Frivaldo v.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996.
Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in
three successive elections but he was twice declared to be disqualified to
hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and he now claims to have reassumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation.
Issues:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid?
(Secondary Issues
)Who should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon? Should
it be Frivaldo who is said to be an alien, Lee who got the second mostnumber
of votes or Vice- Governor Deri as the rules on political succession states?
Held:
Frivaldos repatriation is valid and it was
given a retroactiveeffect. He is also allowed to take office for he got the
popular supportas is shown in the ballots.

Gregorio v. C.A.
G.R. No. L 22802, Nov. 29, 1968
Facts:
The petitioners father, then the appellant, was denied to
elevate to the CA the evidence presented in the two cases he was
appealing. His counsels next motion for reconsideration was then
denied.
Issues:
Can a procedural law have a retroactive effect? Are there solutions made by
the CA valid?
Held:
The writ of certiorari is granted annulling the resolutions of CA denying
the motion for reconsideration. The writ of mandamus is granted to compel
CA to elevate to it the evidence presented at the trial before the Court of
First Instance in Bulacan.
Notes:
Penal laws shall be applied retroactively if such application is favorable to the
accused even if he is already serving a sentence unless she is a habitual
deliveryman
Aruego v. CA254 SCRA 711
Facts:
The late Jose M. Aruego Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with
Luz M. Fabian for 23 years. They had two children out of it, Antonia and
Evelyn.
Issues:
Can the two be called illegitimate children?
Held:
Antonia was proclaimed an illegitimate child and Evelyn wassaid not to be an
illegitimate child.

Cang v. CA
296 SCRA128
Facts:
Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married in 73 and

begot 3 children. Later on Anna Marie found out that her husband
hadextramarital affair with Wilma Soco. Because of this, she filed forlegal
separation. They agreed that their children should receive amonthly support
of P1,000 and that Anna Marie can enter into anycontract or agreement
without the written consent of her husband.After this, Mr. Cang went abroad
filed a divorce case from her wifeand married an American woman. (Anna
Marie got custody of thechildren.) Eventually, they also divorced. While in the
US, he remitsmoney to his children in the Philippines.On 1987, the brother
and sister-in-law of Anna Marie filed foradoption of the 3 children. Anna Marie
consented this because shewas leaving the country and her brothers and
sisters have been helpingher raise the children since her husband already
lost his parental rightsfor not supporting their children.Upon learning about
this, Cang went back to the Philippines and filedan opposition and a
petition to reacquire custody of his children. Sincethe mother is already in
the US, the court ruled that the custody should be passed to whom she
relinquished it.
Issues:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the writtenconsent of a
natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandonedthem?
Held:
The petition for reconsideration of the father was granted andthe ruling of
the lower courts has been set aside. Thereby denying theadoption since the
court believes that who, by law and under the facts of the case, has not
abandoned them.

Francisco v. CA
299 SCRA 188
Facts:
Eusebio Francisco was married to Arte Guevarra, his secondwife, when they
acquired a sari-sari store and two houses and lots.Eventually, Eusebio got too
sick to administer these properties.During this time, his children in his first
marriage were able to find away on having him authorize Conchita, one of his
children, toadminister the two houses and lot.
Issues:
Arte petitioned that the administration of such properties be passed to her
but the lower courts denied this for the reason of lack ofevidence that these
properties were acquired during their marriage.The trial court ruled that the
properties were exclusively owned byEusebio.
Held:
The petition is denied and the administration of the property inquestion is
still given to the daughter of Eusebio

WAIVER OF
RIGHTSPEFTOK
Integrated Services vs.
NLRC, G.R. No.
124841. July 31,1998
This is a petition for
certiorari filed by
PEFTOK seeking to set
asidethe decision of
NLRC dated 26 Feb
1995 that granted claims
tocomplainants (security

guards) against
PEFTOK, and two other
corps. Facts:

*October 13, 1989,

Eduardo Abugho,
Claro Mendez,
andLeonardo
Daluperi, to bar all
claims they may
have
againstPEFTOK
before June 30,
1989. They also

sought the
issuance ofan alias
writ of execution
for their
entitlement to full
benefits as
provided in the labor
arbiters decision.
*May 29, 1992,
Eduardo Abugho,
Fidel Sabellina,
LeonardoDaluperi,
Claro Mendez, and
Reynaldo Maasin
executed

anotherquitclaim
and waiver
renouncing
whatever claims
they haveagainst
PEFTOK for the
period ending
March 15, 1998.
Howeverthey also
claimed that the
waiver and
quitclaim were
prepared
andreadied by
PEFTOK and were

further forced to
sign for fear
thatthey will not
get their salaries
come payday. Or
worse,
theirservices be
terminated.
Furthermore, they
asserted that the
waiversthey signed
were contrary to
public policy, the
same being
writtenin English,

which they do not

understand, nor
were the contents
ofsaid waiver
explained to
them.* Petitioner
(PEFTOK) answers
in saying that the
quitclaimssigned
by the security
guards suffer no
legal infirmity. That
waiverof the claim
in dispute is not
prohibited by law.

Issue:
Whether the
signed waivers
effectively waives
the claims ofthe
security guards
against PEFTOK.
Held:
Petition is
dismissed for lack
of merit; decision
of the NLRCdated
Feb. 26, 1995
affirmed.There is
no voluntariness in

the execution of
the waivers in
question. They are
commonly frowned upon
as contrary to
public policy and
ineffective to bar
claims for the full
measure
of the workers legal
right.
Valderama vs. Macalde,
470 SCRA 168
The case is a petition
for review on certiorari

of the decision of
theCourt of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 48899
partially annulling
thedeed of sale insofar
as it affects the 2/3rds of
the lot being occupied
bythe Macaldes. Facts:
* Before the WWII,
parents of
Salvacion Macalde
rented a lot
inTondo, Manila,
where their house
occupied 2/3

portion of
the property. In
1977, Herminia
Albano acquired
the lot, and
theMacalde
siblings leased the
property from
Albano. On
theremaining 1/3
of the land is an
apartment which
was being leasedto
the spouses
Roberto and

Natividad
Valderama.* 11 Jun
1978, Pres.
Ferdinand Marcos
issued Presidential
Decree No. 1517
proclaiming
specific parcels of
urban lands as
Urban
Land Reform Zones.
Under Sec. 6,
legitimate tenants
within the

urban zones who

had been residing
on the land for ten
years ormore, who
have built their
homes on the land,
and residents
whohave legally
occupied the lands
by contract
continuously for
thelast ten years,
shall not be
dispossessed of

the land and shall

beallowed right of
first refusal to purchase
the same
* 14 May 1980,
former Pres.
Marcos issued
Proclamation
No.1967, declaring
the Metro Manila
area as an Urban
Zone.*13 April
1983, Proc. No.
2284 was issued
amending Proc.

No.1967,
identifying 244
sites in Metro
Manila as areas for
priority
development, including
Albanos property.
*November 1990,
Albano offered to
sell the property to
SalvacionMacalde
and her siblings.
Macalde on her
behalf and in
behalf ofher

siblings conveyed
their desire to buy
the property in a
letterdated 9 Nov
1990. She further
suggested that
they discuss the
price
as well as other terms
and conditions of the
sale. Albanos
grandchild
received the letter
but Albano did not
respond.*14 March

1991, Albano told

Macalde that she
had already
soldthe property. In
a letter dated 21
Mar 1991, Macalde
complained
toAlbano about the
sale of the land to
another despite
her prior offerto
buy the land on
Nov 1990. She also
requested that
Albanorescind the

sale of the land

insofar as the
portion occupied
by theirhouse was
concerned. It was
later on found that
the buyers of
theland are the
spouses
Valderama.
Macalde conveyed
to theValderamas
in writing, her
willingness to buy
the portion of the

land her home

occupies. Both
Albano and
Valderama
rejectedM
acaldes offer.
*Macalde filed a
case against
Albano and
Valderama, to
annul thesale of
the land,
cancellation of the
title and
reconveyance.

TheMacaldes
asserted that they
had the
preferential right
to buy the property
under P.D. No.
1517.*Albano
answered in saying
that the property
was not within
thecoverage of the
law and that the
Macaldes had been
notified of
herintention to sell

the property but

that they had
ignored the
offer.The
Valderamas on the
other hand said
that the Macaldes
hadwaived their
preferential right
to buy the property
since they failedto
exercise their right
when Albano first
offered the
property tothem.

Later in the case

Albano said in a
testimony that she
hadrepeatedly
offered to sell the
property to
Salvacion Macalde
andthat at the end,
she refused to do
so due to financial
constraints.She
however, failed to
present
documentary

evidence to this
end.
Issue:
Whether the Macaldes
right of first refusal
to purchase
the land where
their ancestral
home stands was
waived by Sa
lvacion Macaldes
alleged verbal refusal
when

Albano offered to
sell the lot to the
Macaldes.
Held:
Petition denied. Re
solution in
CA-G.R. CV No. 48899
isaffirmed.
The preferential right of
the Macaldes is deemed
to
not have been waived
because the waiver of
suchright requires some
note or memorandum

or anyprivate or public
document for the
waiver to beeffective.
Such verbal offer may
not be sufficientbasis to
support the alleged
waiver. In this
caseAlbano and
Valderama failed to
present
sufficient,competent
and credible evidence
that the Macaldeshad
waived their rights.DM
Consunji vs. CA, G.R.

No. 137873, April 20,

2001
This case was filed by
DM Consunji Inc.
seeking the reversal of
the CAdecision that
affirmed the decision of
the RTC of Pasig which
granted
Jose Juegos widow the
right to claim damages
against DM Consunji.
Issue:
Whether Maria Juegos
right to claim damages

was waived byher receipt

of benefits under the
Workmens
Compensation
Act.
Facts:
* 22 Nov 1990,
Jose Juego, a
construction
worker of DM
Consunjifell 14
floors from the
Renaissance Tower
in Pasig that
caused

hisdeath.*Maria,
his widow, filed a
complaint for
damages against
hisemployer. The
decision of the
case was made in
favor of Maria.
Onappeal by DM
Consunji, the CA
affirmed the
decision of the
RTC.DM Consunji
now seeks the

reversal of the
decision of the CA.
*In Pacana vs. Cebu
Autobus Company it was
ruled that
aninjured worker has a
choice of either to
recover from the
employerthe fixed
amounts set by the Wo
rkmens Compensation
Act or to
prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the
torfeasor for

higherdamages but he
cannot pursue both
courses of action
simultaneously.
However, an
exception was
held in Floresca
vs.Philex Mining
Corporation
The exception
is where a claimant
who has already been
paid under the
Workmens
Compensation

Act may still sue

for damages under the
Civil Code on the basis
of supervening facts or
developments
occurring after he
opted for the
first remedy.
*Maria alleged that
she only learned
about the
negligence of
theemployer after
she had applied for

and received the

benefits under
ECC. That she had
committed a mistake of
fact because she didnt
know what
damages could be
recovered from the
death or
herhusband or that
she may also
recover more from
the Civil Codethan
from the ECC.*DM
Consunji claimed

that by being the

complainant in a
criminalcase for
Simple Negligence
resulting to
Homicide against
the
employer, Maria couldnt
have been ignorant of the
facts. That
from 2 Jan 1991,
and every month
thereafter, she
knew of thechoices
of remedies

available to her
and yet she chose
to claim
andreceive the
benefits from ECC.
This choice
resulted in a
waiver ofelection
that bars her from
any action, suit or
proceedinginconsis
tent with the
elected remedy. In
other words, the
claimant, by her

choice of one
remedy, waived
the other.
Held:
Remanded, the
RTC of Pasig is to
determine whether
theaward decreed
in its decision is
more than that of
the ECC.If so, the
payments already
made to the
private
respondentunder

the ECC should be

deducted
therefrom.
There is no showing
that Maria knew of the
remediesbefore she
applied for claims
before the ECC. That
sheonly learned after
the prosecutor issued a
resolution on6 Feb 1991,
that there may be a civil
liability. This lackof
knowledge or mistake of
fact negates the
waiver.REPEAL OF

LAWSMecano vs COA,
G.R. No. 103982,
December 11, 1992
This is a petition for
certoriari, seeking to
nullify the decision of
theCommission of
Audit embodied in its 7
th

Endorsement denying
hisclaim for
reimbursement under
Sec. 699 of the Revised
AdministrativeCode, as
amended, the total

amount of
PHP40,831. Facts:
*Petitioner,
Director II of NBI,
was
hospitalized for
cholecystitisfrom
26 Mar- 7 Apr,
1990, where he
incurred medical
andhospitalization
expenses. On 11
May 1990, in a
memo to
NBIDirector Alfredo

Lim, he requested
reimbursement for
hisexpenses on the
ground that he is
entitled to the
benefits under
Sec699 of the RAC.
Sec. 699.
.In case of
sickness caused by
orconnected directly
with the performance of
some act in the line
ofduty, the Department

head may in his

discretion authorize the
payment of the
necessary hospital fees.
Said claim was
forwarded by Lim
to relevant
authorities. In a 4
th

Endorsement
however,
thenUndersecretar
y of Justice
Silvestre H. Bello
III, returned the

petitioners claim to
Lim stating that in a 5
th

Endorsement by
theChairman of
COA, the RAC
being relied upon
was repealed by
theAdministrative
Code of 1987.
Petitioner resubmitted his
claim toLim with a
copy of then

Secretary of Justice
Franklin M. Drilon
Opinion No. 73, S. 1991
stating that, the
issuance of the
Administrative
Code did not
operate to repeal
or abrogate in
itsentirety the
Revised
Administrative
Code, including the
particular

Sec. 699.. Lim then

forwarded the claim
to the relevant
authorities but
finally in 16 Jan
1992, COA
Chairman
EufemioDomingo
in his 7
th

endorsement,
denied the claim
on the groundthat
Sec. 699 of the
RAC has been

repealed by the
AdministrativeCod
e of 1987, solely
for the reason that
the same section
was notrestated or
re-enacted in the
administrative
Code of 1987.
*Administrative Code or
1987 Sec. 27.
Repealing Clause
. --- Alllaws,
decrees, orders,
rules and

regulations, or
portions
thereof,inconsisten
t with this Code
are hereby
repealed or
modified
accordingly. This is an
example of a general
repealing provision.
*The failure to add
a specific repealing
clause indicates
that theintent was
not to repeal any

existing law,
unless an
irreconcilableincon
sistency and
repugnancy exists
in the terms of the
new andold laws.
This falls under the
category of an
implied repeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the
Administrative
Code of 1987

repeal Sec.699 of
the RAC.
Held:
Petition granted.
Respondent is
ordered to
give due course to
the petitioners claim
for benefits.
There are two kinds of
implied repeal.Implied
repeal by irreconcilable
inconsistency takes
placewhen two statutes

cover the same subject

matter; they areso
clearly inconsistent and
incompatible with each
otherthat one law
cannot be enforced
without nullifying
theother. COA failed to
demonstrate that the
provisions of the
two codes on the matter
of the claim are in
anirreconcilable
conflict. In fact, there
cannot be a
conflictbecause the

provision on Sec. 699 of

RAC has not
beenrestated in the
Administrative Code of
1987.On the other hand,
implied repeal by the
enactment of astatute
revising or codifying the
formal laws on the
wholesubject matter is
only possible if the
revised statute or
codewas intended to
cover the whole subject,
to be a completeand
perfect system in itself.

In this case, what

appears clearis the
intent to cover only
those aspects of
government thatpertain
to administration,
organization and
procedure(Opinion No.
73, S.1991).
Repeals by implication
are not favored, and will
not be
decreed unless it is
manifest that the
legislature so
intended.As laws are

presumed to be passed
with deliberation with
fullknowledge of
all existing ones on
the subject, it is
butreasonable to
conclude that in
passing a statute it
was notintended to
interfere with or
abrogate any former
law relatingto the
same matter, unless
the repugnancy
between the two isnot
only irreconcilable,

but also clear

and convinc
ing

Solangon vs. Salazar,

G.R.No. 125944, June
29, 2001
This is a petition for
review on certiorari of
the decision of the CA
inC.A. G.R. No. 37899,
affirming the decision
of Malolos, Bulacan
RTC Branch 16 for
annulment of mortgage.
This action

was initiated by
the plaintiffs to prevent
the closure of the
mortgaged
property. Facts:
*22 Aug 1986,
plaintiffs
mortgaged a
parcel of land in
Sta. Maria,Bulacan
in favor of the
defendant to
secure the
payment of
aPHP60,000 loan,

payable within
4mos., with an
interest rate
of6%/mo.*27 May
1987 plaintiffs
again mortgaged
the same parcel of
landin favor of the
defendant to
secure the
payment of a
PHP136,512loan,
payable within a
year at the legal
interest rate.*29

Dec 1990 plaintiffs

again mortgaged
the same parcel of
land infavor of the
defendant to
secure the
payment of a
PHP230,000loan,
payable within
4mos., at the legal
interest
rate.*Plaintiffs
contend that the
CA erred in ruling
that the

loanobligation
secured by a real
estate mortgage
with an interest
rate of72% per
annum or 6% per
month is not
unconscionable.*C
ourt of Appeals
maintain that since
Central Bank
Circular No.905
repealed the Usury
Law, therefore
rendering it

legallyinexistent,
there is no more
maximum rate of
interest and the
ratewill just
depend on the
mutual agreement
of the parties.
Issue:
Whether the 72%
per annum interest
rate on the loan of
the petitioners be
sustained, given
that the Usury Law

ceiling oninterest
rates has already
been repealed or
rendered
ineffective by C.B.
Circular No. 905.
Held:
Decision of the CA
is affirmed subject
to the modification
thatthe interest
rate of 72% per
annum be reduced
to 12% perannum.

Even if C.B. Circular

No. 905 repealed the
Usury law, thereis
nothing in the circular
that grants lenders the
authorityto raise
interest rates to levels
which will either
enslavetheir borrowers
or lead to a
hemorrhaging of their
assets.In a similar case,
Medel v. CA, the SC
said that,
We agree

that the stipulated

rate of interest at
5.5%/mo. on
theP500,000 loan is
excessive, iniquitous,
unconscionable and
exorbitant we find the
interest rate at 5.5%/mo.
or
66%/annum,
stipulated upon by the
parties in the
promissorynote
iniquitous and
unconscionable, and
hence contrary

tomorals, if not
against the
law. The stipulation is
void.

In this case, the

situation of the
petitioners is much
worse inthat they are
required to pay the
stipulated interest of
72%per annum.
Thornton v Thornton
Richard Brian
Thornton for and in
behalf of the minor

child
SequeiraJennifer
Delle Francisco
Thornton
(petitioner) v
Adelfa
FranciscoThornton
(respondent)Facts:
Richard Thornton
(American) and
Adelfa Thornton
(Filipino)
weremarried and
had a child
(Sequeira). Richard

Thornton
admonished
herwife for her
irresponsibility to
Sequeira. Adelfa
Thornton left
homewith her child
without notifying
Richard Thornton.
With such,
RichardThornton
filed a petition for
habeas corpus
(Family Court in
MakatiCity) which

was dismissed for

the reason that the
child was just
inBasilan.
However, he did
not find the child
so he petitioned
again for
habeas corpus (Court of
Appeals) which was
denied due to the
courtsclaimed lack of
jurisdiction; thus, this
petition for review of
the CAs

decision.Issue/s:Di
d RA 8369
impliedly repeal BP
129 and RA 7902
insofar as
the jurisdiction of t
his Court to issue
writ of habeas corp
us in custody
ofminor case is
concerned?
Held:Petition is
granted. The Court
holds that the
capacity to issue

writ ofhabeas
corpus is not
exclusive to family
courts. It was
pointed out thatthe
primordial
consideration is
the welfare of the
child; thus, legal
technicality (in this
case, the use of the
word exclusive) is
not the
main priority.
Lledo v Lledo

Carmelita Lledo
(complainant) v
Atty. Cesar Lledo
(respondent)Facts:
Atty. Cesar Lledo was
dismissed due to
Carmelita Lledos filing
of an
administrative
case against him.
GSIS Regional
Manager
thenexplained that
the request for a
refund of

retirement
premiums
isdisallowed under
the Uniform Rules
in Administrative
Cases in the
Civil Service.
Furthermore, Courts
decision did not provide
that Cesar
is entitled to a
refund of his
retirement
premiums.
However, in the

instant case, Cesar Jr.

seeks only the return of
his fathers personal
contributions to
the GSIS and not
the retirement
benefits.Issue/s:Is
Section 9 of
Commonwealth
Act No. 186
impliedly
repealed? Werethe
later enactments
intended to
substitute the

earlier ones?
Held: None of the s
ubsequent laws ex
pressly repealed S
ection 9 ofCommo
nwealth Act No.
186, as
amended. The
inevitable
conclusionthen is
that Section 11(d)
of Commonwealth
Act No. 186, as
amended,continue
s to govern cases

of employees
dismissed for
cause and their
claims for the return of
their personal
contributions. Atty.
Cesars
dismissal should
not deprive him of
the money that
belongs to him
inthe first place.
Also, it was
mentioned that, as
a general rule,

repeals by
implication are not
favored. When
statutes are in pari
materia,
theyshould
be construed
together. A law
cannot be deemed
repealedunless it is
clearly manifested
that the legislature
so intended it

JUDICIAL
DECISIONSDe Roy v
CA
Felisa De Roy and
Virgilio Ramos
(petitioners) v CA
and Luis Bernal,et
al
(respondents)Facts
:
The firewall of a
burned out
building owned by
petitioners
collapsedand

destroyed the
tailoring shop of
the respondents.
Felisa De Roy
andVirgilio Ramos
have been warning
the respondents
beforehand.
RTChowever found
the petitioners
guilty of gross
negligence. The
decisionwas
affirmed by CA. On
the last day of 15

day period in
submittingappeals,
petitioners filed a
motion to extend
time (February 27,
1986)which was
then denied by the
appellate court in a
resolution; thus,
thisspecial civil
action for certiorari
to review the
resolutions of the
CAIssue/s:

Did the CA err in

dismissing the
petitioners motion for
time
extension? Is the
rule laid down in
Habaluyas
Enterprises Inc.
vJapzon be made
to apply in this
case considering
that the decision
isnot published in
the Official
Gazette?Held:The

Court resolved to
deny the instant
petition for lack of
merit. SCfinds that
CA did not commit
a grave abuse of
discretion when it
denied petitioners
motion for extension of
time. It was said that
CA
correctly applied
the rule laid down
in Habaluyas
Enterprises Inc. v

Japzon that 15 day for

reconsideration cant be
extended basing on a
Resolution
promulgated in
May 30, 1986.
Furthermore, there
is no lawrequiring
publication of
Supreme Court
decisions in the
OfficialGazette
before they can be
considered binding
and effective.

Pesca v Pesca
Lorna Guillen
Pesca (petitioner) v
Zosimo Pesca
(respondent)Facts:
CA reversed the
decision of the RTC
of Caloocan City
which hasdeclared
the marriage
between petitioner
and respondent to
be null andvoid on
the ground of
psychological

incapacity on the
part of
therespondent;
thus, this petition
for review on
certiorari of a
decision ofthe
Court of
AppealsIssue/s:Did
the CA err in
reversing the
decision of the
RTC? Do the
decisionsof the
Court have the

force of law?
Held:The CA did
not err in reversing
the decision of the
RTC.Psychological
incapacity is
already explained
in Santos v CA and
inRepublic v CA
and Molina. The
interpretation
placed upon the
writtenlaw by a
competent court
has the force of

law. In
Santos, psychologi
cal incapacity
refers to no less
than a mental
(not physical)incap
acity that causes a
party to be truly
incognitive of the
basicmarital
covenants that
concomitantly
must be assumed
and discharged by
the parties to the

marriage.
This therefore
should apply in the
case.It is only
when a prior ruling
of this Court finds
itself overruled,
and adifferent view
is adopted, that
the new doctrine
may have to be
applied prospectiv
ely in favor of parti
es who have relied
on the old doctrine

and have acted in

good faith in
accordance
therewith. Thus,
emotionalimmaturi
ty and
irresponsibility, as
brought up by the
petitioner to
therespondent,
cannot be equated
with psychological
incapacity.
PRESUMPTION AND
APPLICABILITY OF

CUSTOMMartinez v
Van Buskirk
SD Martinez and
Carmen Ong de
Martinez (plaintiffs
and appellees)
vWilliam Van
Buskirk (defendant
and
appellant)Facts:Th
e horses of a
cochero wounded
the plaintiff and
her child. The
courtof first

instance of Manila
found the
defendant guilty of
negligence;thus,
this appeal.
Issue/s:Whether
the cochero is
guilty of
negligenceHeld:Th
e Cochero is not
guilty of
negligence. SC
reversed the
judgment onthe
principle that acts

the performance of
which has not
proveddestructive
or injurious and
which have been
acquiesced in by
societyfor so long
time that they
have ripened into
a custom, cannot
be held to be
of themselves
unreasonable or
imprudent Cochero
s had been

in thehabit of
leaving the horses
and assisting in
unloading the
merchandise.Such
is the manner
described by the
defendant on the
day of
theaccident. NCC
10-12Art. 10. In
case of doubt in
the interpretation
or application of
laws, itis presumed

that the lawmaking

body intended
right and justice
to prevail. (n)A
lonzo v. Padua
Issue: How should
Article 1088 be
correctly interprete
d and applied?This
is Article 1088 of
the Civil Code:Art.
1088. Should any
of the heirs sell his
hereditary rights to
astranger before

the partition, any

or all of the coheirs may
besubrogated to
the rights of the
purchaser by
reimbursing him
for the price of the
sale, provided they
do so within the
period of one
monthfrom the
time they were
notified in writing
of the sale by the

vendor.Fact: The
Padua siblings (five
brothers and
sisters) inherited a
parcelof land from
their parents. Two
of them, Celestino
and Eustaquia,
soldtheir undivided
share to the
petitioners in 1963
and
1964. The petition
ers, then, enclosed
the land they

bought and lived

there. In1976,
however, Teclo
Padua, one of the
coheirs, sought to
redeem thearea
sold to the
petitioners. The
trial court
dismissed the
complaintciting
that though there
was no written
notice, the co-heirs
had

actualknowledge
of the sale. But the
Intermediate
Appellate Court
Reversedthe
decision declaring
that Article 1088
requires a written
notice andno
written notice has
been issued;
therefore, the 30
days of
redemptionhas not
yet started (citing

Art. 1623. The

right of legal preemption
orredemption shall
not be exercised
except within thirty
days from
thenotice in writing
by the prospective
vendor, or by the
vendors, as
thecase may be.
The deed of sale
shall not be
recorded in the

Registry
ofProperty, unless
accompanied by
an affidavit of the
vendor that he
hasgiven written
notice thereof to
all possible
redemptioners. )
Held: The Court
reversed the
decision of the
respondent court
and

reinstated the decision

of the trial court. The
Court sated The co
-heirsin this case
were undeniably
informed of the
sales although no
noticein writing
was given them.
And there is no
doubt either that
the 30-day period
began and ended
during the 14
years between the

sales inquestion
and the filing of
the complaint for
redemption in
1977,without the
co-heirs exercising
their right of
redemption. These
are the
justifications for this
exception.
LEGAL PERIODS
NCC 13. When the
laws speak of years,

months, days or nights,

it shall be understood
that years are of three
hundred sixty-five
dayseach; months, of
thirty days; days, of
twenty-four hours; and
nights from sunset to
sunrise. If months are
designated by their
name, they shall be
computed by thenumber
of days which they
respectively have

In computing a period,
the first day shall be
excluded, and the last
dayincluded.
(7a) Revised
administrative codeSec.
31. Legal Periods. "Year" shall be
understood to be
twelvecalendar months;
"month" of thirty days,
unless it refers to
a specificcalendar
month in which case it
shall be computed

according to thenumber
of days the specific
month contains; "day,"
to a day of twenty- four
hours; and "night,"
from sunset to
sunrise. Rule of Court
Rule
22:COMPUTATION
OF TIMESection 1.
How to compute
time. In computing any
period of time
prescribed or allowed
by these Rules, or by or

der
of the court, or by any a
pplicable statute,the day
of the act or event from
which the designated
period oftime begins to
run is to be excluded and
the date
of performance include
d. If the last day of the p
eriod, as thuscomputed,
falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal
holiday inthe place
where the court sits, the

time shall not run until

thenext working day.
The rules above
are the basis for
the decisions in
the following
cases:
Armigos v. Court of
Appeals
Issue: Did the
petitioner
perfected his
appeal within the
reglementary perio
d?Facts: The

petitioner, Rudy
Geo Armigos,
received the
decision on
thecomplaint Mata
filed against him
on June 8, 1977.
He filed for
appealon June 9,
1977 and
perfected his
appeal on June 24,
1977.
Thereglementary
period for

perfecting an
appeal is 15 days.
In
Armigoscomputati
on, his appeal is
still within the
reglementary
period.Held: The
Court ruled against
the petitioner. The
rule stated in
theArticle 13 of the
Civil Code to the
effect that
In computing a peri

od,
the first day shall be
excluded, and the last
day included and the
oldRule 28 (now Rule
22) of the Rule of Court
which stated that In
computing any
period of time
prescribed or
allowed by the
Rules ofCourt, or
by order of the
court, or by any
applicable statute,

the day ofthe act,

event or default
after which the
designated period
of
time begins to run
is not to be include
d. The last day of t
he period socompu
ted is to be
included, unless it
is a Sunday or a
legal holiday
inwhich event the
time shall run until

the end of the next

day which
isneither a Sunday
or a holiday.
In applying this rule,
the Court
considered the day
as synonymous
with the date and
found no
cogentreason to
adopt a different
view.

National Marketing
Corporation (Namarco)
v. Tecson
Issue: Should a
year be computed
as calendar year or
as based on Civil
Codes computation of a
year as having 365 days?
Facts: On
November 14,
1955, the Court of
First Instance of
Manilarendered
judgment on Price

Stabilization Corp.
vs. Miguel Tecson
andAlto Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc.
The decision was
served to
thedefendants of
November 21,
1955. On
December 21,
1965,
Namarco(successo
r of Price
Stabilization Corp)
appealed for the

revival of
the judgment.
Miguel Tecson
moved for the
dismissal of the
case for lackof
jurisdiction and
prescription.
Article 1144(3)
states that an
action
upon judgment must
be brought within ten
years from the time
theright of action

accrues. The decision

became final on
December 21,
1955 (thirty days
after the
defendants
received the
judgment) and
theappeal was
made on
December 21,
1965. The years
1960 and 1964
both had leap
years so that 365

days in ten years

would be equal
to3,650 days and
this would fall on
December 19,
1965.Held: The
Court denied the
petitioners appeal
citing Article 13 of
theCivil Code.
Go v. Dizon
Issues: The
petitioners Notice
of Appeal should
not have

beendismissed
since the appeal
was filed within the
time
provided.Facts:
The petitioners
filed their notice of
appeal thirteen
days fromMarch
21, 1986 (the date
their petition for
relief was denied
by JudgeBaltazar
Dizon). But the
respondent

Equitable filed a
Motion toDismiss
Appeal and was
granted.Held: The
denial for Petition
for Relief was
Reversed and Set
Aside because
Section 13, Rule 41
states that an
appeal can only be
dismissed where the
notice of appeal, appeal
bond, or record onappeal
is not filed within the

period of time herein

provided and the
petitioners filed
their Notice of
Appeal within the
time
provided.Section
23:
Perfection of appeal.
In cases where
appeal is taken,
the perfection of
the appeal shall be
upon expiration of
the last day

toappeal by any
party.
Quiqui v. Boncaros
Issue: Did the
petitioner file their
Motion for
Reconsideration
withinthe 30-day
reglementary
period?Facts: The
petitioners filed a
complaint against
the
respondentsregard
ing the ownership

of a parcel of land.
The presiding
judge of thecase,
Judge Alejandro
Boncaros,
dismissed the
complaint for lack
of jurisdiction over
the case. The copy
of the decision was
received bythe
petitioner on July
17, 1979. The
same filed a
Motion

forReconsideration
on August 17,
1979. The motion
was dismissed for
itwas already
beyond the 30-day
reglementary
period. The
petitionersfiled a
Notice of Appeal
seeking relief from
the Court of
Appeals butwere
denied.Held: The
Court dismissed

the case for lack of

merit, upholding
the
decision of the lower
court. Cited Article
13 of the Civil Code:
Incomputing a
period, the first
day shall be
excluded, and the
last day
included.
Additional info:
The petitioners
cited De las Alas v.

Court of
Appeals but in this
case, the last day
fell on a Sunday,
so the last day
wasmoved to the
first working day
immediately after.
K. APPLICABILITY
OF PENAL LAWS
Lazaro B. Rayray
(plaintiff-appellant) v
Chae Kyung
Lee(defendantappellee)

Related Provisions

NCC 14

Penal laws and those

of public security and
safety
shall be obligatory
upon all who live
or sojourn in
Philippineterritory,
subject to the
principles of public
international law

and to treaty
stipulations.
Nature of the
Case

Appeal from a
decision of the
Court of Juvenile
and
DomesticRelations
Facts

Lazaro Rayray
seeks the

annulment of his
marriage
todefendant Chae
Kyung Lee who is
formerly a resident
ofPusan, Korea.

Summons were
served by
publication.
Plaintiff moved
that thedefendant
be declared in
default for not

filing an answer.
The case was
heard on the
merits and the
decision was
rendered
dismissing the plaintiffs
complaint upon the gr
ound: (1) thatthe
court could not
nullify a marriage
contracted abroad,
(2)that the facts
proven do not

warrant the relief

prayed for.

Plaintiff appealed
to the Court of
Appeals, which
certified thecase to
the Supreme
Court.Issues

Whether or not the

court has
jurisdiction

Whether or not the

marriage of the
plaintiff and
defendant
issubstantially
validHeld

Decision is
affirmedRatio

The court has

jurisdiction
o

the case is on the

annulment of plaintiffs
marriage to
the defendant
which is within the
jurisdiction of
ourcourts
o

the court acquired

jurisdiction by the
plaintiffs
submission thereto
of his complaint
o

Jurisdiction
depends upon the
nationality or
domicile ofthe
parties, not the
place of
celebration of
marriage

Court has
jurisdiction over
the
res

, provided, atleast,
one of the parties
is domiciled in, or
anational of, the
forum
o

Plaintiff is a citizen
of the Philippines,
domiciled
therein, making his
status subject to the
courts
jurisdiction

The marriage of
the plaintiff and
defendant is
substantiallyvalid
o

Exhibit A is not
signed and it was
obtained only
afterthe alleged
wedding
o

Defendant did not

say that she had
been married

before, but
admitted to have
lived with several
other men
o

There is no
showing of
evidence that
Korean
laws permit bigam
y
or polygamy thus i
t is assumed that

theforeign law is
identical to the
lex fori
or in this case
thePhilippine Law
o

Exhibit D states
that defendant had
no
previousmarriage
o

The court cant believe

the plaintiffs testimony

because he lied re
garding
his status before in
this verycourt
L. BINDING EFFECT
Manuela Barretto
Gonzales (plaintiff an
d appellee) v Augusto
C.Gonzales (defendant
and appellant)

Related Provisions

NCC 15

Laws relating to
family rights and duties,
or to the
status, condition
and legal capacity
of persons are
binding upon
citizens of the
Philippines, even though
living abroad.

NCC 17, par 3

Prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their
acts or property,
and those which
have for their
object publicorder,
public policy and
good customs shall
not be
renderedineffectiv
e by laws or
judgments
promulgated, or
bydeterminations
or conventions

agreed upon in a
foreign
country.
Nature of the
Case

Appeal from a
judgment of the
Court of First
Instance of Manila
Facts:
Plaintiff and
defendant are
citizens of the

Philippines
andresidents of
Manila

Significant dates
o

January 19, 1919

they were married

in Manila andlived
together until the
Spring of 1926

Four children were

born

They had mutual

agreement to allow
the plaintiff for her
support and that of
her children(P500
monthly subject to
increase if
necessary),and the
title of certain
properties to be
put in hername
o

November 28, 192

7

absolute divorce is
decreed assecured
in Reno, Nevada by
the husband
o

November
28, 1927

husband went
through the
formsof marriage

with another
citizen of these
Islands andnow
has three children
o

August 1928

husband went
back to the
Philippines

Wife requests that

Philippine courts
confirm and ratify

thedecree of
divorce

Court of First
Instance found
against the
defendant and
granted judgment
as prayed for by
the plaintiff and
intervenors

Parties in this
action are in

dispute over
financial matters,
butthey are in
unity in trying to
secure the courts
of this jurisdiction
to recognize and
approve of the
Reno divorceIssues

Whether or not the

Reno divorce
acquired by the
party isrecognized

in the
PhilippinesHeld

Judgment of the
Court of First
Instance of Manila
is reversedand
defendant is
absolved from the
demands made
against himRatio

Reno divorce is not

recognized

Entire conduct of
the parties clearly
indicates a
purposeto
circumvent the
laws of the
Philippine
Islandsregarding
divorce and to
secure for
themselves a
changeof status for
reasons and

conditions not
authorized byour
law
o

The matrimonial
domicile of the
couple is in
thePhilippines thus
the residence
acquired by the
husbandin Nevada
to secure a divorce
did not
confer jurisdiction

upon the court of t

hat state to dissolv
e the bonds of
matrimony in
which he entered
in 1919
Pastor B. Tenchavez
(plaintiffappellant) v Vicenta F.
Escao, et al
(defendants-appellees)

Related Provisions

NCC 15

Laws relating to
family rights and duties,
or to the
status, condition
and legal capacity
of persons are
binding
uponcitizens of the
Philippines,
even though living
abroad.

NCC 17, par 3


Prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their
acts or property,
and those which
have for their
object publicorder,
public policy and
good customs shall
not be
renderedineffectiv
e by laws or
judgments
promulgated, or

bydeterminations
or conventions
agreed upon in a
foreign
country.
Nature of the
Case
Direct appeal from
a decision of the
Court of First
Instance of Cebu
Facts
Significant dates