1NC vs Jaime and Emma

1
War is dead. We are now left with an international
order of deterrence, ushered in by US-Sino
Engagement
Baudrillard 81 (Jean, Simulacra and Simulation: The Orbital and the
Nuclear, 1981, ML)
The simultaneity of two events in the month of July 1975 illustrated this in a striking
manner: the linkup in space of the two American and Soviet supersatellites, apotheosis of
peaceful coexistence - the suppression by the Chinese of ideogrammatic writing and conversion to
the Roman alphabet. The latter signifies the "orbital" instantiation of an abstract and
modelized system of signs, into whose orbit all the once unique forms of style
and writing will be reabsorbed. The satellization of language: the means for
the Chinese to enter the system of peaceful coexistence , which is inscribed in
their heavens at precisely the same time by the linkup of the two satellites. Orbital flight of the Big
Two, neutralization and homogenization of everyone else on earth. Yet, despite this
deterrence by the orbital power - the nuclear or molecular code - events continue at ground
level, misfortunes are even more numerous, given the global process of the
contiguity and simultaneity of data. But, subtly, they no longer have any
meaning, they are no longer anything but the duplex effect of simulation at the
summit. The best example can only be that of the war in Vietnam, because it took place at
the intersection of a maximum historical and "revolutionary" stake, and of the
installation of this deterrent authority. What meaning did this war have, and wasn't its
unfolding a means of sealing the end of history in the decisive and culminating historic event of our era?

Why did this war, so hard, so long, so ferocious, vanish from one day to the
next as if by magic? Why did this American defeat (the largest reversal in the
history of the USA) have no internal repercussions in America? If it had really
signified the failure of the planetary strategy of the United States, it would
necessarily have completely disrupted its internal balance and the American
political system. Nothing of the sort occurred. Something else, then, took
place. This war, at bottom, was nothing but a crucial episode of peaceful
coexistence. It marked the arrival of China to peaceful coexistence . The
nonintervention of China obtained and secured after many years, Chinas
apprenticeship to a global modus vivendi , the shift from a global strategy of
revolution to one of shared forces and empires, the transition from a radical alternative to
political alternation in a system now essentially regulated (the normalization of Peking - Washington

the USA pulled out

of Vietnam but won the war. And the war ended "spontaneously" when this
objective was achieved. That is why it was deescalated, demobilized so easily. This same
relations): this was what was at stake in the war in Vietnam, and in this sense,

reduction of forces can be seen on the field. The war lasted as long as elements irreducible to a healthy
politics and discipline of power, even a Communist one, remained unliquidated. When at last the war had
passed into the hands of regular troops in the North and escaped that of the resistance, the war could
stop: it had attained its objective. The stake is thus that of a political relay. As soon as the Vietnamese had
proved that they were no longer the carriers of an unpredictable subversion, one could let them take over.
That theirs is a Communist order is not serious in the end: it had proved itself, it could be trusted. It is even
more effective than capitalism in the liquidation of "savage" and archaic precapitalist structures. Same
scenario in the Algerian war.

The other aspect of this war and of all wars today:

behind

the armed violence, the murderous antagonism of the adversaries - which seems a matter of life
and death, which is played out as such (or else one could never send people to get themselves killed in
this kind of thing), behind

this simulacrum of fighting to the death and of ruthless global stakes,

the two adversaries are fundamentally in solidarity against something else,

unnamed, never spoken, but whose objective outcome in war, with the equal complicity of the two
adversaries, is total liquidation. Tribal, communitarian, precapitalist structures, every form of
exchange, of language, of symbolic organization, that is what must be abolished, that is the object of
murder in war - and war itself, in its immense, spectacular death apparatus, is nothing but the medium of
this process of the terrorist rationalization of the social - the murder on which sociality will be founded,

Total complicity, or division of labor between two

for the very end of reshaping
and domesticating social relations. "The North Vietnamese were advised to
countenance a scenario for liquidating the American presence in the course
of which, of course, one must save face." This scenario: the extremely harsh
bombardments of Hanoi. Their untenable character must not conceal the fact that they were
nothing but a simulacrum to enable the Vietnamese to seem to countenance
a compromise and for Nixon to make the Americans swallow the withdrawal of
their troops. The game was already won, nothing was objectively at stake but the
whatever its allegiance, Communist or capitalist.

adversaries (who may even consent to enormous sacrifices for it)

verisimilitude of the final montage. The moralists of war, the holders of high wartime values should not be
too discouraged:

the war is no less atrocious for being only a simulacrum - the flesh
This
objective is always fulfilled, just like that of the charting of territories and of disciplinary sociality.
What no longer exists is the adversity of the adversaries , the reality of antagonistic
suffers just the same, and the dead and former combatants are worth the same as in other wars.

causes, the ideological seriousness of war. And also the reality of victory or defeat, war being a process

the deterrence) that

dominates us today is beyond war and peace, it is that at every moment war and peace are
equivalent. "War is peace," said Orwell. There also, the two differential poles implode into
each other, or recycle one another - a simultaneity of contradictions that is at once the parody and
the end of every dialectic. Thus one can completely miss the truth of a war: namely, that
it was finished well before it started, that there was an end to war at the heart
of the war itself, and that perhaps it never started . Many other events (the oil crisis,
that triumphs well beyond these appearances. In any case, the pacification (or

etc.) never started, never existed, except as artificial occurrences - abstract, ersatz, and as artifacts of

The
media and the official news service are only there to maintain the illusion of an actuality,
history, catastrophes and crises destined to maintain a historical investment under hypnosis.

of the reality of the stakes, of the objectivity of facts. All the events are to be read backward, or one
becomes aware (as

with the Communists "in power" in Italy the retro, posthumous

rediscovery of the gulags and Soviet dissidents like the almost contemporary
discovery, by a moribund ethnology, of the lost "difference" of Savages ) that all
these things arrived too late, with a history of delay, a spiral of delay, that they long ago exhausted their
meaning and only live from an artificial effervescence of signs, that all these events succeed each other
without logic, in the most contradictory, complete equivalence, in a profound indifference to their
consequences (but this is because there are none: they exhaust themselves in their spectacular

all "newsreel" footage thus gives the sinister impression of kitsch , of

retro and porno at the same time - doubtless everyone knows this, and no one really accepts
it. The reality of simulation is unbearable - crueler than Artaud's Theater of Cruelty, which
promotion) -

was still an attempt to create a dramaturgy of life, the last gasp of an ideality of the body, of blood, of
violence in a system that was already taking it away, toward a reabsorption of all the stakes without a

the trick has been played. All dramaturgy, and even all real writing of
Simulation is the master, and we only have a right to the
retro, to the phantom, parodic rehabilitation of all lost referentials . Everything
still unfolds around us, in the cold light of deterrence (including Artaud, who has the
trace of blood. For us

cruelty has disappeared.

right like everything else to his revival, to a second existence as the referential of cruelty).

But the show must go on The aff continues a system

of preemptive warfare that turns and outweighs the
case
Sitze 10 (Adam, Assist. professor of law, jurisprudence, and social thought
@ Amherst College, Political Spaces and Global War, pp. lvii-lix) ***edited for
ableist language
Like modern political space, global political space implies its own mode of
conflictuality: global war (a version of which some readers will have already encountered in
Antonio Negri's and Michael Hardt's 2002 book Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire).197

global war is simply that mode of polemicity that corresponds to the

space of global mobilization. Just as the phenomenological character of
global mobilization is borderlessness, so too is global war deprived of the
borders specific to war; it is a war without fronts, war deprived of the
possibility of face-to-face or forward-facing conflict, war without wartime
(it does not begin with a declaration of war and cannot end with a peace
treaty). Global war is war whose form is structured by the same space-time
compression that defines economic globalization (ubiquity, punctuality, and
instaneity). To be clear, none of this implies that Galli presumes that modern
warfare will somehow magically cease to exist. Like the global mobilization of
which it is but a mode, global war implies a claim on the Earth that is unitary
but not homogenous or unified. As such, the emergence of global war neither
precludes nor is contradicted by the continued existence of residual modes of
war. Nor should we understand Galli to suggest that global war is somehow
equally distributed over the Earth. Just as globalization intensifies inequalities
between the North and the South, the rich and the poor, and the center and
the periphery, so too may we expect global war to manifest itself unequally,
in a distribution of life zones (where the residual existence of modern political
spaces retards the dominance or even emergence of global war) and death
zones (where global war rages not only through the internal displacement
of peoples, the chronic permanence of low-intensity conflict, the
indefinite prolongation of counterinsurgency campaigns, and the
operation of the penal state and its police forces, but also through the
hostile governmental exposure of certain populations more than others to
risk, accident, inclement weather, pollution, and disease). Finally, Galli's
claims about the emergence or even dominance of global war should not be
mistaken for claims that global war is a radical novelty that somehow
emerged promptly with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Just as global
mobilization is not the result of a pure and simple break with political
modernity, but rather a development of political modernity's tensions and
equilibriums in a particularly extreme direction, so too is the emergence of
global war the result of the intensification of certain dynamics,
disequilibriums, and tensions that were already latent in modern warfare
only now in a new and radical direction, past a new and irreversible
threshold. Global war is not, then, fully discontinuous with the mode of
polemicity that plagued the modern from within. It is that same polemicity,
For Galli,

only now unconstrained by any nomos and resistant to the forms what
would be imposed upon it by any single decision or decider. It is, put
simply, the mode of polemicity that corresponds the generalized anomie that
has washed over the Earth with the emergence of the sea of globalization.

Eco-crisis justifies violent states of exception

Matthew Nash 12, PhD candidate in Political Science and Government at
Colorado State, Review of Mick Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty, New
Political Science. Sep2012, Vol. 34 Issue 3, p422-425. 4p.
the
contemporary sovereign state, which uses crises to legitimate states of
exception that reduce individuals to bare life through the biological
management of populations, already operates on the fundamental exclusion of
a more-than-human nature (p. 126). The states exclusion of nature from ethical and political consideration
In Against Ecological Sovereignty: Ethics, Biopolitics, and Saving the Natural World, Mick Smith argues that

ironically may lead to an intensification of the biopolitical predicament in which the sovereign exception has become the

the state of exception which has emerged

out of the global war on terror, may again be mobilized in the
name of the Ecological Crisis. The irony of this situation will be that in this particular
crisis which legitimates further technocratic interventions and further
state and corporate management of biological life, the crisis will emerge as
a result of sovereignty itself, from the way in which humanity has
defined itself on the basis of an excluded nature (p. 126). The (re)productions
of humanitys sovereign relation to nature in myths, theory, and the institutions in
which these forms are articulated, make up the anthropological machinea
series of interlocking ideas which reproduce this sovereign relation and result
in humanitys continued reduction of nature to resource and standing
reserve.
norm. It is not far-fetched, Smith says, that

The affirmatives shift to international cooperation

between the US and the PRC is a symptom of the globally
unified political which only produces insidious forms of
domination under the guise of harmonious collectivity.
Nordin 14 (Astrid, Lecturer in the Department of Politics, Philosophy, and Religion at
Lancaster University, Radical Exoticism: Baudrillard and Others Wars, IJBS Volume 11,
Number 2 (May 2014) Special Issue: Baudrillard and War, [SG])
Baudrillard has a limited amount to say about this outside, but with regards to Asia, and more specifically Japan, he argues for increased exoticisation
(Baudrillard 2003a). For Baudrillard, it is the modern Wests refusal of alterity that spawns nostalgia for the Other, who is now always already domesticated
(Baudrillard 1990 [1987]:145, 165). Despite this nostalgia, we must not try to foster difference. It is counterproductive to call for respecting the
difference of marginalized groups, as this relies on a presumption that they need to have an Identity and makes the marginal valued as such, thus leaving
the marginal where they are, in place. Difference must therefore be rejected in favour of greater otherness or alterity: otherness [laltrit] is not the
same thing as difference. One might even say that difference is what destroys otherness (Baudrillard 1993 [1990]: 127, 131). Thus the other must stay
Other, separate, perhaps difficult to understand, uncontrollable (Hegarty 2004: 118). In this way, Baudrillard advocates more exoticism, an interest in the
other as Other. The Other can only remain Other insofar as we resist the urge to assimilate. What, then, is the consequence of this for scholars who are
interested in configurations beyond the purported Western system or consumer society that Baudrillard clearly thinks he can speak about? Should we
simply stop speaking of Asia in order to try to give it some sort of status as an unknown unknown? Surely this would be intolerably patronising, building
precisely the ethos of derivative difference-promotion that destroys Otherness. Or should we sidestep the issue by simply assuming that everything is now
part of the global cleptocracy of Western-style capitalism, without an outside? This would surely be an equally intolerable and patronising approach to the
issue of otherness. I shall return to these questions towards the end of this article. First, however, I shall brave an attempt to speak of Others wars, namely
imaginations of war emerging from contemporary China. Before I venture into some discussion of contemporary Chinese modes of war, I shall state the
obvious: what I discuss here is merely a small selection of what one could write of as Chinese wars. There is a large and varied literature engaging the
varied traditions of Chinese strategic culture, the numerous cultural expressions that deal with the theme of war, not to mention the Chinese military in
foreign policy. In what follows I outline three dimensions of contemporary Chinese war in order to bring out a number of contrast and themes that have
some bearing on Baudrillards discussion of war. I turn, first, to the Peoples Republic of Chinas participation in the war on terror. I thereafter contrast this
allegedly modern and Western-led war with contemporary rhetoric in Chinese academic and policy discourse, which draws on Ancient Chinese

philosophy.

This discourse has focused on the pre-emption of war in

conjunction with the language of harmony, innate peacefulness and

soft power, portraying such attitudes in opposition to the West. Having outlined a
number of areas where I think Baudrillards discussions of war can shed some light on this
allegedly Chinese ontology of war, I thereafter turn to Chinese actors or discourses that act out war in other
modes, including in popular culture and propaganda. How should we understand these
simultaneous approaches to war, in relation to the disappearance of war that
Baudrillard and others have described in modern Western practices? As described
above, there are aspects of Baudrillards writing where all alternatives to American achieved utopia appear to be erased for

In the final parts of America, for example, simulation is portrayed as

a means of sustaining and extending American dominance at home and
abroad, which is now uncontested and uncontestable, a universal model
even reaching as far as China (Baudrillard 1989 [1986]: 116). And indeed, this universal model
has literally reached the very territorial border of China in the form of the war
on terror that was rolled out all the way to the Sino-Afghan border and
beyond. In Baudrillards view, the 9/11 attacks represented the clash of triumphant
globalization at war with itself and unfolded a fourth world war:
The first put an end to European supremacy and to the era of colonialism; the
second put an end to Nazism; and the third to Communism. Each one
brought us progressively closer to the single world order of today , which is
now nearing its end, everywhere opposed, everywhere grappling with hostile forces (Baudrillard, 2003b). In
Baudrillard (Beck 2009: 110).

the Chinese state has

joined forces with the American leadership to
reinstate the hegemony of the global (of which they have surely dreamt, just
this new fractal state of war and hostility,

To the American unilateral war on terror in Afghanistan and

George W. Bushs call you are either with us or against us, the Chinese
government responded with a (perhaps reluctant) we are with you! This
wish to be part of the global American self has not meant, however, the full
contribution to the war effort that some American representatives may have
hoped. China has, since around the time of 9/11 shifted from being extremely reluctant to
condone or participate in any form of peacekeeping missions , including under United
Nations (UN) flag, to being the UN Security Council member that contributes most to
UN peacekeeping missions. Much of this participation has taken the form of non-combatant personal.
like the rest of us).

Nonetheless, China has been an actively involved party in Operation Enduring Freedom. It has provided police training for
Afghanistans security forces, as well as mine-clearance. Though it was opposed to the US invasion of Iraq without UN mandate,
China has emerged as one of the biggest beneficiaries of the occupation, as it is one of the biggest winners of oil contracts in Iraq.
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, China has been accused of free-riding on American efforts, but China has nonetheless been clearly

The Chinese state has benefited from

participation in the war on terror in more ways than one. The war has
increased Chinese influence in Central Asia. It has legitimized Chinas harsh clamp-downs in Xinjiang,
where the state claims its violence is justified by the presence of separatist terrorists in the Muslim Uyghur community. Not
least, Chinas participation in the war on terror has been used to
demonstrate to the world that China is now a responsible great
power, as measured by the standard of international society (see
Yeophantong 2013 for a discussion of this responsibility rhetoric). Again, this rhetoric of
responsibility has been deployed by both American and Chinese leaders
to tie China more tightly to the purported American-led we. More recently,
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stressed the importance of continued Sino-US co-operation over
Afghanistan post-2014 troop withdrawal. Wang has publicly stressed the common goals of China
positioned as part of the participating and benefiting we.

and the US with regards to Afghanistan: We both hope Afghanistan will continue to maintain stability We both hope to see the

China
and the USA have jointly engaged in what is termed advisory and capacitybuilding for Afghans, for example in training Afghan diplomats, and their cooperation continues around shared goals in the region. Much could be said
here about Chinas participation in the American-led globalization project and
war on terror. My point here is simply to note that whatever we read America as doing through its war on terror, China is a
supporting and benefiting actor in this process. It is clearly positioned as part of this global idea
of self. At the same time, however, China is also portrayed, from within
and without, as a challenger, an alternative, or an other to that global,
American or Western order.
reconstruction of Afghanistan and we both dont want to see the resurgence of terrorism (cited in Chen Weihua, 2013).

We therefore turn next to the Chinese scholarly and governmental rhetoric that claims to offer such an alternative or challenge to

the Western way of war that Baudrillard criticized and that we can see China joining in the war on terror. (ii). Contemporary PRC rhetoric on pre-modern Chinese thought on war In contemporary China, the official
rhetoric on war focuses on pre-emption and the claim that China will never be a hegemonic or warmongering power unlike the US. In this rhetoric, the Chinese war is by nature a non-war. Official documents
emerging in the last decade repeatedly stress that China is by nature peaceful, which is why nobody needs to worry about its rise. In the 2005 government whitepaper Chinas Peaceful Development Road, for
example, we are told that: [i]t is an inevitable choice based on Chinas historical and cultural tradition that China persists unswervingly in taking the road of peaceful development. The Chinese nation has always
been a peace-loving one. Chinese culture is a pacific culture. The spirit of the Chinese people has always featured their longing for peace and pursuit of harmony (State Council of the PRC 2005b). The whitepaper
(and numerous other official and unofficial publications) posit an essentialised Chinese culture of peacefulness as prior to any Chinese relations with the world. This rhetoric of an inherently non-bellicose Chinese
way has also echoed in Chinese academic debates, where Chinese pre-modern philosophy has come back in fashion as a (selectively sampled) source of inspiration. The claims and logics that have come out of
these debates are varied. One significant grouping of Chinese academics directly follow the government line and claim that choosing peaceful rise is on the one hand Chinas voluntary action, on the other hand it
is an inevitable choice (Liu Jianfei 2006: 38). That peacefulness and harmony is something that Chinese people have always valued is an implication, and often explicitly stated fact in these literatures. Zhan
Yunling, for example, claims that from ancient times until today, China has possessed traditional thought and a culture of seeking harmony (Zhang Yunling 2008: 4). This claim to natural harmony is mutually

A related set of
commentators further stress the significance of militarily non-violent means
to China getting its (naturally peaceful) way in international relations
This line of
argument typically sees what some would call soft power tools as a way of
getting others to become more like yourself without any need for outright
war or other forms of physical violence
supportive of the claim that the Chinese nation has always been a peaceful nation, to authors such as Liu Jianfei (2006), or Yu Xiaofeng and Wang Jiangli (2006).

. For example, Ding

Sheng draws on the Sunzi quote mentioned above: to subjugate the enemys army without doing battle is the highest of excellence (Ding Sheng 2008: 197).

. In a discussion of the official government rhetoric of harmonious world under former president Hu

Jintao, Shi Zhongwen accordingly stresses that the doctrine opposes going to extremes, and therefore contradicts what Shi calls the philosophy of struggle (Shi Zhongwen 2008: 40, where struggle implies Marxist
ideology). Qin Zhiyong similarly argues that China needs to steer away from collisions and embrace the aim of merging different cultures (Qin Zhiyong 2008: 73). At the same time, few Chinese academics question
the direction of the merging of cultures discussed above clearly it is other cultures that should merge into Chinas peaceful one. In a common line of thought that draws on the historical concept of Tianxia, or Allunder-heaven, it is argued that the Chinese leadership can thus bring about a harmonious world through voluntary submission [by others] rather than force simply through its superior morality and exemplary
behaviour (Yan Xuetong 2008: 159). On this logic, the leadership will never need to use violence, because everybody will see its magnanimity and will want to emulate its behaviour (Zhao Tingyang 2006: 34. See
Callahan 2008: 755 for a discussion). Much of these debates have come to pivot around this concept of Tianxia, an imaginary of the world that builds on a holistic notion of space, without radical self-other
distinction or bordered difference. To some thinkers, this imagination is based on a notion of globalisation (for example Yu Xiaofeng and Wang Jiangli 2006: 59) or networked space (Ni Shixiong and Qian Xuming
2008: 124) where everything is always already connected to everything else in a borderless world. In these accounts, Tianxia thinking is completely different from Western civilisation, since Chinese civilisation
insists on its own subjectivity, and possesses inclusivity (Zhou Jianming and Jiao Shixin 2008: 28). Despite this apparent binary, it is claimed that Tianxiaism involves an identification with all of humankind, where
there is no differentiation or distinction between people (Li Baojun and Li Zhiyong 2008: 82). A thinker whose deployment of the Tianxia concept has been particularly influential is Zhao Tingyang, who proposes the
concept as a Chinese and better way of imagining world order (Zhao Tingyang 2005; 2006), where better means better than the Western inter-state system to which Tianxia is portrayed as the good opposite. In
opposition to this Western system, he argues that Tianxia can offer a view from nowhere or a view from the world, where [w]orld-ness cannot be reduced to internationality, for it is of the wholeness or totality
rather than the between-ness (Zhao Tingyang 2006: 39). However, as a consequence of a prioritisation of order over the preservation of alterity, any inconsistency or contradiction in the system will be a disaster
(Zhao Tingyang 2006: 33). As a corollary of this prioritisation, Zhao comes to insist on the homogeneity of his all-inclusive space, which aims at the uniformity of society (Zhao Tingyang 2006: 33, emphasis in
original) where all political levels should be essentially homogenous or homological so as to create a harmonious system (2006: 33). The aim of the Tianxia system is thus to achieve one single homogeneous
and uniform space. Clearly, for such homogeneity to be born from a heterogeneous world, someone must change. Zhao argues that: one of the principles of Chinese political philosophy is said to turn the enemy

this
conversion to a single good homogeneity should happen
through volontariness rather than through
expansive colonialism: an empire of All-under-Heaven could only
into a friend, and it would lose its meaning if it were not to remove conflicts and pacify social problems in a word, to transform () the bad into the good (Zhao Tingyang 2006: 34). Moreover,

be an exemplar passively in situ, rather than positively become missionary

(Zhao Tingyang 2006: 36, emphasis in original). However, when we are given clues as to how this idea
of the good to which everyone should conform would be determined , Zhaos idea
of self-other relations seems to rely on the possibility of some Archimedean
point from which to judge this good, and/or the complete eradication of any
otherness, so that the one space that exists is completely the space of self
(Zhao Tingyang 2006: 33). Thus, Zhao confesses that [t]he unspoken theory is that most people do
not really know what is best for them, but that the elite do, so the elite ought
genuinely to decide for the people (2006: 32). As explained by William A. Callahan: By thinking through the
world with a view from everywhere, Zhao argues that we can have a complete and perfect understanding of problems and
solutions that is all-inclusive. With this all-inclusive notion of Tianxia, there is literally no outside. Since all places and all

This
complete and perfect understanding is hence attainable only to an elite,
who will achieve homogeneity (convert others into self) through example.
Eventually, then, there will be no other, the many will have been
problems are domestic, Zhao says that this model guarantees the a prioricompleteness of the world (Callahan 2007: 7).

transformed into the one (Zhao Tingyang 2005: 13, see also 2006). It is through this
transformation and submission to the ruling elite that the prevention
of war is imagined. If Baudrillard had engaged with these contemporary Chinese redeployments
of pre-modern thought on war (which, to my knowledge, he never did), I think he would have
recognised many of the themes that interested him in Western approaches to the first Gulf
war. Most strikingly, this is a way of talking about war that writes out war from its story. Like deterrence, it is an
imagination of war that approaches it via prevention and pre-emption . What
is more, we recognise an obsession with the self-image of the self to itself in
this case, a Chinese, undemocratic self rather than a Western, democratic
one. In this Chinese war, like in the Persian Gulf of which Baudrillard wrote, there is
no space for an Other that is Other. In the Tianxia imaginary, Others can only be imagined as something
that will eventually assimilate into The System and become part of the Self, as the Self strives for all-inclusive perfection. There is

Encounter only happens once the Other becomes like

the Self, is assimilated into the One, and hence there is no encounter at all (for
an analysis that reads Baudrillard and Tianxia to this effect in a Chinese non-war context, see Nordin 2012). As was the
case with the first Gulf War, the war that we are waiting for here in the
Chinese case is thus a non-war. If by war we mean some form of (symbolic)
exchange or some clash of forms, agons, or forces (as we tend to do even in the current cutting
edge research in critical war studies, see Nordin and berg 2013) we cannot expect it to take place . In
China, we see not only a participation in the Western system of
(non)war through the war on terror, but also another system that
precisely denies space for imagining an other as Other, which in turn makes
the idea of exchange impossible. In this sense, the Ancient Chinese approach to war through
the Tianxia concept at least as it is reflected by current Chinese thinkers like Zhao Tingyang and Yan Xuetong is not a
Clausewitzean war continuing politics by other means, but precisely a
continuation of the absence of politics by other means. It arguably
shares this aspect with both the first and the second Gulf Wars. This, however, is
no meeting with an Other in any form.

certainly not to say that there are not those who fear a Chinese war or that we have no reason to fear it. In various guises, the war
that is imagined through a Clausewitzean ontology of agonistic and reciprocal exchange returns and is reified also in China. It is not
uncommon for authors discussing the Chinese traditions of thinking war that I describe above to begin their discussion by explicitly
drawing on Clausewitz and take his war as their point of departure (for example Liu Tiewa 2014). For several Chinese writers, it is
clear that this building of a harmonious world is directed against others whose influence should be smashed (Fang Xiaojiao 2008:
68). From this line of thinkers, the call to build a harmonious world has also been used to argue for increased Chinese military
capacity, including its naval power (Deng Li 2009). Although Chinese policy documents stress that violence or threat of violence
should be avoided, they similarly appear to leave room for means that would traditionally be understood as both hard and soft in
Joseph Nyes dichotomisation (See for example State Council of the PRC 2005a). Indeed, many of Chinas neighbours have voiced

a Chinese non-war is no less

frightening to its neighbours than a war be it labelled just or
unjust, real or virtual. This Chinese war past, present and future is
acted out in various different modes. Violent war is reified through the
spectacle of computer games, art, online memes, cartoons and not least
dramas on film and television (Diamant 2011, 433). The Chinese state claims success
in all of its wars, and simultaneously claims that it has never behaved
aggressively beyond its borders (which is also, of course, a convenient way of
glossing over all the violence perpetrated by the Chinese state
within those borders, the violence with which they are upheld and
with which they were established in the first place, and the clear
contradiction between the states fixation on territorial integrity and
its borderless and holisticTianxia rhetoric). Popular cultural renditions of war paint
a more varied picture, but all contribute to a reification of war.
concern with growing Chinese military capacity over the last few years, and

Engagement will ensure Chinas inclusion in the

Global order
Friedberg 15 (Aaron L. Friedberg is Professor of Politics and
International Affairs at Princeton University, Survival vol 57 no 3 June/July
2015,
http://www.ou.edu/uschina/texts/Friedberg.2015.Survival.US_China_Strat.pdf,
/Kent Denver-MB)
doubling down on engagement and, in particular, on efforts
to tame China by further enmeshing it in the existing international system.
The first approach essentially involves

The arguments and assumptions underpinning this strategy are laid out most clearly in a 2008 Foreign Affairs
article by Princeton professor John Ikenberry entitled The Rise of China and the Future of the West. Ikenberry

takes it as axiomatic that Chinas power will continue to grow while, at least
in relative terms, that of the United States inevitably declines. According to him, what
political scientists refer to as a power transition, in which a previously dominant state
is eventually displaced by a rising one, is thus under way. Although the
history of such transitions has often been violent, Ikenberry believes that,
properly handled, this one need not be. As he explains, the current USled Western order is hard to overturn and easy to join. Even if China wanted
to overthrow it, the existence of nuclear weapons has made war among great powers unlikely eliminating the
major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemons.1
Thankfully, war-driven change has been abolished as a historical process.2 More to the point, if its leaders see
their interests as Ikenberry believes they must, China should have no reason to risk such drastic and dangerous

America designed and built is open, integrated,

and rule-based.3 China can gain full access to and thrive within this system ;
indeed, to a considerable degree it has already done precisely tha t. Because it
is built around rules and norms of nondiscrimination and market openness ,
the Western order enables rising states to advance their expanding
economic and political goals within it. As Ikenberry notes, China has already discovered the
measures. This is because the order that

massive economic returns that are possible by operating within this open-market system.4 In the security
domain, the norms of state sovereignty and the rule of law have provided China with a measure of protection
and reassurance, even when it was relatively weak, and they continue to serve its interests.5 At the highest

the existing global system provides new entrants with ways of gaining
status and authority and opportunities to play a role in its governance . Small
wonder, then, that, as Ikenberry sees it, China is increasingly working within , rather
than outside of, the Western order.6 The prescriptions that follow from this analysis are
straightforward and reassuring. Basically, Washington needs to stay the course ,
demonstrating renewed faith in the resilience and attractive power of the
system it built after the Second World War. The United States must invest
in bolstering the existing order, reinforcing the rules and institutions
that comprise it, and avoiding actions that might undermine them in
pursuit of short-term advantage. Properly managed, the current system
can continue to function, and to serve Americas interests, even as its
power declines relative to Chinas. In short, the rise of China need not lead to a volcanic
struggle The Western order has the potential to turn the coming power shift
into a peaceful change on terms favorable to the United States.7 Regarding
levels,

the balancing part of US strategy, Ikenberry advocates the preservation of existing alliances, which he describes
as having primarily political value as part of a wider Western institutional structure.8 On the question of

the United States should try to ease Beijing down the road
toward liberalising domestic political reform, he appears to favour a longwhether and, if so, how

term, indirect approach. Even though the rules and institutions of the existing system are rooted in
the evolving forces of democracy and capitalism, it is apparently unnecessary for a nation to be democratic to

directly, the logic of his

argument would seem to suggest that, in time, as it becomes more deeply
integrated into the Western order, China is likely to embrace the principles on
which it is based
become a patron and stakeholder.9 However, while Ikenberry does not say so

Politics is death that lives a human life. Status quo legal

frameworks, even in its most radical form, is turned to
death as it reifies the notion that of a human, constructed
by its very warding off of death this causes
necropolitical excess, the perverse pleasure of survival at
the deaths of others, inevitable as death figures into an
economy of scarcity.
Mbembe 3 Achille Mbembe, senior researcher at the Institute of Social and
Economic Research at the University of the Witwatersrand, Necropolitics,
Public Culture 15(1): pg.13
The aim of this essay is not to debate the singularity of the extermination of the Jews or to hold it up by

modernity was at the origin of multiple

concepts of sovereigntyand therefore of the biopolitical . Disregarding this
multiplicity, late-modern political criticism has unfortunately privileged
normative theories of democracy and has made the concept of reason
one of the most important elements of both the project of modernity and
of the topos of sovereignty.7 From this perspective, the ultimate expression of
sovereignty is the production of general norms by a body (the demos) made
up of free and equal men and women. These men and women are posited as full subjects
capable of self-understanding, self-consciousness, and self-representation. Politics, therefore, is
defined as twofold: a project of autonomy and the achieving of
agreement among a collectivity through communication and
recognition. This, we are told, is what differentiates it from war.8 In other words, it is on the
basis of a distinction between reason and unreason (passion, fantasy)
that late-modern criticism has been able to articulate a certain idea of the
political, the community, the subjector, more fundamentally, of what the good
life is all about, how to achieve it, and, in the process, to become a fully
moral agent. Within this paradigm, reason is the truth of the subject and
politics is the exercise of reason in the public sphere. The exercise of reason is
tantamount to the exercise of freedom, a key element for individual autonomy. The romance of
sovereignty, in this case, rests on the belief that the subject is the master
and the controlling author of his or her own meaning. Sovereignty is therefore
defined as a twofold process of self-institution and self-limitation (fixing ones own limits for oneself). The
exercise of sovereignty, in turn, consists in societys capacity for self-creation
through recourse to institutions inspired by specific social and
imaginary significations.9 This strongly normative reading of the politics of sovereignty has
been the object of numerous critiques, which I will not rehearse here.10 My concern is those
figures of sovereignty whose central project is not the struggle for
way of example.6 I start from the idea that

autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization of human existence

and the material destruction of human bodies and populations. Such
figures of sovereignty are far from a piece of prodigious insanity or an
expression of a rupture between the impulses and interests of the body and
those of the mind. Indeed, they, like the death camps, are what constitute the nomos
of the political space in which we still live. Furthermore, contemporary experiences of
human destruction suggest that it is possible to develop a reading of politics,
sovereignty, and the subject different from the one we inherited from
the philosophical discourse of modernity. Instead of considering reason as
the truth of the subject, we can look to other foundational categories that
are less abstract and more tactile, such as life and death. Significant for such a
project is Hegels discussion of the relation between death and the becoming subject. Hegels account of
death centers on a bipartite concept of negativity. First, the human negates nature (a negation exteriorized
in the humans effort to reduce nature to his or her own needs); and second, he or she transforms the
negated element through work and struggle. In transforming nature, the human being creates a world; but

Within the Hegelian

paradigm, human death is essentially voluntary. It is the result of risks
consciously assumed by the subject. According to Hegel, in these risks the animal
that constitutes the human subjects natural being is defeated . In other words, the
human being truly becomes a subjectthat is, separated from the animal
in the struggle and the work through which he or she confronts death
(understood as the violence of negativity). It is through this confrontation with death
that he or she is cast into the incessant movement of history. Becoming subject therefore
supposes upholding the work of death. To uphold the work of death is precisely how
in the process, he or she also is exposed to his or her own negativity.

Hegel defines the life of the Spirit. The life of the Spirit, he says, is not that life which is frightened of
death, and spares itself destruction, but that life which assumes death and lives with it. Spirit attains its

Politics is therefore death that

lives a human life. Such, too, is the definition of absolute knowledge
and sovereignty: risking the entirety of ones life.
truth only by finding itself in absolute dismemberment.11

Globalization forces fragmented liberalism on the

world, assuming a universal liberal subject. The
result of this process is a gigantic clash between the
globalized world order and the fragments that
emerge, a world war over global values.
Baudrillard 96 [Jean, March 16, The Global and the Universal]
Globalisation and universality are not equivalent terms; in fact they could be considered
to mutually exclude one another. Globalisation pertains to techniques, the
market, tourism, information. Universality pertains to values, human rights , freedoms,
culture, democracy. Globalisation seems to be irreversible, the universal on the other hand appears to
be almost an endangered species. At least in so far as it constitutes a system of values for Western
modernity with no counterpart in any other culture. No word for a value system which claims to speak with
a single voice for all cultures and their difference, but which, paradoxically, does not think of itself as
relative and sees itself quite ingenuously as the ultimate transcendent goal of all the others. We do not
imagine for one moment that the universal might refer only to localised Western thought, a product that is
specific to the West, which, original though it may be, is in the final analysis, every bit as difficult to export
as any other local product. Yet that is exactly how the Japanese see the universal, as something specifically
Western, and far from adopting this abstract concept, they take what for us is universal and, in a curious
reversal, make it relative and incorporate it into their own singularity. Any culture worthy of the name loses

Any culture that makes itself universal loses its singularity

and, gradually dies. This is the case for the cultures we have destroyed by assimilating them by
force, but it is also the case for our own, in its claim to be universal. The difference
itself in the universal.

is that the others have died of their singularity and that is a noble death whereas we are dying from the
loss of all singularity, from the extermination of our values, and that is not a noble death. We think that the
destiny of any single value is its elevation to the universal without taking heed of the mortal danger that
this promotion represents. Rather than an elevation, it is a reduction or shall we say an elevation to a
degree zero of value. At the time of the Enlightenment, universalisation was a top down affair, in a process
of continuous advancement. Today, it is bottom up and involves a neutralisation of values as a result of

human rights, for democracy, etc.,

they expand according to the law of the lowest common denominator , to a point of
maximum entropy. The Xerox degree of value. In fact, the universal perishes with
their proliferation and their endless dispersal. And so it is for

globalisation. When the dynamic of the universal as transcendence, as ideal, and as utopia becomes a
reality, it ceases to exist as transcendence, as ideal, as utopia. The gobalisation of exchange puts an end
to the universality of values. It is the triumph of monothought over universal thought. What is globalised is
first of all the market, the promiscuity of exchange of anything and everything, the perpetual movement of
money. Culturally speaking, this is the anything goes promiscuity of the signifier and of values; in other
words, pornography. The endless stream flooding the net with anything and everything, this is
pornography. No need for sexual indecency, the simple existence of this interactive copulation is all it
takes. At theend of this process, there is no longer any difference between the global and the universal.

The universal is itself globalised, democracy, human rights circulate in

exactly the same way, through exactly the same channels as any global
product: like oil or capital. What happens with the passage from the universal to the global is at
once a homogenisation and an infinite fragmenting of the system. The global interconnection of networks
is doubled by a dislocation of the fragments moving further and further apart from each other - like a sky
rocket that explodes and shatters at its highest point then scatters in a thousand fragments. What takes
the place the central is not the local, it's the dis-located. What takes the place of the cencentric is not the
de-centered but the offcenter. Disintegration of the universal. Virtual totalitarianism: "www:// ization of the
world" and fragmentation. Globalisation is both homogenisation and increasing discrimination.

Marginalisation and exclusion, are no accident: they are in the very logic of
globalisation which, unlike the universal, breaks apart the existing structures,
all the better to assimilate them. On every level the gaps grow wider, become irreversible. A
little like the universe where the galaxies are moving away from one another at such prodigious speeds. If
this is the case, one might well ask whether the universal hasn't already succumbed under the weight of
its own critical mass, whether it ever had any real existence other than in official discourse and moral
codes. In any event, for us, the mirror of the universal is shattered (one could even see it as a kind of

in the fragments of this

shattered mirror of the universal, all singularities reemerge. Those that we believed
mirror stage of humanity). But this is perhaps a good thing because ,

threatened are surviving; those we believed had disappeared are coming back to life. Japan, once again, is
a remarkable case in point. Japan, better than any other country, has made a success of globalisation
(technical, economic, financial) without going through the phase of the universal (the succession of middleclass ideologies and forms of political organisation) and without losing anything of its singularity, despite
what is said to the contrary. One could even say that it is precisely because Japan was never lumbered with
the concept of the universal that it succeeded so well technically and globally, by bringing together the
singular (the power of tradition) and the global (the power of the virtual, that is, the internet revolution ).
Behind the increasingly fierce resistance to globalisation, social and political resistance which can seem
like an archaic refusal of modernity at all costs, one cannot but read a reaction against the domination of
the universal, a kind of painful revisionism in respect to the achievements of modernity, and in respect to
the idea of progress and of History, a rejection not only of the (in)famous global techno-structure, but of
the underlying monoculturalism, the mental structure that places all cultures, from every continent under
the one sign of the universal. This resurgence, or, one might even say, this "insurrection" of singularity can
take on violent, anomalous, irrational forms from the perspective of (so-called) "enlightened" thought;
ethnic, religious, linguistic, but also on an individual level, forms of neurosis and personality disorder. But it
would be a monumental error (the same error which can be seen in the moralistic orchestration of political
correctness common to all power structures and the majority of "intellectuals") to write off these
movements of revolt as populist, archaic, or even terrorist. Every event that makes its mark in the world
today, does so in reaction to this abstract universality (including the antagonism of Islam towards Western
values - it is because Islam is the most violent critic of this Western globalisation that Islam is public enemy
number one today). If we refuse to understand this, we will exhaust ourselves in an endless contest

between a universal thought sure of its power and sure of its rightness, and an ever increasing number of
irreducible singularities. Even in our societies, which are thoroughly acculturated to the universal, it is clear
that nothing that has been sacrificed to this concept has truly disappeared. It has simply gone
underground. And what is being played out in reverse today is an entire history supposedly progressivist,
an entire evolutionism cristallised around its ultimate end, which, moreover, has been completely lost sight
of in the meantime. Today this utopia is dislocated, and its dislocation at the deepest levels is proceeding
even faster than its imposition by force. What we are dealing with here is a complex three level process:
the globalisation of exchange, the universality of values and the singularity of forms (languages, cultures,
individuals, character types, but also chance, accident etc.- everything the universal is bound to reject as
exception or anomaly). But, the situation is changing and is becoming more and more extreme as universal
values lose their authority and legitimacy. As long as they were accepted as mediating values, they
succeeded (more or less) in integrating singularities as differences within a universal culture of difference.

globalisation triumphant is razing to the

ground every difference and every value, generating a perfectly indifferent
(non)culture. And all that is left, once the universal is gone, is the all-mighty
global techno-structure on the one hand and singularities abandoned to their
own wild devices on the other. The universal has had its day in history. But today, caught
between a monolithic global order, an unconditional globalisation, and the stubborn insurrection
of singularities erratic, concepts of freedom, democracy and human rights
pale into insignificance, mere ghosts of a lost universal. And it is difficult to imagine
that they could be reborn from their ashes by the mere play of the political which is caught up in the same process of deregulation and whose
foundations are almost as flimsy as those of moral and intellectual authority .
But today they are no longer able to do so because

But the die has not yet been cast, even if for universal values, all bets are definitely off The stakes have
risen and globalisation is by no means a sure winner. Everywhere its dissolving and homogenising force is
being challenged by emerging forces heterogeneous in nature, which are not only different but
antagonistic and irreducible. What may emerge, out of the shattering of the global system, are
singularities. Now, these singularities are neither negative nor positive. They are not an alternative to
global order, they are on a different scale. They are not subject to value judgements; so they can be either
the best or the worst. Their one absolute saving grace is to allow us to break out of the straitjacket of
totality. They cannot be federated in a single historical move. They are the despair of every would-be
dominant monothought. But they are not a monocounterthought. They invent their own rules of the game,

This is what
the Fourth World War will be about, and it will be the only truly world war, since its
stakes are globalisation itself. Culture itself started off as a singularity. That is, an incomparable,
and their most likely fate is the fate of heresies: to be eradicated by global orthodoxy.

irreducible, inexchangeable form. Then came the concept of universal culture. Then the current
globalisation of a culture which had become a global product. I would like to talk a little more about this
"fate of culture" which poses for each of us, within the context of the global, the problem of cultural
identity.

The simulacra of law inculcates the necropolitical

state of total lawfare.
Comaroff and Comaroff 7 John, Professor of African and African American
Studies and of Anthropology, Oppenheimer Fellow in African Studies at Harvard, and Jean,
Professor of African and African American Studies and of Anthropology, Oppenheimer Fellow in
African Studies also at Harvard, Law and disorder in the postcolony, Social
Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale (2007) 15, pg. 144
Nor is it just the politics of the present that are being judicialised. As we said earlier,

the past, too, is

being fought out in the courts. Britain, for example, is currently being sued for acts of atrocity in
its African empire (Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005): for having killed local leaders, unlawfully alienated

By these means is colonialism itself

rendered criminal. Hauled before a judge, history is made to submit to the
scales of justice at the behest of those who suffered it. And to be reduced to a cash
equivalent, payable as the official tender of damage, dispossession, loss, trauma. What imperialism
territory from one African people to another, and so on.33

is being indicted for, above all, is its commission of lawfare: the use of its own
penal codes, its administrative procedures, its states of emergency, its
charters and mandates and warrants, to discipline its subjects by means of
violence made legible and legal by its own sovereign word . Also, to commit its own
ever-so-civilised forms of kleptocracy. Lawfare the resort to legal instruments, to the violence inherent in
the law, to commit acts of political coercion, even erasure (Comaroff 2001) is equally marked in

As a species of political displacement, it becomes most visible

when those who serve the state conjure with legalities to act against its
citizens. Most infamous recently is Zimbabwe, where the Mugabe regime has consistently passed laws
postcolonies.

to justify the coercive silencing of its critics. Operation Murambatsvina, Drive Out Trash, which has forced
political opponents out of urban areas under the banner of slum clearance has recently taken this
practice to unprecedented depths. Murambatsvina, says the government, is merely an application of the

Lawfare34 may be limited or it may

reduce people to bare life; in Zimbabwe, it has mutated into a necropolitics
with a rising body count. But it always seeks to launder visceral power in a
wash of legitimacy as it is deployed to strengthen the sinews of state or
enlarge the capillaries of capital. Hence Benjamins (1978) thesis that the law originates
in violence and lives by violent means; that the legal and the lethal
animate one another. Of course, in 1919 Benjamin could not have envisaged the possibility
law of the land to raze dangerous illegal structures.

that lawfare might also be a weapon of the weak, turning authority back on itself by commissioning courts
to make claims for resources, recognition, voice, integrity, sovereignty. But this still does not lay to rest the

Why the fetishism of legalities? What are its implications for the
play of Law and Dis/order in the postcolony? And are postcolonies different in
this respect from other nation-states? The answer to the first question looks obvious. The
turn to law would seem to arise directly out of growing anxieties about
lawlessness. But this does not explain the displacement of the political into
the legal or the turn to the courts to resolve an ever greater range of wrongs .
The fetishism, in short, runs deeper than purely a concern with crime. It has to do with the
very constitution of the postcolonial polity. Late modernist nationhood, it appears, is
undergoing an epochal move away from the ideal of cultural homogeneity : a
nervous, often xenophobic shift toward heterogeneity (Anderson 1983). The rise of
key questions:

neoliberalism with its impact on population flows, on the dispersion of cultural practices, on geographies
of production and accumulation has heightened this, especially in former colonies, which were erected

with growing
heterodoxy, legal instruments appear to offer a means of
commensuration (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000): a repertoire of standardised terms
and practices that permit the negotiation of values, beliefs, ideals and
interests across otherwise intransitive lines of cleavage . Hence the flight into
a constitutionalism that explicitly embraces heterogeneity in highly
individualistic, universalistic Bills of Rights, even where states are paying less
and less of the bills. Hence the effort to make human rights into an ever more
global, ever more authoritative discourse. But there is something else at work too. A wellfrom the first on difference. And difference begets more law. Why? Because,

recognised corollary of the neoliberal turn, recall, has been the outsourcing by states of many of the
conventional operations of governance, including those, like health services, policing and the conduct of

Bureaucracies do retain some of their old

functions, of course. But most 21st century governments have reduced their
administrative reach, entrusting ever more to the market and delegating ever
more responsibility to citizens as individuals, as volunteers, as classes of
actor, social or legal. Under these conditions, especially where the threat of disorder
seems immanent, civil law presents itself as a more or less effective weapon
war, integral to the management of life itself.

of the weak, the strong and everyone in between . Which, in turn, exacerbates
the resort to lawfare. The court has become a utopic site to which
human agency may turn for a medium in which to pursue its ends .
This, once again, is particularly so in postcolonies, where bureaucracies and bourgeoisies were not
elaborate to begin with; and in which heterogeneity had to be negotiated from the start. Put all this

the fetishism of the law seems over-determined. Not only is

public life becoming more legalistic, but so, in regulating their own affairs and
in dealing with others, are communities within the nation-state : cultural
communities, religious communities, corporate communities, residential
communities, communities of interest, even outlaw communities .
Everything, it seems, exists here in the shadow of the law. Which also makes
together and

it unsurprising that a culture of legality should saturate not just civil order but also its criminal
undersides. Take another example from South Africa, where organised crime appropriates, re-commissions
and counterfeits the means and ends of both the state and the market. The gangs on the Cape Flats in
Cape Town mimic the business world, having become a lumpen stand-in for those excluded from the
national economy (Standing 2003). For their tax-paying clients, those gangs take on the positive functions
of government, not least security provision. Illicit corporations of this sort across the postcolonial world
often have shadow judicial personnel and convene courts to try offenders against the persons, property
and social order over which they exert sovereignty. They also provide the policing that the state either has
stopped supplying or has outsourced to the private sector. Some have constitutions. A few are even
structured as franchises and, significantly, are said to offer alternative citizenship to their members.35
Charles Tilly (1985) once suggested, famously, that modern states operate much like organised crime.

the counterfeiting of
a culture of legality by the criminal underworld feeds the dialectic of law and
disorder. After all, once government outsources its policing services and
franchises force, and once outlaw organisations shadow the state by
providing protection and dispensing justice, social order itself becomes
like a hall of mirrors. What is more, this dialectic has its own geography. A
geography of discontinuous, overlapping sovereignties . We said a moment ago that
communities of all kinds have become ever more legalistic in regulating their
affairs; it is often in the process of so doing , in fact, that they become
communities at all, the act of judicialisation being also an act of objectification. Herein lies
their will to sovereignty, which we take to connote the exercise of
autonomous control over the lives, deaths and conditions of existence of
those who fall within its purview and the extension over them of the
jurisdiction of some kind of law. Lawmaking, to cite Benjamin (1978: 295) yet
again, is power making. But power is the principal of all lawmaking . In sum, to
transform itself into sovereign authority, power demands an architecture
of legalities. Or their simulacra
These days, organised crime is operating ever more like states. Self-evidently,

The biopolitical imperative to secure life, in any

instance, through the prevention of war by liberal
means, powers a global war machine that
exponentially expands in lethality
Evans and Hardt 10 [Brad, lecturer in the School of Politics and
International Studies at the University of Leeds, Michael, Professor of
Literature and Italian at Duke University, Barbarians to Savages: Liberal
War Inside and Out, Theory & Event 13:2, 2010]

One of the most important aspects of your work has been to argue why
the original sentiment which provoked Deleuze and Guattaris Nomadology
narrative needed to be challenged. With the onset of a global war machine
which showed absolutely no respect for state boundaries, matched by the rise
of many local fires of resistance which had no interest in capturing state power, the
Evans:

sentiment that History is always written from the victory of States could now be brought firmly into
question. On a theoretical level alone, the need to bring the Nomadology Treatise up to date was an
important move. However, there was something clearly more at stake for you than simply attempting to

One gets the impression from your works that you were
deeply troubled by what was taking place with this new found
humanitarianism. Indeed, as you suggest, if we accept that this changing political
terrain demanded a rewriting of war itselfaway from geo-political territorial
struggles which once monopolised the strategic field, towards bio-political life struggles
whose unrelenting wars were now to be consciously fought for the politics of all life
itself, then it could be argued that the political stakes could not be higher.
canonise Deleuze and Guattari.

For not only does a bio-political ascendency force a re-conceptualisation of the war effortto include those
forces which are less militaristic and more developmental (one can see this best reflected today in the now
familiar security mantra War by Other Means), but through this process a new paradigm appears which
makes it possible to envisage for the first time in human history a Global State of War or a Civil War on a

it was rather easy to find support for this non-State

paradigm during the 1990sespecially when the indigenous themselves started
writing of the onset of a Fourth World War which was enveloping the planet and consuming
planetary scale. Whilst

everybody within, some have argued that the picture became more clouded with the invasion of Iraq which

The familiar language that has been routinely

deployed here would be of US Exceptionalism. My concern is not really to attend to this
revival of an out-dated theoretical persuasion. I agree with your sentiments in Multitude that this
account can be convincingly challenged with relative ease . Foucault has
done enough himself to show that Liberal War does not demand a strategic trade-off
between geo-political and biopolitical aspirations. They can be mutually reenforcing, even, or perhaps more to the point, especially within a global
Liberal Imaginary. And what is more, we should not lose sight of the fact that it was when
major combat operations were effectively declared over , that is when the
borderlands truly ignited. My concerns today are more attuned to the post-Bush era, which
was simply geo-politics as usual.

going back to the original War on Terrors life-centric remit is once again calling for the need to step up the
humanitarian war effort in order to secure the global peace. Indeed, perhaps more worrying still, given that
the return of the Kantian inspired humanitarian sensibility can now be presented in an altogether more
globally enlightened fashion, offering a marked and much needed departure from the destructive but
ultimately powerless (in the positive sense of the word) self-serving neo-con, then it is possible to detect a
more intellectually vociferous shift taking place which is rendering all forms of political difference to be
truly dangerous on a planetary scale. With this in mind, I would like your thoughts on the Global State of
War today. What for instance do you feel have been the most important changes in the paradigm since you
first proposed the idea? And would you argue that war is still the permanent social relation of global rule?

a global civil war starts from the question of sovereignty.

Traditionally war is conceived (in the field of international relations, for instance, or in
international law) as armed conflict between two sovereign power s whereas civil war
Hardt: The notion of

designates conflict within a single territory in which one or both of the parties is not sovereign. War
designates, in other words, a conflict in some sense external to the structures of sovereignty and civil war
a conflict internal to them. It is clear that few if any of the instances of armed conflict around the world
today fit the classic model of war between sovereign states. And perhaps even the great conflicts of the
cold war, from Korea and Vietnam to countries throughout Latin America, already undermined the
distinction, draping the conflict between sovereign states in the guise of local civil wars. Toni Negri and I
thus claimed that in our era there is no more war but only civil wars or, really, a global civil war. It is
probably more precise to say instead that the distinction between war and civil war has been undermined,
in the same way that one might say, in more metaphorical terms, not that there is no more outside but

rather that the division between inside and outside has been eroded. This claim is also widely recognized,
it seems to me, among military and security theorists. The change from the framework of war to that of
civil war, for instance, corresponds closely to thinking of armed conflicts as not military campaigns but
police actions, and thus a shift from the external to the internal use of force. The general rhetorical move
from war to security marks in more general terms a similar shift. The security mantra that you cite war
by other means also indicates how the confusion between inside and outside implies the mixture of a
series of fields that are traditionally separate: war and politics, for example, but also killing and generating
forms of social life. This opens a complicated question about the ways in which contemporary military
actions have become biopolitical and what that conception helps us understand about them. Rather than
pursuing that biopolitical question directly, though, I want first to understand better how the shift in the
relationship between war and sovereignty that Toni and I propose relates to your notion of liberal and

In a war conventionally conceived, it is sufficient for the two

sovereign powers to justify their actions primarily on the basis of national
humanitarian war.

interest as long as they remain within the confines of international law. Whereas those inside , in other
words, are at least in principle privilege to the liberal framework of rights and representation, those outside

When the relationship of sovereignty shifts, however, and the distinction

then there are no such limits of the liberal
ideological and political structures. This might be a way of understanding why
contemporary military actions have to be justified in terms of discourses
of human rights and liberal values. And this might be related, in turn, to what many
political theorists analyze as the decline of liberal values in the US political
sphere at the hands of neoliberal and neoconservative logics.1 In other words, perhaps when the
are not.

between inside and outside erodes,

division declines between the inside and outside of sovereignty, on the one hand, the liberal logic must be
deployed (however inadequately) to justify the use of violence over what was the outside while, on the
other, liberal logics are increasingly diluted or suppressed in what was the inside. Evans: What I am
proposing with the Liberal War Thesis borrows from some pioneering works which have already started to
cover the main theoretical ground2 . Central to this approach is an attempt to critically evaluate global
Liberal governance (which includes both productive and non-productive elements) by questioning its will to

Liberal Peace is thus challenged, not on the basis of its abstract claims to universality
otherwise, but precisely because its global imaginary shows a
remarkable capacity to wage warby whatever meansin order to
govern all species life. This is not, then, to be confused with some militaristic appropriation of
rule.

juridical or

the democratic body politica situation in which Liberal value systems have been completely undermined
by the onslaught of the military mind. More revealing, it exposes the intricate workings of a Liberal
rationality whose ultimate pursuit is global political dominance. Traces of this account can no doubt be
found in Michael Ignatieffs (completely sympathetic) book Empire Lite, which notes how the gradual
confluence between the humanitarian and the military has resulted in the onset of an ostensibly
humanitarian empire that is less concerned with territory (although the State no doubt still figures) than it

Liberalism as such is
considered here ( la Foucault) to be a technology of government or a means
for strategising power which taking life to be its object feels compelled to wager the
destiny of humanity against its own political strategy. Liberalism can therefore be said to
betray a particularly novel strategic field in which the writing of threat assumes
both planetary (macro-specific) and human (micro-specific) ascriptions. Although it should
be noted that it is only through giving the utmost priority to life itself
working to secure life from each and every threats posed to an otherwise
progressive existence, that its global imaginary could ever hold sway. No coincidence
is with governing life itself for its own protection and betterment.

then that the dominant strategic paradigm for Liberals is Global Human Security. What could therefore be

the Liberal problematic of security of course registers as a Liberal biopolitics of security, which in the process of promoting certain forms of life
equally demands a re-conceptualisation of war in the sense that not every life
lives up to productive expectations, let alone shows its compliance . In a number
of crucial ways, this approach offers both a theoretical and empirical challenge to
termed

the familiar IR scripts which have tended to either valorise Liberalisms visionary potential or simply

castigate its misguided idealism. Perhaps the most important of these is to insist upon a rewriting of the
history of Liberalism from the perspective of war. Admittedly, there is much work to be done here. Not
least, there is a need to show with greater historical depth, critical purpose, and intellectual rigour how
Liberal war (both externally and internally) has subsequently informed its juridical commitments and not
vice versa. Here I am invariably provoking the well rehearsed Laws of War sermon, which I believe more
accurately should be rephrased to be the Wars of Law. Nevertheless, despite this pressing need to
rewrite the Liberal encounter in language whose familiarity would be capable of penetrating the rather
conservative but equally esoteric/specialist field of International Relations, sufficient contemporary
grounds already exist which enable us to provide a challenging account of global civil war from the
perspective of Liberal bio-political rule. Michael Dillon and Julian Reids The Liberal Way of War

A bio-political
discourse of species existence is also a bio-political discourse of species
endangerment. As a form of rule whose referent object is that of species existence, the liberal way
of rule is simultaneously also a problematisation of fear and danger involving threats to the
peace and prosperity of the species. Hence its allied need, in the pursuing the peace and
prosperity of the species, to make war on whatever threatens it. That is the
reason why liberal peacemaking is lethal. Its violence a necessary corollary of the
encapsulates these sentiments, with the following abridged passage worth quoting:

aporetic character of its mission to foster the peace and prosperity of the species... There is, then, a
martial face to liberal peace. The liberal way of rule is contoured by the liberal way of war ...

Liberalism
is therefore obliged to exercise a strategic calculus of necessary killing, in the
course of which calculus ought to be able to say how much killing is enough...
[However] it has no better way of saying how much killing is enough, once it starts killing to make life live,
than does the geopolitical strategic calculus of necessary killing3 . This brings me to the problem of the

is quite suggestive to account for this conflation by

acknowledging the onset of a global political imaginary that no longer permits any
relationship with the outside. One could then support the types of hypothesis you
mention, which rather than affirming the best of the enlightened Liberal
tradition actually correlate the hollowing out of Liberal values to the inability to
inside/outside. On the face of it, it

carve out any meaningful distinctions between inside/outside, peace/war, friend/enemy, good/evil,
truth/falsehood and so forth. However, whilst this approach would no doubt either re-enforce the
militaristic paradigm or raise further critical doubts about the post-modern/post-structural turn in political

The collapses of these meaningful distinctions

are not inimical to Liberal rationality. To the contrary, the erosion of these great
dialectical interplays now actually provides Liberalism with its very
generative principles of formation. I felt that you began to explore this in Empire by noting
thought, it is nevertheless misleading.

how Foucaults bio-politics was inadequate to our complex, adaptive and emergent times. To rectify this,
Deleuzes notion of Control Societies was introduced which is more in line with

Globality is driven by Western paternalism that

assumes the third world is unfit to help themselves
and establishes Western superiority
Dhawan 13- Professor for Political Theory at the University of Innsbruck
(Nikita Dhawan, Fall/ Winter 2013, Human Rights between Past and Future,
Qui Parle, Vol. 22, No. 1pp. 139-166, JSTOR)//Yak
Ulrich Beck points out that, because we live in an increasingly
interdependent world, we face common threats to our ecologies, finances, and security, so
that any violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere . This
globalization of risk unites us in our equal vulnerability , providing the basis
for the cosmopolitan moment of a world risk society.9 In response to the question
The German sociologist

How can the relationship between global risk and the creation of a global public be understood?, Beck

discusses a globalization

of compassion (W, 114), as seen in global media events such as the

Haitian earthquake and the tsunamis, spectacularly demonstrated by the unprecedented
readiness of citizens in faraway countries to donate to relief efforts . World risk
societys shocking threats open up questions of social accountability and responsibility that cannot be
adequately addressed either in terms of national politics or the available forms of international
cooperation. Public debate enables a range of voices to be heard and the public to participate in decisions

For Beck, international civil society actors

are thus given new opportunities to intercede in the fields of human rights
and global justice and in the search for a new grand narrative of radicaldemocratic globalization. Beck endorses a cosmopolitan realpolitik (W, 368), viewing
global institutions such as the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, as well as global
NGOs and transnational social movements such as the World Social Forum, as legitimate
vanguards of global governance. International NGOs like Amnesty International and
that would otherwise evade their involvement.

Greenpeace enjoy a high level of legitimacy in the public sphere and are increasingly entrusted with the
task of globally monitoring issues of human rights and ecology. Although Nussbaum and Beck
enthusiastically endorse cosmopolitanism as a solution for past injustices and a promise of better

I want to emphasize the complicities between liberal cosmopolitan

articulations of solidarity and the global structures of domination they claim
to resist. Pheng Cheah argues that such a critique of cosmopolitanisms elitist detachment is motivated
times to come,

by a vision of cosmopolitanism as an intellectual ethos espoused by a select clerisy lacking feasible

I object to the project of

cosmopolitanism, because it fails to seriously address the historical processes
through which certain individuals are placed in a situation from which they
can aspire to global solidarity and universal benevolence in other words, it lacks
a concept of cosmopolitanism as the self- indulgence of the altruistic and the
magnanimous. Nussbaum, to her credit, is trying to explore ways of improving
peoples lives. But that itself is the problem. Her attempt to act in the interests
of distant others, to look beyond her position and make everyone have as
good a life as ours, disregards the connection between the well- off here
and the impoverished elsewhere. As Spivak has argued, Nussbaums
cosmopolitanism appears profoundly provincial, in its too- hasty assumption,
as given, that a first- world metropolitan academic and a third world
sexed subaltern subject would share fundamental aims and interests .11
Nussbaum firmly believes in a critical Socratic pedagogy 12 that would circumvent
Eurocentrism through cultivating sensitivity to other cultures and
perspectives, even as she asserts that she would rather risk charges of
imperialism than refuse to take a moral stand on urgent issues facing women
(WCD, 2). In contrast to Nussbaums faith in cosmopolitanisms self-correctional reflexivity, S pivak
diagnoses in the cosmopolitan call to align ourselves with our fellow citizens a
shift from the white mans burden to the the burden of the fittest .13 This
revision of social Darwinism defines the unfit as unable either to help or to
govern themselves. The distance between those who dispense justice, aid,
rights, and solidarity and those who are simply coded as victims of wrongs and thus as
receivers remains a signature of historical violence (OA, 266n14). When
progressive activists and intellectuals intervene benevolently in the
struggles of subaltern groups for greater recognition and rights, they
reinforce the very power relations that they seek to demolish. Conversely, Beck
proposes that our common vulnerability in the face of risk brings us together .
political structures for the universal institutionalization of its ideals.10 But

But as we all know,

though we might be facing the same storm, we are not all in

the same boat, and that makes all the difference. For Beck, the tsunamis resulted in the
globalization of compassion; but, as an instructive contrast, I would like to consider a moment in
Spivaks narrative of a major cyclone in Bangladesh in 1991 and the
subsequent intervention by Mdecins sans frontire s. The MSF workers, none of whom
spoke the local language, were obliged to work through interpreters. When Spivak later arrived at one of

villagers ran up to her, saying,

We dont want to be saved, we want to die, they are treating us like
animals.14 In a situation like this, and without any common language, can we
even think of solidarity? For these reasons, the Sri Lankan feminist Malathi De Alwis15 has
asked if we are truly capable of empathizing with the pain of others, and even
if we should be allowed to witness their pain if this witnessing only serves to
affirm our humanity and our capacity to care. Correspondingly, of course, we need to find
the villages where she had worked actively in the past, some of the

authentic victims who truly deserve our benevolence. What do we do with our will to empower the
disenfranchised and the vulnerable, and how do we deal with those who refuse to be interpellated as
appropriate objects of our solidarity?

The forming of Empire has ushered in a new era of

prejudice. Allowing the Empire to continue risks
unlimited violence against the other
Hardt and Negri 2k (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Prof @ Duke;
former inmate, independent researcher, and Prof @ Collge International de
Philosophie, 2000 Empire Harvard University Press,
http://www.angelfire.com/cantina/negri/)
The passage from modern sovereignty to imperial sovereignty shows one of its faces in the shifting
configurations of racism in our societies. We should note first of all that it has become increasingly difficult
to identify the general lines of racism. In fact, politicians, the media, and even historians continually tell us
that racism has steadily receded in modern societies-from the end of slavery to decolonization struggles

Certain specific traditional practices of racism

have undoubtedly declined, and one might be tempted to view the
end of the apartheid laws in South Africa as the symbolic close of an
entire era of racial segregation. From our perspective, however, it is
clear that racism has not receded but actually progressed in the
contemporary world, both in extent and in intensity . It appears to have
and civil rights movements.

declined only because its form and strategies have changed. If we take Manichaean divisions and rigid
exclusionary practices (in South Africa, in the colonial city, in the southeastern United States, or in
Palestine) as the paradigm of modern racisms, we must now ask what is the postmodern form of racism
and what are its strategies in today's imperial society. Many analysts describe this passage as a shift in the
dominant theoretical form of racism, from a racist theory based on biology to one based on culture. The
dominant modern racist theory and the concomitant practices of segregation are centered on essential
biological differences among races. Blood and genes stand behind the differences in skin color as the real
substance of racial difference. Subordinated peoples are thus conceived (at least implicitly) as other than
human, as a different order of being. These modern racist theories grounded in biology imply or tend
toward an ontological difference-a necessary, eternal, and immutable rift in the order of being. In response
to this theoretical position, then, modern antiracism positions itself against the notion of biological
essentialism, and insists that differences among the races are constituted instead by social and cultural
forces. These modern anti-racist theorists operate on the belief that social constructivism will free us from
the straitjacket of biological determinism: if our differences are socially and culturally determined, then all
humans are in principle equal, of one ontological order, one nature .

With the passage to

Empire, however, biological differences have been replaced by
sociological and cultural signifiers as the key representation of racial

hatred and fear. In this way imperial racist theory attacks modern anti-racism from the rear,
and actually coopts and enlists its arguments. Imperial racist theory agrees that
races do not constitute isolable biological units and that nature
cannot be divided into different human races. It also agrees that the
behavior of individuals and their abilities or aptitudes are not the
result of their blood or their genes, but are due to their belonging to
different historically determined cultures.[14] Differences are thus not fixed and
immutable but contingent effects of social history. Imperial racist theory and modern anti-racist theory are
really saying very much the same thing, and it is difficult in this regard to tell them apart. In fact, it is
precisely because this relativist and culturalist argument is assumed to be necessarily antiracist that the
dominant ideology of our entire society can appear to be against racism, and that imperial racist theory

We should look more closely, however, at how

imperial racist theory operates. tienne Balibar calls the new racism a differentialist
racism, a racism without race, or more precisely a racism that does not rest on a
biological concept of race. Although biology is abandoned as the foundation and support, he
says, culture is made to fill the role that biology had played .[15] We are
can appear not to be racist at all.

accustomed to thinking that nature and biology are fixed and immutable but that culture is plastic and

cultures can change historically and mix to form infinite hybrids.

From the perspective of imperial racist theory, however, there are
rigid limits to the flexibility and compatibility of cultures . Differences
between cultures and traditions are, in the final analysis, insurmountable. It is futile and even
dangerous, according to imperial theory, to allow cultures to mix or
insist that they do so: Serbs and Croats, Hutus and Tutsis, African
Americans and Korean Americans must be kept separate.
fluid:

I am the queer suicide bomber before the Hegemony of

the Global and Im taking you with me
Puar 7 Jasbir Puar, professor of womens and gender studies at Rutgers University, Duke
University Press: Durham, NC and London, UK, pg. 216

The fact that we approach suicide bombing with such trepidation, in

contrast to how we approach the violence of colonial domination,
indicates the symbolic violence that shapes our understanding of what
constitutes ethically and politically illegitimate violence. - Ghassan Hage,
"'Comes a Time We Are All Enthusiasm'" Ghassan Hage wonders "why it is that suicide bombing cannot be
talked about without being condemned first," noting that without an unequivocal condemnation, one is a
"morally suspicious person" because "only un- qualified condemnation will do." He asserts. " There

is a
clear political risk in trying to explain suicide bombings."33 With such risks in
mind, my desire here is to momentarily suspend this dilemma by combining an analysis of these

In pondering the
modalities of this kind of terrorist, one notes a pastiche of oddities: a body
machined together through metal and flesh, an assemblage of the
organic and the inorganic; a death not of the Self nor of the Other, but
both simultaneously, and, perhaps more accurately, a death scene that
obliterates the Hegelian self/other dialectic altogether. Selfannihilation is the ultimate form of resistance, and ironically, it acts as
self-preservation, the preservation of symbolic self enabled through the
"highest cultural capital" of martyrdom, a giving of life to the future of
political struggles-not at all a sign of "disinterest in living a meaningful life ."
representational stakes with a reading of the forces of affect, of the body, of matter.

suicide bombers are

"a sign of life" emanating from the violent conditions of life's
impossibility, the "impossibility of making a life. "" This body forces a
reconciliation of opposites through their inevitable collapse- a perverse
habitation of contradiction. Achille Mbembe's and brilliant meditation on necropolitics notes that
the historical basis of sovereignty that is reliant upon a notion of (western)
political rationality begs for a more accurate framing: that of life and death,
the subjugation of life to the power of death . Mbembe attends not only to the
representational but also to the informational productivity of the (Palestinian) suicide bomber. Pointing
to the becomings of a suicide bomber, a corporeal experiential of "ballistics,"
he asks, "What place is given to life, death, and the human body (especially the
wounded or slain body)?" Assemblage here points to the inability to clearly
delineate a temporal, spatial, energetic, or molecular distinction
between a discrete biological body and technology; the entities,
particles, and elements come together, flow, break apart, interface,
skim off each other, are never stable, but are defined through their
continual interface, not as objects meeting but as multiplicities emerging
from interactions. The dynamite strapped onto the body of a suicide bomber is not merely an
appendage or prosthetic; the intimacy of weapon with body reorients the
assumed spatial integrity (coherence and concreteness) and individuality
of the body that is the mandate of intersectional identities: instead we
have the body-weapon. The ontology of the body renders it a newly
becoming body: The candidate for martyrdom transforms his or her
body into a mask that hides the soon-to-be-detonated weapon. Unlike the
tank or the missile that is clearly visible, the weapon carried in the shape of the body
is invisible. Thus concealed, it forms part of the body. It is so intimately part of
As Hage notes, in this limited but nonetheless trenchant economy of meaning,

the body that at the time of its detonation it annihilates the body of its bearer, who carries with it the
bodies of others when it does not reduce them to pieces. The body does not simply conceal a weapon.

The body is transformed into a weapon, not in a metaphorical sense but in

a truly ballistic sense.,1 Temporal narratives of progression are
upturned as death and becoming fuse into one: as one's body dies, one's
body becomes the mask, the weapon, the suicide bomber. Not only does
the ballistic body come into being without the aid of visual cues marking
its transformation, it also "carries with it the bodies of others." Its own
penetrative energy sends shards of metal and torn flesh spinning off into the ether. The bodyweapon does not play as metaphor, nor in the realm of meaning and
epistemology, but forces us ontologically anew to ask: What kinds of
information does the ballistic body impart? These bodies, being in the midst
of becoming, blur the insides and the outsides, infecting
transformation through sensation, echoing knowledge via
reverberation and vibration. The echo is a queer temporality-in the relay of affective
information between and amid beings, the sequence of reflection, repetition, resound, and return (but with
a difference, as in mimicry)-and brings forth waves of the future breaking into the present. Gayatri Spivak,
prescient in drawing our attention to the multivalent tex- tuality of suicide in "Can the Subaltern Speak,"

suicide terrorism is a modality of expression

and communication for the subaltern (there is the radiation of heat, the
stench of burning flesh, the impact of metal upon structures and the ground,
the splattering of blood, body parts, skin ): Suicidal resistance is a message inscribed on the
reminds us in her latest ruminations that

It is both execution and mourning, for both

self and other. For you die with me for the same cause, no matter which
side you are on. Because no matter who you are, there are no designated killees in suicide
body when no other means will get through.

bombing. No matter what side you are on, because I cannot talk to you, you won't respond to me, with the

We have the proposal

that there are no sides, and that the sides are forever shifting,
crumpling, and multiplying, disappearing and reappearing, unable to
satisfactorily delineate between here and there. The spatial collapse of
sides is due to the queer temporal interruption of the suicide bomber,
projectiles spewing every which way. As a queer assemblage- distinct
from the queering of an entity or identity-race and sexuality are
denaturalized through the impermanence, the transience of the suicide
bomber, the fleeting identity replayed backward through its dissolution.
This dissolution of self into others and other into self not only effaces
the absolute mark of self and others in the war on terror, but produces a
systemic challenge to the entire order of Manichaean rationality that
organizes the rubric of good versus evil. Delivering "a message inscribed on the body
implication that there is no dishonor in such shared and innocent death. 36

when no other means will get through," suicide bombers do not transcend or claim the rational nor accept
the demarcation of the irrational. Rather, they foreground the flawed temporal, spatial, and ontological

Organic and inorganic, flesh and

machine, these wind up as important as (and perhaps as threatening) if
not more so than the symbolism of the bomber and his or her defense or
condemnation. Figure 24 is the November/December 2004 cover of a magazine called Jest: Humor for
pre- sumptions upon which such distinctions flourish.

the Irreverent, distributed for free in Brooklyn (see also jest .com) and published by a group of
counterculture artists and writers. Here we have the full force of the mistaken identity conundrum: the
distinctive silhouette, indeed the profile, harking to the visible by literally blacking it out, of the turbaned
Amritdhari Sikh male (Le., turban and unshorn beard that signals baptized Sikhs), rendered (mistakenly?)
as a (Muslim) suicide bomber, replete with dynamite through the vibrant pulsations of an iPod ad. Fully
modern, animated through technologies of sound and explosives, this body does not operate solely or
even primarily on the level of metaphor. Once again, to borrow from Mbembe, it is truly a ballistic body.

Contagion, infection, and transmission reign, not meaning.

CASE

Solvency
China says no multiple warrants
Lundestad and Tunsj 14 professor of international contemporary
history and has a doctorate in history from the University of Oslo AND
Associate Professor at the Center for Asia Security Studies [Ingrid Lundestad
and ystein Tunsj, 2014, The United States and China in the Arctic, Polar
Record 51 (259): 392403 (2015), Cambridge University Press 2014,
doi:10.1017/S0032247414000291] AMarb
There are substantial and obvious differences between the United States and
China in the Arctic. The US is an Arctic coastal state, with a more longstanding
interest in the region. It has a population, territory, EEZ and continental shelf in the
Arctic. The US has also for decades had a significant presence in the broader circumpolar region. It is a
member of Arctic cooperative forums such as the AC. The US has strong influence and
maintains broad interests in the Arctic, including significant strategic and political interests, due
to its regional and global responsibilities. The freedom of the seas, facilitating US
presence and activity, remains a top priority for the US, in the Arctic, as
elsewhere. Compared to the US, China is a relative newcomer and first showed its interest
in the region when it started Arctic scientific research in the 1990s. China is not an Arctic state,
has no Arctic coastline and has no sovereign rights in the area. Thus, Chinas
access to the Arctic is more constrained and the US and China are unequal
powers in Arctic affairs. Also the types and broadness of interests the two countries have in
the region are significantly different. On the one hand, the United States has interests in most
if not all issues pertaining to the Arctic region, related to diplomacy, defence, economy,
including energy, the environment, research, and the indigenous population.
China on the other hand, has more limited interests in the region,
primarily pertaining to economic development and research . Thus the
roles of the two countries in the Arctic are quite different. Even with such an uneven
foundation for their current engagement in the north, there are some similarities in how the two countries
view the region. On a general basis,

the US is a global power and China a great power

This has implications for their

in

the Asia-Pacific with increasingly global ambitions.

approaches to the Arctic, which may be more similar than the case between, for instance, China
and other Arctic states. As great powers with more or less a global outlook, the Arctic is viewed as
just one region among many in their respective foreign policies. For many of the
other Arctic countries, perhaps most notably Canada and Norway, the north has a much more prominent

the Arctic is not considered of

vital strategic interest to either great power. While the Bush administration in the war on
place. Because of this global outlook, it may be argued that

terror focused on the broader middle east, the Obama administration has put explicit emphasis on the

China is currently
preoccupied with the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the western
Pacific. Thus, while the US has more longstanding and broader interests in the
Arctic than China does, the intensity of these interests, when seen next to
other priorities, make them less different from those of China. Even if the
Arctic Ocean becomes navigable and strategically more important in the
future, China may continue to focus diplomatically and militarily on its
sovereignty claims and territorial disputes in the Yellow Sea and the South
and East China Sea. The Arctic is not mentioned in the 2013 white paper on
Asia-Pacific (US Department of Defense 2012a; Clinton 2011). Also

Chinas armed forces (Chinese White Paper 2013). China has no territorial claims in
the Arctic and cannot be expected to have a significant military presence
here. For China it is more relevant to continue to emphasise sea control in coastal waters and access
denial capabilities in the near seas and the western Pacific. Growing power projection capabilities and the

China will
deploy its naval vessels to other oceans and seas, such as the Indian Ocean
and South China Sea, rather than the Arctic. This implies that the United
States and China have less focus on and activity in the Arctic than what their
statuses as great powers may indicate. As noted, the US Department of Defense wants to
developments of a blue water navy facilitate missions in the high seas, but it is likely that

balance its Arctic engagement, ensuring that the US neither invests too much nor too little. Thus, it seems
as if the US wants to be as active in the region as deemed necessary to protect its interests (Lundestad

While the Chinese government has not published any official Arctic
strategy, their priorities are likely to resemble the balancing act of the US,
although China has so far been more ambiguous about what role it will play in
the Arctic. Both countries have become more active in the region as the Arctic is opening up to more
2013).

activity and other Arctic and nonArctic states are paying more attention to it. There also exist certain
common interests in the Arctic, especially related to the freedom of the seas. US and Chinese foreign
affairs and maritime agencies have met to talk about issues related to oceans, the law of the sea and the
polar regions (US Department of State 2014). The US as a global maritime power has an interest in the
Arctic in terms of navigation and overflight, and we have seen that China sees the potential for benefiting
from Arctic transport routes. Thus, both countries seem to argue in favour of the freedom of the seas and

conflicting views and

interpretations of UNCLOS and maritime rights in the South China Sea may
compromise US-China cooperation regarding the usage of sea lanes in the
Arctic. A Chinese exception to accepted rules of international law, such as in the South China Sea, could
undermine laws guaranteeing freedom of navigation elsewhere (Dutton 2012). Thus, China could
support Russias and Canadas position that Arctic sea passages are internal
and their policies of imposing restrictions by remaining silent and accepting
the rules, regulations, and regimes enforced in the waters and sea lanes
defined as internal waters. Chinas own sovereignty and jurisdictional claims
in the South China Sea are likely to continue to be Chinas primary
consideration. China faces the traditional challenge, shared by other coastal states and maritime
seeing Arctic passages as straits for international navigation. However,

nations, of balancing expanding jurisdictional waters and of developing the natural resources in those
waters on the one hand, and the desire of major maritime powers to uphold the principle of the freedom of
the seas throughout the world, on the other (Wu and Zhang 2012). In other words ,

China is facing a
dilemma and needs to juggle between global norms and national interests . So
far, China has supported coastal states claims to jurisdiction, partly in conflict with its own, and US,
maritime interests in the Arctic. China and the US have no conflicting maritime claims in the Arctic or the
South and East China Sea. Overall, a few disputes remain over delineating maritime jurisdiction in the
Arctic, but in comparison to some of the disputes in the South and the East China Sea they have been
resolved peacefully or have been alleviated through joint development. Those still being debated are
seeking settlement in cooperative ways and within the existing legal framework.

Warming
Even if China complies, the central government cant
enforce it
Economy, 7 Elizabeth C. Economy, C. V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director
for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2007
(The Great Leap Backward, Foreign Affairs)
enthusiasm stems from the widespread but misguided
belief that what Beijing says goes. The central government sets the country's
agenda, but it does not control all aspects of its implementation . In fact, local
officials rarely heed Beijing's environmental mandates, preferring to
concentrate their energies and resources on further advancing economic
growth. The truth is that turning the environmental situation in China around will
require something far more difficult than setting targets and spending money; it will require revolutionary
bottom-up political and economic reforms.
Unfortunately, much of this

Turn- Squo Chinese Arctic research is a smokescreen for

future exploitation, means aff makes environment worse
Guilford, 13 (Gwynn, Master of International Affairs from Columbia, B.A. in
Chinese from Middlebury, What Is China's Arctic Game Plan?, 5/16/13,
http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/05/what-is-chinas-arcticgame-plan/275894/, BC)
China has stepped up its funding of Arctic research to
investigate the effects of climate change on water levels, shipping routes and various other things. It
now has a Polar Research Institute in Shanghai to train scientists in Arctic
research, as well as the Xue Long (snow dragon), a 170m (550 ft) research
icebreaker. In 2015, China will launch three research expeditions to the Arctic. Though some of this
seems based on plans for exploiting the new sea route, so far these
projects have been launched under the aegis of environmental
science.
In the last few years,

Overfishing
No impact to food security, c/a Nordin 14, and Baudrillard
81
Double bind either overfishing is rapid and you cant
create a global model in time or its slow and the k
accesses a faster internal link to its impacts
They cant stop illegal overfishing and thats way worse
Pegg 3 (J.R., FL Museum of Natural History,
http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/InNews/overfish2003.htm)
Fish that are illegally caught by rogue nations or by EU fishers in excess of
ICCAT quotas are frequently sold in the United States, Ruais said, and the
"U.S. government has not been sufficiently aggressive with its current
authority or with its fiscal resources to stop this black market." Addressing
the problem of illegal fishing at the market is only one part of the solution the challenge of stopping illegal fishing before it happens could prove
equally, if not more, difficult. "It is a huge challenge given the vastness
and far reach of some of these major fishing nations, many of which have not
signed international agreements," said Admiral Thomas Collins, who is the
Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard.

Zeller and Pauly study is the lynchpin of their overfishing

advantage- multiple flaws and callouts by the scientific
community
1) Conflates different measurements that are nonanalogous and inaccurate.
Kaiser 1/22/16 --- Professor of Marine Conservation Ecology, graduated from Liverpool with a
BSc in Marine Biology, PhD in the School of Biological Sciences at Bangor, joined the Centre for
Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science, moved to the School of Ocean Sciences, DSc through the
University of Liverpool in 2003. (Do Catch Reconstructions really Implicate Overfishing?, Michael J.
Kaiser, January 22, 2016, CFOOD Organization, http://cfooduw.org/do-catch-reconstructions-reallyimplicate-overfishing/)//chiragjain

Catch and stock status are two distinct measurement tools for evaluating a
fishery, and suggesting inconsistent catch data is a definitive gauge of fishery
health is an unreasonable indictment of the stock assessment process.
Pauly and Zeller surmise that declining catches since 1996 could be a sign of
fishery collapse. While they do acknowledge management changes as another possible factor, the
context is misleading and important management efforts are not represented .
The moratorium on cod landings is a good example zero cod landings in the Northwest
Atlantic does not mean there are zero cod in the water. Such distinctions are not
apparent in the analysis. Another key consideration missing from this paper is varying management
capacity. European fisheries are managed more effectively and provide more complete data than Indian
Ocean fisheries, for example. A study that aggregates global landings data is suspect because indeed

Finally the authors estimated

catch seems to mirror that of the official FAO catch data, ironically
proving its legitimacy. Official FAO data is not considered to be completely
landings data from loosely managed fisheries are suspect.

accurate, but rather a proportionate depiction of global trends. Paulys trend line
is almost identical, just shifted up the y axis, and thus fails to significantly alter our perception of
global fisheries.

2) Ignores the ocean ecosystem as a whole- some fish

stocks are increasing to compensate for decreases
Agnew 1/22/16 ---

Director of Standards at the Marine Stewardship Council, the largest fishery

sustainability ecolabel in the world. (Do Catch Reconstructions really Implicate Overfishing?, David
Agnew, January 22, 2016, CFOOD Organization, http://cfooduw.org/do-catch-reconstructions-reallyimplicate-overfishing/)//chiragjain

The paper does not go into much detail on these reasons for the
observed declines in catches and discards, except to attribute it to both
reductions in fishing mortality attendant on management action to reduce
mortality and generate sustainability, and some reference to declines in areas that are not
managed. It is noteworthy that the peak of the industrial catches in the late 1990s/early
2000s coincidentally aligns with the start of the recovery of many well
managed stocks. This point of recovery has been documented previously (Costello et al 2012;
Rosenberg et al 2006; Gutierrez et al 2012) and particularly relates to the recovery of large numbers of
stocks in the north Pacific, the north Atlantic and around Australia and New Zealand, and mostly to stocks
that are assessed by analytical models. For stocks that need to begin recovery plans to achieve
sustainability, this most often entails an overall reduction in fishing effort, which would be reflected in the
reductions in catches seen here. So, one could attribute some of the decline in industrial catch in these
regions to a correct management response to rebuild stocks to a sustainable status, although I have not

The
above-reported inflection point is also coincident with the launch of the MSCs
sustainability standard. These standards have now been used to assess almost
300 fisheries, and have generated environmental improvements in most of them
(MSC 2015). Stock sustainability is part of the requirements of the standard, and
previous analyses (Gutierrez et al 2012, Agnew et al 2012) have shown that certified fisheries
have improved their stock status and achieved sustainability at a higher
rate than uncertified fisheries. The MSC program does not claim responsibility for the turn-around in
directly analyzed the evidence for this. This is therefore a positive outcome worth reporting.

global stocks, but along with other actions such as those taken by global bodies such as FAO, by national
administrations, and by industry and non-Governmental Organisations it can claim to have provided a
significant incentive for fisheries to become, and then remain, certified.

3) Uses cherry-picked data from unreliable sources.

Hilborn 1/22/16 --- Professor in the School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences at
the University of Washington. (Do Catch Reconstructions really Implicate
Overfishing?, Rob Hilborn, January 22, 2016, CFOOD Organization,
http://cfooduw.org/do-catch-reconstructions-really-implicateoverfishing/)//chiragjain
This paper tells us nothing fundamentally new about world catch, and
absolutely nothing new about the status of fish stocks . It has long been
recognized that by-catch, illegal catch and artisanal catch were underrepresented in the
FAO catch database, and that by-catch has declined dramatically . What the authors claim ,
and the numerous media have taken up, is the cry that their results show that world fish stocks
are in worse shape than we thought. This is absolutely wrong. We know that fish
stocks are stable in some places, increasing in others and declining in yet
others. Most of the major fish stocks of the world, constituting 40% of the total

catch are scientifically assessed using a mixture of data sources including data on the
trends in abundance of the fish stocks, size and age data of the fish caught and other information as available . This paper really
adds nothing to our understanding of these major fish stocks . Another group of stocks,
constituting about 20% of global catch, are assessed using expert knowledge by the FAO. These experts use their personal knowledge of these
fish stocks to provide an assessment of their status. Estimating the historical unreported catch for these stocks adds nothing to our

For many of the most important stocks that are not assessed by scientific
organizations or by expert opinion, we often know a lot about their status . For example; abundance of fish
understanding of these stocks.

throughout almost all of South and Southeast Asia has declined significantly. This is based on the catch per unit of fishing effort and the size of
the individuals being caught. Estimating the amount of other unreported catches does not change our perspective on the status of these

In the remaining fisheries where we know little about their status , does the
fact that catches have declined at a faster rate than reported in the FAO catch
data tell us that global fisheries are in worse shape than we thought? The answer is not
really. We would have to believe that the catch is a good index of the
abundance. Looking at Figure 1 of the Pauly and Zeller paper we see that a number
of major fishing regions have not seen declines in catch in the last 10 years .
stocks.

These areas include the Mediterranean and Black Sea, the Eastern Central Atlantic, the Eastern Indian Ocean, the Northwest Pacific and the
Western Indian Ocean. Does this mean that the stocks in these areas are in good shape, while areas that have seen significant declines in

scientific assessments
that stocks in the Mediterranean and Eastern Central Atlantic are often
heavily overfished yet catches have not declined . We know that stocks in the
Northeast Pacific are abundant, stable and not overfished, and in the
Northeast Atlantic are increasing in abundance . Yet their catch has declined.
Total catch, and declines in catch, are not a good index of the trends in fish
stock abundance. Pauly and Zeller have attempted to estimate the extent of unreported catch for all the fish stocks of the world.
catch like the Northeast Atlantic, and the Northeast Pacific are in worse shape? We know from

For any individual stock in the U.S. the hardest part of doing the stock assessment is often estimating the total catch. Historical discards are
often unreported, species were often lumped in the historical catch data, recreational catch was poorly estimated, and illegal catch totally
unreported. Scientists can spend months trying to reconstruct these data for an individual stock and it is recognized that these estimates may

Pauly and Zellers attempt to do this for thousands of global stocks

with a consultant spending perhaps a few months to cover every fishery in an
individual country just cannot be very reliable. We need to move beyond trying to understand the
not be reliable.

historical fish catches, and instead concentrate on understanding the status of fish stocks at present. If all the effort that had been spent in
trying to estimate historical catches by Pauly and Zeller had instead been devoted to analysis of what we know about the status of a sample of
fish stocks in different places, we would know much more about the status of world fisheries.

Chinese fishing is a driving force of Chinas national

protein consumption affecting hundreds of millions (13%
of Chinas population) Also c/a to china
Stratfor 2/12/16 (Stratfor, a global intelligence agency that is based in
Austin, Texas; Fish: The Overlooked Destabilizer in the South China Sea,
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/fish-overlooked-destabilizer-south-chinasea, 2/12/16, //VZ)
In Asia, fish and other marine foodstuffs play a greater role in diets
than in the West Seafood production is an important source of employment
and a vital component of national economies. Asian fisheries make up half
the global total capture production
It makes up
more than
13 percent
in the role of seafood in China's national protein consumption.
In
addition to its important role in national diets (and national food security),
seafood also plays an important economic role. There are an estimated 1.72
Feeding Asian Growth

, and six of the top 10 producers of marine products are in Asia. [graph omitted] [graph omitted] In South

Korea and Japan, seafood makes up about 20 percent of the protein supply and contributes more than 15 percent in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

10 percent of protein supply in Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam, and while it was at around 8.5 percent in China, between 2008 and 2011 there was a

increase

By comparison,

seafood provides a little over 5 percent of protein consumption in the United Kingdom, a little less than 5 percent in the United States and less than 4.5 percent in Germany. [graph omitted] [graph omitted]

million fishing vessels plying the waters of the South China Sea alone,
employing some 5.4 million people. Asia's fleets are growing faster than
those of the rest of the world
Asia contributed a third of global seafood exports,
with China alone accounting for 12.5 percent of total global exports
with the value of China's exports growing nearly 200 percent over the
same period
And

. Since the late 1980s, the overall size of the world's fishing fleets has stabilized, but the Asian fleet has nearly doubled, comprising

around three-quarters of the world's powered fishing vessels. In 2014,

, up from just 7 percent in

2007,

. In Indonesia, fisheries contribute more than 3 percent to total national gross domestic product. In other countries, the numbers are harder to come by, as fisheries are often

included with agriculture and forestry in statistics. Many countries in Asia have sizable local fishing communities, and as with agricultural concerns, these often have a greater political impact than their economic

Fish and other maritime products are particularly important to China

After 1978
Since then, China's seafood
production has grown at a rate of 7.6 percent per year, making China the
largest single producer of seafood in the region and second only to a
combined Southeast Asia. The value of the fishing industry in China has risen
to 1.9 trillion yuan ($289 billion) in 2013
fisheries and marine foodstuffs
industries in China provide nearly 14.5 million jobs
share might suggest.
the

economic opening and reform program, Beijing actively sought to expand its fishing fleet and activities.

, with fish now its top agricultural export. There were nearly 10,000 fish processing

companies in China in 2013, employing 400,000 workers, predominately in Shandong, Liaoning and Fujian. Overall, the

, and China boasted 695,000 fishing vessels in 2013, a sharp

rise from the 52,225 in 1979. Chinese fishermen earn almost 50 percent more than their farming counterparts, and as of 2010, China was spending $4 billion a year in subsidies to the industry. Dwindling Resources
The marine fishing industry has long been important in Asia, and in the 20th century, it saw several boom and bust cycles with the expansion of mechanized fishing fleets and increased consumption and export
patterns.

Protein deficiency causes death via Kwashiorkor, turns

hunger
LaFlamme, 12/21/15 (Mark, has a Masters Degree in Internal Medicine,
Understanding Kwashiorkor,
http://www.healthline.com/health/kwashiorkor#Overview1, //VZ)
Kwashiorkor is caused by a lack of protein in the diet .
You need protein in your diet for your body to repair cells and make new
cells.
. If the body lacks
protein, growth and normal body functions will begin to shut down, and
kwashiorkor may develop. Kwashiorkor is most common in countries where
there is a limited supply or lack of food
What Causes Kwashiorkor?

Every cell in your body contains

protein.

A healthy human body regenerates cells in this way constantly. Protein is also especially important for growth during childhood and pregnancy

. It is mostly found in children and infants in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central America. A

limited supply or lack of food is common in these countries during times of famine caused by natural disasters such as droughts or floods or political unrest. A lack of nutritional knowledge and regional
dependence on low-protein diets, such the maize-based diets of many South American countries, can also cause people to develop this condition. This condition is rare in countries where most people have access to
enough food and are able to eat adequate amounts of protein. If kwashiorkor does occur in the United States, it can be a sign of abuse, neglect, fad diets, or a perceived milk allergy, found mostly in children or older
adults. It can also be a sign of an underlying condition, such as HIV. What Are the Symptoms of Kwashiorkor? The symptoms of kwashiorkor include: change in skin and hair color (to a rust color) and texture fatigue
diarrhea loss of muscle mass failure to grow or gain weight edema (swelling) of ankles, feet, and belly damaged immune system, which can lead to more frequent and severe infections irritability flaky rash shock
How Is Kwashiorkor Diagnosed? If kwashiorkor is suspected, your doctor will first examine you to check for an enlarged liver (hepatomegaly) and swelling. Next, blood and urine tests may be ordered to measure the
level of protein and sugar in your blood. Other tests may be performed on your blood and urine to measure signs of malnutrition and lack of protein. These tests may look for muscle breakdown and assess kidney
function, overall health, and growth. These tests include: arterial blood gas blood urea nitrogen (BUN) blood levels of creatinine blood levels of potassium urinalysis complete blood count (CBC) How Is Kwashiorkor
Treated? Kwashiorkor can be corrected by eating more protein and more calories overall, especially if treatment is started early. You may first be given more calories in the form of carbohydrates, sugars, and fats.
Once these calories provide energy, you will be given foods with proteins. Foods must be introduced and calories should be increased slowly because you have been without proper nutrition for a long period. Your

What Are the

Complications of Kwashiorkor? Even with treatment, children who have had
kwashiorkor may never reach their full growth and height potential. If
treatment comes too late, a child may have permanent physical and
mental disabilities. If left untreated, the condition can lead to coma,
shock, or death.
body may need to adjust to the increased intake. Your doctor will also recommend long-term vitamin and mineral supplementation to your diet.

Block

1
The Politics of Globality is an inversion of Clausewitz, in
which political substitutes for war are merely way by
other means. China and the U.S. unite to wage a war of
the political on citizens of both countries. The logics,
languages, and effects of militarism have become so
normalized that any attempt to distinguish between
military and civic presence militarizes life itself, producing
a perverse investment in normalized violence that
maintains the global war machine

Evans and Pollard 14 [Brad, Senior Lecturer in International Relations

at the Global Insecurities Center, the School of Sociology, Politics and
International Studies, the University of Bristol, UK, and Tyler J., ABD Candidate
in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, Education, the
Politics of Resilience, and the War on Youth: A Conversation with Brad Evans,
Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 36:3: 193-213]
You make a key distinction between what you call soft and hard forms
of militarism which, in many ways I think, speak to Henry A. Girouxs (2012) distinction between the
soft and hard wars on youth. On the one hand, young people and the spaces they occupy
are endlessly commodified and turned over to ethically vacuous forms of marketization,
financialization, and so on. On the other hand, those young people who, for whatever reason,
cant fit the liberal consumerist script are funneled into one of the multiple
containment zones of the punishing state. That said, your notion of soft and
hard militarism I think nicely addresses the ways in which militarization works
throughout society on multiple levelsin the form of global, national, and
domestic security, but also insofar as military language, logics, and
affects have crept ubiquitously into our everyday lives through a
forcefully militarized cultural apparatus. Could you talk a bit about how we might
TP:

unpack and then extend these categories in ways that allow us to understand a bit better one of the most
significant fronts in the war on youth? BE: I think we need to start here by looking at the title of the
Summer Institute, that is The War on Youth. How do we look at the discursive provocation of saying
there is a war on youth taking place? Weve had some discussion around whether the term war itself is a
metaphor or whether it is a diagnostic tool for really analyzing the conditions of the present. The question

how does the term war function politically ? One thing we can
say is that within military establishments, and certainly within the political environment on
that is instantly raised is

popular media, the proliferation of the use of the term war has not been anything unique. Throughout
the 1990s every form of social ill seemed to have a war waged on it the war on
poverty, the war on drugs. This goes into the war on terror, which becomes an openly declared war on all

This
language is emotive and functions in a certain political way . But also, it does
reveal the way that people will diagnose the operation of power . First, an important
start point here is that the proliferation of the use of war doesnt open up into popular
vocabulary within critical discoursesits actually touted by regimes of power . A
regime of power will say a war needs to take place upon this particular social
problem. The proliferation around the meaning of war has been made into a
fronts. I was watching Fox News yesterday and they were talking about a war on Wal-Mart.

moral and ethical imperative, such that action needs to be taken because the
stakes are so high there will be casualties, and of course all wars produce
casualties. You then have to go into the question of saying : What is the use
value and function of appropriating the terminology of war and turning the
logic of war back against itself? One of the earlier and really sophisticated mediations on this
appeared in Michel Foucaults (2003) Society Must be Defended, where he really appreciates the idea that

power has always taken life as its object, particularly since the
beginning of modernity, and indeed, that war has always taken life to be
its object. This resonates with the Nietzschean idea that war is the mode of
modern societies, such that nihilism is also the motive of modern
societies. Situating this in the context of whats happening to youth today, if we take power at its
word, then youth are quite literally inserted within a war paradigm . If we just take the
post 9=11 moment, it was certainly a war paradigm insomuch as youth overseas were deemed to be the
troubling demographic which could become radicalized and which could become insurgents. Youth at home

This paradigm of war,

insecurity, and profiling has increasingly become normalized such that the
academic setting itself has become the front line of a war effort in the most
militarized and crude policing insofar as educators and academics in the UK and Europe now have to
increasingly became profiled and analyzed on their basis for radicality.

monitor studentsattendance, performance, whether someone speaks in a way that might raise

We have openly talked for the last tenfifteen years

about this as a war for hearts and minds. In other words, how could you
even think to divorce education from a war for hearts and minds ? Its an
integral element for the war effort and it continues to be an integral element
of a war effort that is, by definition, a war without end. There is no end to
the catastrophic condition of our times. TP: This is what you mean when
inverting Clausewitz; when you talk about politics today becoming a war by
other means? BE: Absolutely. And politicians have expressed this precise
sentiment that we need to see politics as the continuation of war by other
means. Why? Because conventional understandings of warfare have been all but eviscerated . There
is no clear sense anymore of who are our friends and who are enemies, who
is inside and who is outside, and when times of war and times of peace exis t.
These categories have been all but eviscerated because neoliberalism has
collapsed the precise space-time continuum that once held modern politics
together. TP: Which is why I think to deny that there is a war on youth is not just to misunderstand
suspicions of radical thoughts.

whats happening to young people today, but its also to misunderstand the changing shape of war in the

And to misunderstand the ways in which war

has become normalized, to deny the very terms that power uses . Power in
itself openly declares a war upon youth insomuch as youth and radicality are
deemed to be dangerous. The peace effort has to begin from the logical
position that a war is taking place. And this war takes children as its object .
Why does it take children as its object? This is because some ideas are liberatory, some
ideas are dangerous, this is a war effort which is very much taking place in
conditions of normality such that the military paradigm of society cannot
be divorced from the civic. One of the inevitable outcomes of this has been
the shift towards what we can call entertaining militarism . Not only we do
entertain the military as a central element of global civil society, but the idea
that the military should simply exist in the barracks and be brought out
during times of exceptional crisis has been eviscerated altogether. We had the
contemporary moment. BE: Absolutely.

military providing security for the London Olympics, we have the military parading on talent shows as if it's
part of everyday entertainment, military personal are being openly recruited into education systems

The lines between the military and the

civic have been so eviscerated that it is impossible to distinguish
between times of war and times of peace. Or, to put it another way, since peace
is now seen to belong to a bygone era and war has become so normalized
then the front line exists everywhere. It exists in what types of
commodities you purchase, it exists in what's permissible to teach,
and it certainly exists in terms of what types of subjectivities we are
producing. TP: It seems that any logic of towards perpetual peace has become
perverted into towards perpetual war. BE: Well this is one of the real great
ironies of the revival of certain thinking around perpetual peace , because what we
have quickly discovered is that through inaugurating perpetual peace what we've
actually declared is global war. Global war becomes the inevitable
outcome of a peace that cannot be achieved other than through
militarism. A question that needs to be asked, and which Michel Foucault always asks, is what
type of political subjects do you produce if you say that violence is necessary
for their production? Of course, the type of subjects you do produce are subjects that have
learned to accept the normalization of violence as integral to their
very forms of life. TP: Subjects, in fact, which don't simply accept violence, but which have
been schooled into taking immense pleasure in violence. BE: We have to
look at the proliferation of spectacles of violence today to see how violence
operates not only through the pleasure principle, but how, on the one hand, society and popular
culture preaches that the only way that you can really truly find
empowerment today is through violence; and yet, on the other hand, you're
demonized on account of acting upon those precise messages that popular
culture deems the only way to find empowerment, pleasure, and desire in the
present moment.
through Troops to Teachers programs, and so on.

1nr Perm
Politics of harmonization eradicates political
alternatives. The formulation of politics in this
manner pits the insiders versus the outsiders
promoting perpetual antagonism within the populous,
thus the perm links
Nordin 16 (Astrid, Futures beyond the West? Autoimmunity in Chinas harmonious
world, Review of International Studies, 42, pp 156-177, January 2016) DP

The party-state version of harmonious world has then been deployed to do

various concrete things in Chinese international politics. At the level of
imagining difference, it appears to share our concern here with multiplicity
and openness. However, groups and cultures are described in ways that correspond with David Kerrs
blending diversity under universalism, which tends towards an imagination of difference as hierarchically
ordered, and sometimes as something that should be eliminated .

The future harmonious world

is envisaged as an inevitable choice, and China is imagined as having a
privileged position in the construction of this future because of its purported
harmonious nature based on history. It is inevitable, yet needs to be
constructed and fostered. Against this background, harmonious world is said
by some to indicate an increasingly confident China relinquishing its
aloofness to participate and undertake greater responsibilities in international
affairs. Nonetheless, the term remains to a significant extent a catch all
phrase of friendly connotations. Harmonious world may be useful precisely because of its
vague and elusive implications, that nonetheless speak to both Chinese and non-Chinese sensibilities .
Indeed, who could argue against global peace and prosperity ? Nonetheless,
what emerges from accounts of harmony as articulated in China in the last
decade is a tension in the harmony concept between its need for multiplicity
on the one hand, and its presupposition of universalisability on the other. Bart
Rockman has suggested that harmony may be a necessary glue without which
neither a society nor a polity are sustainable, but that complete social
harmony is ultimately suffocating and illiberal . Jacob Torfing has also taken issue with
predominant understandings of harmony in Southeast Asia that he argues present a post-political
vision of politics and governance that tends to eliminate power and
antagonism. Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe, he understands such a post-political vision as
both theoretically unsustainable and politically dangerous. It is unsustainable
because power and antagonism are inevitable features of the political dimensions of politics. Therefore

politics: cannot be reduced to a question of translating diverging interests

into effective [win-win] policy solutions, since that can be done in an entirely depoliticized fashion, for example, by applying a particular decision-making
rule, relying on a certain rationality or appealing to a set of undisputed
virtues and values. Of course, politics always invokes particular rules, rationalities and values, bu t
the political dimension of politics is precisely what escapes all this . Politics,
then, unavoidably involves a choice that means eliminating alternative
options. Moreover, although we base our decisions on reasons and may have
strong motivations for choosing what we choose, we will never be able to

provide an ultimate ground for any given choice in Derridean terms, such grounds will
always be indefinitely deferred. Therefore, the ultimate decision will have to rely on a skillful combination

The acts of exclusion that politics

necessarily entails will produce antagonism between those who identify with
the included options and those who do not . For this reason, the attempt by the
promoters of harmony to dissociate harmonious politics from the exercise of
power, force and the production of antagonism, claiming a harmony where
everyone wins and no-one looses, is bound to fail. Moreover, the post-political vision of
of rhetorical strategies and the use of force.

politics and harmony is dangerous because its denial of antagonism will tend to alienate those excluded

will tend to displace antagonistic struggles from

the realm of the political to the realm of morals, where conflicts are based on
non-negotiable values and the manifestation of authentic identities . Such nonfrom consideration. This, Torfing writes,

negotiable values would be the opposite of the cooperative harmony sought. To both Rockman and Torfing,
then, complete or perfect harmony will defeat harmony and create disharmony. In this way, the excessive

We can
see this happening in contemporary China, where the harmonising policies
enforced under the harmonious society slogan have produced a range of
oppositional movements, from Chinese youth mocking harmony online to the
increasing number of selfimolations we currently witness in and around Tibet .
Numerous scholars argue that in order to imagine harmony, we need to imagine
heterogeneity and multiplicity. We can now add that the problematic organisation of
difference that remains in imaginations of harmonious world eliminates the
multiplicity in the here-now that is a prerequisite for harmony . What these
production of harmony is what produces the disharmonious elements that come to threaten it.

renditions of harmony show, I believe, is that the tensions in and logics of harmony are very similar to the
ones that are described by Derrida and others in terms of the autoimmune.

What we see in these

accounts is an irresolvable contradiction, which mirrors the autoimmune logic outlined at

the beginning of this article. Harmony must by definition be universal , but its
universalisation by definition makes harmony impossible. In this respect
harmony works on a self-defeating and self-perpetuating logic that is very
similar to what we saw described in the modern West and in democracy.