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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

#8

G.R. No. 100643 October 30, 1992

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 79, Morong,
Rizal, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, Morong, Rizal, REGISTER OF DEEDS,
Quezon City, and AGUENDO EUGENIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM :
In Our Resolution of 14 August 1992, We directed ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel
for petitioner Adez Realty, Inc., to "SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from notice why
he should not be disciplinary dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the judgment
of the court a quo 1 thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with the
apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and
thus failing to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar.
In his EXPLANATION of 1 September 1992, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay "humbly
prostrates himself before the Honorable Court and throws himself at its mercy," and
explains that
. . . whenever he prepares petitioners either for the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, he dictates to his secretary and if portions of the decision or order to be
appealed from have to be quoted, he simply instructs his said secretary to copy the
particular pages of the said decision or order.
In the case at bar, he did instruct his secretary to copy the corresponding pages in the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Somehow, however, some words were intercalated on
a particular paragraph noted by the Honorable Court he regrettably is at a loss to
explain. He remembers, however, that at the time he was preparing the petition at bar
there were other pleadings necessitating equal if not preferential attention from him
which could perhaps be the reason why his secretary committed a very grievous
mistake, Such mistake though he does not condone and he feel upset at the turn of
events. 2
Attached to his EXPLANATION as Annex "A" is an Affidavit 3 of Alicia A. Castro,
purportedly his Secretary, stating among others that
3. . . . in the preparation of the petition for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme
Court, it was Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay who dictated to me the contents of said
petition;
4. . . . in the preparation of the petition, he told me, as he is wont to do whenever he
prepares a petition, to copy the particular pages in the decision of the Court of Appeals,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 entitled "Adez Realty, Inc., petitioner versus The Hon. Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, Branch 79 (not 89 as stated is the Affidavit), et
al., respondents";
5. . . . when I copied the particular pages of the decision of the Court of Appeals as
instructed by Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, I did as instructed, but it was only after our
office received the copy of the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 100643 . . .
that Atty. Dacanay confronted me and asked me where I got that portion which was
added to the particular paragraph noted by the Supreme Court; that it was only then
that I realized the mistake I committed;
xxx xxx xxx
7. . . . I surmise that the error could have been due to the fact that ADEZ REALTY, Inc.
has so many cases being handled by the law office that I presume I could have copied
or my intention was distracted by other pleadings atop my table at the time.

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Upon receipt of the EXPLANATION of counsel, the First Division referred his case en
consulta to the Court En Banc which accepted and took cognizance of it in view of the
possible sanction that may be imposed on a member of the Bar.
After due deliberation, the Court En Banc brushed off as simply unsatisfactory and
incredible counsel's explanation that it was his secretary who committed the mistake.
This "passing-the-buck" stance of counsel was already aptly treated in Adaza
v. Barinaga, 4 where the Court observed thus
Making the law office secretary, clerk or messenger the scapegoat or patsy for the
delay in filing of pleading, motion and other paper and for the lawyer's dereliction of
duty is a common alibi of practicing lawyer. Like the alibi of the accused in criminal
cases, counsel's shifting of the blame to his office employee is usually a concoction
utilized to cover up his own negligence, incompetence, indolence and ineptitude.
The case of petitioner is no better; it can be worse. For, how could the secretary have
divined the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez
Realty," without counsel dictating it word for word? Could it have been a providential
mistake of the secretary as it was very material, and on which could have hinged the
fate of a litigant's cause? Whatever be the truth in this regard, counsel cannot elude
administrative responsibility which borders on falsification of a judicial record to which,
by his inveigling, he unfortunately drags his secretary. Indeed, by no means can he
evade responsibility for the vicious intercalation as he admittedly dictated and signed
the petition.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck the allegation in their
pleadings, more particularly the quoted portions, and ensure that the statements
therein are accurate and the reproductions faithful, down to the last word and even
punctuation mark. The legal profession demands that lawyers thoroughly go over
pleadings, motions and other documents dictated or prepared by them, type or
transcribed by their secretaries or clerks, before filing them with the court. If a client is
bound by the acts of his counsel, with more reason should counsel be bound the acts of
his secretary who merely follow his orders. 5
The instant case originate from a petition for reconstitution of title over a parcel of land.
Section 13 of R.A. 26, in relation to Sec. 12 of the same statute, on which petitioner
bases one of his causes of action, provides among others that notice should be given to
the occupants or persons in possession of the property. Compliance therewith is a
material requirement for granting a petition for reconstitution of title. The inserted
phase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty," was just
the right phrase intercalated at the right place, making it highly improbable to be
unintentionally, much less innocently, committed; and by the secretary a that. All
circumstances herein simply but strongly sustain Our belief. Certainly, making it appear
that respondent Court of Appeals found that no notice was given to the occupants of
subject property when in fact it did not make such a finding is a clear indication
not merely of carelessness in lifting a portion of the assailed decision but a malicious
attempt to gain undue advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more
importantly, to deceive and misguide this Court, which is the final arbiter of litigations.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that, save in certain instances, factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court. 6 The distortion of facts
committed by counsel, with the willing assistance of his secretary, is a grave offense
and should not be treated lightly, not only because it may set a dangerous precedent
by, rather, because it is a clear and serious violation of one's oath as member of the
Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility directs
that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper,
the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal
or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved" (Emphasis
supplied).
Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a court decision constitutes willful
disregard of the lawyer's solemn duty to act at all times in manner consistent with the
truth. A lawyer should never venture to mislead the court by false statements or

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quotations of facts or laws. Thus, in Bautista v. Gonzales, 7 We suspended respondent
for six (6) months for, among other submitting to the lower court falsified documents,
representing them to the true copies. In Chavez v. Viola, 8 We suspend respondent
counsel for five (5) months after he filed an Amended Application for Original
Registration of Title which contained false statements.
The case at bar, although akin to the aforementioned cases, has more serious and farreaching repercussions. Those who attempt to misguide this Court, the last forum for
appeal, should be dealt with more severely lest We be made unwilling instruments of
inequity and injustice. Indeed, counsel has demonstrated his wanton disregard for truth
and fairplay even before the Highest Court of the land. Worse, he compounded his
unprofessional mischief by laying the blame on his hapless secretary whose duty is was
simply to obey him.
It is well to repeat, perhaps to the point of satiety, what We have already said
. . . that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. On of those requirement is the observance of
honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the
courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice . . . A lawyer, on the
other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the
administration of justice would gravely suffer . . . It is essential that lawyers bear in
mind at all times that their duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they
are above all . . . sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and
only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interest of their clients. For this
reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court. 9
WHEREFORE, We find ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner, guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a judicial Decision elevated to Us on certiorari, thereby
altering its factual findings with the apparent purpose, and no other, of misleading the
Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus miserably failing to live up to
the standards expected of him as a members of the Philippines Bar.
Consequently, ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is hereby DISBARRED effective
immediately from the practice of law.
Let copies of this Resolution be served personally on Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay at his
given address at Mezzanine Floor, WIL-VIC Building, 125 Kamias Road, Quezon City,
entered upon his personal records, and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all the courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, JJ. concur.
Narvasa, C.J. is on leave.
Footnotes
1 See Decision of the Twelfth Division, Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 23773, prom.
30, April 1991; Rollo, pp. 51-55.
2 Rollo, p. 93.
3 Annex "A", EXPLANATION; Rollo, p. 96.
4 Adm. Case No. 1604, May 29, 1981; 104 SCRA 684, and the cases cited therein.
5 See Baring v. Cabahug No. L-23229, July 20, 1967; 20 SCRA 696.
6 Autria v. People, G.R. No. 83530, December 18, 1990; 192 SCRA 342.
7 Adm. Matter No. 1625, February 12, 1990; 182 SCRA 151.
8 Adm. Case No. 2152, April 19, 1991; 196 SCRA 10.
9 Ibid, citing Casals v. Cusi, No. L-35766, July 12, 1973, 52 SCRA 58; and Panga v.
Ramos, Adm. Case No. 1053, September 7, 1979, 93 SCRA 87.
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