The Vedanta Sutras, commentary by Sankaracharya (SBE34), tr.

by George
Thibaut [1890] at sacred-texts.com

37. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of the
inappropriateness (of that doctrine).
The Strakra now applies himself to the refutation of that doctrine, according to
which the Lord is the cause of the world only in so far as he is the general ruler.-But how do you know that that is the purport of the Stra (which speaks of the
Lord 'without any qualification')?--From the circumstance, we reply, that the
teacher himself has proved, in the previous sections of the work, that the Lord is
the material cause as well as the ruler of the world. Hence, if the present Stra
were meant to impugn the doctrine of the Lord in general, the earlier and later
parts of the work would be mutually contradictory, and the Strakra would thus
be in conflict with himself. We therefore must assume that the purport of the
present Stra is to make an energetic attack on the doctrine of those who
maintain that the Lord is not the material cause, but merely the ruler, i.e. the
operative cause of the world; a doctrine entirely opposed to the Vedntic tenet of
the unity of Brahman.
The theories about the Lord which are independent of the Vednta are of various
nature. Some taking their stand on the Snkhya and Yoga systems assume that
the Lord acts as a mere operative cause, as the ruler of the
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pradhna and of the souls, and that pradhna, soul, and Lord are of mutually
different nature.--The Mhesvaras (Saivas) maintain that the five categories, viz.
effect, cause, union, ritual, the end of pain, were taught by the Lord Pasupati
(Siva) to the end of breaking the bonds of the animal (i.e. the soul); Pasupati is,
according to them, the Lord, the operative cause.--Similarly, the Vaiseshikas and
others also teach, according to their various systems, that the Lord is somehow
the operative cause of the world.
Against all these opinions the Stra remarks 'the Lord, on account of the
inappropriateness.' I.e. it is not possible that the Lord as the ruler of the
pradhna and the soul should be the cause of the world, on account of the
inappropriateness of that doctrine. For if the Lord is supposed to assign to the
various classes of animate creatures low, intermediate, and high positions,
according to his liking, it follows that he is animated by hatred, passion, and so
on, is hence like one of us, and is no real Lord. Nor can we get over this difficulty
by assuming that he makes his dispositions with a view to the merit and demerit
of the living beings; for that assumption would lead us to a logical see-saw, the
Lord as well as the works of living beings having to be considered in turns both
as acting and as acted upon. This difficulty is not removed by the consideration
that the works of living beings and the resulting dispositions made by the Lord
form a chain which has no beginning; for in past time as well as in the present
mutual interdependence of the two took place, so that the beginningless series is
like an endless chain of blind men leading other blind men. It is, moreover, a
tenet set forth by the Naiyyikas themselves that 'imperfections have the
characteristic of being the causes of action' (Nyya Stra I, 1, 18). Experience

shows that all agents, whether they be active for their own purposes or for the
purposes of something else, are impelled to action by some imperfection. And
even if it is admitted that an agent even when acting for some extrinsic purpose
is impelled by an intrinsic motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same; for
the
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[paragraph continues] Lord is no longer a Lord, even if he is actuated by intrinsic
motives only (such as the desire of removing the painful feeling connected with
pity).--Your doctrine is finally inappropriate for that reason also that you maintain
the Lord to be a special kind of soul; for from that it follows that he must be
devoid of all activity.

38. And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord with the
souls and the pradhna).
Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing there lies the further
objection that a Lord distinct from the pradhna and the souls cannot be the
ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a certain way. But of
what nature is that connexion to be? It cannot be conjunction (samyoga),
because the Lord, as well as the pradhna and the souls, is of infinite extent and
devoid of parts. Nor can it be inherence, since it would be impossible to define
who should be the abode and who the abiding thing. Nor is it possible to assume
some other connexion, the special nature of which would have to be inferred
from the effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just what is not
settled as yet 1.--How, then, it may be asked, do you--the Vedntins--establish
the relation of cause and effect (between the Lord and the world)?--There is, we
reply, no difficulty in our case, as the connexion we assume is that of identity
(tdtmya). The adherent of Brahman, moreover, defines the nature of the
cause, and so on, on the basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render
his tenets throughout conformable to observation. Our adversary, on the other
hand, who defines the nature of the cause and the like according to instances
furnished by experience,
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may be expected to maintain only such doctrines as agree with experience. Nor
can he put forward the claim that Scripture, because it is the production of the
omniscient Lord, may be used to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the
Vedntin; for that would involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the
Lord being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of Scripture
again being established on the omniscience of the Lord.--For all these reasons
the Snkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid of foundation. Other
similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted by
corresponding arguments.

Footnotes

436:1 The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and the pradhna
and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world considered as the effect of
the pradhna acted upon by the Lord; for that the world is the effect of the
pradhna is a point which the Vedntins do not accept as proved.

39. And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the part of the Lord).
The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an untenable hypothesis, for the
following reason also.--Those philosophers are obliged to assume that by his
influence the Lord produces action in the pradhna, &c. just as the potter
produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot be admitted; for the pradhna,
which is devoid of colour and other qualities, and therefore not an object of
perception, is on that account of an altogether different nature from clay and the
like, and hence cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action.

40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the pradhna is ruled
by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.
Well, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the Lord rules the pradhna
in the same way as the soul rules the organ of sight and the other organs which
are devoid of colour, and so on, and hence not objects of perception.
This analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we infer that the organs are
ruled by the soul, from the observed fact that the soul feels pleasure, pain, and
the like (which affect the soul through the organs). But we do not observe that
the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, &c. caused
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by the pradhna. If the analogy between the pradhna and the bodily organs
were a complete one, it would follow that the Lord is affected by pleasure and
pain no less than the transmigrating souls are.
Or else the two preceding Stras may be explained in a different way. Ordinary
experience teaches us that kings, who are the rulers of countries, are never
without some material abode, i.e. a body; hence, if we wish to infer the existence
of a general Lord from the analogy of earthly rulers, we must ascribe to him also
some kind of body to serve as the substratum of his organs. But such a body
cannot be ascribed to the Lord, since all bodies exist only subsequently to the
creation, not previously to it. The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because
devoid of a material substratum; for experience teaches us that action requires a
material substrate.--Let us then arbitrarily assume that the Lord possesses some
kind of body serving as a substratum for his organs (even previously to
creation).--This assumption also will not do; for if the Lord has a body he is
subject to the sensations of ordinary transmigratory souls, and thus no longer is
the Lord.

41. And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite duration or absence
of omniscience (on the Lord's part).

The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is invalid, for the following

reason also.--They teach that the Lord is omniscient and of infinite duration, and
likewise that the pradhna, as well as the individual souls, is of infinite duration.
Now, the omniscient Lord either defines the measure of the pradhna, the souls,
and himself, or does not define it. Both alternatives subvert the doctrine under
discussion. For, on the former alternative, the pradhna, the souls, and the Lord,
being all of them of definite measure, must necessarily be of finite duration;
since ordinary experience teaches that all things of definite extent, such as jars
and the like, at some time cease to exist. The numerical measure of pradhna,
souls, and Lord is
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defined by their constituting a triad, and the individual measure of each of them
must likewise be considered as defined by the Lord (because he is omniscient).
The number of the souls is a high one 1. From among this limited number of
souls some obtain release from the samsra, that means their samsra comes to
an end, and their subjection to the samsra comes to an end. Gradually all souls
obtain release, and so there will finally be an end of the entire samsra and the
samsra state of all souls. But the pradhna which is ruled by the Lord and which
modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is meant by samsra. Hence,
when the latter no longer exists, nothing is left for the Lord to rule, and his
omniscience and ruling power have no longer any objects. But if the pradhna,
the souls, and the Lord, all have an end, it follows that they also have a
beginning, and if they have a beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the
doctrine of a general void.--Let us then, in order to avoid these untoward
conclusions, maintain the second alternative, i.e. that the measure of the Lord
himself, the pradhna, and the souls, is not defined by the Lord.--But that also is
impossible, because it would compel us to abandon a tenet granted at the
outset, viz. that the Lord is omniscient.
For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative philosophers, according
to which the Lord is the operative cause of the world, appears unacceptable.

Footnotes
439:1 I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the omniscient Lord knows
its measure.