partitioned on 2 May 1986 by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold by the mother of the
petitioners to respondents Spouses Lumbao should be deducted from
the total lot, inherited by them in representation of their deceased
mother, which in this case measures 467 square meters. The 107square meter lot already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can no
longer be inherited by the petitioners because the same was no
longer part of their inheritance as it was already sold during the
lifetime of their mother.
Likewise, the fact that the property mentioned in the
two Bilihan ng Lupa documents was described as a portion of a parcel
of land covered in Tax Declarations No. A-018-01674, while the subject
matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was the property
described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3216 of the Registry
of Deeds of the Province of Rizal in the name of Maria is of no moment
because in the Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981, it is clear that there was only one estate left by Maria upon her
death. And this fact was not refuted by the petitioners. Besides, the
property described in Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and the
property mentioned in TCT No. 3216 are both located in Barrio
Rosario, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, and almost have the
same boundaries. It is, thus, safe to state that the property mentioned
38
in Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and in TCT No. 3216 are one and
the same.
Under the above premises, this Court holds that the Bilihan
ng Lupa documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 are
valid and enforceable and can be made the basis of the respondents
Spouses Lumbaos action for reconveyance. The failure of respondents
Spouses Lumbao to have the said documents registered does not
affect
its
validity
and
enforceability. It
must
be
remembered that registration is not a requirement for validity of the
contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves
chiefly to bind third persons. The principal purpose of registration is
merely to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a
transaction involving the property had been entered into. Where the
party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered
at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of
that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him.
39
40
41
There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the subject lots was
awarded to Margarita Herrera in 1959. There is also no dispute that
Margarita executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on October 7, 1960.
Defendant NHA claims that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is, in effect, a
waiver or transfer of rights and interest over the subject lots in favor
of Francisca Herrera. This Court is disposed to believe otherwise. After
a perusal of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Margarita Herrera, it can
be ascertained from its wordings taken in their ordinary and
grammatical sense that the document is a simple disposition of her
estate to take effect after her death. Clearly the Court finds that the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" is a will of Margarita Herrera. Evidently, if the
intention of Margarita Herrera was to merely assign her right over the
lots to her daughter Francisca Herrera, she should have given her
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" to the defendant NHA or to Francisca Herrera
for submission to the defendant NHA after the full payment of the
purchase price of the lots or even prior thereto but she did not. Hence
it is apparent that she intended the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her
last will and not an assignment of rights as what the NHA in its
resolution would want to make it appear. The intention of Margarita
Herrera was shared no less by Francisca Herrera who after the
former's demise executed on August 22, 1974 a Deed of SelfAdjudication claiming that she is her sole and legal heir. It was only
when said deed was questioned in court by the surviving heirs of
Margarita Herrera's other daughter, Beatriz Mercado, that Francisca
Herrera filed an application to purchase the subject lots and presented
the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" stating that it is a deed of assignment of
rights.19
The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding
the lots to the heirs of Francisca Herrera. It upheld the trial court
ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of
rights but one that involved disposition of property which shall take
effect upon death. The issue of whether it was a valid will must first
be determined by probate.
Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.
Petitioner NHA raised the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION OF THE NHA AND THE
DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ATTAINED
FINALITY, AND IF SO, WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATABARS THE COURT FROM FURTHER
DETERMINING WHO BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAS PREFERENTIAL
RIGHTS FOR AWARD OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS;
42
43
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the
estate of the decedent as the next "person"39 likely to stand in to fulfill
the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The opposition of
other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should have put
the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in
the said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of SelfAdjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and void 40 should
have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and
properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a testate
or intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted
arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the
probate court to determine. We affirm the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an element of
testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred
property; (2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the death of the
instrument maker.41
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370
dated August 28, 2003, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No. B-2780 dated March 9,
1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Rollo, at 8.
2
A Decree Creating the National Housing Authority and Dissolving the
Existing Housing Agencies, Defining Its Powers and Functions,
Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, Presidential Decree
No. 757, promulgated July 31, 1975.
3
Rollo, at 70.
4
Id.
5
It should be noted that a thumbmark is considered a valid signature.
As held in Payad v. Tolentino, 62 Phil. 848 (1936): "The testator's
thumbprint is always valid and sufficient signature for the purpose of
complying with the requirement of the article. While in most of these
cases, the testator was suffering from some infirmity which made the
writing of the testator's name difficult or impossible, there seems to
be no basis for limiting the validity of thumbprints only to cases of
illness or infirmity."
6
Rollo, at 49.
44
45
46
Commander Abeng he with other Huks left Mt. Banahaw for Tiaong;
that when they crossed the Osiw River already near Tiaong, they were
met by Pasumbal and Capino; that when they were at the outskirts of
the town, he and the party were told by Commander Tommy to attack
the 8th BCT camp in Tiaong to prevent the sending of army help to
the town proper; that he took part in firing on the camp which
returned the fire in the course of which he was wounded; and that
because of his wound he could not escape with his companions to the
mountains when the Army soldiers dispersed and drove them out of
the town and so he was finally captured by said soldiers.
As to defendants Pasumbal and Capino, their participation in and
responsibility for the raid was duly established not only by the going
of Pasumbal on November 12th to the mountains following
instructions of Umali, and conferring with Commander Abeng asking
him to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan, but also by the fact that
Pasumbal and Capino in the afternoon or evening of November 14th
met the Huks at the Osiw River as the dissidents were on their way to
Tiaong and later Pasumbal and Capino were seen in the yard of
Punzalan firing at the house with automatic weapons and hand
grenades.
What about Umali? His criminal responsibility was also established,
tho indirectly. We have the testimony of Amado Mendoza who heard
him instructing Pasumbal to contact Commander Abeng and ask him
to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan. The rest of the evidence is more or
less circumstantial, but nonetheless strong and convincing. No one
saw him take part in the firing and attack on the house of Punzalan;
nor was he seen near or around said house. Because of his important
position as Congressman, perchance he did not wish to figure too
prominently in the actual raid. Besides, he would seem to have
already given out all the instructions necessary and he could well stay
in the background. However, during the raid, not very far from
Punzalan's house he was seen in the lanzonesan of his father, holding
a revolver and in the company of about 20 armed men with Huk
Commander Torio, evidently observing and waiting for developments.
Then he and his companions left in the direction of Taguan.
Umali and Pasumbal, however, claim that during the raid, they were in
the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, about seven kilometers away from
Tiaong where a consolation party was being held. There is ample
evidence however to the effect that they arrived in Pasumbal's home
only around midnight. An Army soldier named Cabalona who
happened to be in Pasumbal's home arriving there earlier in the
evening and who was invited to take some refreshments said that he
47
did not see the two men until they arrived about midnight when the
Army reinforcements from Lucena passed by on their way to Tiaong.
Thus, we have this chain of circumstances that does not speak in
favor of Umali, or Pasumbal for that matter. But this is not all. There is
the rather strange and unexplained, at least not satisfactorily,
behaviour of Umali and Pasumbal that evening of November 14th.
Assuming for a moment as they claim, that the two were not in Tiaong
at the commencement of the raid between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., and
during the whole time the raid lasted, and that they were all that time
in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, still, according to their own
evidence, they were informed by persons coming or fleeing from
Tiaong that there was a raid going on there, and that some houses
were burning. As a matter of fact, considering the promixity of Taguan
to Tiaong, a distance of about seven kilometers and the stillness and
darkness of the night, the fire and the glow produced by the burning
of three houses and the noise produced by the firing of automatic
weapons and the explosion of the hand grenades and bottles of
gasoline, could and must have been seen and heard from Taguan. The
natural and logical reaction on the part of Umali and Pasumbal would
have been to rush to Tiaong, see what had really happened and then
render help and give succor to the stricken residents, including their
own relatives. It will be remembered that the houses of the fathers of
Umali and Pasumbal were in Tiaong and their parents and relatives
were residing there. And yet, instead of following a natural impulse
and urge to go to Tiaong, they fled in the opposite direction towards
Candelaria. And Umali instead of taking the road, purposely avoided
the same and preferred to hike through coconut groves so that upon
arriving in Candelaria, he was wet, and spattered and very tired. Had
they wanted to render any help to Tiaong they could have asked the
police authorities of Candelaria to send a rescue party to that town. Or
better still, when the army reinforcements from Lucena sent at the
instance of Punzalan, who at about eight or nine that evening was
returning to Tiaong from Lucena, found at the barrio or sitio of
Lusakan near Tiaong that there was fighting in the town, he
immediately returned to Lucena to get army reinforcements to relieve
his town, was passing by Taguan, where they were, Umali and
Pasumbal could have joined said reinforcements and gone to Tiaong.
Instead the two continued on their way to the capital (Lucena) where
before dawn, they went and contacted Provincial Fiscal Mayo, a first
cousin of Umali, and Assistant Fiscal Reyes and later had these two
officials accompany them to the Army camp to see Col. Gelveson, not
for the purpose of asking for the sending of aid or reinforcement to
48
49
because the premedition was for the killing of Punzalan. The result
was the killing of three others intended by the raiders (People vs.
Guillen, 47 Off). The killing may, however, be qualified by treachery,
the raiders using firearms against which the victims were defenseless,
with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The
three murders may be punished with the penalty of death. However,
because of lack of the necessary votes, the penalty should be life
imprisonment.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised by the
appellants in their brief.
In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder,
arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. For the crime of
sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision
correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three
murders, each of the appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and
to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and for the
arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article
321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the
raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of
Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more
persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother
of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the
decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the
pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the
duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the
heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, we find it
unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to
frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums awarded
the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by
the court below will stand. With these modifications, the decision
appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion
and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
50