A2016 Persons Digests

Griswold v.
Connecticut
381 U.S. 479 ll June 7, 1965 ll Douglas, J.
Petitioners:
Respondent:
Estelle T. Griswold, C. Lee Buxton

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
FACTS:
Appellants Griswold, an
Executive
Director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut and Buxton, a licensed physician
were arrested tried, convicted and fined $100
for violating provisions of the General Statutes
of Connecticut sections 53-32 and 54-196. They
provided medical advice to a married couple
that wanted to be informed on contraception
methods
and
subsequently
prescribed
contraceptive devices and materials for the
wife's use.
Section 53-32 provides that the use of any
drug, medicinal article or instrument to prevent
conception is punishable by fine or mandatory
jail time. Section 54-196 provides that any
accessory to such crime is punished as if they
were the principal offender.
Intermediate appellate court and the
State's highest court affirmed the judgment.
151 Connecticut 544, 200 A.2d 479
Appellants asserted that their conviction
pursuant to the statute is in violation of their
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus they
believe that Connecticut is unconstitutional.
HELD:
Yes. Appellants have standing, in so far as
that they assert that the crimes for which they
were charged is, constitutionally, not a crime.
Yes. While the right to privacy is not
explicitly included in the Bill of Rights, the right
of married couples to decide on reproductive
choices and to be assisted in doing so is
protected by peripheral rights or the
"penumbra" of other rights provided by the
First Amendment (right to teach, as in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, supra; and Meyer v.
Nebraska; right to association, NAACP v.
Alabama), the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
and the Ninth amendment.
Court
reversed
Connecticut
ISSUES:
Whether appellants have standing to assert
right of married couples to privacy?
Whether their conviction as accessories due
to enforcement of said Connecticut statute
violated appellants Fourteenth Amendment
rights?
Persons and Family Relations
Dilag
332
Eisenstadt v. Baird
405 U.S. 438 ll March 22, 1972 ll Brennan, J.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS:
William Baird [Appellee]
was convicted
at a bench trial in the
Massachusetts Superior Court under the Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c.272, 21
and 21A for (1) exhibiting contraceptive articles in the course of delivering a lecture on
contraception and (2) giving a woman Emko vaginal foam (contraceptive foam) at the end
of the lecture.
(Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746) The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: (1)
unanimously decided to set aside the conviction for exhibiting contraceptives but (2) by a
4-3 vote, sustained the conviction for giving away the contraceptive foam. Baird filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. The District Court dismissed the petition.
The Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal and remanded the actions to remand the action
with directions to grant the writ to Baird.
ISSUES AND RATIO:
1. Whether Baird has standing to
contraceptives:
Appellant: Eisenstadt
Bairds conviction rests on the
restriction that he is not a
doctor or a physician. Baird is
also no t a single person
denied
access
to
Contraceptives. Thus, Baird
should have no standing in
court.
assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to

Response
Court of Appeals: Statute in which
Baird was convicted is not a health measure; it does
not follow how Baird should be prevented from
Attacking the statute. The point of giving away
c o n t r a c e p t i v e s i s t o challenge the statute.
Supreme Court: Unmarried persons denied access to
contraceptives are not
themselves
subject
to Prosecution, and are denied a forum in which
to assert their rights.
HELD: Baird is now in a position to assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to
contraceptives
2. Whether the Massachusetts statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment:
a. The deterrence of fornication cannot be taken as the purpose of the ban on distribution
of contraceptives.
b. The Massachusetts statute on restricting access to non-married persons does not
serve any health purpose. If that were the case, then the restriction should also
apply to married persons.
c. If the r ight to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
HELD: The Massachusetts statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Dilag
332
Geluz v. CA
G.R. No. L-16439 ll Jul. 20, 1961 ll Reyes, J.
PETITIONER:
Antonio Geluz
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Oscar Lazo
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva aborted her pregnancy by
her husband, Oscar Lazo, on three occasions:
once before their marriage and twice during its
course. On all three instances, she sought the
services of Antonio Geluz, a doctor.
Oscar Lazo claimed that he did not know of,
nor gave his consent to, the abortion, and thus,
citing the last abortion as his basis, he filed a
complaint with the trial court, asking the court
to compel Geluz to indemnify him. His
complaint and plea for indemnity was granted
by the trial court and further affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, on the basis of the provisions
on the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Hence, Antonio Geluz came to the Supreme
Court to appeal his case.
ISSUES:
Can the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, recover
damages from a physician who caused the
same?
HELD:
No. The court ruled that indemnity cannot
be had as an unborn fetus has no juridical
personality, and thus, no action can be brought
before the court on its behalf, and nor can any
right that may arise from an injury caused to it
accrue to its parents or heir, by virtue of his

juridical personality being extinguished, or in
fact, not having at all been realized, the
moment it was aborted. Neither can provisional
personality of a conceived child, as provided by
Article 40, be invoked in this case since it does
not satisfy the requisite of birth. Hence, the
court explained that both the trial court and CA
erred in awarding the damages to Lazo since
Article 2206 does not cover the case of an
unborn fetus that is not endowed with
personality.
Only moral damages can be claimed by
parents on the basis of the illegal arrest of the
normal development of their unborn child,
which results to parents distress and anguish
on the loss, and disappointment of their
parental expectations. However, since the case
at bar involves voluntary abortion on the part of
the mother, coupled by the fact that the
husband was indifferent to the other two
abortions, the court was unable to find any
ground to award moral damages. This is
exacerbated by the fact that Lazo didnt even
sue on administrative or criminal grounds, but
only seemed to be after the doctors money.
Hence, the court reversed the decision and
dismissed Lazos complaint.
Cadorna
332
Joaquin v. Navarro
G.R. No. L-5426 ll May 29, 1953 ll Tuason, J.
PETITIONER: Ramon Joaquin
RESPONDENT: Antonio Navarro
FACTS:
During the Japanese invasion, the Navarro
family, consisted of Joaquin Navarro Sr., 70;
Angela Joaquin de Navarro, ~67; Joaquin
Navarro Jr., ~30; and sisters Pilar, ~33;
Concepcion, ~23; and Natividad, ~25, were
killed in various orders. The established fact is
that the three sisters, Pilar, Concepcion and
Natividad, were the first ones to get killed,
while their father, Joaquin Navarro Sr., was the
last. The disputed order of death however
concerns that of Angela Joaquin de Navarro and
Joaquin Navarro Jr., because no clear evidence
shows that at the time when Joaquin Navarro
Jr. got shot on the head, Angela Joaquin had
already been dead or was still alive.
It is important to solve the mystery because
it has a bearing on the rights to succession of
Ramon Joaquin, herein referred to as Petitioner,
who is the biological son of Angela Joaquin to a
previous relationship, as well as the legally
adopted child of Joaquin Navarro Sr., and
Antonio Navarro, herein referred to as
Respondent, who is the biological son of
Joaquin Navarro Sr. to a previous marriage.
ISSUES:
Between the mother and son, who died
first?
In answering this question, must the
presumption of survivorship in Rule 131,
Section 3 (jj) of the Rules of Court or
simultaneous death in Section 43 of the Civil
Code be applied?
HELD:
Based on the preponderance of evidence
provided by Francisco Lopezs testimony, the
court ruled that it is most probable that Joaquin
Navarro Jr. died before her mother. The
contrary position is merely speculative, and is
thus trumped by the formers circumstantial
FACTS.
Thus, there is no need to use the
presumption of survivorship in Rule 131,
Section 3 (jj) of the Rules of Court, or the
presumption of simultaneity of death in Section
43. These two provisions only apply when the
FACTS are unknown and unknowable, which is
not true for the case at hand.
The Court affirmed the trial courts finding that
Angela
outlived
her
son.
Cadorna
332
Mercado v. Espiritu
FACTS:
Petitioners Domingo and Josefa Mercado
brought suit against Luis Espiritu (but now
directed against the administrator, Jose
Espiritu, since Luis died), alleging that they and
their sisters are the sole heirs of Margarita
Espiritu, their mother and the sister of the
defendant. Petitioners claim that in 1910, Luis,
by means of cajolery, induced and fraudulently
succeeded in getting the petitioners to sign a
deed of the land left by their mother for P400,
notwithstanding the fact that said land,
according to its assessment, was valued at
P3,795. They therefore ask that the sale be
rendered null & void and that defendant be
ordered to deliver and restore to petitioners the
shares of the land, together with its products.
The defendant answers this by saying that
Margarita, with due authorization of her
husband and petitioners father Wenceslao,
sold to Luis a portion of the land (15 cavanes of
seed) for P2,000. To cover his childrens needs,
Wenceslao subsequently pledged or mortgaged
to Luis the remainder of said land (6 cavanes of
seed) at P375. With this amount being
insufficient, he additionally borrowed other
sums of money aggregating a total of P600.
After their fathers death, the petitioners then
declared themselves to be of legal age and
executed, together with their sisters, the
notarial instrument ratifying the previous
contracts and selling absolutely and in
perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400
as an increase of the previous purchase price,
the property that had belonged to their mother.
ISSUE:
WON the sale can be annulled on the
grounds that petitioners were minors without
legal capacity to contract on the date of its
execution, and that the defendant availed
himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining
petitioners consent.
HELD:
No, the sale cannot be annulled.
First, the evidence adduced at the trial
doesnt show, even circumstantially, that the

purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud, deceit,
violence or intimidation in order to effect the
sale. Second, no evidence appears in the
records that petitioners were minors when they
executed and signed the document. No certified
copies of their baptismal certificates were
presented, nor did they produce any
supplemental evidence to prove that Domingo
was 19 and Josefa 18 when they signed the
document. The statement made by one of the
adult parties of said deed, in reference to
certain notes made in a book or copybook of a
private nature, which she said their father kept
during his lifetime and until his death, is not
sufficient to prove the plaintiffs minority on the
date of the execution of the deed.
Even in the doubt whether they were of
legal age on the date referred to, the courts, in
their interpretation of the law, have laid down
the rule that the sale of real estate, effected by
minors who pretend to be of legal age, is valid,
and they cannot be permitted afterwards to
excuse themselves from compliance with the
obligation assumed by them or to seek their
annulment. (Law 6, title 19, 6th partida.1) The
judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and
absolves the purchase from the complaint filed
against him doesnt violate the law relative to
the sale of minors property nor the rules laid
down in consonance therewith.
If he who is a minor (1) deceitfully says or sets

forth in an instrument that he is over twenty-five
years of age, and this assertion is believed by
another person who takes him to be of about that
age, (2) in an action at law he should be deemed to
be of the age he asserted, and should not (3)
afterwards be released from liability on the plea that
was not of said age when he assumed the obligation.
The reason for this is that the law helps the deceived
and not the deceivers.
Falcone
332
Braganza v. Villa Abrille

FACTS:
Rosario, with her sons Rodolfo and
Guillermo, received from respondent, as a loan,
on October 30 1944, P70,000 in Japanese notes
and in consideRATIOn, promised to pay him
P10,000 in the legal currency of the Philippine
Islands 2 years after the cessation of hostilities
or as soon as International Exchange has been
established in the Philippines
Since the petitioners didn't pay, Villa Abrille
sued them on March 1949
Braganzas claim as defense that they only
received P40,000 and that Guillermo and
Rodolfo were minors when they signed the
promissory note
ISSUE:
Is the mom liable? How about Rodolfo and
Guillermo?
HELD:
Mom is liable. Children are liable in as much
as they benefited from the loan
RATIO:
No question on mom's liability. She can't
use minority as a defense since it's personal to
the minors. However, such defense will benefit
her to the extent of the shares for which minors

were responsible
At time of the signing of the loan
agreement, Guillermo was 16 and Rodolfo 18.
Failure to disclose their minority in
promissory note does not mean that they'll not
be permitted to assent it. THERE WAS NO
JURIDICAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE INABILITY
How is this different from Mercado? In
Mercado,
there
was
an
active
misrepresentation in that the siblings Mercado
wrote in the document that they were of age.
Here, no such thing. = Guillermo and Rodolfo
are not legally bound
Article 1301 of the old Civil Code states that
"an action to annul a contract by reason of
minority must be filed within 4 years". Since
Rodolfo turned 1947, action will expire October
1951. Action was filed June 1951, so within the
period BUT the brothers are not entirely
absolved. Article 1340 "states that the minor
party must make restitution to extent that they
may have profited by money they received"
Another thing is, the funds were used for
their support
While the promise to pay P10,000 can't be
enforced, 1340 states that they should be liable
for
P1000
Hermosisima
332
Bambalan v. Maramba
G.R. No. L-27710 ll Jan. 30, 1928 ll Romualdez, J.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS:
Isidro Bambalan
German Maramba and Genoveva Muerong
FACTS:
Isidro Bambalan, the plaintiff, executed a
deed of sale involving a piece of land to
Genoveva Muerong, one of the defendants. At
the time he signed and executed said deed,
Isidro was a minor, and made no
misrepresentation that he was of legal age. In
fact, Genoneva was aware that Isidro was still a
minor, as she was the one who purchased his
first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the
document. The plaintiff now wishes to
invalidate said sale.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the sale was invalid because the
plaintiff who executed the same was a minor
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the lower court.
RATIO DECIDENDI
The doctrine laid down in the case of
Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu, where the
minor was held to be estopped from contesting
the contract executed by him pretending to be
of age, is not applicable in this case, since the
plaintiff did not pretend to be of age and since
his minority was well known to the purchaser.
Cadorna
332
Braganza v. Villa Abrille

G.R. No. L-12471 ll Apr. 13, 1959 ll Bengzon, J.
PETITIONERS: Rosario de Braganza, et al.
RESPONDENT: Fernando de Villa Abrille
FACTS:
Rosario and her sons loaned Japanese war
notes in the amount of P70,000 from Fernando
F. de Villa Abrille, promising to pay him with
interest in Philippine currency two years after
the cessation of the war as soon as
International Exchange has been established in
the Philippines. Upon their failure to pay, Villa
Abrille sued them, to which the defendants
asserted the sons minority during the time they
signed the promissory note as an excuse for
their liability. Further, Villa Abrille, when the
defendants signed said promissory note, was
not aware that the sons were still minors, since
none of the defendants made any
representation as to the twos ages at the time.
RULING:
The Court held Rosarios liability but only
made the sons liable to the extent that they
benefitted from the loan.
RATIO DECIDENDI
NO. Mere failure to disclose minors age
does not constitute fraud, hence the minors
cannot be held liable. There is no juridical duty
on their part to disclose their incapacity on the
basis of their minority. Misrepresentation of
age, for it to be fraudulent, must be active and
not passive; that is, the minors actually have to
lie about their age and not just fail to disclose it.
Meanwhile, the minors are nonetheless
required to make restitution insofar as they
have benefited from the money they received.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the minors were liable to
pay since they failed to disclose their being
minors
Cadorna
332
Martinez v. Martinez
G.R. No. 445 ll Mar. 31, 1902 ll Cooper, J.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Pedro Martinez
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Francisco Martinez
FACTS:
Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the
compulsory legal heir of Francisco Martinez
Garcia, brought a suit to declare his father
prodigal. He accused his father of squandering
his estate by making donations to his second
wife and her family. On the other hand,
Francisco stated that gave his son a general
power of attorney to administer his estate, but
that the revoked the same due to his sons
mismanagement.
ISSUES:
WON Francisco should be declared prodigal
RULING:
The Court affirmed the CAs decision and
ruled in favor of not declaring Francisco
prodigal.
RATIO DECIDENDI
NO. This is based on the Courts own
understanding of prodigality as acts that must
show a morbid state of mind and a disposition
to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such
an extent as is likely to expose the family to
want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs
of their undisposable part of the estate. Pedros
testimony was insufficient to allege prodigality
on his fathers part, and neither is there any
evidence that his father has been transferring
properties to diminish his estate. The Court
found that the father is far from being prodigal
and still exercises his full mental faculties and
possesses ability to manage his estate wisely.
On the other hand, it was the son who has
exhibited tendencies to be prodigal.
Cadorna
332
Wassmer v. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089 ll Dec. 26, 1964
FACTS:
On August 23, 1954, Francisco Velez and
Beatriz Wassmer applied for a license to
contract marriage. In preparation for their
wedding on Sept. 4, invitations were distributed
and apparel were purchased. On Sept. 2, Velez
left a note for Wassmer to the effect that the
wedding will have to be postponed due to the
opposition thereto of his mother. The day after,
he sent a telegram assuring her of his return.
Alas, he never did. Velez was declared in default
after failure to answer Wassmers suit for
damages, and was ordered to indemnify
plaintiff. Velez filed a petition for relief from
judgment on the ground of excusable
negligence, as well as a motion for new trial and
reconsideration on the ground that there is no
provision of the Civil Code authorizing an action
for breach of promise to marry.
ISSUES:
(1) WON defendants petition for relief on
the ground of excusable negligence is
valid;
(2) WON mere breach of a promise to
marry is an actionable wrong;
(3) WON defendant must be held
answerable in damages;
(4) WON the damages awarded were
excessive.
HELD AND RATIO DECIDENDI:
(1) Defendants petition was NOT VALID
because it wasnt supported by an
affidavit of merits based on FACTS. The
contention that his failure to marry
plaintiff was due to fortuitous event is a

mere conclusion or opinion.
(2) Mere breach of a promise to marry is
NOT AN ACTIONABLE WRONG (Estopa
v. Biansay). Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the new
Civil Code the provisions that would
have it so.
(3) The circumstances surrounding the
breach of promise to marry are contrary
to good customs for which defendant
MUST BE HELD ANSWERABLE in
damages. Article 21, CC, provides that
"any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage."
No question was raised as to the award
of actual damages. As per Article 2219,
CC, moral damages are recoverable in
this case. As per Article 2232, CC,
exemplary
damages
are
also
recoverable because the circumstances
indicate that defendant acted in a
wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner.
(4) Considering
the
particular
circumstances, the SC affirmed the
lower courts judgment but REDUCED
the initial moral and exemplary
damages from PHP25000 to PHP15000
as a reasonable award.
Ordoyo
10
332
Tanjanco v. CA
G.R. No. L-18630 ll Dec. 17, 1966 ll J.B.L Reyes, J.
PETITIONER:
APOLONIO TANJANCO
RESPONDENTS: HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS
FACTS:
From
December,
1957,
petitioner
APOLONIO TANJANCO courted the respondent,
ARACELI SANTOS, both being of legal age.
Tanjanco expressed and professed his
undying love and affection for Santos who
eventually reciprocated such feelings. With
Tanjancos promise of marriage in mind,
Santos acceded to his pleas for carnal
knowledge sometime in July, 1958. For one
year, Tanjanco had carnal access to Santos
which eventually led to Santos getting
pregnant. As a result of her pregnancy,
Santos had to resign from her job as secretar
y in IBM Philippines, Inc. In her state of
unemployment Santos became unable to
support herself and her baby, and because
Tanjanco did not fulfill his promise of
marriage she suffered mental anguish, a
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, and social humiliation. Santos
prayed to the court that Tanjanco be
compelled to recognize the unborn child she
was bearing, and pay her for support and
damages.
Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which
the court granted for failure to state cause of
action. Santos appealed the case to the Court
of Appeals and the latter decided the case,
stating that no cause of action was shown to
compel recognition of the unborn child nor for
its support, but a cause of action was present
for damages, under Article 21 of the Civil
Code. Tanjanco appealed such decision
pleading that actions for breach of a promise
to marry are
jurisdiction.
not
permissible
in
this
ISSUES:
WON Tanjanco is compelled to pay for
damages to Santos for breach of his promise
to marry her
HELD:
In its decision, Court of Appeals relied
upon the memorandum submitted by the
Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to
support the original draft of the Civil Code. In
the example set forth by the memorandum,
Court of Appeals failed to recognize that it
refers to a tort upon a minor who has been
seduced. Seduction connotes the idea of
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse
of confidence on the part of the seducer to
which the woman has yielded. That definition
of seduction is not consistent with the
position of Santos, who was of legal age, and
granted carnal access to Tanjanco and had
sexual relations with him for one whole year.
Rather than being deceived, Santos exhibited
mutual passion to Tanjanco which is
incompatible with the premise behind the idea
of seduction.
Decision of Court of Appeals is reversed, and
that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed.
Complaint of Santos is dismissed for failure to
state cause of action
Pagdanganan
11
332
De Jesus v. Syquia
G.R. No. L-39110 ll Nov. 28, 1933
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: CESAR SYQUIA
FACTS:
Plaintiff Antonia Loanco-De Jesus worked as
a cashier for a barber shop of which defendant
Cesar Syquia, an unmarried man from a
prominent family, was accustomed to get his
haircut. The two became acquainted and
developed an amorous relationship which
resulted to Antonia getting pregnant and giving
birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931.
During the early months of Antonias
pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor at
her home, and in February 1931, he handed
Antonia a letter which was addressed to the
priest who was to christen the baby
acknowledging that the baby is his and that it
be christened in his name.
Defendant showed paternal interest in the
situation that even when he was abroad, he
continued to write to Antonia cautioning her to
take care of herself so that junior would be
strong.
After giving birth, Syquia took Antonia and
the child in his house where they lived together
in regular family style with all household
expenses paid for by Syquia. When Antonia
showed signs of a second pregnancy, Syquia left
her and thereafter married another woman.
During the christening of the child, the
defendant caused the child to be given the
name Ismael Loanco instead of the originally
planned Cesar Syquia, Jr.
ISSUES:
WON the breach of promise to marry is
actionable.
WON the letters made by defendant prove
sufficiency of acknowledgment of paternity.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the trial court in refusing to give damages to
Antonia for breach of promise to marry. The
action has no standing in civil law, apart from
the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. This case exhibits none of the features
necessary to maintain such an action.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
judgment could be based requiring the
defendant to recognize the second child, Pacita
Loanco.
The sufficiency of acknowledgement of
paternity is satisfied by the production of one or
more documents, of indubitable authenticity,
written by the recognizing father, as
contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of
the Civil Code. The admission of paternity is
contained in the note to the priest and the
other letters addressed to Antonia during her
pregnancy.
Perez
12
332
Piccininni v. Hajus
FACTS:
The petitioner, Piccininni, claims that the
defendant, Hajus, made him believe that they
would get married and live at her house.
Because of this, Piccininni spent $40,000 to
renovate and improve her house.
Hajus claimed that she cant be charged
with fraud and that what she committed was a
breach of promise to marry. Therefore, no
action can be brought upon her because of the
Heart Balm Act.
The Heart Balm Act states no action shall
be brought upon any cause from alienation of
affections or from breach of promise to marry.
Trial court ruled that the Heart Balm Act
bars Piccininni from charging Hajus. Case
brought to SC.
ISSUE:
WON Piccinnini can recover his property in
light of the Heart Balm Act
HELD:
Yes. Piccininni is not asking for damages
because of a broken heart or a mortified spirit.
He is asking for the return of things which he
gave to Hajus because of her fraudulent
representations. Picininni does not assert that
Hajus wronged him in failing to marry him. He
just asserted that she wronged him in
fraudulently inducing him to transfer property
to her. His complaint is based on what she did,
and not on what she refused to do.
Hence, trial courts judgment was reverse.
Poblador
13
332
Loving v. Virginia
Warren, CJ.
FACTS:
In Virginia, there is a comprehensive
statutory scheme prohibiting and punishing
interracial marriages. Residents Mildred Jeter, a
Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white
man, were married in the District of Columbia.
After their marriage, they established their
marital abode in Caroline County in Virginia.
They were convicted for violating Section 2058 which states that any white person and
colored person shall go out of this State for the
purpose of being married, and with the
intention of returning and be married out of it,
and afterwards return to and reside in it,
cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be guilty
of a felony and imprisoned for not less than one
nor more than five years. The central feature of
this act is the absolute prohibition of a white
person marrying other than another white
person. The couple instituted an action to
nullify the ruling of the Court as a violation of
their 14th amendment.
ISSUE:
WON the statutory scheme adopted by
Virginia preventing marriages between two
persons solely on the basis of racial
classifications violates the Equal Protection and
Due Process clauses?
HELD:
State argument- no violation of equal

protection as whites and colored people are
punished with the same degree. Furthermore,
there is a rational basis, which is based on
scientific evidence, for it to outlaw interracial
marriages. The Court could not question the
wisdom behind the legislation.
Court: The history of the 39th Congress
(one who introduced the 14th amendment) and
jurisprudence reveal that equal protection is
not limited to equal application of penalty in
the classification made by legislature. There is
no question that Virginias miscegenation
statutes rest solely upon distinctions according
to race. The Court has consistently repudiated
these kinds of statutes as inimical to the
doctrine of equality. It entails the most rigid
scrutiny for the statute to be valid. However,
there is no legitimate and overriding purpose
independent of racial discrimination which
justifies the classification.
It is also violative of the due process clause
as the freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men. It is one of the basic civil rights of
man. The 14th amendment requires that
freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discriminations. The freedom to
marry, or not marry, a person of another race
resides with the individual and cannot be
infringed by the State.
Tiangco
14
332
Zablocki v. Redhail
FACTS:
Wisconsin statute: members of a certain
class of Wisconsin residents may not marry,
within the State or elsewhere, without first
obtaining a court order granting permission to
marry. The class is defined to include any
Wisconsin resident having minor ISSUE not in
his custody and which he is under obligation to
support by any court order or judgment. Court
permission cannot be granted unless the
marriage applicant submits proof of compliance
with the support obligation and, in addition,
demonstrates that the children covered by the
support order are not then and are not likely
thereafter to become public charges.
Redhail was denied a marriage license
because of his failure to comply with the
statute. It was found that Redhail had a
paternity action instituted against him, alleging
that he was the father of a baby girl born out of
wedlock. He was adjudged to pay $109/mo as
support for the child until she reached 18 years
of age.
When Redhail applied for a marriage
license, Zablocki did not ISSUE the license for
violating the statute on the grounds that: (1) he
had not satisfied his support obligations to his
illegitimate child and; (2) the child had been a
public charge since her birth, receiving benefits
under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Program.
ISSUE:
WON the Wisconsin statute is constitutional
[NO]
On privacy: Right to marry is of
fundamental importance, and since the
classification at ISSUE here significantly
interferes with the exercise of that right, a
critical examination of the state interests
advanced in support of the classification is
required.
The decision to marry has been placed on
the same level of importance as decisions
relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing,
and family relationships. It would make little
sense to recognize a right of privacy with

respect to other matters of family life and not
with respect to the decision to enter the
relationship that is the foundation of the family
in [US] society
Two interests are asserted: the permissionto-marry
proceeding
furnishes
an
opportunity to counsel the applicant as to the
necessity of fulfilling his prior support
obligations; and the welfare of the out-ofcustody children is protected.
However, the State has already numerous
other means for exacting compliance with
support obligations, means that are as effective
as the statute yet do not impinge upon the right
to marry: via wage assignments, civil contempt
proceedings, and criminal penalties.
The statutory classification interferes
directly and substantially with the right to
marry:
No Wisconsin resident in the affected
class may marry in Wisconsin or
elsewhere without a court order.
Some of those in the affected class will
never be able to obtain the necessary
court order, because they either lack
the financial means to meet their
support obligations or cannot prove
that their children will not become
public charges.
Some will be coerced in foregoing their
right to marry.
Statute is grossly underinclusive since they
do not limit in any way new financial
commitments by the applicant other than those
arising out of the contemplated marriage.
Statutory
classification
is
substantially
overinclusive as well: Given the possibility that
the new spouse will actually better the
applicants financial situation, by contributing
income from a job or otherwise, the statute in
many cases may prevent affected individuals
from improving their ability to satisfy their prior
support obligations.
Sevilla
15
332
Graham v. Graham
33 F.Supp. 936 ll Jul. 15, 1940 ll District Judge Tuttle
PLAINTIFF:
DEFENDANT:
Sidney Graham
Margrethe Graham
FACTS:
Sidney Graham sues his former wife based
on an agreement they had when they were still
married. Said agreement stipulated that
Margrethe is to pay Sidney a sum of $300 per
month until they no longer want said
agreement to continue. Sidney alleges that the
reason for said agreement was Margrethes
plea to have him quit his work in a hotel so he
could accompany her in all her travels.
Margrethe denies Sidneys allegations and
asserts, among others, that the contract was
not within the power of a married woman
under Michigan law to make.
ISSUES:
WON the contract is valid and binding
RULING:
The judge ruled that the contract is void.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Regardless of WON the woman is
competent to enter into the alleged contract
under Michigan law, which states that married

woman have no general power to contract, but
can contract only in relation to her separate
property, the contract is VOID because it
contravenes public policy. Under the law,
marriage is not merely a private contract
between the parties, but creates a status in
which the state is vitally interested and under
which certain rights and duties incident to the
relationship come into being, irrespective of the
wishes of the parties. As a result of the
marriage contract, for example, the husband
has a duty to support and to live with his wife
and the wife must contribute her services and
society to the husband and follow him in his
choice of domicile. Any private agreement
between persons married or about to be
married which attempts to change the essential
obligations of the marriage contract as defined
by the law is contrary to public policy and
unenforceable, as is the case when the wife
releases the husband from his duty to support
his wife in a contract between married persons.
Cadorna
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332
Bradwell v. Illinois
FACTS:
The statute of Illinois on the subject of
admissions to the bar enacts that no person
shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or
counsellor-at-law without having previously
obtained a license for that purpose from some
two of the justices of the Supreme Court.
Mrs. Myra Bradwell applied to the judges of
the Supreme Court of Illinois for a license to
practice law. With this petition are a certificate
from an inferior court of her good character,
and that on due examination she had been
found to possess the requisite qualifications.
Pending this application, she also filed an
affidavit, stating that she was born in the State
of Vermont; that she was (had been) a citizen of
the State; that she is now a citizen of the United
States, and has been for many years past a
resident of the city of Chicago, in the State of
Illinois. She also filed a paper asserting that she
was entitled to the license prayed for by virtue
of the second section of the fourth article of the
Constitution of the United States, and that of
the 14th article of amendment of that
instrument.
Her application was denied, and it was
stated as a sufficient reason that under the
decisions of the SC of Illinois, the applicantas
a married woman would be bound neither by
her express contracts nor by those implied
contracts which it is the policy of the law to
create between attorney and client. The
decision also states that admitting women
would mean that the courts would be exercising
the authority conferred upon them in a manner
that was never contemplated by the legislature.
Plus, God designed the sexes to occupy
different spheres of action, and that it belonged
to men to make, apply, and execute the laws.
ISSUE:
WON the decision violates a provision of
the Federal Constitution.
HELD:
No--the decision of the Illinois court upheld,
and Mrs. Bradwell still cannot practice law.
There are privileges and immunities
belonging to citizens of the United States, and
that it is these and these alone which a State is
forbidden to abridge. However, the right to
admission to practice in the courts of a State is
not one of them. The SC here, referring to the
opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, says that
the power of a State to prescribe the
qualifications for admission to the bar of its
own courts is unaffected by the 14th
amendment, and that they cannot inquire into
the reasonableness or propriety of the rules it
may prescribe.
The Supreme Court also dismissed any
claim under the privileges and immunities
clause of the unamended ConstitutionArticle
IV, Section 2, Clause 1. Bradwell argued that
because she had been born in Vermont but
later moved to Illinois, Illinois' denial of a law
license was inter-state discrimination. But the
Court noted that under the recently-enacted
Fourteenth Amendment, "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they
reside." Because Bradwell had been a resident
of Illinois for several years, she was now a
citizen of Illinois, and the interstate provision of
Article IV did not apply.
Falcone
17
332
Dunn v. Palermo
522 S.W.2d 679 ll Jul. 7, 1975 ll Henry, J.
APPELLANTS:
APPELLEE:
Winfield Dunn, et al.

Rosary Palermo
FACTS:
Rosary Palermo, a Nashville lawyer, married
Denty Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer. She
has continued to use and enjoy her maiden
name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for
all purposes. Subsequent to her marriage, she
lodged with the Registrar a change of address
form listing her name as Palermo. She was
advised that she was required to register anew
under the surname of her husband, or have her
name purged from the registration records.
Upon her refusal to so register, her name was
purged from the registration list. Thus this
action, wherein appellee seeks a declaratory
judgment declaring that the defendants'
interpretation of Sec. 2-206, is erroneous, or in
the alternative that this statute be declared
violative of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and of the Nineteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
ISSUES:
WON it is mandatory for a married woman
to assume the name of her husband repute
RULING:
The Court ruled in favour of the appellee.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
There is no constitutional question that
needs to be answered as regards the Texas
statute as it does not mandate any change of
name by a woman upon marriage. It merely
recognizes the prevalence of the virtually
universal custom under which a woman
normally adopts the surname of her husband.
We hold that in this jurisdiction a woman, upon
marriage, has a freedom of choice; she may
elect to retain her own surname or she may
adopt the surname of her husband. So long as a
person's name remains constant and consistent,
and unless and until changed in the prescribed
manner, and absent any fraudulent or legally
impermissible intent, the State has no
legitimate concern.
Cadorna
18
332
In Re: Santiago
A.C. No. 932 ll Jun. 21, 1940 ll Laurel, J.
PETITIONER-COMPLAINANT:
RESPONDENT:
OSG
Roque Santiago
FACTS:
Ernesto Baniquit, then living separately
from his wife Soledad Colares for some nine
consecutive years and was bent on contracting
a second marriage, sought the legal advice of
the respondent, who was at the time a
practicing and notary public in the Province of
Occidental Negros. The respondent, after
hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the
latter that he could secure a separation from his
wife and marry again. He made Baniquit and his
wife sign a document, in which it was
stipulated, among other things, that the
contracting parties, who are husband and wife
authorized each other to marry again, at the
same time renouncing or waiving whatever
right of action one might have against the party
so marrying. The respondent assured the
spouses that they were single and as such,
could contract another and subsequent
marriage, hence on June 11, 1939, Ernesto
contracted a second marriage with Trinidad
Aurelio. Upon realizing his mistake, which came
from his idea that seven years separation of
husband and wife would entitle either of them
to contract a second marriage, respondent
immediately sent for the contracting parties
who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and
signed the deed of cancellation of their

contract. Thus, the OSG filed this complaint
charging the respondent with malpractice and
praying that disciplinary action be taken against
him.
ISSUES:
WON the contract executed by the spouses
upon the respondents advice validly
terminated the marital tie between the two
RULING:
The respondent Roque Santiago is found
guilty of malpractice and is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one year.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The Court held that there is no doubt that
the contract executed by and between the
spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares,
upon the advice of the respondent and
prepared by the latter as a lawyer and
acknowledged by him as a notary public, is
contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the
vital foundation of the family. As such, Roque
Santiago is guilty of malpractice for having given
false advice to the couple due to either his
recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law.
Cadorna
19
332
Selanova v. Mendoza
A.M. No. 804-CJ ll May. 19, 1975 ll Aquino, J.
COMPLAINANT: Saturnino Selanova
RESPONDENT: Judge Alejandro Mendoza
FACTS:
Saturnino
Selanova
charged
Judge
Alejandro E. Mendoza of Mandaue City with
gross ignorance of the law for having prepared
and ratified a document extrajudicially
liquidating the conjugal partnership of the
complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. One
condition of the liquidation was that either
spouse (as the case may be) would withdraw
the complaint for adultery or concubinage
which each had filed against the other and that
they waived their "right to prosecute each other
for whatever acts of infidelity" either one would
commit against the other. Judge Mendoza
claimed that he was aware of the invalidity of
the agreement but he nevertheless ratified it on
the assurance of the spouses that they would
ask the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental to approve the agreement. He said that
he relied on the provision that "the husband
and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership during the marriage,
subject to judicial approval" (Par. 4, Art. 191,
Civil Code).
ISSUES:
WON the document of extrajudicial
liquidation of conjugal partnership ratified by
the respondent is void.
RULING:
The respondent is severely censured but
not disbarred due to the attending
circumstances.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The agreement in question is void because
it contravenes the Art 221 of the Civil Code
which makes void any (1) any contract for
personal separation between husband and wife;
and (2) every extrajudicial agreement, during
marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband and
wife. They also cited that Judge Mendozas
reliance on Art. 191 Par.4 of the Civil Code was
misplaced and that the Court had already ruled
in an earlier case that judicial sanction for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during
the marriage should be secured beforehand
before it can be ratified. Meanwhile, in regard
to the other main stipulation of the contract in
question, which waives the right of either
spouse to file a complaint against any
adulterous offense the other may commit, was
also cited to be "contrary to law, morals and
public order, and as a consequence not
judicially recognizable" They held that while
while adultery and concubinage are private
crimes, they still remain crimes and a contract
legalizing their commission is therefore void.
Cadorna
20
332
Jones v. Hallahan
501 S.W.2d 588 ll Nov. 9, 1973 ll Commissioner Vance
APPELLANTS:
APPELLEE:
Marjorie Jones, et al.

James Hallahan
FACTS:
The appellants, each of whom is a female
person, seek review of a judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court which held that they
were not entitled to have ISSUEd to them a
license to marry each other. Appellants contend
that the failure of the clerk to ISSUE the license
deprived them of three basic constitutional
rights, namely, the right to marry; the right of
association; and the right to free exercise of
religion. They also contend that the refusal
subjects them to cruel and unusual punishment.
ISSUES:
WON in refusing to ISSUE a marriage
license to the appellants, the appellee violated
the formers constitutional rights.
RULING:
The CA affirmed the judgment of the lower
court.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. The Court found that there was no
constitutional violation since there is no
constitutional sanction or protection of the

right of marriage between persons of the same
sex. Using sources that define the word
marriage, since Kentucky statutes do not define
the term, they found that marriage has always
been considered as the union of a man and a
woman and that no authority to the contrary
has yet been presented. Thus, it appeared to
the Court that the appellants were prevented
from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky
or the refusal of the County Court Clerk of
Jefferson County to ISSUE them a license, but
rather by their own incapability of entering into
a marriage as that term is defined. A license to
enter into a status or a relationship which the
parties are incapable of achieving is a nullity. If
the appellants had concealed from the clerk the
fact that they were of the same sex and he had
ISSUEd a license to them and a ceremony had
been performed, the resulting relationship
would not constitute a marriage. In substance,
the relationship proposed by the appellants
does not authorize the issuance of a marriage
license because what they propose is not a
marriage.
Cadorna
21
332
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health

Plaintiffs were denied marriage license by the Department of Public Health, due to same-sex
marriage.
FACTS:
The plaintiffs are 14 individuals from five
Massachusetts counties. The plaintiffs include
business executives, lawyers, an investment
banker, educators, therapists, and a computer
engineer.
Many are active in church, community, and
school groups. They have employed such legal
means as are available to them for example,
joint adoption, powers of attorney, and joint
ownership of real property to secure aspects
of their relationships. Each plaintiff attests a
desire to marry his or her partner in order to
affirm publicly their commitment to each other
and to secure the legal protections and benefits
afforded to married couples and their children.
The plaintiff couples attempted to obtain a
marriage license from the city/town clerks
office and complied all the formalities. The
Department of Public Health, charged by the
statute, refused to accept the notice of
intention to marry and denied a marriage
license on the ground that Massachusetts did
not recognize same-sex marriage. Plaintiffs filed
a suit. The Superior Court ruled for the DPH.
Plaintiffs appealed from this decision.
ISSUE:
WON the Superior Court was correct in its
summary judgment in favor of the Department
of Public Health, and thereby dismissed the
plaintiffs claim to construe the statute to

permit marriage to same-sex couples.
WON prohibiting same-sex marriages was
valid under Massachusetts marriage licensing
statutes, G.L. c. 207 or was it a violation of
Massachusetts constitution?
HELD:
NO. The Superior Court was not correct in
its summary of judgment in favor of the
Department of Public Health and by dismissing
the plaintiffs claim.
NO. Declining a license to same-sex
marriage was not valid under Massachusetts
marriage licensing statutes and thus, was a
violation of the constitution. Barring an
individual from the protections, benefits, and
obligations of civil marriage, solely for the
reason that the person would marry a person of
the same sex, violated the Massachusetts
Constitution.
The court construed the civil marriage to
mean the voluntary union of two persons as
spouses to the exclusion of others. This
reformulation
redressed
the
plaintiffs'
constitutional injury and furthered the aim of
marriage and advanced the legitimate state's
interests the department had identified.
Judgment of the Superior Court was
reversed by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court.
Reyes, G.
22
332
Silverio v. Republic
FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio underwent
sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.
The doctor ISSUEd a medical certificate proving
the same.
Silverio filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex in his birth certificate. In his
birth certificate, it is indicated that his name is
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio and his sex
was registered as male. He alleges that he is a
male transsexual. He seeks to have his name
changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely and
his sex from male to female
PROCEDURAL:
Trial Court: Grant petition in consonance
with the principles of justice and equity.
Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans
body is not his own doing and should not be in
any way taken against him.
CA: Reverse No law allowing the change
of either name or sex in the certificate of birth
on the ground of sex reassignment through
surgery.
ISSUES:
WON a persons first name can be changed
on the ground of sex reassignment [NO]
The state has an interest in the names
borne by individuals and entities for purposes
of identification. A change of name is a
privilege, not a right.
Art. 376 (NCC) No person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority.
RA 9048 amended the provision. Section 1
of RA 9048 provides Authority to Correct
Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of
First Name or Nickname.
No entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected without a judicial order, except for
clerical or typographical errors and change of
first name or nickname which can be corrected
or changed
Sec 4: Grounds for Change of First Name
(1) the petitioner finds the first name to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (2) the new first
name has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly

known by that first name or nickname in the
community and; (3) the change will avoid
confusion.
Changing petitioners first name for his
declared purpose (to make his name compatible
with the sex he transformed himself through
surgery) may only create grave complications in
the civil registry and the public interest.
Petition should have been filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could
be legally done. (Rather than filing first in the
trial court)
A law does not exist which allows the
change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex
on the ground of sex reassignment.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth
certificate is a historical record of the FACTS, as
they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex
of a person is determined at birth, visually done
by the birth attendant by examining the genitals
of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a persons sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,
is immutable.
WON the entries in the birth certificate as
to first name or sex can be changed on the
ground of equity [NO]
Petitioner wishes to change his name and
sex since this is the first step of marrying his
fianc.
However, marriage, one of the most sacred
social institutions, is a special contract between
a man and a woman. One of the essential
requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a male and a female. To
grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations.
Following will be affected:
Allowing the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex
reassignment.
Treatment on provisions of the Labor
Code directly applicable to women.
Cadorna
23
332
Silverio v. Republic
COURTS FINAL REMARKS:
Petitioner pleads that the unfortunates are
also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment
and the realization of their dreams. No
argument about that. The Court recognizes that
there are people whose preferences and
orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
recognized parameters of social convention and

that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely
by the legislature, not by the courts.
Cadorna
24
332
Republic v. Cagandahan
G.R. No. 166676 ll Sep. 12, 2008 ll Quisumbing, J.
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Jennifer Cagandahan
FACTS:
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate before the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna.
She asserted that she was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while
growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), which is
a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics.
Tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized, she has stopped growing and she
has no breast or menstrual development; she
has become a male person. In her petition with
the RTC to have her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed
from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff, her physician
testified on her condition by presenting a
medical certificate to back her alleged
condition. The RTC granted her petition,
recognizing her proven medical condition. Thus
(OSG) filed this petition seeking areversal of the
abovementioned ruling based on (1) violations
on Rule 108 of the Rules of Court regarding (a)
Cagandahans failure to implead the local civil
registrar in her petition with the RTC and (b) her
plea to have her gender changed in the birth
certificate (OSG believes her condition does not
make her male; and (2) a violation on Rule 103
of the Rules of Court, in which Cagandahan
failed to state that respondent is a bona fide
resident of the province where the petition was
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date
of such filing. The court dismissed the two
procedural ISSUES on Rules 108 and 103, and
decided on the substantive merit regarding the
change of gender in Cagandahans records due
to her medical condition.
ISSUES:
WON the trial court erred in ordering the
correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her name and gender, on
the ground of her medical condition known as
CAH
RULING:
The Republics petition is denied.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. The respondents condition, CAH, is one
of many conditions involving intersexuality,
which apply to human beings who cannot be
classified as either male or female. Here, the
rule of determining a persons gender at birth
cannot apply because the sexual development
in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive.
Instead, it is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed. Thus,
the Court is of the view that where the person
is biologically or naturally intersex, the
determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. In the case of
respondent, his having ordered his life to that of
a male is backed by preponderant biological
bases. Unlike in the case of individuals who
underwent sexual reassignment, respondent
here has simply let nature take its course and
has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. In the
absence of a law on such an unusual matter, the
Court will not dictate on respondent concerning
a matter so innately private as ones sexuality
and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether
or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse
the male tendency due to CAH.
Cadorna
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332
People v. Santiago
G.R. No. L-27972 ll Oct. 31, 1927 ll Street, J.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
The People of the Philippine Islands

Felipe Santiago
DOCTRINE:
In relation with the course syllabus topic
from which the case is filed under, the marriage
between Santiago and Masilang cannot be
considered as valid because it lacked the
essential (marriage) requisite of consent freely
given
refused; however, the appellant succeeded by

forcing himself on her.
The appellant then brought the victim to
the nearby house of his uncle, Agaton Santiago.
In the afternoon, a protestant minister was
brought in to conduct a ceremony that married
the appellant and the victim.
NATURE:
This is an appeal brought to the Supreme
Court to reverse the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija
finding the appellant guilty of rape and
sentencing him to undergo imprisonment,
reclusion temporal; requiring him to endow the
offended party; requiring him to recognize and
maintain the offspring, if there should be any,
as consequence of the rape; and requiring him
to pay further costs.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage of the appellant and the
victim is considered valid to exempt him from
criminal liability. NO.
FACTS:
Felicita Masilang (victim), aged 18, was
Felipe Santiagos (appellant) niece by marriage.
On November 23, 1926, the appellant asked
the victim to accompany him to cross the river
and from there he led her to a place far from
the highway with tall grass hiding them from
public view. The appellant manifested a desire
to have sexual intercourse with the girl but she
RATIO:
The court found that the offense of rape
has indeed been committed, but the marriage
ceremony was only a mere ruse of the
appellant to escape from criminal liability. The
actions of Santiago before and after the
marriage would prove that he really had no
intention to marry Masilang other than for the
aforementioned reason. Furthermore, because
the victim was under duress, the marriage is
void for lack of consent. Consequently, the
appellant is not exempt from criminal liability.
The judgment appealed from is in accordance
with law, and will be affirmed. Costs against
the appellant.
Yumol
26
332
Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat

G.R. No. 47101 ll Apr. 25, 1941 ll Horilleno, J.
FACTS:
The plaintiff met the defendant in March
1938. After several dates, they were engaged
on 19 September of that year. On 26 November
the same year, the plaintiff married the
defendant in the Catholic Cathedral of the City
of Baguio. After living together as husband and
wife for eighty-nine days, the defendant gave
birth to a child of nine months, on February 23,
1939. Because of this the plaintiff abandoned
the defendant and did not return to their life as
husband and wife.
The plaintiff then requests the annulment
of the marriage he had with the defendant on
the grounds that he consented to the marriage
because the defendant had assured him that
she was virgin.
ISSUES:
WON annulment can proceed given
plaintiffs claim that he had been defrauded by
his wife whom he thought was a virgin
RULING:
The judgment appealed from is deemed to
be in accordance with law, and is thus affirmed.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
NO. The plaintiff's allegation that he had
not suspected the pregnancy of the defendant
when he married her is highly improbable, given
her obvious advanced pregnancy. Therefore it is
unnecessary to consider the appellants
allegation of fraud. He also argued that it is not
uncommon to find people with big stomachs,
but we find this argument too puerile to even
consider, especially since the appellant is a
freshman in law school.
Marriage is a most sacred institution: it is
the cement, the very foundation, on which
society rests. For annulment to proceed, it is
entirely necessary that the pieces of evidence
provided be clear and reliable. No such
evidence can be found in this case.
Cadorna
27
332
Eigenmann v. Guerra
FACTS:
Eduardo Eigenmann [who represented
himself as of legal age] and Maryden Guerra got
married before Judge Prudencio Encomienda as
solemnizing officer and 4 witnesses, including
Eduardos mother. After living together for
quite a time, Eduardo filed an action for the
annulment of his marriage to Maryden Guerra
on the grounds of his age and lack of parental
consent, his consent not freely given [use of
force, intimidation by Froilan Guerra, wifes
father], and lack of legal authority of the one
who administered the oath [councillor of
Quezon City] making the marriage void ab initio.
ISSUES:
WON his lack of statutory age and lack of
parental consent may be grounds for
annulment of marriage
WON his consent being not freely given
may render the marriage void
WON the marriage is void ab ignition
because of the lack of legal authority by the
officer who administered the oath
HELD:
No. He is estopped because of his
misrepresentation of his age [claimed to be
25yrs,8mos] when he applied for marriage
license. With regards to the consent of his
mother, the fact that the mother was a witness
to the marriage and did not object to the
marriage implies consent. Consent may be
given in any form [written,oral or implied] A
written consent under oath is not necessary.
No. There was no factual or legal for the
claim.The Court did not see any reasonable or
well-grounded fear of an imminent danger and
grave evil upon Eigenmanns person or property
that would arise from the statement of Froilan
Guerra [Balita ko lumiligaw ka sa aking anak.
Pag niloko mo iyan, mag-ingat ka.] The
statement for the court was only an admonition
natural for a father and not a threat.
No. What is declared null and void by the
law are marriages solemnized w/o a marriage
license. A marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained. The local civil registrar and
the solemnizing officer are not required to
inquire about the authority of the officer
administering the oath.
Bayona
28
332
Navarro v. Domagtoy
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 ll Jul. 19, 1996 ll Romero, J.
COMPLAINANT: Rodolfo Navarro
RESPONDENT: Judge Hernando Domagtoy
FACTS:
Petitioner Rodolfo G. Navarro submitted
evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which,
he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well
as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the
law:
1.) Respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F.
Borga, despite the knowledge that the
groom is merely separated from his first
wife. (In violation of Art. 41 of the FC)
2.) Respondent judge performed a marriage
ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
and Gemma G. del Rosario at the
respondent judges residence in the
Municipal of Dapa, which does not fall
within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos.
(In violation of Art. 7 Par. 1 of the FC)2
In response, Judge Domagtoy claimed that
his act of solemnizing the marriage between
Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from
his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga was predicated on
an affidavit supposedly ISSUEd by the Municipal
Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact
that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not
seen each other for almost seven years. With
respect to the second charge, he maintains that
in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo
and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7 Par.
1 of the Family Code, and that he merely
worked within the ambit of Art. 8 of the same
code, which provides for other possible venues
to solemnize a marriage.
I believe its this issue and its corresponding ruling

that would be important for purposes of our
discussion in class
ISSUES:
WON
respondent
exhibited
misconduct and ignorance of the law.
gross
RULING:
Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy
is SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and
given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
YES. Judge Domagtoys gross ignorance of
very basic legal principles enshrined in the
Family Code resulted to a bigamous and
therefore void marriage for the first marriage
he solemnized, and to the second, a lack of the
necessary authority of the solemnizing officer,
since he solemnized the marriage outside of his
jurisdiction.
Judge Domagtoys reliance on the said
affidavit of Tagadans 7-year separation with his
former wife, which said affidavit was proven to
have not been ISSUEd by the MTC Judge of
Basey, Samar but only sworn before him, is
insufficient justification for his having
solemnized Tagadans second marriage on the
basis of his wifes presumptive death.
Regardless of whether Tagadan had a wellfounded belief that his wife, who had not been
heard of for almost 7 years, was dead, it was
still necessary for him to have undergone a
summary proceeding officially declaring his
former wifes presumptive death. Absent such
mandatory proceeding, the subsequent
marriage is considered bigamous, and
therefore, void.
Art. 7 Par. 1 of the Family Code provides
that marriage may be solemnized by, among
others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction. For members of
the Appellate and Supreme courts, this
jurisdiction extends throughout the Philippines
Cadorna
29
332
Navarro v. Domagtoy
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 ll Jul. 19, 1996 ll Romero, J.
(ie. CA and SC judges/justices can solemnize
marriages regardless of venue, so long as the
requisites are met). The same cannot be said,
however, for judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions (eg. MTC judges); they may
only officiate weddings within their areas; they
lack the authority to solemnize weddings in
areas beyond their jurisdiction. While this may
not affect the validity of the marriage, it
nonetheless results to an irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, namely,
the authority of the solemnizing officer, which,
as a result, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability. Meanwhile, the

respondents defense on the applicability of Art.
8 in the same code cannot stand since a.) the
requisites for holding the marriage outside of
the official venues listed therein are not
satisfied in this case since only one and not both
of the parties requested another venue, and the
parties are neither at the point of death nor in a
remote place; and b.) Art. 8 is only a directory
provision and does not alter or qualify the
authority of a solemnizing officer.
Cadorna
30
332
Araes v. Occiano
Apr. 2, 2002
PETITIONER:
Merceditas Mata Aranes,
RESPONDENT: Judge Salvador M. Occiano,
FACTS:
Aranes charged respondent Occiano,
Presiding Judge of the MTC of Batalan,
Camarines Sur with gross ignorance of the law
for solemnizing her marriage with late
Dominador Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Aranes and Orobia lived as husband and wife
until the death of Orobia. Then Aranes
discovered that she cannot inherit the
properties of Orobia, nor get his pension as a
retired Navy Commodore because their
marriage was a nullity.
In his comment, Occiano averred that he
was requested to solemnize the wedding in
Nabua, due to Orobias difficulty in walking. He
examined the documents before the ceremony
and upon discovering the absence of a marriage
license he refused to solemnize the marriage.
However, the couple assured him that they will
deliver the license to him immediately after.
The
petitioner
filed
an
Affidavit
Desistance attesting that the judge did refuse to

solemnize her marriage at first and, upon
reading the comment of the judge, realized her
own shortcomings.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge committed gross
ignorance of the law.
HELD:
YES. Respondent judge was guilty of
solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
license and for doing so outside his territorial
jurisdiction. The Affidavit of Desistance cannot
exculpate Occiano because withdrawal of
complaint does not necessarily have a legal
effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action.
Respondent judge is fined 5,000 pesos
with a stern warning that a repetition in

the future will be dealt with more severely
of
Cristobal
31
332
Republic v. CA and Castro

G.R. No. 103047 ll Sep. 2, 1994
PETITIONER:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO
FACTS:
Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas
were married in a civil ceremony performed by
Judge Pablo M. Malvar, without the knowledge
of Castro's parents (thus, a secret marriage).
Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the
processing of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage license (license
no.3196182). The couple did not immediately
live together as husband and wife, but only did
so when Castro was pregnant. However, they
only lived together for 4 months and eventually
parted ways. Their baby was later adopted by
Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas,
and brought to the US. Desiring to follow her
daughter, Castro consulted a lawyer regarding
the possible annulment of her marriage. They
discovered that there was no marriage license
issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of
their marriage. She was issued by the Civil
Registry of Pasig a certification of due search
and inability to find to back this claim.
The trial court denied Castros petition for
nullity of marriage, ruling that the certification
was inadequate to establish the alleged nonissuance of a marriage license. Castro then
appealed to the appellate court, which
reversed the trial courts decision and declared
the marriage between the contracting parties
null and void. Petitioner, Republic of the
Philippines, then filed for petition for review on
certiorari.
search and inability to find" sufficiently proved

that the local civil registry office did not issue
marriage license no. 3196182 to the
contracting parties. Since no marriage license
was issued, marriage is rendered void ab initio
(under the Family Code, Art.4).
*Also worth noting that Castro failed to
offer any other witness regarding the
celebration of her marriage. This is because of
its peculiar circumstance being a secret
marriage. Cardenas did not appear during the
annulment trial, so he is considered in default.
ISSUE:
WON the certification of due search and
inability to find marriage license presented as
evidence is sufficient to render the marriage
void.
HELD:
Yes. Unaccompanied by any circumstance
of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court3, a certificate of "due
3
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an

officer having custody of an official record or by his
deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry
Cruz
32
332
Alcantara v. Alcantara
Aug. 28, 2007
HUSBAND: Restituto Alcantara
WIFE: Rosita Alcantara
FACTS:
Restituto filed a petition for annulment
against Rosita on the following grounds:
(1) The wedding was performed without
first securing a marriage license
Even though the couple was
married twice (first at the stairs in
Manila City Hall before a certain
Minister Aquilino Navarro through a
fixer and second at San Jose de
Manuguit Church in Tondo), the
ceremonies
were
celebrated
without the parties securing a
marriage license.
(2) The alleged ML, procured in Carmona,
Cavite, appearing on the marriage
contract, is a sham, as neither party was
a resident of Carmona, and they never
went to Carmona to apply for a license
with the local civil registrar of the said
place.
(3) The certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona states the ML
number of 7054133 but the marriage
contract bears the ML number
7054033.
The couple has 2 children, but on the side,
Restituto has a mistress with whom he has 3
children. It appeared that he was filing for an
annulment with the intent to evade prosecution
for concubinage.
ISSUE:
WON the irregularities relating to the ML
are sufficient to render the marriage void.
HELD:
No. The petition was dismissed for lack of
merit.
parties. In this case, the marriage contract

between the petitioner and respondent reflects
a ML number. A certification to this effect was
also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona. The certification4 moreover is precise
that it specifically identified the parties.
Issuance of a ML in a city or municipality,
not the residence of either of the contracting
parties, and issuance of a ML despite the
absence of publication or prior to the
completion of the 10-day period for publication
are considered mere irregularities that do not
affect the validity of the marriage 5.
On the discrepancy in ML numbers, it is not
impossible to assume that it is a mere
typographical error. It therefore does not
distract the Court in its conclusion regarding the
existence and issuance of said ML to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to
court must come with clean hands, he cannot
pretend that he was not responsible or a party
to the marriage celebration which he now
insists to be rendered invalid. He is an educated
person (mechanical engr) and he knowingly and
voluntarily entered into marriage. The Court
ruled, he cannot benefit from his action and be
allowed to extricate himself from the marriage
bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no
longer palatable to his taste or suited to his
lifestyle. We cannot countenance such
effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of
the institution of marriage betrays his bad
faith.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The
presumption is always in favor of the validity of
the marriage. Every intendment of the law or
fact leans towards the validity of the marriage
bonds. This presumption is of great weight.
Note: The marriage involved herein having
been solemnized on 1982 thus, prior to the
4
RATIO:
To be considered void on the ground of
absence of a ML, the law requires that the
absence of such ML must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such ML was issued to the
This certification enjoys the presumption that

official duty has been regularly performed and the
issuance of the marriage license was done in the
regular conduct of official business.
5
An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of
marriage does not affect its validity but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
Dolot
33
332
Alcantara v. Alcantara
Aug. 28, 2007
effectivity of the Family Code, will be assessed
on its validity based on the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time
of its celebration.
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless
ALL these requisites are complied with: (a) Legal
capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Their consent, freely given;
(c) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(d) A marriage license, except in a marriage
of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage
license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general
public
is
interested.
Dolot
34
332
Vda. De Jacob v. CA
Aug. 19, 1999
PETITIONER:
TomasaVda.DeJacobasSpecialadministratixoftheIntestateEstateof
DeceasedAlfredoEJacob
RESPONDENTS: CA, PedroPilapil,ProvinceofCamSur,JuanTrivino
NATURE:
Petitionforreviewoncertiorariofade
cision of CA
RULING:
PetitionisGRANTEDandtheassailedde
cisionoftheCAisRESVERSEDandSETASI
DE.MarriagebetweenpetitionerandAlfred
oJacobisherebyrecognizedanddeclared
VALID
FACTS:
TomasaVda.DeJacobclaimstobethe
survivingspouseofDrAlfredoJacob, and
wasappointedSpecialAdministratrixofhis
estatesbyvirtueofareconstructedmarriag
econtractbetweenthem
PedroPilapil,thedoctorsallegedadopt
edson,claimsthatthemarriagebetweenT
omasaandDrJacobwasvoidforhavingn
omarriagelicenseandonlya
reconstructedmarriagecontract,plusnoma
rriageceremony
ISSUE:
WONTomasasmarriagetoDr.Jacobw
asvalid
RATIO:
It
hasbeenestablishedthatTomasaandDrJ
acoblivedtogetherashusband
andwifeforatleastfiveyears
(affidavitwasexecuted).Marriage
is
exceptionalincharacteranddidntrequire
marriagelicense
Secondaryevidence:trialandCAcommi
ttederrorswhentheyexcludedtestimonies
ofAdelaPilapilandMsgrFlorencioYllana.
Also,therewerephotosoftheweddingcer
emony
DueexecutionwasestablishedbyAdela
Pilapilwhowaspresentatmarriagecerem
ony
Subsequentlossofthedocumentwass
hownbytestimonyofYllana
Giventhattheylivedtogetherashusba
ndandwife,presumptionofmarriageisgiv
en
Hermosisima
35
332
Sevilla v. Cardenas
G.R. No. 167684 ll Jul. 31, 2006
FACTS:
The petitioner wishes to appeal the
decision of the CA. Sevilla wishes for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Cardenas, such that his consent was given
because of intimidation of the retired Colonel
father of Cardenas. Cardenas claims that they
were both married civilly and also had a
religious ceremony. The couple has been
living as husband and wife for 25 years
already, before Sevilla filed the case. Sevilla
claims that the marriage license used in their
contract is non-existent because he never
applied for a license. The Local Civil Registrar
affirmed this that they cannot locate the said
logbook containing the record for the
marriage license, but it can be inferred that it
is due to an overload of problems in their
office, and that they belatedly admitted that
they couldnt find the book because the
officer in charge of it had already retired.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage can be declared null
and void because of the inability to provide

proof of the license.
HELD:
No. It is evident in the certifications
provided by and the witnesses from the Local
Civil Registrar that they did not exert all their
efforts into finding the said logbook containing
the
record
of
the
marriage
license.Presumption of regularity of official
duty may be rebutted by affirmative evidence
of irregularity or failure to perform duty.
Hence, they cannot ISSUE a certificate for due
search and inability to find, as seen in Sec. 29,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. It does not
mean that there is really no marriage license,
and with this, one must always remember that
every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds. Since
there is a doubt with Sevillas claim that the
marriage license is fictitious, it is resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.
Macariola
36
332
People v. Mendoza
G.R. No. L-5877 ll Sep. 28, 1954 ll Paras, CJ.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:
People of the Philippines
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANT: Arturo Mendoza
FACTS:
The defendant-appellant married Jovita de
Asis in 1941. Without said married being
annulled or declared void, and no pretense
made as to defendant-appellants belief that
Jovita had been missing and not heard of from
seven years which could give rise to the
presumption of her death, he entered a second
marriage with Olga Lema in 1941. In 1943, his
first wife, Jovita de Asis died. Then, in 1949, he
contracted a third marriage with Carmencita
Panlilio, which said third marriage gave rise to
his prosecution for and conviction of the crime
of bigamy.
The defendant-appellant then contends
that his marriage with Olga Lema in 1941 is null
and void and, therefore, non-existent, having
been contracted while his first marriage with
Jovita de Asis was still in effect, while his third
marriage with Carmencita Panlilio cannot be the
basis of a charge for bigamy because it took
place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The
Solicitor General, however, argues that, even
assuming that appellant's second marriage to
Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from
criminal liability, since there was no previous
judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage.
The Court of First Instance rendered judgment

in favour of the People of the Philippines as
represented by the OSG, prompting the
defendant-appellant to file this petition.
ISSUES:
WON the defendant-appellant could be
held liable for bigamy for his third marriage,
considering that the second marriage it was
predicated on is null and void by virtue of its
having been contracted during the subsistence
of his first marriage
RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed
judgment and acquitted the defendantappellant
RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. There was no judicial decree needed to
declare the invalidity of the defendantappellants second marriage; it was void ab
initio. Neither is there any ISSUE of presumptive
death that could have rendered the same valid.
Thus, the third marriage, having been
contracted after the death of the defendantappellants first wife, is considered valid.
Cadorna
37
332
Tolentino v. Paras
G.R. No. L-43905 ll May 30, 1983 ll Melencio-Herrera, J.
PETITIONER:
Serafia Tolentino
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Edgardo L. Paras, Maria Clemente and the Local Civil
FACTS:
Amado Tolentino, petitioners late husband,
contracted a second marriage with private
respondent Maria Clemente while his first
marriage with the petitioner was still subsisting.
Petitioner charged him with Bigamy in a
criminal case, where the Court, upon Amado's
guilty plea, sentenced him to suffer the
corresponding penalty. After Amado had served
the prison sentence imposed on him, he
continued to live with private respondent until
his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate
carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse
Maria Clemente."
Thereafter, petitioner sought to correct the
name of the surviving spouse in her husbands
death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to her
name in a Special Proceeding for Correction of
Entry, which the lower Court dismissed "for lack
of the proper requisites under the law." Thus,
petitioner filed a case against private
respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of
Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the
lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of
the death certificate of Amado, which said case
was dismissed by the respondent Court for
three reasons: (1) the correction of the entry in
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the
proper remedy because the ISSUE involved is
marital relationship; (2) the Court has not
acquired proper jurisdiction because as there is
a lack of the required publication prescribed
under Art. 108, read together with Art. 412 of
the Civil Code; and (3) the subject matter of the
case has been aptly discussed in Special
Proceeding No. 1587-M, which the Court has
already dismissed, for lack of the proper
requisites under the law. The petitioner then
filed current petition to assail said judgment by
the respondent Court.
ISSUES:
WON petitioner is entitled to have her late

husbands death certificate corrected to reflect
her name as the rightful surviving spouse
RULING:
The Court set aside the decision of the
respondent Court and declared petitioner the
surviving spouse of the deceased Amado
Tolentino, thereby ordering that the
corresponding correction be made in the
latter's death certificate in the records of the
Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes. First, the suit she filed against private
respondents Maria Clemente and the Local Civil
Registrar is a proper remedy; it is of an
adversary character as contrasted to a mere
summary proceeding. Although her ultimate
objective is the correction of entry
contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code
and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially
seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful
surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in
order to lay the basis for the correction of the
entry in the death certificate of said deceased.
Further, the publication required by the Court
below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is not absolutely necessary for no other
parties are involved. After all, publication is
required to bar indifferently all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort
against the right sought to be established.
Second, considering that Amado, upon his
own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that
sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the
marital status of petitioner and the deceased.
There is no better proof of marriage than the
admission by the accused of the existence of
such marriage. The second marriage that he
contracted with private respondent during the
lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from
the beginning, and of no force and effect. No
Cadorna
38
332
Tolentino v. Paras
G.R. No. L-43905 ll May 30, 1983 ll Melencio-Herrera, J.
judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage. It can be safely
concluded, then, without need of further proof
nor remand to the Court below, that the private
respondent is not the surviving spouse of the
deceased Amado, but the petitioner.

Rectification of the erroneous entry in the
records of the Local Civil Registrar may,
therefore, be validly made.
Cadorna
39
332
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy
G.R. No. L-53703 ll Aug. 19, 1986 ll Paras, J.
PETITIONER: Lilia Oliva Wiegel
RESPONDENTS: Honorable Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and Karl Heinz Wiegel
FACTS:
In an action filed before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City,
herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the
ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to
one Eduardo A. Maxion that has been subsisting
when she married the respondent. Lilia, while
admitting the existence of said prior subsisting
marriage claimed that said marriage was null
and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter
said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued,
the ISSUE agreed upon by both parties was
whether the first marriage, assuming the
presence of force exerted against both parties,
was void or merely voidable.
Contesting the validity of the pre-trial
order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an
opportunity to present evidence showing that
(1) the first marriage was vitiated by force
exercised upon both her and the first husband;
and (2) the first husband was at the time of the
marriage already married to someone else.
Respondent
judge
ruled
against
the
presentation of evidence because the existence
of force exerted on both parties of the first
marriage had already been agreed upon as the
set of facts on which judgment will be based.
Hence, the petitioner filed this present case.
ISSUES:
WON the marriage between respondent
and petitioner was valid based on the
respondents first marriage being void.
RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed
judgment and acquitted the defendantappellant
RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. Even if the petitioner proves that her
first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against her and her first husband, the marriage
would still be valid until annulled since it was
merely voidable and not void. Since no
annulment was made, it is clear that when she
married respondent, she was still validly
married to her first husband, consequently, her
marriage to respondent is VOID. There is
likewise no need for evidence about the existing
prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a
marriage, though void, still needs, according to
this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact.
Hence, she would still be regarded as a married
woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with the respondent, with such marriage being
void ab initio.
Cadorna
40
332
Terre v. Terre
A.M. No. 2349 ll Jul. 3, 1992 ll Paras, J.
PETITIONER: Dorothy Terre
RESPONDENT: Atty. Jordan Terre
FACTS:
Dorothy and Jordan Terre met each other
while they were in high school, during such
time, Dorothy was already married to another
man who was allegedly her first cousin, while
Jordan was single. Jordan courted her and
continued doing so through his pursuance of
law studies, to which she decided that it was
futile but was nonetheless convinced by the
former that they could marry since her first
marriage with her first cousin, it being contrary
to public policy and morals, was void ab initio.
The two eventually got married with Jordan
convincing Dorothy that she was single and
could marry, and that there was no need for her
first marriage to be declared void by the Court.
During their relationship as spouses, Dorothy
had been supporting him through law school.
Ultimately, she conceived his child and it was
during this time when Jordan suddenly
disappeared for no apparent reason. She soon
found out that he had married another woman,
prompting her to file a case of abandonment
and bigamy, as well as an administrative case,
against her husband.
In his defense, Jordan contended that he
married Dorothy on the belief that she was
single; that when he found out about her
previous marriage, she drove him out of their
home; that the child Dorothy was carrying was
not his but her former husbands; and that he
contracted a second marriage believing in good
faith that his marriage with Dorothy was void ab
initio, she having been married already when
they contracted their marriage.
ISSUES:
WON the respondent
contracting a second marriage
is
liable
for
RULING:
The Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent
Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from
the Roll of Attorneys.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Yes. When the second marriage was
entered into, respondent's prior marriage with
complainant was subsisting, no judicial action
having been initiated or any judicial declaration
obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage
of respondent with complainant. Respondent
Jordan Terres defense of having believed in
good faith that his prior marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre was null, and void
ab initio and that no action for a judicial
declaration of nullity was necessary is spurious,
considering that (1) he did not rebut
complainant's evidence as to the basic facts
underscoring his bad faith; and (2) it was the
same argument he used to inveigle complainant
into believing that her prior marriage, being
incestuous and void ab initio, made her free to
contract a second marriage with him.
Respondent, being a lawyer, knew or should
have known that such an argument ran counter
to the prevailing case law of this Court which
holds that for purposes of determining whether
a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
Furthermore, even if respondents argument
about the lack of need for the judicial
declaration of marriage nullity were to be
accepted, thus rendering his first marriage to
complainant valid, it would still result to him
being criminally liable for bigamy since he
contracted his second marriage with the first
one still subsisting. This, and other
circumstances showing his flawed moral
character, are enough grounds to adjudge him
unfit to remain as a member of the Bar, as well
as inadequate to uphold the purpose and
responsibility of his gender in support of
marriage as a basic social institution.
Cadorna
41
332
Atienza v. Brillantes
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 ll Mar. 29, 1995 ll Quiason, J.
COMPLAINANT: Lupo Almodiel Atienza
RESPONDENTS: Judge Francisco Brillantes
FACTS:
Lupo A. Atienza filed a complaint against
Judge Francisco Brillantes for Gross Immorality
and Appearance of Impropriety. Complainant
alleges that the respondent is cohabiting with
one Yolanda De Castro, with whom complainant
has two children. Further, complainant claims
that respondent is married to one Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has five children. For his
part, respondent alleges that complainant was
not married to De Castro, and moreover, he
denies having been married to Ongkiko,
although he admits having five children with
her. He alleges that the lack of a marriage
license in both his first and second marriage
ceremonies with Ongkiko made the same void
ab initio, and that because of it, he believed in
good faith, that when he married De Castro in
civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he
was single. Finally, respondent argues that the
provision of Article 40 of the Family Code,
which provides that a judicial declaration of
nullity was needed for remarriage, does not
apply to him considering that his first marriage
took place in 1965 and was governed by the
Civil Code of the Philippines, while the second
took place in 1991 and is governed by the
Family Code.
ISSUES:
WON respondents second marriage was
valid considering that lack of judicial declaration
of absolute nullity on his first marriage that was
contracted without a marriage license.
RULING:
The Court dismissed the respondent from
service and forfeited all his leave and
retirement benefits, and with prejudice to
reappointment in any branch, instrumentality,
or agency of the government, including
government-owned
corporations.
and
controlled
RATIO DECIDENDI
No. Under Art. 40 of the Family Code, there
must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage before a party thereto can
enter into a second one. Said Article applies to
remarriages entered into after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, regardless
of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under
Art. 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impaired upon the application of Art.
40 to his case. Neither can he invoke good faith
as regards his belief of being single when he
married De Castro since he, being a lawyer,
should know that a marriage license is
necessary before one can get married. He had a
chance to correct the flaw of his marriage with
Ongkiko upon their second wedding ceremony.
His failure to secure a marriage license on two
occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad
faith. Thus, it is evident that respondent failed
to meet the standard of moral fitness for
membership in the legal profession. While the
deceit employed by respondent existed prior to
his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge,
his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De
Castro began and continued when he was
already in the judiciary. The Code of Judicial
Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge
must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties but also as to his behavior as a private
individual. As there is no duality of morality, a
public figure is also judged by his private life.
Cadorna
42
332
Borja - Manzano v. Sanchez

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 ll Mar. 8, 2001 ll Davide, Jr., CJ.
PETITIONER:
Herminia Borja-Manzano
RESPONDENTS: Judge Roque R. Sanchez
FACTS:
Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano filed
charges against respondent Judge for gross
ignorance of the law for the latters action of
solemnizing the marriage between David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao, who were
both in existing marriages when they married
each other, with the former being
complainants late husband. Complainant
contends that when respondent Judge
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to
know that the same was void and bigamous, as
the marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand,
initially claims that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao, he did
not know that Manzano was legally married.
What he knew was that the two had been living
together as husband and wife for seven years
already without the benefit of marriage, as
manifested in their joint affidavit. However,
during his later Manifestation, he presented
two separate affidavits of the late Manzano and
of Payao, which expressly stated that they were
married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos,
respectively. Respondent Judge alleges that on
the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
WON respondent Judge can be held liable
for solemnizing the void marriage between
Manzano and Payao
RULING:
The Court adopted the recommendation of
the Court Administrator with an increased fine
of 20,000 imposed upon the respondent Judge.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes. Respondent Judge knew or ought to
know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in
his comment, he stated that had he known that
the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another
marriage. Likewise, respondent Judge cannot
deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos
subsisting previous marriage, as the same was
clearly stated in their separate affidavits which
were subscribed and sworn to before him. The
fact that Manzano and Payao had been living
apart from their respective spouses for a long
time already is immaterial, as such does not
dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize
the parties to remarry. This holds true all the
more when the separation is merely de facto, as
in the case at bar. Further, respondent Judge
cannot take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating
that they had been cohabiting as husband and
wife for seven years. Just like separation, free
and voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least five years does not severe the tie of
a subsisting previous marriage; it is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license. It
could not serve as a justification for respondent
Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage
vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.
Clearly,
respondent
Judge
demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when
he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
Cadorna
43
332
Apiag v. Cantero
Panganiban., J.
COMPLAINANTS/PLAINTIFFS: Maria Apiag, Teresita Securom, Glicerio Cantero
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT:
Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero
ANTECEDENT FACTS:
According to Maria Apiag, she and Judge
Cantero were married after living together as
husband and wife. They had 2 children, Teresita
and Glicerio. Judge Cantero then disappeared
without any apparent cause and left Maria to
raise their children alone. They suffered from
his abandonment and didn't hear from him for
many years, until they found out that he was in
Hinundayan, Southern Leyte. They asked for his
support in a letter but were ignored.
Afterwards, they found out he was already
married to Nieves Ygay and that all the public
documents required of the defendant had the
latter's name instead of Maria's as his wife.
(1993) In a letter complaint, Maria Apiag,
along with her children, Teresita and Glicerio,
charged Judge Cantero (MTC of Pinamungajan
Aloquinsan, Cebu) with Gross Misconduct for
allegedly having committed bigamy and
falsification of public documents. The Court
referred this case for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
(1994) Teresita, on behalf of her mother,
and Judge Cantero had a compromise
agreement. In it, the parties settled the case
amicably, by letting Teresita and Glicerio
receive 1/4 of the retirement money that Judge
Cantero would get, and that they would be in
included as beneficiaries of the First
Party in case of death, inherit properties
from the First party, and that Teresita is
authorized to receive and collect 4000php
monthly out of the 2nd check salary of Judge
Cantero. Also in the agreement, it was agreed
upon that there would be a voluntary
withdrawal of the case, and if this were not
done, the agreement would be void.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the first marriage with Maria Apiag is
void.
(2) WON the absence of Maria Apiag for more

than 7 years raises the presumption that
she is dead and there was no need for any
judicial declaration.
(3) WON the crime of Bigamy and Falsification
had already prescribed.
(4) WON the charge of Grave Misconduct is
applicable to him because at the time of the
offense he wasn't a member of the
judiciary.
HELD:
The results of the investigation done by
Exec. Judge Gualberto Delgado (RTC Toledo
City, Cebu) show that the first marriage was
valid. Judge Cantero's argument that not having
seen his wife for 40 years has no merit because
a judicial declaration of death must be filed
before one can remarry. He was also found to
have committed misrepresentation in his
documents and his conduct was also found to
have failed in meeting the standard of moral
fitness in his profession.
HOWEVER:
(1) YES, the first marriage is void. Judge Cantero
alleged that the marriage was not valid because
his consent was not freely given. He was merely
forced to marry Maria because he got her
pregnant. He also said that they never lived
together, and that is was suspicious for the
complainants to show up now when he was
about to retire.
(2/3) YES. The marriage of Judge Cantero to
Nieves Ygay took place and all their children
were born before the effectivity of the Family
Code. The doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante,
wherein it was decided by the Court that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages, applies in favor of
the respondent. So Judge Cantero's 2nd
Quiambao
44
332
Apiag v. Cantero
Panganiban., J.
marriage is considered VALID. The Falsification
charge also does not prosper because it is based
on the Bigamy charge, which Judge Cantero was
not found guilty of.
(4) NO. Gross misconduct cannot be applicable
in this case because the acts pertain to Judge
Cantero's personal life, and have no direct
relation to his judicial function. Other than this
case, the Judge didn't have any wrongdoing in

his record. It was found however, that he
violated Canon 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. But, he shouldn't be judged solely for
a mistake committed in his youth. The Court
would have imposed a penalty for neglecting
and refusing to support his first family, but in
view of his death before this Decision, the case
is DISMISSED.
Quiambao
45
332
Antone v. Beronilla
G.R. No. 183824 ll Dec. 8, 2010
FACTS:
March, 12 2007: Myrna Antone,
executed an affidavit-complaint for
Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla, alleging
that her marriage with respondent in 1978
had not yet been legally dissolved when
Beronilla contracted a second marriage
with Cecile Maguillo in 1991.
Beronilla moved to quash the
information on the grounds that the
facts charged do not constitute an
offense
He declared that his marriage with
Antone was null and void by the RTC
branch 16, Nacal, Biliran on April 26
2007, and it was final and executory.
Given that it was null and void from
the beginning, there was no first
marriage and the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute the
crime of bigamy.
Prosecution pointed out that the first
marriage on Nov 18 78 has not been
severed when he contracted the second
marriage on Feb 16 91 which means that
bigamy has been executed prior to the
declaration that the 1st marriage was null
and void on April 27 2007
March 26 2008: Petitioner alleged to
the CA that the Pasay City Trial court acted
without or in excess of its jurisdictions or
with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the case of bigamy and denied
her motion for reconsideration
July 18 2008: CA denied the
respondents motion for reconsideration for
the lack of merit
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred to

conclude that the first element of
bigamy (a valid first marriage) is
lacking.
HELD: YES
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was

promulgated in 1987 states that: The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void.
This court held that under the FC, a
subsequent judicial declaration of
the nullity of the first marriage is
immaterial in a bigamy case, by
then, the crime has already been
consummated.
This court declared that a person,
who contracts a subsequent
marriage absent a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous
one, is guilty of bigamy.
The issue on the declaration of nullity of
the marriage bet. Petitioner and
respondent only after the latter contracted
the subsequent marriage is, immaterial for
the purpose of establishing that the facts
alleged in the information for bigamy does
not constitute an offense.
THE ORDERS OF THE RTC AND
RESOLUTIONS OF CA IS SET ASIDE.
CRIMINAL CASE IS REMANDED TO THE
TRIAL
COURT
FOR
FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.
Quilala
46
332
Llave v. Tamano
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This petition for review on certiorari
assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CV
No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution
dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner
Estrellita
Juliano-Llaves
(Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J.
Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was

bigamous.
FACTS:
REASON:
The marriage between the late Sen.
Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in
1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim
rites. The only law in force governing
marriage relationships between Muslim
sand non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code
of 1950, under the provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given time.
Under the marriage provisions of the Civil
Code, divorce is not recognized except
during the effectivity of Republic Act No.
394 which was not availed of during its
effectivity. As far as Estrellita is concerned,
Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda
has been severed by way of divorce under
PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim
personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1)
thereof provides that the law applies to
marriage and divorce wherein both parties
are Muslims, or wherein only the male
party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law
or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not
provide for a situation where the parties
were married both in civil and Muslim
rites.
Around 11 months before his death,

Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice
initially under the Islamic laws and tradition
on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang,
Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil
status was indicated as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been
representing herself to the whole world as
Sen. Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his
widow. On November 23, 1994, private
respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano
(Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in
behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos
legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for
the declaRATIOn of nullity of marriage
between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for
being bigamous. The complaint alleged that
Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31,
1958 under civil rights, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993.
HOLDING:
The petition is DENIED.
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage
of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083.
Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
marriage
between
Ramos
47
332
Santos v. Bedia Santos

FACTS
Leouel and Julia got married on

September 1986. The lived with the latter's
family. The marriage was strained,
however. The couple frequently had
quarrels about when they would start living
independently from Julia's parents, and
days where Leouel was away, spending time
with his own parents. In 1988, Julia went to
the US to work as a nurse despite Leouel's
opposition. When she was able to contact
him through long distance telephone call,
she promised she would return when her
contract expired. She never did. Leouel got
the chance to be in the US due to a military
training. There he tried his best to look or
contact his wife but to no avail.
Leouel then filed to nullify their
marriage due to Julia's psychological
incapacity. Julia countered that it was
Leouel who was incompetent. The
prosecutor ascertained that there is no
collusion between the two. Leouels
petition is however, denied by the lower
and appellate court.
ISSUE:
WON there is actual psychological

incapacity in the case at bar that would
nullify the marriage.
HELD:
No. Although Leouel stands aggrieved,
his petition must be dismissed because the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife
is not clearly shown by the factual settings
presented.
Before deciding on the case, the SC
noted that the Family Code did not define
the term psychological incapacity, which
is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law.
But basing it on the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee, the
provision in PI, adopted with less specificity
than expected, has been designed to allow
some resiliency in its application. The FCRC

did not give any examples of PI for fear that
the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
FCRC would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law. The
term psychological incapacity defies any
precise definition since psychological causes
can be of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of but
must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. PI should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage
which (Art. 68), include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and
support. The intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of PI to the
most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also
notes that PI must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the
Reposar
48
332
Santos v. Bedia Santos

marriage; and it must be incurable or, even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
Reposar
49
332
Republic v. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 ll Feb. 13, 1997
FACTS:
Roridel Olaviano was married to

Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in
Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after.
Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility on the early stages of the
marriage, observed from his tendency to
spend time with his friends and
squandering his money with them, from his
dependency from his parents, and his
dishonesty on matters involving his
finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner
thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned
from her job in Manila and proceeded to
Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their
child a week later. The couple is separatedin-fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence
for Roridel consisted of her own testimony,
that of two of her friends, a social worker,
and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did
not present any evidence as he appeared
only during the pre-trial conference. On 14
May 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the marriage void. The
Solicitor General appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the
appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs
decision. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether opposing or conflicting

personalities should be construed as
psychological incapacity
range of mental and behavioral conduct on

the part of one spouse indicative of how he
or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the
long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage; where said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends
to cause the union to self-destruct because
it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos
v. Court of Appeals, where psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at
the time the marriage is celebrated, and
that there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability. In
the present case, there is no clear showing
to us that the psychological defect spoken
of is an incapacity; but appears to be more
of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or
neglect in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the
guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code,
removing any visages of it being the most
liberal divorce procedure in the world:
HELD:
The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion

the Civil Code Revision Committee intended
to liberalize the application of Philippine
civil laws on personal and family rights, and
holding psychological incapacity as a broad
(1) The burden of proof belongs to the

plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the
Cadorna
50
332
Republic v. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 ll Feb. 13, 1997
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
complaint, sufficiently proven by

expert, and clearly explained in the
decision;
The incapacity must be proven existing
at the time of the celebration of
marriage;
The incapacity must be clinically or
medically permanent or incurable;
Such illness must be grave enough;
The essential marital obligation must
be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code as regards husband and
wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the
same code as regards parents and their
children;
(7) Interpretation made by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church, and
(8) The trial must order the fiscal and the
Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels
for the State.
The
petition,
assailed
marriage
Molina
Supreme Court granted the

and reversed and set aside the
decision; concluding that the
of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo
subsists and remains valid.
Cadorna
51
332
Chi Ming Tsoi v CA & Gina Lao - Tsoi

G.R. No. 119190 ll Jan. 16, 1997
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi had
already been married for a span 10 months.
During that period, it is quite unbelievable that
the couple has not ever engaged in sexual
intercourse even if none of them are impotent.
Gina filed a case in order to annul her
marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Her husband, on the other hand,
is against the said petition and is insisting
that their marriage should remain valid.
Mr. Tsoi submitted his medical report as
evidence on the trial. It states that from the
original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeterthe defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection,
in that with his soft erection, the defendant is
capable of having sexual intercourse with a
woman.
ISSUE:
WON the Trial Court and Court of Appeals
erred in their decision to render the marriage

void due to one of the partys incapacity.
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court affirms the decision
of the lower courts.
The prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
It must be stated that neither the trial
court nor the respondent court made a finding
on who between petitioner and private
respondent refuses to have sexual contact with
the other; since the action to declare the
marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e.,
even the psychologically incapacitated.
One of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is "to procreate
children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage.
Reyes, N
52
332
Choa v. Choa
G.R. No. 1473376 ll Nov. 26, 2002
FACTS:
Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married

in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl
Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an
annulment of his marriage to Leni.
Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint
for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage based on psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial and the trial court
further held that Alfonso presented
quantum evidence that Leni needs to
controvert for the dismissal of the case.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him
with perjury, concubinage and deportation
which
shows
latters
psychological
incapacity because according to him it
clearly showed that his wife not only
wanted him behind bars but also to banish
outside the country.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented

quantum evidence for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Leni on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The court held that documents

presented by Alfonso during the trial of the
case do not in any way show the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife. The
evidence was insufficient and shows grave

abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
Alfonso testified and complained about
three aspects of Lenis personality namely
lack of attention to children, immaturity,
and lack of an intention of procreative
sexuality and none of these three, singly or
collectively,
constitutes
psychological
incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be
characterized
by
gravity,
juridical
antecedence, and incurability. It must be
more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a
neglect in the performance of marital
obligations.
A
mere
showing
of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities
does
not
constitute
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence
from other witnesses failed to identify and
prove root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity. It just established
that the spouses had an incompatibility or a
defect that could possibly be treated or
alleviated through psychotherapy. The
totality of evidence presented was
completely insufficient to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity more so without
any medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination.
Cadorna
53
332
Antonio v. Reyes
G.R. No. 155800 ll Mar. 10, 2006 ll Tinga., J.
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do
- Tinga (2006)
PETITION:
Review on Certiorari assailing the decision
of CA. [Reversing the RTC decision: nullity of
marriage of Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne
F. Reyes]
3.
4.
5.
DECISION:
Reverse CA and affirm RTC Antonio and
Reyes marriage is null and void.
6.
FACTS:
Antonio and Reyes met in 1989 and were
married in 1990. Upon the unbearable
psychological incapacity of Reyes, Antonio left
her almost a year after. Antonio filed a petition
to declare his marriage null and void alleging
Reyes as psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of
marriage (Art 36 of FC). Antonio alleges that
Reyes persistently lied about her life, her
company, her occupation, income and
education. The acts undermined the basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust,
and respect. Both Antonio and Reyes brought in
experts to prove their individual claims. Reyes
witness used a Comprehensive PsychPathological Rating Scale, showing results that
Reyes is not psychologically incapacitated; yet
Antonios witness claims that the test is not
reliable.
TOOL OF ANALYSIS: Molina Guidelines
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage belongs to the plaintiff
2. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
7.
experts and (d) clearly explained in the

decision.
The incapacity must be proven to exist at
the time of the celebration of marriage.
The incapacity must be incurable.
The incapacity must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
Essential obligations affected: Art 68-71,
220, 221 and 225 in FC.
Courts should give great respect to
interpretations of National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church.
ISSUE:
WON Reyes conditions and actions are
bases for psychological incapacity, thus
nullifying the marriage
HELD:
(1) Antonio sufficiently proved that Reyes is
psychologically incapacitated through his
testimony and two expert witnesses who (2)
identified Reyes constant lying as pathological.
The court held that pathological jealousy and
repeated lying undermines the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses that is based on
love, trust and respect. (3) The psychological
incapacity was established on or even before
the celebration of marriage when Reyes
fabricated the existence of friends. (4) The
Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the
Catholic Church (in reference to Molina [7])
already annulled the marriage. (5) The
psychological incapacity is indeed incurable.
Antonio came back to Reyes as an attempt to
make the marriage work. Seeing that Reyes
never changed proves the incurability.
Sevilla
54
332
Dimayuga Laurena v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Darlene, filed for annulment due
to psychological incapacity of her husband due
to the following reasons:
Infidelity
Physical abuse (for having hit her face)
Abandonment of conjugal home
Stopped support for children
Trial court and CA denied petition on
grounds of insufficient evidence to declare
husband as psychologically incapacitated.
ISSUE:
WON husband can be declared as
psychologically
incapacitated
therefore
rendering the marriage voidable
HELD: NO
RATIO:
Court held that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by:
1. Gravity it must be grave and serious
such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out ordinary duties required
in a marriage. (there is no evidence
there is incapacity of husband to the
assumption of marriage is due to
psychological incapacity and not merely
because of refusal, neglect, or difficulty,

much less ill will)
2. Judicial antecedence must be rooted
in history of the party antedating the
marriage,
although
the
overt
manifestations may emerge after the
marriage. (Petitioner failed to prove this
as she only cited that during their
honeymoon they had a 15 year old who
slept with them, but respondent
explained that they have had sex
several times before said honeymoon
and the buy was with them to take their
pictures and due to money constraints,
he had to stay in one room with them)
3. Incurability must be incurable, or the
cure would be beyond the means of
party involved. (In this case Dr. Lapuz
failed to convince the court that
husbands psychological incapacity was
incurable, e.g. when they reach the age
of 50 s or 60 s, they may settle down)
The burden proof belongs to the plaintiff to
nullify the marriage. Any doubt should be in
favor of the marriage. Petitioners reasons for
annulment of marriage are grounds for legal
separation but not for declaring a marriage
void.
Tan de Guzman
55 332
Te v. Te
Feb. 13, 2009
PETITIONER:
Edward Kenneth Te
RESPONDENT: Rowena Yu-Te
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were married
then separated. Petitioner filed for annulment
of marriage on the basis of psychological
incapacity.
Clinical
psychologist
found
petitioner to be afflicted with Dependent
Personality Disorder (insecure, weak, gullible,
no direction in life, unable to decide without
advice), while respondent has Antisocial
Personality Disorder (disregard for others
rights, abusive, controlling without remorse,
tendency
to
blame others). Clinical
psychologist recommended annulment.
ISSUE, HOLDING, RATIO
WON personality disorders of both parties
are sufficient grounds for declaring marriage
void YES. Void ab initio per FC Art 36. Courts
must consider expert opinion as decisive
evidence. Personality disorders with their
respective features incapacitate both parties to
fulfil essential marital obligations.
HELD:
Petition is GRANTED; marriage is declared
VOID AB INITIO.
During joint meetings, Family Law

Committee and Civil Code Revision Committee
included additional kind of void marriages
under psychological incapacity based on Canon
Law (laws adopted by ecclesiastical authority
for the government of the Church and its
members). The committees thought it was a)
an acceptable alternative to divorce; and b) a
solution to problem of Church annulments not
recognized by civil law.
Psychological incapacity has nothing to do
with consent (lack of due discretion); it refers
to marital obligations, which were the object of
the consent (lack of due competence).
Intentionally, drafters did not give examples to
avoid ejusdem generis and limit applicability of
the provision.
Standards in Republic v. CA and Molina
were set because of the deluge of petitions
for nullity. In fact, OSG labelled FC Art 36 as the
most liberal divorce procedure in the world.
Ct, however, need not worry about the
abuse of Art 36; there are safeguards such as
State intervention against collusion and
fabrication of evidence. Ct therefore declares
that there should be perspectives other than
that in Molina (without disposing of rules set
from this case) to govern annulments under
Art 36.
NOTES
Ordoyo
56
332
Ting v. Velez-Ting
Mar. 31, 2009 ll Nachura., J.
FACTS:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez Ting met
in medschool, fell in love, and got married. Ben
worked as an anesthesiologist in a hospital
owned by Carmen s family. They had 6 kids.
After 18 years of marriage, Carmen filed for a
petition asking for the nullity of their marriage.
According to her, Ben has psychological
incapacity because his chronic alcoholism,
violence (hurting Carmen and forcing her to
have sex), compulsive gambling habit,
irresponsibility in the failure to give regular
financial support to his family.
Dr. Pureza Trinidad Oate (psychiatrist)
compulsive gambling, physical abuse of
respondent are clear indications that husband is
suffering from a personality disorder.
Dr. Obra refuting Oate s opinion:
(stenographic notes, psychiatric evaluation of
interview with Bens brothers) nothing wrong
with petitioner s personality, considering the
latter s good relationship with his fellow doctors
and good record as anesthesiologist.
RTC nullified the marriage, saying that his
compulsive gambling, habitual alcoholism,
violence, etc, are grounds for psychological
incapacity. CA reversed the decision.
ISSUES:
1. WON CA decision violated stare decisis of
Molina and Santos cases
2. WON requirement for declaration of the
nullity of marriage has been liberalized
3. WON
petitioner
is
psychologically
incapacitated
HELD:
1. (Discussion on stare decisis, its definition
etc. similar to Legmeth. No need, and is
only procedural, not the main issue of the
case) Interpretation or construction of a law
by courts constitutes a part of the law as of
the date the statute is enacted.
2. Molina doctrine, not abandoned. In
previous cases, the set of rules evaluating
the psychological incapacity should not be
rigidly applied because no two cases are
similar. We must give weight to the
authority of the expert opinion, juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability.
TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE IS ENOUGH, to
sustain a finding, not only on the factors
provided above.
3. Marriage VALID, Reversed CA ruling.
Petitioner failed to prove the pre-existing
psychological defect prior marriage, there
are two conflicting expert opinions but
more weight is given to Dr. Obra s findings
because of the extent of his evaluation
(used a report from a third psychiatrist from
South Africa). Semper praesumitur promatrimonio. Presumption is always in favor
of the validity of marriage. Totality of
evidence is inadequate to declare him
psychologically unfit. Although the Court
condones the behavior or the husband for
no rational explanation could be made. He
owes love, respect and fidelity to his wife,
as much as the latter owes the same to him.
Tiangco
57
332
Suazo v. Suazo
Mar. 10, 2010
PETITIONER:
RESPONDENT:
Jocelyn M. Suazo
Angelito Suazo and Republic of the Philippines
DOCTRINE:
Psychological incapacity as a ground for
void marriages (FC, Article 36): The mere
testimony of the spouse is not sufficient
evidence to prove the psychological incapacity
of the other spouse and to render their
marriage void ab initio.
NATURE OF PETITION:
On July 14, 2004, petitioner filed an
appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals that reversed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 119, Pasay City
on January 29, 1999. The reversed RTC decision
nullified the petitioners marriage with the
respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
FACTS:
On June 1985, Jocelyn (petitioner) and
Angelito (respondent) met for the first time
in Bian, Laguna when the both of them were
only 16 years of age.
After months of courtship, Jocelyn went
with Angelito and his friends to their trip to
Manila. They stayed there for three days.
Upon being gone for three days, their parents
went to look for them and when the former
found them, they were brought back to
Laguna.
Not long after that incident, their
marriage was arranged. They were married on
March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the
Mayor of Bian.
The two were forced to stop schooling.
And because they had no means to support
their new family, the couple lived with
Angelitos parents first.
Jocelyn was the one who supported the
family. She worked as a household helper for
the relatives of Angelito. The husband, on the
other hand, refused to work and became a
drunkard instead. Whenever Jocelyn will urge
Angelito to find work, the latter will only be
infuriated and their discussion will lead to a
violent quarrel.
On July 1987, Jocelyn finally left Angelito.

Not long after, Angelito found another
woman to live with and they even had their
own children.
On October 1997, Jocelyn filed in the
Regional Trial Court a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, as amended. She claimed that
Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The following reasons were included
in her complaint:
That from the time they were married until
they separated, their relationship has been
characterized by bitter quarrels that caused
severe physical and emotional pains to the
petitioner
The main reason for their quarrel was
always the refusal of the respondent to
work and his excessive drinking which
makes him psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations
The psychological incapacity of the
respondent started from the time of their
marriage and became very apparent as
time went by and is now showing to be
permanent and incurable
Angelito did not answer to this complaint
nor did he subject himself into the
observation of Nedy Tayag, a psychologist
hired by the petitioner.
The hearings commenced once the RTC
has proven that no conspiracy existed
between the two conflicting parties.
Jocelyn presented three witnesses:
herself; her aunt, Maryjane Serrano; and the
psychologist, Nedy Tayag.
Jocelyns testimony
- Repeated allegations in her petition
- Described the occurrence of the
beatings
- Declared that Angelito did not treat her
that way before marriage
- Described Angelito as quarrelsome with
other people also
Yumol
58
332
Suazo v. Suazo
Mar. 10, 2010
Her aunts testimony
- Corroborated
testimony
parts
of
Jocelyn's
The psychologists testimony

- Claimed that the respondent suffered
from Anti-Social Personality Disorder;
described it as serious and severe;
chronic (incurable) and long- standing
even before the marriage
- This disorder has been deemed as
incurable since the person itself is not
aware that he possesses such a disorder
- Although no physical examination was
done, these findings were based on the
report given by Jocelyn (who was found
to display no pattern of lying and very
responsive
and
coherent
her
psychological examination)
- Claimed that the disorder has
prevented the respondent from
interacting normally with his wife and
other people and this hindered him
from functioning as the husband of the
family (they have no children, he lets
his wife work as a maid, etc.)
- This disorder thus affect the
psychological incapacity of to perform
marital obligation he is a good for
nothing person
The SG, representing the Philippines,
opposed the petition for the declaration of the
nullity of the marriage saying that the
psychologist did not examine and test
Angelito all of her report findings were
merely hearsay since they only came from the
testimony of the petitioner.
RULING OF RTC: annulled the marriage
No particular instance in the law to

consider a person as psychologically
incapacitated yet there are some admitted
grounds that would render a person to be
unfit to comply with his marital obligation
(in this case: refusal to work, habitual
alcoholism).
Respondent has not shown love and
respect; he is irresponsible, immature,
jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all a
wife beater.
This could also have stemmed from the

fact the two were married young and they
never the developed the love and respect
that a married couple should have
developed.
The respondent could have blamed the
family of the girl because he was forced to
enter a marriage he did not want at that time.
Based on the psychological incapacity
requisites enunciated by the Court in Santos v.
CA, the RTC concluded that the respondent did
suffer from psychological incapacity which is
not only grave but incurable and it did render
him to be unfit to fulfill his marital obligations.
The testimonies given are enough to prove this
and to give to the petitioner the relief prayed
for.
Letting the marriage remain valid (wife will
still use the last name of the husband, etc.) will
only remind the beaten party of the hardship
that she has to go through.
RULING OF THE CA: reversed the RTC
decision
The courts should have used the

totality of evidence approach: If the totality
of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.
There is much scarcer evidence to hold that
the respondent was psychologically incapable
of entering into the marriage state, that is, to
assume the essential duties of marriage due to
an underlying psychological illness.
The theory of the psychologist that the
respondent was suffering from an anti - social
personality syndrome at the time of the
marriage was not the product of any adequate
medical or clinical investigation, but it was
merely based on the testimony of the wife
which is found to be inconclusive.
It can only be due to simple causes like
immaturity or irresponsibility which are not
equivalent to psychological incapacity. It can
also be rebelliousness because of their loveless
marriage.
The concept of psychological incapacity is
Yumol
59
332
Suazo v. Suazo
Mar. 10, 2010
not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality
are convenient excuses of parties to separate
and divorce.
Jocelyn filed another petition for the
reversal of the CA ruling and it included
the following arguments:
The Court of Appeals went beyond
what the law says, as it totally disregarded
the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the
marriage null and void.
Article 36 of the Family Code did not
define psychological incapacity; this omission
was intentional to give the courts a wider
discretion to interpret the term.
ISSUE:
WON there is a basis to nullify their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
NO.
RATIO:
The Court finds Jocelyns evidence
insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological
incapacity to perform essential marital
obligations.
Expert Opinion Evidence: Both the
psychologists testimony and the psychological
report did not conclusively show the root
cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos
alleged
psychological
condition.
The
psychologist
evaluated
Angelitos
psychological condition only from the
testimony of Jocelyn.
It is not mandated that a personal
examination must be done because there are
times when this is not entirely possible;
however, there are other measures on how a
psychologist can find out about the

background of the person in consideration.
The Court then concluded that the
psychologist, using only the petitioners
testimony could not have secured a complete
personality profile and could not have
conclusively formed an objective opinion or
diagnosis
of
Angelitos
psychological
condition.
Jocelyns Testimony: The Court finds this
testimony as insufficient. All of the beatings
and refusal to work arguments happened after
the marriage. She did not clearly specify what
was the exact time that all of these alleged
arguments happened. This is a clear
evidentiary gap that materially affects her
cause, as the law and its related
jurisprudence require that the psychological
incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and
refusal to find a job, while indicati ve of
psychological incapacity, do not, by
themselves, show psychological incapacity.
Moreover, while it may be conceded that
physical violence on women indicates
abnormal behavioral or personality patterns,
such violence, standing alone, also does not
constitute psychological incapacity.
Wherefore, premises considered, we deny the
petition for lack of merit. We affirm the
appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Costs against the petitioner.
Yumol
60
332
Marable v. Marable
PETITIONER:
Rosalino Marable
RESPONDENT: Myrna Marable
FACTS:
Petitioner and Respondent met while the
Petitioner was still in college, courted
(notwithstanding petitioner already having a
girlfriend at the time) and eventually eloped
and were married in civil rites in Tanay, Rizal,
followed by a church wedding. They had five
children. However, after a few years, they
began to argue incessantly, the frequency of
their fights being exacerbated by the
petitioners extra-marital affair and failed
business ventures. Eventually, the petitioner
left the family home and stayed with his sister
in Antipolo. He gave up all his property to his
wife and children and converted to Islam after
dating several women. Eventually, Petitioner
filed for nullity of marriage on grounds of
psychological incapacity to fulfill essential
obligations of marriage; he cited his
underprivileged background and the influence
of a father who was a womanizer and a
gambler; he alleged feelings of misery and
lonelinss throughout his life from childhood to
college. In his petition, he cited the
psychological report of Dr. Tayug which stated
he had Anti- Social Personality Disorder,
rooted in deep feeling of rejection from family
to peers, and leading to experiences of selfabsorbed need for attention. Dr. Tayags
report concluded that the petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations.
Trial Court ruled for the nullity of the
marriage, based on Dr. Tayugs report.
OSG filed for an appeal, and the Appellate
Court reversed the Trial Courts decision based
on a lack of legal and factual bases: it ruled
that the petitioner failed to establish the
existence of psychological incapacity, that the
root cause of the disorder and its gravity and

permanence were not fully explained, nor was
it proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
The OSG further contends that the
petitioner, contrary to his claim of a disorder,
was a good provider and father to his children;
further, the burden of proof to establish such
an incapacity lies with the petitioner, who was
unable to substantiate his claim that his
infidelity was due to a psychological disorder,
and not general dissatisfaction with his
marriage.
Petitioner filed for an appeal with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
a. WON Petitioner has presented sufficient
basis for psychologically incapacity to fulfill
essential marriage obligations, and
consequently,
b. WON his marriage can be deemed void on
such grounds.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the petitioner has no
basis for nullity of marriage, given his basis of
psychological incapacity was insufficiently
proven. The Appellate Court did not err in
declaring the petitioner and respondents
marriage as valid and subsisting, and the
appeal is denied for lack of merit.
The findings in Dr. Tayugs psychological
report did not sufficiently prove that the
Petitioner had psychological incapacity to fulfill
essential marital obligations.
For psychological incapacity to be
sufficient grounds for nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family
Alampay
61
332
Marable v. Marable
Code, there must be a severe psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the
marriage has been celebrated; a mental
incapacity rendering the party incapable of
giving meaning and significance to the
marriage he or she has contractedthe party
must be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.
Among the guidelines laid down by
Republic vs. CA for psychological incapacity are
the ff.:
i. Burden of proof rests on the plaintiff; any
doubt is to be resolved in favor of the
continuation of marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity
ii. Root cause of psychological incapacity
must be: a) medically/clinically identified,
b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently
proven by experts and d) clearly explained
in the decision
iii. Incapacity must be proven to be existing
at the time of the celebration of the
marriage
iv. Such incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or
incurable
v. Such illness should be grave enough to
bring about disability of the party to
assume essential obligations of marriage
vi. Essential martial obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 6871 of the Family
Code as regards husband and wife, as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the Code as
regards parents and their children
vii. Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
neither controlling nor decisive, should be
given great respect
viii. Trial Court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state; no

decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General ISSUES a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition
The Petitioner had relied completely on
the psychological examination and findings of
Dr. Tayag, but these were insufficient to
establish the petitioners psychological
capacity, as it merely made general
conclusions about the petitioners alleged
suffering from Anti-social Personality
Disorder without stating factual basis for
finding the petitioner to be socially deviant,
rebellious, impulsivenessetc.
As held in Suazo vs. Suazo, the declaration
for nullity must be based on an in-depth
assessment of the parties by a psychologist or
expert, for conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity. However, in Dr. Tayags evaluation:
The report did not specify how the
Petitioners actions were a result of his
psychological incapacity. ii. There was no
established link, medical or otherwise,
between the petitioners acts and his alleged
The Court ruled that sexual infidelity by
itself is not sufficient proof that the petitioner
is suffering from incapacity, as the latter must
be more than just difficulty, refusal or
neglect in the performance of marital
obligationsSantos vs. Court of Appeals ruled
that the intention of the law to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage
Alampay
62
332
Ablaza v. Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed

in the RTC a petition for the celebration of
the absolute nullity of the marriage
contracted on December 26, 1949
between his late brother Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the
marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila had been celebrated without a
marriage license, due to such license
being issued only on January 9, 1950,
thereby rendering the marriage void ab
initio for having been solemnized without
a marriage license.
Being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano, who had died without any
issue, entitled him to one-half of the real
properties acquired by Cresenciano before
his death, thereby making him a real party
in interest; and that any person, himself
included, could impugn the validity of the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila
at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being
void ab initio.
RTC dismissed the petition: (1)
petition is filed out of time and (2) the
petitioner is not a party to the marriage.
CA affirmed* RTC. [no prescription
but should be real party: brother is not
real party]
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is a real party in

interest in the action to seek the declaration
of nullity of the marriage of his deceased
brother
HELD:
[RTC decision set aside, case remanded

to RTC for further proceedings w/
instructions to require petitioner to amend
pleading]
Yes. The validity of a marriage is tested

according to the law in force at the time the
marriage is contracted. As a general rule,
the nature of the marriage already
celebrated cannot be changed by a
subsequent amendment of the governing
law. Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 0211-10-SC [(Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages: took effect on March
15, 2003] which explicitly provides the
limitation that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or wife was not
in effect since it extends only to marriages
under
Family Code (1988). The marriage was
solemnized under the regime of the Civil
Code w/c contains no provision on who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage and when. Court cited Ninal v
Bayadog and distinguished between a void
and voidable marriage and how they can be
impugned.* However, not anyone can file a
petition. The only party who can
demonstrate a proper interest can file the
action. Interest within the meaning of the
rule means material interest, or an interest
in ISSUE to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case. Assuming the
petitioner was as he claimed himself to be,
then he has a material interest in the estate
of Cresenciano that will be adversely
affected by any judgment in the suit. But
this right hinges upon a prior determination
of WON Cresenciano had any decendants,
ascendants, or children, and of whether the
petitioner was the lates Cresencianos
surviving heir. Thus, hes a party of interest
but needs to implead Leonila and Leila
[Cresies wife and daughter] as theyre
indispensable party whose substantial right
will be affected by any judgment of this
action.
Bayona
63
332
Ablaza v. Republic of the Philippines

NOTE:
* This case is under period to file action
or raise defense, SC tackled it in passing:
" XXX being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding
in which the fact of marriage may be material,
either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether
before or after the death of either or both the
husband and the wife, and upon mere proof
of the FACTS rendering such marriage void, it

will be disregarded or treated as non-existent
by the courts."
* ISSUE on prescription by CA in
passing: while action to declare the nullity
of a marriage considered void from the
beginning does not prescribe, the law
nonetheless requires that the same action
must be filed by the proper party
Bayona
64
332
Ninal v. Badayog
G.R. No. 133778 ll Mar. 14, 2000 ll Ynares-Santiago., J.
PETITIONERS: Engrace Nial for Herself and as Guardian of the minors Babyline Nial, Ingrid Nial,
Archie Nial and Pepito Nial, Jr.
RESPONDENT: Norma Badayog
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa
Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie,
petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito
to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985. 1
year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage
license. Instead, they instituted an affidavit
stating that they had lived together for at least
5 years, therefore exempting them from
securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a
car accident on February 19, 1977. After his
death, petitioners filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between
Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage
was void for lack of marriage license.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the charge on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an
action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
WON the second marriage of Pepito was
void for a lack of a marriage license
WON the heirs of the deceased may file
for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos
marriage after his death
RULING:
The petition is GRANTED, and the assailed
Order of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
YES. They cannot be exempted even
though they instituted an affidavit and
claimed that they have cohabited for at least
5 years, since their cohabitation was not the
type contemplated by law, he having been
still married to his first wife when he started
cohabiting with Norma. The five-year period
of cohabitation that exempts couples from
acquiring a marriage license should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
"husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In their case, since a legal
impediment was existing, they cannot be
deemed to have been exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license, which lack
thereof resulted to the status of the second
marriage as void ab initio.
YES. Unlike voidable marriages, void

marriages are imprescriptible, and can
therefore be the subject of a declaration of
nullity even after the death of either of the
parties. Art. 47, which was invoked by
respondent, cannot apply to this case as said
article refers not to void but to voidable
marriages. The trial courts conclusion that
the death of petitioners father extinguished
the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage
bond that was dissolved between the two.
Cadorna
65
332
Domingo v. CA
G.R. No. 104818 ll Sep. 17, 1993 ll Romero., J.
PETITIONER:
RESPONDENTS:
Roberto Domingo
Court of Appeals and Delia Soledad Avera, represented by her Attorney-inFact Moises R. Avera
FACTS:
Delia Soledad Avera and Roberto

Domingo were married in 1976. Delia later
found out that Roberto was married to one
Emerlinda dela Paz since 1969 when the
latter sued them for bigamy. Delia filed a
petition at the RTC of Pasig for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property against Roberto
since their marriage was contracted while
Robertos first marriage is still subsisting.
Avera is an OFW while Domingo is
unemployed
and
was
completely
dependent on her. Avera wanted Domingo
to turn over the possession and
administration of the properties she
acquired to her brother but he refused. The
RTC and the CA dismissed Domingos
motion to dismiss, hence this petition.
ISSUES:
WON a judicial declaration of a void

marriage is necessary for the division of
properties given that the marriage was
void ab initio (subsequent marriage
while first marriage still subsisting).
WON respondent Delia Soledad Avera
can file for a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage for purposes other
than remarriage.
HELD:
1) YES. It is necessary in order to protect

the subsequent spouse who believed
that her spouse was lawfully married to
her. The division of properties is only
one of the consequences of the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage; hence there is no need to file
for an ordinary civil action that the
petitioner suggests.
2) YES. Art. 40 of the FC states The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Petitioner contends
that it means the declaration is required
only for purposes of remarriage. The SC
held that the term solely pertains to
the final judgment and not to for
purposes of remarriage meaning solely
the final judgment can be invoked to
make a previous marriage void to be
allowed to remarry, but the final
judgment can be invoked for other
purposes.
Cristobal
66
332
De Castro v. Assidao De Castro

G.R. No. 160172 ll Feb. 13, 2008
PETITIONER: REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO
RESPONDENT: ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO
FACTS:
Reinel Anthony De Castro and Annabelle
Assidao planned to get married and so they
obtained a marriage license from the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Pasig City. When the couple
went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the
marriage license had already expired. In order
to push through with the plan, in lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a fake affidavit
stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years, when in
fact, there was no cohabitation. They were then
married under civil rites, but did not live
together after the ceremony. Annabelle later
gave birth to their daughter Reinna Tricia De
Castro, who she raised and financially
supported alone. She then filed a complaint for
support under the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
stating that she is married to Reinel and that he
failed to do his responsibility to financially
support her as his wife and Reinna as his
legitimate child with her.
The trial court ruled that the marriage is not
valid because it was solemnized without a
marriage license. However, it declared Reinel as
the natural father of the child, and was obliged
to give her support.
Reinel brought case to CA. CA denied the
appeal, but modified the previous ruling such
that Reinna is declared as a legitimate child and
that the marriage is valid until properly annulled
by a competent court. It also ruled that since
the case is an action for support, it was
improper for the trial court to declare the
marriage of the parties as null and void in the
very same case and ordered that a separate
case be filed for it. Case then brought to SC.
*Worth noting: Reinel refused to undergo a
DNA test for paternity and filiation and to state
with certainty the last time he had sex with
Annabelle.
ISSUE:
determine the validity of the marriage

between petitioner and respondent in an
action for support
(2) WON the child is the daughter of Reinel
RULING:
Petition granted in part. CA decision set
aside, RTC decision reinstated.
RATIO:
1. Yes. The validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked. As it ruled in Nial v.
Bayado, for purposes other than
remarriage, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. In this case, the
fact is important to establish the childs
status and her entitlement for financial
support from the father. As for the couples
marriage, it was decided to be void ab initio
since they failed to obtain and present a
marriage license. The falsity of the affidavit
cannot be considered as a mere irregularity
in the formal requisites of marriage.
2. Reinna is his illegitimate child and therefore
entitled to his support. The childs
Certificate of Live Birth lists Reinel as the
father. In addition, Reinel, in an affidavit
waiving his additional tax exemption,
admitted that he is the father of the child.
During his testimony in the RTC trial, he also
conceded that Annabelle was his former
girlfriend, that he used to visit her in her
house or clinic and that they would go to a
motel to have sex, which eventually led to
Annabelles pregnancy.
(1) WON the trial court had the jurisdiction to
Cruz
67
332
Dio v. Dio
G.R. No. 178044 ll Carpio., J.
DOCTRINE:
Void marriages under Art 36 have coownership as their property regime.
FACTS:
Alain and Caridad were childhood
sweethearts who started living together in
1984 until they decided to separate in 1994.
They decided to live together again and in
98 they got married. Alain filed for the
nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Their marriage was
declared void ab initio and their properties
dissolved.
(However, Caridad was in US and filed and
granted a divorce even before the filing of the
case in CFI. She was already married to
another man.)
ISSUE:
WON there was an error in the order that
the absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties under Art 147
HELD:
NO. The property regime of void
marriages falls under Art 147 and 148. The
relationship of the parties can be
characterized as the union of legally

capacitated parties not barred by impediment
to get married, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void. There are 3 elements for
Art 147 to apply, all of which are present in
this case:
1. Parties capacitated to marry
2. Live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife
3. Union is without the benefit of
marriage, or marriage is void
The Court erred in applying Sec 19 of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages which states that the decree shall
only be issued after compliance with Arts 50
and 51 (dissolution of properties and delivery
of presumptive legitimes) These articles apply
only to void ab initio or annulled marriages
under Arts 40 and 45, NOT 36 (psychological
incapacity). Void marriages under Art 36 are
governed by rules on co-ownership. Art 496
CC states that partition can be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. It is not necessary to liquidate
the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
Dantes
68
332
Moe v. Dinkins
533 F.Supp. 623 (1981), 669 F.2d 67 (1982)
FACTS:
Raoul (who was 18) wanted to marry Maria
(who was 15). They lived together and had a
child (Ricardo). However, in order to get a
marriage license, they needed parental consent,
which Maria's mother would not give. Maria's
mother wanted to continue getting welfare
benefits from her minor child, and would lose
the benefits if Maria married.
Raoul, Maria, and Ricardo sued (in Federal
Court) to have the New York parental consent
requirement declared and unconstitutional
violation of due process.
In New York, parental consent was required
for those under 18.
Another underage couple (Pedro (17) and
Cristina (15 and pregnant)) intervened to turn
this into a class action suit.
ISSUE:
WON The New York parental consent
requirement violates due process.
HELD: DISMISSED.
RATIO:
The Trial Court found that while minors do
have constitutional rights, courts have long
recognized the government's power to make
adjustments to the constitutional rights of
minors. For example, children can't get driver's
licenses or buy alcohol.
The Court found that the right of minors to

marry is not a fundamental right, and that the
courts do not need to apply strict scrutiny. All
that is required is that New York have a rational
basis for making the law. The rational basis test
only asks whether the governmental action at
issue is a rational means to an end that may be
legitimately pursued by government. The Court
found that New York had a rational basis for the
law. The State has the paternalistic power to
promote the welfare of children who lack the
capacity to act in their own best interest. The
State interests in mature decision-making and
in preventing unstable marriages are legitimate
under its parens patriae power.
In addition, the Court found that the State
has a legitimate interest in supporting the
fundamental privacy right of a parent to act in
what the parent perceives to be the best
interest of the child free from State court
scrutiny.
Raoul et. al. argued that the courts were in
a better position to determine maturity on a
case-by-case basis because they were
disinterested parties. But the Court found that
in most cases, "the natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best interest of their
children."
The Court found that they weren't denying
Raoul and Maria's rights, they were simply
delaying those rights. As soon as they turned 18
they'd be allowed to marry anyone they want
De Castro
69
332
Katipunan v. Tenorio
O.G. No. 43442 ll Sep. 29, 1937
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT: Marcos Katipunan,

DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE: Rita Tenorio, et al
FACTS:
- Plaintiff brought an action to annul their
marriage
- Defendant and plaintiff were married on
1919
- Plaintiff alleges that he wasnt aware
of the insanity of the defendant at
the time of the marriage but it was
apparent after the celebration of the
marriage (1926)
ISSUE:
1. WON Rita Tenorio was mentally sound

at the time of her marriage
2. WON being diagnosed as of
unsound mind after marriage
can be grounds for annulment
HELD:
1. NO
2. NO
- Principles of declaration of insanity
o Generally insanity admitted, or
once proved, is presumed to
continue, the burden to prove
the allegation is on the person
making it
o Once insanity has existed, it is
sought to be proved that a
subsequent act of its subject
was done in a lucid interval
- Admittance of plaintiff that during
the nuptial ceremony, he did not
have the least suspicion that his

bride was suffering from insanity
o Coupled with the testimony of
Ursula Paz, indubitably show that at
the time she wedded the plaintiff,
the defendant was mentally sound
Declaration of plaintiff
o He noticed the insanity only several
days after the marriage
o He decided to continue living with
her, because he believes that one
day it would be cured
o Waited until 1926 when the
defendant, after her 4th delivery of
birth, had so severe an attack of
madness to warrant hospitalization
until declared incurable
Husband
and
wife
cohabited
continuously for 7 years
Presumption of the validity of the
marriage
Sec. 30
o Annullable Marriages A marriage
may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:
(c) That either party was of
unsound mind, unless such party,
after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as
husband and wife
MARRIAGE VALID
Dilag
70
332
Suntay v. Cojuangco - Suntay

Martinez., J.
PETITIONER:
Federico Suntay
RESPONDENT: Isabel Cojuangco- Suntay
Suntay Family Tree:
Federico Suntay Cristina Aguinaldo- Suntay
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay Isabel Cojuangco- Suntay
(1) Margarita Guadalupe (2)Isabel Aquino(3)Emilio Aguinaldo
FACTS:
In 1958, Emilio and Isabel got married. They had 3 kids, Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aquino and
Emilio Aguinaldo. However, after 4 years, the marriage turned sour and Isabel filed a case against Emilio
for parricide. In retaliation, Emilio petitioned for legal separation for his schizophrenia (which has
already manifested even before the celebration of the marriage).
In 1967, the TC granted said petition with the ff. dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties.
In 1990, Cristina (grandmother of Isabel Aquino respondent) died without a will. Isabel prayed that
she be appointed as administratix of the estate. However, her legitimacy is being contested because of
the declaration of nullity between her parents. Federico, on the other hand, is contending that he is the
surviving spouse of the decedent. Hence the case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a declaration of nullity or an annulment was indeed granted to Isabel Aquinos parents?
2. WON Isabel Aquino is a legitimate daughter of her parents thus qualified to be an administratix of
her grandmothers estate?
HELD/ RATIO:
1. ANNULMENT- Apparently, there was a conflict between the dispositive portion and the body. As
such, the entire case must be read so as to construe the real intent (like in LegMeth). In the body,
it was clearly stated that: The marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
was annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which are
considered voidable. Art. 85 (3) allows annulment if either of the parties was of unsound mind.
The Civil Code was followed in the case and NOT the family code; and in the Civil Code, only Arts.
80, 81, 82 and 83 were grounds for a void marriage.
2. YES- Having established that the marriage was only annulled, Isabel Aquino is deemed legitimate.
A voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage
dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express
provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of
children born in voidable marriages is legitimate (Art. 89). The terms annul and null and void
have different legal connotations and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate;
obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with whereas null and
void is something that does not exist from the beginning.
Dolot
71
332
Aquino v. Delizo
G.R. No. L-15853 ll Jul. 27, 1960
FACTS:
Aquino filed a complaint for annulment

of marriage with Delizo, on the grounds of
fraud, wherein Delizo concealed from
Aquino the fact that she was pregnant by
another man during their marriage on
December 27, 1954, and sometime in April
1955, gave birth to Catherine Aquino. RTC
dismissed complaint due to nonpresentation of evidence, but was excused
of his negligence, but still, the complaint
was dismissed. Court of Appeals affirmed
RTCs ruling, saying that it was not
impossible for plaintiff and defendant to
have had sexual intercourse during their
engagement so that the child could be
their own (respondents defense), and that
it was impossible that Aquino could not
have noticed/suspected that Delizo was
pregnant when they got married. He filed
a motion for a new trial and presented the
ff:
1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino, his brother
who was living with Delizo at the
time they met, admitting he was the
father of 3 children with Delizo, and
that they hid her pregnancy from the
plaintiff up to the time of the

marriage.
2. Affidavit of Conchita Delizo
admitting her pregnancy by Cesar
Aquino and hiding the pregnancy.
3. Birth certificates of the 3 children.
4. Pictures of Delizos natural plumpness
ISSUE:
WON the marriage can be annulled on

the grounds of the concealment of
pregnancy by another man at the time of
marriage.
HELD:
Yes. Concealment by the wife of the

fact that at the time of the marriage, she
was pregnant by another man other than
her husband constitutes fraud, and is
ground for annulment of marriage. Ruling
on Buccat cant apply here, because
Delizo was then only 4 months
pregnant, and it cannot be said that her
pregnancy was readily apparent then,
since she was naturally plump (kaloka
ang euphemism). (6th month pa usually
nagiging noticeable)
Enad
72
332
Anaya v. Palaroan
G.R. No. L- 27390 ll Nov. 26, 1970
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Aurora A. Anaya

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Fernando O. Palaroan
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya appealed the dismissal of the
Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of Manila
of her complaint for the annulment of her
marriage to Fernando Palaroan.
Fernando had earlier filed for annulment on
the ground that his consent had been obtained
through force and intimidation. This complaint
was dismissed: the validity of their marriage
was upheld, and Auroras counterclaim was
granted.
While the negotiations for the amount of
the counterclaim was underway, Fernando
revealed to Aurora that, several months prior to
their marriage, he had a premarital relationship
(assumption: sex) with a close relative of his.
This non-divulgement, Aurora alleged,
definitely wrecked their marriage.
Furthermore, Aurora alleged that Fernando
had pretended to shower her with love and
affection when he was courting her, but only
intended to marry Aurora so that he could
evade marrying his close relative, from whose
family he was receiving threats forcing him to
marry her.
She also alleged that since he had not
married her out of love, he had never intended
to perform the marital duties and obligations
and had even covertly made up his mind against
living with her.
Finally she alleged that he had courted
a third girl with whom he later cohabited
and had several children with over a span
of nine years.
ISSUE
Whether or not a husbands non-disclosure
to his wife of his premarital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of
marriage.
RATIO
The Court voted to affirm the lower court
and uphold the validity of their marriage on
the following grounds:
A. In marriage, the law prohibits only

specific frauds, of which non-divulgement is
not part.
Art. 85 and 86 of the Civil Code refer to
fraud as a vice of consent, which may be
grounds for the annulment of marriage.
However,
only
specific
frauds
misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure

as to a previous conviction and concealment of
pregnancy constitute grounds for the
annulment of marriage.
The Court reasoned that it was clear the
Congress, in writing these provisions, intended
to exclude all other frauds and deceits. To
emphasize this intention further, Art. 86
contains
the
interdiction:
No
other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage.
The Court also stressed the state interest in
the institution of marriage, saying, The law
does not assuage her grief after her consent
was solemnly given, for upon marriage she
entered into an institution in which society, and
not herself alone, is interested.
B. The cause for the second fraud charge
that Fernando had courted her and obtained
her hand without intending to comply with his
marital duties and obligations had long since
lapsed.
The Court said, Any secret intention on the
husbands part not to perform his marital duties
must have been discovered by the wife soon
after the marriage. Aurora should have
brought her charges based on that fraud within
four years after the marriage, which was
celebrated in December 1953. However, since
this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it was
declared barred.
Espaola
73
332
Ruiz v. Atienza
FACTS:
Jose Ruiz, the plaintiff, and Pelagia Atienza,
the defendant, were sweethearts in 1938. Nine
months later, they had a baby outside of
marriage which resulted in Pelagias father,
cousin-in-law and three other persons visiting
Ruiz in his boarding house and convincing him
into marrying Pelagia. After some discussion,
they including Pelagiasecured a marriage
license and solemnized their wedding at an
Aglipayan church.
Four days later, Ruiz brought suit trying to
annul the marriage by saying that he has been
forced into wedlock. He said he only went with
them that afternoon because he was
convinced due to the following reasons: he
was threatened by Pelagias father with a
balisong; her cousin-in-law told him that if he
doesnt marry Pelagia, he would have trouble in
the bar exams because many were rejected on
the ground of immorality; and he would be
physically safe if he goes with them.
ISSUE:
WON being forced into marriage (due to
threats and intimidation) is enough reason to
annul their marriage.
HELD:
No, their marriage cannot be annulled.
First, the Court reviewed his arguments:
- The threats from the father only came after
he said that he cannot marry Pelagia due to
the fact that he was already married. This
made Mr. Atienza grab him by his necktie,
exclaiming So you mean to fool my
daughter!
Flares
of
anger
are
understandable and also, it wasnt
sufficiently established that the father
displayed any balisong or made any threat
against the life of Ruiz.
As to the threat to obstruct his admission to
the Bar, it is not considered such duress as
to constitute an annulment of marriage.
(and where a man marries under the
threat of, or constraint from, a lawful
prosecution for seduction or bastardy, he
cannot avoid the marriage on the ground of
duress - 38 C.J., sec. 70, p. 1305)
Promise of him being safe was only said
to make him feel secure since he was afraid
of the possible bodily harm he might endure
in retaliation for the dishonor he inflicted
upon her family.
Ruiz makes it look like he was practically

kidnapped until after the marriage ceremony,
but he had many occasions to escape. He also
had companions in the house whom he couldve
asked for help. In fact, there was even a
policeman.
The evidence doesnt warrant that his
consent was obtained through force or
intimidation. Court then cites the provision of
the Marriage Law (sec 30 Act No. 3613) that
refers to force or violence. Force or
violence doesnt include mere intimidation, at
least where it doesnt in legal effect amount to
force or violence. Furthermore, Atienzas
attorney has successfully met the issues,
upholding the judges conclusion of fact that
neither violence nor duress attended the
marriage celebration.
Falcone
74
332
Jimenez v. RP and Canizares

RULING:
HELD:
Decree appealed from is set aside. Case

remanded to lower court for further
proceedings
FACTS:
Joel Jimenez filed for annulment of his

marriage w/ Remedios Canizares for
impotency.
He says that her vagina was too small to
allow penetration
Respondent, on the other hand, refused
to undergo physical exam to determine
capacity for copulation (even if ordered
by court)
Because of this, Zamboanga court
entered a decree annulling the marriage
between the plaintiff and defendant.
Marriage is an institution in w/c the

community is deeply interested. It is
surrounded w/ safeguards to maintain
purity, continuity and permanence.
The law specifically enumerates legal
grounds that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence to annul a
marriage
Husband's testimony isn't sufficient
evidence
Respondent's refusal to be examined or
failure to appear in court must not be
presumed as suppression of evidence
because women of this country are by
nature coy, bashful and shy and would
not submit to a phys exam unless
compelled to.
Impotency should not be presumed ->
the presumption is in favor of potency
Hermosisima
75
332
Sarao v. Guevara
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE:
B. Sarao
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT: Pilar Guevara
FACTS:
o Plaintiff and defendant were married and
on the same day, plaintiff tried to have
carnal knowledge of defendant. The later
showed reluctance and begged him to
wait until evening. Although he found the
orifice of her vagina sufficiently large for
his organ, she complained of pains in her
private part later that night. Plaintiff also
noticed oozing of some purulent matter
offensive to the smell coming from
defendants vagina.
o Every attempt to have carnal access to his
wife proved to be futile because she always
complained of pains in her genital organs.
o Upon the advice of the physician,
defendants uterus and ovaries were,
with consent of the plaintiff removed due
to the presence of a tumor. The removal of
said organs rendered defendant incapable
of procreation.
o Plaintiff declared that from the time he
witnessed the operation, he lost all desire
to have access with his wife and thus filed
this complaint for annulment of marriage
on the ground of impotency.
ISSUE:
WON their marriage can be annulled on the
ground of physical impotency.
HELD:
No. Judgment of the Court of First Instance
affirmed.
RD:
o Plaintiff wants to construe the phrase
physically incapable of entering into the
married state as with the capacity to
procreate. Impotency is not the ability
to procreate but the ability to copulate.
Defect must be one of copulation and not
of reproduction. Bareness will not
invalidate the marriage.
o The removal of the organs rendered her
sterile but it by no means made her unfit
for sexual intercourse. It would appear that
it was the memory of this first unpleasant
experience with her that made him gave up
the idea of having carnal knowledge of her.
o Defendant was not impotent at the time
she married the plaintiff for the existence
of tumor did not necessarily render her
incapable of copulation.
o Plaintiff also contends that his consent of
the marriage was procured through fraud
in that the defendant did not reveal to him
that she was afflicted with a disease in her
sex organs. According to the Court, this
contention in untenable since fraud is not
alleged in the complaint and has not been
proved at the trial.
Macariola
76
332
SSS v. De Bailon
Mar. 6, 1937
FACTS: (Im narrating it in a more chronological
way than found in the courts description)
the partitioning of her mothers estate.
In December, 1914, Marciana Escano

married Arthur W. Jones. Escano would give
birth to their only child, Angelita Jones. On the
10th of January, 1918, Jones left the country
after obtaining a passport and was never heard
of again. Escano initiated proceedings to have
her husband judicially declared an absentee in
October, 1919. The court obliged her request
on the 25 th of the same month pursuant to
article 186 of the Civil Code with the condition
that the declaration of absence would only take
effect 6 months after its publication. The court
declared the declaration of absence in effect
on April 23, 1921. On May, 1937, Escano
married Felix Hortiguela.
Upon the death of Escano, Hortiguela was
appointed judicial administrator of her estate.
Hortiguela then proceeded to split the estate
between himself and his stepdaughter
Angelita; they were Escanos only heirs. This
partitioning of property and final accounting
was approved on June 26, 1933. However, on
May 1934, Angelita filed a motion alleging that
the marriage between Escano and Hortiguela
was void ab initio because they failed to meet
the seven -year absence requirement of one
spouse for the spouse present to be legally able
of entering a subsequent marriage. According
to her the amount of time between the
declaRATIOn of absence (April 21, 1921) and
the marriage of Escano to Hortiguela (May 6,
1927) is only 6 years and 14 dayswell below
the 7-year requirement. If proven right,
substantial changes would have to be made to
ISSUE:
WON the marriage between Escano and
Hortiguela is void.
HELD:
The validity of the second marriage was
upheld by the court. According to the court, the
7- year requirement should be counted from
the last known sighting of the spouse absent,
not from the courts official declaration.
Therefore, Jones should have counted from
the 10 th of January
1918 which was the last sighting of her
father. Court pointed out that both Escano and
Angelita believed Arthur Jones to be dead as
proven by the fact that she grew up recognizing
Hortiguela as her stepfather.
(There was also a brief discussion regarding the
fact that the marriage between Hortiguela and
Escano was not present in the civil register.
Court held that the marrying parties are not to
be held liable, nor the marriage invalidated, for
the failure of the solemnizing official to
transmit the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary. Just in case maam
touches on this issue)
** also note: For the purposes of the civil
marriage law, it is not required to have the
former spouse judicially declared absent. Such
declaration is only required for the
administration of the estate of the absentee.
Marin
77
332
SSS v. De Bailon
FACTS:
In 1955, Clemente Bailon contracted
marriage with Alice P. Diaz in Barcelona,
Sorsogon. After 15 years Bailon filed beofre the
Court of First Instance a petition to declare Alice
presumptively dead. The CFI granted the
petition. After 13 years from the granting of the
petition Bailon contracted another marriage
with Teresita Jarque.
Bailon died soon after and since he was a
member of the SSS, Teresita filed a claim for
funeral benefits and was granted P 12.000.
Siblings Cecilia and Norma who claimed to be
daughters of Bailon and a certain Elisa Jayona
contested the release of funeral benefits,
submitting an affidavit stating that Alice was
very much alive. A certain Hermes Diaz who was
the brother of Alice likewise filed an affidavit
claiming the same.
The SSS then cancelled the payment of the
funeral expenses and death pension, ordering
Teresita to return the P 12,000. Their ground
was that the granted petition to declare Alice
presumptively dead was not final, and that
Bailon who deserted his wife in bad faith made
the subsequent marriage bigamous and
therefore void.
Alice herself also reappeared, asserting that
she was the lawful wife of Bailon, and that she
was not really absent since she just lived with
her parents in the same town of Barcelona. The
SSC then found Teresita as a common-law wife
and therefore not entitled to Bailon's benefits.
In a petition brought about by the
respondent before the Court of Appeals, the
appellate court sided with the respondent,
saying that the SSS wrongly declared the
marriage null and void since only competent

courts can nullify a second marriage and that
second marriage contracted by person with
absent spouse endures until annulled.
Hence the petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bailon and Jarque's
marriage was invalid seeing that Alice was not...
quite dead yet?
HELD:
Second marriages in which springs from the
first spouse of one of the parties is presumed
dead is deemed valid until proven otherwise by
a competent court. In this the SSS erred in its
judgment.
According to law, the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance will terminate
subsequent marriages. Such absentee's mere
reappearance, even if made known to spouses
in subsequent marriage, will not terminate such
marriage. Presumption of the validity of the
second marriage continues in spite of the
spouse's physical reappearance and by fiction of
law must still be regarded as an absentee.
If subsequent marriage is not terminated by
affidavit of reappearance but by death, the
marriage cannot be questioned except by direct
action for annulment. Voidable marriages
cannot be assailed collaterally, and can only be
assailed during the lifetimes of the parties.
Upon the death of either party, the marriage is
deemed good ab initio.
Respondent is rightful spouse beneficiary of
Bailon.
Nuez
78
332
Yu v. Yu
G.R. No. 164915 ll Mar. 10, 2006 ll Carpio-Morales., J.
PETITIONER:
ERIC JONATHAN YU
RESPONDENT: CAROLINE T. YU
FACTS:
Eric Jonathan Yu (petitioner) filed a petition
for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals
alleging that his estranged wife Caroline
Tanchay-Yu (respondent) unlawfully withheld
from him the custody of their minor child
Bianca.
Subsequently, respondent filed a petition
against petitioner before the Pasig Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for declaration of nullity of
marriage and dissolution of the absolute
community of property. The petition included a
prayer for the award to her of the sole custody
of Bianca and for the fixing of schedule of
petitioners visiting rights subject only to the
final and executory judgment of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68460.
Appellate court thereafter awarded
petitioner full custody of Bianca during the
pendency of the habeas corpus case. Appellate
court later on also ordered respondent to
amend her petition before the Pasig RTC which
she did. However, citing a change in address
and constraints on resources, respondent
dismissed her petition in the Pasig RTC.
Respondent filed her own petition for
habeas corpus for the custody of Bianca this
time in the Pasay City RTC.
ISSUES:
WON question of custody over Bianca
should be held before the Pasay RTC, if not the
Pasig RTC
WON writ of habeas corpus is available to
determine the custodial right of parents over
their children
HELD:
NO. Pasig RTC has jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter of the case.

Appellate court erroneously applied the law
of the case doctrine when it ruled in its July 5,
2002 resolution that that the pendency of the
habeas corpus petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 68460
prevented the Pasig RTC from acquiring
jurisdiction over the custody aspect of
petitioners petition for declaration of nullity.
NO. Articles 49 and 50 of the Family Code
governed the case at bar. Specifically, Article 49
states that, During the pendency of the action
for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage. the Court shall provide for the
support of the spouses and the custody and
support of their common children. x x x It shall
also provide for appropriate visitation rights of
the other parent.
Article 50 meanwhile mentions that, The
final judgment in such cases for the annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriage shall
provide for. the custody and support of the
common children. unless such matters had
been adjudicated in previous proceedings.
The issue of the custody of the child is
deemed pleaded upon action for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage. There was
no need for the petitioner to ask for a writ of
habeas corpus just to gain custody of his child.
By filing before the Pasig RTC the case for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, petitioner
automatically submitted the issue of custody of
Bianca as an incident thereof.
Petition granted. August 10, 2004 decision of
CA is reversed and set aside; Special
Proceedings in Pasay City RTC is dismissed;
Pasig City RTC ordered to continue with
proceedings.
Pagdanganan
79
332
People v. Zapata and Bondoc

FACTS:
Andres Bondoc filed a case againse his wife,
Guadalupe Zapata, and Dalmancio Bondoc for
cohabiting and having sex from 1946-47.
Wife found guilty and was sentenced to 4
months of arresto mayor.
Husband filed for a second case
complaining about the adulterous acts of his
wife and Bondoc from 1947-48.
Both defendants filed a motion to quash
this complaint on the ground that they would
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense.
Trial Court upheld this and quashed the
complaint. They stated that both complaints
must be deemed one continuous offense
because the defendants and offenses in both
complaints were the same.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense."
ISSUE:
WON Trial Court erred in quashing the
second complaint of adultery because of double
jeopardy
HELD:
YES. Adultery is a crime of result and not of
tendency. Each time you have sex constitutes a
crime of adultery. The two parties may be the
same, but this does not argue against the
commission of the crime.
There is no constitutional or legal provision
that bars the filing of as many complaints for
adultery as there were adulterous acts
committed, each constituting one crime.
Two reasons why there is no double
jeopardy in this case:
1) A continuous crime exists if there is unity of
criminal intent or purpose. In this case this
does not apply. Basically, the times they
had sex after the filing of the first complaint
are separate and distinct crimes.
2) Another reason why there was no double
jeopardy in this case is because after the
first complaint, Bondoc does not have the
defense that he did know the wife was
married anymore. If this were double
jeopardy and the second complaint
quashed, Bondoc would go unpunished.
Poblador
80
332
Muoz v. Del Barrio

Felix, J.
PETITIONER APPELLANT:
Felicidad Munoz
RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE: Jose Del Barrio
FACTS:
Felicidad Munoz and Jose del Barrio were
married civilly in 1942 and canonically later that
same year. They lived together and had two
children, Felix Luis Del Barrio(11) and Maria
Teresa Del Barrio(9). During their married life,
they had frequent quarrels wherein Jose
maltreated Felicidad. Felicidad was unable to
take the abuse and they ended up separating.
Notwithstanding such separation, the wife
claimed that her husband maltreated her in
several more occasions (Dec. 1950 or Jan. 1951
and September 1951). She filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan and alleged
that their marriage was governed by the system
of conjugal partnership and no property was
acquired during the marriage except for one
portion of land. She prayed for legal separation,
custody of their children, support of respondent
for their children, and for the conjugal property
to pay for the costs of this case.
Respondent denied petitioner's accusations.
The court tried to for them to reconcile,
pursuant to Art. 98 CC but failed. The Court
proceeded to try the case and the plaintiff
presented witnesses testify:
(1) Jovita Faustino (a tenant of the apartment
owned by her father who witnessed their
fights)
(2) Felix Munoz (her father)
(3) Faustino Mallari (patrolman who was called
to intervene in a fight and saw evidence of
scratches and ecchymosis on the appellant)
(4) Atty. Manuel Macias (stopped respondent
when he boxed his wife and twisted her
neck in a quarrel)
The Court however, dismissed the petition
for lack of merit.
Art. 98. In every case the court must take
steps, before granting the legal separation,
toward the reconciliation of the spouses, and
must be fully satisfied that such reconciliation is
highly improbable.
Petitioner appealed the said judgment.
ISSUES:
Whether the maltreatments that the
appellant suffered at the hands of the
respondent after their separation of dwelling,
which allegedly occurred in Dec. 1950 or Jan.
1951 and September 1951, furnish ground for
legal separation applied for under Art. 97(2) CC. > NO
HELD:
Decision appealed from is affirmed.
RATIO:
In the case at hand, we only look at the
alleged maltreatments that occurred after the
separation as the ones previous couldn't have
amounted to attempts on the life of the wife
because she didn't institute any action for legal
separation then.
Art. 97 NCC states that:
A petition for legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife
and for concubinage on the part of the
husband as defined in the Penal Code; or
(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life
of the other.
An attempt on the life of another requires
the intention to kill. Without proof of such, a
person cannot be convicted of attempted or
frustrated murder. According to RPC 2nd Ed.
Bk. 2 part 1 of Dean Francisco, "it is absolutely
necessary that the homicidal intent be
evidenced by adequate acts to produce the
death of the victim."
We see here that the respondent only
used are his bare fists at most and desisted
from giving further chastisement after the
first blows were given at the spur of the
impulse.
**The Court points out that this being a civil
case, only preponderance of evidence is
necessary, however, the petitioner should
have filed a case against her husband for
attempted parricide and have him prosecuted
Quiambao
81
332
Muoz v. Del Barrio

Felix, J.
as a means of establishing her right to secure
legal separation that she applied for in this
case.
**note: In the present case, it is the CC that is
applied. In relation to this however, I think

that the result would've been different had it
been tried using the FC Art. 55(1)
Quiambao
82
332
Gandionco v. Pearanda
PETITIONER: Froilan Gandionco
RESPONDENT: Hon. Seven Penaranda and Teresita Gandionco
This is a special civil action for certiorari, with
application for injunction, to annul the Order of
the respondent Judge ordering Froilan to pay
support pendente lite to Teresita and their
child, and the Order of the same respondent
Judge, dated 5 August 1987, denying
petitioner's motion to suspend hearings in the
action for legal separation filed against him by
private respondent as well as his motion to
inhibit respondent Judge from further hearing
and trying the case.
FACTS:
29 May 1986: Teresita filed with the RTC of
Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, presided
over by respondent Judge, a complaint against
petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage.
13 October 1986: Teresita also filed a
criminal case to the MTC of General Santos City,
a complaint against petitioner for concubinage.
Froilan claims that the civil action for legal
separation and the application for support
pendente lite, should be suspended in view of
the criminal case for concubinage filed against
him the private respondent
He cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure:
- SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from
offenses. Whenever the offended
party shall have instituted the civil
action to enforce the civil liability
arising
from
the
offense.
as
contemplated in the first Section 1
hereof, the following rules shall be
observed: (a) After a criminal action has
been commenced the pending civil
action arising from the same offense
shall be suspended, in whatever stage it
may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been
rendered.
ISSUE:
WON the criminal case for concubinage

should be settled before the civil case for legal
separation can proceed
HELD: NOPE
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, a civil action for legal separation,
based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of,
or simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not one
"to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense" even if both the civil and criminal
actions arise from or are related to the same
offense
Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it
refers to civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged.
Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply
referred to "Civil action arising from the
offense."
- Sec. 1 of Rule 107:
Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising
from offenses.-Except as otherwise
provided by law, the following rules shall
he observed:
(c) After a criminal action has been
commenced, no civil action arising from
the same offense can be prosecuted
and the same shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found until
final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered.
This action for legal separation is not to
recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at
the conjugal rights of the spouses and their
relations to each other
Froilan says that his conviction for
concubinage will have to be first secured before
the action for legal separation can prosper or
succeed
- Court says that his assumption is
erroneous
A decree of legal separation, on the ground
of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for
Quilala
83
332
Gandionco v. Pearanda
legal separation. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary. DISMISSED
Quilala
84
332
Lapuz v. Eufemio
FACTS:
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for
legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio
(married civilly and canonically) from 1934 to
1943 until her husband abandoned her. They
had no child; however, acquired properties
during their marriage.
She discovered her husband cohabiting with
a Chinese woman named Go Hiok.
She prayed for an issuance for a decree of
legal separation. (Also, that the defendant
Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his
share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio S. Eufemio counter-claimed for the
declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage
with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy on the ground of his
prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok.
Trial commenced but before it could be
completed, Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular
accident.
Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for
legal separation" on two (2) grounds
- Petition for legal separation was filed
beyond the one-year period provided
for in Article 102 of the Civil Code
- Death of Carmen abated the action for
legal separation
Counsel for petitioner substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario
Lapuz. Eufemio opposed the motion.
Court dismissed the case. Plaintiffs cause of
action did not survive.
Eufemio acquiesced with the dismissal of
his counterclaims by praying for the affirmance
of the order that dismissed not only the
petition for legal separation but also his
counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz
marriage to be null and void ab initio.
ISSUE:
MAIN - WON the death of the plaintiff
before a final decree in an action for legal
separation abates the action
SUB(?) - WON it will also apply if the action
involved property rights
HELD:
An action for legal separation which
involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses is purely personal. It
is recognized in Article 100 of the Civil Code
where only the innocent spouse has the right
to claim for legal separation. On the other
hand, Article 108 provides the spouses to stop
or abate the proceedings and even rescind a
decree of legal separation already rendered
through reconciliation. Since it is personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party
to the action causes the death of the action
itself
- Death has settled the question of
separation beyond all controversy and
deprived the court of jurisdiction
Further, an action for legal separation is
abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved. These rights are
mere effects of decree of separation, their
source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into
existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical
and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would
necessarily
remain
unborn.
Ramos
85
332
Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz

Castro, J.
PLAINTIFF:
Estrella de la Cruz
DEFENDANT: Severino de la Cruz
FACTS
The parties were married and had six
children. After more or less 20 years of
marriage, the
plaintiff filed a case alleging that the
defendant had abandoned her as well as
mismanaging their conjugal partnership
properties (in the form of several successful
business ventures), praying for 1) separation of
property, 2) monthly support of P2500 during
the pendency of the action and 3) payment of
P20,000 as attorneys fees.
Her reasoning was that the defendant
stopped residing in their conjugal home in
Bacolod City and instead started living in Manila
and denied communications with her. Plaintiff
was also alleging that based on unsigned notes
she found, that the defendant was having illicit
liaisons with another woman. She fears that the
defendant will squander their conjugal assets
on this alleged mistress. Plaintiff also alleges
that defendant had abused his powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership for
his failure to inform the plaintiff the state of
their business enterprises.
For the defendants part, he vehemently
denied the accusation of having a mistress and
that the reason he lived separately was because
he could not concentrate with work at their
conjugal home because of the plaintiffs
quarrelsome nature. He asserts that instead of
mismanaging their conjugal partnership
property, he has successfully expanded through
his own hard work and diligence. He also alleges
that he had never abandoned the family. In
fact, he had been giving the plaintiff P500
monthly support, allowances for their children
ranging from P1200- P1500 a month, as well as
financing their education.
ISSUE
WON the defendant abandoned his family
and abused his powers of administration,
making it grounds for legal separation of the
conjugal partnership properties.
HELD
NO. The Court held that the defendant is
not guilty of abandonment of his wife nor abuse
of his administrative powers. To entitle the
plaintiff to any of the remedies she asks for,
under article 178, there must be real
abandonment, and not mere separation. The
abandonment must not only be physical
estrangement but also amount to financial and
moral desertion. The Court believes that the
defendant did not intend to leave his family
permanently. The facts show that he continued
to give support in his absence, thus he was not
guilty of abandonment as it was held in People
v Schelske where abandonment meant an act of
separation with intent that it shall be perpetual,
since contributing to their support negatived
such intent.
The Court also believed that there was
insufficient evidence to prove that the
defendant had married and was living with a
concubine.
The Court believed that the defendants
refusal to inform the plaintiff of the progress
and status of their family businesses does not
constitute abuse. Abuse connotes willful and
utter disregard of the interest of the
partnership, evidenced by a repetition of
deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to
the latter, which is not the case for the
defendant.
Courts must need exercise judicial restraint
and reasoned hesitance in ordering a separation
of conjugal properties because the basic policy
of the law is homiletic, to promote healthy
family life and to preserve the union of the
spouses, in person, in spirit and in property.
Consistent with its policy of discouraging a
regime of separation as not in harmony with
the unity of the family and the mutual affection
and help expected of the spouses, the Civil
Code (both old and new) requires that
separation of property shall not prevail unless
expressly stipulated in marriage settlements
before the union is solemnized or by formal
judicial decree during the existence of the
Reposar
86
332

Castro, J.
marriage (Article 190, new Civil Code, Article
1432, old Civil Code): and in the latter case, it
may only be ordered by the court for causes
specified in Article 191 of the new Civil Code.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance
is reversed and set aside. Conformably to our
observations, however, the defendant is
ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in the concept of
support, the amount of P3,000 per month, until

he shall have rejoined her in the conjugal home,
which amount may, in the meantime, be
reduced or increased in the discretion of the
court a quo as circumstances warrant. The
award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff is
reduced to P10,000, without interest.
Reposar
87
332
Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong

G.R. No. 153206 ll Oct. 23, 2006 ll Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong
and Lucita G. Ong were married on July 13,
1975. They have 3 children: Kingston,
Charleston, and Princeton who are now all the
age of majority.
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint
for Legal Separation under Art 55 par 1 of the
Family Code, alleging that her life with William
was marked by physical violence, threats,
intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.
RTC granted prayer for legal separation. CA
upheld RTCs decision when herein petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The
climax of the couples drama was on December
14, 1995 when the respondent asked petitioner
to bring Kingston, their son, back from Bacolod
which turned into a violent quarrel with the
petitioner hitting the respondent on the head,
left cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately
pointing a gun at respondents head asking her
to leave the conjugal house.

ISSUE:
WON CA erred in upholding the RTCs
decision granting legal separation to Lucita
when she herself has given ground for legal
separation when abandoned her family.
HELD:
No. It is true that a decree of legal
separation should not be granted when both
parties have given ground for legal separation
(Art 56 (4) FC). However, the abandonment
referred to in the Family Code is abandonment
without justifiable cause for more than one
year. Also, it was established that Lucita left
William due to his abusive conduct which does
not constitute the abandonment contemplated
in the said provision.
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Reyes, G.
88
332
People v. Sensano
G.R. No. 37720 ll Mar. 7, 1933
FACTS:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura

were married on April 29, 1919.
After the birth of their only child,
Mariano left them to go to Cagayan for
3 years without any letter or support
even if his wife is actually poor,
illiterate, and without any relatives to
contact for help.
During that period, Ursula met Marcelo
Ramos who took her and her child with
him.
Mariano returned in 1924 and
subsequently charged his wife and
Marcelo of adultery.
o They were sentenced to 4 months
and 1 day of arresto mayor.
Ursula, after completing her sentence,
begged his husband for forgiveness.
o He refused to pardon her and told
her that she could go where she
wished.
o She then went back to Marcelo and
lived with him once more. (still in
1924)
o Mariano did not assert his rights as a
husband, and even went to Hawaii
where he stayed for 7 years
completely abandoning his family.
Upon Marianos return to PH, he again
charged his wife and her paramour of
adultery to obtain a divorce under Act
No. 2710.
ISSUE:
WON Mariano can file charges of

adultery for the second time despite the
fact that he seemingly consented with

his wifes actions.
HELD:
NO.
The husband was assuming a mere pose
when he signed the complaint as the
offended spouse.
Based on the evidence and his conduct,
he CONSENTED to the adulterous
relations of his wife and her lover;
therefore he is unauthorized to institute
the criminal proceeding.
o Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code, paragraphs 1 and 2, are as
follows:
"Prosecution of the crimes of
adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness. The crimes of
adultery and concubinage shall not
be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended
spouse.
"The offended party cannot
institute
criminal
prosecution
without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor,
in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the
offenders."
No merit in the argument which states that

it was impossible for the husband to take
any action against the accused during the
said seven years.
Reyes, N.
89
332
Ocampo v. Florenciano
FACTS:
Jose De Ocampo was married to Serafina
Florenciano in 1938.
After several years of marriage, Jose
learned of Serafinas illicit relations with many
men, including a Jose Arcalas. He then sent her
to Manila as student of Beauty Culture.
Until in 1955, after having been
abandoned by Serafina, Luis caught her in the
act of having illicit relations with one Nelson
Orzame.
Thereafter, he filed a petition for legal
separation on the ground of adultery.
Serafina did not answer the suit and
when interviewed by the fiscal, (Art. 101
NCC) she admitted to having sexual relations
with several men.
Believing there was confession of
judgment on the part of Serafina, condonation
or consent to the adultery and prescription,
since it was in 1951 when Luis learned of the
illicit relations but only filed the case in 1955,
the court of first instance of Nueva Ecija and the
Court of Appeals dismissed the case on the
grounds of Article 101 of the NCC.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court?
HELD: Yes.
NOTE: the case deals with the adultery of
the wife with Orzame (1955), as the adultery
committed by her with Arcalas (1951) has
prescribed when this case was filed in 1955,
4 years too late. (Art 102 NCC)
Condonation and Consent

Plaintiffs failure to actively search for
defendant and take her home constituted
condonation or consent to her adulterous
relations since it was not his duty to search
for her to bring her home. Hers was the
obligation to return.
Confession of Judgement.
The trial court erred in the interpretation
of Aritcle 101 of the New Civil Code. As we
(SC) understand the article, it does not
exclude, as evidence, any admission or
confession made by the defendant outside of
the court. It merely prohibits a decree of
separation upon a confession of judgment.
Confession of judgment usually happens when
the defendant appears in court and confesses
the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a
pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's
demand what the law prohibits is a judgment
based exclusively or mainly on defendant's
confession. If a confession defeats the action
ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the
separation will immediately confess judgment,
purposely to prevent it.
Moreover, when the court learned that
the defendant equally desires the separation
and admitted the commission of the offense,
it should be doubly careful lest a collusion
exists.
Griffiths v Griffiths,
Collusion - the agreement between
husband and wife for one of them to commit or
to appear to commit, or to be represented in
court as having committed, a matrimonial
offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid
defence, for the purpose of enabling the other
to obtain a divorce.
Roa
90
332
Sargent v. Sargent
COMPLAINT:
Donald Sargent is filing for divorce with
Frances Sargent because of an allegation of
adultery.
RULING: No adultery took place.
FACTS:
Donald and Frances Sargent are married
since September 22, 1909. Donald filed a
petition charging Frances of committing
adultery (1) on various days in November
1917 with an unknown man; (2) at an
unknown time and place where she contracted
gonorrhea; (3) based on her relationship with
Charles Simmons. In order to prove the
occurrence of adultery, he did not come home
on two occasions and facilitated a scenario
framing Frances committing adulterous acts
with Charles. Donald gathered the help of
servants in his household to provide
testimonies of Frances alleged adulterous acts
such as:
[Ida Lewis] that Frances discussed the
issue of the possibility of interracial
marriage (which was considered against
morals at that time)
[Charlotte Lunford] that Charles is
always at Frances room, sometimes even
going there three times a day.
[Viola Jones] that Frances and Charles
drink and laugh together from time to time
[Mack Jetter] that Frances invited
Charles to her room dressed in her
nightgown, pulling Charles toward her.
Donald also hired detectives Tienken and
Wilsdon to listen to the conversations between
Frances and Charles through a dictograph which
both claim that Frances called Charles as
Dearie.
(Not surprisingly), Frances and Charles
denied the allegation. The court expressed its

disbelief of the story presented by Donald and
his witnesses because of the sources it came
from, specifically, all of the witnesses Donald
presented were under his payroll. Furthermore,
the court said:
To accept such a story would be to say that
every woman in her home is at the mercy of
servants who, for pay or to satisfy a grudge,
might relate a tale which only their mistress and
the alleged correspondent could deny.
ISSUE: (from the doubt of the judge)
WON Donald connived with his employees
and hired detectives to set-up Frances alleged
adultery
HELD:
Yes. The court felt that most of the
testimonies were inconclusive of the allegations
of adultery and
even
found
some
contradictions in the stories presented such
as whether at the time they allegedly caught
Frances and Charles committing to adultery,
the door was locked (according to Charlotte)
or half-open (according to the detectives).
There were also peculiarities that the court
cannot resolve such as why the witnesses
waited for 2 hours and 20 minutes for
adultery to occur and not find any conclusive
evidence that such event transpired. Finally, the
court posed the question, if there was any
doubt as to the fidelity of Frances, why did
Donald create a possibility of Frances being in
contact with Charles? Donald did not do
anything to protect her wife from Charles
alleged evil influence. Donald, instead,
orchestrated a scenario to make it more likely
for Frances to commit adulterous acts;
solidifying the fact that Charles did connive with
his employees to frame Frances of adultery.
Sevilla
91
332
Brown v. Yambao
FACTS:
1955 Brown filed for legal separation from
his wife Yambao due to adultery while he was in
the internment camp during the Japanese
invasion his wife had a baby with another man,
which he learned on 1945 upon his release. The
wife failed to answer and was held in default.
The City Fiscal conducted an investigation and
found that Brown also lived martially with
another woman and had a child with her after
his release.
ISSUE:
WON prosecuting officer is limited to
finding out if there is collusion
HELD: NO
RATIO:
Court held that according to CC ART. 100.
The legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation or of consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, legal separation cannot be claimed
by either of them. Collusion between the
parties to obtain legal separation shall cause
the dismissal of the petition.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil

Code, calling for the intervention of the state
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings
for legal separation (and of annulment of
marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize
that marriage is more than a mere contract;
that it is a social institution in which the state is
vitally interested, so that its continuation or
interruption cannot be made depend upon the
parties themselves CC 52. It is consonant with
this policy that the injury by the Fiscal should be
allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that
may indicate whether the proceedings for
separation or annulment are fully justified or
not.
OBITER:
Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for
legal separation cannot be filed except within
one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became
cognizant of the cause and within five years
from and after the date when such cause
occurred.
In this case, Brown only filed for legal
separation after 10 years of knowing about
Yambaos infidelity therefore action for legal
separation on the basis of her infidelity has
prescribed.
Tan de Guzman
92
332
Bugayong v. Ginez
G.R. No. L-10033 ll Dec. 28, 1956
PETITION:
Petition for appeal of the dismissal of the
CA on the legal separation case of the
petitioner, on the grounds of adultery
ISSUE:
WON the act of sleeping with his wife
constitutes condonation of the act of adultery,
thus being a valid defense for legal separation
FACTS:
Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy,
married Ginez on 1949
After some time, when husband went
back to the US again, he began receiving
letters from Valeriana Polangco, his sisterin-law, and some anonymous writers,
alleging acts of infidelity of his wife (1951)
A letter from his wife, which he said that he
destroyed, said that a certain 'Eliong' kissed her
(1952) he went to Pangasinan and stayed
with his wife for 2 nights & 1 day
He tried to verify from his wife the
veracity of the info, but she just packed
hear things and left.
Despite the answer, he kept on looking
for her, and upon failing to do so, went to
igloos Norte "to soothe his wounded
feelings"
(1952) husband filed a case of legal
separation at the CFI of Pangasinan, but was
dismissed on the issue of condonation of
husband of the acts of the wife
HELD:
YES it is an act of condonation
Defined as the forgiveness of a marital
offense constituting a ground for legal
separation;
conditional
forgiveness
or
remission of a matrimonial offense
We are assuming that plaintiff's line
of conduct that he really believed his
wife guilty of adultery, as the issue on
the letters are not on question
According to American jurisprudence, any
cohabitation with the guilty party, after the
commission of the offense, and the
knowledge of such by the injured party, will
amount
to
conclusive
evidence
of
condonation, but this presumption may be
rebutted by evidence.
Even a singular voluntary act of marital
intercourse between the parties ordinarily is
sufficient to constitute condonation, and if they
lived in the same house, it is presumed that
they live on matrimonial cohabitation
Art. 100 of the civil code states that legal
separation may be claimed by the innocent
spouse provided that there had been no
condonation or consent.
Tiangco
93
332
Matubis v. Praxedes
Oct. 25, 1960 ll Paredes, J.
Plaintiff-Appellant: Socorro Matubis
Defendant-Appellee: Zoilo Praxedes
DOCTRINE:
Consent: Under Article 100 of the Civil
Code, legal separation may be claimed only by
the innocent spouse, provided that there is no
condonation of the adultery or concubinage.
This condonation may be express or implied;
Prescription: Under Article 102 of the new Civil
Code, an action for legal separation cannot be
filed except within one year from and after the
date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of
the cause.
NATURE OF PETITION:
Plaintiff-appellant appealed from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur dismissing her complaint for
legal separation and change of surname based
on the alleged abandonment and concubinage
of the defendant-appellee. Her reasons for the
appeal are: (1) the lower Court erred in having
considered that the period to bring action had
already elapsed, and (2) that there was consent
on the part of the plaintiff to the concubinage.
FACTS:
In January 1943, Socorro Matibus (plaintiff)
and Zoilo Praxedes (defendant) legally married
at Iriga, Camarines Sur.
In May 1944, the couple agreed to live from
each other because they could not agree on
how to live as husband and wife.
In April 1948, plaintiff and defendant
entered into an agreement, with the significant
portion (to the case) provided below:
(b) That both without any interference
by any of us, nor either of us can
prosecute the other for adultery or
concubinage or any other crime or suit
arising from our separation.
In January 1955, defendant began
cohabiting with Asuncion Rebulado and they
deported themselves as husband and wife. In
September of the same year, their common
child was born.

In April 1956, plaintiff filed for the
complaint for legal separation and change of
surname against the defendant. After the trial
in the lower court, without the defendant
presenting any evidence, the latter rendered
that the actions of the defendant did constitute
concubinage; however, they had to dismiss the
petition based on Articles 102 and 100 of the
new Civil Code (discussed under nature of
petition):
(1) The plaintiff became aware of the illegal
cohabitation of her husband with Asuncion
Rebulado in January, 1955. The complaint
was filed on April 24, 1956. The present
action was, therefore, filed out of time and
for that reason action is barred.
(2) The plaintiff has consented to the
commission of concubinage by her
husband. Her consent is clear from the
aforementioned portion of the agreement
(b). Having consented to the concubinage,
the plaintiff cannot claim legal separation.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the lower Court erred in having
considered that the period to bring action
had already elapsed. NO.
(2) WON there was consent on the part of the
plaintiff to the concubinage. YES.
RATIO:
(1) Based on their interpretation by the
Court of Article 102 of the new Civil
Code, the complaint was indeed filed
outside the periods provided for in the
Article. By the very admission of
plaintiff, she came to know the
concubinage in January, 1955, but she
only instituted the complaint only on
April 24, 1956.
(2) Condonation and consent on the part of
plaintiff are necessarily the quoted
Yumol
94
332
Matubis v. Praxedes
Oct. 25, 1960 ll Paredes, J.
paragraph of the agreement. The
condonation and consent here are not
only implied but expressed.
As a matter of fact, the counsel of the
plaintiff does agree with the courts decision
that the complaint should be dismissed;
however, it does not agree that it should be
dismissed based on the grounds laid out by the
lower Court. They argue that it should be based
on the fact that the couple have already been
living legally separately from each other long

before the effectivity of the new Civil Code. The
Court cannot subscribe to this contention
because it is contrary to the law.
Conformably with the foregoing, we find that
the decision appealed from is in accordance
with the evidence and the law on the matter.
The same is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Yumol
95
332
Contreras v. Macaraig
Petitioner: Elena Contreras
Respondent: Cesar Macaraig
FACTS:
Contreras and Macaraig were married in
1952, and had three children.
1958: couple acquired rights, as lessee and
purchaser under a conditional sale agreement,
to own a house and lot in Philamlife Homes in
QC, where they transferred. Installments paid
by wifes father. Spouses own no other conjugal
property.
Shortly before 1961 election: Macaraig,
manager
of
wifes
fathers
printing
establishment MICO offset, met Lily Ann Alcala,
who places orders with said company for
progpaganda materials for Sergio Osmena, vicepresidential candidate; after elections, husband
resigned from MICO offset to be a special agent
at Malacanang. He began to be away from
home often and to come home very late; when
wife asked why, husband explained busy with
series of confidential missions.
Sept 1962: Avelino Lubos, family driver, told
wife that husband was living in singalong with
Lily Ann Alcala.
Oct 1962: upon husbands return to
conjugal home, wife refrained from verifying
Lubos report in her desire not to anger/drive
husband away.
April 1963: wife heard rumors husband was
seen with a woman on dasmarinas st
May 1963: wife desisted from discussing
matter with husband; did not want to
precipitate quarrel
Husband would come home for a few days;
would be gone for about a month
After receiving reports that Lily Ann Alcala
had given birth to baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima
Antioquia, her fathers employee, to verify the
reports. Family drove Antioquia to the singalong
house where she saw husband carrying a baby
in his arms. She went to the Singalong parish
priest and inquired about the child of Cesar
Macaraig and Lily Ann Alcala, and was given a
copy of the baptismal certificate of Maria Vivien
Mageline Macaraig which she gave to wife in
Oct, 1963.
Wife asked father-in-law to intercede. Mr

Macaraig, after talking to his son and seeing
him with the new baby, told wife he could not
do anything.
Nov. 1963: wife asked cooperation of older
sister of husband, who obliged and arranged a
meeting at her home in Buendia between wife
and Lily Ann. Lily Ann said she was willing to
give up husband as she had no desire to be
accused criminally but it was husband who
refused to break relationship with her
Dec 1963: wife filed for legal separation
Husband never answered case; fiscal sent
and found no collusion; wife allowed to present
evidence
Lower court dismissed complaint:
In respect of concubinage: cognizant may
not connote date when proof sufficient to
establish cause is possessed, rendering law
meaningless as all wife would have to do would
be to claim that necessary proof was secured
only within a year before filing of complaint.
Hard to concede law envisages/encourages
filing of complaint within one year after
innocent spouse receives information of others
infidelity, however baseless the report
Lower court believes the correct rule lies
between the two extremes
At the time wife acquired information
which can be reasonably relied upon as true
that her husband is living in concubinage with
another woman, one-year period deemed to
have started even if wife shall not then be in
possession of sufficient proof to establish
concubinage before court of law; one-year
proof: allotted time for securing proof
After husband resigned from MICO offset to
be special agent in Malacanang, he would
seldom come home, claiming confidential
missions as an excuse. But Sept 1962, drivers
testimony reported him to be living with Lily
Ann, and it was driver who brought Antioquia to
house in Singalong where she saw husband, Lily
Ann and baby
Alampay
96
332
Contreras v. Macaraig
Requirement of law on one-year period
after cognizance by plaintiff of cause is not of
prescriptive nature, but is of essence of the
cause of action, based on principle of marriage
as an inviolable social institution
Lower court has to find wife became
cognizant of husbands infidelity in Sept. 1962;
wife made attempts to induce husband to
amend his erring ways but failed; her desire to
bring him back to connubial fold and preserve
family solidarity deterred her from taking timely
legal action
ISSUES:
Whether one-year period from timely legal
action pursuant to Art. 102 of the Civil Code
should be counted from Sept 1962 (drivers
report) or from Dec. 1963 (filing for complaint)
RULING:
SC set aside appealed decision and hold
wife entitled to legal separation, remanding
case to lower court for appropriate
proceedings.
five years from after date when such cause
occurred is not involved
Sept 1962: wife had knowledge of
husbands infidelity based solely on family
driver; she thought it best not to go deeper into
the matter in the hopes, notwithstanding
husbands obvious neglect, that he would
return; when her husband did return in
October, she refrained from bringing up the
matter of marital infidelity
1963: failure of wife to act on rumors

likewise due to her joy at husbands return,
again desisted from discussing matter wife
made brave attempts to persuade husband to
return (asking help from father-in-law to
intercede, and cooperation of defendants older
sister)
Supreme Court rules that in the eyes of the
law, wife really became cognizant of infidelity of
her husband in early Dec 1963 when the
following happened (as quoted from appealed
decision):
Wife, in early Dec 1963, accompanied by
two children and Mrs Lagronio went to talk to
husband at his work place. They repaired to
Victoria peak, a nearby restaurant, where wife
pleaded husband to give up Lily Ann and return
to conjugal home, assuring him she was willing
to forgive him. Husband informed wife he could
no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return
to his legitimate family.
From the forgoing, Supreme Court
concludes that it was only on the occasion
mentioned in the preceding paragraph when
husband admitted to her that he was living with
and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to
his legitimate family, that appellant must be
deemed to be under obligation to decide
whether to sue or not to sue for legal
separation, and it was only then that the legal
period of one year must be to have
commenced.
Alampay
97
332
Somosa Ramos v. Vamenta

Jul. 29, 1972 ll Paredes, J.
FACTS:
June 18, 1971 - Lucy Somosa-Ramos filed a
civil case for legal separation on grounds of
concubinage and an attempt to her life by the
respondent Clemente Ramos. She also sought
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
for the return to her of what she claimed to be
her paraphernal and exclusive property
[managed by Clemente].
July 1971 husband countered this by
invoking Art. 103 of the Civil Code which
prohibits the hearing of an action for legal
separation before the lapse of six months from
filing of the petition
Aug 4, 1971 respondent Judge Cipriano
Vamenat, Jr granted the motion of Clemente
Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
sought by his wife Lucy.
ISSUE:
WON Article 103 of the Civil Code
prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal
separation before the lapse of six months from
the filing of the petition, would likewise
preclude the court from acting on a motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as
an ancillary remedy to such a suit
HELD:
NO. Art 103* is not an absolute bar to the
hearing of motion for preliminary injunction
prior to the expiration of the six-month period.
SC reversed respondent Judges suspension of
petition for writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.
Art. 104* eases the absolute limitation from
which the court suffers under Art. 103. The
court said that by reading Art 104 in relation to
Art 103, there appears to be recognition that
the question of management of their respective
property need not be left unresolved even
during such six-month period. Thus, the parties
may be heard even w/o waiting for the lapse of
the six-month period. Citing Araneta v
Conception: XXX But this practical expedient
[six-month delay period for hearing], necessary

to carry out legislative policy, does not have the
effect of overriding other provisions such as the
determination of the custody of the children
and alimony and support pendente lite
according to the circumstance ...The law
expressly enjoins that these should be
determined by the court according to the
circumstances. If these are ignored or the
courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank
injustice may be caused."
Also, from Aug. 4 1971 to July 29, 1972
[date of SC decision], six months have already
lapsed thus no impediment for lower court to
act on the motion of the petitioner [moot and
academic na ang case?]
Rationale behind Art 103:
Special nature of suit for legal separation: it
is relationship w/c the law attaches the
QUALITY OF PERMANENCE
Cooling off period: recital of grievances
against each other in court may fan their
inflamed passions against one another
*Art. 103 CC [Art. 58, FC]
An action for legal separation shall in no case be
tried before six months shall have elapsed since
the filing of the petition
*Article 104 CC [Art. 61, FC]
After the filing of the petition for legal
separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live
separately from each other and manage their
respective property.
The husband shall continue to manage the
conjugal partnership property but if the court
deems it proper, it may appoint another to
manage said property, in which case the
administrator shall have the same rights and
duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to
dispose of the income or of the capital except in
accordance with the orders of the court.
Bayona
98
332
De La Via v. Villareal
G.R. No. L- 13982 ll Jul. 31, 1920 ll Johnson, J.
PETITIONER:
Diego De La Vina
RESPONDENTS: Judge Antonio Villareal and Narcisa Geopano
FACTS:
Narcissa Geopan filed a complaint of
divorce in RTC Iloilo against her husband, Diego
de la Vina, on the ground of concubinage. Due
to said illicit relationship between her husband
and one Ana Calog, she was ejected from the
conjugal home in Guijulngan, Negros
Occidental, and thereafter forced to establish
her habitual residence in the city of Iloilo, with
no means to support herself other than through
the expense of one of her daughters. Thus, she
prayed for a decree of divorce, partition of
conjugal property, and alimony pendente. After
filing the complaint, she presented a motion for
preliminary injunction to restrain her husband,
who was the sole administrator of their
conjugal property, from alienating or
encumbering the same. Respondent Judge
Villareal granted the motion, prompting the
husband to file this present case of petition for
certiorari on the ground that the judge had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action and
that exceeded his power and authority in
issuing the preliminary injunction.
ISSUES:
WON the wife validly acquired a residence
or domicile separate from that of her husband
during the subsistence of their marriage
WON in an action for divorce, where
conjugal property is concerned, a preliminary
injunction may be ISSUEd to restrain a spouse
from alienating/encumbering conjugal property
during the pendency of the action
RULING: Petition is denied.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
YES. The general rule that the domicile of
the wife follows that of the husband is not an
absolute rule. Here, De La Vina unlawfully
ejected Geopano from the conjugal home to
have illicit relations with another woman, giving
Geopano more than enough justification to
establish her domicile elsewhere, lest her
continued cohabitation give the impression of
condonation to said illicit affairs. It is well
established in various jurisprudence that the
wife may acquire a separate residence where
the husband has given cause for divorce, which
in this case, is De La Vinas having committed
concubinage. Having established this, it follows
that the Geopano could file the case of divorce
to the RTC of Iloilo, instead of the RTC that has
jurisdiction over De La Vinas residence, which
the latter insisted and which the court rejected.
Yes. While the law grants the husband the
power to solely administer the conjugal
property without the consent of the wife, this
legal maxim only holds true as long as a
harmonious relationship between them exists.
When such relation ceases, the husbands
powers of administration should be curtailed
during the pendency of action to protect the
interests of the wife. The preliminary injunction
prayed for by Geopano is well within
paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 164 of Act No.
190, and thus, the RTC judge didnt commit any
breach of jurisdiction in granting the same.
Cadorna
99
332
Reyes v. Ines - Luciano

G.R. No. L- 48219 ll Feb. 28, 1979 ll Johnson, J.
PETITIONER:
MANUEL J. C. REYES,
RESPONDENTS: HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court,
Quezon City, COURT OF APPEALS and CELIA ILUSTRE-REYES,.
FACTS
Celia filed for legal separation against her
husband Manuel due to his attempts to her life
cited in 2 instances:
1) On Mar. 10, 1976, Manuel pummeled her
with fist blows that floored her, then held
her head and, with intent to kill, bumped it
several times against the cement floor.
When she ran upstairs to her father for
protection, he pushed her at the stairway
of flights and she fell sliding to the ground
floor. Determined to finish her off, he
again gave her a strong swing at her
abdomen which floored her half
unconscious. Were it not for plaintiff's
father, he would have succeeded killing
her;
2) On May 26, 1976, she went to their house
to get her overnight bag. Upon seeing her,
defendant yelled at her to get out. When
she did not mind him, he suddenly doused
her with a glass of grape juice, kicked her
several times that landed at her back and
nape, and was going to hit her with a steel
tray as her driver, Ricardo Mancera, came
due to her screams for help. For fear of
further injury and for life, she rushed to
Precinct 5 at United Nations Avenue,
Manila Metropolitan Police, for assistance
and protection.
Celia asked for support pendente lite for
her and her three children but Manuel
opposed this, alleging adultery on the part of
Celia. Respondent judge granted P5,000 which
was reduced to P4,000 because the children
are in the custody of the husband upon motion
for reconsideration of Manuel. Manuel filed for

certiorari at the CA but the CA affirmed the
RTC. Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
WON alimony pendente lite should be
granted to the wife while the legal separation
case is pending given that there is an allegation
of adultery on her part?
HELD & RD
YES. The Court denied the petition of the
husband and affirmed the Court of Appeals
decision with modification granting the
support pendente lite at the rate of P4,000 a
month.
Court held that while adultery is a defense in
an action for support, the alleged adultery
must be established by competent evidence.
During the hearing, Manuel did not present
any evidence to prove the allegation. The
adultery may still be proved in the hearing of
the legal separation.
In determining the amount, it is not
necessary to go to the full merits of the case. It
is sufficient that the court ascertain the kind
and amount of evidence which it may deem
sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the
application, in view of the provisional character
of the resolution.
It was also noted that Celia was not asking
for support from the husbands personal funds
but from the conjugal property of which
Manuel is the president, manager and
treasurer. It is also cited that the husband can
afford the support given that they have various
corporations.
Cristobal
100 332
Baez v. Baez
G.R. No. 132592 & 133628 ll Jan. 23, 2002
PETITIONER: AIDA P. BAEZ
RESPONDENT: GABRIEL B. BAEZ
FACTS:
On September 23, 1996, Cebu RTC made
the following decisions:
The legal separation of Aida Baez and
Gabriel Baez on the ground husbands
sexual infidelity
The dissolution of their conjugal property
relations and the division of the net
conjugal assets
The forfeiture of husbands one-half share
in the net conjugal assets in favor of the
common children
The payment to wifes counsel of the sum of
P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken
from her share in the net assets
The surrender by husband of the use and
possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and
the smaller residential house located at
Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to wife
and the common children within 15 days
from receipt of the decision
Aida then filed an urgent ex-parte motion to
modify the decision, specifically on the payment
attorneys fees, which was granted by the RTC.
She also filed a motion for moral and exemplary
damages, which was denied by the court, and
another motion for execution pending appeal
regarding the husbands expulsion from the
conjugal residential house and the surrender of
the Mazda vehicle, which was granted by the
court.
Gabriel elevated the case to the CA, which
set aside RTCs ruling on the execution of
judgment pending appeal of the assets and
denied Aidas motion for reconsideration, which
gave rise to the instant petitions.
ISSUES:
(1) WON execution of judgment pending
appeal was justified
(2) WON multiple appeals are allowed in an
action for legal separation
RULING:
Petitions denied for lack of merit. Affirmed
CAs decision (to set aside execution of
judgment pending appeal)
RATIO:
(1) No. Based on the courts prior ruling in the
case Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, execution
pending appeal is allowed when superior
circumstances
demanding
urgency
outweigh the damages that may result from
the issuance of the writ. In this case, court
sees that there is no superior or urgent
circumstance that outweighs the damage
which Gabriel would suffer if he were
ordered to vacate the house, as Aida has,
according to the husband, two houses and
lots in the US where she is a permanent
resident.
(2) No. Legal separation is not subject to
multiple appeals. The effects of legal
separation, such as entitlement to live
separately, dissolution and liquidation of
the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, and custody of the minor
children, follow from the decree of legal
separation. They are mere incidents of legal
separation, not separate or distinct matters
that may be resolved by the court.
Cruz
101 332
La Rue v. La Rue
May 25, 1983
APPELLANT:
APPELLEE:
Betty La Rue
Walter La Rue
FACTS:
The parties were married in 1950. The
husband exclusively handled the financial affairs
while the appellant wife worked for 7 years,
earning $51,000, and then, having been
encouraged by the husband, was a homemaker
for the rest of the marriage, raising their two
children and caring for the house.
The trial court granted their divorce in
March 1980, stating that the husbands abusive
conduct far outweighed the wifes. The divorce
order granted her alimony and health
allowance, but did not provide for the
distribution of marital assets.
She petitioned the Ohio circuit court for:
interest of all of husbands personal
property
Undivided interest of all of husbands
real property
Conveyance to her of all real & personal
property in the name of and under
husbands control
Reservation for dower interest in real
property owned by husband
The court dismissed her petition for failure
to prove the existence of a contract where their
marital assets were equally owned, or that any
of her earnings were invested in any of her
husbands properties. It did not find any ground
to establish constructive trust for the wife.
Before this said petition, she also filed a
separate suit (which she lost) concerning a
house originally named to her but signed over
to the husband around the time the marriage
began to deteriorate.
ISSUE:
WON trial court erred in ruling that wife
was not entitled to equitable distribution of
marital assets.
HELD:
Yes. The Ohio circuit courts judgment was
reversed; the case is remanded for further
consideration
Equitable distribution of marital property
began when the courts equitable powers are
applied to secure equitable rights for one
spouse in the property held by the other due to
constructive trust impressed on said property.
In Patterson v. Patterson, where the wifes
interest in property toward which she had
made a material economic contribution was
secured, constructive trust, particularly on
property acquired through joint funds or efforts
but in the name of only one spouse, is a redress
against unjust enrichment (as it is unfair to
permit the possessing spouse to keep the entire
interest where the other supposedly has a
material contribution to the acquisition of said
property). This was used as a special equity
doctrine.
South Carolina has applied this doctrine,
which is, as defined in the Burgess case, the
wife is entitled to a special equity in the
husband's property acquired during coverture
where the wife has made a material
contribution to the acquisition of the property.
The court cited cases, as well as the
situation in other states, to justify that
homemaking services may be a consideration in
the distribution of assets, while rejecting the
part in Patterson which excludes it.
Homemaking services posted a problem
since, to an extent, it is merely a part of the
traditional obligation of the husband to support
his wife upon which the theory of alimony is
based, but there has been an increasing
recognition as of late that homemaking services
is no longer viewed as a mere adjunct of the
husbands obligation.
In assessing the value of homemaking
services, the court said that it may not depend
on a mechanical formula, but that she has
contributed to the economic wellbeing of the
family unit through the performance of the
myriad of household and childrearing tasks.
The length of the marriage, as well as fault on
the part of the wife, is factors in determining its
value. Its value must be considered in relation
Dantes
102 332
La Rue v. La Rue
May 25, 1983
to the net assets at the time of the divorce, and
also in light of the alimony award.
However, there is still a difference between
equitable distribution based on homemaking
services and those based on economic
contributions, since the former still has some
correlation to alimony and has the
characteristic of a judgment. Thus, equitable
distribution based on homemaking services
cannot lead to transfers made of legal title to a
real estate.
That the husband was guilty of abusive

conduct exonerates the appellant from fault. As
to her contributions, her $51,000 worth of
earnings when she worked counts for economic
contribution, and her homemaking services also
entitle her to another equitable consideration,
both counted against the net marital assets. The
home wherein a separate suit was filed is also
considered part of the net assets, as well as the
joint bank accounts of the parties.
Dantes
103 332
Matute v. Macadaeg
FACTS:
Rosario Matute was found guilty of adultery in
an action for legal separation filed by her husband,
Armando Medel, on Nov. 6, 1952. Armando was
awarded the custody of their four children, ages 4,
8, 10 and 12. Armando then left for the US, leaving
the care of his children to his sister in Davao City.
Rosario came to live with them so she could be
with her children.
Armando came back in 1954, and in Mar 1955
the children joined him in Cebu. With Armando's
consent on the condition that they will return in 2
weeks, Rosario brought the children to Manila for
her father's funeral in April 1955. She didn't return.
She subsequently filed a prayer asking for
the court to:
(1) Award her the custody of her children
because her children, three of whom
were already above 10 years old,
preferred to be with her and that she
was not unfit to take charge of them
by reason of moral depravity, habitual
drunkenness, incapacity or poverty (in
deference to Sec 6, Rule 100, Rules of
Court) and
(2) For Armando to pay for support for the
children's schooling.
On June 29, 1955 Judge Macadaeg
denied her prayer and ordered he r to return
the custody of the children to Armando
within 24 hours.
She then filed an action for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
arguing that Judge Macadaeg had issued the
decision with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUES:
WON There was grave abuse of
discretion or lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the Judge.
WON R o s a r i o Matute is fit to be

awarded custody of her children pursuant to
Sec. 6, Rule 100, Rules of Court.
HELD:
Petition DENIED. There was no grave
abuse of discretion. Rosario is unfit by
reason of her poverty.
RATIO:
WRT Jurisdiction & Grave Abuse of
Discretion
A petition for certiorari and prohibition is
a question of whether the respondent
acted "in excess or without jurisdiction" or
"with grave abuse of discretion".
There is no question that respondent
judge had jurisdiction. If he had made a
mistake, and he did not, then it would at
best only be an "error in judgement" and not
an "error in jurisdiction".
Neither did he act with grave abuse of
discretion because the June 29, 1955 order
merely enforced the award made in the Nov.
6, 1952 which was already final and
executory. Unless the Nov. 6, 1952 decision is
reviewed and modified, the award of
custody must stand.
WRT Fitness of Matute
Children at least 10 years of age may
choose their preferred parent according to
Sec. 6, Rule 100, Rules of Court unless the
parent is unfit to take charge of them by
reason
of
moral
depravity,
habitual
drunkenness, incapacity or poverty.
Rosario Matute is without means of
livelihood and depends on her brothers for
money and shelter. She is thus unfit by reason
of her poverty.
De Castro
104 332
Laperal v. Republic
G.R. No. L-18008 ll Oct. 30, 1962 ll Barrera, J.
Legal Basis: Art. 372 When legal separation
has been granted, the wife shall continue
using her name and surname employed before
the legal separation.
FACTS:
Elisea Santamaria petitioned for the use of
her maiden name Elisea Laperal after
obtaining legal separation from her husband.
She also supported said petition on the fact
that she has ceased to live with him for many
years.
Prior to the decree of legal separation, she
has been using her married name, Elisea
Santamaria.
The lower court used Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court, Change of Name, and granted the
petition.
The rationale of the lower court was that
to continue using her married name would
give rise to confusion in her finances and the
eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets
ISSUE:
WON the Court may use Rule 103 despite
the specific stipulations in Art. 372 of the Civil
Code
HELD / RATIO:
No. Elisea should retain her married name.
She is still married and there was no

severance of the vinculum.
Art. 372 should prevail because it
specifically qualified its application to married
women legally separated from their husbands
thus, this applies to Elisea. Even if the Court
were to apply Rule 103, it is the opinion of the
Supreme Court that it is not a sufficient ground
to justify a change of the name for to hold
otherwise would be to provide an easy
circumvention of the mandatory provisions of
Art. 372.
On the lower courts justification above, the
Supreme Court held that it was not sufficiently
proven that there will be confusion in her
finances. Secondly, with the issuance of the
decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal
partnership between petitioner and her
husband had automatically been dissolved and
liquidated. Consequently, there could be no
more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.
**Just in case it will be asked, the previous
related case is Dunn v. Palermo- Palermo
wants to retain her maiden name even after
marriage. This was allowed by the Court. The
legal name of any person is the one written in
the birth certificate.
Dolot
105 332
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
FACTS:
Alice Reyes - Filipina (wife)
Richard Upton - American (husband)
nd
Theodore Van Dorn - American (2 husband)
H and W got married in HK in 1972. After
the marriage, they established their residence in
the
Philippines.
In 1975, they obtained a decree of divorce
in Nevada on the ground of incompatibility.
In 1982, the wife remarried to Theodore
Van Dorn also in Nevada.
The wife has a business in Ermita, Manila,
the Galleon Shop, which the 1st husband claims
to be a conjugal property but the wife argued
that as of the time that they obtained a divorce,
they both expressed that they had no
community of property, hence, this case.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the divorce decreed abroad is
binding in the Philippines in cases of
mixed marriage (Filipino + Foreigner)?
(2) WON the 1st husband may be entitled to
the administration of the property
subject of the dispute (this one is not
the focus of the discussion, though
worth mentioning since its also in the
case)
HELD / RATIO:
1. Yes. It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
The marriage tie when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either; otherwise,
it would create a ridiculous situation where
the foreigner husband is no longer married
to the Filipina wife but the latter is still tied
to the marriage.
2. No. He is estopped by his own
representation previously that there is no
community of property was to be
adjudicated by the court in Nevada.
Besides, the wife should not discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.
Karichi note: Philippine laws apply to
Filipinos, ergo, foreigners cannot use our
laws against our citizens.
Dolot
106 332
Quita v. CA and Dandan

G.R. No. 124862 ll Dec. 22, 1998 ll Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos,
married in the Philippines (1941). They got a
divorce (filed 1950) in San Francisco, California,
USA, and submitted evidence of their
agreement to live separately & a settlement of
their conjugal properties. Final judgment of
divorce was on 1954, and Quita subsequently
contracted 2 marriages, still in the USA, since
then.
In 1972, Arturo died. Dandan, along with
her and Padlans alleged 6 children claimed to
be heirs of the intestate of Arturo. The trial
court, without a proper hearing, decided in
favour of the subsistence of the marriage of
Quita and Padlan, stating that a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought & decreed
after the effectivity of the present Civil Code
was not entitled to recognition as valid in
Philippine jurisdiction, declaring Quita and
Arturos brother as the only heirs. Upon partial
reconsideration, the Padlan children, except for
one (illegitimate) were recognized as heirs,
excluding the brother. Dandan was still not
counted because her marriage to Padlan was
contracted on 1947, which makes it bigamous,
thus void ab initio. Dandan appealed, stating
that the court erred in deciding without a
hearing, because there was an actual
controversy as to the lawful heirs of the
deceased. CA affirmed appeal, declared null and
void trial courts decision, and remanded the
case for further proceedings. Quita appealed to
SC.
ISSUE:
WON case should be remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings.
HELD:
YES. The provision states: If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases. There is
no controversy as to the children, but the
controversy lies as to who is the legitimate
surviving spouse of Arturo. In Quitas comment
on her entitlement to inherit despite their
divorce, she says that Arturo was a Filipino, and
so they remained legally married. From this, the
SC interpreted that Quita was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce
should have prompted the trial court to conduct
a hearing establishing Quitas citizenship. Her
citizenship is important to determine, in light of
the ruling in Van Dorn v Romillo Jr. Trial court
based citizenship solely to the time of their
marriage as the trial court was not supplied
with a basis to determine petitioners
citizenship at the time of divorce.
Quita became an American citizen in 1954,
the same year final judgment of divorce was
obtained. If proven that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen, she will lose her right to inherit.
SC emphasizes that the question to be
determined by the trial court should be limited
only to the right of Quita to inherit from Arturo
as his surviving spouse, since Dandans claim
has already been resolved (bigamous marriage).
Petition denied. CAs direction to remand the
case for further proceedings affirmed.
Emphasis on question of hereditary rights of
petitioner.
Enad
107 332
Llorente v. CA
G.R. No. 124371 ll Nov. 23, 2000
PETITIONER:
RESPONDENTS:
Paula T. Llorente
Court of Appeals and Alicia F. Llorente
FACTS:
Lorenzo N. Llorente was a serviceman in
the United States Navy, who married
petitioner Paula in church rites in Camarines
Sur in 1937.
Lorenzo left for the US before World War
II broke out, leaving Paula behind in the
conjugal home.
In 1943, Lorenzo was granted US
citizenship, as well as leave to visit his wife
after the Philippine liberation. Upon his
return in 1945, he discovered that she was
pregnant, and had been having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino.
Lorenzo refused to live with Paula, and in
1946 executed with her a written agreement
wherein they decided that support from
Lorenzo would be suspended, their marital
union would be dissolved according to judicial
proceedings, and that Paula will not be
prosecuted for adultery, given she voluntarily
admitted fault and peacefully agreed to
separation.
Upon returning to the US, Lorenzo filed
for and obtained a divorce in San Diego
County, California. He traveled back to the
Philippines, where he married respondent
Alicia F. Llorente.
They lived together as husband and wife
for 25 years and had three children. During
such time, Lorenzo also executed a last will
and testament, in which he bequeathed all
his property to Alicia and their three children,
further designating her as sole executor of
said will. Lorenzo died in June 1985.
In September of the same year, Paula
filed for letters of administration over
Lorenzo's estate in her favor, contending that
she was the surviving spouse, and the
property disposed of in the will were acquired
during their marriage.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in her
favor, holding that the divorce decree granted
to Lorenzo is void and not applicable in the
Philippines, therefore also rendering his

marriage to Alicia void. The Court of Appeals
affirmed (with modification, to the effect that
Alicia is declared co-owner of properties she
and Lorenzo acquired during their 25 years
together).
ISSUES
1) Whether a divorce acquired by a
naturalized US citizen is applicable in the
Philippines
2) Whether the will executed in favor of the
second spouse is valid (minor issue)
RATIO
The Court reversed the decision of the
trial and appellate courts and remanded the
case to the court of origin on the following
grounds:
A. Divorce was applicable under Arts. 15 and
16 of the Civil Code.
The CA and RTC used the renvoi
doctrine, which refers the case to the law
of decedent's domicile - in this case,
Philippine law.
The Court interpreted Arts. 15 and 16
as applying only to Philippine nationals.
Only they are covered by the policy
against
absolute
divorces.
Aliens,
meanwhile, may obtain absolute divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according
to law. Thus, they upheld the validity of
Lorenzo's divorce.
B. The Court did not decide the will's
inherent validity and the actual inheritors,
since according to his nationality, these
are issues best proven by foreign law.
However, the question of whether will
was executed in accordance with
formalities required was resolved based
on Philippine law. The Court decided yes,
thus leaving to the court of origin the
Espaola
108 332
Garcia v. Recio
responsibility of determining the intrinsic
validity of the will and successional rights
of the parties.
Falcone
109 332
Garcia v. Recio
FACTS:
March 1987 Respondent Rederick Recio,
a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon Rizal
May 1989 Australian family court
decreed a divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage
January 1994 He married petitioner
Grace Garcia-Recio in Cabanatuan City.
In their application for marriage license, he
declared himself as single and Filipino
Starting October 22, 1995 he and
petitioner started living separately without
prior judicial dissolution of marriage.
March 1998 petitioner Grace Garcia filed
a petition for a Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy, saying that when they got
married, Rederick still had a subsisting
marriage. She said she only learned of this in
1997.
Respondent claims that his first marriage
had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia, making him legally
capacitated to marry petitioner back in 1994.
July 1998 While the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending, Rederick
secured a divorce decree from a family court in
Sydney
because
the marriage
had
irretrievably broken down
Trial court declared the marriage dissolved
on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines, NOT due to his alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry.
1. W/N the divorce between Rederick and

Editha Samson (first wife) was proven
2. W/N Rederick was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner.
insufficient to just present the divorce

decree.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132,
a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document.
If the document isnt kept in the
Philippines, the copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine Foreign Service
stationed in that foreign country in
which the record is kept; and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office
Divorce decree between respondent
and Editha Samson appears authentic.
But appearance isnt sufficient.
Compliance with the rules on evidence
must be demonstrated.
Fortunately, when the divorce decree
was submitted, it was objected by the
petitioners counsel not for its
inadmissibility but because it had not
been registered in the Local Civil
Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial
court then ruled that it was admissible,
subject to petitioners qualification.
Hence it was admitted in evidence and
given weight by the judge as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney,
Australia because the petitioner failed
to object properly.
Compliance with articles 11, 13, and 52
of the Family Code that the petitioner
quoted isnt necessary as respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws. (He acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992)
HELD:
1. YES.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity
to the foreign law allowing it. It is
Note, just in case Maam asks: in civil

cases, defendants have the burden of proving
the material allegations in their answer when
they introduce new matters. Since the divorce
was a defense raised by respondent, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
ISSUES: (Karichi says its Issue #2)
Falcone
110 332
Garcia v. Recio
2. NO.
Respondent claims that the Australian
divorce decree, validly admitted in
evidence, adequately establishes his
legal capacity to marry under
Australian Law.
BUT there are types of divorces: 1)
Absolute (terminates the marriage)
and 2) Limited (suspends the marriage
and leaves the bond in full force)
There is no showing which type of
divorce was procured by him
The Australian divorce decree contains
a restriction that reads: A party to a
marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy
This shows that the divorce he
obtained MAY be restricted.
This doesnt establish his legal

capacity to remarry according to his
national law.
No proof has been presented on the
legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.
Petitioners prayer to declare her marriage

to respondent as null and void on the ground
of bigamy wasnt granted because it may turn
out that under Australian Law, he was
capacitated to marry to marry as a result of the
divorce decree. Hence, the case was
remanded to the trial court to receive
evidence which show petitioners legal
capacity to marry petitioner. If theres none,
then they may declare nullity of marriage on
the ground of bigamy, as theres already
evidence of two existing marriage certificates.
Falcone
111 332
Republic v Obrecido
NATURE:
Petition for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the RTC
RULING:
Petition by RP GRANTED. Assailed decision
set aside
FACTS:
Orbecido married Lady Villanueva 1981.
1986 wife left for the US. A few years later his
wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen
2000 Cipriano learned from his son that his
wife had obtained a divorce decree and married
an Innocent Stanley
Cipriano filed w/ trial court petition to
remarry invoking Par 2 Art 36 of the Family
Code--> Court granted
OSG says that par 2 article 26 covers
marriages between a Filipino and an alien.
Proper remedy they say should be annulment
or legal separation. A matter of legislation
ISSUE:
Could Paragraph 2 Article 26 be construed
to include Filipinos who have naturalized?
HELD:
Records of family code deliberations
showed that intent of par 2 of art 26 is to avoid
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Does same principle apply to this case?
Cites Quita v CA. The Court therein hinted, by
way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by

his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Phil law and can thus remarry.
Court held that Par 2 Art 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties
who at time of marriage were Filipinos but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains divorce--> To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice
2 essential elements:
1) Valid marriage celebrated between Filipino
citizen and foreigner
2) Valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him/her to
remarry reckoning point not citizenship at
time of marriage, but citizenship at the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry
For case to prosper, respondent herein
must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen-> Before a
foreign divorce can be recognized by our courts,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as
a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.--> such foreign law must
be proved also--> must also show that divorce
decree allows former wife to remarry
No sufficient evidence submitted. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent's submission of aforecited evidence
Hermosisima
112 332
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas

FACTS:
Gerbert Corpuz (Gerbert) was a former
Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization. He later
married a Filipina, Daisylyn Sto. Tomas
(Daisy). Gerbert left for Canada soon after
the wedding because of his work. He
returned after 4 months to surprise Daisy, but
discovered that she was having an affair with
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice in
Ontario, Canada granted his petition for
divorce.
2 years after the divorce, Gerbert found
another Filipina to love. Gerbert went to the
Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisys
marriage certificate. Despite the registration of
the divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) informed him that the
marriage between him and Daisy still subsists
under Philippine law. To be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court,
pursuant to a NSO Circular.
Gerbert filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the
RTC. Daisy did not file any responsive pleading
and offered no opposition to the petition. In
fact, Daisy alleged her desire to file a similar
case but was prevented by financial
constraints. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar
prayer to Gerberts.
The RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was NOT THE PROPER
PARTY to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he
is a NATURALIZED CANADIAN CITIZEN. It ruled
that ONLY THE FILIPINO spouse can avail of
the remedy, under Art. 26, Sec 2 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE:
WON Art. 26, Sec. 2 extends to aliens the
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
HELD:
NO. The alien spouse can claim no right
under Art. 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
FILIPINO SPOUSE.
RD:
Art. 26, Sec. 2 was included in the law to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative
intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, Art. 26, Sec. 2 provided
the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have
his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or
her to remarry. Without Art. 26, Sec. 2, the
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue
in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our
laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond.
An action based on Art. 26, Sec. 2 is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. However, no Philippine court can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse,
whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.
Article 26 (par. 2) of the Family Code:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive
Order 227)
Macariola
113 332
Yasin v. Sharia District Court

Bidin, J.
PETITIONER: Hatima Yasin
RESPONDENT: Honorable Judge Shari'a District Court Third Shari'a Judicial District, Zamboanga City
FACTS:
Hatima Yasin was married to Hadji Idris
Yasin in accordance with Muslim rites and
customs. They were granted a divorce by the
Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc. in
accordance with Islamic Law later on. Her exhusband Hadji then contracted another
marriage to another woman. Hatima then
filed a petition to resume the use of maiden
name (Hatima Centi Y. Saul). The respondent
court ruled that under Rule 103 Sec. 2(a) and
3 of the Rules of Court (for change of name!)
the petition is not sufficient in form as the
same did not indicate her residence and the
name that she seeks to adopt.
Hatima
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration which the respondent court
denied, holding firm their belief that the
requirements for Rule 103 should be
complied with in order for the name change
to be granted. Hence this petition alleging
that the respondent court erred in applying
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
WON a petition for resumption of maiden
name and surname is also a petition for
change of name
HELD:
Petition is granted and the orders of the
respondent court are set aside. The
petitioner is authorized to resume her
maiden name and surname.
RATIO:
No. Although the respondent court
claimed that according to Art. 376 CC no
person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority, and that the same
is governed by Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, the only name that may be changed

under this is the true and official name
recorded in the Civil Register. The same is
one's name given at birth which for the
petitioner, is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. Petitioner
in this case doesn't seek to change her
registered maiden name but prays to be
allowed to resume the use of it. In marrying
Hadji, it was only her civil status that
changed and not her name.
Divorce as defined in PD 1086 (Code of
Muslim Personal Laws) severs the marriage
bond and allows the spouses to contract
another marriage. Art. 370 CC tells us that a
married woman may use her maiden name
and surname and is not obligated to use her
husband's name upon marriage. Art. 371 CC
further adds that if the wife is the guilty party
in an annulment case, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname or, if she is the
innocent spouse, she may opt to do the same.
The innocent spouse is also allowed to
continue using her husband's last name
unless either of them marries again. A widow
or divorcee need not seek judicial
confirmation of the change in her civil status
in order to revert to her maiden name as the
use of her husband's name is merely an
option.
**Separate Opinion:
Romero, J. points out that the dissolution
of matrimonial bonds consequent upon the
granting of absolute divorce/declaration of
nullity of marriage/nullity provides a legal
ground for the automatic dropping of the use
of the husband's family name and the
resumption of the use of a woman's maiden
name. This is merely a recognition of the
change in civil status.
Marin
114 332
Perez v. CA
Petitioner Nerissa wants to reverse an earlier
decision by the CA, which awarded custody
of her child Ray Perez II to her estranged
husband Dr. Ray Perez.
FACTS:
After six miscarriages, two operations and
a high-risk pregnancy, Ray and Nerissa Perez
finally had a child they named Ray II. Nerissa
was working as a nurse in the US and was
able to finance a house in Mandaue City.
She was a permanent resident in the US
since 1992. Ray was a doctor and worked as
a general practitioner. They stayed in the US
during her pregnancy.
After she gave birth they returned to
Cebu but Nerissa went back to the US
supposedly to wrap up everything there and
return to Cebu to settle down. When she
returned she and her hubby were no longer
on good terms and eventually became
estranged despite efforts to reconcile. She
then filed a petition for habeas corpus at the
RTC, which it granted citing Art. 213 of the
Family Code. The CA reversed the ruling
saying that there are compelling reasons to
deny Nerissa custody of the child.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WoN Ray II is better off with Mum or Dad
considering their circumstances?
HELD:
When the parents of the child are
separated, the applicable law is Article 213
of the Family code. It does not qualify
"separation" so it applies to both legal
separation and separation in fact.
The reason in mandating that a child
under seven years be given to the mother is
the belief that a child has a basic need for
the mother's loving care.
However,
consideration must be first and foremost the
wishes and best interests of the child.
The CA, in deciding that Nerissas
workload in the US casts doubts in her
capability to take care of the child is
unreasonable. She can adjust her schedule
and manage her time or place the child
under the care of someone competent. In
fact, this has been the practice in the country
where kids are taken care of by yayas.
Ray's work schedule was not presented
as evidence in the trial and therefore has no
bearing. CA's reasoning that Ray was more
flexible is not well founded. In fact, he has
more work than his wife.
The mother's role in the life of her child
is irreplaceable. The depth of a mother's love
has been immortalized in prose and poetry
and finds its justification not in fantasy but in
reality.
Petition granted and the
reversed and set aside.
Nuez
CA decision
115 332
Narag v. Narag
A.C. No. 3405 ll Jun. 29, 1998
COMPLAINANT: JULIETA B. NARAG
RESPONDENT: ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG
FACTS:
On November 13, 1989, Julieta B. Narag,
complainant, filed an administrative complaint
for disbarment against her husband, Atty.
Dominador M. Narag, respondent, for having
violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Ethics of Lawyers. Complainant claims that
respondent has abandoned their family to live
with his former student. On June 26 1990,
complainant sought the dismissal of her
administrative complaint stating that she
fabricated her allegations and such actions
were out of confusion arising from her extreme
jealousy. IBP Board of Governors dismissed
complaint for failure to prosecute.
However, on November 25, 1991, the
Supreme Court received another letter of
complaint from complainant again appealing
for the disbarment of her husband, claiming
that she dropped previous complaint because
of threats against her by her husband.
Respondent prayed for the affirmation of the
Boards dismissal of the complaint, and even
professed his love for his wife and their family.
On August 24, 1992, the Supreme Court
issued another resolution referring the
comment of the respondent to the IBP, and in
the hearing before the IBP, the respondent
alleged among others that, 1) He loved his
family dearly and gave them sustenance, a
comfortable home, companionship and a good
name, 2) He was abused physically, mentally,
and emotionally by the complainant making
their marriage a nightmare (and in the process
made him filed a petition for annulment), and
that 3) His wife had a propensity to file false
charges against him, listing down several
complaints she had filed against him and Gina
Espita (the paramour).
On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer
recommended the indefinite suspension of the
respondent from the practice of law. IBP
subsequently approved the adoption of such
suspension on August 23, 1997. Complainant
sought the disbarment of her husband through
a complaint filed on October 20, 1997. IBP
granted the petition and denied the motion for

reconsideration of the respondent.
ISSUES:
WON conduct of respondent warrants the
imposition of the penalty of disbarment
HELD:
YES. Respondent was accused of gross
immorality for abandoning his family in order to
live with Gina Espita. Complainant was able to
prove, through the witnesses she presented,
that respondent did abandon his family. The
brother in law of the paramour, Charlie Espita,
positively identified the respondent as the one
living in with his sister, and also confirmed that
they had two children. He also admitted that he
was the one who handed over to the
complainant the love letters that respondent
sent to Gina Espita and that the respondent
tried to dissuade him from testifying.
Bienvenido Eugenio, father in law of Charlie
Espita, strengthened the testimony of Charlie
by confirming the identity of the respondent as
the live in partner of Gina Espita. The
handwriting of the love letters to Gina Espita
also matched the handwriting on the cards
respondent sent to complainant. Respondent,
with such allegations, failed to prove to the
satisfaction of the investigating body that he
was morally fit to have his name on the Roll of
Attorneys. He only denied the allegations
thrown at him and the witnesses he presented
simply impeached the good character of his
wife. That he provided well for his family, and
was even a successful lawyer and seasoned
politician was insufficient to show his moral
fitness to continue being a member of the
noble profession of law. The court reminded
the respondent that parents not only have
rights but also duties to support, educate and
instruct their children according to right
precepts and good example; and to give them
love, companionship and understanding, as well
as moral and spiritual guidance. As a husband,
it was his duty to live with his wife; to observe
Pagdanganan
116 332
Narag v. Narag
A.C. No. 3405 ll Jun. 29, 1998
mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render
help and support. Respondent admitted that he
was away from home because of work but the
evidence showed that he was only away
because he spent time with his paramour. The
resentful testimony of his two sons showed the
impact of his actions on his family. His son
Jervis would not bear to forgive him while
another son, Dominador, mentioned the
trauma he went through which led to the
dissolving of his own marriage. Respondent
claimed that he adhered to the sanctity of

marriage, but ultimately his acts proved
otherwise. Complainant was able to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that
respondent had breached the high and exacting
moral standards set for members of the law
profession.
DOMINADOR M. NARAG DISBARRED, His
name ORDERED STRICKEN from ROLL of
ATTORNEYS
Pagdanganan
117 332
Goitia v. Campos Rueda

FACTS:
Luisa (petitioner) and Jose (respondent)
married and stayed together for a month
before she was forced to leave the conjugal
abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents.
She stated that a month into their
marriage, her husband demanded her to
perform lascivious acts on his genital organs
and continually demanded similar lewd acts.
She refused to do this and husband maltreated
her because of this. This gave her no choice but
to leave.
Luisa then filed a complaint against her
husband asking for support.
CFI held that husband cannot be compelled
to support wife, except in his own house, unless
it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a
divorce or separation. Hence this case.
ISSUE:
WON Luisa can compel husband to give her
support outside conjugal home
HELD:
YES.
Article 149 of the Civil Code, which states
that The person obliged to give support may,

at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the
pension that may be fixed or by receiving and
maintaining in his own home the person having
the right to the same, is not absolute.
The law will not permit the husband to
evade or terminate his obligation to support his
wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal
home because of his wrongful acts.
In this case, the wife was forced to leave
the conjugal abode because of the lewd
demands and maltreatment of the husband,
she can therefore claim support from the
husband for separate maintenance even
outside the conjugal home. Wife had a just
cause for leaving therefore husband still has to
support her.
The mere act of marriage creates an
obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife. A judgment for separate
maintenance is not payable as damages or as a
penalty, but rather a judgment calling for the
performance of a duty made specific by the
mandate of the sovereign. This is done to
preserve public policy.
Poblador
118 332
Warren v. State
Smith, J.
APPELLANT:
APPELLEE:
Joseph Roblins
Lewis Slaton (District Attorney) and Joseph Drolet (Asst. District Attorney)
FACTS:
Daniel Steven Warren was indicted for the
rape and aggravated sodomy of his wife but
because they are married, he says that he is
exempted from being convicted for the same.
ISSUE:
WON there is an implicit marital exclusion
in the rape and aggravated sodomy statutes
HELD:
No. There is no marital exemption in rape
or aggravated sodomy because the same
would go against what the Constitution stands
for.
RATIO:
The Defendant argued that:
(1) There exists within the rape statute an
implicit marital exclusion that makes it
legally impossible for a husband to be
guilty of raping his wife.
Rape is committed when a person has carnal
knowledge of a female forcibly and against
her will.
a) Lord Hale's contractual theory: "but a
husband cannot be guilty of a rape
committed by himself upon his lawful
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial
consent and contract the wife hath
given up herself in this kind unto her
husband which she cannot retreat."
b) Medieval time: the wife is the
husband's chattel/property and thus,
rape was nothing more than a man
making use of his own property
c) Unity in marriage/Unity of Person
theory: A woman's legal existence is
suspended
or
incorporated/consolidated into that of
her husband's and therefore, them
being only one legal being, the husband

cannot be convicted of raping himself.
d) Other justifications: Prevention of
fabricated charges; Preventing wives
from using rape charges for revenge;
Preventing state intervention into
marriage so that possible reconciliation
will not be thwarted.
The theories were pretty much made
during the time when marriage was
irrevocable and wives were subservient to
their husbands. Her identity was merged into
his, her property became his property, and she
took his name for her own. There are new
laws now that give equal protection to men
and women. Besides, N o woman would
knowingly include an irrevocable term to her
revocable marriage contract that would allow
her husband to rape her. Also, the argument
of women as chattel doesn't hold water either
because even at that time, rape was defined
as the carnal knowledge of a female whether
free or slave, forcibly and against her will."
(2) There is an implicit marital exclusion
within the aggravated sodomy statute that
makes it legally impossible for a husband
to be guilty of an offense of aggravated
sodomy performed upon his wife.
Sodomy was originally defined as "the
carnal knowledge and connection against the
order of nature by man with man, or in the
same unnatural manner with woman." One
accused of sodomy cannot defend himself by
alleging consent because the same is not an
element of the offense.
(3) If the Court finds no marital exemptions
under the rape and aggravated sodomy
statutes it would.
Quiambao
119 332
Thurman v. City of Torrington

595 F. Supp. 1521
FACTS:
Tracey Thurman was the victim of her
husbands,
Charles
Thurman,
repeated
harassments and physical abuse. Such instances
were on October 1982 when Charles Thurman
attacked Tracey Thurman at the home of Judy
Bentley and Richard St. Hilaire in the city of
Torrington. He took by force their son Charles J.
Thurman, Jr. Mr. St.-Hilaire filed a complaint but
the police officers of refused to take a
complainteven of trespassing.
The acts of harassment continued. Even
when her husband was finally arrested after
attacking her in full view of a policeman and
after a judge issued an order prohibiting him to
go to his wife's home, the police continued to
ignore Thurman's pleas for help. Her husband
violated the order and came to her house and
threatened her. When she asked the police to
arrest her husband for violating his probation
and threatening her life, they ignored her. She
obtained a restraining order against her
husband, which he violated, but again the
police failed to take any action.
This culminated when Charles Thurman
appeared at the BentleySt. Hilaire residence in
the early afternoon and demanded to speak to
Tracey Thurman. Tracey, remaining indoors,
called the police department asking that Charles
be picked up for violation of his probation. After
about 15 minutes, Tracey went outside to try to
persuade him not to take or hurt Charles Jr.
Charles suddenly stabbed Tracey repeatedly in
the chest, neck, and throat.
At the duration of these events, police
officers acted ineptly in handling the wifebattering situation. At the time when Tracy was
stabbed, Officers DeAngelo, Nukirk, and
Columbia arrived on the scene but still
permitted Charles Thurman to wander about
the crowd and continue to threaten Tracey.
Finally, upon approaching Tracey once again,
this time while she was lying on a stretcher,
Charles Thurman was arrested and taken into
custody.
It was eventually found out that Charles
worked as a counterman and short order cook
at Skies Diner. There he served many members
of the Torrington Police Department, including
some of the officers in this case. While at work,

Charles Thurman boasted to the officers that he
intended to get his wife and that he intended
to kill her.
Tracy then filed a complaint in the Federal
Court and sued the city for the lack of equal
protection in the application of social services,
and that this violated the 14thamendment of
the U.S. Constitution, particularly the inept
police response to a husband beating up a wife.
The City brought a motion to dismiss her claims.
The Cityargues that the equal protection
clause [no state shall deny any person the equal
protection of the laws] only prohibits
intentional discrimination that is racially
motivated.
ISSUE:
WON the plaintiffs have properly alleged a
violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
HELD:
Yes, the application of the equal protection
clause is not limited to racial classifications or
racially motivated discrimination. Classifications
on the basis of gender will be held invalid under
the equal protection clause unless they are
substantially
related
to
strike
down
classifications which are not rationally related
to a legitimate governmental purpose.
Tracey Thurman alleges that the city uses
an administrative classification that manifests
itself in discriminatory treatment that violates
the equal protection clause. Police protection in
the City of Torrington, they argue, is fully
provided to persons abused by someone with
whom the victim has no domestic relationship.
But the Torrington police have consistently
afforded lesser protection, plaintiffs allege,
when the victim is (1) a woman abused or
assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend, or (2) a
child abused by a father or stepfather.
City officials and police officers are under an
affirmative duty to preserve law and order, and
to protect the personal safety of persons in the
community. This duty applies equally to women
whose personal safety is threatened by
individuals with whom they have or have had a
Quilala
120 332
Thurman v. City of Torrington

595 F. Supp. 1521
domestic relationship as well as to all other
persons whose personal safety is threatened,
including women not involved in domestic
relationships. If officials have notice of the
possibility of attacks on women in domestic
relationships or other persons, they are under
an affirmative duty to take reasonable
measures to protect the personal safety of such
persons in the community. Failure to perform
this duty would constitute a denial of equal
protection of the laws.
Tracey Thurman alleges there is an
administrative classification used to implement
the law in a discriminatory fashion. It is well
settled that the equal protection clause is
applicable not only to discriminatory legislative
action, but also to discriminatory governmental
action in administration and enforcement of the
law.
A city may be sued for damages under
1983 when the action that is alleged to be
unconstitutional implements or executes a
policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted and promulgated by
the bodys officers or is visited pursuant to
governmental custom even though such a
custom has not received formal approval
through the bodys official decision-making
channels.
Some degree of specificity is required in

pleading a custom or policy. A plaintiff must
typically point to the facts outside his own case
to support his allegation of a policy on the part
of a municipality. In the instant case, however,
the plaintiff Tracey Thurman has specifically
alleged in her statement of facts a series of acts
and omissions on the part of the
defendant police officers and police department
that took place over the course of eight months.
From this particularized pleading a pattern
emerges that evidences deliberate indifference
on the part of the police department to
the complaints of the plaintiff Tracey Thurman
and to its duty to protect her. Such an ongoing
pattern of deliberate indifference raises an
inference of custom or policy on the part of
the municipality. Furthermore, this pattern of
inaction climaxed on June 10, 1983 in an
incident so brutal that under the law of the
Second Circuit that single brutal incident may
be sufficient to suggest a link between a
violation of constitutional rights and a pattern
of police misconduct. Finally, a complaint of
this sort will survive dismissal if it alleges a
policy or custom of condoning police
misconduct that violates constitutional rights
and alleges that the Citys pattern of inaction
caused the plaintiffs any compensable injury.
Quilala
121 332
People v. Liberta
FACTS:
Mario and Denise were married in 1978.
Shortly after the birth of their son, in October of
that year, Mario began to beat Denise.
April 30, 1980: the Family Court issued
temporary order of protection to her.
Mario was ordered to move out and remain
away from the family home, and stay away
from Denise. Mario could visit his son once each
weekend.
March 24, 1981: Mario called Denise to ask
if he could visit his son, but Denise would not
allow him to come to her house. Instead, she
agreed to allow him to pick up their son and her
and take them both back to his motel provided
that a friend of his would be with them at all
times.
Alone at the Motel room, Mario attacked
Denise, threatened to kill her, and forced her to
perform fellatio on him and to engage in sexual
intercourse with him. Mario forced Denise to
tell their son to watch what the defendant was
doing to her.
Denise went to the police station and swore
out a felony complaint against the defendant.
On July 15, 1981 the defendant was
indicted for rape in the first degree and sodomy
in the first degree
Appellate Division Affirmed this.
Mario argues that:
He was within the marital exemption to
rape and sodomy and could not be
prosecuted for either crime
Both rape and sodomy statutes contravene
the Equal Protection Clause by burdening
only men and not women
ISSUE:
1. WON Mario was falsely charged for 1st
degree rape and sodomy in lieu of the
marital exemption
2. WON the statutes violate the Equal
Protection Clause
HELD:
1. NOPE
Section 130.35 of the Penal Law states:
A male is guilty of rape in the first

degree when he engages in sexual
intercourse with a female . . . by
forcible compulsion.
Female, for purposes of the rape
statute, is defined as any female
person who is not married to the actor
For purposes of the rape and sodomy
statutes, a husband and wife are
considered to be not married if at the
time of the sexual assault they are
living apart
Legislature expanded the definition of
not married to include cases where
the H and W were living apart pursuant
to a court. Given this, the present case
falls within the first definition of these
situations
Mario was properly found to have been
statutorily not married to Denise at
the time of the rape.
There is no rational basis for
distinguishing between marital rape
and nonmarital rape.
o Rape is a degrading, violent act,
which violates the bodily integrity
of the victim and frequently causes
severe, long-lasting physical and
psychic harm.
o A marriage license should not be
viewed as a license for a husband to
forcibly rape his wife with impunity
o A married woman has the same
right to control her own body as
does an unmarried woman
2. YES the statutes violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
A statue that treats males differently
from females violates the Equal
Protection
Clause
unless
the
classification is substantially related to
the achievement of an important
government objective
The people bear the burden of showing
the objective and the relationship bet.
The discrimination in the statute and
that objective
Ramos
122 332
People v. Liberta
Arguments advanced by the People for

the exemption of females are:
o Only females can become pregnant
o The rationale of this is that the
purpose of this statutory rape is to
protect the harm caused by
teenage pregnancies.
o There is NO EVIDENCE that
preventing pregnancies is a primary
purpose of the statute.
o Instead, the purpose is to protect a
woman from unwanted and violent
sexual intrusion.
Probability of medical, sociological, and
psychological problems
Rejected by the court

Overbroad generalization grounded on
stereotypical notions which is not a
legitimate rationale
A gender-neutral law for forcible rape is
unnecessary and therefore the law is
constitutional because a woman cannot
rape a man or if not, are rare
Sexual intercourse occurs upon any
penetration, however slight
Contact can be achieved without a male
being aroused and without consent
Order of the Appellate Division AFFIRMED.
Ramos
123 332
Tenchavez v. Escano
FACTS:
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were
secretly married. They planned to elope
immediately after their marriage but Vicentas
mother got wind of what was going on and thus
prevented their plans. The Escanos were
surprised and disgusted at the clandestine
nature of the marriage and the scandal it would
bring so they sought priestly advice in the form
of a recelebration of marriage but that too,
never materialized because of a letter that says
Tenchavez was having an amorous relationship
with Pacita Noel, their matchmaker. The
newlyweds still had contact with each other
however the love between them grew colder
and they eventually became estranged. When
Vicenta went to Misamis Occidental to escape
the scandal, she had a lawyer file a petition for
the annulment of her marriage. She did not sign
it and it was dismissed due to her nonappearance at the hearing. She then left for the
United States and filed a divorce on the grounds
of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character. Her parents, on their part, sought
papal dispensation of her marriage. Vicenta
then got married to an American, Leo Moran
and acquired American Citizenship on Aug
1958.
Tenchavez, initiated the proceedings at bar
on July 1955. He charged the Escanos with
having discouraged their daughter from joining
her husband and alienating her affections, and
against the Roman Catholic Church, for having,
through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages.
ISSUES:
WON The divorce is valid and WON the
Court may compel Escano to cohabit with
Tenchavez
HELD:
The Divorce is invalid because a foreign
divorce decree cannot be recognized in the
Philippines especially if it was granted by a
court of the place which was not the parties
bona fide domicile and on a ground not
recognized by our law, which does not allow
absolute divorce. (See Art 15 of NCC) Foreign

decrees even in private international law cannot
be enforced or recognized if they contravene
public policy. In addition, Vicenta was still a
Filipino citizen and covered by Philippine law
when the divorce was decreed, hence the
divorce is not recognized and is invalid. Her
marriage to Tenchavez still subsists and her
cohabitation with Leo Moran is adulterous in
nature.
It is also not within the province of courts to
attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with and render conjugal rights to the
other. However, a spouse who unjustifiably
deserts the conjugal abode can be denied
support.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity
of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not
entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
contracted with another party by the divorced
consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of
divorce, entitled to validity in the country; (2)
That the remarriage of divorced wife and her
co-habitation with a person other than the
lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of
legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid
divorce decree by one consort entitles the other
to recover damages; (4) That an action for
alienation of affections against the parents of
one consort does not lie in the absence of proof
alienation of affections against the parents of
one consort does not lie in the absence of proof
of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is
hereby modified as follows; (1) Adjudging
plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to
a decree of legal separation from defendant
Vicenta F. Escano; (2) Sentencing defendantappellee Vicenta Escano to pay plaintiffappellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000
for damages and attorneys' fees; (3)
Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay
the appellee, Mamerto Escano and the estate
Reposar
124 332
Tenchavez v. Escano
of his wife, the deceased Mena Escano, P5,000
by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
See Art 69 of FC and relate it to the case,

regarding
the
exemptions
and
rules.
Reposar
125 332
Garcia v. Santiago
G.R. No. L-28904 ll Dec. 29, 1928
FACTS:
April 8, 1910 - Cipriana married to Isabelo;
they lived together as husband and wife
February 3, 1925 - continued family
dissentions compelled her to leave the conjugal
dwelling
Alejo (son of Isabelo by his first wife)
seduced Prisca Aurelio (daughter of Cipriana
by her first husband) and Prisca gave birth to a
child
Isabelo did not require his son to marry
Ciprianas daughter, thus seemingly tolerating
their illicit relationship
Isabelo has been conveying, and is
attempting to convey to his son lands,
producing around 4,500 cavanes of palay at
P4 per cavan annually, belonging to their
conjugal partnership to the prejudice of his
wife
Isabelo continually refused to provide for
her support. Moreover, he just answered
Ciprianas allegations by a general denial.
ISSUES AND RDS:
WON Ciprianas separation from Isabelo is
unjustified.
NO. The spouses led a rather stormy life
subsequent to the dishonor of the plaintiffs
daughter; Isabelo ordered her to leave his
house and threatened to maltreat her if she
returned.
Also, keeping the two young people under
the same roof with the opportunity to continue
their illicit relations would create a very
embarrassing situation for the girls mother.
To compel the plaintiff to cohabit with
her husband can only lead to further
quarrels, thus the separation therefore seems
necessary.
WON the court should restrain Isabelo
from conveying properties of the conjugal
partnership and WON he is unfit to administer
the property of the CP (due to his public illicit
relations with Geronima Yap)
NO. Cipriana failed to prove that the property
conveyed is community property. In fact, it is
shown by documentary evidence that the land
was acquired by Isabelo before his marriage to
Cipriana.
There is NO reason to deprive the husband
of his right to administer the CP
WON the Cipriana is entitled to a monthly
pension of P500
YES, but the sum requested is too large, an
allowance of P50 per month is enough at
present.
Reyes
126 332
McGuire v. McGuire
PLAINTIFF APELLEE:
Lydia McGuire
DEFENDANT APPELLANT: Charles McGuire
As long as the home is maintained and the
parties are living as husband and wife it
may be said that the husband is legally
supporting his wife and the purpose of the
marriage relation is being carried out.
PETITION:
Recover
suitable
maintenance
and
support money. Procedural history district
court ruled in favor of plaintiff.
RULING:
Reverse the district courts decision.
FACTS:
Lydia McGuire married Charles McGuire on
August 11, 1919. At the time of marriage,
Charles was a bachelor of 46 or 47 years of age
and had a reputation of extreme frugality, of
which Lydia was aware. Lydia had been
previously married and had inherited a onethird interest in 80 acres of land from her
previous husband. She brought an action
against her husband to recover suitable
maintenance and support money. She testified
that her husband was a poor companion and
that he would give her only small amounts
of money on request. She worked the fields and
did chores. For several years she had raised
chickens and sold poultry and eggs to buy
clothing, things she wanted, and groceries. The

house was not equipped with a bathroom,
bathing facilities, or an inside toilet. She was
privileged to use all the rent money she wanted
from the 80 acres of land. She used this money
to visit her daughters, and her husband
provided no funds for such use. She had
three abdominal operations for which her
husband paid for, but she was no longer able to
raise chickens. Her husband had land in the
value of $83,960, bank deposits in the sum of
$12,786.81, and income of $8,000 or $9,000 a
year. Her husband appealed the trial courts
ruling in favor of her, alleging that the decree
was not supported by sufficient evidence, and
is contrary to law.
ISSUE:
WON wife is entitled to relief
HELD:
No. To maintain an action such as the one
at bar, the parties must be separated or living
apart from each other. Parties are not living
apart and wife has been supported in the same
manner without complaint. As long as home is
maintained and the parties are living as
husband and wife it may be said that the
husband is legally supporting his wife and the
purpose of the marriage is being carried out.
Sevilla
127 332
Pelayo v. Lauron
FACTS:
Physician Pelayo was called to Laurons
house on the night the defendants daughter in
law to help her give birth. The birthing was
difficult and fetus was remove by means of
forceps wherein Pelayo had done till morning
and he visited the patient several times. Pelayo
is asking for 500 Php as equitable payment
which defendants do not want to pay.
Defendants contend that their daughter in
law died. Even when she was alive, she lived
independently of them and it was only
fortuitous circumstance that she gave birth in
their house. They held that they are not liable
for the complaint.
ISSUE:
WON the parents are liable for services
rendered to Pelayo. NO
RATIO:
The rendering of medical assistance in case
of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses are bound by
way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.)
Court held that within the meaning of the
law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers
with respect to the obligation that devolves
upon the husband to provide support, among
which is the furnishing of medical assistance to
his wife at the time of her confinement.
Tejano
128 332
Young v. Hector
FACTS:
The parties were married in New Mexico in
February 1982 and had two daughters. The
father was a successful architect with several
business ventures until the stock market
crashed. The mother is an attorney whose
income sustained the family when the husband
failed to find work. When they moved to Miami
for the Alices work, Robert stayed in New
Mexico to finish his business ventures. He later
returned there for a treasure hunting while the
wife accepted a shareholder position in one of
the largest law firms in Florida. When he
returned to his family, they were already
separated but lived in the same house. The
mother leaves early in the morning and return
late at night, working for 12-14 hours a day,
and 6-7 days a week. The father was active in
school and extra-curricular activities of the
children. He was unemployed for six years
because he was computer illiterate and failed to
meet the demands of the architectural firms.
Alice hired a housekeeper to do the cleaning,
cooking and taking care of the kids while she
was at work. When Alice applied for divorce,
the Court awarded her primary residential
custody of the children with frequent and
continuing contact with the father.
ISSUE:
WON a parents financial resources should
be a determinative factor in child custody?
HELD:
No, it is only one of the factors balanced
with the caretaking roles and other statutory
factors. It is the best interest of the children for
the preservation and continuation of the
caretaking roles that the parties established.
According to the Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations,
the court should allocate custody based on the
parents past caretaking laws. Financial
resources SHOULD NOT be a determinative
factor. The separation of the father from his
children should not be a factor because he has
been the primary caretaker of the children. His
alimony should also be increased, distribution
of assets and liabilities should be more

equitable and award for attorneys fees
increased. Reversed and remanded.
On Rehearing En Banc:
ADDITIONAL FACTS:
Both parents are loving and capable parents
(gathered from the testimonies of family
friends, neighbours, and school personnel).
They did not have an agreement to the
caretaking roles that the mother be responsible
for the support of the family and father for the
care of the children. His unemployment is the
reason for their disagreements. A live-in
housekeeper attended the needs of the
children during the day and the mother during
the night. Even with the mothers salary
increase ($30,000 to $300,000) they were still
indebted which later could not sustain the
nanny. The father has been away from home
for substantial periods of time and Alice has
been the dominant influence.
HELD:
No basis for the court to overturn the
decision. The childrens best interest is that
they remain with the parent who had
continuously been there to care for their needs
throughout their lives and not on the parent
who had devoted a substantial amount of time
with them perhaps only when it was convenient
or opportunistic to do so. The mother had been
the constant parent throughout the childrens
lives. They have personally witnessed an
outburst of anger of Robert, who was
recommended to have an anger management
session. There were three reasons cited by the
guardian pendent lite as to why the mother
should have custody. (1) The mother has been
more economically stable as she has shown
proclivity to remain steadily employed unlike
the father. (2) the mother has been the
constant factor and dominant influence in the
childrens lives. (3) She is superior in her ability
to control anger around the children.
Affirmed lower courts decision but remanded
to
determine
the
proper
awards.
Tiangco
129 332
Silva v. Peralta
Nov. 29, 1960 ll J.B.L. Reyes, J.
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS:
DEFENDANT-APELLEE:
Elenita Ledesma Silva & Saturnino R. Silva

Esther Peralta
DOCTRINE:
Use of surname; Art. 370 of the CC; a
married woman is authorized by law to use the
surname of her husband; impliedly, it also
excludes others from doing likewise
NATURE OF PETITION:
This is an appeal on both questions of fact
and law from the decision of the Court of First
Instance favoring the defendant commenced by
the Silva spouses against Esther Peralta, seeking
to: (1) enjoin the latter from representing
herself as Mrs. Esther Peralta Silva; (2) order
defendant to pay Elenita Silva the sum of
P250,000.00 as moral, nominal and exemplary
damages [allegedly suffered by reason of such
misrepresentation]; and (3) pay an additional
amount of P10,000.00 byway of the attorney's
fees.
FACTS:
In June 1942, defendant Esther Peralta
came to live with her sister, Mrs. Pedro Pia,
after abandoning her studies as a student nurse
during the outbreak of the war in 1941. During
the same time, Saturnino Silva, an American
citizen and an officer of the United States Army,
was assigned to the Philippines to aid in the
countrys fight for freedom.
TAKE NOTE: Saturnino was married to a
certain Prescilla Isabel of Australia
In
1944,
Saturnino
became
the
commanding officer of the 130th Regiment,
with their headquarters located in Magugpo,
Tagum, Davao.
During that same year also, Esther
accompanied her younger sister Florence in the
latters arrest and investigation in Anibongan
and later to the general headquarters in
Magugpo. This was the time when Saturnino
first met Esther.
Florence was acquitted from the charges

filed against her; however, she was advised to
temporarily live in another area of Davao. They
decided to stay in the home of the spouses Mr.
& Mrs. Camilo Doctolero.
Saturnino frequently visited Esther in the
house of the Doctoleros, and soon after
professed his love for the female. Having
believed that there were no impediments to
their upcoming union, Esther said yes.
On Janury 14, 1945, Saturnino and Esther
got married by a certain Father Cote in a house
blessing ceremony.
TAKE NOTE: There was no documentary
ascertaining the existence of their marriage
since they alleged that there were no available
printed forms for the purpose.
The couple lived together as common-law
husband and wife and their union had begotten
them a son whom they named Saturnino Silva,
Jr.
In May 1945, Saturnino sustained serious
wounds during a battle rendering his transfer
from Davao to Leyte, and eventually to the
United States.
TAKE NOTE: It was only during his return to
the US to be treated for his battle wounds, did
he finally divorce his Australian wife, Prescilla
Isabel.
On May 9, 1948, Saturnino contracted a
marriage with the plaintiff Elenita Ledesma
Silva.
Upon Saturninos return to the Philippines,
Esther demanded that he give support for their
child. His refusal instituted a suit for support
filed in the Court of First Instance in Manila.
As a counter-attack, Saturnina and Elenita
also filed an action (discussed under Nature of
Petition) and another suit in Cotabato.
Yumol
130 332
Silva v. Peralta
Nov. 29, 1960 ll J.B.L. Reyes, J.
ISSUES:
(1) WoN it is proper for the defendant to
represent herself as the wife of Saturnino
(Mrs. Silva). NO.
(2) WoN plaintiff can claim for moral, nominal
and exemplary damages allegedly suffered
by reason of such misrepresentation. NO.
(3) WoN defendant can claim for actual
damages and fees due to harassment and
moral damages caused by the deceit of
Saturnino, and his consequent refusal to
acknowledge their child. YES.
RATIO:
(1) As mentioned earlier, there was no
printed evidence that could ascertain the
validity of the marriage between Saturnino and
Esther. The only evidence that could be
presented was the testimony given by the
defendant herself and of her own counsel, Atty.
Juan Quijano. Despite having convincing proof
that Saturnino and Esther have lived together as
common-law husband and wife, the testimonies
presented contained many inconsistencies
which rendered it unconvincing. Also, there are
some documentary requirements presented
that prove that Esther has represented herself
as single even after her alleged marriage with
Saturnino.
In the face of the evidence, the
presumption of the marriage cannot be upheld
and it is safe to conclude that no marriage had
really taken place. Aside from the evidence that
were discussed in the previous paragraph,
another argument that strongly contradicts the
validity of their marriage is the fact that at the
time of the alleged marriage on, Saturnino was
still married to the Australian Priscilla Isabel.
In view of the non-existence of appellee's
marriage with Saturnino Silva, and the latter's
actual marriage to plaintiff Ledesma, it is not
proper for Esther to continue representing
herself as the wife of Saturnino. Article 370 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines authorizes a
married woman to use the surname of her
husband; impliedly, it also excludes others from

doing likewise.
(2) The court found that Elizas claims of
humiliation and distress (upon learning from
her lawyer that her husband had a child by the
defendant, and was being sued for it) are not
satisfactorily proved. In the absence of proof
that the suit was reckless or malicious, there is
no right to claim damages.
(3) The court assumed that the defendant
would never have agreed to live maritally with
Saturnino nor beget a child by him had not Silva
concealed that he was already married. It is well
to note in this connection, that Silva's act in
hiding from appellee that he could not legally
marry her, because, he allegedly have an
Australian wife, was not mere negligence, but
actual fraud practiced upon the appellee. Also,
Esther would not have been compelled to
relinquish her employment to attend to the
litigation filed to obtain for the child the
support that Silva refused. Wherefore, Esther's
loss of employment is ultimately a result of
Silva's deception and she should be indemnified
therefore. Based on these gprunds, he should
stand liable for any and all damages which
include the expense of maintaining the
offspring and the expenses of litigation to
protect the child's rights and the loss of the
mother's own earnings.
Moreover, based on a clear showing of the
facts giving rise to such damages Esther had
acted in good faith. Saturnino formerly
introduced her to other persons as Mrs. Silva,
and sent her letters thus addressed, prior to his
subsequent marriage to Elenita.
Esther Peralta is enjoined from representing
herself, directly or indirectly to be the wife of
appellant Saturnino R. Silva; and appellant
Saturnino R. Silva is in turn ordered to pay
Esther Peralta the amount of P30,000.00 by
way of pecuniary and moral damages, plus
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. No costs.
Yumol
131 332
Tolentino v. CA
PETITIONER: Constancia Tolentino
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Contancia Tolentino is the present legal
wife of Arturo Tolentino; they were married in
April 1945
Consuelo David was legally married to
Arturo in Feb. 1931, they had children, but the
marriage was terminated pursuant to law
during the Japanese occupation in September
1943, by decree of absolute divorce granted by
Court of First Instance of Manila
Divorce on ground of desertion and
abandonment by the wife, on finding that
Arturo was abandoned by Consuelo David for at
least three continuous years
Arturo married again: first a Pilar Adorable,
who passed, then Constancia in April 1945
Consuelo kept using the surname Tolentino
after divorce and up to the time of the
complaint
Third party defendant (Arturo) admitted
that the use of the surname Tolentino by
Consuelo was with his familys consent.
Constancia Tolentino filed complaint
against Consuelo David to enjoin her by
injunction from using the surname Tolentino
Consuelo file an answer: admitted to using
the surname and stated she will continue to use
the surname
Trial Court granted Constancias action for a
writ of preliminary injunction: Consuelo David
was enjoined from using/employing/applying in
any manner the surname TOLENTINO
Consuelo David filed a motion for leave to
file a third party complaint against her former
husband; it was granted, and Arturo Tolentino,
third party defendant, filed his answer
Trial Court then confirmed the preliminary
injunction in making the same permanent and
perpetual-restraining and enjoined Consuelo
David from using the surname Tolentino
Consuleo appealed to the CA on the
following
grounds:
plaintiff
Constancia
Tolentinos cause of action had prescribed and
the absence of the monopolistic proprietary
right of Constancia to the use of the surname
Tolentino
CA: reversed decision of trial court

ISSUES:
W/N Constancias cause of action had
already prescribed (YES)
W/N Constancia can exclude by injunction
Consuelo David from using the surname of
her former husband from whom she was
divorced (NO)
W/N a woman who has been legally
divorced from her husband may be
enjoined by the latters present wife from
using the surname of her former husband
(NO)
RULING:
Constancias cause of action has prescribed.
Use by respondent Consuelo David of
surname is NOT a continuing actionable wrong
The use of a surname by a divorced wife for
a purpose not criminal in nature is not a crime
Art. 1150 of the Civil Code on prescription:
the time for prescription for all kinds of
actions, when there is no special provision
which ordains otherwise, shall be contained
from the day they may be brought
All actions, unless an exception is provided,
have a prescription period. Unless made
imprescriptible by law, an action is subject to
bar by prescription with a prescription period of
five ears from the time the right cause of action
accrues when no other period is prescribed by
law (Civil Code, Art. 1149).
Civil Code provides for some rights which
are not extinguished by prescription, but an
action as in this case is not among them; there
is no special law providing for imprescriptibility.
Even if supposed violation is a continuous
one, does not change the principle that the
moment the breach of right or duty occurs, the
right of action accrues and the action from that
moment can be legally instituted
Alampay
132 332
Tolentino v. CA
Whatever the period, the action has long
prescribed whether the cause accrued on April
1945, when Constancia and Arturo were
married, or August 1959 when the present Civil
Code took effect or in 1951 when Constancia
came to know of the fact that Consuelo David
was still using the surname Tolentino It is the
legal possibility of bringing the action, which
determines the starting point for the
computation of the period of prescription
Constancia should have brought legal action
immediately against Consuelo David after
gaining knowledge of the use of the latter of the
surname of her former husband
Action was brought only on Nov. 1971, after
twenty years
CA: where plaintiff fails to go to Court
within the prescriptive period, he loses his
cause, not because the defendant acquired
ownership by adverse possession over his name
but because the plaintifs cause of action had
lapsed thru the statute of limitations
Constancia MAY NOT exclude Consuelo
from using the name of her former husband,
from whom she was divorced.
To sustain Consuelos use of the surname
does not contradict Articles. 370 and 371 of the
Civil Code.
Senator Tolentinos commentary on Art. 370 of
the Civil Code:
the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to
use the husbands surname. She cannot be
prevented from using it; but neither can she
restrain others from using it.
Arr. 371: not applicable because it speaks of
annulment while the case at bar refers to
absolute divorce where there is a severance of
valid marriage ties.
Effect of divorce is more akin to the death
of the spouse where the deceased woman
continues to be referred to as the Mrs. of the
husband, even if the latter has remarried rather
than to annulment, as if there had been no
marriage at all
Consuelo David MAY NOT be enjoined by
her former husbands present wife from using
his surname.
WHY: Consuelo has established that

granting an injunction would be an act of
serious dislocation to her.
Presented proof of entering into contracts
with third persons, acquired properties and
entered into other legal relations using the
surname Tolentino.
Constancia failed to show that she would
suffer legal injury or deprivation of legal rights
inasmuch as she can use her husbands
surname and be fully protected in case
Consuelo David uses the surname for illegal
purposes.
There is NO USURPATION of Constancias
name and surname
The mere use by Consuelo of the surname
cannot be said to have injured Constancia
Usurpation of identity implies injury to the
interests of the owner of the name; elements of
usurpation of a name
i. Possibility of a confusion of identity
between owner and usurper
ii. Use is unauthorized
iii. Use of anothers name is to designate
personality or identify a person
None of these elements exist in the case at bar;
Constancia did not claim that
Consuelo had impersonated her
It is public knowledge that Constancia is the
legal wife of Arturo Tolentino; invitations to
public functions are always addressed to her as
the wife
Consuelo never represented herself after
the divorce as Mrs. Arturuo Tolentino but
simply as Mrs. Consuelo David-Tolentino
Consuelo David has legitimate children who
have every right to use the surname Tolentino
She cannot be compelled to use the prefix
Miss or use the name of Mrs. David
different from the surnames of her children;
records do not show that she has legally
remarried
RULING:
Use of the surname Tolentino by
Consuelo David does not impinge on the rights
of Constancia.
Alampay
133 332
Tolentino v. CA
Petition dismissed for lack of merit. CA
decision affirmed. Writs of preliminary and
mandatory injunction by the trial court, set

aside.
Alampay
134 332
Perez v. Tuazon de Perez

FACTS:
Antonio Perez, as guardian ad litem of his
son Benigno Perez, filed a civil case against
defendant Angela Tuason de Perez [wife] at the
CFI Manila.
Plaintiffs three causes of action: Defendant
1. to be declared a prodigal and placed
under guardianship for squandering her
estate on a young man named Jose Boloix
prayed for writ of injunction
2. was spending the conjugal partnership of
gain - prayed for writ of injunction
3. defendant has expressed her desire to
marry and have children with Jose Boloix, i f
only to embarrass her husband prays for
185k by way of damages and attorneys fees
Defendant avers that jurisdiction of the
case belongs to Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court [RA 1401] not CFI. The CFI
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
WON trial court erred in holding that it
has no jurisdiction over the causes of action
filed by Antonio Perez
HELD:
NO. All causes of action fall under exclusive
jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court as provided by Sec 38 A (b)(d) of
RA 1401.
1.
2.
On declaration of prodigality for

squandering of paraphernal estate
Falls squarely under Sec 38 A (b) on
cases involving guardianship
On issue of CPG
Material injury in A116 does not
3.
refer to patrimonial (economic)

economic injury or damage, but to
personal (i.e. physical or moral) injury.
But since the cause of action is
predicated on the grant of guardianship
because of prodigality, then exclusive
jurisdiction is still with JDRC.
On issue of placing plaintiff in an
embarrassing situation by wife avowing
openly her intention to marry and have a
child w/ another man
Falls under Sec 38 A (d) on proceeding
under A116 when spouse brings
dishonour upon the other
PERTINENT PROVISIONS:
RA 1401
SEC. 38AProvision of the Judiciary Act to
the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the following cases after the effectivity
of this Act:
(b) Cases involving custody, guardianship,
adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;
(d) proceedings brought under the
provisions of Articles one hundred sixteen,
two hundred twenty-five, two hundred fifty,
two and three hundred thirty-one of the Civil
Code.
Art. 116
When one of the spouses neglects his or
her duties to the conjugal union or brings
danger, dishonour or material injury upon the
other, the injured party may apply to the court
for relief.
The court may counsel the offended party
to comply with his or her duties, and take such
measures
as
may
be
proper
Bayona
135 332
Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo

G.R. No. L- 17014 ll Aug. 11, 1921 ll Street, J.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Mariano B. Arroyo
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Dolores C. Vasquez De Arroyo
FACTS:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de
Arroyo were married and have been living as
man and wife for 10 years until Dolores left
their conjugal home with the intention of living
separately from her husband. Thus, Mariano
initiated an action to compel her to return to
the matrimonial home and live with him as a
dutiful wife, to which Dolores filed a cross
complaint asking for a decree of separation, a
liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an
allowance for counsel fees and permanent
separate maintenance on the basis of cruelty on
the part of Mariano. The trial judge ruled
against Mariano, concluding that his continued
ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient
justification for her abandonment of the
conjugal home and the permanent breaking off
of marital relations with him. Thus, Mariano
went to the Supreme Court to appeal.
ISSUES:
WON Dolores abandonment was with
sufficient justification as to render her entitled
to her prayers in the cross complaint
WON the husband is entitled to a
permanent mandatory injunction to compel the
wife to return to the matrimonial home and live
with him as his dutiful wife
RULING:
The Court reversed the judgment appealed
from and absolved Mariano from the cross
complaint. It also declared the lack of
justification on Dolores part for leaving the
conjugal home, admonishing her, but not to the
extent of giving an unconditional and absolute
order to return to the marital domicile and
resume her wifely duties.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
NO. The tales of cruelty that Mariano
allegedly committed were not sufficiently
proven by Dolores. The obligation which the

law imposes on the husband to maintain the
wife is a duty universally recognized and is
clearly expressed in Arts.
142 and 143 of the Civil Code. Accordingly,
where the wife is forced to leave the
matrimonial abode and to live apart from her
husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel
him to make provision for her separate
maintenance; and he may be required to pay
the expenses, including attorneys fees,
necessarily incurred in enforcing such
obligation. Nevertheless, the interests of both
parties as well as of society at large require
that the courts should move with caution in
enforcing the duty to provide for the separate
maintenance of the wife, for this step involves
a recognition of the de facto separation of the
spousesa state which is abnormal and
fraught with grave danger to all concerned.
From this consideration it follows that
provision should not be made for separate
maintenance in favor of the wife unless it
appears that the continued cohabitation of the
pair has become impossible and separation
necessary from the fault of the husband. Facts
of the case show that Mariano has done
nothing to forfeit his right to the marital
society of his wife and she is under a moral and
legal obligation to return to the common home
and cohabit with him. While cruelty was
indeed a ground, it is necessary to prove the
extent of said cruelty that would render
Dolores entitled to the relief she was seeking.
NO. Although the husband is entitled to a
judicial declaration that his wife has absented
herself without sufficient cause and that it is
her duty to return, the Court is disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order,
enforceable by process of contempt, may be
entered to compel the restitution of the
purely personal right of consortium. Thus, the
Court
merely
admonished
Dolores.
Cadorna
136 332
CIR v. Fisher
G.R. No. L-11622 ll Jan. 28, 1961 ll Barrera, J.
PETITIONER:
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE
RESPONDENTS: DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS
FACTS
British Walter G. Stevenson and Beatrice
Mauricia Stevenson were married in Manila in
1909. Walter died on Feb. 22, 1951 in California
where the couple established their permanent
residence since 1945. This case is on the
determination and settlement of his hereditary
estate.
In his will, Walter instituted Beatrice as
his sole heiress to real and personal
properties they acquired while residing in
the Philippines amounting to P130k.
ISSUE RELEVANT TO US
WON in determining the taxable net
estate of the decedent, one-half () of the
net estate should be deducted therefrom as
the share of the surviving spouse.
HELD & RD
YES. The SC held that in determining the
taxable net estate of the decedent, of the
net estate should be deducted as the share of
the surviving spouse in accordance with our
law on CPG. Thus, only the one-half share of
Walter in the conjugal partnership property
constituted his hereditary estate subject to
estate and inheritance taxes.
Under the old CC, where one spouse is a
foreigner and there is no ante-nuptial
agreement, it is the national law of the
husband that becomes the dominant law in
determining property relations. Since both are
British citizens, British laws should apply;
however, in the absence of proof of what
English law is, court is justified to indulge in
processual presumption" in presuming that
the law of England is the same as our law.
Cristobal
137 332
Domalagan v. Bolifer
PLAINTIFF:
DEFENDANT:
Jorge Domalagan
Carlos Bolifer
FACTS:
In November 1909, Domalagan and Bolifer
entered into a verbal contract wherein
Domalagan was to pay Bolifer P500 upon the
marriage of their children (son Cipriano
Domalagan and daughter Bonifacia Bolifer). In
August 1910, plaintiff paid P500, together with
the further sum of P16 "as hansel or token of
future marriage." Despite the said agreement,
Bonifacia Bolifer married Laureano Sisi and
upon learning of the marriage, Domalagan
demanded that Bolifer return the P516 he gave
earlier, together with the interest and payment
for damages which he suffered after being
obliged to sell certain real property in order to
fulfill the said contract.
Plaintiff then filed a complaint against
defendant in the Court of First Instance in
Misamis. The defendant presented a general
denial and alleged that there was no cause of
action. The lower court ruled in favor of
Domalagan and ordered Bolifer to return the
sum of P516 with an interest of 6% from Dec.
17, 1910. Defendant then appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
WoN contract was valid and effective
despite being against the provision stated under
paragraph 3, Section 335 of the Code of
Procedure in Civil Action that a contract should
be reduced to writing?
RULING:
Judgment of lower court affirmed.
RATIO:
Yes. The provision does not render oral
contracts invalid. It simply provides the method
by which the contract mentioned may be
proven. A contract may be a perfectly valid
contract even though it is not clothed with the
necessary form. If the parties to an action,
during the trial of the cause, make no objection
to the admissibility of oral evidence to support
contracts like the one in this case and permit
the contract to be proved by evidence other
than in writing, it will be just as binding upon
the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
In this case, the lower court found that a large
preponderance of the evidence showed that the
plaintiff had delivered to the defendant the sum
of P516 in substantially the manner alleged in
the complaint, thus proving the existence and
validity of the said contract.
Cruz
138 332
Serrano v. Solomon
G.R. No. L- 12093 ll Jun. 29, 1959
FACTS:
Melchor Solomon married Alejandria
Feliciano on June 21, 1948. On the same day,
but before the marriage ceremony, he executed
a Deed of Donation where he donated all his
exclusive properties as basic capital for their
conjugal and family life. The donation further
provides in the case that they begot no children
that, should he die before his wife, that his
brothers and sisters will be heirs to of his
property (including those acquired in the
conjugal union) and if the wife dies before him,
that Estanislao Serrano will be heirs to the same
half.
Less than nine months after the
marriage, the wife died. Then, Serrano
commenced the action to enforce the terms
of the donation. Solomon filed a motion for
dismissal and was granted by the trial court,
who ruled that the said donation cannot be
counted as donation propter nuptias because it
was not made in consideration of the marriage
and that the donation was made not to either
of the parties but to a third person. Serrano
appealed the decision.
ISSUE:
WON the donation can be validly
considered as a donation propter nuptias
WON the donation may be held valid and
effective as a donation other than donation
propter nuptias
HELD:
No. The court agrees fully with the trial
court, citing in support Article 1327 of the Civil
Code on donation proper nuptias, which was
reproduced for Article 126 of the New Civil
Code1. Whether the Old Civil Code (as the
marriage was contracted in 1948) or the New
Civil Code will apply, the result will be the same.
The court questioned whether the
donation was made in consideration of their
marriage or in consideration of the death of
either of them in the absence of children. The
court ruled that marriage in itself was not the
only consideration or condition; it must be a
childless marriage and either spouse must die
before for the donation to operate.
Even granting that it is in consideration of
the marriage, the donation was not in favor of
the wife but of Serrano. Citing Manresas
commentary, the court said that donations
granted to persons other than the spouses even
If founded on the marriage are among those
excluded from those excluded from Art. 1327.
No. It cannot be considered a donation
inter vivos because it was never accepted by
the donee either in the same instrument or
donation or in a separate document as required
by law.
Neither can it be considered a donation
mortis causa because the donor is still alive,
and time and occasion have not arrived for
considering its operation and implementation,
and, as it will be counted equivalent to a last
will, it must conform to the strict requisites and
provisions for executing wills, which the
donation does not.
Dantes
139 332
Solis v. Barroso
G.R. No. L- 27939 ll Avancena, J.
DOCTRINE:
Donations Propter Nuptias are covered by
Title II Book III of CC (Arts618-656). Under Art
633 CC, a donation of real property is valid only
if it is made in a public instrument.
NOT fall under Art1279 CC. REVERSED on the ff

grounds:
FACTS:
The spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima
Barroso made a donation propter nuptias in
favour of their son Alejo and his fiance
Fortunata
One of the conditions of the donation is
that in case of the death of one of the
donees, one-half () of the lands donated
would revert to the donors.
2 months after the marriage, Alejo died.
Juan, the father, died in the same year.
Maxima Barroso, the mother, recovered
possession of the donated lands, for which
Fortunata, Alejos wife, filed an action
demanding the execution of the proper
deed of donation
The lower court ruled in Fortunatas
favour, basing the judgement on Art 1279
CC (relating to contracts).
Hence this appeal by the Barrosos.
ISSUES:
WON the donation propter nuptias in this
case is valid
WON the same is cov ered by A r t 1 2 7 9
CC relating to contracts.
HOLDING & RATIO:
The donation is NOT VALID and it DOES
Donation propter nuptias, according to Art

1328 CC, is governed by Title II, Book III
of the Civil Code (Arts 618-656)
Art 633 CC provides that a donation of
real property is valid only if it is made
in a public instrument.
o Only exceptions to Art 633 CC:
onerous and remuneratory donations
Therefore, the donation propter nuptias
in this case was NOT VALID and did not
create any right since it was not made in a
public instrument.
The lower court was in error when it
considered the donation onerous, which,
pursuant to Art 622 CC, would make the
donation fall under the rules on contracts.
The donation was made only in
consideration of marriage and not, as may
be inferred in Art 619 CC, for donations for
valuable considerations.
In donations propter nuptias, the
marriage is really a consideration, but
not necessary to give b i r t h t o the
obligation. Even without marriage,
t h e r e may be a valid donation propter
nuptias, and such a donation would forever
be valid even if no marriage ever took
place.
This is so because the marriage in a
donation propter nuptias is a resolutory
condition and not a condition necessary for
the birth of the obligation.
De Castro
140 332
Mateo v. Lagua
G.R. No. L- 26270 ll Oct. 30, 1969 ll J.B.L. Reyes, J.
PETITIONERS:
RESPONDENTS:
Bonifacia Mateo, et. al.

Gervasio Lagua, et. al.
FACTS:
Cipriano Lagua = owner of the 3 parcels of
land
Cipriano Lagua and Alejandro Dumlao are
the parents of Alejandro Lagua
Alejandro Lagua was to be married to
Bonifacia Mateo
Cipriano Lagua, in a public instrument,
donated 2 out of the 3 lots to his son in
consideration of the latters marriage
The newlyweds took possession of the
properties but the Certificate of Title
remained in the donors name
o 6 years later, Alejandro Lagua died, his
wife and daughter stayed with Cipriano
Lagua
Cipriano Lagua undertook the farming of the
donated lots
o At start, he was giving the owners share
o After 3 years, he refused to deliver the
share
o Mateo filed a case for possession and
damages = GRANTED
Cipriano Lagua executed a deed of sale of
the same 2 parcels in favor of his younger
son, Gervasio Lagua
o Share of the proceeds of the land were
still being given to Mateo until 1965
o On the stopping of the share, she found
out about the sale
o She filed for recovery of possession of
the properties = GRANTED
Gervasio Lagua filed for annulment of the
donation of the 2 lots
o ARGUMENT: When Cipriano donated the
lots (which were allegedly the only
properties he owned), he neglected
leaving something for his own support
and for Gervasios legitime as forced heir.
o Cipriano Lagua died while case was
pending
ISSUE:
WON inofficious donations can be reduced
HELD:
YES
DPN properties may be reduced for being
inofficious
DPN are without onerous consideration (no
obligation burdening the done), the
marriage being merely the occasion or
motive for the donation, not its causa.
o They are subjection to reduction if they
should infringe the legitime of a forced
heir
Steps to consider in determining legal share of
compulsory heirs
1) Net estate = Value of properties at the time
of death LESS payable obligations and
charges
2) Net Estate + all donations subject to
collation
3) Determination of legitimes per heir
In order to say that a donation is inofficious,

it should be proven that it exceeds that of
the disposable free portion plus the donees
share as legitime in the properties of the
donor
o Pieces of evidence to such are
incomplete. They lacked proof that
these were the only properties of
Cipriano Lagua and that there are only 2
heirs left.
DISMISSED
Dilag
141 332
Nazareno v. Birog
FACTS:
Andrea Rodriguez and Juan Aben were
married and had a daughter named Alberta
Aben. Their daughter Alberta later got
married to Mariano Meleno Nazareno and
had a child named Bonifacio Nazareno. When
Juan Aben died, Andrea got married to Cirilo
Braganza. Andrea and her second husband
Cirilo had no offspring.
In March 1917, Cirilo executed a deed of
donation of land to his then six-year old stepgrandson Bonifacio. The donation was
accepted in the same deed by Alberta and
Mariano, parents of Bonifacio. Cirilo
continued to possess and enjoy the land.
Begin ning in 1930, Cirilo sold portions of the
land:
1930
1933
1934
71 ares and 30 centares to Birog for

1, 100 (paid)
2 hectares to Birog for 2, 200
(initially with remaining balance of
300, later paid 275, wrote
promissory note for 25)
1 hectare and 70 ares to Ariola for
1, 600 (balance of 600, promissory
note for that sum payable at end of
Feb or March 1935)
These two buyers immediately took

possession of the land and cultivated them.
Cirilo died on Dec.1934 and since Ariola
had not paid by Feb 1935, plaintiff wrote
him a letter demanding the payment.
Pedro Braganza (brother of Cirilo) collected
balanc e of 25 from Birog in March1935.
Hence, the contest for land ownership is
between the donee (Nazareno) and buyers of
land (Birog and Ariola).
ISSUE:
WON Nazareno, may recover title and
possession of a parcels of land described? NO
HELD/ RATIO:
Not only did Nazareno lose ownership of
the two portions of the land that the
Birogs and Ariolas possess, he signed a
deed in favor of Ariola on the third and
last portion; therefore, he is estopped
from claiming the land.
More importantly, appeal must be
dismissed since Nazareno has no cause
of action under Art.1335 OCC. The
donation was made by the husband to
a grandchild of his wife by a previous
marriage. When the donation was
made, the spouses were already
married hence it falls under the
prohibition provided by law. Donations
from the spouse to the children, as
well as grandchildren, of the other by a
previous marriage are void.
Neither has the plaintiff acquired the
land by prescription for there is no
evidence that he ever possessed it or
claimed it against his grandfather (as
evident in deed in favor of Ariola,
signed by Nazareno as witness).
NOTE:
This is a wrong decision since the doctrine
cannot be applied to all cases. For example,
when the grandchildren already have children
of their own, the spouse of the original owner
can no longer benefit from the donation since
he/she will cease to be a compul sory heir of the
grandchild.
Dolot
142 332
Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L- 28771 ll Mar. 31, 1971 ll Fernando, J.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:
CORNELIA MATABUENA,
PETRONILA CERVANTES
FACTS:
Plaintiff seeks to reverse the lower court
decision declaring the donation of his deceased
brother to defendant as valid, even though it
was done when they were in a common-law
relationship. She claims that a donation made by
her brother while living martially without the
benefit of marriage to defendant was void.
There was stipulation of FACTS which both sides
agreed upon, which are:
defendant asserts her ownership precisely

because such donation was made in 1956 & her
marriage to the deceased did not take place
until 1962. The lower court agreed with the
defendant.
1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned

the property in question;
2) That Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of
Donation inter vivos in favour of defendant,
Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land
in question on Feb. 20, 1956, which same
donation was accepted by the defendant;
3) That the donation of the land to the
defendant which took effect immediately
was made during the common-law
relationship as husband and wife between
the defendant-donee and the now deceased
donor, and later they were married on
March 28, 1962;
4) That Felix Matabuena died intestate on
Sept. 13, 1962;
5) That the plaintiff claims the property by
reason of being the only sister and nearest
collateral relative of the deceased by virtue
of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed
by her in 1962 and had the land declared in
her name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon.
HELD:
YES. The court explained that although Art.
133 of CC considers donations between the
spouses during marriage as void, policy
considerations of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality require that the
same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. The Court cited a 1954 CA decision,
Buenaventura v. Bautista1, holding that
donations between common-law spouses fall
within the prohibition and is null and void as
contrary to public policy. The CA decision
further states that: assent to such irregular
connection for 30 years bespeaks greater
influence of one party over the other, so that
the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased, and also: so long as
marriage remains the cornerstone of our family
law, reason and morality alike demand that the
disabilities attached to marriage should likewise
attach to concubinage.
The court further stated that even without
the precedent, any other conclusion cannot
stand the test of scrutiny, bec. it would be to
indict the framers of the CC for a failure to apply
a laudable rule to a situation w/c in its essentials
cannot be distinguished. If there is ever any
occasion where the principle of StatCon that
what is within the spirit of the law is as much a
part of it as what is written, this is it. Whatever
omission may be apparent in an interpretation
purely literal of the language used must be
remedied by an adherence to its avowed
objective.
However, the court stated that the lack of
The plaintiff, alleging absolute ownership of

the parcel of land in question, stated that the
donation made by her brother to defendant was
null and void under Art. 133 of the Civil Code,
which states that: Every donation between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void. This
prohibition does not apply when the donation
takes effect after the death of the donor.
Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate
gifts which the spouses may give each other on
the occasion of any family rejoicing. The
ISSUE:
WON the ban on a donation between the
spouses during a marriage applies to commonlaw relationships.
Enad
143 332
Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L- 28771 ll Mar. 31, 1971 ll Fernando, J.
validity of the donation does not necessarily
result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the
disputed property. After all, her brother and the
defendant were legally married; w/c makes the
defendant her brothers widow. As provided for
in the CC, defendant is entitled to of the
inheritance, and the plaintiff, as surviving sister,
to the other half.
Lower court decision reversed. Questioned

donation declared void, with the rights of both
parties as heirs recognized. Case remanded to
the lower court.
NOTE: There are annotations in the last part of
the case that expounds on donations.
Enad
144 332
Harding v. Commercial Union

G.R. No. L- 12707 ll Aug. 10, 1918
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE:
Mrs. Henry E. Harding and her husband
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Commercial Union Assurance Company
- There was no proof that the gift was not a
FACTS:
moderate one, thus falling under the
Mr. Henry E. Harding purchased a
exception in the article above. The Court
Studebaker automobile, which he then gave to
could not rule on whether the gift was
his wife.
moderate, because such a decision would
With his consent, she acquired from
depend
purely
on
the
couples
defendants agent, Smith, Bell & Company, Ltd.,
circumstances.
None
of
this
is
in the
an insurance policy for the car worth P3,000,
records.
based on the its present value.
- The defendant is not in a position to
The car was totally destroyed in a fire, and
challenge the validity of the donation.
the iron and steel parts that did not burn were
Commercial Union bore absolutely no
taken by Smith, Bell & Company and sold. The
relation to the Hardings during the donation,
proceeds of the sale were not tendered to the
and thus had no rights or interests in it at the
plaintiff before the trial. (During the trial,
however, P10 was tendered to the plaintiff as
time.
proceeds of the sale. The plaintiffs refused this
Certain transfers from husband to wife or
sum.)
vice-versa are prohibited. However, the
Thus, the instant petition is for the recovery
prohibition can be taken advantage of only by
of the P3,000 from the defendant. Commercial
persons bearing a relation to the parties who
Union argued that because the car was a gift
are making the transfer, or to the property
from Mrs. Hardings husband, such gift is void
itself, where the transfer interferes with their
under the Civil Code, Art. 1334 of which states,
rights or interests. Unless such relationship is
All gifts between spouses during the
proven, the validity of the transfer cannot be
marriage shall be void. Moderate gifts which the
assailed.
spouses bestow on each other on festive days of
In addition, the Court did not believe Mrs.
the family are not included in this rule.
Harding was guilty of fraud. An expert mechanic
assessed the car, valuing it at P3,000. The cars
ISSUES:
cost, repairs included, was even proven to be
A. Whether the donation from Mr. Harding to
greater than the amount of the insurance. Mrs.
his wife is valid,
Harding had only given the defendant the value
B. (Minor issue) Whether Mrs. Harding was
of P3,000 based on the assessment of the
guilty of fraud in valuing the car at P3,000,
mechanicwhich, the Court said, was not proof
and therefore,
of bad faith.
C. Whether she can make a claim for the
Thus, because the defendant had agreed to
benefits of the insurance policy.
the worth of the car, it was bound by this value.
Having found both the donation and the
RATIO:
The Court ruled in the couples favor on
valuation valid, the Court concluded that Mrs.
both issues.
Harding was entitled to the benefits of her cars
insurance policy.
The donation was valid. The Court ruled so
for two reasons:
Espaola
145 332
Sumbad v. CA
FACTS:
After the death of his wife Agata B. Tait,
George K. Tait, Sr. lived a common-lawrelationship with Maria F. Tait to whom, in
1974, he donated a certain parcel of
unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc. After
he passed away in 1977, Maria sold lots
including the Sum-at property. She died in 1988.
A year after, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and
Beatrice Tait, daughters of George Tait with
Agata Tait, brought an action for quieting of
title, nullification of deeds of sale and recovery
of possession with damages against private
respondents (those who bought the land from
Maria). Petitioners contend that the Deed of
Donation is void because:
According to their witness, it is forged by a
certain Raquel Tait, their fathers ward
It was made in violation of Art 133 of the
Civil Code, now Art 87 of the Family Code
It was notarized by a person who had no
authority to act as a notary public
Maria had no authority to sell the Sum-at
property, making the sales in favour of the
private respondents null and void
Since they only learned of the sales in 1988,
when Maria became seriously ill, they are
not barred from bringing the present
action.
ISSUES:
1) WON the donation executed by George Tait
in favour of Maria Tait is valid and effective
2) WON laches barred the claim of the
plaintiffs.
HELD:
1) Donation is VALID.
The Court ruled that their witnesss
testimony of the forgery was incredible,
vague, and grossly unconvincing since
the statements doesnt ring true and
appear to have been rehearsed. Forgery
should be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. The petitioners
shouldve
presented
handwriting
experts to support their claim.
They also claim that the deed of
donation is invalid under Art 749 of the

Civil Code which requires a public
instrument as a requisite for the validity
of donations of immovable property.
They contend that the person who
notarized the deed had no authority to
do so. However, the person who
notarized it was the deputy clerk of
court who acted For and in the
absence of Clerk of Court. In
accordance with the presumption that
official duty has been performed, its
presumed that he was duly authorized
to by the clerk of court.
Does the deed of donation contravene
with Art 133 of the Civil Code that
states Every donation between the
spouses during the marriage shall be
void. This prohibition doesnt apply
when the donation takes effect after
the death of the donor. Neither does
this prohibition apply to moderate gifts
which the spouses may give each other
on the occasion of any family
rejoicing?
No. Although it was ruled in Matabuena v

Cervantes that Art 133 extends to common-law
relations (as can now be seen in Art 87 FC:
...the prohibition shall apply to persons living
together as husband and fife without a valid
marriage.), the petitioners never invoked this
as a ground to invalidate the deed of donation.
Their attack on its validity centred solely on the
allegation that it was forged and that the
notarized by an unauthorized person. Litigants
cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal
as this would contravene the basic rules of fair
play and justice.
o Assuming that they arent prevented by
this rule, they were still unable to
present evidence in support of such a
claim. The evidence on record doesnt
show whether George was married to
Maria, and if so, where the marriage
took place. If Maria was not married to
their father, evidence shouldve been
presented to show that at the time the
deed was executed, they were still
Falcone
146 332
Sumbad v. CA
remaining common-law-relations. The
only testimony that they have to that
effect is that in 1941, Maria became
their stepmother. There was no
evidence presented that their father
and Maria were still together until
1974, when the donation was made.
2) Petitioners are guilty of laches for waiting

12 years before claiming their inheritance.
Their father died in 1977 but they only
brought present action in 1989. This
precludes them from assailing the donation
made by their father in favour of Maria.
**Laches failure or neglect for an

unreasonable length of time to do that
which, by exerting due diligence, could
or should have done earlier.
All in all, petitioners have not sufficiently
shown the nullity of private respondents title
to the lots. Furthermore, assuming that they
never knew of the existence of the Deed of
Donation, its impossible for them to not notice
that the land had been occupied by the
defendants and their families. They waited until
Maria had died before assailing the validity of
the sales.
Falcone
147 332
Ching v. Goyanko
Nature:
Petition for review on certiorari of a
decision of the CA
RULING:
Petition denied for lack of merit
FACTS:
Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz
married bore Joseph Evely Jerry Imelda etc
1961, parents acquired 661 sqm property in
Cebu but as they were chinese citizens,
property was registeredin the name of aunt,
Sulpicia Vetura
May 1993, Sulpicia executed a deed of sale
over property in favor of father Goyanko. That
same year, October, a deed of sale over the
property in favor of his common-law wife Maria
Ching was executed
After death of father on 1996, respondents
discovered that ownership had already been
transferred. They had the signature verified and
PNP Crime Lab found the signature to be a
forgery. Filed for nullification of deed of sale
Petitioner claimed that she is the actual
owner of the property as it was she who
provided its purchase price. Presented notary
public who testified Goyanko appeared and
signed document in his presence
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, finding that
the signature was genuine and that the
transaction undertaken was only temporary and
transitory on the part of Joseph Goyanko. Said
court also said that Torrens title is not subject
to collateral attack
Upon appeal to the CA, Ca ruled in reverse,
saying that the property having been acquired
during existence of a valid marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
and that no evidence has been shown that
there was a judicial decree of dissolution of
marriage.
CA also ruled that the fact that Joseph
Goyangko and Maria Ching were living a
common-law relationship, Art 1352 of the Civil
Code provides that the contract of sale, for
being contrary to morals and public policy

produces no effect.
ISSUES:
A. WON proscription against sale of property
between spouses applies even to common
law relationships
B. WON a judicial relation of trust between
Joseph Goyanko and petitioner can validly
exist between them
HELD:
a) Yes
Art 1409 Civil Code: contracts whose
cause, object or purposes is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, pub order
and policy are void and inexistent from
the beginning
Art 1352: Contracts w/o cause, or with
unlawful cause, produce no effect
whatsoever.
Also, law emphatically prohibits
spouses from selling property as well
as giving donations to each other. *
Law prohibits spouses from selling
property to each other because
o If allowed, transfers and
conveyances would destroy the
system of conjugal partnership
o Designed to prevent the
exercise of undue influence by
one spouse over the other.
Also apply to common-law spouses,
otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be
better than those in legal union
As conveyance in question was made
by Goyanko in favor of his commonlaw wife, it was null and void
b) Does not persuade
Petitioners testimony that it was she
who provided the purchase price is
uncorroborated, Even if she was
considered the breadwinner of the
family does not conclusively clinch her
claim
Hermosisima
148 332
Onas v. Javillo
FACTS:
Crispulo Javillo contracted two marriages.
His first marriage was with Ramona Levis where
they had 5 children [petitioners-appellees]. Ater
Ramonas death, he married Rosario Onas
[oppositor-appellant] where four children were
born. During the first marriage, 11 parcels of
land were acquired while 20 parcels of land
were acquired during the 2nd marriage.
Crispulo Javillo died intestate on the 18th of
May, 1927 and Santiago Andrada was named
administrator of his estate. He submitted two
projects of partition, the first disapproved by
the lower court and second partition is the one
now on appeal in this case. Partition was made
on the claim that the properties of the 2nd
marriage were products of the first marriage.
Appellant now alleges that the lower court
committed the following errors:
1. All the properties acquired during the
second marriage were acquired with the
properties of the first marriage.
2. Lower court erred in approving the partition
dated Sept. 9, 1931 notwithstanding that
the same did not include all of the
properties of the deceased, Crispulo Javillo.
ISSUES:
1) WON the community partnership shall
continue to exist between the surviving
spouse and the heirs of the deceased
spouse.
2) WON the properties of the second marriage
can be claimed as products of the
properties of the first marriage.
3) WON the partition that was approved by
the lower court is valid.
HELD:
Judgment of the lower court is reversed and
case REMANDED for further proceedings.
RD:
1. NO. Gutierrez adopting the view of
Matienzo states that: When the marriage is
dissolved, the cause that brought about the
community ceases, for the principle of an
ordinary partnership are not applicable to
this community, which is governed by
special rules. Provisions of law governing
the subject should cease to have any effect
for the community of property is admissible
and proper in so far as it conforms to unity
of life, to the mutual affection between
husband and wife, and serve as a
recompense for the care of preserving and
increasing the property; all of which
terminates by the death of one of the
partners.
Community terminates when the
marriage is dissolved or annuled or when
during the marriage an agreement is
entered into to divide the conjugal
property. The conjugal partnership does not
exist as long as the spouses are united.
2. NO. Whatever is acquired by the surviving
spouse on the dissolution if the partnership
by death or presumption of death whether
the acquisition be made by his or her
lucrative title, it forms part of his or her
own capital, in which the other consort, or
his or her heirs, can claim no share.
3. NO. The project of partition approved the
lower court is based on the absurd claim
that it does not appear that there was
liquidation of the partnership of property of
the first marriage nor does it appear that
they asked for such liquidation. Partition
was based on the erroneous assumption
that the properties of the second marriage
were produced by the properties of the first
marriage. Partition is not in conformity with
the law.
Macariola
149 332
Vda. De Delizo v. Delizo

Jan. 30, 1976
FACTS:
In dispute are the conjugal properties of
Nicolas Delizo from his first and second
marriages. Delizo was married to Rosa Villasfer
from 1981 to 1909 and to Dorotea de Ocampo
from 1911 to 1957. The partition for the
separation was initiated by the heirs of the first
marriage whose claims were refuted by the
claims of the second marriage. The main
problem was that they could not agree on
which properties fell under the property regime
of the first marriage and which fell under the
second. This was complicated because of the
extensive scope of properties Delizo acquired
throughout his lifetime17 pieces of property
were under consideration. In particular,
however, 66-hectares found in Caanawan,
Nueva Ecija are being disputed. While the trial
court and Court of Appeals found that it was
acquired during the first marriage, the division
of the fruits of the properties was not clear
mainly because majority of the improvement of
the 66-hectare property were implemented
during the second marriage; only 20 hectares of
the 66 were cultivated during the first marriage.
This was made more complicated by the fact
that although only 20 hectares were cultivated
during the first marriage, it was the money
made from the 20 hectares that was used to
acquire all subsequent property. Taking those
facts into consideration, the Court of Appeals
held that 20% of all properties acquired during
the first marriage should go to the children of
the first marriage and 80% to the conjugal
partnership of Nicolas and Dorotea.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the lands
composing the Caanawan properties could not
have been the properties of the first marriage
because they were public lands before
becoming homesteads. According to the law, it
was only after 5 years of cultivation that lands
from the public domain would be given to the
occupant. The court also held that possession of
these lands was not established during the start
of the occupation but at the precise time that
the occupants were given ownership. However,
although the first marriage did not technically
own any lands and imparted to its heirs only
inchoate rights, the Court held that justice and
equity demanded that the rights to the
properties by apportioned in proportion to the
extent to which the requirements of the public
land laws had been complied with during the
existence of each conjugal partnership. Since
the capital of either marriage could not be
determined with mathematical precision, the
Court divided the total mass of the properties in
proportion to the duration of each partnership.
Thus the second conjugal partnership had 46/64
of the total mass of properties and the first
18/64. Of these Nicolas is entitled to half;
32/64. Dorotea and her heirs are entitled to
23/64 while Rosa Villasfers share would be
9/64. Each of the kids of the first marriage are
entitled to 142/1664 of the entire estate while
the children of the second marriage are entitled
to 64/1664 of the all the properties.
ISSUE:
How much were each of the heirs of Nicolas
Delizo entitled to given the fact that properties
acquired during his first and second marriages
could not be divided with mathematical
precision?
Marin
150 332
Lim v. Garcia
FACTS:
Hilario Lim died intestate in 1903. The trial
court ruled that the entire estate had been
conjugal property except a house and a sum of
10,000 pesos. The children of the deceased filed
an appeal against the widow to reverse the
decision.
ISSUE:
WoN the estate was really conjugal
property considering that the widow brought
nothing to the conjugal partnership as it was
alleged?
HELD:
Yes, the properties are conjugal. It is
presumed that all the estate of the married
couple will be considered conjugal partnership
property unless proven that it is a part of the
separate estate of the husband and wife.
The buildings in question were constructed
out of partnership funds - the building erected
during the coverture on land belonging to one
of the married couple will be considered as
conjugal partnership property.
Nuez
151 332
Rodriguez v. De La Cruz
G.R. No. L- 3629
FACTS:
Matea Rodriguez (plaintiff) filed a complaint
in the CFI Albay against the children of her
husband from his first marriage (defendants) for
the purpose of recovering certain parcels of
lands. Plaintiff claims that:
1. She acquired said lands during her first
marriage from her deceased father
2. She had permission from Hilarion to
commence this action in her own name
against his children
3. Hilarion had been administering said lands
during the entire period of his marriage to
her.
However, CFI Albay dismissed the case in
favor Hilarions children through his first
marriage and found from evidence during trials,
that said lands described were acquired by
Hilarion during his marriage to his first wife, one
Andrea de Leon and that said lands were not
acquired by plaintiff from her father. The lands
in question were granted to the children of
Hilarion from his first marriage. Rodriguez
appealed to the SC.
ISSUES AND RULINGS:

(1) WON Hilarion was the owner of said
lands since he had been administering the lands
in question during the entire period of his
marriage to Matea.
NO. There is no provision in the Civil Code
which prohibits a husband from administering
the property of his wife. Just because he has
been administering it for a long time doesnt
mean it is his. The mere fact that she had
permitted her husband to administer her
property (even without delivering the same to
her husband by means of a public document1)
does not mean that she has forfeited the same
in favor of her husband.
(2) WON the CFI Albay err in finding that
Hilarion acquired the land in question during his
marriage to Andrea de Leon?
YES. SC examined the evidence adduced
during the lower court trials and found that the
lands in question were acquired by Matea from
her deceased father through inheritance. Cause
remanded to the lower court with direction that
a judgment be entered declaring that the said
plaintiff is the owner.
Ordoyo
152 332
PBT Co. v. Register of Deeds

May 5, 1934 ll Moran, J.
PETITIONER - APPELLANT: Peoples Bank and Trust Co.,
RESPONDENT-APPELLEE: The Register of Deeds for the City of Manila,
DOCTRINE:
To the wife belongs the management of the
fruits of her paraphernal property, which has
not been delivered to her husband under the
formalities prescribed by the law, while such
fruits remain unliquidated, on the ground that
they answer for the necessary and
indispensable expenses incurred in the
administration and preservation of the property
FACTS:
Domina Angeles, married to Manuel
Sandoval from whom she lives separate and
apart, executed an instrument in favor of
Peoples Bank and Trust Company where she
conveyed in trust her paraphernal property
consisting of three parcels of land with two
buildings thereof. Trust was constituted in order
that lots would be subdivided and sold and that
trustee would collect the rents to be derived
from the property. Registration for the
instrument was denied upon presentation at
the Register of Deeds for the City of Manila.
Petitioner brought the matter in consulta
before the Court of First Instance but the
registration was still denied. CFI held that
instrument was null and void because it lacked
the consent of the husband given that such
fruits were considered conjugal partnership
property, management of which corresponds to
the husband.
ISSUE:
WON wife may authorize in trust the
collection of fruits of her paraphernal property
HELD:
YES. Article 1387 of the Civil Code says that
the fruits of the paraphernal property, which
are conveyed in trust, belong to the conjugal
partnership, management of which belongs to
the husband of the grantor. However, according
to the deed of trust, the grantor neither parts
with nor conveys the rent of her paraphernal
property. Trust instrument merely authorized
Peoples Bank and Trust Company to collect
rent of paraphernal property. Such act was

merely an act of administration of the
paraphernal property which the wife has yet to
deliver to her husband for purpose of
conferring management upon him.
Applying the doctrine aforementioned, the
grantors husband cannot claim the fruits in
question for their conjugal partnership until a
liquidation thereof has been made by her.
Husband only acquires the right to claim the
fruits for the conjugal partnership upon the
liquidation by the wife.
Failure to comply with the requisite
prescribed in article 1387 (consent of husband)
merely renders the contract voidable, right of
action exclusively belonging to husband or his
heirs.
Decision reversed, Register of Deeds for the
city of Manila ordered to register instrument in
question
Manresas commentaries were cited, which
according to Court, supported their ruling
- The management of paraphernal property
conferred upon the wife by article 1384 of the CC
carries with it the power to enter into contracts
regarding the same, subject only to the limitation
contained in article 1387, the wife personally
defraying the expenses incurred therein as a
consequence, without prejudice to the liabilities to
which such property is subject, in accordance with
the provisions of article 1385 (November, 1898)
- Management of the paraphernal property by the
wife should be conducted in accordance with the
provisions of article 1384 of the CC, which only
differs from the former law in that for such acts and
contracts executed in connection with said
management the wife does not need marital consent
(October 1918)
- Prohibition in article 1387 must be construed in a
restrictive manner; the wife may legally perform
every act not intended to alienate, mortgage or
otherwise encumber her paraphernal property, she
being authorized to execute contracts arising from
the administration of an estate, and consequently to
Pagdanganan
153 332
PBT Co. v. Register of Deeds

May 5, 1934 ll Moran, J.
obtain loans, without marital consent, for the benefit
of said property (January, 1928)
Pagdanganan
154 332
Philippine Sugar Estates v. Poizat

FACTS:
Poizat was given general power of
attorney, which authorized him to enter
transactions in the name of his wife.
Poizat obtained loan from PSED
(plaintiffs). To secure this loan, he mortgaged
properties of his wife.
However, he failed to pay this loan and
the properties he mortgaged were foreclosed
and sold to PSED.
Wife questioned sale to PSED, contending
that her husband executed mortgage illegally
and was not authorized. (Poizat signed
mortgage in his own name, not in as the
attorney-in-fact)
Trial court ruled against wife. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the mortgage executed by Poizat
and the subsequent sale of properties to
PSED was valid
HELD:
No. Poizat signed the contract in his own
name. Evidence suggested that he executed
the contract as a personal act, not as
attorney-in-fact of his wife.
Properties sold were paraphernal /

exclusive to wife before and during the
marriage. Hence, it could only be mortgaged
if executed in the wifes name, place, or
stead.
Although Poizat was given general power
of attorney, the law specifies how and in what
manner he should have executed the
mortgage
Art. 1713 in the CC provides that: In
order to compromise, alienate, mortgage, or
to execute any other act of strict ownership,
an express power is required.
In this case, by signing the mortgage in his
own name, Poizat did not exercise the
express power granted to him by his wife.
Because of this, the mortgage and sale of
the properties to PSED were declared
NULL and VOID. RTC ruling reversed.
Dissenting opinion of Villa-Real:
Upon signing and conveying power of
attorney, such an act was tantamount to
giving husband authority to encumber
property.
Poblador
155 332
Castro v. Miat
TOPIC: Exclusive Property
HELD: No. The property involved is part
of the conjugal properties of the spouses
because it was acquired during the
marriage. CC provisions apply in this
case.
FACTS:
Moises and Condordia acquired 2 parcels
of land during their marriage. Then
Concordia died. The balance for the Paco
property was paid for after her death, and
the property was registered under Moises'
name. The 2 properties were promised to
their sons, however, Moises asked his sons if
he could keep one of the properties, and they
agreed. The same was witnessed by other
family members. In the end, Moises handed
the owner's duplicate of the Paco property
title to Romeo. The 2 sons (Romeo and
Alexander) shared the Paco property.
Alexander sold his half to his brother (who
gave him 6k as downpayment). Later, Romeo
found out that their father mortgaged the
property for 30k to the Castros.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Paco property was conjugal or
capital
2. WON there was a valid oral partition
covering said property
3. WON the Castro spouses were buyers in
bad faith
HELD:
(1) The Paco property is conjugal. The
same was acquired during the marriage even
though the balance for it was only paid for
after the death of Concordia. Since the couple
was married before the FC, the CC applies.
According to Article 153(1) of the New Civil
Code:
Art. 153(1)
The following
property:
are
conjugal
partnership
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during

the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
Also, Article 160 of the New Civil Code
provides that:
all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. 1
(2) Yes. The oral partition is valid. The
court relied on Moises' letter to Romeo which
stated, "ANG BAHAY AY PARA SA INYONG
DALAWA, LALO NA NGAYONG MAY ASAWA
NA KAYONG PAREHO." and on Moises' Bro's
testimony that before Concordia died, there
was an agreement that the Paraaque
property would go to Moises while the Paco
property would go to Romeo and Alexander.
This was reiterated at the deathbed of
Concordia. When Moises returned to Manila
for good, the agreement was affirmed in front
of the extended Miat family members. Also,
Alexander
accepted
his
brother's
downpayment for his share of the land.
The Court also pointed out that the
Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the
New Civil Code doesn't apply because
partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyance of real property, considering that
it involves not a transfer of property from one
to the other but rather, a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property that an
heir is renouncing in favor of another heir
who accepts and receives the inheritance.
(3) No, they are not buyers in good faith.
Petitioner Virgilio Castro admitted in his
testimony that Romeo told him that Moises
had given the Paco property to them. Castro
knew that Moises had no right to sell the
property
belonging
to
his
son.
Quiambao
156 332
Jocson v. CA
As interpreted by this Court, the party who
invokes this presumption must first prove that
the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. In other words, proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition
sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
FACTS:
Emilio Jocson was married to Alejandra
Poblete, who had two surviving children,
Moises and Agustina.
There are three documents by sale to
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez that covers almost all
of Emilios properties, including his one-third
(1/3) share in the estate of his wife.
Moises Jocson assails the documents and
prays that they be declared null and void and
the properties subject matter therein be
partitioned between him and Agustina as the
only heirs of their deceased parents. These
documents of sale are:
Six (6) parcels of land, all located at
Naic, Cavite, for the sum of P10,000.00
pesos
Two rice mills and a camarin for P5,000
pesos
Extrajudicial partition of the unsettled
estate of Alejandra Poblete, dividing the
same into three parts, one-third (1/3)
each for the heirs of the wife, wherein
Emilio sold his share to Agustina for
P8,000 pesos.
Moises claimed that the properties
mentioned, except the extrajudicial partition
are the unliquidated conjugal properties of
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, which the
former, therefore, cannot validly sell. (This is
the main contention of Moises pertinent to our
class)
ISSUE:
WON
conjugal
the
properties
are
considered
HELD:
NO
Moises invoked Art 160 of the CC which
state:
All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
The party who invokes this presumption
must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage
Proof of acquisition during the coverture is
a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership.
The fact that the properties were registered
in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the
properties were acquired during the spouses'
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts
The certificates of title show that the
properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the
registered owner. This is so because the words
"married to' preceding "Alejandra Poblete' are
merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio
Jocson
There being no showing also that the
camarin and the two ricemills, which are the
subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal properties of
the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete, they should be considered, likewise, as
the
exclusive
properties
of
Emilio.
Quilala
157 332
Francisco v. CA
DOCTRINES:
All property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
> Burden of proving that property is exclusive or
conjugal rests upon the party asserting it.
> Names in titles or in deeds are just indications
do not automatically rebut the above
presumption.
FACTS:
Teresita Francisco alleges that since her
marriage on February 10, 1962 with Eusebio,
she and her husband have acquired the
following:
(1) A sari-sari store, a residential house and lot,
and an apartment house,
(2) A house and lot at Barrio San Isidro,
Rodriguez, Rizal.
She further avers that these properties
were administered by Eusebio until he was
invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart
disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him
unfit to administer them. She also claims that
his children his first marriage succeeded in
convincing their father to sign a general power
of attorney which authorized Conchita
Evangelista (daughter) to administer the house
and lot together with the apartments situated
in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit
for damages and for annulment of said general
power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its
enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be
declared as the administratrix of the properties
in dispute.
However, trial court eventually favored the
respondents for it found that the Teresita failed
to adduce proof that said properties were
acquired during the existence of the second
conjugal partnership, or that they pertained
exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the court
ruled that those properties belong exclusively
to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to
administer them. CA affirmed this decision.
ISSUES:
WON said properties were part of their
conjugal property
HELD:
NO, it was not a part of their conjugal
property. Petitioner lacks merit.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides
that all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. However, the party
who invokes this presumption must first prove
that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. Needless to say, the
presumption refers only to the property
acquired during the marriage and does not
operate when there is no showing as to when
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
In this case, petitioner failed to adduce
ample evidence to show that the properties
which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired
during her marriage with Eusebio.
With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite,
Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner failed to refute the
testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the
same from his parents. Interestingly, petitioner
even admitted that Eusebio brought into their
marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of
a possessor only as it was not yet registered in
his name.
Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property
prior or subsequent to his second marriage is
inconsequential. The property should be
regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of
law, pursuant to Article 148 of the New Civil
Code.
Essentially, property already owned by a
spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to
the marriage, is considered his or her separate
property. Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to
properties acquired gratuitously and include
those acquired by either spouse during the
marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or
donation (hence, it is still a separate property
even if obtained during marriage).
Ramos
158 332
Francisco v. CA
As regards the house, apartment and sarisari store, private respondents aver that these
properties were either constructed or
established by their father during his first
marriage. On the other hand, petitioner insists
that the said assets belong to conjugal
partnership. In support of her claim, petitioner
relied on the building permits for the house and
the apartment, with her as the applicant
although in the name of Eusebio. She also
invoked the business license for the sari-sari
store issued in her name alone. However, the
aforementioned documents in no way prove
that the improvements were acquired during
the second marriage. And the fact that one is
the applicant or licensee is not determinative
of the issue as to whether or not the property
is conjugal or not.
Regarding the property at San Isidro,

Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents assert
that their father purchased it during the lifetime
of their mother. In contrast, petitioner claims
ownership over said property inasmuch as the
title thereto is registered in the name of
Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita
Francisco.
The fact that the land was registered in the
name of Eusebio Francisco, married to
Teresita Francisco, is no proof that the
property was acquired during the spouses
coverture. The phrase married to preceding
Teresita Francisco is merely descriptive of
the civil status of Eusebio Francisco.
Ramos
159 332
Dewara v. Alvero
DOCTRINES:
1. There is a presumption of the conjugal
nature of property and thus the burden of
proof rests on the party asserting
otherwise. (From Art 116 FC)
2. If one of the spouses has no exclusive
property incurs fines and indemnities, the
responsibilities enumerated in Art 161 of
the CC must be first accomplished before
fines and indemnities can be charged to the
conjugal partnership. (From Art 163 CC)
FACTS:
Eduardo and Elenita Dewara were married
before the enactment of the FC. Ed hit Ronnie
Lamela while driving a private jeep. Ed has
no property in his name to pay for the civil
indemnity he incurred. Lamela asked to levy a
certain lot in the name of Elenita to pay for the
indemnity. Petitioner claimed that the levy on
execution of the lot was illegal because the said
property was her paraphernal or exclusive
property and could not be made to answer for
the personal liability of her husband.
Respondent spouses contend that the lot was
conjugal property of the petitioners.
The RTC gave credence to Elenitas account
that it was sold to her by her father and aunt in
order to help her build capital. RTC ruled that it
was in essence, a gratuitous donation and
therefore it was paraphernal property that
could not be used to pay for Eduardos civil
liability.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC, it
ruled that Elenita and Eduardo acquired the
property by onerous title during their marriage
through their common fund. Thus, it belonged
to the conjugal partnership of gains and might
be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities
adjudged against Eduardo. Hence this petition.
and execution sale to answer for the civil

liability adjudged against Eduardo in the
criminal case for serious physical injuries, which
judgment had already attained finality.)
HELD:
The lot retains its conjugal nature. The
Court said that the lot was acquired during their
marriage and that their marriage was governed
by the conjugal partnership of gains. Elenita was
not able to convince the Court that its selling
price was so inadequate to consider it as a
donation. There is a presumption of the
conjugal nature of property and thus the
burden of proof rests on the party asserting
otherwise. The responsibilities enumerated in
Art 161 of the CC must be first accomplished
before Ronnie can be compensated, as provided
by Art 163.
ISSUE:
The sole issue for resolution is whether the
subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive
property of Elenita or the conjugal property of
spouses Elenita and Eduardo.
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable

for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the
cases where she may legally bind the
partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage,
from obligations which constitute a charge
upon property of either spouse or of the
partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation
made during the marriage upon the
separate property of either the husband or
the wife; major repairs shall not be charged
to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal
partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the
education of the children of both the
husband and wife, and of legitimate
children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to
complete a professional, vocational or other
course.
(The answer to this question will define

whether the property may be subject to levy
Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted

by the husband or the wife before the marriage
Reposar
160 332
Dewara v. Alvero
shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary
indemnities imposed upon them be charged to
the partnership.
However, the payment of debts contracted
by the husband or the wife before the marriage,
and that of fines and indemnities imposed upon
them, may be enforced against the partnership
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
Article 161 have been covered, if the spouse
who is bound should have no exclusive property
or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of

the liquidation of the partnership such spouse
shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purposes abovementioned.
Art 116 FC
All property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
Reposar
161 332
Zulueta v. Pan Am
G.R. No. 28589 ll Jan. 8, 1973 ll Concepcion, C.J.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Zulueta, his wife and daughter
were passengers aboard defendants plane
from Honolulu to Manila. Upon reaching Wake
Island the passengers were advised that they
could disembark for a stopover for about 30
minutes. Plaintiff went to the toilet at the
terminal building but finding it full walked 200
yards away. Upon returning he told an
employee of the defendant that they almost
made him miss the flight because of a defective
announcing system. He had a discussion with
either the plan captain or the terminal
manager. He was told that they would open his
bags which here fused and he warned them of
the consequences. Just the same they opened
his bags and found nothing prohibited. They
forced him to go out of the plane and left him at
Wake Island. His wife had to send him money
and he was able to leave Wake Island and
return to Manila thru Honolulu and Tokyo after
two days. This action was to recover damages
from the defendant.
ISSUE:
WON moral damages may be recovered.
HELD:
The records amply establish plaintiffs
right to recover both moral and exemplary
damages. Indeed, the rude and rough reception
plaintiff received at the hands of Sitton or
Captain Zentner when the latter met him at the
ramp (What in the hell do you think you are?
Get on that plane); the menacing attitude of

Zentner or Sitton and the supercilious manner
in which he had asked plaintiff to open his bags
(open your bag, and when told that a fourth
bag was missing, I dont give a damn); the
abusive language and highly scornful reference
to plaintiffs as monkeys by one of PAN AMs
employees (who turning to Mrs. Zulueta
remarked, will you pull these three monkeys
out of here?); the unfriendly attitude, the ugly
stares and unkind remarks to which plaintiffs
were subjected, and their being cordoned by
men in uniform as if they were criminals, while
plaintiff was arguing with Sitton; the airline
officials refusal to allow plaintiff to board the
plane on the pretext that he was hiding a bomb
in his luggage and their arbitrary and highhanded decision to leave him in Wake; Mrs.
Zuluetas having suffered a nervous breakdown
for which she was hospitalized as a result of the
embarrassment, insults and humiliations to
which plaintiffs were exposed by the conduct of
PAN AMs employees; Mrs. Zulueta having
suffered
shame,
humiliation
and
embarrassment for the treatment received by
her parents at the airport all these justify an
award for moral damages resulting from mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings,
moral shock, and social humiliation thereby
suffered by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were awarded
Pesos 500,000.00 and moral damages, Pesos
200,000.00
exemplary
damages,
Pesos
75,000.00attorneys fees and Pesos 5,502.85
actual damages.
Reyes, G.
162 332
Mendoza v. Reyes
G.R. No. L-31618 ll Aug. 17, 1983
Doctrine:
Art 177: CP property - those acquired by
onerous title at the expense of common
fund
Properties acquired during marriage are
presumed to be conjugal in character.
o This is not destroyed by the fact that
the registration of the property is in the
name of only one of the spouses.
FACTS:
Ponciano filed a complaint with CFI of Rizal
for the annulment of the deed of sale of
two parcels of land with their
improvements, executed by his wife, Julia
as vendor and the Mendozas as vendees
o He averred that said properties were
conjugal properties of himself and his
wife and that she had sold them to
petitioners "all by herself" and without
his knowledge or consent
The properties in question were bought on
an installment basis from Gregorio Araneta,
Inc. (representative of J. M. Tuason & Co.).
The spouses were always in arrears in the
payment of the installments due to lack of
money so they had to borrow money from
the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
(RFC) to pay the balance of the properties
in question.
In the deed of absolute sale executed by
Araneta, the vendee named is 'Julia de
Reyes'. Her signature appears over the
caption 'vendee' and those of Ponciano
under the phrase: 'with my marital
consent.'
o The Transfer Certificates of Title were
thus issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, in the name of 'JULIA
REYES married to PONCIANO REYES.'
The mortgage contracts executed by
the spouses in favor of the RFC were
duly registered and annotated on the
back of the said TCTs.
As promised to the RFC, the spouses built a
house and later a camarin on the two lots
which was leased as a school building for 2
years. And when the school was transferred
to another place, the camarin was leased on
December 10, 1952 to Mr. and Mrs.

Mendoza for 10 years. The contract of lease
was signed by Julia as lessor, with the
marital consent of Ponciano.
o In spite of the good rentals they had
been receiving for the building, the
spouses failed to pay their obligations
to the RFC so they had to ask for an
extension of 5 years from DBP, as the
successor of the RFC.
On March 3, 1961, the Reyes spouses were
already living separately and were not in
speaking terms; while Ponciano was absent
attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold
absolutely the lots in question, together
with their improvements to the Mendozas
without the knowledge and consent of
Ponciano. By virtue of such sale, TCTs were
subsequently issued in the name of the
Mendozas.
o Hence, Ponciano filed a case for the
annulment of the deed of sale as
mentioned earlier.
CFI dismissed the complaint and declared
the properties in question as exclusive and
paraphernal properties of Julia, thus she
can validly dispose of the same without the
consent of her husband and that the
Mendozas are innocent purchasers.
CA reversed the decision. Thus, the
petitioners filed separate petitions for
review on certiorari.
ISSUES AND RDs:
WON the properties involved are indeed

conjugal in character, hence the deed of
sale executed by Julia is rightfully voided by
the CA with respect to the share of
Ponciano
o YES.
o The applicable provision of law is Article
153 of the Civil Code which provides:
"ART. 153. The following are
conjugal partnership property:
"(1) That which is acquired by onerous
title during the marriage at the expense
of the common fund, whether the
Reyes, N.
163 332
Mendoza v. Reyes
G.R. No. L-31618 ll Aug. 17, 1983
acquisition be for the partnership, or

for only one of the spouses;"
o The presumption found in Article 160
of the Civil Code must be overcome by
one who contends that the disputed
property is paraphernal.
"ART. 160. All property of the marriage
is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife."
As stated in a precedent, "it is
sufficient to prove that the property
was acquired during the marriage in
order that the same may be
deemed conjugal property."
o The disputed properties were acquired
by onerous title during the marriage,
and the funds used to buy the land and
to build the improvements thereon
came from the loans obtained by the
spouses from RFC.
To rebut the presumption and the
evidence of the conjugal character of the
property, the petitioners have only the
testimony of Julia de Reyes to offer. But her
claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the
ITRs where she made it to appear that the
properties in question are conjugal assets of
the partnership. Also, she made a
statement that the rentals paid by her coappellees were income of the conjugal
partnership.
WON the doctrine of estoppel applies in this
case
o NO.
o It is mentioned that in another case
which is filed against Mr. Reyes, he
stated defenses that he and his wife
never had any kind of fund which could

be called conjugal partnership funds,
that they acted independently from one
another whenever either one engaged
in any business.
o Estoppel can only be invoked between
the
person
making
the
misrepresentation and the person to
whom it was addressed. It is essential
that the latter shall have relied upon
the misrepresentation and had been
influenced and misled thereby.
The alleged misrepresentation was
never addressed to the petitioners,
much less made with the intention
that they would act upon it.
WON the petitioners acted in bad faith
o YES.
o On cross-examination, Mrs. Mendoza
admitted that she learned of the RFC
mortgage when the lots were about to
be purchased.
o Property acquired during a marriage is
presumed to be conjugal and the fact
that the land is later registered in the
name of only one of the spouses does
not destroy its conjugal nature.
o The Mendozas demanded the consent
of Ponciano on the mere lease of the
properties
allegedly
for
their
protection, yet on the actual sale where
there is a transfer of greater rights they
have not required such consent.
WON there is an unjust enrichment of
Ponciano if the deed of sale is nullified
o NO. Mr. Reyes did not receive any part
of the proceeds of the sale and his wife
has been aligning herself with the
Mendoza couple.
Reyes, N.
164 332
Castillo v. Pasco
G.R. No. L-16857 ll May 29, 1964
PROVISION:
Art 118. Property bought on installment
paid partly from exclusive funds of either or
both spouses and partly from conjugal funds
belongs to the buyer/s if full ownership was
vested before the marriage and to the conjugal
partnership if such ownership was vested
during the marriage. In either case, any amount
advanced by the partnership or by either or
both spouses shall be reimbursed by the
owner/s upon liquidation of the partnership.
PETITION:
Review and reversal of the decision of CA
declaring the fishpond in San Roque as the
exclusive paraphernal property of Macaria
Pasco.
RULING:
CA decision revoked and set aside, case
remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
FACTS:
Macaria Pasco is married to Marcelo
Castillo, Sr. During the marriage, Gabriel and
Purificacion Gonzales executed a deed of sale to
the spouses for the fishpond in question. The
fishpond was payable in three installments:
P1000 upon the execution of the deed. This
installment was paid from Pascos own
account.
P2000 paid with the proceeds of the loan
from Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, who later assigned
his interest to Dr. Antonio Pasco.
P3000 paid from a loan secured by a
mortgage on 2 parcels of land assessed in
the name of Macaria Pasco.
ISSUE:
WON the 2nd and 3rd payment came from
the CPG
HELD:
Yes, the loans become obligations of the
CPG.
Using the ruling in Palanca v. Smith Bell that
if money borrowed by the husband alone on
the security of his wifes property is conjugal in
character, a fortiori should it be conjugal when
borrowed by both spouses. The reason
obviously is that the loan becomes an obligation
of the conjugal partnership which is the one
primarily bound for its repayment.
Deeds show that the loans indicate that
Castillo, Sr. and Pasco are joint borrowers of the
Jacinto and Gonzales loans. The loans thus
became obligations of the conjugal partnership
of both debtor spouses, and the money loaned
is logically conjugal property.
Since the fishpond is undivided property of
Pasco and the conjugal partnership with
Castillo, Sr. his heirs are entitled to ask for its
partition and liquidation. The ultimate interest
of each party must be resolved after due
hearing, taking into account:
a) Pascos 1/6 direct share
b) Her half of the community property
c) Her successional rights to a part of Castillo,
Sr.s share pursuant to the governing law of
succession when he died
d) Her right to reimbursement for any amount
advance by her in paying the mortgage
debt.
Sevilla
165 332
Lorenzo v. Nicolas
FACTS:
Lorenzo and Clemente got married
Lorenzos
children
(petitioners)
v.
Clementes grandchildren (respondent)
Petitioners claim that the 2 lands are
conjugal properties and cannot be sold to the
respondents.
Lot 6: she paid P169.16 before her marriage
to Manuel. The P833.32 balance was payable in
installment
Lot 5: she paid P116.84 before her marriage
with Manuel. The P850.32 balance was payable
by installment of P52.32 on the 1 and P42 on
each succeeding year.
ISSUE:
WON 2 lots are conjugal properties
HELD:
NO.
The fact that all receipts for installments
paid even during the lifetime of the late
husband Manuel Lorenzo were issued in the

name of Magdalena
Clemente and that the deed of sale or
conveyance of parcel No. 6 was made in her
name in spite of the fact that Manuel Lorenzo
was still alive shows that the two parcels of land
belonged to Magdalena Clemente.
But since the installments were paid during
the marriage, they are deemed conjugal there
being no evidence that they were paid out of
funds belonging exclusively to Magdalena, such
amounts should be reimbursed to the CPG.
Property bought by either spouse
installment before the marriage and was fully
paid only after the marriage but ownership had
vested on the buyer-spouse before the
marriage is separate property of the buyerspouse, although the installments paid by the
conjugal partnership during the marriage must
be reimbursed to it after liquidation. (SempioDiy)
Tan de Guzman
166 332
Calimlim Canulas v. Fortun

G.R. No. L-57499 ll Jun. 22, 1984
NOTE:
This case was decided in 1984, under the
Civil Code and without the Family Code.
FACTS:
Respondent husband owned a land by
inheritance, on which land the residential house
of his family was built. Husband eventually
abandoned wife for concubine. Husband sold
land and house to concubine.
ISSUES, HOLDING, RATIO
WON construction of conjugal house on the
husbands land made the land conjugal
property
YES. Both the land and the house become
conjugal
property
upon
construction.
HOWEVER, the CPG is indebted to the husband,
as a creditor, for the value of the land. CC Art
158 par 2 read:
Buildings constructed at the expense of the
partnership during the marriage on land
belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to
the partnership, but the value of the land shall
be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the
same.
(Example: Land was P2,000, house was
P10,000. At liquidation of CPG, P2,000 will be
returned to the landowner.)
Such was also the holding in Padilla v
Paterno: The conversion from paraphernal to
conjugal property of the land and house shall
retroact to the time the conjugal house was
built. The conversion cannot happen upon

liquidation, because the CPG no longer exists by
then.
THEREFORE: Husband could not have sold
both house and land because both are conjugal
property.
WON sale of house and land to concubine was
valid
NO. First, the contract was contrary to
morals and public policy. Sale being made by
husband in favour of a concubine after the
husband abandoned his family, such sale was
subversive of the stability of the family, a basic
social institution protected by public policy. CC
Arts 1409 and 1352 read:
Art 1409. ...contracts whose cause, object,
or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy are void
and inexistent from the very beginning.
Art 1352. Contracts without cause, or with
unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever.
The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.
Further, as in donations inter vivos, sales
between persons living as husband and wife are
void.
WHEREFORE: Sale of house and land is null and
void.
Ordoyo
167 332
DBP v. Adil
May 11, 1989
DOCTRINE:
(1) Those who have the right to alienate
property can be waived or renounced* the
right to prescription but not the right to
prescribe in the future. (Art. 1112 CC)
(2) Under Art 165 CC, the husband is the
administrator of CPG. All debts contracted
by him for the benefit of the CPG are
chargeable to the partnership.
FACTS:
Defendant spouses Patricio Confessor and
Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan
(P2,000) from Agricultural and Industrial Bank
(now DBP) to be paid in ten equal yearly
amortizations. However, they failed to pay the
first time so the husband executed another
promissory note to pay the outstanding
balance, otherwise, the foreclosure of the
mortgage. But the spouses did not pay the

obligation so DBP went to CFI Iloilo.
ISSUE:
1. WON prescription can be waived or
renounced
2. WON Confessor can bind the conjugal
partnership
HELD:
(1) Yes, as stated in Art 1112 CC. Prescription
has set in the failure to pay the first
promissory note. But upon the second
promissory note, he expressly renounced
and waived his right to prescription of the
action covering the first promissory note. Its
condition is the pre-existing obligation
under the first note.
(2) Yes the conjugal partnership is liable for his
obligation. (Art 165 explanation above)
Tiangco
168 332
Luzon Surety v. De Garcia

G.R. No. L-25659 ll Oct. 31, 1969 ll Fernando, J.
PETITIONER:
Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
RESPONDENTS: Josefa Aguirre de Garcia, Vicente Garcia and the Fourth Division of the Court of
Appeals
DOCTRINES:
(1) Article 121 of the FC (Art. 161 of the
NCC): The conjugal partnership is liable for all
debts and obligations contracted during the
marriage by the designated administratorspouse, by both spouses, or by one spouse with
the consent of the other, as long as it is for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
There is no there is no showing of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare
of the Garcia spouses from the signing of the
husband as guarantor.
(2) Article 122 of the FC (Art. 163 of the
NCC): The payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband (or wife before or)
during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redound to the benefit of the family.
The husband, in acting as guarantor or
surety for another in an indemnity agreement,
did not act for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
Philippine National Bank filed a complaint

against Chavez and herein petitioner with PNB
asking to be paid a certain amount. In the
decision of the court, siding with the bank, it
also ordered the third party defendants,
including Garcia, to pay the petitioner the
amount it needed to pay PNB.
The CFI of Negros Occidental then issued a
writ of execution against Vicente Garcia for the
satisfaction of the monetary claim of the
petitioner. A writ of garnishment was also
issued by the
Provincial Sheriff levying and garnishing the
sugar quedans of the Garcias, from their sugar
plantation, registered in the names of both.
Respondent-spouses then filed in the CFI
against the Provincial Sheriff to enjoin such
from selling the sugar allegedly owned by their
conjugal partnership. The lower court ruled in
their favor, and so did the CA.
Petitioner correspondingly filed this present
petition.
NATURE OF PETITION:
This is a petition for review of a decision of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the lower court that the conjugal
partnership could not be held liable on an
indemnity agreement executed by the husband
since there was no benefits that accrued to the
conjugal partnership.
ISSUES:
(1) WON a conjugal partnership, in the
absence of any showing benefits received, could
be held liable on an indemnity agreement
executed by the husband to accommodate a
third party in favor of a surety company. NO.
FACTS:
The husband, Vicente Garcia signed an
indemnity agreement, as one of the guarantors
in a surety bond of Ladislao Chavez and the
petitioner in this case in favor of Philippine
National Bank (PNB) to guarantee a crop loan,
wherein he bound himself, jointly and severally,
to indemnify petitioner charges and expenses of
whatsoever kind that the petitioner might incur
at any time as guarantor of the said bond. It
also included the payment of interest fees and
litigation fees.
RATIO:
(1) SC ruled that the CA adjudicated the
matter in accordance with law. They affirmed
the decision of the CA and of the trial court.
Even though the husband was the
designated administrator of their properties,
the only obligations that he incurred that can be
charged upon the conjugal partnership are
those that promote the advancement of his
profession or career with the belief that it can
accrue benefits to the family. This is not true in
the case at hand since the act of Vicente in
signing as a guarantor was not for the benefit of
the family. No proof was shown that he
Yumol
169 332
Luzon Surety v. De Garcia

G.R. No. L-25659 ll Oct. 31, 1969 ll Fernando, J.
received compensation of any sort when he
agreed to sign as guarantor.
It was raised that the act of signing as
guarantor gave Vicente the image that he can
be trusted, adding to his reputation and
esteem, and this could benefit him in such a
way that it will be easier for him to secure
money which he can use for his family. The SC
said that although this claim was not without
basis, it lacked conviction. It still held that this
obligation incurred by the husband was not for
the benefit of the family. As a matter of fact, it
was for the benefit of a third party, Ladislao
Chavez.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of

Appeals of December 17, 1965, now under
review, is affirmed with costs against the
petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
Separate Opinion:
In Reyes concurring opinion, he adds that it
is not a requirement that the actual charges or
obligations must accrue to the conjugal
partnership from the husbands transactions; it
suffices that the transaction should be one that
would normally produce such benefit for the
partnership.
Yumol
170 332
Ayala Investment v. CA
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills obtained loan
from Ayala Investment, and Husband-Ching, VP
of PBM, executed acted as surety for loan.
PBM failed to pay loan; AIDC filed case
against PBM and Alfredo-Ching to pay loan,
with interest.
Court of First Instance, Pasig, held that
accord. to Art. 121 of the Family Code:
Conjugal Partnership shall be liable for (2) all
debts and obligations contracted during
marriages by administrator spouse for benefit
of the family.
for benefit of the family does NOT
include husband acting as surety for a
corporate loan
AIDC may NOT enforce payment of loan
against spouses-Chings CPG Court of
Appeals: upheld CFI ruling
AIDC filed for appeal
ISSUE:
W/N Husband-Ching, acting as surety for
PBM, falls under the for the benefit of the
family condition that makes CPG liable for the
loan/debt to AIDC
HELD:
NO. Supreme Court upholds decision of the
CA and CFI in ruling that the CPG is not liable for
the PBM debt.
Art. 121 of Family Code:
CPG liable for debts and obligations
contracted
during
marriage
by
administrator spouse for benefit of the
family.
Payment of personal debts contracted by

husband/wife before/during marriage shall
NOT be charged to CPG except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family.
In order for CPG to be liable, the debt
incurred by husband as administrator of CPG
must be incurred with the husband as the
principal obligor (i.e. directly received
money/services for his business or professions;
no benefits need to be proven, so long as the
family may stand to benefit from the loan that
husband contracts on behalf of the family
business)
In case at bar: husband, as VP of PBM, only
acts as SURETY OR GUARANTOR, thus contract
is not categorized as falling within the category
of benefit of the family; the husband did NOT
contract obligation for family business; he acted
as SURETY for LOAN contracted by a THIRD
PARTY of which he was an EMPLOYEE (i.e. PBM
is third party, husband, as VP, is employee of
PBM)
Debt was clearly a corporate debt; CPG
should not be made liable for the surety
agreement which was for the benefit of a third
party (PBM) and not the Ching-Family
For the debt to be in benefit of the family
and for CPG to be liable, the family must
directly benefit from the use of the loan
In the case at bar: the corporate loan was
extended to PBM and used by PBM, not by
Husband-Ching or the
Ching-family, whose benefits are only
incidental because the husband is an employee
of PBM
Loan is CORPORATE, NOT personal: it is not
an exercise of industry or profession or act of
administration for the benefit of the family
Art. 122 of FC:
Alampay
171 332
Carlos v. Abelardo
G.R. No. 146504 ll Apr. 9, 2002
TOPIC: Charges upon the CPG [FC Art. 121
(2)(3)]
Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be
liable for:
(2) All debts and obligations contracted
during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership of gains, or by
both spouses or by one of them with
the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by
either spouse without the consent of
the other to the extent that the family
may have been benefited;
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to
cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall
be solidarily liable for th e unpaid balance with
their separate properties.
QUICK GUIDE:
Petitioner issued US$25,000 as a loan to his
daughter and son-in-law for the spouses
conjugal home [house and lot]. The loan is
liability of CPG even if the husband denies
giving consent by not signing the
acknowledgement executed by his wife to such
because the loan redounded to the benefit of
the family.
FACTS:
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against
Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of
the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house and
lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989
when the petitioner issued a check worth as
such to assist the spouses in conducting their
married life independently. The seller of the
property acknowledged receipt of the full
payment. The petitioner tried to collect the
money but was met w/ threats so he made a
formal demand but the spouses failed to

comply with the obligation. . Abelardo
contended that the amount was never intended
as a loan but his share of income on contracts
obtained by him in the construction firm and
that the petitoner could have easily deducted
the debt from his share in the profits. RTC
decision was in favor of the petitioner, however
CA reversed and set aside trial courts decision
for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there
was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the
owner of the Paranaque property which
became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses.
The
wife
executed
an
instrument
acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not
sign. [Spouses separated in fact for more than 1
year]
ISSUE:
WON the spouses CPG is liable for the said
loan
HELD:
Yes, undisputed is the fact that they used
the money to buy a house and lot which served
as their conjugal home. Even though it was only
the wife who executed the instrument of
acknowledgment of accountability which the
husband refused to sign, CPG is still liable for
the loan since such redounded to the benefit of
the family. Defendant-husband and defendantwife are jointly [CPG] and severally [in case of
insufficiency of CPG] liable in the payment of
the loan.
MINOR ISSUE:
Abelardos contention that it is not a loan
rather a profit share in the construction firm is
untenable since there was no proof that he was
part of the stockholders that will entitle him to
the profits and income of the company.
Bayona
172 332
Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman

G.R. No. 160347 ll Nov. 29, 2006 ll Chico-Nazario, J.
PETITIONERS:
Arcadio and Luisa Carandang
RESPONDENTS: Heirs of Quirino A. De Guzman
MAIN DOCTRINE:
An obligation entered into by the husband
and wife is chargeable against their conjugal
partnership and it is the partnership, which is
primarily bound for its repayment. Thus, when
the spouses are sued for the enforcement of
the obligation entered into by them, they are
being impleaded in their capacity as
representatives of the conjugal partnership and
not as independent debtors
FACTS:
Quirino de Guzman and the Spouses
Carandang are stockholders as well as
corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting
System. Spouses Carandang subscribed to
increases made in MBSs capital stock, which
subscriptions, de Guzman claims to have been
partially paid by him. Thus, de Guzman sent a
demand letter to the spouses for the payment
of said total amount. However, the latter
refused to pay, contending that a preincorporation agreement was executed
between Arcadio Carandang and de Guzman,
whereby the latter promised to pay for the
stock subscriptions of the former without cost,
in consideration of Carandangs technical
expertise, newly purchased equipment, and skill
in
repairing
and
upgrading
radio/communication equipment. This led de
Guzman to file a complaint against the spouses,
seeking recovery of the amount allegedly paid
by him.
The trial court and the CA both ruled in de
Guzmans favour, prompting the spouses to file
this petition. In particular, both courts declared
that the debt to de Guzman should be paid by

the spouses jointly and severally (note: this is
the same as a SOLIDARY obligation).
ISSUES:
WON the liability of the spouses Carandang
is joint and solidary
RULING:
The Court affirmed the RTC and CAs
judgment but modified it by saying that the
spouses should pay the amounts they owe de
Guzman from their conjugal partnership
properties
RATIO DECIDENDI:
NO. It is apparent from the facts of the case
that the spouses Carandang were married way
before the effectivity of the Family Code; hence,
their property regime is conjugal partnership
under the Civil Code. It must be noted that for
marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
partnership of gains, an obligation entered into
by the husband and wife is chargeable against
their conjugal partnership and it is the
partnership, which is primarily bound for its
repayment. Thus, when the spouses are sued
for the enforcement of the obligation entered
into by them, they are being impleaded in their
capacity as representatives of the conjugal
partnership and not as independent debtors.
Hence, either of them may be sued for the
whole amount, similar to that of a solidary
liability, although the amount is chargeable
against their conjugal partnership property.
Cadorna
173 332
Ros v. PNB
G.R. No. 170166 ll Apr. 6, 2011
Husband obtained loan from PNB and
mortgaged land by forging wifes signature.
Contract VALID because H cannot come to court
with unclean hands and loan was automatically
assumed to have benefited the family because
it was obtained for family business.
FACTS
Ros obtained a loan of P115,000 from PNB
Laoag on Oct. 14, 1974 and mortgaged a parcel
of land as security. PNB foreclosed on the
property and bought it in an auction. The land
was then registered in the name of PNB in 1978.
Aguete claimed that she had no knowledge
of the loan obtained by her husband without
her consent and filed to annul the mortgage,
sale and consolidation of the property, alleging
that her signatures were forged and that the
loan did not redound to the benefit of the
family.
ISSUES
1. WON the wife did not consent to the
mortgage executed by the husband,
thereby making the contract void.
2. WON the loan from PNB redounded to the
conjugal partnership
HELD & RD:
1. NO. The Court held that the Civil Code
was in effect at the time of the mortgage, thus
the property is considered part of the CPG. Art.
173 of the CC (The wife may, during the
marriage, and within ten years from the

transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband
entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of
the husband which tends to defraud her or
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property) does not guarantee that Courts will
declare annulment of contract, but rather only
upon a finding that the wife did not give
consent. It was not sufficiently proven that the
signature was forged. Also, the documents were
notarized, therefore they are public documents
that has in their favor presumption of
regularity.
Ros admitted in the complaint that he had
forged his wifes signature. If he were alive at
the time of the decision he would have been
prosecuted for forgery. By this admission, he
cannot bring the action against PNB because he
needed to come to court with clean hands.
2. YES. The Court ruled that the benefit to
the family was apparent at the signing of the
contract, which application included for
additional working [capital] of buy & sell of
garlic & Virginia tobacco. Where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes that such obligation
will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
Petition denied.
Cristobal
174 332
Tinitigan v. Tinitigan
Oct. 30, 1980
FACTS:
Teofista Payumo Tinitigan leased a
residential house in Pasay to copetitioner
Pentel Co. without permission from her
husband, Severino Tinitigan Sr., who filed a
complaint before Rizal CFI Branch II. He later
sought, and was given, court approval to sell
the Pasay property to Quintin Lim, general
manager of Pentel Co. The wife filed a petition
for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal
partnership in another court, which appointed
her administrator of the conjugal properties
subject to conditions (one of them being that
the disposition of the Pasay property is subject
to the decision of CFI Branch II.
Meanwhile, the husband sold the Pasay
property not to Lim, but to Chiu Chin Siong. The
wife protested but was denied because he
supposedly has the right under Art. 171 CC,
further justified because it will relieve the
conjugal properties from foreclosure due to
mortgage obligations.
She brought the case to the CA but it
affirmed the assailed decision, hence the
petition.
ISSUES:
- WON the husband was the administrator of
the conjugal partnership
- WON the sale was valid.
Yes. As a general rule, Art. 165 NCC makes

the husband the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. Exceptions are in Art. 168, where
the wife may administer only by the husbands
express authority in a public instrument. Other
provisions may make the wife administrator by
judicial decree. This does not apply since the
decree giving her administration was issued
after the CFI already authorized the sale, and
because the decree was subject to certain
conditions, particularly the sale of the Pasay
property.
Yes. Art. 166 NCC states that, while the
husband as administrator cannot alienate or
encumber property w/o wifes consent (unless
she is declared non compos mentis, a
spendthrift, or under civil interdiction), the
court may compel her if she unreasonably
refuses to give consent, hence the husbands
seeking of judicial approval in the sale.
Even so, Art. 171 NCC allows the husband to
dispose of the conjugal partnership to fulfill the
obligations in Art. 1612 pertaining to debts and
obligations contracted by either spouse for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. This does
not require the wifes consent and it is implied
that judicial intervention is not necessary.
The wife didnt deny these great conjugal
liabilities the danger of foreclosure of many of
their conjugal properties.
HELD:
Dantes
175 332
Guiang v. CA
G.R. No. 125172 ll Panganiban, J.
DOCTRINE:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the
consent of both the husband and the wife. The
absence of the consent of one renders the sale
null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes
it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can
ratification cure the defect.
FACTS:
The wife went to Manila.
The husband sold half of the conjugal
property without her consent.
When she came back, she found her
children living in separate households, so she
gathered them and they lived in the house the
husband sold.
The buyers sued her for trespassing.
They later made an amicable settlement,
which is still pending in the RTC.
The wife sought for the declaration of the
dead of sale as null and void because it was sold
without her consent.
The buyers contend that the contract was
merely voidable, and that it was ratified by the
wife when she entered into an amicable

settlement.
ISSUES:
WON the deed of sale is void or voidable
given that the Conjugal Property was sold
without the wifes consent
WON the amicable settlement ratified the
contract.
HOLDING & RATIO:
Deed of sale is VOID. Void contracts cannot
be ratified.
Art 124 FC was correctly applied by the
lower court because wifes consent was absent.
Art 1390 CC does not apply because there
was no mistake, violence, intimidation or
undue influence that vitiated the wifes
consent; the consent was completely absent.
The amicable settlement cannot ratify a
void contract. Citing Art 1422 CC, A contract
which is the direct result of a previous illegal
contract is also void and inexistent.
De Castro
176 332
Relucio v. Lopez
G.R. No. 138497 ll Jan. 16, 2001 ll Pardo, J.
PETITIONER: Imelda Relucio
RESPONDENT: Angelina Mejia Lopez
2. WON petitioners inclusion as party is

essential to the proceedings
DOCTRINE:
3rd Parties or Strangers to the marriage do
not have cause of action when one spouse
petitions for appointment as the sole
administrator of the properties.
HELD:
1. NO
o A cause of action is an act or omission
of one party (defendant) in violation of
the legal right of the other (plaintiff).
o Elements:
A right in favour of the plaintiff
An obligation on the part of the
defendant
An act/omission on the part of
defendant that violated the rights
of the plaintiff / breach of
obligation that gives rise to an
action for recovery of damages
o The complaint is by an aggrieved wife
against the husband
Cause of action arises only between
the husband and the wife who have
rights and obligations to each other.
o Petitioner is a complete stranger to the
marriage and to the cause of action
Administration is between the
married couple only
o Wifes petition for forfeiture is on the
share of the husbands share of the
properties co-owned by him and
petitioner
It does not involve the issue of
validity of the co- ownership
o Seeking of support by wife is from the
husband, also not from the stranger
FACTS:
In 1968, Husband left Wife and 4 legitimate
children
He arrogated unto himself full and exclusive
control and administration of the conjugal
properties
Spent and used for sole gain and benefit
and excluded the wife and children
VALID during that time, as husband was
sole admin
In 1976, Husband got into an illicit
relationship and cohabited with the
Petitioner/Paramour
Started to build up a fortune consisting of
stockholdings in Lopez- owned or controlled
corporations,
and
other
properties
(buildings, vehicles, lots, jewelry, etc.)
o Came from actual contribution of
properties and money (which were
conjugal) of Husband
o Concealed these from the original
family, entered into using his name or
his paramours name or both
o In 1993, Petition of Wife to be sole
administratix of properties, forfeiture,
etc. against husband and petitioner
o A motion to dismiss the petition filed by
Petitioner on the ground that wife has
no action against her
DENIED: as she was impleaded as a
necessary or indispensable party
because some of the properties
were registered in her name.
ISSUES:
1. WON wifes petition for appointment as
sole administratix establish a cause of
action against petitioner
2. NO
o An indispensable party is one without
whom there can be no final
determination of an action
o A real party in interest is an
indispensable party, who stands to be
benefited/injured by the judgement of
the suit
Since petitioner would not be
affected in any way, she is not a
real party in interest, and is not an
indispensable party to the suit.
Dilag
177 332
Jader Manalo v. Camaisa

DOCTRINE:
Being merely aware of a transaction is NOT
tantamount to consent. Court authorization is
only resorted to in cases where the spouse who
did not give consent is incapacitated.
FACTS:
Negotiations ensued between the husband
and the interested buyer of 4 parcels of land
(Makati and Taytay) in the wifes presence but
eventually wife refused to sign the contracts of
sale.
Already drafted a Contract to Sell all that
is lacking is the actual contract signing
Buyer already paid the downpayment in
check subsequently returned by the
husband
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages
ISSUES:
- W/N sale of CPG without wifes written
consent is valid? NO
- W/N court authorization is warranted? NO
RATIO:
The properties subject of the contracts in
this case were conjugal; hence, for the
contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of
both husband and wife must concur. The wife
admittedly did not give her written consent to
the sale. Even granting that the wife actively

participated in negotiating for the sale of the
subject properties, which she denied, her
written consent to the sale is required by law
for its validity. Significantly, the buyer herself
admits that the wife refused to sign the
contracts to sell. The wife may have been aware
of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal
properties. However, being merely aware of a
transaction is not consent.
The buyer argues that since the wife
unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the
contracts to sell, court authorization under
Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted. In
here, the court ruled that the argument is
bereft of merit. The buyer is correct insofar as
she alleges that if the written consent of the
other spouse cannot be obtained or is being
withheld, the matter may be brought to court
which will give such authority if the same is
warranted by the circumstances. However, it
should be stressed that court authorization
under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases
where the spouse who does not give consent is
incapacitated. In this case, petitioner failed to
allege and prove that respondent Norma was
incapacitated to give her consent to the
contracts. In the absence of such showing of the
wifes incapacity, court authorization cannot be
sought.
PETITION IS DENIED.
Dolot
178 332
Villanueva v. Chiong
G.R. No. 159889 ll Jun. 5, 2008 ll Quisumbing, J.
PETITIONERS: WALTER VILLANUEVA AND AURORA VILLANUEVA
RESPONDENTS: FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ELISERA CHIONG
DOCTRINE:
Sale of conjugal property without consent
of other spouse when marriage governed by CC
is only voidable, not void ab initio.
FACTS:
Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married
in 1960, but were already separated in fact in
1975. During their marriage they acquired a lot,
which Florentino sold the one-half western
portion to the Petitioners for 8,000 Pesos,
payable in instalments. When they finally paid
in full, they demanded for the deed of sale.
Elisera, however, refused to sign the deed.
Elisera filed for Quieting of Titles at the RTC,
while Florentino executed the Deed of Absolute
Sale in favour of the petitioners. RTC ruled in
favour of Elisera, and declared the sale null and
void.
1737. Elisera timely questioned the sale when

she filed the civil case on 1991, perfectly within
ten years from the date of sale and execution of
the deed.
Petitioners finally contend that the
transaction should not be entirely voided
because Florentino is entitled to one-half share
over the lot. This is also untenable, because the
court has previously ruled in other cases that
the alienation of the sale must be annulled in its
entirety and not only insofar as the share of the
wife in the conjugal property is concerned.
Petition denied, RTC decision affirmed with
modificationpayment of interests deleted.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the subject lot is part of the exclusive
property of Florentino;
2. WoN the sale of land was valid.
HELD:
No. Petitioners claim that it is exclusive
property because the Chiongs were already
separated in fact. This cannot be, because the
separation in fact between husband and wife
without judicial approval does not affect the
conjugal partnership. Elisera both showed the
certificate of title and a real property tax
declaration showing that it was part of their
conjugal property, and Florentino also admitted
the conjugal nature of the lot.
Yes. It is not void ab initio, but only
voidable, because they were married before the
Family Code and so governed by the provisions
of the Civil Code, specifically Articles 1666 and
Unless the wife has been declared a non compos

mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction
or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the

conjugal partnership without the wifes consent
7
The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten
years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when
such consent is required, or any act or contract of
the husband which tends to defraud her or impair
her interest in the conjugal partnership property.
Enad
179 332
Flores v. Lindo
G.R. No. 183984 ll Apr. 13, 2011
PETITIONER:
Arturo Sarte Flores
RESPONDENTS: Spouses Enrico L. Lindo, Jr. and Edna C. Lindo
owner-spouses acceptance. The execution of
DOCTRINE:
the Special Power of Attorney by Enrico in
When the power of administration is given
Ednas favor perfected the contract as binding,
to one spouse, this does not include the power
making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage valid.
to encumber or dispose of the property without
written consent of the owner-spouse. However,
if the owner-spouse gives his or her consent
after such transaction, it shall be perfected as a
binding contract.*
FACTS:
Edna Lindo borrowed P400,000 from Arturo
Flores, and executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage to secure the loan. The deed
covered property in her name and her
husbands, Enrico Lindo, Jr. She signed the
deed, as well as a Promissory Note, for herself
and her husband, as his attorney-in-fact.
When she failed to pay the loan, Flores filed
an action to foreclose the property. However,
Edna alleged that Enrico had not been a party
to the loan, because she had contracted it
without his signature.
The Regional Trial Court had ruled that
petitioner was not entitled to foreclosure, upon
finding that the Deed had been executed on 31
Oct. 1995, but the Special Power of Attorney by
Enrico in his wifes favor was only dated 4 Nov.
1995.
ISSUE:
Whether Edna had validly mortgaged their
property.
RATIO:
The Court held that she had. An
administrator does not have the powers of
disposition or encumbrance without the ownerspouses written consent, and any transaction
done without the consent shall be void.
However, paragraph 2 of Art. 1248 provides
for the perfection of the contract upon the
8
As stated in FC Art. 124, paragraph 2:

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers

do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as
a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization of the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Espaola
180 332
Go v. Go
FACTS:
Jesus Gaviola sold two parcels of land to
Protacio Go Jr. 23 years later, 1999, he executed
an affidavit of renunciation and waiver,
whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his
father, Protacio Sr, not h, who had purchased
the property
On November 1987, Marta Go, wife of Sr
and mother of petitioners died
On December 1999, Protacio Sr and his son
Rito sold a portion of the property to Ester
Servacio
On March 2001, petitioners demand the
return of the property but Servacio refused to
heed their demand
Petitioners averred that following Protacio
Jr's renunciation, property became conjugal
property; and sale of property to Servacio w/o
prior liquidation of the community property
between Sr and Marta was null and void
RTC declared property was conjugal
property, because there were 3 vendors who
were heirs of Marta (also, presumption of
conjugal property) BUT affirmed the validity of
the sale saying that as long as the portion sold
will not be allotted to other heirs in the final
partition of the property....as long as the
portion sold does not encroach upon the
legitimate of other heirs, it is valid
ISSUE:
Must the subject property be liquidated
first before being sold?
HELD:
Art 130 Family Code
Upon the termination of the marriage by
death, the conjugal partnership property shall
be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is

instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate
the conjugal property either judicially or extrajudicially within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six
month period no liquidation is made, any
disposition or encumbrance involving the
conjugal partnership property of the terminated
marriage shall be void
Sr and Marta married prior to effectivity of
Family Code= CPG
Upon Marta's death in 1987, the conjugal
partnership was dissolved (Art 175 civil code)
and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued
among Protacio Sr and other heirs of Marta w/
respect to her share in the assets before
liquidation
Sr, although becoming co-owner w/ his
children, could not yet assert or claim titile to
any specific portion of Marta's share w/o an
actual partition of property being done 1st
either by judicial decree or agreement.
Nonetheless, he had a right to sell his
undivided share, but not the interest of his coowners--> the sale of Sr and Rito was not
necessarily void, for their rights on the property
were necessarily transferred, making Servacio a
co- owner of Marta's share.
To declare the sale entirely void would
prejudice the rights of Servacio.
Since no certain allotment for each heir was
shown, appropriate course is to commence an
action for judicial partition
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a
trustee for the benefit of the coheirs of her
vendors in respect of any portion that might not
be validly sold to her.
Petition denied. Ruling of RTC affirmed
Hermosisima
181 332
Garcia v. Manzano
DOCTRINE:
In the system established by the Civil Code,
the wife does not administer the CPG unless
with the consent of the husband, or by decree
of court under its supervision. Legally, the wife
cannot mismanage the conjugal partnership
unless the husband tolerates it.
FACTS:
Plaintiff and respondent are husband and
wife but they have been living separately from
each other since 1948, all attempts at
reconciliation between them having failed.
As a result of their joint efforts, plaintiff and
defendant acquired and accumulated real and
personal properties. And upon the sepaRATIOn
of the spouses, the defendant (wife) assumed
the
complete
management
and
administRATIOn of the conjugal partnership
properties.
Husband alleged that his wife has been
enjoying said property, as well as its fruits to
the exclusion, has fictitiously transferred or
alienated majority of said properties, has
neglected to file any income tax returns and has
failed to turn over his rightful share.
As a result, petitioner prayed for 1)
complete accounting of CPG and its fruits and
that 2) his rightful share be given pursuant to
law.
Defendant filed to dismiss the petition on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action
under Article 191 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
1) WON husband has cause of action under
Article 191 of the NCC
If none, WON he is entitled to some relief
under the allegations of his complaints
HELD:
DISMISSED. Complaint is not under the
provisions of Articles 190 and 191 of NCC and
complaint does not establish a case for
separation of property.
RD:
Article 191 cannot be availed by the
husband where the administration of the CPG
has been forcibly taken from him by his wife
and she abuses the management thereof.
Consistent with its policy of discouraging a
regime of separation and not in harmony with
the unity of the family and mutual affection
expected of the spouses, the old and new Civil
Codes require that separation of property shall
not prevail unless expressly stipulated in 1)
marriage settlements, 2) or by formal judicial
decree during the existence of marriage (Art.
190, NCC)
Under Article 191, the only grounds for
separation of properties are 1) spouse has been
sentenced to a penalty which carries civil
interdiction 2) spouse has been declared absent
or 3) when legal separation has been granted.
This enumeration must be regarded as
limitative, in view of the Codes restrictive
policy.
Article 167 of the CC grants cause of action
exclusively to the wife in cases of
mismanagement and maladministration by the
husband (since CC grants administration of CPG
to husband). In the system established by the
Civil Code, the wife does not administer the
CPG unless with the consent of the husband, or
by decree of court under its supervision.
Legally, therefore, the wife cannot mismanage
the CPG unless the husband or courts tolerate
it.
In the event of such maladministration by
the wife, the remedy of the husband does not
lie in a judicial separation of property but in
revoking the power granted to the wife and
assume administration of the community and
the conduct of the affairs of the conjugal
partnership.
The articles above quoted contemplate
exclusively the remedies available to the wife
against the abuses of her husband because
normally only the latter can commit such
abuses.
Macariola
182 332
Partosa-Jo v. CA
Dec. 18, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo filed two cases
against the respondent Jose Jo for judicial
separation of property and for support. The
cases were consolidated and tried jointly. The
holding of the lower court addressed the claim
for support but did not make any explicit
commentary with regard to the request for
separation. Jose Jo elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the
dispensation of support made by the lower
court but dismissed the claim for judicial
separation of property because it interpreted
the separation between the petitioner and
respondent was something both agreed upon.
As a result, it was not covered by Article 178 of
the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
WON, given the circumstances, the judicial
separation of property could be granted
WON the Supreme Court may re-interpret
the decision of the lower court because of
possible inconsistencies between the body and
dispositive portion of its decision
HELD:
YES TO BOTH.
The Supreme Court reiterated the principle
that where there is an ambiguity caused by an
omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of
a decision, it (the Supreme Court) may amend
the decision for the sake of clarity even after
the judgment has become final. In the case at
bar, it was clear that, given the facts and
findings, the trial court should have rendered a
decision regarding the petition for judicial
separation of property. In particular, the
petitioner pointed to the penultimate
paragraph of the decision as proof that the
lower court had ruled in favor of the judicial
separation of the property. Indeed, the SC

further stated that the Court of Appeals should
have modified the decision instead of merely
subscribing to the lower courts work.
The court overruled the Court of Appeals
assertion that the separation of the petitioner
and respondent was agreed upon and, thus, not
entitled to judicial separation of property.
According to the petitioner, their separation
was meant to be temporary during the initial
stages of her pregnancy. As proof that they
never agreed to separate, the petitioner
actually attempted to return to the conjugal
home. Upon her attempted return, however,
she was denied entry by her husband. Under
Article 128 of the Family Code (SIDENOTE:
although the original case used the Civil Code as
legal basis, the decision of the SC used the FC
because courts, upon the appeal of a previous
decision, will abide by intermediate changes in
the law which may render previous decisions
erroneous), she could file for judicial separation
of property. She was abandoned by the
respondent when he refused her entry to the
conjugal home.
Also, the respondent failed in his
obligations to her and the family owing to his
admission that he numerous children with other
women and refusal to give financial support.
Lastly, the respondent did not establish any just
cause for his failure to comply with his marital
obligations.
Therefore, petitioner is entitled to half of the
properties of the respondent.
**abandonment a departure by one
spouse with the avowed intent never to return,
followed by prolonged absence without just
cause, and without in the meantime, providing
in the least for ones family although able to do
so
Marin
183 332

"To entitle her (plaintiff), to any of these
remedies... there must be real abandonment
and not mere separation. The abandonment
must not be only be physical estrangement but
also amount to financial and moral desertion."
FACTS:
Plaintiff Estrella, alleging abandonment and
mismanagement of conjugal partnership by her
husband Severino, prays for the separation of
the conjugal property.
Estrella says - Since 1955 the defendant has
not slept in the conjugal dwelling, for he had
abandoned her for his concubine who lived in
Manila. Whenever he returned to Negros he
only slept in his office. His failure to inform her
about the state of their business enterprises
constituted grounds for mismanagement.
Severino says - He denied having an illicit
affair. He slept in the office because he and his
wife always quarreled. He did not abandon his
wife and children because he gave his wife
support of Php 500, gave them allowances of
more than Php 1000 (corroborated by this
officemate) and did not mismanage the
conjugal partnership because he expanded it
with his zeal and industry. In fact, Estrella
played mahjong.
ISSUE:
WoN the separation of the defendant
constituted abandonment, a legal ground for
judicial separation of property?
HELD:
NO. Defendant is not guilty of
abandonment. To entitle her (plaintiff), to any
of these remedies... there must be real
abandonment and not mere separation. The
abandonment must not be only be physical
estrangement but also amount to financial and
moral desertion.
Record showed that he continued to give
support to his family. The wife and kids were
not living in want. In fact, the wife seems to
have the money to play mahjong.
There is no mismanagement because the
husband was able to expand the conjugal
property. There is no abuse since he has not
done acts to prejudice the wife.
THE COURT HOWEVER, DOES NOT
CONDONE THE HUSBAND BUT MERELY POINTS
OUT THE LACK OF THE WIFE'S CAUSE FOR
ACTION. The courts must be hesitant in
ordering judicial separation because the basic
policy is to preserve the unity of spouses in
person, in spirit and in property.
Judgment where there has been no real
abandonment may slam shut the door for
possible reconciliation.
Nuez
184 332
In Re: Voluntary Dissolution of CP of Sps. Bernas

FACTS:
In May 1962, petitioner-spouses Jose
Bermas, Sr. & Pilar Manuel Bermas executed an
Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership & Sep of Property, after mutually
agreeing to dissolve such. It states that they are
and have been legally married since Dec 24,
1932, w/ 2children, both of age and married.
During their marriage, they acquired 12 parcels
of land and 2 bldgs. The purpose of this
Agreement is to prevent friction, dissension and
confusion among their respective heirs in the
future, particularly because petitioner H Jose
has 2 sets of children: 1 by former marriage,
another by his present W. The result of this
agreement/contract concerns the income
derived from rentals and quitclaim that any
property acquired by any or both of the parties
shall pertain to him or her exclusively, or to
both as co-owners, as the case may be.
The petition was filed in June stating the
above mentioned facts and that this voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during
the marriage is allowed, under Art 191 of CC,
subject to judicial approval. Moreover, the
spouses have no outstanding debts/obligations
and the separation of properties would not
prejudice any creditor or 3rd persons. Hearing
was set in July and notice to that effect was
published in a newspaper of gen circulation in
Zamboanga City once a week, for 3 consecutive
weeks.
However, after the hearing, the court
denied the petition on the ground that under
CC Art 192, a conjugal partnership shall only be
dissolved once legal separation has been

ordered and exceptions, under Art 191, are civil
interdiction, declaration of absence or
abandonment. And upon approval of the
petition for dissolution, the court shall take
such measures as may protect the creditors and
other third persons.
ISSUE:
WON conjugal partnership may be dissolved
w/o notification of children of the parties
previous marriages
HELD:
NO. In a proceeding for dissolution of a
conjugal partnership under Art 191 CC, it is
essential that children of previous marriages
shall be personally notified of said proceeding.
In this case, the names and addresses of
children by previous marriage of Jose Bermas,
Sr. have not been given and it appears that they
have not been notified personally of the filing of
the petition and of the date of its hearing even
though the danger of substantial injury to their
rights would seem to be remote. At any rate,
the rights of the children by the 1st marriage
are still affected in the event that when there is
doubt, the partnership property shall be divided
between diff conjugal partnerships in
proportion to the duration of each and to the
property belonging to the respective spouses.
Decision appealed set aside. Case remanded to
lower court for further proceedings.
Ordoyo
185 332
Lacson v. Jose - Lacson

Aug. 30, 1968 ll Castro, J.
DOCTRINE:
The law allows the separation of property
of the spouses and the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction
is secured beforehand.
In the absence of an express declaration in
the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between the spouses during the
marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a
judicial order (Art 190, CC)
The husband and the wife may agree upon
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
during the marriage, subject to judicial
approval (Art 191, CC)
FACTS:
Alfonso Lacson and Carmen San Jose-Lacson
were married and had four children. On January
9, 1963, Carmen left the conjugal home in
Bacolod and went on to reside in Manila. She
filed a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila for custody of all their
children as well as support for them and herself.
However, the spouses were able to reach an
amicable settlement with respect to the
custody of the children (Two elder children
would go to Alfonso, the two younger children
to Carmen), separation of property, and
support (Alfonso would pay Carmen P300
monthly) which was approved by the Court of
First Instance. Carmen later on filed a motion
praying for custody of all her children. Alfonso
opposed the motion which was sustained by
the JDRC. Carmen subsequently raised the
validity of the settlement with regard to the
custody of their children.
ISSUES:
WON
the
settlement/compromise
agreement between the two spouses approved
by the Court of First Instance is valid and
conformable to law
HELD:
YES.
The
settlement/compromise
agreement between the two spouses is valid
with respect to the separation of property and
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. (See
doctrine aforementioned) Judicial sanction was
obtained upon the CFIs approval of the
separation of their property as well as the
dissolution of the conjugal property. Moreover,
the propriety of severing the spouses financial
interests is manifest given that they have been
separated in fact for at least five years already
and at the same time the court had no power to
compel the spouses to live together. However,
the approval of separation of property and the
dissolution of the CPG does not mean the court
legalizes/recognizes the separation in fact of
the spouses.
As to the custody of the children, the Court
held that the CFI erred in depriving the mother
of the custody of the two older children, citing
Art 363 of the CC which commands that no
mother shall be separated from her child under
seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure. When
the settlement was approved by the CFI, the
two older children were then 6 and 5 years old
respectively and the court did not have any
compelling reasons to grant their custody to the
father other than to rely on the mutual
agreement of the spouses in their settlement.
The courts, in determining which parent
custody of the child should be granted, should
take into account where the child can best be
assured of the rights granted to him by law.
Decision of the CA declaring null and void the
settlement/compromise judgment in so far as
it relates to the custody and right of visitation
over the two elder children is affirmed.
Pagdanganan
186 332
Maquilan v. Maquilan
TOPIC: Voluntary separation of property
DOCTRINE:
Art. 134 - The separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place
except by judicial order. Such judicial separation
of property may either be voluntary or for
sufficient cause.
FACTS:
Spouses married with one son. However,
their relationship soured when husband found
out wife was cheating on him.
He filed a case of adultery against wife =
both wife and her paramour found guilty.
Wife then filed for nullity of marriage,
dissolution of CPG, and damages on the
grounds that husband was psychologically
incapacitated.
During this case, spouses entered into a
Compromise Agreement to partially divide their
CPG.
However, husband filed an Omnibus Motion
praying for the repudiation of the agreement,
stating that his lawyer did not inform him of the
consequences of it. This was denied so he
appealed to the CA >> also denied husband
hence this case.
The husband argues that:
1. The Compromise Agreement should not
have been deemed valid since it is
against law and public policy (wife was
guilty of adultery hence cant get share
of property)
2. That the proceedings where it was
approved is null and void, there being
no appearance and participation of the
Solicitor General or the Provincial
Prosecutor
3. That the respondent, having been
convicted of adultery, is therefore
disqualified from sharing in the conjugal
property.
4. Lawyer did not intelligently inform him

of the consequential effects of the
agreement.
ISSUE:
WON the Compromise Agreement is valid
given the arguments of the husband
HELD:
Petition denied. Ruling of CA affirmed.
Compromise Agreement is valid.
1. Husbands argument that wife cant get a
share and that her share should go to their
common child under Articles 43(2) and 63
of the FC is wrong. The provisions he cited
are inapplicable to this case and it is Article
134 of the FC that should be applied. Under
Article 134 of the Family Code, separation
of property may be effected voluntarily or
for sufficient cause, subject to judicial
approval. The questioned Compromise
Agreement which was judicially approved is
exactly such a separation of property
allowed under the law. This conclusion
holds true even if the proceedings for the
declaration of nullity of marriage was still
pending.
2. Solicitor Generals participation is not
required. The proceedings pertaining to the
Compromise Agreement involved the
conjugal properties of the spouses. The
settlement had no relation to the questions
surrounding the validity of their marriage.
3. The conviction of adultery does not carry
the accessory of civil interdiction, therefore
wifes right to manage property is not
deprived.
4. Negligence of lawyer binds client. Only
reckless or gross negligence of counsel
deprives the client of due process of law.
Other notes:
The Compromise Agreement stipulated that:
Poblador
187 332
Maquilan v. Maquilan
a. P500,000.00 of the money deposited in the
bank jointly in the name of the spouses
shall be withdrawn and deposited in favor
and in trust of their common child, Neil
Maquilan, with the deposit in the joint
account of the parties.
b. The store that is now being occupied by the
plaintiff shall be allotted to her while the
bodega shall be for the defendant. The
defendant shall be paid the sum of
P50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of the
store in full settlement thereof.
c. The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy the
bodega until the time the owner of the lot
on which it stands shall construct a building
thereon;
owned by the plaintiff while the Honda

Dream shall be for the defendant;
d. The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff
who shall pay the defendant the sum of
P75,000.00 as his share thereon and in full
settlement thereof;
e. The house and lot shall be to the common
child.
Art. 34 of RPC - Civil interdiction shall deprive
the offender during the time of his sentence of
the rights of parental authority, or
guardianship, either as to the person or
property of any ward, of marital authority, of
the right to manage his property and of the
right to dispose of such property by any act or
any conveyance inter vivos.
The motorcycles shall be divided between

them such that the Kawasaki shall be
Poblador
188 332
Yaptinchay v. Torres
DOCTRINE:
Common law spouses MAY claim coownership of their spouse's properties ONLY IF
there is a clear showing that he/she has
contributed to the acquisition of the property
involved.
RELATED ARTICLE:
Art. 148 FC (but before, Art 144 CC was used)
In cases of cohabitation not falling under
the preceding Article9, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her shall
be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article. The
foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply
even if both parties are in bad faith.
FACTS:
Teresita Yaptinchay filed a case at the Ct. of
First Instance(CFI) of Rizal, Pasay City, wherein
she sought to be appointed as both Special and
Regular administratix of the estates of Isidro
Yaptinchay (who she allegedly cohabited with
for 19 years), when the latter passed away
without a will. However, the same had been
granted to Virginia Yaptinchay, daughter of the
Note: cohabitation cases in Article 148:

1. Parties who have no legal capacity to marry or
have some legal impediment to marry each other
(incestuous, less than 18, against public policy) but
without getting married live together as H and W
2. Where one or both parties are validly married to
others but live together in an adulterous relationship
deceased with his alleged legitimate wife,

Josefina Yaptinchay. Virginia then submitted a
preliminary inventory of the assets of the estate
of her father, including the disputed lot in North
Forbes Park. Teresita however, filed another
case, this time at the Pasig Branch, praying for
an action of replevin, preliminary injunction,
and for liquidation of the supposed partnership
she had when she cohabited with the deceased
(+damages). The judge then issued a TRO to
prevent the respondents from disposing any of
the properties listed in the complaint and from
interfering with the rights of the respondent to
and possession over the Forbes property. CFI
Pasig branch:
(June 15, 1966) Upon the defendant's (Virginia
and family) filing a bond in the amount of p10k,
let a writ of preliminary injunction requiring
Teresita to deliver the Forbes property to
Virginia and refrain from disturbing the
possession of the same.
(June 28, 1966) Amended order: Enjoining
defendant and their agents from selling,
disposing, or otherwise encumbering said
properly in any manner pending the
termination of this case.
(August 8, 1966) Petitioner's motion to
reconsider June 15 order overturned: principally
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took actual or physical
possession of the said properties which were
formerly held by the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay
and the plaintiff, by virtue of her appointment
and under her authority, as Special
Administratrix of the estate of the deceased
Isidro Yaptinchay, the plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby denied.
ISSUES:
(3) WON respondent judge committed a grave
abuse of discretion in issuing an injunctive
writ transferring the Forbes property to
Virginia while Teresita was occupying the
said property
(4) WON Teresita can claim that she was the
co-owner of the Forbes property by virtue
Quiambao
189 332
Yaptinchay v. Torres
of her common law relationship with the
deceased
HELD:
Petition for certiorari dismissed, Writ of
preliminary injunction set aside. (No errors as to
orders of respondent judge.)
(1) No. Although the long standing rule is that
injunction is not to be granted for the purpose
of taking property out of possession and/or
control of a party and placing it in that of
another whose title thereto has not been
clearly established, the same rests upon the
sound discretion of the Court. Teresita wasn't
able to clearly establish that the loans she
contracted during the construction of the house
were made for the same. On the contrary, it
was evident that the loans were made for
purposes other than the construction of the
Forbes home. Also, the unsupported assertion
that the Forbes home is Teresita's exclusive

property may not override the prima facie
presumption that since the house was
constructed on Isidro's lot during his marriage
with Josefina, the same is part of the conjugal
property of the couple and is thus subject to the
control of the special administratix.
(2) No. Art. 144 CC which states, "When man
and a woman live together as husband and
wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership," is circumscribed with conditions
that must first be shown before rights may
accrue. Petitioner was not able to CLEARLY
SHOW that she had contributed to the
acquisition of the property involved.
Quiambao
190 332
Juaniza v. Jose
DOCTRINE:
Co-ownership contemplated in Art 144,
requires that the man and woman living
together must not be incapacitated to contract
marriage
FACTS:
Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro
Ramos but had been cohabiting with, Rosalia
Arroyo, for sixteen 16 years in a relationship like
husband and wife.
Eugenio Jose, an owner and operator of a
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of
collision with a freight train of the Philippine
National Railways which resulted in the death
to seven 7 and physical injuries to five 5 of its
passengers.
The CFI charged damages to Eugenio and
Rosalia jointly and severally to pay:
Plaintiff Victor Juaniza the sum of
P1,600.00 plus legal interest from date
of complaint until fully paid and costs of
suit.
Pay the respective heirs of the
deceased Josefa P. Leus, Fausto Retrita,
Nestor del Rosario Aonuevo and Arceli
de la Cueva in the sum of P12,000.00
for the life of each of said deceased,
with legal interest from date of
complaint, and costs of suit.
Rosalia filed for a motion for consideration
to exempt her from paying damages jointly and
severally with Eugenio
RTC denied the motion pursuant to Art 144
of the CC:
When a man and woman living together
as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from

the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
ISSUES:
- WON Article 1441 of the Civil Code is
applicable in a case where one of the
parties in a common-law relationship is
incapacitated to marry - NO
- WON Rosalia who is not a registered owner
of the jeepney can be held jointly and
severally liable for damages with the
registered owner of the same. NO
HELD:
Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that
the man and the woman living together must
not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage.
Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to
Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment
for him to contract marriage with
Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited
provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo
cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney.
Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered
owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for
damages caused by its operation.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Rosalia
Arroyo is hereby declared free from any
liability for damages and the appealed decision
is hereby modified accordingly. No costs.
Quilala
191 332
Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS

FACTS:
The late Jose Consuegra was employed as a
shop foreman in the province of Surigao del
Norte. He contracted two marriages, the first
with Rosario Diaz and the second, which was
contracted in good faith while the first marriage
was subsisting, with Basilia Berdin.
Consuegra died, while the proceeds of his
GSIS life insurance were paid to petitioner
Basilia Berdin and her children who were the
beneficiaries named in the policy. They received
Php 6,000.
Consuegra did not designate any
beneficiary who would receive the retirement
insurance benefits due to him. Respondent
Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first marriage,
filed a claim with the GSIS asking that the
retirement insurance benefits be paid to her as
the only legal heir of Consuegra, considering
that the deceased did not designate any
beneficiary with respect to his retirement
insurance benefits.
Petitioner Berdin and her children, likewise,
filed a similar claim with the GSIS, asserting that
being the beneficiaries named in the life
insurance policy of Consuegra, they are the only
ones entitled to receive the retirement
insurance benefits due the deceased
Consuegra.
The GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the
late Jose Consuegra were Rosario Diaz, his
widow by his first marriage who is entitled to
one-half, or 8/16, of the retirement insurance
benefits, on the one hand; and Basilia Berdin,
his widow by the second marriage and their
seven children, on the other hand, who are
entitled to the remaining one-half, or 8/16.
Basilia Berdin didnt agree. She filed a
petition declaring her and her children to be the
legal heirs and exclusive beneficiaries of the
retirement insurance.
The trial court affirmed stating that: "when
two women innocently and in good faith are
legally united in holy matrimony to the same
man, they and their children, born of said
wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children
and each family be entitled to one half of the
estate.
Hence the present appeal by Basilia Berdin

and her children.
ISSUE:
To whom should this retirement insurance
benefits of Jose Consuegra be paid, because he
did not designate the beneficiary of his
retirement insurance?
HELD:
Berdin averred that because the deceased
Jose Consuegra failed to designate the
beneficiaries in his retirement insurance, the
appellants who were the beneficiaries named in
the life insurance should automatically be
considered the beneficiaries to receive the
retirement insurance benefits.
The GSIS offers two separate and distinct
systems of benefits to its members one is the
life insurance and the other is the retirement
insurance. These two distinct systems of
benefits are paid out from two distinct and
separate funds that are maintained by the GSIS.
In the case of the proceeds of a life
insurance, the same are paid to whoever is
named the beneficiary in the life insurance
policy. As in the case of a life insurance
provided for in the Insurance Act, the
beneficiary in a life insurance under the GSIS
may not necessarily be an heir of the insured.
The insured in a life insurance may designate
any person as beneficiary unless disqualified to
be so under the provisions of the Civil Code.
And in the absence of any beneficiary named in
the life insurance policy, the proceeds of the
insurance will go to the estate of the insured.
Retirement insurance is primarily intended
for the benefit of the employee, to provide for
his old age, or incapacity, after rendering
service in the government for a required
number of years. If the employee reaches the
age of retirement, he gets the retirement
benefits even to the exclusion of the beneficiary
or beneficiaries named in his application for
retirement insurance. The beneficiary of the
retirement insurance can only claim the
proceeds of the retirement insurance if the
employee dies before retirement. If the
employee failed or overlooked to state the
Ramos
192 332
Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS

beneficiary of his retirement insurance, the
retirement benefits will accrue to his estate and
will be given to his legal heirs in accordance
with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no
beneficiary is named in the insurance policy.
GSIS had correctly acted when it ruled that
the proceeds should be divided equally
between his first living wife and his second. The
lower court has correctly applied the ruling of
this Court in the case of Lao v Dee.
NOTE:
Gomez v. Lipana:
In construing the rights of two women who
were married to the same man, held "that since
the defendant's first marriage has not been
dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has
not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her
husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she

survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal
partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such
putative heir she has an interest in the
husband's share in the property here in dispute.
With respect to the right of the second
wife, although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the
conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved before judicial
declaration of its nullity, "the only lust and
equitable solution in this case would be to
recognize the right of the second wife to her
share of one-half in the property acquired by
her and her husband and consider the other
half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of
the first.
Ramos
193 332
Maxey v. CA
FACTS:
Maxey and Morales lived as common-law
spouses from 1903 to 1918. Their first marriage
in 1903 was void because it was a military
wedding which was not yet recognized during
that time. They were also able to acquire
parcels of land. They eventually validly married
in 1919 however Morales, who was a housewife
all those years, died shortly after. Their children
filed this case praying for the annulment of sale
for their parents properties executed by their
father without their knowledge and consent.
ISSUE:
WON the said properties were exclusive to
their father or if they were actually common
properties co-owned by their mother because
they were acquired from their joint efforts and
industry.
HELD:
The said properties were common
properties co-owned by the spouses Maxey and
Morales.
The rules of co-ownership apply to this
case, as stated in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Based on the article, it would be unjust if a
woman who is a wife in all aspects except for a
valid marriage will be required to earn a living
or engage in business before the rules on coownership would apply. Morales ran the
household and held the family purse. The
Filipino woman traditionally holds the purse
and runs the household.
The real contribution to the acquisition of
property mentioned in Yaptinchay includes not
only the earnings of a woman from a
profession, occupation, or business. It also
includes her contribution to the familys
material and spiritual goods through caring for
the children, administering the household,
conserving scarce resources, freeing her
husband from household tasks, and otherwise
performing the traditional duties of a
housewife.
Relevant articles:
Art 144 CC:
When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
Art 147 FC:
When a man and a woman who are capacitated
to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of
this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts
inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other,
until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage
is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation. (144a)
Reposar
194 332
Valdez v. RTC
G.R. No. 122749 ll Jul. 31, 1996 ll Vitug, J.
FACTS:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were
married on January 5, 1971. Begotten during
the marriage were 5 children.
June 22, 1992: Valdes sought the
declaRATIOn of nullity of the marriage pursuant
to Art 36 of the Family Code.
RTC held that:
1. Marriage of the spouses are declared null
and void under Art 36 on the ground of
their mutual psychological incapacity to
comply with their essential marital
obligations.
2. The 3 older children, Carlos Enrique III,
Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall
choose which parent they would want to
stay with. While Stella Eloisa and Joaquin
Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their
mother: Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The Petitioner shall have visitation rights
over the children who are in the custody of
the other.
3. The petitioner and respondent are directed
to start proceedings on the LIQUIDATION of
their COMMON PROPERTIES as defined by

Art 47 of the FC, and comply with the
provisions of Art 50, 51 and 52, within 30
days from notice of this decision.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion
in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions
without marriage. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit
expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE:
WON the property regime should be based
on co-ownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed
by the rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in
the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly
if said partys efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family.
Reyes, G.
195 332
Cario v. Cario
G.R. No. 132529 ll Feb. 2, 2001
DOCTRINE:
Art 147 (Live-in partners w/o impediments):
wages and salaries shall be owned in equal
shares; rules on co-ownership governs the
properties
they
acquired
thru
their
work/industry
Art 148 (Property regime of bigamous
marriages): properties acquired thru their
ACTUAL contributions shall be owned by them
in common; do not include wages and salaries
Art 40: to contract a subsequent marriage, a
judicial declaration of nullity is needed to
render the previous marriage void
FACTS:
June 20, 1969: SPO4 Santiago Cario
married Susan Nicdao (had 2 offsprings)
Nov 10, 1992: Cario married Susan Yee
(cohabited since 1982; didnt have children)
1988: Cario became ill and bedridden due
to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. But he passed away on Nov 23,
1992 (13 days after the wedding HAHA) under
the care of Susan Yee, who is also the one who
spent for his medical and burial expenses
Both Susans claimed for benefits and
insurance pertaining to Cario from various
govt agencies. Nicdao collected: Php 146,000
from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM
& Pag-ibig. Yee collected: Php 21,000 from GSIS
Life, and Burial (GSIS and SSS)
Dec 14, 1993: Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against Nicdao
praying that she be ordered to return to her at
least one-half of Php 146,000.00 death
benefits. The trial court, as affirmed in toto by
the CA, granted Yees petition since the 1st
marriage was void ab initio due to the lack of
marriage license (as depicted in the marriage
certificate and Local Civil Registrar of San Juans
certification which states that they do not have
a record of the marriage license)
ISSUE + RD:
WON Yee is entitled to of the death
benefits, thus Nicdao should give her the said
amount
Under the Civil Code, the law in force in the

marriage of Nicdao and the deceased, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and
the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio
They are not entitled to the said
exceptions
Nicdao avoided the issue WRT the
validity of their marriage
Presumption of validity of marriage
cannot stand
Art 40: for purposes of remarriage, there must
first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be
void.
Marriage is also void.
Given that both marriages are void, how should
they separate the property of the spouses?
Apply Art 148 for Yee: Properties
acquired by the parties through their
actual joint contribution shall belong to
the co-ownership. Wages and salaries
earned by each party belong to him or
her exclusively.
o The disputed P146,000.00 death
benefits,
are
clearly
renumerations, incentives and
benefits
from
governmental
agencies earned by the deceased as
a police officer.
o Unless respondent Susan Yee
presents proof to the contrary, it
could not be said that she
contributed money, property or
industry in the acquisition of these
monetary benefits.
o Hence, they are not owned in
common by respondent and the
deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and respondent has
no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the
said death benefits of the
deceased shall pass to his legal
heirs. And, respondent, not being
Reyes, N.
196 332
Cario v. Cario
G.R. No. 132529 ll Feb. 2, 2001
the legal wife of the deceased is not
one of them.
Apply Art 147 for Nicdao: Wages and salaries
earned by either party during the cohabitation
shall be owned by the parties in equal shares
and will be divided equally between them, even
if only one party earned the wages and the
other did not contribute thereto.
Conformably, even if the disputed death
benefits were earned by the deceased
alone as a government employee, Article

147 creates a co- ownership in respect
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share 1/2
thereof.
of the death benefits under scrutiny
shall g o to the petitioner as her share in the
property regime, and the other half
pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
Reyes, N.
197 332
Rivera v. Heirs of Villanueva

Jul. 21, 2006 ll Corona, J.
MAIN DOCTRINE:
Juaniza v. Jose no co-ownership exists
between parties to an adulterous relationship
and Agapay v. Palang it is necessary for each
of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in
order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it.
PROVISION USED:
Art 144 (CC). When a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by
rules on co-ownership.
PETITIONERS: (in relation to Pacita Gonzales)
Elino and Dominador as half-brother,
Soledad as half-sister-in-law and Teofila and
Cecila as children of half-brother. Their interest
is for the partition of Gonzales estate.
FACTS:
Pacita Gonzales cohabited with Romualdo
Villanueva in an adulterous relationship from
1927-1980. Villanueva is legally married to
Amanda Musngi, who died in 1963. Gonzales
died intestate in 1980. Villanueva and
respondent Angelina executed a deed of

extrajudicial partition with sale. Petitioners
wanted to stop this and filed a case for partition
of Gonzales estate. The properties include 5
lots under the name of both Gonzales and
Villanueva, 1 lot under the name of Gonzales
only, subdivision lots, stock shares and savings
deposit.
ISSUE:
WON the properties Gonzales and
Villanueva has an equal share over acquired
property during their cohabitation
HELD:
Depends on the time.
Four properties under the name of
Gonzales and Villanueva should NOT go to
petitioners. (Refer to main doctrine)
The one lot under Gonzales name only is
her property because the efficacy of the title
was not rebutted.
The rest of the property under Gonzales
and Villanuevas name after the death of
Musngi (1963), according to Art 144 CC, one
half should go to Gonzales heirs and the other
should go to Villanuevas heirs. They are to
share the property equally.
Sevilla
198 332
Saguid v. CA
DOCTRINE:
Share in the common property shall be
determined by the each of the parties actual
contribution in the absence of proof, it is
presumed that Gina and Jacintos actual
contributions are of equal amount
their joint account that was used to acquire said

properties.
FACTS:
17 old Gina S. Rey was married but
separated in fact from her husband.
She met Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, in
July 1987.
Gina and Saguid decided to cohabit as
husband and wife in a house built on a lot
owned by Jacintos father
Jacinto made a living as the patron of their
fishing vessel Saguid Brothers. Gina, on the
other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but
decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from
1992 to 1994 when her relationship with
Jacintos relatives turned sour.
They separated after 9 years of cohabiting
with each other
Gina filed a complaint for Partition and
Recovery
of
Personal
Property
with
Receivership, alleging that from her salary as
entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute
P70,000.00 in the completion of their
unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings
as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able
to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of
furniture and household effects, with a total
value of P111,375.00.
RTC and CA decided in favor or Gina and
stated that both Gina and Jacinto contributed to
HELD:
Given that Gina and Jacinto are not
capacitated to marry (Gina having a subsisting
marriage) Art. 148 of the Family Code must
govern which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state
of concubinage, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, and
multiple alliances of the same married man
...only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their
respective contributions ...
Even if the marriage commenced in 1987,
which is before the date of the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148
thereof applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code (As seen in Sempio-Dy).
While there is no question that both parties
contributed in their joint account deposit, there
is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact
amount of their respective shares therein
Stated in Article 148 of the Family Code, in
the absence of proof of extent of the parties
respective contribution, their share shall be
presumed to be equal.
ISSUES:
WON the prior courts had basis to grant all
alleged properties and contributions to GINA
Tan de Guzman
199 332
San Luis v. Sagalongos

Feb. 6, 2007
FACTS:
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. First
wife died with 6 common children. Second wife,
with one common son, was an American citizen
who was eventually granted divorce in the US
from Felicisimo. Third wife was Felicidad whom
Felicisimo married in the US (before effectivity
of FC) after divorce with 2nd wife.
After Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for
liquidation of CPG and letters of administration
over property to be granted to her.
ISSUES, HOLDING, RATIO
WON Felicisimos marriage with Felicidad
was valid
REMANDED TO TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER
EVIDENCE. Under Van Dorn ruling, which was
also the basis of FC Art 26 par 2, it would be
absurd and unjust for a Filipino spouse not to
be allowed to remarry despite a foreign divorce
granted to his/her foreign spouse. If Felicisimos
divorce with American wife were true and valid,
he should therefore be allowed to remarry with
Felicidad. If such remarriage with Felicidad were
validly contracted under US law (being
contracted in the US), such marriage should also
be valid in the Philippines.
HOWEVER, evidence is insufficient to prove
the validity of both the divorce and the
remarriage in light of rules on evidence for
foreign divorce and foreign laws. (Refer to case
if you want to know more about these rules,
but this issue is not of primary importance to
the lesson.)
WON
Felicidad
has
legal
standing/personality to file petition for letters
of administration
YES. Given the insufficiency of evidence,
Felicidads legal standing may fall under three
possible situations wherein she is:
1) Felicisimos surviving wife entitled to CPG,

should the validity of both divorce and
remarriage be proven;
2) Co-owner of common property under CC
Art 144, governing property relations
between cohabiting persons who have
capacity to marry but do not marry, should
the validity of the divorce be proven but
validity of remarriage be not proven; or
3) Limited co-owner of common property
under FC Art 148, governing property
relations between cohabiting persons who
have no capacity to marry, should the
validity of both the divorce and remarriage
be not proven.
CC Art 144. When a man and a woman live
together as H&W, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void ab initio, the property
acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
*In co-ownership, any property acquired
during union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through joint efforts. Hence,
shares are presumed equal, unless the contrary
is proven.*
FC Art 148. In cases of cohabitation not
falling under Art 147, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal...
*Ct: Art 148 has been held to have
retroactive effect.*
WHEREFORE: In all three situations, Felicidad
has legal standing to file petition for letters of
administration.
Ordoyo
200 332
Penebscot Area Housing v. City of Brewer

438 A. 2d. 14 ll Aug. 14, 1981 ll Nichols, J.
PLAINTIFFS: Penobscot Are Housing Development Corporation, et al.
DEFENDANTS: City of Brewer, et al.
DOCTRINE:
Definition of a family; In a family, the
domestic bond is important. There Court
pointed out three important components of the
family: there must be permanent parents that
take care of the members; there should be a
sense of permanence and cohesiveness among
the members; and they should be doing their
jobs such as cooking and cleaning to the
family.
NATURE OF PETITION:
This is an appeal from the Superior Court,
Kennebec County.
FACTS:
The Penobscot Area Housing Development
Corporation is a private, non-profit organization
corporation who recently organized a project to
provide housing for retarded citizens. For that
purpose, it has negotiated a purchase and sale
agreement to acquire a house and lot in a
district of the City of Brewer which is zoned for
low density single family residential use under
the Citys zoning ordinance.
In the application submitted to the Brewer
Code Enforcement Officer, William L.
Wetherbee, the proposed use was for a group
home for six adults or older minors, which
group home would be licensed as a Boarding
Home by the State meaning that six retarded
persons were going to live in that house under
the supervision of approximately two full-time
employees. Wetherbee denied the occupancy
permit because the Corporation's proposed use
did "not meet the terms of the City of Brewer's
zoning ordinance as a single family." He
recommended that the Corporation apply for a
nursing home use rather than as a single family
use. Applying for a nursing home instead meant
that the Corporation needed to meet additional
requirements as prescribed by the ordinance.
Not wanting to do so, the Corporation
appealed to the Citys Board of Appeals. The
Board affirmed Wetherbees decision that the
proposed use could not be classified as a single
family use under the ordinance. They then

sought review of this by a petition to the
Superior Court of Kennebec County. The State
of Maine and the Bureau of Mental Retardation
joined in this appeal. The appeal was amended
by the petitioner to make the Bureau the
legal guardian of three retarded persons
chosen from Penobscot County live in the
housing project of the Corporation. Later on,
the Superior Court affirmed the decision of the
Board.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE (in relation to the syllabus topics of
family):
WON the Superior Court erred in affirming
the Board's decision that the concept of a single
family use in the Brewer ordina nce did not
cover the proposed group home. NO.
RATIO:
Another section in the ordinance gave a
definition of the family (Art. 1 Sec. 101):
"FAMILY" is a single individual doing his own
cooking, and living upon the premises as a
separate housekeeping unit, or a collective
body of persons doing their own cooking and
living together upon the premises as a separate
housekeeping unit in a domestic relationship
based upon birth, marriage or other domestic
bond as distinguished from a group occupying a
boarding house, lodging house, club, fraternity
or hotel. In reviewing the ordinance, the Court
noted that relationships other than those based
on blood or law, i.e., founded on birth or
marriage, are included in the definition of
family. Relatio nships based upon "other
domestic bond[s]" satisfy the ordinance as well.
Although the main use of the questioned
areas were to be used for groups that fall under
the definition given above, the ordinance
permitted other uses in the low density single
family
residential
districts
if
special
requirements were met. However, the
Corporation proposed its group home as a
Yumol
201 332

single family residential use in its application
and appeal to the Board and that is where the
issue originated from.
The plaintiffs' principal argument is that the
interpretation of the ordinance by the Board
and its affirmance by the Superior Court placed
undue emphasis on the role of the staff and
ignored the fact that the plain purpose of the
group home was to create a family environment
for the residents. The requirement of a
domestic bond would have been met by the
relationship forged among the residents
themselves as they lived and worked together.
The plaintiffs cited several decisions from other
jurisdictions in which similar definitions of
family have been construed to include group
homes to strengthen their argument.
The Court finds no merit in their arguments.
The concept of "domestic bond" implies the
existence of a traditional family-like structure of
household authority. Such a structure would
include one or more resident authority figures
charged with the responsibility of maintaining a
separate housekeeping unit and regulating the
activity and duties of the other residents. In so
doing, this resident authority figure serves
legitimate zoning interests of a community by
stabilizing and coordinating household activity
in a way that is consistent wit h family values
and a family style of life. The Board found that
although a staff would be employed by the
Corporation for the purposes of maintaining a
home for six retarded adults, staff members
would not necessarily reside at the home;
rather, the Board's findings suggested the staff
would serve on a rotating basis. Thus, a central
figure of authority residing on the premises
similar to a parent or parents in a t raditional
family setting was clearly absent. The absence
of a resident authority figure in the
Corporation's proposal clearly distinguishes this
case from cases cited by the plaintiffs in which
the definition of family was held to include
group homes.
Another note pointed out by the Court was
in terms of the permanence of the residents in
the home. In relationships founded on marriage
or birth, the notion of domestic bond also
connotes a quality of cohesiveness and
permanence in the relationship of residents.

The Board of Appeals found that the residents
would not control "the choice of who the
incoming residents would be nor when other
residents would leave." Some residents would
ultimately be transferred to foster homes. They
further found that the average stay of a
resident would be one to one and one-half
years. These facts are not consistent with the
development of permanent and cohesive
relationships among the residents, especially in
the absence of a resident authority figure.
Finally, the definition of family further
specifies that the persons comprising the
collective should not only be living together
in a relationship founded on a domestic bond
but should be "doing their own cooking and
living together upon the premises as a sep arate
housekeeping unit." The Board found that the
Corporation and its rotating staff would plan
and manage the activities of the residents.
Further, staff members were to be responsible
for preparing meals and providing "some
cleaning and other services." They concluded
that such an arrangement would not comply
with the requirement of the ordinance.
The Corporation's proposal failed to meet
the definitional criteria of a domestic bond
and it also failed to satisfy the more concrete
specifications of the ordinance as well. While
the purpose of such homes is laudable, the
scrutiny that is needed to be done under the
local zoning ordinances should not be easily
abandoned. If the problem of locating group
homes is pervasive in this state, legislative, not
judicial, action may be most appropriate.
Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (that are not
related to the topic of family):
Venue: The City of Brewer tried to dismiss
the petition in the Superior Court based on
improper venue, but they were dismissed.
Particularly, what was being challenged was
whether the State of Maine and the Bureau of
Mental Retardation were parties that had
standing to bring legal action. A statute was
Yumol
202 332

raised saying that any party was allowed to
file an appeal to a decision rendered by a court.
But it was clarified that these parties must have
a legal standing such that they have obtained
particularized injuries. At first, the Court opined
that the State and the Bureau did not suffer a
particularized injury sufficient for purposes of
standing and the status of party which standing
confers. Although the State and the Bureau
went on to argue that they were injured in
such a way that the refusal of the City to
approve the occupancy permit was a hindrance
to the mandate of state and federal laws to
protect the rights of mentally retarded citizens
and to promote their welfare, the Court said
that these concerns still did not give rise to
particularized injuries in the case. However,
given that the Bureau was named as the legal
guardian of the three retarded persons who
were proper parties in this case in the amended
petition, any problem of venue was cured. They
concluded finally that the venue was properly
laid in the Kennebec Court.
Zoning exemption for the State: The
Corporation raised the point that according to a
statue, zoning ordinances are advisory with
respect to the State. They contend that this
statutory provision exempted its proposed
group home from the Brewer ordinance
because the Corporation was acting as an
agent of the State in furtherance of clearly
articulated state obligations and interests by
initiating the group home project in the City of
Brewer. The Court opined that the statute was
not intended to exempt all such corporations
from local zoning ordinances. Their decision

was based on other ordinances present. For
instance, there was a law saying that these
exemptions can only be recognized when it is
proven that it is reasonably necessary for public
welfare and convenience and the like. State
involvement is also necessary. The court below
concluded that evidence before the Board of
Appeals was insufficient to support findings of
such. Furthermore, there was no showing that
there were no other suitable locations that can
be used for that purpose. The Court therefore
concluded that the Corporation was not exempt
from legitimate local zoning regulations.
Constitutional arguments: The Corporation
claims that the interpretation of the ordinance
violates their rights to due process and equal
protection of the law under Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution. The Court
opined that it was unclear to them if any rights
were indeed violated since the plaintiffs were
not able to show any evidence of this violated
right upon the imposition of the ordinance.
Zoning ordinances are part of the police power
of municipalities and they are presumed to
comply with due process when they bear a s
ubstantial relation to the advancement of public
principles. The argument of the Corporation
extends as far as confusing the power to control
land use with the power to distinguish persons
making use of the land, but this is again without
merit. In sum, these Plaintiffs have failed to
overcome the presumption of constitutional
validity of the ordinance which they challenge.
Yumol
203 332
Mendoza v. CA
PETITONER:
Ceclio Mendoza (husband)
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals, and Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza (wife)
DOCTRINE:
Art. 222, Civil Code: No suit shall be filed
between members of the family (case at bar:
between spouses) unless it should appear
that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in Art. 2035.
Art. 2035, Civil Code: NO COMPROMISE
upon the following questions shall be valid:
(2) validity of a marriage or a legal separation,
and (4) future support.
FACTS:
Spouses-Mendoza were married in 1954,
then husband-Mendoza moved to the States
for further studies and to practice his
profession. Wife-Mendoza filed a complaint,
alleging husband-Mendoza had deliberately
abandoned her without justifiable cause and
refuses to provide maintenance and support
for the wife who is allegedly pregnant, and
without a source of revenue.
Wife-Mendoza wants maintenance and
support since husband-Mendoza is employed
in a hospital in the U.S., earning an average of
200 USD monthly.
Husband-Mendoza moved to dismiss
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper
venue. Motion denied.
Husband-Mendozas second motion to
dismiss on grounds of Art. 222, Civil Code:
No suit shall be filed or maintained
between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed, subject to the limitations in

Article. 2035.
Husband-Mendoza claims Wife-Mendoza
failed to state a cause of action, because her
complaint contained no allegations that
earnest efforts had been made to reconcile
prior to her filing a complaint. Thus, pursuant
to Art. 222 CC, no suit can be filed before
such efforts at compromise have been
averred to in the complaint.
Court of First Instance: dismissed motion
to dismiss complaint. CA: dismissed motion to
dismiss complaint.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N Wife-Mendozas complaint is invalid
for failure to contain allegations that earnest
efforts
had
been
made
to
compromise/reconcile.
HELD:
NO. Wife-Mendozas complaint is valid.
Art. 222 of the Civil Code does not apply,
because it is subject to limitations under Art.
2035, which enumerates what are not
subjects of a valid compromise.
Wife-Mendozas complaint involves a
CLAIM for FUTURE SUPPORT. Under Art 2035
of the Civil Code, claim for future support
CANNOT be a subject of a VALID
COMPROMISE. Thus, Art. 222 does not apply,
and Wife-Mendozas complaint is VALID.
Alampay
204 332
Mendez v. Bionson
PETITIONERS:
ZOILA MENDEZ, RAFAEL MENDEZ, and MATILDE BIONSON
RESPONDENTS: MAXIMO, EUGENIA JUANA, FORTUNATA, PRUDENCIA, ROMAN, ANECITA and MARIA,
all surnamed BIONSON and HON. ALFREDO C. LAYA, Judge, Court of First of Cebu,
Branch XII,
DOCTRINE:
Collateral relatives who are not brothers
and sisters are not included in the term family
relations used in Art. 150 [FC].
FACTS:
Three cases involved:
1. 1st case [CFI] Zoila et al filed for action
against Maximo et. al for partition of 2
parcels of land; CFI decided in favour of
Maximo et. al but failed to include in the
dispositive that Zoila et al should vacate the
said lands
2. 2nd case [CFI] Maximo et. al filed an
action for recovery of possession and
ownership for a portion of the land w/c
Zoila et. al refuse to deliver to them; CFI in a
summary judgement ordered Zoila et. al to
vacate the said land
- Zoila et. al filed a petition but was
dismissed by CFI
3. 3rd case [SC] Zoila et. al assails the
summary judgement assigning errors on the
interpretation of the decision in the first
case
WON CFI erred in not dismissing Maximos

case for lack of earnest efforts being exerted by
the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement
before the action was instituted, the parties
being members of the same family. - NO
Maximo et al already exerted diligent effort
to arrive at an amicable settlement during the
first case, thus Zoila et. al cant assign this error
on the 2nd case which is just a mere
consequence of the first case
Zoila et. al are collateral relatives not
among the family members enumerated in CC
Art.
21710.
ISSUES/RATIO:
WON decision in first case denied
respondents [Maximo] claim of ownership. - NO
It is clear that Maximo et. al were declared
owners of the land in question. Documentary
evidence [tax declarations & official tax] in
support of Maximos testimonial evidence
shows that they are owners. Dismissal of
counterclaim of respondents cannot affect their
rights on 2 parcels of land in question bec it
only referred to moral damages, rentals
&attorneys fees. Respondents are the owners
& thus they have a right to possession of land &
right of action against holder & possessor of
such in order to recover land.
10
CC Art. 217 provides that only the ff are family

relations:
a. bet husband & wife
b. bet parent & child
c. among other ascendants & their descendants d.
among bros & sis
Bayona
205 332
Guerrero v. RTC
G.R. No. 109068 ll Jan. 10, 1994 ll Bellosillo, J.
PETITIONER: Gaudencio Guerrero
RESPONDENTS: Regional Trial Court Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr. and Pedro Hernando
FACTS:
An action was filed by petitioner Guerrero
against private respondent Hernando regarding
ownership of real property. The two are
brothers-in-law, they being married to halfsisters. During the pre-trial conference,
respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., noted the
relationship between them and on the basis
thereof, he gave the petitioner five (5) days "to
file his motion and amended complaint" to
allege that the parties were very close relatives,
their respective wives being sisters, and that the
complaint to be maintained should allege that
earnest efforts towards a compromise were
exerted but failed. Guerrero moved to
reconsider said order, claiming that since
brothers by affinity are not members of the
same family, he was not required to exert
efforts towards a compromise. He also argued
that Hernando was precluded from raising this
issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss
nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in
his answer.
Said motion was denied by the judge who
reiterated the 5-day deadline for Guerrero to
amend his complaint. However, the 5-day
period expired without Guerrero following the
order; thus, the respondent Judge dismissed the
case.
ISSUES:
WON brothers by affinity are considered
members of the same family contemplated in
Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil
Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of
the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts
towards acompromise before a suit between
them may be instituted and maintained
WON the absence of an allegation in the

complaint that earnest efforts towards a
compromise were exerted, which efforts failed,
is a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
RULING:
The Court granted the petition and ordered
the RTC Judges dismissal of the action to be set
aside, directing the latter to continue.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
NO. The enumeration of "brothers and
sisters" as members of the same family does
not comprehend "brothers-in-law". Sisters and
brothers by affinity not listed under Art. 217 of
the New Civil Code as members of the same
family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code
repeats essentially the same enumeration of
"members of the family", the Court found
noreason to alter existing jurisprudence on the
matter. Thus, the court a quo erred in ruling
that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law
of private respondent Hernando, was required
to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise
before filing the present suit.
NO. Attempt to compromise as well as the
inability to succeed is a condition precedent to
the filing of a suit between members of the
same family, the absence of such allegation in
the complaint being assailable at any stage of
the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of
cause of action. It is not therefore correct, as
petitioner contends, that private respondent
may be deemed to have waived the aforesaid
defect in failing to move or dismiss or raise the
same in the Answer.
Cadorna
206 332
Hontiveros v. RTC
G.R. No. 125465 ll Jun. 29, 1999
PETITIONERS:
Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros
RESPONDENTS: Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Iloilo City; Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson
DOCTRINE:
Members of the same family are the
following: husband and wife, parents and
children, ascendants and descendants, and
brothers and sisters, whether full or half blood.
FACTS:
Respondents Gregorio Hontiveros had filed
to register a parcel of land in Capiz, which
petitioners
Augusto, Gregorios brother, and Maria,
Augustos wife, protested. The spouses
Hontiveros claimed that they were the owners
of the land, and they had been deprived both of
its possession and income.
Respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and
Teodora Ayson denied that they were married,
alleging that
Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was
single. The respondents also claim that the
petitioners had failed to allege that earnest
efforts toward compromise had been made
pursuant to Art. 15111 since Gregorio and
Augusto were brothers. Thus, they prayed that
the subject land be reconveyed to them.
The trial court dismissed the petitioners
case on the ground that, though efforts toward
compromise had been alleged, they had not
been verified.
The Court granted the petition, setting aside

the assailed decision and remanding it to the
trial court for further proceedings, resolving the
issues hence:
A. Absence of the verification required in Art.
151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court over the complaint. Verification is
merely a formal requirement. If there is
doubt as to the veracity of the complaints
alleged, the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings.
B. No. Because of the inclusion of Teodora
Ayson as respondent and Maria Hontiveros
as petitioner, the case cannot be covered by
Art. 151, where members of the same
family refers to the following relationships:
- Husband and wife
- Parents and children
- Ascendants and descendants
- Brothers and sisters, whether full or
half-blood
Teodora and Maria do not fall within these
relationships with respect to the Hontiveros
family, and are considered strangers for the
purposes of Art. 151.
ISSUES
A. Procedural: Whether the lack of verification
required by Art. 151 is sufficient ground for
dismissal.
B. Whether Art. 151 is applicable.
RATIO
11
ART. 151. No suit between members of the same

mily shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts
were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be
the subject of compromise under the Civil Code
Espaola
207 332
Lacson v. Lacson
G.R. No. 150644 ll Aug. 28, 2006
PETITIONER:
RESPONDENTS:
Edward V. Lacson
Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson, represented by their mother
and guardian ad litem Lea Daban Lacson
DOCTRINES:
Art.203, FC - The obligation to give support
shall be demandable from the time the person
who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except
from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand.
Art.207, FC - When the person obliged to
support another unjustly refuses or fails to give
support when urgently needed by the latter,
any third person may furnish support to the
needy individual, with right of reimbursement
from the person obliged to give support.
FACTS:
Edward Lacson is married to Lea Daban and
they have two daughters, Maowee and
Maonaa. Not long after the birth of their second
child in 1976, Edward left the conjugal home in
Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and
children to seek shelter and financial assistance
elsewhere. For a month, they stayed with Leas
mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her
mother and then with her brother Noel Daban.
From 1976 to 1994 (18 years), they transferred
from one dwelling place to another not their
own. Lea did not badger Edward for support,
holding on to her husbands promise of doing so
on his letter dated December 10, 1975, which
he failed to comply with. He, however,
occasionally gave meager amounts for the
childrens school expenses. Edwards mother
also contributed to help in the childrens
schooling, but it was Leas brother, Noel Daban,
who lent a large sum to the family (between
P400,000-600,000). Lea, in behalf of her
daughters, then filed a complaint against
Edward for support before the Iloilo RTC in
1995.
In his answer, Edward alleged giving to
Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet
their needs. He explained, however, that his
lack of regular income and the unproductivity of
the land he inherited, not his neglect,
accounted for his failure at times to give regular
support.
The RTC ruled in favor of the sisters and
their mother and ordered Edward to pay them
18 months worth of support in arrears,
amounting to around P2.5 million. Edward
appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTCs
decision, which led to this petition for review to
the SC. He contends that he should not be
made to pay for support in arrears from 19761994 since there was no previous extrajudicial
or judicial demand from the respondents, citing
Art.203 of the Family Code. The computation
for support should just start from 1995 as that
was the date when the sisters formally asked
for support by lodging the complaint.
ISSUES:
1. WoN Edward should pay for the support in
arrears from 1976-1994 despite the
absence of an extrajudicial or judicial
demand
3. WoN Noel Daban is subject to
reimbursements for loans he provided for
the familys sustenance
4. WoN the sale by Lea of half of what Edward
claims to be his exclusive or capital
property, amounting to P5 million, can be
considered as payment for his support in
arrears to his daughters
RULING:
Petition denied. RTC & CAs decision
affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Yes. Edward overlooked the fact that he
abandoned his children at their tender
years and as such could not demand for
support since he was also difficult to get in
touch with. It also appeared that Lea made
an extrajudicial demand sometime in 1976
when she came to her mother-in-laws
house asking for financial support, as also
embodied in Edwards note dated
December 10, 1975. Thus, RTC was correct
Cruz
208 332
Lacson v. Lacson
G.R. No. 150644 ll Aug. 28, 2006
in computing arrears from 1976.
2. Yes. Under Art.207, FC, he is entitled to
reimbursements as Edward, the person
obliged to pay support, failed or refused to
do so. It was also worth noting that the setup constitutes as a quasi-contract given the
juridical relationship between Edward and
Noel (brother-in-law), which is attached
with an equitable principle enjoining one
from unjustly enriching himself at the
expense of another.
3. No. There was no showing that the property

was conjugal or exclusive. Lea even claimed
that she and Edward separately sold their
shares in the property. In addition to this,
the daughters were not parties to the sale,
thus, it was erroneous to assume that they
benefited from the proceeds of the
property, more so to consider that the
amount offsets his separate obligation for
support in arrears.
Cruz
209 332
Modequillo v. Modequillo
G.R. No. 86355 ll May 31, 1990
FACTS:
On January 29, 1988, the CA rendered
judgment on a civil case regarding a vehicular
accident in March
1976 ordering Modequillo and Malubay to
pay tens of thousands of pesos worth for
compensation and loss of earnings from death,
burial expenses, hospitalization, moral damages
and attorneys fees, to be taken from their
goods and chattels.
Hence, on July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on
a parcel of residential land as well as a parcel of
agricultural land registered in Modequillos
name. He filed a motion to quash the levy on
the residential land since it is where the family
home was built since 1969 and falls under such
category, and under Art. 1523 FC, is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment
except for liabilities in Art. 155. Modequillo
believes that the said judgment debt is not one
of those falling under Art. 155.
The trial court denied the motion, saying
that it was only deemed as a family home upon
the Family
Codes effectivity on August 4, 1988, hence
the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the residential house and lot is
exempt from the execution of the judgment
debt
HELD:
No. SC agreed with trial court that the
residence was deemed as family home only on
August 3, 1988 (since 1988 was a leap year) by
operation of law under Art. 153 FC. The
exception under Art. 155 are effective from the
time a family home is constituted as such.
However, the vehicular accident occurred
on 1976 and the judgment became final and
executory on January 1988, both before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Art. 1523 have
no retroactive effect, not even under Article
162 which states that the same chapter shall
govern existing residences. Nor was the house
judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
family home under the Civil Code. Thus, the
residential house and lot was not subject to the
exception under Art. 155.
Dantes
210 332
Patricio v. Dario III

FACTS
Marcelino Dario (grandfather) died
intestate in 1987. He was survived by his wife
and 2 sons. He left several parcels of land
including the land in dispute on which a
residential house and a pre-school building is
built.
Perla (widow - petitioner) and Marcelino
Marc (1st son) wanted to partition the property,
but Marcelino III (2nd son - respondent) did not.
The petitioner argues that the property
stopped being the family home in July 5, 1997
when 10 years have passed since the
decedent's death.
The respondent argues that under Art 154
FC the property cannot be partitioned while his
minor son (decedent's grandson) still resides
therein.
ISSUES
WON The property (which was the family
home) can be partitioned given that the
decedent's minor grandson still resides there 10
years after the decedent's death
HELD
Petition GRANTED. The grandson is not the
decedent's dependent, so therefore he is not

entitled to the benefits of Art 159 FC.
RATIO:
In order for a minor beneficiary to be
entitled to Art. 159, three requisites must
concur:
(1) The relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of
the Family Code;
(2) They live in the family home, and
(3) They are dependent for legal support upon
the head of the family.
The grandson is a descendant of the
decedent so he passes the first requisite. He is
indeed living in the family home, so he also
satisfies the second requisite. However, he
cannot demand support from his paternal
grandmother if his parents are capable of
supporting him. The liability for providing
support falls squarely on his parents, and only
when they are in default will it fall on the
grandparents.
As such, there is no legal impediment to the
partition of the property.
De Castro
211 332
Veneracion v. Mancilla
G.R. No. 158238 ll Jul. 20, 2006 ll Callejo, Sr., J.
PETITIONERS:
Mary Grace M. Veneracion, Daisy and Richard Veneracion (minors)
RESPONDENTS: Charlie Mancilla (represented by heirs), Giar Cheng Linda, Caitlin, Erica, Tiffany
Mancilla, Hon. Judge Adoracion H. Angeles (RTC Caloocan City) Sheriff Jovinal Salayon,
Register of Deeds of Paraaque City
DOCTRINE:
3rd Parties or Strangers to the marriage do
not have cause of action when one spouse
petitions for appointment as the sole
administrator of the properties
Mortgage was foreclosed. A writ of

execution was issued on Nov. 7, 2000.
Sheriff levied on the property and was sold
to the respondents.
It turned out that:

o Elizabeth had been living with
Geronimo Veneracion without the
benefit of marriage with 3 children.
They have been residing in the
said property.
o Their father died before the sale of the
property.
Mary Grace and her siblings filed a petition
against the Heirs of Charlie for the partial
annulment of the decision of the RTC
o Alleged that their father was the one
who paid the monthly instalments of
the property because their mother
didnt have any source of income.
o Alleged that it was conjugal property
and thus, the need for their fathers
signature for the mortgage, which
Elizabeth wasnt aware of
NATURE OF PETITION:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court of the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dismissing the petition for
partial annulment of judgement filed by
Petitioner under Rule 47 of Rules of Court
FACTS:
- 1995 (Feb. 14)
o Elizabeth
Mendinueta
(wife
of
Geronimo Veneracion) secured a loan
from Charlie Mancilla.
Php 1.2 M Through a
promissory note to pay on
August 14, 1995, at 5% monthly
interest. This is with a real
estate mortgage over the
residential lot located at Better
Living Subdivision in Paraaque
(it was indicated that she was
single),
including
the
residential
house situated
thereon.
- 1995 (Oct. 11)
o Elizabeth defaulted on the loan, and
Charlie filed for judicial foreclosure of
mortgage.
o Charlie died during the pendency of the
case.
- 1996 (Oct. 18)
o Pre-trial findings:
Elizabeth was able to secure a
Php 1.2M loan from the Banco
Filipino Savings Mortgage Bank,
to be used to pay Charlie.
Elizabeth asked for reduction of
the monthly interest from 5%
to 3%
ISSUE:
WON the family home is exempted from
forced sale as it was the family home and
conjugal in nature
HELD: NO
- Petitioners failed to include in their petition
copies of the receipts for the instalment
payments that their father allegedly made
- Also, they were not able to attach any proof
that the said property was indeed their
family home and part of the conjugal
property of their parents.
o Not even the records from the RTC was
attached
- Their mother also never alleged in her
petition that the said property was conjugal
in nature and was being used as the family
home
Dilag
212 332
Veneracion v. Mancilla
G.R. No. 158238 ll Jul. 20, 2006 ll Callejo, Sr., J.
o
-
What she only included in her petition

was to reduce the monthly interest.
Petitioners annulment petition in the CA
has no prima facie or substantive merit
PETITION IS DENIED.
COSTS AGAINST THE
Dilag
PETITIONERS.
213 332
Arriola v. Arriola
DOCTRINE:
Although the house, as accessory to the
land, forms part of the estate of the deceased
which has passed by succession to the coownership of the heirs, the family home
continues to be as such for a period of 10 years
after the death of the head of the family. As
such, the house and the land on which it stands
cannot be immediately partitioned under Art.
159 of FC. This is to avert the disintegration of
the family unit following the death of its head.
FACTS:
Fidel Arriola had 2 marriages. After his
death, his sons from both marriages partitioned
his estate through public auction.
ISSUE:
W/N the house (family home) can be
included in the sale
HELD: No.
RATIO:
Article 159. The family home shall continue
despite the death of one or both spouses or of
the unmarried head of the family for a period of
ten years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the
same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the
family home.
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the
disintegration of the family unit following the
death of its head. To this end, it preserves the
family home as the physical symbol of family
love, security and unity by imposing the
following restrictions on its partition: first, that
the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a
period of 10 years from the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family, or for a longer period, if there is still a
minor beneficiary residing therein; and second,
that the heirs cannot judicially partition it
during the aforesaid periods unless the court
finds compelling reasons therefor. No

compelling reason has been alleged by the
parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling
reason to order the partition of the family
home, either by physical segregation or
assignment to any of the heirs or through
auction sale as suggested by the parties. More
importantly, Article 159 imposes the
proscription against the immediate partition of
the family home regardless of its ownership.
This signifies that even if the family home has
passed by succession to the coownership of the
heirs, or has been willed to any one of them,
this fact alone cannot transform the family
home into an ordinary property, much less
dispel the protection cast upon it by the law.
The rights of the individual co-owner or owner
of the family home cannot subjugate the rights
granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of
the family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family
home -- consisting of the subject house and lot
on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at
this time, even if it has passed to the coownership of his heirs, the parties herein.
Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus,
for 10 years from said date or until March 10,
2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a
minor beneficiary residing therein, the family
home he constituted cannot be partitioned,
much less when no compelling reason exists for
the court to otherwise set aside the restriction
and order the partition of the property.
To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain
the CA ruling that the subject house is part of
the judgment of coownership and partition. The
same evidence also establishes that the subject
house and the portion of the subject land on
which it is standing have been constituted as
the family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs.
Consequently, its actual and immediate
partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of
a period of 10 years from the death of Fidel
Arriola,
or
until
March
10,
2013.
Dolot
214 332
Sps. Kelly v. PPI

G.R. No. 172263 ll Jul. 9, 2008 ll Corona, J.
COMPLAINANTS: SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY
RESPONDENTS: PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA
FACTS:
Husband Kelley acquired agricultural
chemical products from PPI in 1989, but he
failed to pay for it. PPI filed an action for sum of
money in the RTC of Makati, and the court ruled
in favour of PPI, issued a writ of execution,
which then prompted the sheriff respondent to
sell the Kelleys real property in Naga City, with
PPI as the highest bidder. The Kelleys filed for a
motion of nullity of levy and sale, on the ground
that the subject property was their family home
which was exempt from execution. The RTC of
Naga City dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action, which
the CA upheld.
ISSUE:
WoN the subject property is exempt from
execution.
HELD:
We dont know that yet. Case remanded to
RTC of Naga City, allowing petitioners to
present evidence that property is indeed their
family home as constituted in accordance with
the law.
For a family home to be constituted as such
there must be proof that:
(1) It was constituted jointly by the husband
and wife, or by an unmarried head of the
family;
(2) It is the house where they and their family
actually reside and the lot on which it is

situated;
(3) It is part of the ACP/CPG, or of the exclusive
properties of either spouse with the latters
consent, or on the property of the
unmarried head of the family;
(4) The actual value of the family home shall
not exceed, at the time of its constitution,
the amount of P300,000 in urban areas and
P200,000 in rural areas.
But under FC, there is no need to constitute
the family home judicially/extrajudiciallyall
family homes constructed after the effectivity
of the FC are constituted as such by operation
of law. All existing family residences as of Aug.
3, 1988 are considered family homes. The
exemption is effective from the time of the
constitution of the family home as such and
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually
reside therein. Also, the debts for which the
family home is made answerable must have
been incurred after Aug. 3, 1988. Otherwise,
the alleged family home must be shown to be
constituted either judicially/extrajudicially
pursuant to CC. However, the rule is not
absolute. (see: Art 155 and 160 of FC)
Case reinstated and remanded to the RTC of
Naga City for determination whether or not
the property covered is a duly constituted
family home and therefore exempt from
execution.
Enad
215 332
Josef v. Santos
G.R. No. 165060 ll Nov. 7, 2008
PETITIONER: Albino Josef
RESPONDENT: Otelio Santos
DOCTRINE:
The fact of a property being a family home
must be properly determined by the court
(according to the procedure below).
FACTS:
Petitioner Josef had bought shoe materials on
credit from respondent Otelio Santos, who, upon
Josefs failure to pay, brought a case for collection
before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina. The
RTC ruled that Josef was liable to Santos for
P404,836.50, with a 12% per annum interest.
As a result, some of Josefs personal properties
were auctioned off, including a real property in
Marikina, for which Santos was the winning
bidder.
Josef questioned the sale of the personal and
real properties, claiming that he was insolvent and
had no property to answer for the judgment. He
further claimed that the personal properties
belonged not to him but to his children, and that
the house and lot was his family home, thus
exempt from execution.
ISSUE:
Whether Santos could validly seize the real
property claimed to be a family home.
RATIO
The Court held that the trial court failed to
determine the truth to petitioner Josefs
allegations. The court must adhere to the
following procedure:
1. Determine if petitioners obligation to
respondent falls under either of the
exceptions under Art. 15512 of the Family
12
ART. 155. The family home shall be exempt from

execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the
family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
Code;
2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of
petitioners claim that the property
was his family home through:
- Ocular inspection of the premises
- Examination of the title
- Interview of members of community
where alleged family home is located,
to determine whether petitioner
actually resided within its premises
- Order that photographs of the
premises,
depositions
and/or
affidavits of proper individuals /
parties be submitted, or conduct a
solemn examination of petitioner,
his children and other witnesses.
The respondent must be given the opportunity
to cross-examine and present contrary
evidence.
3. If the property is found to be the petitioners
family home, the court should determine:
a. If the obligation sued upon was
contracted or incurred prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code;
b. If the petitioners spouse is still alive,
and if there are other beneficiaries of
the family home;
c. If the petitioner has more than one
residence, in order to determine which
of them, if any, is his family home;
d. Its actual location and value, in order to
apply Arts. 15713 and 16014.
service or furnished material for the construction of the
building.
13 ART. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not
exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the
three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two
hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as
may hereafter be fixed by law.
In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the
adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the
constitution of a family home shall be the basis of
evaluation.
For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to
include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual
Espaola
216 332
Josef v. Santos
G.R. No. 165060 ll Nov. 7, 2008
Thus, the writs of execution issued in
respondent Santoss favor, as well as the titles
obtained through them, were declared void.
The trial court was directed to conduct an
inquiry into whether the real property was
Josefs family home. Santos was ordered to hold
the properties and their proceeds in abeyance
while waiting for the outcome of the inquiry.
income at least equals that legally required for chartered

cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas.
14 ART. 160. When a creditor whose claim is not among
those mentioned in Art. 155, obtains a judgment in his
favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the
family home is actually worth more than the maximum
amount fixed in Art. 157, he may apply to the court which
rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of
the property under execution. The court shall so order if it
finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the
maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its
constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the
maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from
subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the
person or persons constituting the family home, by the
owner or owners of the property, or by any of the
beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a
family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be
applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and
then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs.
The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment
debtor.
Espaola
217 332
Sps. De Mesa v. Sps. Acero

DOCTRINE:
Exemption from execution must be set up
and proved to the sheriff before the sale of the
property at public auction
FACTS:
Parcel of land was registered under Araceli's
name. Petitioners jointly purchased subject
property on April 17 1984 while merely
cohabiting before marriage. House was later
constructed on property w/c petitioners
occupied as family home after they got married
sometime in January 1987
Sometime in September 1988, Petitioner
obtained a loan from respondent, w/c was
secured by a mortgage over subject property.
Check bounced, acquitted but ordered to pay
for said debt
Writ of execution was issued and sheriff
levied upon subject property. Subsequently sold
on public auction, respondent being highest
bidder.
Leased the lands to petitioner and a
Juanito. After failure to pay rent, filed an action
for detainer
Petitioner then claims that the land is theirs
ISSUE:
WON petitioner can still claim land
HELD:
For family home to be exempt from
execution, distinction must be made as to what
law applies when it was constituted and what
requirements must be complied w/ by the
judgment debtor or his successors claiming such
privilege
1) Family residences constructed before
effectivity of FC or before Aug 3 1988 must
be constituted as a family home either
judicially or extrajudicially in order to be
exempt from execution
2) Family residences constructed after
effectivity of FC are automatically deemed
to be family homes and thus exempt from

execution from time it was constituted
3) Family residences w/c were not judicially or
extrajudi constituted as a family home prior
to effectivity of FC, but were existing
thereafter, are considered as family homes
by operation of law and are prospectively
entitled to benefits accorded to a family
home
Subject property became a family residence
sometime in January 1987. No showing of
constitution. Still, when family Code took effect,
subject property became a family home by
operation of law and was thus prospectively
exempt from execution
However, the exemption from execution
must be set up and proved to the sheriff before
the sale of the property at public auction or at
the time it was levied or w/in a reasonable time
thereafter
Honrado v Ca: at no other time can the
status of a residential house as a family home
can be set up and proved and its exemption
from execution be claimed but before the sale
thereof at public auction
Having failed to set up and prove to sheriff
the supposed exemption before sale at public
auction, petitioners are now barred from raising
the same. Failure to do so estops them from
later claiming said exemption
Right from execution can be waived or be
barred by laches by the failure to set up and
prove status of property as family home at the
time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter
Petitioners allowed a considerable time to
lapse before claiming such. One year lapsed
from time subject property was sold. It was only
time respondents filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer or 4 years from time of auction sale,
that petitioners started to file action. -->
Negligence or omission to assert right =
abandonment, waiver or refusal to assert right
Hermosisima
218 332
Perido v. Perido
PROOF OF FILATION:
Marriage of Lucio and his second wife,
Marcelina. Since the marriage of Lucio and
Marcelina was presumed to be valid in the
absence of proof to the contrary, their children
were considered legitimate.
FACTS:
Lucio married twice during his lifetime. He
begot three children with his first wife. After his
first wife died, Lucio married Marcelina with
whom he had five children. Lucio died in 1942,
while his second wife died in 1943.
On August 1960, the children and
grandchildren of the first and second
marriages of Lucio executed a document
denominated as Declaration of Hiership and
Extra-Judicial Partition, portioning among
themselves certain properties.
The children belonging to the first
marriage had second thoughts about the
partition praying for the annulment of the said
document alleging that the five children of
Lucio and Marcelina were all illegitimate and
therefore had no successional rights to Lucios
estate. On the theory that the five children
were born out of wedlock and were not
recognized by their parents before or after their
marriage.
RTC: Annulled the declaration but the five
children of Marcelina were included in the
partition in view of the findings that they
were legitimate. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage of Lucio and Marcelina
was valid.
Which would answer WON their children are
legitimate children.
HELD: Yes.
CA decision affirmed. Five children of Lucio
and Marcelina were born
during
their
marriage, and, therefore, legitimate. They
acquired successional rights to their fathers
estate.
RD:
CA found that there was evidence to show
that Lucios first wife died during the Spanish
regime. This finding is conclusive upon the
Court and beyond their power of review. Under
the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal
impediment to marry Marcelina before the
birth of their first child.
CA correctly held that the testimony of
Leonora (Lucios grandchildren of
first
marriage) saying that Lucio was not actually
married to Marcelina was not conclusive. She
was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony. It
is weak and insufficient to rebut the
presumption that persons living together as
husband and wife are married to each other.
This presumption, especially where legitimacy
of the issue is involved, may be overcome only
by cogent proof on the part of those who allege
the illegitimacy.
MINOR ISSUES:
WON some lands questioned are part of
Lucios exclusive properties.
- Lands were all declared in the name of
Lucio. Then there is evidence showing that
the lands were inherited by Lucio from his
grandmother. In other words, they were
exclusive properties of Lucio which he
brought into the first and second marriages.
WON some properties questioned are part
of the conjugal properties of Lucio and
Marcelina.
- It is expressly stated in the certificate of
title that Lucio, the registered owner, was
married to Marcelina unlike in the previous
land titles. If the law presumes a property
registered in the name of only one of the
spouses to be conjugal, the presumption
becomes stronger when the document
recites that the spouse in whose name the
land is registered is married to somebody
else. Legal presumption that said properties
belonged to conjugal partnership had not
been overcome by clear proofs to the
contrary.
Macariola
219 332
Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti Liyao

Mar. 7, 2002
FACTS:
William Liyao, Jr. contends that he is
entitled to successional rights as a
compulsory heir of William Liyao. According
to the petitioner, his mother Corazon Yulo and
William Liyao cohabited with each other from
1965-1975. During that time, they lived in the
same house together with Corazons two
children from her subsisting marriage with
Ramon Yulo. During this period, he alleges
that his father furnished him generously for
support by giving him allowance and paying
for his education. As evidence of this, the
petitioner provided numerous pictures,
anecdotes, and witnesses in order to
corroborate his claim for successional rights.
The respondents (Liyaos children from his
marriage) deny his allegations. They argued
that their father never had affairs and that
their parents never legally separated from
each other. Also, they point out the fact that
Corazon Yulo never separated from her
husband neither. In fact, they claim to have
seen the two together during the time in which
Liyao and Yulo were supposed to be
cohabiting. Lastly, they testified that their
father never issued checks in favor of the
petitioner and that they never received any
formal request for the recognition of Liyao, Jr.
as an illegitimate child of their father. The
trial court granted the petition citing a
preponderance of evidence while the Court of
Appeals reversed it.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner may be recognized as
William Liyaos illegitimate child based on the
evidence he presented
HELD:
NO. The presumption is always in favor of
the legitimacy of the child. The petitioner may
not impugn his possible legitimacy without
strong and conclusive pieces of evidence.
According to the New Civil Code a child born
and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate. As Ramon and
Corazon Yulo were not legally separated nor
was their marriage annulled, then William
Liyao Jr. is presumed to be the legitimate fruit
of that marriage.
The Court held that the fact that the fact
that Corazon cohabited with William Liyao for
10 years was immaterial because only the
husband or his heirs may impugn the
legitimacy of a child. The fact that Corazon
Yulo claims his illegitimacy with another man
as a result of adulterous relations has no
bearing if the Ramon Yulo does not impugn
the legitimacy of the child in question. Lastly,
the Court held that even if the petition was
coursed through the children of Ramon Yulo
(note: the legitimacy of a child may only be
impugned in a direct action by the proper
party) who might be in a position to impugn
his legitimacy as his heirs, they could not be
certain that Ramon Yulo was already dead.
As
such,
the
petition is
denied.
Marin
220 332
SSS v. Aguas
The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate
child is buttressed by her birth certificate
bearing Pablo's signature. A birth certificate
signed by the father is a competent evidence
of paternity.
FACTS:
Upon the death of Pablo Aguas, the spouse
Rosanna wanted to claim SSS benefits for her
and her children as beneficiaries and
dependents. SSS, upon the submission of
evidence by Pablo's sister, denied the claims,
stating that the wife Rosanna abandoned the
home and therefore was not entitled to
support and the children Jeylnn and Janet were
not children of Pablo but of Rosanna's
paramour.
Rosanna submitted birth certificates of the
two girls in the SSC hearings but was still
denied. She appealed the case to CA, which
ruled in her favor stating questions pertaining
to the children's legitimacy may only be
decided by the courts. SSS now seeks reversal
from the SC.
ISSUE:
WoN Jeylnn and Janet were dependents of
Pablo
HELD:
Jeylnn - Yes, she is. The birth certificate
submitted was signed by Pablo Aguas which
indicated that she was a legitimate child born
before Rosanna left the conjugal home. As for
conflicting baptismal certificates of Jeylnn
(signed by Pablo Aguas) and a certain Jennelyn
(signed by paramour), the Court concluded
that they were the same person, corroborated
by account of a scandal during the baptismal
ceremony. It was impossible for Rosanna to
give birth to two consecutive children in 3
months.
Janet - No, she isn't. Her birth certificate
was merely prima facie evidence, being only a
photocopy.
Consistent
testimonies
by
neighbors stated that she was only adopted
when the couple wasnt lucky in having kids.
There being no adoption papers, she was not a
legitimate child of Pablo.
Nuez
221 332
In Re: Baby M
109 N.J. 396
FACTS:
The Sterns entered into a surrogacy
agreement with Mary Beth Whitehead in
which she agreed to bear the child of Mr.
Stern (through artificial insemination) in
exchange for costs plus $10,000 and to
terminate her rights as a mother (before
the baby was even conceived). Upon the
birth of the baby (Melissa) and the
subsequent handover to the Sterns as
agreed, Mrs. Whitehead "became deeply
disturbed, disconsolate, stricken with
unbearable sadness." She persuaded the
Sterns to give her one last week with the
child by telling them that she was suicidal
(so they handed their child over to a
suicidal woman) and she fled to Florida
with her husband and the baby. There,
they took evasive maneuvers to avoid
detection before being ordered to turn
over the child. The Sterns filed suit,
seeking ultimate custody of the child and
enforcement of the surrogacy contract (in
which the child would be placed
permanently in their custody and Mrs.
Whitehead's parental rights would be
permanently
terminated).
After a
lengthy trial, the court ordered that Mrs.
Whitehead's
parental
rights
be
terminated and that sole custody of the
child be granted to Mr. Stern. The court
also entered an order allowing the
adoption of Melissa by Mrs. Stern, all in
accordance with the surrogacy contract.
Mrs. Whitehead appealed.
WHITEHEAD
ARGUES:
Surrogacy
contract is invalid because:
1. It conflicts with public policy since it
guarantees that the child will not have
the nurturing of both natural
parents, presumably New Jersey's
goal for families.
2. It deprives the mother of her
constitutional
right
to
the
companionship of her child.
4. It conflicts with statutes concerning
termination of parental rights and
adoption.
She claims primary custody with

visitation rights for Mr. Stern, both on a
best-interests basis as well as on the
policy basis of discouraging surrogacy
contracts. The standard for determining
best interests is that the child should be
placed with the mother absent a showing
of unfitness.
STERNS ARGUE:
Contract is valid and should be
enforced. They have a right to privacy,
which includes the right of procreation and
the right of consenting adults to deal with
matters of reproduction as they see fit.
Given the circumstances, the child is
better off in their custody with no
residual parental rights reserved for Mrs.
Whitehead. Furthermore, the statute
which grants full parental rights to a
husband in relation to the child
produced, with his consent, by the union
of his wife with a sperm donor denied him
equal protection of the laws.
RULING:
Pre-birth contract under which a
woman agrees to be impregnated,
through artificial insemination, by a man
not her husband and to give up,
irrevocably, all parental rights upon the
birth of the resulting child for the purpose
of permitting the natural father and his
wife to adopt the child as their own where
the woman is to be paid $10,000 and
where there is no showing that the
woman is an unfit mother or that the
natural father and his wife are fit parents
runs counter to laws governing adoption
and termination of parental rights and
the public policies of keeping children with
both of their natural parents and of
treating the rights of natural parents
equally concerning the custody of children
and is therefore VOID. Nonetheless, based
solely on the best interests of the child,
custody was granted to the Sterns, with
visitation rights to Mrs. Whitehead.
Ordoyo
222 332
In Re: Baby M
109 N.J. 396
RATIO:
Adoption through private placement
is "very much disfavored" in New Jersey
law.
The use of money for the purpose of
adoption through private placement is
illegal and perhaps criminal.
A contract under which the mother,
before the baby is born, agrees to
surrender all parental rights to the child
is coercive.
In a case such as this, the best
interests of the child become secondary to
the market concerns of facilitating an
adoption: the child is "sold" without regard
for whether the purchasers will be
suitable parents; the natural mother
does not receive the benefit of counseling
and guidance; and the monetary incentive
to sell may, in some circumstances, make
her decision less voluntary.
The adoptive parents may not be fully
informed of the surrogate's medical
history.
Statues provide that a surrender of
parental rights can only occur where
there has been a voluntary surrender of a
child to an approved agency or to the
state, accompanied by a formal document
acknowledging termination of parental
rights or where there has been a showing
of parental abandonment or unfitness.
Under the contract, the rights of the

mother are irrevocably termination before
she knows the strength of her bond with
the child. Therefore, she cannot give
informed consent.
There is a danger that surrogacy will
be a benefit to the rich at the expense of
the poor.
Mr. Stern was never denied the right
to procreate because the custody, care,
companionship and nurturing that follow
birth are not parts of the right to
procreation. To assert that Mr. Stern's
right to procreation gives him the right to
the custody of Baby M. would be to assert
that
Mrs.
Whitehead's
right
to
procreation does not give her the right to
the custody of Baby M.; it would be to
assert that said right includes within it a
constitutionally protected contractual
right to destroy somebody else's right of
procreation.
EQUAL PROTECTION:
The state has a sufficient basis for
distinguishing between a sperm donor
and a surrogate mother, even if the only
difference is between the time it takes to
provide sperm for artificial insemination
and the time invested in a nine-month
pregnancy.
Ordoyo
223 332
Johnson v. Calvert
851 P.2d 776 ll May 20, 1993
DOCTRINE:
Under California law, she who intended to
bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own is the natural
mother.
PROOF GIVEN:
For the Calverts; Evidence of blood tests
showing that Crispina is genetically related to
the child
FACTS:
Mark and Crispina Calvert are married but
unable to have a child. Anna Johnson offered to
serve as surrogate mother. The two parties
enter into a contract where Anna serves as
surrogate, while the Calverts pay her $10,000 in
installments as well as purchase a life insurance
policy for Johnson. The relationship between
the two sides soured, with Anna demanding the
payment of the balance or else she would
refuse to give up the child. The Calverts
responded with a lawsuit seeking a declaration
that they were the legal parents of the child.
Upon the birth of the child, it was proven
through blood tests that Anna was NOT the
genetic mother of the child. The trial court ruled
that 1) the Calverts were the genetic, biological
and natural parents of the child, 2) Anna had no
parental rights to the child, and 3) the surrogacy
contract was legal and enforceable against
Annas claims, all of which were affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
- WON Anna can claim custody of the child
- WON the surrogate contract violates public
policy
HELD:
NO. Because undisputed evidence shows
that Anna gave birth to the child and that only
Crispina is genetically related to such child, and
no clear legislative preference is given between
blood tests and gestation as means of
establishing a mother and child relationship,
then the case can only be decided by looking at
the intent of both parties as manifested by the
surrogacy agreement. Basing it on such
agreement, it is clear then that the parties aim
was to bring the Calverts child into the world,
and not for them to donate the zygote to Anna.
From the outset, Crispina intended to be the
mother of the child. Annas act of carrying the
child may have been indispensible for
eventually giving birth to him, but she would
not have been able to do so had she manifested
her intent to keep the child as her own prior to
the implantation of the zygote. Although the
Uniform Parentage Act, which bases parent and
child rights on the existence of a parent and
child relationship, recognizes both genetic
consanguinity and giving birth as means of
establishing a mother and child relationship,
when the two means do not coincide in one
woman, she who intended to procreate the
child is the natural mother under California law.
NO. Gestational surrogacy is completely
different from adoption, and as such, should
not be subject to adoption statutes. Both
parties voluntarily agreed to participate in in
vitro fertilization before the child was
conceived.
Moreover,
the
financial
considerations given to Anna ($10,000 and the
purchase of an insurance policy) were NOT for
her giving up her parental rights over the child
but rather for carrying the child and undergoing
labor.
Pagdanganan
224 332
In Re: Adoption of Anonymous

BIOLOGICAL - ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY
DOCTRINE:
A child born of consensual AID during a
valid marriage is a legitimate child entitled to
the rights and privileges of a naturally
conceived child of the same marriage. The
husband in such a relationship is therefore the
parent, and his consent is required to the
adoption of such child be another.
FACTS:
Husband and wife had a baby by consensual
AID (artificial insemination donor) during their
marriage. Husband and wife were registered
parents in babys birth certificate.
They separated and divorced but child was
declared legitimate. Husband was given
visitation rights while the wife and child
received support.
The wife later remarried and her new
husband petitioned to adopt the child. The first
husband refused to consent, and petitioner
suggested that the first husbands consent was
not required because he is not the natural
parent of the child.
ISSUE:
WON first husbands consent is needed for
the adoption of his child given that he is not the
natural father.
HELD:
Yes. A child born of consensual AID during a
valid marriage is a legitimate child; therefore
the father of such child is the parent whose
consent is required to the adoption of such
child. The determinative factor is whether the
legal relationship of the father and child exists.
A child conceived through AID does not have a
natural father, but does have a lawful father.
In response to claims that AID constitutes
adultery of the mother, the court found that in
the absence of legislation prohibiting artificial
insemination, the child was lawfully begotten
and not the product of an illicit or adulterous
relationship. Since there is consent by the
husband, there is no marital infidelity.
OTHER NOTES:
New York has a strong policy in favor of
legitimacy, so it is absurd to hold illegitimate a
child born during a valid marriage, of parents
desiring but unable to conceive a child, and
both consenting and agreeing to the
impregnation of the mother by a medically
selected anonymous donor. This policy is for the
protection of the child, not the parents.
Poblador
225 332
Andal v. Macaraig
DOCTRINE:
Children born after the one hundred and
eighty days next following that of the
celebration of marriage or within the three
hundred days next following its dissolution or
the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate. The presumption
may only be rebutted if there is proof that it
was physically impossible for the husband to
have access to his wife during the first 120 days
of the 300 next preceding the birth of the
child.15
Children born after the one hundred and

eighty days next following that of the
celebration of marriage or within the three
hundred days next following its dissolution
or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
FACTS:
Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas were a
married couple. Emiliano however, became sick
of tuberculosis and his brother, Felix, lived with
the couple in order to help out in the farm.
Emiliano's illness gradually worsened until it
came to the point where he was bedridden. On
Sept. 10, 1942, Maria and Felix eloped and went
to live with Maria's father. On January 1 1943,
Emiliano died w/o the presence of his wife who
didn't even turn up at his funeral. On June 17,
1943, Maria gave birth to Mariano. Now,
Mariano and his mother as guardian ad litem,
brought an action in the CFI of Camarines Sur
for recovery of the ownership and possession of
a parcel of land owned by Emiliano which had
been given to him by his mother, Eduvigis
Macaraig, by way of donation propter nuptias in
favor of his marriage to Maria.
Since Mariano was born on June 17, 1943,

and Emiliano died on Jan. 1, 1943, he is
presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano
and Maria, he having been born w/in 300 days
following the dissolution of the marriage. This
presumption can only be rebutted by proof that
it was physically impossible for the husband to
have had access to his wife during the first 120
days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the
child. There was no evidence presented that
Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial
period of conception, specially during the
period comprised between August 21, 1942 and
September 10, 1942, which is included in the
120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of
the child Mariano Andal. Although Emiliano was
suffering from tuberculosis and was bedridden,
this doesn't change the fact that he still could
have engaged sexual relations with his wife (as
he was not impotent). Also, the fact that his
wife was engaged in adulterous relations is not
enough proof to contradict the presumption of
legitimacy.
ISSUE:
WON Mariano Andal is the legitimate son of
the spouses Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas
HELD:
Yes. Mariano is the legitimate child of the
spouses. Art 108 CC provides:
15
See Art 166 FC: grounds for impugning legitimacy

of children: physical impossibility here refers to
physical incapacity to have sexual intercourse/ H+W
living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse was not possible/ serious illness of the
husband which absolutely prevented sexual
intercourse
This presumption may be rebutted only by

proof that it was physically impossible for
the husband to have had access to his wife
during the first one hundred and twenty
days of the three hundred next preceding
the birth of the child.
Under section 68, par. (c) of Rule 123, of the

Rules of Court,
The issue of a wife cohabiting with the
husband who is not impotent, is
indisputably presumed to be legitimate, if
not born within one hundred eighty days
immediately succeeding the marriage, or
after the expiration of three hundred days
following
its
dissolution.
Quiambao
226 332
Jao v. CA
DOCTRINE:
If it can be proved by blood tests that the
child and the supposed father belong to
different blood groups, the cohabitation by
itself cannot be a ground for recognition.
FACTS:
Arlene Salgado and Perico Jao lived
together as husband and wife
Salgado gave birth to Janice
Salgado, filed for recognition and support
from Jao.
Jao denied paternity
Blood grouping test of NBI established that
Jao was not the father
Salgado claims that probative value was
given to blood tests only in cases where they
tended to establish paternity
ISSUE:
WON the admissibility and conclusiveness
of the result of blood grouping tests can prove
non-paternity
HELD: YES
If it can be proved by blood tests that the
child and the supposed father belong to
different blood groups, the cohabitation by
itself cannot be a ground for recognition.
The Court affirms the decision of the Court

of Appeals and holds that the result of the
blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar,
are admissible and conclusive on the
nonpaternity of respondent Jao visavis
petitioner Janice.
EXTRA FACTS:
Paternity Science has demonstrated that
by the analysis of blood samples of the mother,
the child, and the alleged father, it can be
established conclusively that the man is not the
father of the child. But group blood testing
cannot show that a man is the father of a
particular child, but at least can show only a
possibility that he is. Statutes in many states,
and courts in others, have recognized the value
and the limitations of such tests. Some of the
decisions have recognized the conclusive
presumption of non-paternity where the
results of the test, made in the prescribed
manner, show the impossibility of the alleged
paternity. This is one of the few cases in which
the judgment of the Court may scientifically be
completely accurate, and intolerable results
avoided, such as have occurred where the
finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony
conflicting with the results of the test.
Quilala
227 332
Macadangdang v. CA
FACTS:
Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married
woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw. She
allegedly had intercourse with petitioner
Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March,
1967. Due to their affair, she and her husband
separated.
On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days
following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to
a baby boy who was named Rolando
Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on
December 24, 1967.
Respondent (Elizabeth Mejias) filed a
complaint for recognition and support against
petitioner, which the latter opposed by filing a
petition for dismissal.
The lower court in a pre-trial conference,
issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing certain
stipulations, admissions and factual issues on
which both parties agreed.
Lower court eventually dismissed the
complaint. Plaintiff appealed to the CA. CA
reversed the LC's decision, declaring minor
Rolando to be the illegitimate child of Rolando
Macadangdang.
Respondent appealed through a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied it.
treated as borne out by the record or that

which is based on substantial evidence. It is not
even confirmed by her own husband, who was
not impleaded.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the child Rolando is
conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of
the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin
Anahaw
Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery

at or about the time of the conception of the
child, but there was no physical impossibility of
access between her and her husband as set
forth in article 255, the child is prima facie
presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly
improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is
that of the husband. For the purposes of this
article, the wife's adultery need not be proved
in a criminal case.
There was no concrete or even substantial
proof was presented to establish physical
impossibility of access between respondent and
her spouse. From her very revealing testimony,
respondent declared that she was bringing two
sacks of rice to Samal for her children; that her
four children by her husband in her mother's
house in the said town; that her alleged
estranged husband also lived in her mother's
place.
Child was born October 30, 1967 which was
HELD:
Crucial Point: Respondent's initial illicit
affair with petitioner occurred sometime in
March, 1967 which caused her separation with
the husband (according to her)
BUT!
The finding of the Court of Appeals that
respondent and her husband were separated in
1965 cannot be considered conclusive and
binding on this Court. It is based solely on the
testimony of respondent which is self-serving.
Nothing in the records shows that her
statement was confirmed or corroborated by
another witness and the same cannot be
Bear in mind the Civil Code provisions:

Art. 255. Children born after one
hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before
three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
Against this presumption, no evidence shall
be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband's having access to
his wife within the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife
were separately, in such a way that
access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Ramos
228 332
Macadangdang v. CA
seven months after their first illicit intercourse
and consequently the separation between the
husband and the wife (if in fact they did). Note,
the couple had been already married years
before such date (with 4 children).
HENCE:
After 180 days following marriage: Check!
Before 300 days following (alleged) separation:
Check
NOTE: Child had no birth certificate of baptism.
If indeed March 1967 was the time they had
sex and child was born October 1967, then it
would be just 7 months. But it was shown that
the baby was born normally (full term; it was
not premature). Yaya took care of him, which if
it was just 7 months he should be in the
incubator! How can he be the child of Antonio
Macadangdang?
*JUST TO NOTE:
In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been
more definite in its pronouncements on the
value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that
while baptismal and marriage certificates may
be considered public documents, they are
evidence only to prove the administration of
the sacraments on the dates therein specified
but not the veracity of the states or
declarations made therein with respect to his
kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of
Fortus vs. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331
[1968]), this Court held that a baptismal

administered, in conformity with the rites of the
Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the
child, but it does not prove the veracity of the
declarations and statements contained in the
certificate that concern the relationship of the
person baptized. Such declarations and
statements, in order that their truth may be
admitted, must indispensably be shown by
proof recognized by law.
BACK TO THE TOPIC:
The child Rolando is presumed to be the
legitimate son of respondent and her spouse.
This presumption becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there was physical
impossibility of access between the spouses in
the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded
the birth of the child. (physical impossibility
cited above in Art. 257)
This presumption of legitimacy is based on
the assumption that there is sexual union in
marriage, particularly during the period of
conception. Hence, proof of the physical
impossibility of such sexual union prevents the
application of the presumption. To overthrow
this, it should be beyond reasonable doubt.
Impotence refers to the inability of the
male organ to copulation, to perform its proper
function, which is different from sterility.
The separation between the spouses must
be such as to make sexual access impossible.
The illness of the husband must be of such a
nature as to exclude the possibility of his having
sexual
intercourse
with
his
wife.
Ramos
229 332
Chua Keng Giap v. IAC

FACTS:
The Court is facing yet another bid by the
petitioner insisting that he is the son of the
deceased Sy
Kao and it was an error for the respondent
court to reject his claim. He also contests the
denial of his motion for reconsideration on the
grounds that it had been filed on time.
This case arose when Chua Keng Giap filed
on May 19, 1983, a petition for the settlement
of the estate of the late Sy Kao. The private
respondent moved to dismiss for lack of a cause
of action and of the petitioner's capacity to file
the petition. The latter, it was claimed, had
been declared as not the son of the spouses
Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao, for the settlement
of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. The
decision in that case had long become final and
executory.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner really is Sy Kaos son.
HELD:
Petition was denied. The Court held that
petitioner was, in fact, beating a dead (,
decomposing, maggot ridden, fly-infested,)
horse. The Court had already ruled in finality
the matter of filiations between the petitioner
and his alleged mother. It has already passed
on in Sy Kao v Court of Appeals where Sy Kao
herself flatly denied that he was her son. There
is no better person who could say that

petitioner was her son other than Sy Kao
herself. The Court observed through Justice
Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:
Petitioner Sy Kao denies that respondent
Chua Keng Giap is her son by the deceased
Chua Bing Guan. Thus, petitioner's opposition
filed on December 19, 1968, is based principally
on the ground that the respondent was not the
son of Sy Kao and the deceased but of a certain
Chua Eng Kun and his wife Tan Kuy.
After hearing on the merits which lasted for
ten years, the court dismissed the respondent's
petition on March 2, 1979 on a finding that he is
not a son of petitioner Sy Kao and the
deceased, and therefore, had no lawful interest
in the estate of the latter and no right to
institute the intestacy proceedings.
There is no point in prolonging these
proceedings with an examination of the
procedural objections to the grant of the
motion to dismiss. In the end, assuming denial
of the motion, the resolution of the merits
would have to be the same anyway as in the
aforesaid case. The petitioner's claim of filiation
would still have to be rejected. Discussion of
the seasonableness of the motion for
reconsideration is also unnecessary as the
motion would have been validly denied just the
same even if filed on time.
Reposar
230 332
Cabatbat Lim v. IAC

G.R. No. L-69679 ll Oct. 18, 1988 ll Grio - Aquino, J.
FACTS:
Case at hand is a squabble over the estate
of late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat. Petitioner is
Violeta Cabatbat-Lim who claims to be the
only child of Esperanza while the respondents
are the sisters and children of a deceased
brother.
Private respondents (sisters of Esperanza)
filed at CFI Pangasinan for partitioning of
Esperanzas estate (died intestate on 4/23/77).
Part of her estate is the Calasiao Bijon
Factory which is in possession of Violeta
(alleged child of Esperanza and Proceso
Cabatbat). They were saying that Violeta is only
a ward (ampon) through the ff evidences:
- Absence of any records that Esperanza was
admitted to hospital where Esperanza was
supposedly born
- Absence of birth certificate in the live birth
section of the Provincial Hospital (19471948)
- Civil registry certification of 3/9/77 that
there is no birth record of Violeta Cabatbat
from5/26/48 or 49
- Certification that Esperanza and Proceso
were only guardians (from Principal II of
the Pilot School)
Amparo Resides testimony on 5/21/48 that
she was in the Provincial Hospital to watch a
cousin give birth and there she met Benita
Lastimosa who gave birth to an IC Baby Girl
Lastimosa on 5/26/48 (now known as Violeta
Cabatbat) Violeta on the other hand tried to
adduce evidence that will support her claim.
Among which he showed are the following:
- Her birth record filed 6/15/48 showing her
birth of 5/26/48 and that shes a Legitimate
Child of Esperanza and Prospero
Procesos testimony that shes his child w/

Esperanza
Benita Lastimosas denial that she delivered
at Provincial Hospital
Marriage Certificate of Violeta and Lim Biak
Chiao showed that Esperanza is the mother
of the bride
Deed of Sale 5/14/60 where minor
Violeta is assisted by mother Esperanza
Deed of Absolute Sale 4/21/61 assisted by
father Proceso
TC held that Violeta is NOT natural child of

Esperanza and Proceso therefore NOT a legal
heir.
ISSUE:
WON Violeta is a natural child of Esperanza
and Proceso
HELD:
NO. TC and CA findings on filiation is given
great accord, conclusive upon the SC.
TC then said that the Registry Book of
hospital admission doesnt even Esperanza was
a patient on 5/26/48 and it doesnt even show
that Esperanza was ever admitted from 12/1/47
6/15/48.
On 5/26/48, Records only show that there
was one birth at that day and that was Benita
Lastimosa who gave birth to an IC baby girl
Lastimosa. Absence of birth record in the Civil
Regitry makes her exhibit doubtable. Moreover,
her reliance on NCC 263 is misplaced as such
action is not to impugned legitimacy but to
claim inheritance as legal heirs from a childless
aunt. They do not claim that shes an
Illegitimate Child but that shes not a child of
their aunt at all.
Reyes, G.
231 332
Republic v. Labrador
G.R. No. 132980 ll Mar. 25, 1999
DOCTRINE:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and Art 412
CC: may be used only to correct clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry. Substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested
parties are impleaded and due process is
observed.
FACTS:
Sept 26, 1997: Gladys C. Labrador filed a
Petition for the correction of entries in the
record of birth of Sarah Zita Erasmo (her niece)
in RTC-Cebu. Change of name of SARAH ZITA C.
ERASMO to SARAH ZITA CAON
She alleges that her sister only had a
common law relationship with Degoberto
Erasmo; hence Sarah Zita is illegitimate and she
shall use her mothers surname pursuant to Art.
176 FC.
The mother is now living in US with her
foreigner husband.
Change of the name of petitioners sister
which was erroneously written as ROSEMARIE
CAON instead of MARIA ROSARIO CAON
Gladys reported that she was the one who
erroneously gave Rosemarie as the name of
the childs mother to the Civil Registrar since
she was more familiarly known as such
RTC-Cebu granted her petition. Solicitor-
General files a petition for Review on certiorari.

ISSUE + RD:
WON Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
is the proper action to impugn the legitimacy of
a child.
NO. It is inapplicable. See the above-mentioned
doctrine.
The RoC shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights.
Where the effect of a correction in a
civil registry will change the civil status of
petitioner and her children from legitimate to
illegitimate, it cannot be granted except only in
an adversarial proceeding (a full hearing not
merely a summary proceeding).
Should have as respondents the civil
registrar, as well as all other persons who have
or claim to have any interest that would be
affected thereby. Thus, Sarah Zita and her
parents should have been parties to the
proceeding.
The change will affect her legitimacy, as
well as her successional and other rights. It
might also embarrass her due to the social
stigma that illegitimacy may bring.
There is also no sufficient legal explanation
has been given why an aunt, who had no
appointment as guardian of the minor, was the
party-petitioner.
Reyes, N.
232 332
Tan v. Trocio
A.C. No. 2115 ll Nov. 27, 1990 ll Melencio-Herrera, J.
PROOF OF PATERNITY USED:
Birth Certificate of Jewel Tan in the name of
Felicidad and her husband, Tan Le Pok
DOCTRINE:
Presumption should be in favor of
legitimacy unless physical access between the
couple was impossible.
NATURE OF COMPLAINT:
Disbarment of Trocio for immoral conduct.
RULING:
Complaint dismissed.
FACTS:
Tan is an owner and directress of the Harlyn
Vocational School. She alleges that sometime in
April 1971, the legal counsel of the school, Atty.
Trocio, raped her.
On February 1972, she begot a son who she
named Jewel.
Trocio replied by saying that it is true that
he is the legal counsel of the vocational school,
that he assisted Tan in collecting money
from insurance companies. However, he
denies that he raped Tan.

ISSUE:
WON Trocio should be disbarred for
immoral conduct.
HELD:
Trocio should NOT be disbarred.
On lack of proof:
- The rape allegedly took place in 1971 but no
criminal charge was filed and the complaint
appeared only in 1979.
- Tan continued having dealings and doing
business with Trocio as if nothing
happened, such as helping Tan, her mother
and her sister to prosecute a robbery case.
- Her silence and continued relations with
Trocio made it appear as condonation.
It is strange for an unwanted son to be
named Jewel
Not proved that the child was his. In the
birth certificate, Jewel is the legitimate child of
Tan and her husband, Tan Le Pok
Sevilla
233 332
People v. Tumimpad
DOCTRINE:
Science has demonstrated that by the
analysis of blood samples of the mother, the
child and the alleged father, it can be
established conclusively that the man is not the
father of a particular child. (Prieto not father)
birth to Jacob Salcedo

Result of the blood test conducted by the
Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob
Salcedo has a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo
type "B", accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and
Tumimpad type "O".
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L.
Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel C.
Prieto were charged with the crime of rape
committed against a 15 year old Mongoloid
child (Sandra).
The Salcedo family, composed of Col.
Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son Alexander and
wife and daughter Sandra, lived in a twostorey officers' quarters
Four security men were assigned to
Salcedo, two of whom were accused Constable
Ruel Prieto and accused-appellant Moreno
Tumimpad.
Sandra complained of constipation,
irritability and moodiness.
Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out
from the kitchen and told her mother, "Mama,
patayin mo 'yan, bastos."
Sandra was brought to the hospital and was
confirmed pregnant, 9 months later she gave
ISSUE:
WON the accused committed the crime of
rape
HELD:
Accused held that he was always with Col.
Salcedo, but this was proven to be untrue, and
the mom testified that there were times that
Sandra was left alone with accused.
Accused simplistically and quite erroneously
argues that his conviction was based on the
medical finding that he and the victim have the
same blood type "O".
Accused-appellants'
culpability
was
established mainly by testimonial evidence
given by the victim herself and her relatives.
The blood test was adduced as evidence only to
show that the alleged father or any one of many
others of the same blood type may have been
the father of the child.
Tan de Guzman
234 332
Benitez Badua v. CA
G.R. No. 105625 ll Jan. 24, 1994
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian were owners of various properties
located in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his
husband died in 1989. Vicentes sister and
nephew filed a complaint for the issuance of
letters of administration of Vicentes estate in
favor of the nephew, herein private respondent.
The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was
raised and cared by the deceased spouses since
childhood, though not related to them by
blood, nor legally adopted. The latter to prove
that she is the only legitimate child of the
spouses submitted documents such as her
certificate of live birth where the spouses name
were reflected as her parents. She even
testified that said spouses continuously treated
her as their legitimate daughter. On the other
hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said
spouses were unable to physically procreate
hence the petitioner cannot be the biological
child. Trial court decided in favor of the
petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole
heir of the spouses.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners certificate of live birth will
suffice to establish her legitimacy.
HELD:
The Court dismissed the case for lack of
merit. The mere registration of a child in his or
her birth certificate as the child of the supposed
parents is not a valid adoption. It does not
confer upon the child the status of an adopted
child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to
simulation of the child's birth or falsification of
his or her birth certificate, which is a public
document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and
brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
latter. In the notarized document, they stated
that they were the sole heirs of the deceased
because she died without descendants and
ascendants. In executing such deed, Vicente
effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live
Birth of the petitioner where it appeared that
he
was
the
petitioners
father.
Tejano
235 332
De Aparicio v. Paraguya
May. 29, 1987 ll Gancayco, J.
FACTS:
Trinidad
Montilde
had
an
affair
with
a
priest,
Rev.
Fr.
Felipe
Lumain
and
conceived
a
child
thereafter. To avoid scandal, she married
Anastacio Mamburao in
her
fourth
month of pregnancy. They never lived
together as husband and wife. 192
days after
the
marriage, Consolacion
Lumain was born. When her father
(Rev. Lumain) died, he executed a will
granting her as sole and universal heir
of all his property rights and interests.
ISSUE:
(1) WON Consolacion is the
child of Fr. Lumain?
(2) WON she is entitled to
heir?
(2) Yes because of his duly probated

will
in Court, designating her as
his
only
heir.
Paternity
is
unnecessary to determine. One who
has compulsory heirs may
dispose
by
will
of
all
his
estate
or
any part
of it in favor of any
person having capacity to succeed.
natural
be his
HELD:
(1) Yes.
Although
there
is
the
presumption that the plaintiff is the
daughter of the spouses Anastacio and
Trinidad, this was revoked by the
account of the
plaintiffs
mother.
Bearing in mind the date of the
birth of her child (192 days after
the marriage), it is evident that the
moher was still single at the time
she was conceived. Under Art 265
of the civil code,
filiation of a
legitimate child
is
proven by the
record of birth or by an authentic

document or a final
judgment >
duly probated will of the deceased
recognizing
her
as
his
natural
daughter.
OTHER ISSUES:
Respondent was also arguing that he
bought the land from a third person
but upon
closer look
of the court,
the land he was talking about was
outside the property
of the Lumains.
The land was left to Felipe and
Macario by there parents. Since there
is a probated of Felipe, who died
before
Macario,
the latter
could
not inherit from the former. There
is
co-ownership
between Consolacion
and Macario
Tiangco
236 332
Constantino v. Mendez
G.R. No. 57227 ll May. 14, 1992 ll Bidin, J.
DOCTRINE:
ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE
The evidence presented by the woman was
the time that she and the man had sexual
intercourse; however, this declaration was not
considered as clear and convincing evidence by
the Court. The date was very crucial to the
determination if Michael was indeed conceived
during the time the woman and man were
having sexual relations. There was also no proof
that the woman did not have any sexual
encounter with other men.
FACTS:
Amelita Constantino was a waitress at
Tonys restaurant in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and there
she met Ivan Mendez sometime in August 1974.
The next day, she was invited by Ivan to dine
with him at Hotel Enrico and courted her. Ivan
brought Amelita inside his hotel room and
through a promise of marriage succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her. He later on
confessed that he is a married man. Despite
this, they repeated their sexual contact in the
months of September and November, 1974 and
as a result, Amelita got pregnant. She asked for
support but Ivan refused to attend to her.
Amelita claimed that she had no sexual
relations with any other man except Ivan. As
relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the
unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's
restaurant but denied having carnal knowledge
her. He prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of cause of action. After
giving birth to Michael, Amelita filed an
amended complaint. The trial court ruled in
favor of Amelita and ordered Mendez to pay
her the damages and to recognize her son

Michael as his own illegitimate child.
ISSUE:
- WON Michael should be recognized as
Ivans illegitimate child. NO.
- WON Amelita is entitled to damages. NO.
RATIO:
The burden of proof is on Amelita to
establish her allegations that Ivan is the father
of her son. Consequently, in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence establishing
paternity or filiation, the complaint must be
dismissed. Amelita's testimony on crossexamination that she had sexual contact with
Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of
November, 1974 is inconsistent with her
response that she could not remember the date
of their last sexual intercourse in November,
1974. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the
first or second week of November, 1974 is the
crucial point that was not even established on
direct examination as she merely testified that
she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the
months of September, October and November,
1974.
Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a
basis for recovery. Damages should only be
awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product
of voluntariness and mutual desire. More
importantly, Constantino admitted that she was
attracted to Mendez. The repeated sexual
intercourse only indicates that passion and not
promise of marriage was the reason that she
allowed to submit herself to Ivan. Therefore she
is not entitled to damages.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Yumol
237 332
Mendoza v. Mella
DOCTRINE:
Although a birth certificate is by nature a
public document, there must be a CLEAR
STATEMENT in the document that the parent
recognizes the child as his or her own. Without
such, voluntary recognition of filiation has no
basis.
FACTS:
Litigated property was donated by Paciano
Pareja to son Gavino in 1939. Gavino
disappeared in 1943 (he died that year accord.
to CA), leaving common-law wife Mendoza and
son Rodolfo (petitioners).
1948: Paciano sold lot to Mella
(respondent), who notified petitioners in 1952
to vacate lot. Petitioners ignored notice. Mella
commenced action in 1955 on basis of deed of
sale by Paciano.
Petitioners claim ownership of contested
land for Rodolfo on grounds of succession from
Gavino and by adverse possession for more
than 10 yrs.
The issue of adverse possession for
more than yearsis not well taken because it was
raised for the first time with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
W/N Rodolfo may be considered
acknowledged as natural child, entitled to
successional rights, with a birth certificate as
proof of filliation.
CA:
NO, for 2 reasons:
i) Only evidence is Rodolfos birth certificate,
which is NOT proof of acknowledgment,
because the old Civil Code was never
established in this country, thus Art. 131

referring to acknowledgement in record of
birth never came into effect.
ii) NO showing that Rodolfos parents could
have married each other when he was
conceived
SC:
NO, but for a different reason than CA; SC chose
to resolve only the FIRST issue.
Civil Registry Law passed in 1930 contained
provisions for registration of births, including
those of illegitimate parentage; record of birth
under such law, if sufficient in contents for the
purpose, would meet requisites for voluntary
recognition.
Rodolfo was born in 1935. Civil Registry Law
applies.
HOWEVER: the evidence is a mere certified
copy of registry record, and not the actual birth
certificate.
Such is NOT sufficient proof of filiation
because though it contains names of both
parents, there is no showing that parents signed
the original birth certificate, let alone that they
swore to its contents.
Even if birth certificate is in nature a public
document wherein voluntary recognition of a
child may be made, in such a case, there must
be a CLEAR STATEMENT in document that
parent recognizes the child as his or her own.
Without such, voluntary recognition has no
basis.
HELD:
Rodolfos birth certificate is not sufficient
proof of filiation to Gavino.
Alampay
238 332
Lim v. CA
DOCTRINE:
Marriage certificate does not satisfy the
required solemnity of a public document as
proof of filiation.
FACTS:
Felisa Lim and Francisco Uy claimed they
inherited, to the exclusion of the other, a house
and lot in Sta. Cruz Manila as sole heir of Susana
Lim.
Felisa Lims pieces of evidence: certificate of
baptism [stating that Felisa is natural daughter
of Susana] and marriage certificate [stating that
Susana gave consent to Felisas marriage]
Francisco Uys pieces of evidence:
application of alien registration, order
cancelling alien reg and identification certificate
all issued by Bureau of Immigration [Uys
Filipino citizenship by derivation from mom
Susana Lim]
TC: Felisa Lim sole heir
CA: neither is entitled to inheritance
because neither of them had been recognized
by Susana Lim as her child by any of the means
provided for by law; and neither had either of
them been declared in a judicial proceeding to
be a child of Susana Lim."
ISSUES:
1. WON Felisas marriage certificate is enough
proof of filiation
2. WON Fransisco is entitled to the property
because he purchased it w/ his money
before Susana died [not pertinent to class

discussion but just in case]
HELD:
1. No. Section 131 of the Civil Code of 1889
requires that the recognition of a natural
child "be made in the record of birth, in a
will, or in some other public document."
However, article 1216 of the Civil Code of
1889 provides that public documents "are
those authenticated by a notary or by a
competent public official, with the
formalities required by law." The public
document referred to in Sec 131 of CC
belongs to the 1st class [executed by
private individual that is authenticated by a
notary]. Marriage contract does not satisfy
the requirement of solemnity mentioned
above. The marriage contract is a mere
declaration by the contracting parties, in
the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and of two witnesses of legal age,
that they take each other as husband and
wife, signed by signature or mark by the
said contracting parties and the said
witnesses, and attested by the person
solemnizing the marriage.
2. No for two reasons: a) Uy raised the theory
of implied trust for the first time in her
motion for reconsideration filed with the
appellate court; b) the evidence regarding
the alleged purchase by her late husband is
altogether unconvincing.
Bayona
239 332
HEIRS OF R. BAAS v. HEIRS OF BIBIANO BAAS

G.R. No. L-25715 ll Jan. 3, 1985 ll Makasiar, J.
PROOFS PRESENTED IN THIS CASE:
(1) A note from Bibiano Banas admonishing
Raymundo for staying out late and which
has been signed by the former with Su
Padre at the end;
(2) School records of Raymundo including
matriculation certificates indicating him as
hijo de Bibiano Banas, and a report card
bearing Bibianos signature for a
parent/guardian;
(3) Certified copy of Raymundos marriage
certificate indicating his father to be
Bibiano;
(4) Typewritten letters containing Raymundos
autobiography, statement of personal
circumstances, and statement of grievances
intimated with Atty. Faustino regarding his
bitterness on Bibianos heirs unwillingness
to have him partake on Bibianos estate
FACTS:
The late Raymundo Baas was a natural
child born out of wedlock of Dolores Castillo
and of an unknown father.
When he went to school, it was Bibiano
Baas who shouldered all his school expenses.
During one of his frequent visits to Bibianos
house, he met Trinidad Vecino, whom he
eventually married. In their marriage certificate,
Bibiano was named as Raymundos father,
while Pedro Baas, Bibianos brother, was
indicated as a sponsor therein. Bibiano died in
1955, survived by his wife and children, who are
the defendants-appellees in this case. Eight
years later, Raymundo also died, survived by his
wife and children, who, on the other hand are
this cases plaintiffs-appellants. Three years
after Raymundos death, his wife and children
instituted the present case to partake on the
estate of Bibiano, they being the descendants of
Raymundo whom they allege to be Bibianos
acknowledged natural son and therefore one of
his rightful heirs, as well as to collect fruits and
damages against the children of Bibiano. Thus,
plaintiffs-appellants presented the proofs
indicated above to establish their claim, which
proofs, as claimed by Trinidad were only
discovered
after
Raymundos
death.
Meanwhile,
Bibianos
heirs
presented
duplicates of sworn statements made by

Raymundo and Pedro to the effect that the
former had only belatedly known that the latter
was his father, that the latter recognizes him as
his son, and that they wish to correct the entry
made in the formers marriage certificate which
indicated Bibiano as his father; and made by
Bibiano to the effect that Pedro was
Raymundos father. The Court of First Instance
ruled in favour of the defendants-appellees,
finding plaintiffs-appellants proofs of filiation
to be insufficient.
ISSUES:
A. WON proofs presented by Raymundo Baas
are sufficient to prove that Bibiano Baas
had
voluntarily
acknowledged
the
Raymundo as his natural son
B. WON the heirs of Raymundo Baas can
assert his personal right to claim filiation on
his behalf
RULING:
The decision appealed from was affirmed by the
Court, who held that there was no voluntary
recognition.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
A. NO. The court conceded that Art. 278 of the
NCC should be given retroactive effect: Art.
278Recognition shall be made in the record of
birth, a wilt a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing. Applying
this provision to the proofs presented by
plaintiffs-appellants:
(1) The note containing Su Padre was
insufficient proof of voluntary recognition
considering the context of the entire letter and
the Filipino tendency to treat children in their
extended families as their own. As such, it was
only an indication of paternal solicitude and
does not meet the requirement of Art. 278 that
recognition of natural children should be
precise, express and solemn.
Neither can plaintiffs-appellants succeed on
their argument of incidental acknowledgment,
which only applies when recognition is made in
a public document, which naturally, people are
Cadorna
240 332
HEIRS OF R. BAAS v. HEIRS OF BIBIANO BAAS

G.R. No. L-25715 ll Jan. 3, 1985 ll Makasiar, J.
more careful with so that any incidental
acknowledgment made therein enjoys a
presumption of truth. This only applied to Art.
131 of the Old Civil Code, which required
filiation to be acknowledged only in a public
document. Meanwhile, the private document
shown by plaintiffs-appellants could have made
a case for compulsory recognition if it has
qualified as an indubitable writing under Art.
135 of the Old Civil Code. However, the
requisite for this type of recognition, in contrast
to the voluntary recognition contemplated in
Art. 131, is that acknowledgment be direct and
express.
As already mentioned Su Padre was
insufficient to make the note qualify as an
indubitable writing, therefore, Art. 135 also
does not apply.
(2) and (3) The school records and marriage
certificates are likewise insufficient proofs
because they were not personally prepared by
Bibiano. There are no records of any evidence
to show that Bibiano Baas furnished the
statements therein or that he had any
participation in securing the enrollment and the
marriage certificate of Raymundo nor made
representations in connection therewith.
Meanwhile, as regards Bibianos signature
appearing at the back of Raymundos report
card, it could either mean parental solicitude, or
Bibiano signing it in his capacity as guardian.
(4) Nowhere in the letters of Raymundo to
Atty. Faustino did he claim his right against the
estate of Bibiano. Also, the statement of
personal circumstances and autobiography
were made at a time after Raymundo aired his
grievances over Bibianos heirs treatment to
their fathers estate, and thus, the possibility

that Raymundo has personal hidden motives
other than establishing filiation cannot be
discounted.
Besides
the
application
of
the
abovementioned provision, the court also cited
that all the documents presented by the
plaintiffs-appellants ran contrary to the public
documents made by Pedro and Raymundo,
acknowledging their relationship as father and
son, and by Bibiano, corroborating the same in
his own personal statement. The latters
statement, if it were to be conceded that
Bibiano, at any time, recognized Raymundo as
his son, can be taken to be a renunciation of the
same, which renunciation is not prohibited by
law. These public documents are more reliable,
also taking into consideration the fact that
Raymundo did not make any claim for
compulsory recognition as Bibianos heir during
the eight years that passed before Bibianos and
his death. Trinidads testimony that all these
facts were unknown to her prior to her
husbands death is belied by human experience
and her inconsistent testimonies during the
trial.
B.
NO. Granting that, after the death of
Bibiano Baas, Raymundo could file an action
for compulsory recognition against Bibiano's
heirs despite his not being under the exceptions
set forth by Art. 135 of the Old Civil Code or Art.
283 of the New Civil Code, still plaintiffsappellants cannot invoke Raymundo's right to
file such action, because it is not transmissible
to the natural child's heirs; the right is purely a
personal one to the natural child, and such
action for the acknowledgment of a natural
child can only be exercised by him
Cadorna
241 332
Republic v. CA and Vicencio

G.R. No. 88202 ll Quisumbing, J.
FACTS
Appeal of the decision of the RTC allowing
Cynthia Vicencios change of surname to Yu.
Cynthias legitimate father Pablo Vicencio left
the family before she turned 1. Her mother
instituted an action to declare her father an
absentee and then subsequently married her
step-father Ernesto Yu who acted as her father
since. She used Vivencio on official documents
such as school records and used Yu when she
participated in public functions.
The trial court granted the change of name
and stated that failure to resort to adoption by
the step-father should not be a cause for
disallowing the legal change of name. CA
affirmed the TC decision, holding that it was in
the best interest of the petitioner to change the
surname as the discrepancy between the
original surname and the surname of the stepfather who has been socially recognized as her
father caused her embarrassment and
inferiority complex.
Sol Gen argued that there is no proper and
reasonable cause to warrant the change of
surname and that it might even cause confusion

and legal complications because her mother
and step-father have children of their own and
she might even claim inheritance rights as a
legitimate daughter.
ISSUE
WON petitioners change of surname to
that of her stepfathers is allowed.
HELD & RD
NO. The Court upheld the grave legal
consequences that the Sol Gen argued. Also,
since she is the legitimate child of her biological
parents, she is supposed to bear her legitimate
fathers surname. Change of name is a privilege
and not a right, and should therefore be
carefully considered by the courts and to deny
the same unless proper and reasonable causes
are shown.
Decision is the same regardless of Cynthias
age.
Cristobal
242 332
De Asis v. CA
PETITIONER:
Manuel De Asis
RESPONDENTS: CA, Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy and Glen Camil Andres De Asis, represented by
mother/guardian Vircel De Asis
Doctrine:
The right to receive support cannot be
renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third
person; neither can it be compensated with
what the recipient owes the obligator (Art. 301,
FC). Furthermore, the right to support cannot
be waived or transferred to third parties and
future support cannot be the subject of
compromise (Art. 2035, FC).
FACTS:
In 1988, Vircel De Asis, on behalf of her
child Glen Camil, filed an action for
maintenance and support from Manual De Asis
alleging that he is the father of the child and the
he refused and/or failed to provide for the
maintenance of the child, despite repeated
demands. Manuel denied his paternity of the
said minor and that he cannot therefore be
required to provide support. Both parties
though agreed to dismiss the complaint.
In 1995, another complaint for maintenance
and support was again filed by same parties
against Manuel, which was granted by the
Kalookan RTC and ordered Manuel to pay for
support and allowance. Manuel moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
judicata, alleging that present suit is barred by
the prior judgment. RTC ruled that res judicata
is inapplicable in an action for support for the
reason that renunciation or waiver of future
support is prohibited by law. He then filed a
petition for certiorari to CA, which was
dismissed under the same grounds and which
led to current petition in SC.
ISSUE:
WoN respondent courts acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in upholding the denial of the

motion to dismiss by the trial court, and holding
that an action for support cannot be barred by
res judicata
RULING:
Petition dismissed, RTC & CA decisions
affirmed.
RATIO:
No. Both courts applied the correct
principles regarding right to support. The right
to receive support can neither be renounced
nor transmitted to a third person under Art.301,
FC. Furthermore, future support cannot be the
subject of a compromise under Art.2035,FC.The
right to support being founded upon the need
of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is
not entitled to renounce or transfer the right
for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary
giving up of life itself. Thus, the agreement
between the mother and the alleged father
regarding the dismissal of the first complaint for
support is in the nature of a compromise and as
such, violates the prohibition against any
compromise of the right to support. It is true
that in order to claim support, filiation and/or
paternity must first be shown between the
claimant and the parent. However, paternity
and filiation or the lack of the same is a
relationship that must be judicially established
and it is for the court to declare its existence or
absence, not by the will or agreement of the
parties. In this case, lack of filiation was not
considerably established. This means that the
first dismissal cannot have force and effect and
cannot bar the filing of another action, thus
second
action
may
still
prosper.
Cruz
243 332
Rodriguez v. CA
G.R. No. 85723 ll Jun. 19, 1995
FACTS:
On October 15, 1986, Clarito Agbulos
brought an action for compulsory recognition
against Bienvenido Rodriguez. Agbulos brought
her mother as first witness. She identified the
plaintiffs father, but the opposing counsel
objected, on the basisof Art. 280 CC16.
The trial court sustained it but CA, which is
of the opinion that the testimony may be
allowed, reversed the order. Rodriguez filed a
petition for certiorari to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the mothers testimony identifying
the putative father of Agbulos may be accepted.
HELD:
Yes. By tracing the counterpart provisions
from the Spanish Civil Code, New Civil Code and
the Family Code, the Court concluded that Art.
280 referred to voluntary recognition and not to
be applied for compulsory recognition.
The Court noted that the respondent relied
on Art. 283 CC and Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court17
to defend the
admissibility of her mothers testimony. Article
172 FC has adopted Art. 283 CC, particularly
paragraph 4, where filiation may be proven by
any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
Furthermore, the Court also noted that Art.
280 CC was not just repealed; it no longer has a
counterpart prohibition in the Family Code,
which undoubtedly discloses the intention of
the legislative authority to uphold the Code
Commission's stand to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity of illegitimate
children.
16
When the father or the mother makes the

recognition separately, he or she shall not reveal he
name of the person with whom he or she had the
child; neither shall he or she state any circumstance
whereby the other party may be identified.
17
Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules.
Dantes
244 332
Mariategui v CA
G.R. No. L-57062 ll Bidin, J.
DOCTRINE:
Filiation can be proven using a Birth
Certificate. Without it, the continuous
enjoyment of the status as a child is still
sufficient proof of filiation. This case is simply
an illustration of Art 172 FC.
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui had 3 wives (and 3 sets of
children) during his lifetime.
(1) The first, Eusebia, died in 1904 and left
him 4 children. (hereinafter First set)
(2) The second, Flaviana, he married in
1910, and with whom they had 1
daughter. (hereinafter Second set)
(3) The third, Felipa, he married sometime
in 1930, and with whom they had 3
children (Jacinto, Paulina, Julian). Felipa
died in 1941. (hereinafter Third set)
Lupo died in 1953.
In 1973, his descendants by his first and
second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition wherein they adjudicated
for themselves a piece of land in Muntinglupa.18
The third set of children filed a complaint
alleging that the extrajudicial partition deprived
them of their respective shares.
The first set argued that
The complaint was one for the
recognition of natural children (wherein
Art 27819 and 28520 CC shall apply with
18
In effect, the first and second set of children tried

to defraud the third set of children from their rightful
shares.
19
Art. 278 CC. Recognition shall be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing.
20
Art. 285 CC. The action for the recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority
of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a
document should appear of which nothing had been
respect to prescription for the

recognition of natural children)
Prescription has barred the third set
of children from claiming their right
to demand their share of the partition.
And that they (third set of children)
belatedly filed an action for recognition
and they werent able to prove their
successional rights over the estate
TC: Dismissed
CA: All descendants, including the third set, are
entitled to equal shares of the estate.
ISSUES:
WON this is a case primarily of recognition
of natural children21
WON the third set of children are legitimate
WON Prescription bars the third set from
claiming their share of the partition.
HOLDING & RATIO:
Petition (by first set of children) DENIED, CA
decision AFFIRMED:
This is an action principally of partition
(NOT for recognition); the status of the third set
of children was raised only collaterally to assert
their rights to the estate.
The third set of children are legitimate
because
There is a presumption of marriage
between Lupo and Felipa
o They deported themselves as
husband and wife
o They were known in the community
as such
o Even if there was no marriage
certificate, no evidence was offered
to controvert the presumption
Jacintos (child of the third set of
children) birth certificate is sufficient
heard and in which either or both parents recognize

the child.
21
Because if it is indeed such a case, then the filing
of the action for recognition has indeed prescribed
as per Art 285 CC.
De Castro
245 332
Mariategui v CA
G.R. No. L-57062 ll Bidin, J.
proof of filiation of legitimate children
as per Art 172 FC22
Even if Julian and Paulina could not
present
any
evidence,
they
continuously enjoyed the status of
children of Lupo which is still sufficient
proof to establish filiation of legitimate
children in Art 172.
Prescription does not run against the third
set of children
So long as they have not expressly
or impliedly repudiated the coownership.
In other words, a co-owner cannot
acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners without a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly
communicated to the other co-owners.
The execution of the extrajudicial
partition and registration of the
properties in their own names (First set)
cannot be considered as repudiation of
the co-ownership because it was not
duly communicated to the third set of
children who were their legitimate coheirs
22
Art. 172 FC. The filiation of legitimate children is

established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open
and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
De Castro
246 332
Aruego, Jr. v. CA
PETITIONERS:
Jose E. Aruego, Jr., Simeona San Juan Aruego, Ma. Immaculada T. Alanon, Roberto A.
Torres, Cristina A. Torres, Justo Jose Torres and Agustin Torres
RESPONDENTS: The Hon. Court of Appeals, 13th Division and Antonia Aruego
DOCTRINE:
Family Code cannot be given retroactive
effect insofar as it prejudices the vested right of
persons under the Civil Code
FACTS:
In 1983 (Mar. 7), a Complaint for Compulsory
Recognition and Enforcement of Successional
Rights was filed by Private respondent and her
sister (Antonia and Evelyn Aruego), represented
by their mother (Luz Fabian)
The respondents allege that:
The late Jose Aruego, a married man,
had an amorous relationship with Luz
Fabian
Antonia and Evelyn was born out of this
relationship
They are thus illegitimate children of
Jose Aruego
BASIS OF ACTION: Open and continuous
possession of the status as illegitimate children
(Art. 285 CC)
Regular support and educational
expenses
Allowance to use his surname
Payment of maternal bills and
baptismal expenses
Taking them out to restaurants and
departments stores on occasions of
family rejoicing
Attendance to school problems
Introducing them as such children to
family friends
Art. 285 (CC)
The action for the recognition of natural
children may be brought only during the
following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the
minority of the child, in which case the latter
may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority.
Petitioners contend that:
With the advent of the Family Code,

jurisdiction over the complaint of
private respondent on the ground of
prescription has shifted from the CC to
the FC
o From the 4 years after attainment
of his majority to during the
lifetime of the alleged parent
o This is because when the sisters
filed the petition, it was almost 1
year after the death of their
presumed father
Art. 172 (FC)

The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgement; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence,
the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws
Art. 175 (FC)
Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the
same period specified in Art. 173 [during the
lifetime of the child] except when the action is
based on the 2nd paragraph of Art. 172, in
which case the action may be brought during
the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Art. 256 (FC)
This Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Dilag
247 332
Aruego, Jr. v. CA
Code or other laws.
the Family Code.

This right can no longer be prejudiced
or impaired by the enactment of a new
law.
The application of Art. 175 of the Family
Code will adversely affect the right of
the private respondent.
In the CC:
Prescription will not yet bar the
respondent from filing the petition, as
they have filed within 1 year after
attainment of majority and their father
died while they were minors (period of
within 4 years after attainment of
majority)
In the FC:
Prescription is barred, as it requires the
filing of the petition during the lifetime
of the concerned parent
ISSUE:
WON the provisions of the Family Code be
applied in the instant case
WON the application of the Family Code in
this case prejudice or impair any vested right of
the private respondent such that it should not
be given retroactive effect in this particular case
HELD:
NO
Vested / Acquired Rights = not defined by
the Family Code
Left it to the courts to determine what
it means as each particular issue is
submitted to them
In the ruling in Tayag v. Court of Appeals:
Right of action of the minor child has
been vested by the filing of the
complaint in court under the regime of
the Civil Code, prior to the effectivity of
PETITION IS DENIED
DECISION OF CA AFFIRMED
Dilag
248 332
Jison v. CA
G.R. No. 124853 ll Feb. 4, 1998
DOCTRINE:
Testimonial evidence was more than
sufficient to establish her open and continuous
possession of status as an illegitimate child.
However, she cannot rely on her birth and
baptismal certificates since it was not shown
that the putative father had anything to do with
the filing of said certificates.
consider the child as his, by continuous and

clear manifestations of parental affection and
care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that
they reveal not only the conviction of paternity,
but also the apparent desire to have and treat
the child as such in all relations in society and in
life, not accidentally, but continuously.
FACTS:
Private
respondent,
Monina
Jison,
instituted a complaint against petitioner,
Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate
child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years
after her mothers death and when she was
already 39 years of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison
since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he
impregnated Esperanza Amolar (a nanny),
Moninas mother. Monina alleged that since
childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous,
implied recognition as the illegitimate child of
petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It
was likewise alleged that petitioner supported
her and spent for her education such that she
became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank
Examiner. Monina was able to present total of
11 witnesses.
The following facts were established based

on the testimonial evidence offered by Monina:
1. That Francisco was her father and she was
conceived at the time when her mother was
employed by the former;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his
child through his overt acts and conduct.
ISSUE:
WON the evidence can prove filiation
HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code,
illegitimate filiation may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as that of
legitimate children.
Article 172 thereof
provides the various forms of evidence by
which legitimate filiation is established.
To prove open and continuous possession
of the status of an illegitimate child, there must
be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth

purportedly identifying the putative father is
not competence evidence as to the issue of
paternity. Franciscos lack of participation in the
preparation of baptismal certificates and school
records render the documents showed as
incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to
the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25
years of age attesting that Francisco was not
her father, SC was in the position that if Monina
were truly not Franciscos illegitimate child, it
would be unnecessary for him to have gone to
such great lengths in order that Monina
denounce her filiation. Moninas evidence
hurdles the high standard of proof required for
the success of an action to establish ones
illegitimate filiation in relying upon the
provision on open and continuous possession.
Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more
than mere preponderance of evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity
and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed
her action well within the period granted her by
a positive provision of law. A denial then of her
action on ground of laches would clearly be
inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.
Dolot
249 332
Alberto v. CA
G.R. No. 86639 ll Jun. 2, 1994
PETITIONER:
RESPONDENTS:
Ma. Theresa R. Alberto

Court of Appeals, intestate estate of Juan M. Alberto and Yolanda R. Alberto
FACTS:
Sweethearts Aurora Reniva and Governor
Juan M. Alberto had a daughter, Ma. Theresa
Alberto. Juan married Yolanda Reyes after
Albertos birth.
On Theresas 14th birthday, the governor
was on his way to visit her. He was assassinated
and died intestate.
Juans widow Yolanda petitioned for the
administration of his estate and was appointed
administratrix.
Theresa motioned to intervene as oppositor
and re-open the proceedings, praying that she
be declared as having acquired the status of a
natural child, and thus being entitled to share in
Juans estate.
The trial court decided in her favor and
compelled Juans heirs and estate to recognize
her as a natural daughter. However, the Court
of Appeals reversed this decision.
ISSUES
May recognition of the child be ordered
upon the estate and heirs of the deceased
parent, based on evidence that the child has
been in continuous possession of natural
status?
RATIO
Yes. The Court granted the petition, which
reversed the Court of Appeals ruling and
affirmed that of the trial court.
The following was established by the trial
court, and was deemed to have sufficiently
proven that Juan recognized Theresa as his
daughter:
- Theresa used Alberto as her surname in
all her school records, and Juan was known
to be her father by the school personnel.
- Juan paid for Theresas education.
- She was recognized as Juans daughter by
his relatives and friends, and was regarded
as a niece by Juans siblings and a cousin by

their children.
He proudly relayed to his friends the high
grades on her report card.
Juan would have visited her on her birthday
in her school, if not for his death.
Theresa and her mother were present in
the Philippine General Hospital when Juan
died, and Fr. Arcilla, Juans first cousin, held
Theresas hand, asking the guard to make
way for her and saying she was Juans
daughter.
The acts not only of Juan but also of his

relatives demonstrate that the recognition of
Theresas status was made not only by Juan but
by his relatives as well.
Since there were no legal impediments
between Juan and Theresas mother Aurora,
they could have validly married. As a natural
child, Theresa occupies the highest in the
hierarchy of illegitimate children.
Thus, the present petition was found to be
covered by Art. 235 of the Civil Code:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the
following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the
minority of the child, in which case the latter
may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority.
Juan died on Sept. 18, 1967Thereses 14th
birthday. </3
Therese would reach 21 on Sept. 18, 1974,
and would still have until Sept. 18, 1978 to file
the action for recognition. Since the action was
filed on Sept. 15, 1978, it was within the
deadline.
Espaola
250 332
Guy v. CA
G.R. No. 163707 ll Sep. 15, 2006 ll Ynares-Santiago, J.
PETITIONER:
MICHAEL C. GUY
RESPONDENTS: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch
138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI,
represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES
FACTS:
Respondent minors Karen & Kamille Oanes
Wei, represented by their mother Remedios
Oanes, filed a petition for letters of
administration, claiming that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei,
who died intestate in Makati in 1992, leaving an
estate valued at P10M consisting of real and
personal properties. Sima Weis known heirs
are his spouse Shirley Guy and their children all
surnamed Guy. Respondents prayed that
Michael Guy (Petitioner) be appointed as
Special Administrator of the estate. Michael, on
the other hand, prayed for the dismissal of the
petition, arguing that respondents should have
established their status as illegitimate children
during the lifetime of Sima Wei, pursuant to Art.
175 of FC.
In a supplement to their (Michael and coheirs) Joint Motion to Dismiss, petitioners claim
that respondents claim had been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason
of Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver
of Claim stating that in exchange for the
financial and educational assistance received
from petitioner, respondents discharge the
estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
RTC denied motion to dismiss, because
Remedios has not been established as the duly
constituted guardian of her minor daughters
no renunciation of right occurred. (For 1st issue,
respondents issued a certificate of non-forum
shopping signed by their counsel only, not
including their siggies.)
ISSUES:
(1) WoN Respondents petition should be
dismissed for failure to comply with the
rules on certification of non-forum
shopping;
(2) WoN the Release and Waiver of Claim
precludes respondents from claiming
their successional rights;
(3) WoN respondents are barred by
prescription from proving filiation.

HELD:
(1) No. Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court provides that the certification of nonforum shopping should be executed by the
plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply
with the requirement shall be cause for
dismissal of the case. However, while a petition
may be flawed where the certificate of nonforum shopping was signed only by counsel and
not by the party, this procedural lapse may be
overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.
(2) No. the Release and Waiver of Claim
does not bar the minor respondents from
claiming successional rights. The SC ruled that
there was no waiver of hereditary rights
waiver was not clear on the purpose of its
execution. It merely states that Remedios
received P300k and an educational plan for her
minor daughters by way of financial assistance
and in full settlement of any and all claims of
whatsoever nature and kind against the estate
of the late Rufino Guy Susim.did not
specifically mention respondents share in the
estate of Sima Wei. Also, according to Article
1044 of CC: Any inheritance left to minors or
incapacitated persons may be accepted by their
parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may
repudiate the inheritance left to their wards
only by judicial authorization.
In the present case, private respondents
could not have possibly waived their
successional rights because they are yet to
prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate
children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has
consistently denied that private respondents
are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to
rule that they waived their hereditary rights
when petitioner claims that they do not have
such right.
Enad
251 332
Guy v. CA
G.R. No. 163707 ll Sep. 15, 2006 ll Ynares-Santiago, J.
(3) No. To rule as such would be premature,
because respondents have yet to present
evidence. Illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time the Family Code took effect
and whose putative parent died during their
minority are given the right to seek recognition
for a period of up to four years from attaining
majority age. Under the Family Code, when
filiation of an illegitimate child is established by
a record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned, the
action for recognition may be brought by the
child during his or her lifetime. However, if the
action is based upon open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
or any other means allowed by the rules or
special laws, it may only be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear
therefore that the resolution of the issue of

prescription depends on the type of evidence to
be adduced by private respondents in proving
their filiation. While the original action filed by
private respondents was a petition for letters of
administration, the trial court is not precluded
from
receiving
evidence
on
private
respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise
of its recognized powers in handling the
settlement of the estate, including the
determination of the status of each heir. That
the two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance,
may be joined in one complaint is not new in
our jurisprudence.
Petition denied. Case remanded for reception
of evidence.
Enad
252 332
Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz

FACTS:
Joanne Rodjin Diaz, represented by her
mother and guardian, Jinky Diaz, filed a
complaint for compulsory recognition with
prayer for support pending litigation against
Rogelio Ong before RTC of Tarlac.
Jinky, who was married to a Hasegawa
Katsuo Feb 1993, cohabited and lived together
with Rogelio from Jan 1994- Sept 1998
She alleges that from this relationship,
Joanne Diaz was born on Feb 25 1998
Rogelio paid for all the hospital and
baptismal expenses. However, in September
1998, Rogelio abandoned Joanne and Jinky
RTC ruled in favor of Jinky and Joanne,
recognizing the latter as an illegitimate child
since Hasegawa only went home once a year,
thus making it impossible to be the father
Rogelio appealed to the CA. During
pendency of the case though, he died.
CA ruled in the reverse and ordered that
the case be remanded to trial courts for DNA
Testing. Petitioner, estate of Rogelio Ong,
challenges this decision alleging that:
1) Joanne is the legitimate heir of Jinky and
Japanese man
2) That DNA testing would be not advisable
since Rogelio's already dead
ISSUES:
1) WON CA erred in not declaring Joanne as
the legitimate child of Hasegawa and Jinky
2) WON DNA Analysis is still feasible
notwithstanding the death of Rogelio
HELD:
1) Though there is a reasonable presumption
in favor of legitimacy for a child born in a
marriage, this is not conclusive. This can be
overthrown by evidence like:
- impossibility for the parents to conceive the
child on said date
- impotence of the husband
- record of birth appearing in the civil
registrar admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by parent concerned etc
2) New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the
conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio
or upon application of any person who has
a legal interest in the matter of ligitation
Sec 4 provides that DNA testing can push
through if a biological sample exists
- Even if Rogelio already died, any of
biological samples (saliva, tissues, hairs, and
bones) can be used for DNA Testing. (Any
physical residue of the long dead parent can be
resorted to)
CA ruling affirmed
Hermosisima
253 332
Uyguangco v. CA
DOCTRINE:
If the action to establish illegitimate filiation
is based on the second paragraph of Article 172
(secondary evidence), the action may only be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
PROOF OF FILIATION:
Open and continuous possession of status
as illegitimate children (lived with his father
from 1967 until 1973, receiving of support, use
of fathers surname, shared profits of a family
business, directorship in a family corporation)
FACTS:
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in
1975, leaving his wife and four children
(petitioners) and considerable properties which
they divided among themselves. Claiming to be
an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario,
and having been left out in the extrajudicial
settlement of his estate, Graciano Uyguangco
(respondent) filed a complaint against the
petitioners.
To prove his filiation, Graciano alleged that
at the age of 15, he moved to his fathers
hometown, he received support from his father
while he was studying and he was assigned by
his father as storekeeper at the Uyguangco
store. (SEE OTHER PROOF MENTIONED ABOVE).
However, he admit that he had none of the
documents mentioned in Article 278 (record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record on in any authentic writing) to show that
he was the illegitimate son of the deceased.
Petitioners: Respondent could no longer
prove his alleged filiation under the applicable
provisions of the Civil Code as the only evidence
allowed under Article 278 CC to prove the claim
was not available to himself.
RTC: Graciano could prove his alleged filiation.
CA affirmed.
NOTE:
Since the case was decided in 1989, the
Court already applied the Family Code
provisions as the Civil Code provisions the
petitioners invoke has been superseded, or
modified by the FC.

ISSUES:
WON Graciano should be allowed to prove that
he is an illegitimate child of his claim father,
who is already dead, in the absence of
documentary (primary) evidence required.
HELD:
No. His action should be barred under
Article 175 of the FC.
RD:
Under Article 175 of FC, illegitimate children
may establish their legitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children. In the absence of the
primary evidence mentioned in Article 172,
respondent is now allowed to establish his
claimed of filiation by 1) open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child
or 2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
The problem of the respondent, however, is
that, since he seeks to prove his filiation under
the second paragraph (secondary evidence) of
Article 172 of the FC, his action is now barred
because of his alleged fathers death in 1975.
The second paragraph of Article 175 states that
when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
Respondent can no longer be allowed at
this time to introduce evidence of his open and
continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child or prove his filiation through
any means allowed by the ROC or special laws.
The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco
is already dead and can no longer be heard on
the claim of his alleged sonss illegitimate
filiation.
Rationale of the rule (Sempio Diy): It is a
truism that unlike legitimate children who are
publicly recognized, illegitimate children are
usually begotten and raised in secrecy and
without the legitimate family being aware of
their existence. Who then can be sure of their
Macariola
254 332
Uyguangco v. CA
filiation but the parents themselves? But
suppose the child claiming the illegitimate child
of a certain person is not really the child of the
latter? The putative parent should thus be given
the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs

filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or
she is already dead.
Macariola
255 332
David v. CA
Nov. 16, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Daisie T. David and respondent
Ramon R. Villar had an intimate relationship
that resulted in the birth of Christopher J.
respondent Villar was married at the time that
the said intimate relationship took place. In
1991, Villar took Christopher on a family
vacation to Boracay with the consent of the
petitioner. After the said trip, Villar refused to
return custody of Christopher to David.
In response to his refusal to return custody
of the child, David filed a petition for habeas
corpus on behalf of her son with the RTC of
Angeles City. The RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioner and ordered the respondent to
return custody to David and furnish their
children with support. The respondent
subsequently raised the issue before the Court
of Appeals that ruled in his favor, stating that
the petition for habeas corpus was not
appropriate because the parental authority of
the mother over illegitimate children was
express under the provisions of law. As such,
questions regarding custody and support could
be raised in a single petition. Taking into
consideration that the respondent was
financially better off compared to the
petitioner, the CA awarded custody to Villar.
Petitioner then raised the issue to the level of
the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
- WON the mother of an illegitimate child
could petition for habeas corpus in order to
regain custody of her child
- WON the financial and material superiority
of the husband compared with the mother
may grant him custody of their illegitimate
child
HELD:
NO. The Court cited Rule 102, sec. 1 of the
Rules of Court that provided that the writ of

habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or by which the rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto. In correlation with this, the
court then referred to Art. 176 of the Family
Code that stated that illegitimate children are
placed under the parental authority of their
mother.
Taking those two provisions in
conjunction with each other, the Court ruled
that petitioner was entitled to relief through
habeas corpus because her rightful custody
to Christopher J. was being deprived by her
husband.
NO. Although it was true that the
respondents financial status would likely afford
the child better opportunities and prospects in
life, it was not enough to deprive the mother of
custody
when
she
had
sufficiently
demonstrated that she was likewise capable
of providing a sufficient, if less luxurious,
lifestyle for her son. Her complete inability to
provide for her son would have to be proved in
order for the parental authority vested in the
mother by the Family Code to be overthrown.
This was not the case in this instance. Also, the
Court pointed to the fact that any child less
than 7 years of age could not be separated from
his mother and that, in any case, the child had
already categorically stated that he would
prefer to be with his mother. The fathers
recognition of the child as his own is not
enough to claim custody but is sufficient for the
claiming of support. The payment of allowance
or support need not be conditioned with
custody.
Custody granted to the petitioner with the
respondent obliged to support his children
with her.
Marin
256 332
People v. Namayan
The crime of rape committed by the accused
carries with it, among others, the obligations to
acknowledge the offspring if the character of its
origin does not prevent it and to support the
same.
FACTS:
Margie Pagaygay, a mental retardate, was
raped three times by defendant
Namayan.
Her mother noticed that her stomach was
bulging and upon medical examination, she was
found to be four to five months pregnant.
Namayan was convicted for rape, but
appealed his decision saying that it was
impossible for him to have intercourse since he
was jailed during the time of the alleged rapes
and that victim's testimony betrays behavior of
a girl who was raped.

HELD:
The record shows that it was possible for
the defendant to have raped the girl. The
testimony of the jailer could not be conclusive
because his task was merely to oversee the
records and not check the physical presence of
the defendant in jail.
On the allegation that victim betrayed the
normal behavior of a girl that was sexually
threatened, the court reminds us that she was a
mental retardate and had no will to resist his
advances.
There is no doubt that defendant is the
father of the child, the acts of sexual
intercourse having occurred one month before
the start of conception.
Nuez
257 332
Republic v. Abadilla
FACTS:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino
have been living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
They begot two children, Emerson and
Rafael, whose respective birth certificates
indicated inter alia the following information:
Surname:
Abadilla
Fathers name: Herson (instead of Gerson)
Abadilla
Date of marriage of parents:
June 19, 1987
Place of marriage of parents: Dingras, Ilocos
Norte
in spite of the fact that no marriage
occurred between the parents.
In 1997, the parents and their children
filed before the RTC of Laoag City an
Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation
of Entries, seeking to have the following
corrections made in the birth certificates of
Emerson and Rafael:
1. Ordering that the date and place of
marriage be deleted;
2. Ordering that Herson be corrected as
Gerson.
According to Article 17623, FC, Emerson and

Rafael should bear the surname of their
mother, Luzviminda Celestino.
The Civil Registrar was thus ordered to
change the entry in the amended birth
certificates from Abadilla to Celestino.
During the hearing of the petition, the

parents testified to not being married despite
bearing two children. The trial court granted the
petition and ordered the abovementioned
corrections to be made.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC committed a reversible error
when it allowed the deletion of the date and
place of marriage, but failed to order the
change of the minors surname from Abadilla
to Celestino.
RULING:
YES. The OSG, which brought the petition
up for certiorari, was correct in saying that such
change should have been made, considering
that the minors parents are still not married,
ergo Emerson and Rafael are illegitimate
children.
23
Article 176, FC. Illegitimate children shall use the

surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the
legitime of a legitimate child.
Ordoyo
258 332
Gan v. Reyes
G.R. No. L-145527 ll May. 28, 2002 ll Bellosiollo, J.
KEYWORDS: Support pendente lite
FACTS:
- Bernadette Pondevida instituted in behalf
of her daughter a complaint against
petitioner for support with prayer for
support pendente lite.
- Motion to dismiss by petitioner was denied
and the trial court ordered him to recognize
private respondent Francheska Joy S.
Pondevida as his illegitimate child and pay
her support every month, among others.
- Private respondent moved for execution of
judgment of support which trial court
granted by issuing a writ of execution.
- Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the CA imputing grave
abuse of discretion by the trial court for
granting said writ. CA dismissed petition.
- Petitioner argues that action for support
cannot be granted right away because: 1)
judgment for support which is under appeal
cannot be executed without a good reason
for its immediate execution; 2) writ was
invalid because it was done in violation of
his right to notice and hearing; and 3) his
claim of adultery on the part of private
respondent should be heard by the court
because such defense would lead to the
denial of the claim of support.
ISSUE:
WON support for the respondent can be
immediately executed by the court
RULING:
Petition denied. CA decision dismissing
petition for certiorari by petitioner and the trial
courts upholding of validity of writ of execution

affirmed.
RATIO:
- Yes. Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court
clearly states that, unless ordered by the
trial court, judgments in actions for support
are immediately executory and cannot be
stayed by an appeal.
- Petitioners interpretation of the provision
cannot be accepted by the court because
the plain words of such provision need no
further explanation.
- Furthermore, the interest and welfare of
the child are of paramount concern in all
cases involving him. It would be a travesty
of justice if support is withheld until the
final decision of the trial court is handed
out, especially in view of the poverty of the
child.
- The Court cited an earlier decision (De Leon
vs Soriano) where it was said that money
and property adjudged for support and
education should be given without delay as
the time spent waiting for the final
judgment of the case may lead to the child
suffering due to lack of nutrition or missed
payments in school all because he lacked
funds.
- Even if the accumulated amount were paid
after the trial, such payment cannot repair
the damage caused while the child was
wanting of support. Years of missed classes
and long periods of hunger may not be
made up.
- Adultery could not be alleged because
petitioner was not even married to private
respondent.
Pagdanganan
259 332
De Guzman v. Perez
G.R. No. 156013 ll Jul. 25, 2006 ll Corona, J.
KEYWORDS:
Child neglect by wealthy dad
FACTS:
- Roberto and Shirley were sweethearts while
studying law in UST. This led to Shirley
getting pregnant, giving birth to Robby.
However, Roberto and Shirley never got
married. Roberto ended up marrying
another woman.
- Roberto only sent support Robbys
schooling twice, and sent medical support
only when Robby fell seriously ill. Other
than these, he never provided any financial
support for his son.
- Shirley got a job as a factory worker in
Taiwan, but this was not enough to provide
for Robby. Roberto on the other hand, lived
a luxurious lifestyle.
- This led to Shirley demanding support from
Roberto. This was ignored, which forced
Shirley to file a criminal case for
abandonment and neglect under Art.59 of
PD 603.
- Shirley presented a notarized copy of the
General Information Sheet of the RNCD
Development Corporation showing that
Roberto owner P750,000 worth of
corporate shares.
- The City prosecutor ruled in favour of
Shirley, stating that her proof constituted
circumstantial evidence of his ample
financial resources.
- Robert argues that his wealth was just his
dads and that one can only be charged with
neglect if one has the means but fails to
provide. Second, he argues that Robby was
not a neglected child because Shirley and
her family provide for him. He says that

neglect only takes place when both parents
do not provide for the child.
ISSUE:
WON Roberto has indeed neglected his son
RULING:
Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
- Yes. There is a prima facie evidence
showing that petitioner is in fact financially
capable of supporting Robbys education.
His argument that his wealth is only his
dads cannot hold water.
- Second, his argument that neglect only
takes place if both parents neglect the child
under PD 603 is also wrong. The law is clear
and shows that neglect can be committed
by any parent. The irresponsible parent
cannot exculpate himself from the
consequences of his neglect by invoking the
other parents faithful compliance with his
or her own parental duties.
- However, he cannot be indicted for
violation of PD 603 in relation to RA 7610 as
the latter covers only those cases of neglect
under the former which are not covered by
the RPC. Neglect of child under PD 603 is
also a crime under Art. 277 of the RPC.
Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of
RA 7610.
- Finally, this does not mean that Roberto is
already guilty of neglect. The presumption
of innocence still stands and what has only
been ascertained is that there is probably
cause to charge him for neglect.
Poblador
260 332
Zepeda v. Zepeda
41 Ill. App. 2d 240 ll Apr. 3, 1963 ll Dempsey, J.
KEYWORDS:
Action for damages to redress wrongful life
caused by being a bastard
FACTS:
- Petitioner alleges that he is the
illegitimate child of the defendant
and that he was the result of his
parents sexual relations that arose
from a marriage promise by the
defendant. The
marriage
however,
did not follow through.
- The plaintiff now seeks damages
for deprivation of his right to be
a
legitimate
child,
to
have
a
normal home, to have a legal
father, to inherit from his father,
to
inherit
from
his
paternal
ancestors, and for being stigmatized
as a bastard.
ISSUE:
(1) WON
the
fraudulent act
of the
defendant is considered
to be a
tortious act (tort)
(2) WON a tort can be inflicted upon a
being
simultaneously
with
its
conception
(3) WON the plaintiff has a cause of
action
RULING:
While
the
cause for action for
wrongful life may qualify as a tort,
it
is
not actionable considering its farreaching legal implications that proscribes the
court from engaging in law making.
RATIO:
Yes. The defendant hid the fact
that he was a married man and
couldnt
actually fulfill his
promise
to
marry the plaintiffs mother. It was
not only a moral wrong but was, under
the
aggravated
circumstance
of this
case, tortious in nature.
Yes. The plaintiff is a person now

and he was a potential person with full
capacity for independent existence at
the time of the original wrong. As he
developed biologically from potentiality
to reality, the wrong developed as
well.
A legitimate child has the natural
right to be wanted, loved, and cared
for. However, a legitimate child cannot
maintain an action against his parents
for lack of affection, failure to provide
a pleasant home, etc.
- An
illegitimate
child
cannot
be
given rights superior to those of a
legitimate child and therefore, the
plaintiff has no cause for action on
this account.
- Plaintiff also complains of the stigma
of being the bastard child of his
father.
His
adulterine
birth
has
placed
him
under
a
permanent
disability. He protests not only the
act which caused him to be born
but birth itself.
- Although the Court agrees he has
suffered a wrong, it is unwilling to
allow him the relief which he
seeks because such recognition of
his claims means the creation of a
new tort: a cause of action for
wrongful life. If the court were to
allow this, the same would extend
to other actions for wrongful life
(ex. One might seek damages for
being born a certain color, race,
etc).
- The Court believes that a thorough
study of the consequences should
be made. With the interest of
society so involved, the
action
needed to redress the tort could
be so far-reaching that the policy of
the State should be declared by
the representatives of the people.
Quiambao
261 332
Republic v. Capote
G.R. No. 157043 ll Feb. 2, 2007 ll Corona, J.
KEYWORDS:
Illegitimate child asking for change of surname
from his dads to his moms
FACTS:
- Minor Giovanni N. Gallamaso is the
illegitimate natural child of Corazon P.
Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. He used
the surname of his natural father despite
the absence of marriage between his
parents.
- His birth certificate registered at the Local
Civil Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte
indicates Gallamaso as his surname.
- He seeks to change his surname to his
moms.
- His mother might eventually petition for
Giovanni to join her in the US, and
continued use of the surname Gallamaso
may complicate his status as a natural child.
- Respondent prayed for an order directing
the local civil registrar to effect the change
of name on Giovannis birth certificate.
- The Republic contends that the CA erred in
affirming the TCs decision granting the
petition for change of name despite the
non-joinder of indispensable parties.
ISSUE:
WON Giovanni can change his surname
RULING:
Petition denied. CA affirmed.
RATIO:
Yes. In accordance with Art. 176 FC and Art.

366 CC. Under Art. 176: Illegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their
mother Meanwhile, Art. 366 provides
that a natural child acknowledged by both
parents shall principally use the surname of
the father. If recognized by only one of the
parents, a natural child shall employ the
surname of the recognizing parent.
The Republics contention that the CA erred
in affirming the trial courts decision which
granted the petition for change of name
despite the non-joinder of indispensable
parties is untenable.
Capote complied with the requirement of
an adversarial proceeding by posting in a
newspaper of general circulation the notice
of the filing of the petition. The lower court
also furnished the OSG a copy thereof.
Despite the notice, no one came forward to
oppose the petition, including the OSG.
The fact that no one opposed the petition
did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction
to hear the same nor does it make the
proceeding less adversarial in nature.
Considering that the OSG did not oppose
the petition or the motion to present its
evidence ex parte when it had the
opportunity to do so, it cannot now
complain that the proceedings in the lower
court were not adversarial enough.
A proceeding is adversarial where the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it.
Quilala
262 332
Dolina v. Vallecera
G.R. No. 182367 ll Dec. 15, 2010 ll Abad, J.
KEYWORDS: Legal support; woman and child
abuse; temporary protection
FACTS:
- Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary protection
order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera for
alleged woman and child abuse under Republic
Act (R.A.) 9262.
- In her complaint, she added a handwritten
prayer for financial support from Vallecera for
their supposed child. She used the child's
Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as
the child's father.
- Vallecera opposed, and claims that her
petition was essentially one for financial
support rather than for protection against
woman and child abuses and that he was not
the child's father given that the signature in the
Certificate of Live Birth was not his.
- RTC dismissed petition. She filed for a motion
for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
case.
ISSUE:
WON RTC correctly dismissed Dolina's action for
temporary protection and denied her
application for temporary support for her child
RULING:
Petition is denied.
RATIO:
- Yes. She filed the wrong action to obtain
support. RA 9262 is for protection women and
children from from abuse.
- Although the issuance of a protection order

against the respondent in the case can include
the grant of legal support for the wife and the
child, this assumes that both are entitled to a
protection order and to legal support.
- Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had
been abusing her and her child. But it became
apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was
not the case since, contrary to her claim,
neither she nor her child ever lived with
Vallecera. She just wanted to get support from
him in filing the case.
- To be entitled to legal support, petitioner
must, in proper action, first establish the
filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted
or acknowledged.
- Since Dolina's demand for support for her son
is based on her claim that he is Vallecera's
illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to
such support if he had not acknowledged him,
until Dolina shall have proved his relation to
him. The child's remedy is to file through her
mother a judicial action against Vallecera for
compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond
question, support follows as matter of
obligation. In short, illegitimate children are
entitled to support and successional rights but
their filiation must be duly proved.
- What she could have done is to file for the
benefit of her child an action against Vallecera
for compulsory recognition in order to establish
filiation
and
then
demand
support.
Alternatively, she may directly file an action for
support, where the issue of compulsory
recognition may be integrated and resolved.
Ramos
263 332
Ramirez v. Gmur
G.R. No. L-11796 ll Aug. 5, 1918 ll Street, J.
KEYWORDS: Legitimacy of 2 sets of children
dependent on mothers legitimacy and her 2nd
marriages validity
FACTS:
- Samuel Bischoff died, with a will leaving his
widow Ana Ramirez as executrix of his estate.
- According to the will, Bischoff bore no children
with Ramirez and was therefore devoid of
forced heirs.
- This fact is being contested by two sets of
children from his natural (legitimate) daughter,
Leona Castro (deceased already), who he had
with Felisa Castro in his first marriage. The
entitlement of the 2 sets of children rests on
whether Leona was a legitimate child of
Bischoff.
- Leona Castro married Frederick von Kauffman
and had three children (the first set of children).
- Kauffman eventually sought a divorce from
Castro in Paris which was granted. Leona then
married Dr. Ernest Mory and had a daughter
before the celebration of their marriage. During
the marriage they had 2 additional daughters.
ISSUE:
1. WON Leona Castro is a legitimate child of
Bischoff.
2. WON the Mory children are legitimate
children and therefore entitled to inherit shares
from Bischoff's testate.
RULING:
Judgment affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that Leona Castro is a
natural (legitimate) child of Bischoff, whether
by Law 11 of Toro (turned Law 1, title 5, book
10 of the Novisima Recopilacion) which was the
law at that time or under article 131 of the Civil
Code. Tacit recognition was sufficient in either
case.
- There was sufficient proof that Bischoff
recognized her as such, ranging from the
memorandum issued by the priest for her
record of birth and a document executed by
Bischoff recognizing her as his daughter.
- Ramirez contests that only children by persons
free to marry are considered natural
(legitimate). The Court held that there was no
proof that Leona's mother was committing
adultery when she married Bischoff.
- The presumption is that persons are free to
marry and the burden of proof rests heavily on
the one contesting it.
2. No. The divorce decree obtained by Kauffman
in Paris was not recognized by Philippine courts.
There was conclusive evidence that shows that
neither Kauffman nor Leona was domiciled in
Paris. The divorce was apparently their only
intent for going there.
- Courts of a country where neither spouses are
domiciled in have no jurisdiction to determine
their matrimonial status.
- Leona's marriage with Mory was therefore
void and the children born from it are
illegitimate. The Mory children's claim to
inheritance must therefore be rejected.
Reposar
264 332
In Re, Julian Wang

G.R. No. 159966 ll Mar. 30, 2005 ll Tinga, J.
KEYWORDS: Parents petition for child to drop
middle name because of plan to stay in
Singapore
FACTS:
- Julian Lin Carulusan Wang was born in Cebu
City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa
Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not
yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married on September 22,
1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of
their son so that the childs name was changed
from Julian Lin Carulusan to Julian Lin Carulusan
Wang.
- Parents plan to stay in Singapore for a
long time to let Julian study there together
with his sister, Wang Mei Jasmine (born in
Singapore)
In Singapore, middle names or the maiden
surname of the mother are not carried in
a persons name.
They anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
will be discriminated because of his
current registered name which carries a middle
name.
- The RTC rendered a decision denying the
petition for they found that the reason given for
the change of name did not fall within the
grounds recognized by law. They found that the
change sought is merely for the convenience
of the child, however they said that names
cannot be changed to suit the convenience of
the bearers. The court further reasoned that
legitimate children have the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, (Art.
174 of the FC) and there is no reason why this
right should now be taken from Julian (a minor).
When Julian reaches the age of majority, he
could then decide whether he will change his

name by dropping his middle name.
- Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision but this was denied in a resolution
explaining that the Singaporean practice of not
carrying a middle name does not justify the
dropping of the middle name of a legitimate
Filipino child who intends to study there (i.e.
dropping of the middle name would be
tantamount to giving due recognition to or
application of the laws of Singapore
instead of Philippine law which is controlling).
The court said that change of name which
would not prejudice public interest or would
not be for a fraudulent purpose would not
suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the
change of name is itself not reasonable.
- Petitioner then filed this petition.
ISSUE:
WON dropping the middle name of a minor
child is contrary to Art. 174 of the FC
RULING:
Petition denied.
RATIO:
- Yes. Middle names serve to identify the
maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well
as further distinguish him from others who may
have the same given name and surname as he
has.
- The only reason for dropping his middle
name is convenience. How such change of
name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is
not clearly established.
Reyes
265 332
In Re, Adoption of Edwin Villa

G.R. No. L-22523 ll Sep. 29, 1967 ll Angeles, J.
KEYWORDS: Sister na, mother pa!
FACTS:
- Atty. Luis Santos, Jr. and Edipola Villa Santos
would like to adopt the 4-yr old Edwin Villa y
Mendoza.
- Edipola and Edwin are siblings. (Edipola is
already 32 yrs. old, anlayo nung age gap!)
- Edwin, being a sickly child since birth, was
entrusted by his parents to the petitioners.
- His parents testified that they have voluntarily
given their consent to the adoption of their son.
- The Trial Court dismissed the petition and
their motion for reconsideration upon the
reasoning that there will be an incongruous
situation where Edwin, who is her legitimate
brother, will also be her son.
ISSUE:
WON an elder sister may adopt a younger
brother
RULING:
The decision appealed from is set aside, and the
petition for the adoption of the subject minor,
granted.
RATIO:
- Yes. A study of American precedents would
reveal that there is a variance in the decisions of
the courts in different jurisdictions regarding

the matter of adoption of relatives, thus it
cannot be stated as a general proposition that
the adoption of a blood relative is contrary to
the policy of the law.
- Art. 335 CC enumerates those persons who
may not adopt, and it has been shown that
petitioners herein are not among those
prohibited from adopting. Art 339 CC names
those who cannot be adopted, and the minor
child whose adoption is under consideration, is
not one of those excluded by the law.
- Art. 338, on the other hand, allows the
adoption of a natural child by the natural father
or mother, of other illegitimate children by their
father or mother, and of a step-child by the
step-father or stepmother. This last article
removes all doubts that adoption is not
prohibited even in these cases where there
already exist a relationship of parent and child
between them by nature.
- Regarding the dual relationship, it should be
noted that relationship established by the
adoption is limited to the adopting parents and
does not extend to their other relatives, except
as expressly provided by law.
- Lastly, we do not have any provision in the law
that expressly prohibits adoption among
relatives, thus they ought not to be prevented.
Reyes
266 332
Republic v. CA and Bobiles

G.R. No. 92326 ll Jan. 24, 1992 ll Regalado, J.
KEYWORDS: Rules governing adoption; joint
adoption; retroactivity; vested rights
FACTS:
- On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Bobiles filed a
petition to adopt Jason Condat before
the RTC of Legaspi City.
- The court found the petition sufficient in form
and substance; it complied with all jurisdictional
requirements and the petition has the
positive endorsement of the DSWD. Because of
those elements, the trial court
granted the adoption.
- The petitioner appealed to the CA for the
reversal of this judgment but the CA
affirmed the RTC decision. The petitioner
elevated the case to the SC and argues
that the CA should have applied the Family
Code retroactively.
- The petition for adoption was filed on
February 2, 1998, when the law applicable was
PD 603, or the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
The Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988.
- The complaint of the petitioner is based on the
ground that Zenaida Bobiles should have been
joined by her husband in the petition for
adoption pursuant to the requirement of Art.
185 of FC, requiring that the husband and wife
must jointly adopt.

ISSUE:
WON the requirements of Art. 185 of FC should
retroact to Bobiles petition to adopt
RULING:
Petition denied.
RATIO:
- No. Art. 256 of FC provides: This code shall
have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
- During the time of the petition, Zenaida
Bobiles had the right to file the petition on
her own without joining her husband therein.
The established rule is that the statute in force
determines the jurisdiction of the court at the
time of the commencement of the action.
- Art. 185 of FC is remedial in nature. Procedural
statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective
construction in the sense that they may be
applied to pending actions and proceedings, as
well as to future actions. However, they will not
be so applied as to defeat the procedural steps
completed before their enactment.
- Even then, the husband has an affidavit of
consent attached to the petition for adoption.
Sevilla
267 332
Republic v. Toledano
G.R. No. 94147 ll Jun. 8, 1994 ll Puno, J.
KEYWORDS: American couple adopting brother
of naturalized US citizen (wife)
FACTS:
- Respondent spouses Clouse sought to adopt
the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger
brother of respondent Evelyn A. Clouse.
- Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the
United States of America. On August 19, 1988,
Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the
United States of America in Guam.
- His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise
consented to the adoption due to poverty and
inability to support and educate her son.
- Lower court granted the adoption.
- Solgen contended that lower court erred
because BECAUSE THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT
QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
ISSUE:
WON Solomon can be adopted by the Spouses
Clouse
RULING:
Petition granted.
RATIO:
- No. Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive
Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the
persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen
who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child
of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is
married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt

jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
- Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt
Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the
exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision.
- In the first place, he is not a former Filipino
citizen but a natural born citizen of the United
States of America. In the second place, Solomon
Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by
consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his
spouse.
- When private respondents spouses Clouse
jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon
Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a
Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship
when she was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1988.
- Though it may appear that Evelyn may appear
to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article
184 of E.O. 209, since she was a former Filipino
citizen who sought to adopt her younger
brother, unfortunately, the petition for
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone
without violating Art. 185. which mandates a
joint adoption by the husband and wife.
Art. 185 FC: Husband and wife must jointly
adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When
one spouse seeks to adopt his own
illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks
to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
- Alvin is neither of the above.
Tan de Guzman
268 332
Republic v. Miller
G.R. No. 125932 ll Apr. 21, 1999 ll Pardo, J.
KEYWORDS: FC retroactivity; foreign couple
qualified to adopt before FC; vested right
FACTS:
- Two American citizens adopted a child.
- Natural parents were in poverty and had no
visible means of livelihood.
- The Family Code, which was effective on
August 3, 1988, generally prohibits aliens from
adopting Filipino children.
- Adoption, in the case at bar, was filed July 29,
1988, when the Child and Youth Welfare Code
was still in full effect. Under said Code, aliens in
the case at bar were qualified to adopt.
ISSUE:
WON aliens can adopt a Filipino child before the
effectivity of the general prohibition in the FC
RULING:
RTC decision affirmed.
RATIO:
- Yes. FC cannot retroact against a vested right.
In this case, the vested right is the right to
adopt per qualification under the Child and
Youth Welfare Code.
- A vested right is one whose existence,
effectivity, and extent does not depend upon
events foreign to the will of the holder.
Tejano
269 332
In Re, Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim

G.R. No. 168992-93 ll May 21, 2009 ll Carpio, J.
KEYWORDS: Mother wanted to singly adopt
their unofficially adopted children who are
already adults
FACTS:
- Monina and Primo Lim were a childless couple.
- Michelle and Michael were entrusted to them
by Lucia Ayuban in 1977 and 1983. They were
so eager to have children so they made it
appear that they were their real parents. They
raised them as their own, sent the kids in
exclusive schools, and were given the surname,
Lim.
- Primo died in 1998 and Monina married Angel
Olario, an American citizen in 2000.
- On 2002, Monina filed separate petitions for
the adoption of Michelle and Michael, who
were 25 (already married) and 18 years old
respectively. Michelle, her husband, Michael,
and Olario all gave their consent to the
adoption.
- DSWD issued a certification stating that
Michelle and Michael were abandoned
children whose natural parents whereabouts
are unknown. However, RTC still denied the
petition.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner, who has remarried, can
singly adopt?
RULING:
Petition denied. RTC affirmed.
RATIO:
NO. Parental authority is only one of the effects
of adoption. Husband and wife must adopt
jointly except for instances allowed by law.
- Petitioner is contending that she can file for
adoption singly because parental authority is no
longer required in this case since Michelle is
already married and Michael has attained the
age of majority.
- It is true that upon the age of emancipation,

parental authority
over the person and
property of the child terminates. However, this
is only one of the effects of adoption.
- The following are the effects of adoption:
Sever ties between biological parents
except when the spouses of adopter is
the biological parent
Legitimate child of the adopter (surname,
support and succession)
Endow them reciprocal rights and
obligations from the relationship of
parent and child (not limited to)
Choose the name of the child
Right to be the legal and compulsory heirs
of each other
- The law is clear. According to Sec. 7 Art. 3 of
RA 8552, the husband and wife shall jointly
adopt except in certain cases.
- Monina is not adopting the legitimate children
of Olario. The children were not her illegitimate
children. Nor were the spouses separated from
each other. The use of the word shall means
that the provision is mandatory and that the
couple must jointly adopt.
- Furthermore, Olario, an American citizen, has
additional requirements aside from his affidavit
of consent. These cannot be waived by Sec. 7
because the children are not relatives within
the fourth civil degree nor the legitimate child
of the petitioner. He must show that:
His country has diplomatic relations with
the Philippines
He has been living in the Philippines for
at least three continuous years prior
to the filing of petition for adoption
He must maintain residency until the
adoption decree is entered
He has legal capacity in his country
Adoptee is allowed to enter in his country
as the latters adopted children
Tiangco
270 332
Lazatin v. Campos
G.R. No. L-43955-56 ll Jul. 30, 1979 ll Teehankee, J.
KEYWORDS: The will in the safety deposit box;
when secondary evidence of adoption admitted
FACTS:
- January 13, 1974: Dr. Lazatin died intestate.
He was survived by his wife, Margarita, and his
adopted twin daughters, Nora (de Leon) and
Irma (Veloso).
- February 1974: Margarita commenced an
intestate proceeding. [Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio
and Yvonne intervened claiming to be admitted
illegitimate (not natural) children of Dr. Lazatin.
One Lily also intervened claiming to be another
admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.]
- April 11, 1974: Margarita also died, leaving a
written will, providing for: a legacy of cash,
jewelry, and stocks to Arlene de Leon, a
granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo
Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of
education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner
Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.
- During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a
safety deposit box at the People's Bank and
Trust Company that only she and Nora could
open.
- April (16), 1974: Nora, accompanied by her
husband, Bernardo, opened the safety deposit
box and removed its contents: (a) shares of
stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her
sister, Irma; and (c) jewelry belonging to her
and to her mother. Her sole reason for opening
the box was to get her stock certificates and
other small items deposited therein. When she
was to close the deposit box, the bank
personnel informed her that she needed an
authority from the court to do so, in view of her
mother's death and so, she removed everything
from the box.
- June 3, 1974: Private respondents filed a
petition to probate the will of the late
Margarita,
Days after having learned that Nora had opened
the safety deposit box: Ramon, son of Renato,
filed a motion claiming that the deceased had
executed a will subsequent to that submitted
for probate and demanding its production. He
likewise prayed for the opening of the safety
deposit box. Nora admitted that she opened the
box but there was no will or any document

resembling a will therein.
- November 6, 1974: The safety deposit box was
opened, at which time it was found to be
empty, because prior Nora had already
removed all of its contents.
- November 22, 1974: Seven months after the
death of Margarita, Renato intervened for the
first time in the proceedings to settle the estate
of Dr. Lazatin as an admitted illegitimate (not
natural) child. On this day, Ramon also filed a
petition in the estate proceedings of Margarita
to examine private respondents on the contents
of the safety deposit box
- August 20, 1975: Renato filed a motion to
intervene in the estate of Margarita as an
adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit
executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of Dr.
Lazatin, stating that the petitioner was an
"illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later
adopted by him. This affidavit was modified to
state that petitioner was adopted by both of
the spouses.
- Respondent court heard Renatos motion to
intervene as an adopted son in the estate of
Margarita. During the hearings, he was not able
to present any decree of adoption in his favor.
He instead resorted to prove his adoption by
stating the following evidence: 1) he recognized
the deceased spouses as his parents and he had
been supported by them until their death; 2) he
was formerly known he was known as "Renato
Lazatin" but was compelled to change his
surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased
spouses refused to give consent to his marriage
to his present wife; 3) he and his wife used to
stay at the residence of the father of Margarita,
but a few months later, they transferred to
another property owned by the deceased
spouses, where they continuously resided up to
the present; 4) photographs of Irma where she
addressed herself as his sister, of deceased
Margarita and him when he was a boy; and 5)
document showing that his real name is
"Renato Lazatin
- November 14, 1975: Respondent court
discontinued the hearing when Renato could
not present evidence on the issue of his alleged
legal adoption.
Yumol
271 332
Lazatin v. Campos
- March 4, 1976: Respondent court barred the
introduction of petitioner's evidence since they
would not prove or tend to prove the fact of
their adoption but rather of a recognized
natural child.
- March 16, 1976: Renato then filed, in both
cases, a motion to declare as established the
fact of adoption in view of respondent Nora's
refusal to comply with the orders of respondent
court to deposit the items she had removed
from the safety deposit box of Margarita.
Private respondents opposed the motion.
- March 26, 1976: Respondent court denied
Renato's motion.
- June 3,1976: Respondent court, ruling on
petitioners motion for reconsideration,
declared that Renato has failed to establish his
status as an adopted child.
- Hence, the petition at bar.
ISSUE:
WON Renato was an adopted child (Upon the
determination of this issue, it can also be
determined if he can intervene in the petitionsNO)
RULING:
Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
- The Supreme Court finds the ruling of the
respondent court to be in conformity with law
and jurisprudence. Renato was not able to
establish his status as an adopted child.
- The evidence presented by Renato does not
lead the Court to any link to the existence of a
court degree of his judicial adoption. Petitioner
merely proceeds from an assumption that he
was judicially adopted between the years 1928
and 1932. No judicial records of such adoption
or copies thereof decreed by a competent court
are presented or attempted to be presented.
- Furthermore, no witnesses were cited to that
adoption proceeding or to the adoption decree.
Even though Renato secured a certification
from the CFI of Manila which reported that
their records have been burned and that the
record of Renatos adoption was not one of the
salvaged documents, it does not furnish any
legal basis for a presumption of adoption in

favor of petitioner. This is because there was no
proof that petitioner was really adopted in
Manila or that an adoption petition was filed in
the Court of first Instance of Manila by the
deceased spouses, where, after hearing, a
judgment of approval was rendered by said
court.
- Moreover, if there was really such adoption,
petitioner could have conveniently secured a
copy of the newspaper publication of the
adoption as required by law.
- The absence of proof of such order of
adoption by the court cannot be substituted by
the claim that the child has lived with a person,
not his parent, and has been treated as a child
to establish such adoption. The attempts of
Renato to prove his adoption by acts and
declarations of the deceased do not discharge
the mandatory presentation of the judicial
decree of adoption. However, declarations in
regard to pedigree are admissible evidence, but,
in proving adoption, there is a better proof
available that can be produced.
- Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible
where the records of adoption proceedings
were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the
introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence
of the instrument.
- Renato failed to establish the former existence
of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss
or destruction. His supposed adoption was only
testified to by him and is allegedly to be
testified to a brother of the deceased and
others who have witnessed that the deceased
spouses treated petitioner as their child.
- Assuming the mere fact that the deceased
spouses treated petitioner as their child does
not justify the conclusion that petitioner had
been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses
nor does it constitute admissible proof of
adoption.
- As a necessary consequence, Renato cannot
intervene in the settlement of the estate of
Margarita as an adopted child because of lack
of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an
estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has
an interest in the estate, either as one who
Yumol
272 332
Lazatin v. Campos
would be benefited as an heir or one who has a
claim against the estate like a creditor.
Notes:
- Nature of adoption proceedings: The fact of
adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively proved by the person claiming its
existence. Where, under the provisions of the
statute, an adoption is effected by a court
order, the records of such court constitute the
evidence by which such adoption may be

established.
- Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible
where the records of adoption proceedings
were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the
introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence
of the instrument.
Yumol
273 332
Santos v. Aranzanso
G.R. No. L-23828 ll Feb. 28, 1966 ll Bengzon, J.
KEYWORDS: Adoption collaterally attacked in
settlement proceedings of adoptive moms
estate
FACTS:
- Spouses Santos filed a petition in 1949 for the
adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos
(Petitioners), aged 17 and 8 yrs old respectively.
- Guardian appointed by the Court gave her
written consent to the petition, as did Paulina,
who was above 14 yrs old.
- Spouses Santos stated in their petition that
Paulina and Aurora had lived with them since
they were 3 months old and 15 days old,
respectively, and although efforts had
been made to find their natural parents, the
natural parents could not be located.
- After due publication of the petition in the
National Weekly, a newspaper of general
circulation, once a week for three consecutive
weeks, the case was set for trial and the
Adoption Court granted the petition of spouses
Santos in accordance with Rule 100 of the Rules
of Court in the Philippines, and Paulina and
Aurora were children of the spouses Santos for
all legal intents and purposes from Aug. 1949.
- Eight years later, wife-Santos passed away
intestate. Husband-Santos filed a petition with
the Court of First Instance Mnaila for
settlement of intestate estate, stating wifeSantos surviving heirs to be himself and
Paulina and Aurora, 27 and 17 yrs old
respectively. He also asked to be appointed
administratior of the estate.
- Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura
(Respondents) filed opposition to the petition
for appointment of administrator, both claiming
to be first cousins of deceased-wife-Santos;
Gregoria alleged the marriage between the
spouses-Santos was bigamous and void, and
that adoption of Paulina and Aurora were
likewise void for want of written consent of
their natural parents, who were alive and had
not abandoned them. Demetria added that she
is the mother of the child Paulina.
- CFI: validity of the adoption could not be
assailed collaterally in intestate proceedings.
- CA: reversed CFI ruling; said adoption was void
due to absence of consent of childrens natural
parents and that such was a jurisdictional

defect open to collateral attack.
- Meanwhile, Petitioners-Santos filed a
preliminary injunction against the Respondents
to keep them from intervening in the
settlement proceedings, alleging in their
petition for review with the SC that
Respondents (and two other strangers also
claiming to be first cousins of deceased-wifeSantos) had been receiving 7k each from the
probate court.
- SC modified preliminary injunction to enjoin
probate court from hearing the settlement
case, or from disbursing any more from the
estate, disallowing respondents from receiving
any funds from intestate estate.
ISSUE:
1. WON the adoption decree of the spousesSantos could be collaterally assailed in the
settlement proceedings
2. WON the judgment of adoption in this case
can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud
3. WON the marriage between the spousesSantos, if void, affects the rights of the
adoptees
RULING:
Motion denied. CA erred in reviewing under
collateral attack the determination of the
adoption court that parents of adoptees had
abandoned them
RATIO:
1. No. The validity of an adoption may NOT be
assailed collaterally in proceedings for intestate
succession.
- The CA contends that it can be collaterally
attacked because the adoption proceedings did
not properly dispense with the consent of the
natural parents. Relying on American
jurisprudence wherein parental consent is a
jurisdictional requisite, the doption decree is
void because the adoption court failed to
express that abandonment by adoptees
natural parents had occurred.
- However, under our law: if the natural parents
had abandoned the children, consent to
adoption by the court-appointed guardian
Alampay
274 332
Santos v. Aranzanso
G.R. No. L-23828 ll Feb. 28, 1966 ll Bengzon, J.
suffices. It is not accurate to say that the
adoption court had not made a determination
of the fact of abandonment, when they had
indeed determined that the spouses-Santos
were married for 27 yrs., that adoptees had
been living with them since the elder was 3
months and the younger 15 days, and that
attempts to locate the parents had failed.
- ABANDONMENT is any conduct of the parent
to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over the child.
- While the CFI did not use the term
abandonment, its findings contain facts and
circumstances which constitute such fact. An
ADOPTION ORDER implies a finding of
necessary facts; the burden of proof is on the
party attacking it; an adoption order can
therefore NOT BE VOID merely because fact
needed to show compliance is obscure.
- Judicial determination of a particular fact (e.g.
abandonment of an adoptee by his next of kin)
is essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to
enter an order of adoption, but it does not
make said fact determine the jurisdictional
validity of a decree once issued. A mere error of
fact cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the
determination must stand until reversed on
appeal; it CANNOT be collaterally
attacked.
- Rationale: Otherwise, status of adopted
children would always be uncertain, since
evidence might not be the same at all
investigations and be different with each
tribunal.
- Mere error in the fact does not affect the
jurisdiction; if jurisdiction be obtained to
determine a fact, its determination of a wrong
or insufficient fact based on improper evidence
is IMMATERIAL to the question of a legal right
to proceed judicially to the next stem.
- A judicial determination may be
contrary to evidence, or legal evidence, or
without any evidence, but it cannot be
impeached for want of jurisdiction.
2. No. A judgment can be set aside on ground of

fraud only in a separate action brought for that
purpose, NOT by collateral attack.
- The Respondents cannot argue that husbandSantos concealed the adoption proceedings
from the natural parents in this case.
- Re: the alleged lack of notice of adoption
proceedings on the natural parents of the
adoptees, ADOPTION is a proceeding IN REM
Thus constructive notice, such as publication
duly made is enough when the residence of the
natural parents were unknown, is sufficient.
Furthermore, notice is NOT REQUIRED in cases
of abandoning parents.
3. No. Assuming the marriage between the
spouses-Santos is void, wife-Santos is deemed
to have filed the petition for adoption single;
the defect would lie only with husband who was
allegedly married to another, could not adopt
without joining the wife in petition.
- Furthermore, the estate is the wifes,
therefore the flaw would not affect
consideration of right of adoptees to succeed as
her adopted children.
- Respondents may NOT intervene, since
intestate succession benefits adopted children
to the exclusion of first cousins, provided
adoption is valid.
- Since adoption is for the promotion of the
welfare of child and the trend is to encourage
adoption, construction should be given
adoption laws as will sustain rather than defeat
this purpose; thus, where adoption has been
fully consummated, the adoption statute must
be construed reasonably liberally to the end
that an assumed relation and intention of
parties to the adoption be upheld, particularly
against strangers to proceedings collaterally
attacking them.
Alampay
275 332
DSWD v. Belen
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362 ll Jul. 18, 1997 ll Regalado, J.
KEYWORDS: Admin case against judge who
approved petition for adoption without DSWD
study report
FACTS:
- Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora
Bernardo-Soriano, both naturalized American
citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of
their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea.
- Judge Belen granted the petition finding the
spouses highly qualified to adopt based on the
findings and recommendation of the DSWD that
the adopting parents and the adoptee have
already developed love and emotional
attachment and that parenting rules have been
demonstrated the minor. Judge says that the
DSWD findings and recommendations are
contained in the Adoptive Home Study Report
and Child Study Report prepared by the local
office of the DSWD through social welfare
officer Vedana.
- It turned out however that DSWD didnt have
any record in its files regarding the adoption
and that there was no order from the judge for
the DSWD to conduct a Home and Child Study
Report. Neither was there a directive from the
judge for the social welfare officer to
coordinate w/ DSWD re the minors adoption.
-Thus, Admin complaint was filed against Judge
Antonio Belen and social welfare officer of
lower court ElmaVedana for violating Art. 33 of
PD 603 [Child Welfare Code] and SC Circular No.
12.
ISSUE:
WON approval from the DSWD is necessary for
the home and case study reports (and WON a
judge may decide based on such report)
RULING:
Belen definitely rendered the adoption decree
in derogation of the provisions of Art. 33 and
Circular No. 12 and Vedaa should have
coordinated with the DSWD in connection with
the preparation of the home and case study
reports. However, only stern warning was given
because of good faith.
RATIO:
- No. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper
course that respondent judge should have
taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset
about the commencement of the Special
Proceeding so that the corresponding case
study could have been accordingly conducted
by said department.
- DSWD has the necessary competence, more
than that possessed by the court social welfare
officer, to make the proper recommendation.
- Belen should never have merely presumed
that it was routinary for the social welfare
officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding
the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to
exercise caution and to see to it that such
coordination was observed in the adoption
proceedings, together with all the other
requirements of the law.
- Belen may well have wittingly or unwittingly
placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the
child whose adoption was under consideration.
Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal
device by which a better future may be
accorded
an
unfortunate
child.
Bayona
276 332
Duncan v. CFI
G.R. No. L-30576 ll Feb. 10, 1976 ll Esguerra, J.
KEYWORDS: Adoption through consent of
Attorney who was given by her client authority
to have the latters child adopted
FACTS:
- Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and
Maria Lucy Christensen are husband and wife
who filed for a petition for adoption of minor
Colin Berry Christensen Duncan with the Court
of First Instance.
- Colin, then only 3 days old was given to
petitioners for them to adopt by Atty. Corazon
de Leon Velasquez, who received the infant
from the child's unwed mother who told the
former never to reveal her (the mother's)
identity because she wanted to get married and
did not want to destroy her future.
- The mother, who never provided for the
maintenance and support of her child,
instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez to
look for a suitable couple who will adopt the
child. Said couple happened to be herein
petitioners who later on had the child baptized,
with their names appearing in the records of
said baptism as the parents of said child.
- In the petition for adoption filed by
petitioners, Atty. Velasquez, as the de facto
guardian or loco parentis of the child subject of
the adoption petition, gave the written consent
in compliance with the consent requirement
provided for in Art. 340 of the Civil Code which
states that: The written consent of the
following to adoption shall be necessary: (1)
The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of
age or over; (2) The parents, guardian or person
in charge of the person to be adopted.
- Learning from the testimony of Atty.
Velasquez that the natural mother of the child
sought to be adopted was still alive, the court
then pressed her to reveal the identity of said
mother, however she refused to do so on the
ground that there existed an attorney and client
relationship between them, and that she had
been instructed by her client not to reveal the
latter's identity.
- Hence, the CFI dismissed the petition for
adoption on the ground that the consent given
for the same was improper and falls short of the
express requirement of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the person who gave the consent for
adoption, Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is
the proper person required by law to give such
consent
RULING:
The decision of the respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, is
annulled by the Court, declaring that the minor
Colin Berry Christensen Duncan is the adopted
child and the heir of petitioners Robin Francis
Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen.
RATIO:
- Yes. Besides the abovementioned Art. 340 of
the Civil Code, there also exists another rule
regarding consent to adoption found in Rule 99,
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, which states that
There shall be filed with the petition a written
consent to the adoption by each of its known
living parents who is not an insane or hopelessly
intemperate or has not abandoned such child,
or if there are no such parents by the general
guardian, or guardian ad litem of the child
- Going by the set of facts in this case, only one
of two persons particularly described by law
may be considered here as legally capable of
giving the required written consent. They are:
(1)under Art. 340 of the Civil Code: parent,
guardian or person in charge of the person to
be adopted, and (2) under Rule 99, Sec.3 of the
Rules of Court: each of the known living parents
who has not abandoned such child.
- The father's consent here is out of the
question as the child is illegitimate and
unrecognized, while the natural and unwedded
mother, who from the time she gave her child
to Atty. Velasquez up to the time of the
adoption proceedings, has not bothered to
inquire into the condition of the child, much less
to contribute to the livelihood, maintenance
and care of the same, is the antithesis of that
described in the law as "known living parent
who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or
has not abandoned such child.
- It can indubitably established based on the
facts that said mother had completely and
absolutely abandoned her child; thus, her
Cadorna
277 332
Duncan v. CFI
G.R. No. L-30576 ll Feb. 10, 1976 ll Esguerra, J.
consent to the adoption proceedings is not
needed and not the one being required by law.
- Meanwhile, there clearly appears only one
person who could be considered as the
guardian exercising patria potestas over such
abandoned child, since there was no guardian
ad litem appointed by the court and the child is
not in the custody of an orphan asylum,
children's home or any benevolent society. This
person is no other than Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez who could, with reason, be called the

guardian of said infant.
- Hence, the consent given by her to the
adoption proceedings is sufficient for the same
to be deemed in compliance with the Civil Code
and Rules of Court provisions on consent to
adoption. This decision is in greater consonance
with just and humane considerations than the
CFIs harsh and cruel interpretation of the law.
Cadorna
278 332
Cang v. CA
G.R. No. 105308 ll Sep. 25, 1998 ll Romero, J.
KEYWORDS: Consent needed to adopt minor
not abandoned
FACTS:
- Herbert Cang and Anna Marie were married
and had 3 children. They judicially separated
and Anna Marie was granted the custody of the
children. Herbert went to the States and
divorced her.
- Maria Clara, sister of Anna Marie, and her
husband Ronald Clavano petitioned to adopt
the three kids because Anna Marie wanted to
go abroad and could not take care of the minor
children. Keith who was 14 y/o by this time
executed consent to be adopted.
- Upon learning the about said petition, Herbert
immediately returned to the Philippines and
filed an opposition.
- RTC granted the adoption, citing mainly the
financial capability of the adopting parents to
provide for the children as opposed to the
inconsistent and meager support that the father
was able to give.
ISSUE:
1. WON the father has abandoned the children
2. WON the minor children may be legally
adopted without the consent of the father if the
father has already abandoned the children
RULING:
Petition granted. Adoption denied as it was filed
without the consent of the father who, by law
and fact, has not abandoned the children.
RATIO:
1. No. The Court found that there was no
abandonment, because despite the meager
amounts that Herbert was able to send and
deposit in bank accounts, the main fact is that
there were efforts exerted to provide for the
family.
- The Court also cited the letters as proof of the
bond that the father has with the children.
- The conclusion of the courts below that
petitioner abandoned his family needs more
evidentiary support other than his inability to
provide them the material comfort that his
admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There
should be proof that he had so emotionally
abandoned them that his children would not
miss his guidance and counsel if they were
given to adopting parents.
- Keiths consent to be adopted was also taken
as a want to continue living in the same
economic status that the prospective adopters
are providing them.
- The discretion to approve adoption
proceedings is not to be anchored solely on
best interests of the child but likewise, with due
regard to the natural rights of the parents over
the child.
2. Yes. Abandoned children may be adopted
without the consent of the abandoning parent.
The consent of the natural parent of the
children is needed if there was no
abandonment or other impediment.
- In this case, there was no abandonment.
Cristobal
279 332
Landingin v. Republic
G.R. No. 164948 ll Jun. 27, 2006 ll Callejo, Sr., J.
KEYWORDS: Aunt wants to adopt minor
children of her deceased brother allegedly
abandoned by their mom
FACTS:
- Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen residing
in Guam, filed a petition for the adoption of her
deceased brothers minor children, Elaine, Elma
and Eugene (all Dizon Ramos).
- When their father Manuel died in 1990, the
minors were left under the care of their
paternal grandmother while their mother,
Amelia, went to work in Italy where she
eventually resided with her live-in partner and
their son.
- It was alleged that the mother rarely
communicates with the children and only sends
minimal financial support. It was Diwata, her
children and other relatives abroad who
financially supported the siblings. Upon the
grandmothers death, Diwata decided to adopt
the children and bring them to Guam to live
with her.
- After filing, the trial court ordered the DSWD
to conduct a case study and submit a report
before the initial hearing.
- The minors have given their written consent to
the petition, as affirmed by the eldest minor
Elaine. Diwata testified on her behalf, stating
that she is a qualified adopter since shes a 57
years old widow, lives alone in her own home
and is gainfully employed as a part-time
restaurant server earning $5.15 per hour and
$1,000 per month in tips. She likewise
presented as evidence the Affidavit of Consent
executed by her children and notarized in
Guam.
- Elizabeth Pagbilao, a Social Welfare Officer
from DSWD, submitted the report to court,
recommending the minors adoption by Diwata
as the children are considered abandoned by
their biological mother, who she happened to
personally interview during a chance vacation in
the Philippines and who gave her voluntary
consent (but not written) to the petition.
- The trial court granted the petition, ruling in
favor of the adoption. But the OSG appealed to
the decision, citing lack of written consent from
the childrens biological mother, as well as the
petitioners children in Guam, and also failure

to establish petitioners position to support the
children. CA reversed TCs ruling. Diwata filed
the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
1. WON the petitioner is entitled to adopt the
minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos
2. WON the affidavit of consent purportedly
executed by the petitioner-adopters children
sufficiently complies with the law
3. WON petitioner is financially capable of
supporting the adoptees
RULING:
Petition denied.
RATIO:
1. No. Written consent of the biological parents
or legal guardian is indispensable for the validity
of a decree of adoption under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act
of 1998).
- The general requirement of consent and
notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the
proposed adoption.
- Though petitioner argues that the written
consent of the biological mother is no longer
necessary because the biological mother has
abandoned the children, it is necessary to
establish that abandonment existed at the time
of adoption.
- In this case, it was proven that there was no
complete abandonment as children still
communicates with the mother, though rare it
may be, and Elaine even mentioned that she
consults serious personal problems with Amelia.
Amelia also sends minimal financial support to
them.
- Court also stated that if Amelia has indeed
abandoned the siblings, petitioner should have
obtained the consent instead from the legal
guardian, the childrens uncle (fathers cousin).
Cruz
280 332
Landingin v. Republic
G.R. No. 164948 ll Jun. 27, 2006 ll Callejo, Sr., J.
2. No. The joint affidavit of consent by the
petitioners children notarized in Guam should
have been authenticated or acknowledged
before a Philippine consular office in order to
be acknowledged as duly notarized document in
our country in compliance to the Rules of Court,
Section 2 of Act No. 2103.
- No further proof was introduced by petitioner
to authenticate the written consent of her
legitimate children, thus it is inadmissible as
evidence.
of rearing the three children in the US. She only

has a part-time job, her home in Guam is still
being amortized and she is rather of age.
- Petitioner is not stable enough to support the
children and is only relying on the financial
backing, support and commitment of her
children and her siblings.
- The ability to support the adoptees is personal
to the adopter (should not come from her
children and relatives), as adoption only creates
a legal relation between the former and the
latter.
3. No. It is doubtful whether petitioner will be

able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect
Cruz
281 332
Tamargo v. CA
G.R. No. 85044 ll Jun. 3, 1992 ll Feliciano, J.
KEYWORDS: Natural parents wants to pass
liability to adoptive parents for sons shooting
incident
FACTS:
- December 10, 1981: Sabas & Felisa Rapisura
filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc
- October 20, 1982: Adelberto Bundoc, then 10
years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle. Her parents filed civil and criminal
charges2 against Bundoc.
- November 18, 1982: Petition for adoption was
granted.
- Now, Bundocs natural parents argued that it
was not they, but the adopting parents, the
Rapisuras, who should be the indispensable
parties to the case, since parental authority has
already shifted from the moment the petition
was filed before the shooting occured. They
relied on Art. 363 and 39 (2)4 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code.
- The Tamargos argued that Bundoc was living
with his natural parents at that time, and that
parental authority was not relinquished due to
the filing and granting of petition.
- The trial court ruled in favor of the Bundocs
and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Notice of appeal was then filed at the trial court
but was denied as it was filed beyond 15day
reglementary period on December 22, 1987.
- The Tamargos went to the CA petitioning for
mandamus and certiorari to reverse all three
trial court orders. CA denied them because they
lost the right to appeal.
ISSUE:
1. WON Supreme Court may still receive the
case, notwithstanding the loss of right to appeal
2. WON adoption may be given retroactive
effect, making the adopting parents the
indispensable parties even when actual custody
was with the natural parents
RULING:
CA decision REVERSED; Case REMANDED to

Trial Court for further proceedings
RATIO:
1. Yes. The Court, in the interest of serving
substantial justice, invoked its right to suspend
the application of technical rules.
2. No. Art. 2180 CC imposes civil liability on the
father (or mother if the former is dead /
incapacitated) for damages caused by a minor
living with them. This stems from the doctrine
of imputed negligence, where a person is not
only liable for torts committed by him, but also
for torts committed by others with whom he
has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible. Parental liability is a consequence
of the duties and responsibilities accompanying
parental authority.
- At the time of the shooting, parental authority
resided with the Bundocs; since they had actual
custody at that time, they are indispensable
parties to the case.
- The Court disagrees with the Bundocs reliance
on Art. 36 & 39 of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, since Art. 585 of the same code and Art.
221 FC6 points to the parents holding actual
custody liable for the minors tortuous acts.
- Retroactivity may be given in the
granting of the petition when it is
essential for some benefit/advantage in favor
of the child. However, the Court ruled that it is
unfair for parental authority to retroact to the
Rapisuras to unduly burden them with liability
for a tortuous act that they neither couldve
foreseen nor prevented.
- Lastly, while Art. 357 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code vests parental authority in the
adopting parents during the period of trial
custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting
parents are given actual custody of the child
during such trial period.
- In the instant case, the trial custody period
either had not yet begun or bad already been
completed at the time of the air rifle shooting.
Dantes
282 332
Sayson v. CA
G.R. No. 89224-25 ll Jan. 23, 1992 ll Cruz, J.
KEYWORDS: Status of natural and adoptive
children challenged by aunts and uncles in
estate proceeding
FACTS:
- When their parents died, Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel were left with the properties of their
parents which the latter inherited from the
grandparents.
- Their fathers siblings (Aunts and Uncles) filed
a complaint for partition and accounting of
the intestate estate.
- The children resisted the action and filed their
own defense alleging that Delia and Edmundo
were adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter. As such, they were
entitled to inherit their fathers share of his
estate by right of representation.
- The aunts and uncles contend that Delia and
Edmundo were not legally adopted because
Doribel had already been born when the decree
of adoption was issued. Under Art. 335 CC,
those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural
children by legal fiction were ineligible to
adopt.
- They also contend, however, that Doribel is
not the legitimate daughter but was in fact born
to another woman who manifested in a petition
for guardianship of the child that she was her
natural mother.
ISSUE:
1. WON Delia and Edmundo were legally
adopted
2. WON Doribel is the legitimate daughter
3. WON Doribel, Delia and Edmundo are heirs of
the intestate estate of their parents
4. WON they have a right of representation
RULING:
Petition (by the aunts and uncles) denied. CA
decision affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Yes. Delia and Edmundo are legally adopted.
- The position of the aunts and uncles is
inconsistent because they question the legality
of Delias and Edmundos adoption on the
ground that Doribel had already been born, but

in the same breath they also question Doribels
legitimacy.
- Also, the timeliness of the challenge to the
decree of adoption is questionable. They should
have brought this with the court even before
the adoption was decreed.
- The validity of adoption cannot be challenged
collaterally. It should be challenged in a direct
proceeding.
2. Yes. Doribel is a legitimate child.
- The birth certificate is a formidable piece of
evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of
recognition under Art. 265 CC and Art. 172
FC.
- Although it is only prima facie evidence of
filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence, no such evidence was presented in
the case.
- Doribels legitimacy also could not be
challenged collaterally.
3. Yes. Doribel, Delia and Edmundo are
therefore the exclusive heirs to the intestate
estate of their parents, conformably with Art.
979 CC, which states: Legitimate Children and
their descendants succeed the parents and
other ascendants, without distinction as to sex
or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.
- An adopted child succeeds to the property of
the adopting parents in the same manner as a
legitimate child.
- The philosophy underlying this article is that a
persons love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents
and thereafter spreads among his collateral
relatives. It is also supposed that one of his
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave
them eventually to his children as a token of his
love for them and as a provision for their
continued care even after he is gone from this
earth.
4. Yes but only Doribel, not Delia or Edmundo,
has the right of representation.
- Art. 970: Representation is a right created by
fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the
De Castro
283 332
Sayson v. CA
G.R. No. 89224-25 ll Jan. 23, 1992 ll Cruz, J.
degree of the person represented, and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
- Art. 971: The representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one
who the person represented would have
succeeded.
- Art. 981: Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead,
survive, the former shall inherit in their own

right, and the latter by right of representation.
- Delia and Edmundo do not have the right of
representation because the grandparents are
considered strangers to the adopted child. The
relationship created by adoption exists only
between the adopting parents and the adopted
child. Thus, while the adopted children have the
right to succeed their parents, they do not have
the right of representation.
De Castro
284 332
Johnston v. Republic
G.R. No. L-18284 ll Apr. 30, 1963 ll Labrador, J.
KEYWORDS: Adoptive mother wants to give
adoptee surname of husband who did not
adopt her
The order of the court below prescribing the use

of the surname Valdes by the adopted minor is
affirmed.
FACTS:
- Petitioner (Isabel Valdes Johnston) filed a
petition for the adoption of one Ana Isabel
Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana (2 yrs
and 10 mos old)
- Both couples are Filipino, childless and SHE
already got the consent of the Mother Superior
of the orphanage (where the child stays) and the
husband.
- Petitioner contends that she used her married
surname in filing the petition, and that this is the
surname she has been using after getting
married and is known by it in the community and
by her friends/relatives.
RATIO:
- No. Art. 341 (CC) provides that the adoption
shall: 1) Give to the adopted person the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child
of the adopter; 2) Dissolve the authority vested
in the parents by nature; 3) Make the adopted
person a legal heir of the adopter; and 4) Entitle
the adopted person to use the adopter's
surname.
- Par. 4 refers to the adopters own surname,
which is her maiden name, and not her married
surname; She entered the adoption not as a
married woman.
- Adoption created a personal relationship
between the adopter and the adopted, and the
consent of the husband to the adoption did not
have the effect of making him an adopted
father.
- To allow the minor to adopt the surname of
the husband of the adopter, would mislead the
public into believing that she had also been
adopted by the husband, which is not the case.
ISSUE:
WON adoptee can use the surname of the
father, who did not adopt her
RULING:
Dilag
285 332
Republic v. CA and Wong

G.R. No. 97906 ll May 21, 1992 ll Regalado, J.
KEYWORDS: Adoptee of Chinese couple wants
to use Filipino surname to get rid of social
stigma in Muslim community
FACTS:
- Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo
Alcala Sr. and Segundina Alcala.
- When he was two and a half years old and
then known as Maximo Alcala Jr. and his sister
Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they
were, with the consent of their natural parents
and order of the court, adopted by spouses
Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both
naturalized Filipinos. They decided to adopt the
children as they remained childless after fifteen
years if marriage.
- Upon reaching the age twenty-two, herein
private respondent, filed a petition to change
his name to Maximo Alcala Jr. It was averred
that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed
and isolated him from his relatives and friends,
as the name suggest a Chinese ancestry when in
truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing
in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase
any implication whatsoever of alien nationality;
that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese
surname, thus hampering his business and
social life; and that his adoptive mother does
not oppose his desire to revert to his former
surname.
ISSUE:
WON the reasons given by private respondent
in his petition for change of name are valid,
sufficient, and proper to warrant the granting of
said petition
RULING:
The reasons given in his petition for change of
name are valid, sufficient, and proper to
warrant the granting of said petition.
RATIO:
- Yes. The change of the surname of the
adopted child is more an incident rather than
the object of adoption proceedings. A change of

name does not define or effect a change in
ones existing family relations or in the rights
and duties flowing therefrom. Neither does it
alter ones legal capacity, civil status or
citizenship.
- The change of name is justifiable because of
the embarrassment and ridicule his family name
"Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives
and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and
living in a Muslim community. Another
justifiable cause is his desire to improve his
social and business life.
- In granting and denying petitions for change of
name, the question of proper and reasonable
cause is left to the sound discretion of the
court. The evidence presented need only be
satisfactory to the court and not all best
evidence available.
- Among the grounds for change of name which
have been held valid are: a. when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce; b. when the change
results as legal consequence, as in legitimation;
c. when change will avoid confusion; d. having
continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of alien
parentage; e. sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
good faith and without prejudicing anybody; f.
when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
change of name would prejudice public interest.
- Rule 103 of the Rules of Court has its
primordial purpose which is to give a person an
opportunity to improve his personality and
provide his best interest.
- Concordantly, the Court held that a change of
name does not define or effect a change in
one's existing family relations or in the rights
and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter
one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship;
what is altered is only the name.
Dolot
286 332
Republic v. CA and Caranto

G.R. No. 103695 ll Mar. 15, 1996 ll Mendoza, J.
KEYWORDS: Clerical error in name: Michael to
Midael
FACTS:
- Caranto couple filed for adoption of Midael
C. Mazon, fifteen years old, who had been
living with Jaime Caranto since he was seven
years old, even when the couple got married.
They prayed that judgment be rendered: a.
declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the
child of petitioner for all intents and
purposes; b. dissolving the authority vested
in the natural parents of the child; and c. that
the surname of the child be legally changed
to that of the petitioners and that the first
name which was mistakenly registered as
MIDAEL be corrected to MICHAEL.
- Sol Gen opposed the petition insofar as the
correction of the name involved. He argued
that it could not be granted because the
petition was basically for adoption.
- RTC dismissed Sol Gens opposition, on the
ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry) applies only to the correction
of entries concerning the civil status of
persons. The RTC further stated that the
error could be corrected in the same
proceeding for adoption to prevent
multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to
the petitioners. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
1. WON RTC acquired jurisdiction over
respondents petition for adoption because
publication did not state the true name of the
minor child
2. WON action for correction of entries in the

civil registry may be done in the same action
for adoption
RULING:
Decision modified, deleting the correction of
the name Midael to Michael.
RATIO:
1. Yes. Correction involves merely a clerical
errorthe substation of the letters ch for the
letter d. Changing the name of the child from
Midael Mazon to Michael Mazon cannot
possibly cause any confusion because both
names can be read and pronounced with the
same rhyme and tone.
- The purpose of the publication requirement is
to give notice so that those who have any
objection to the adoption can make their
objection known.
2. No. Since the case falls under Rule 108 (o.
change of name, in Sec 2. Entries subject to
cancellation or correction), Sec. 3 of said rule
requires the local civil registrar to be
impleaded in the proceeding. He is an
indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.
- Nor was notice of the petition for correction
of entry published as required by Sec. 4 of the
same rule. The notice given by publication in
this case was only for adoption (Rule 99, $4).
- Nothing was mentioned that in addition the
correction of his name in the civil registry was
also being sought. Thus, decision of the RTC
with regard to the correction of the name is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Enad
287 332
Republic v. Hernandez
G.R. No. 117209 ll Feb. 9, 1996 ll Regalado, J.
KEYWORDS: Adoptive parents want to change
first name of adoptee
FACTS:
- Van and Regina Munson filed a petition to
adopt minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran. At
the time of the filing, Kevin had been in the
Munsons care for almost a year.
- In the same petition, they prayed for the
change of Kevins name to Aaron Josephthe
name he was baptized with, and the name his
adoptive family, relatives and friends had
called him by since his arrival in the Munsons
home.
- The petitioner opposed the inclusion of the
change of name in the petition for adoption,
arguing that change of name should be a
separate
proceeding
from
adoption,
according to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
- The trial court found that the Munson
couple was fit to adopt Kevin. It also held that
Kevins name could be changed to Aaron
Joseph, saying: The first name sought to be
changed belongs to an infant over a year old.
Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor
engaged in any contractual obligations.
Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf be
deemed to have any immoral, criminal or
illicit purpose for seeking said change of
name. There is no way that the state or any
person may be so prejudiced by the action for
change of Kevin Earls first name.
- Thus, petitioner appealed by certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON an adoption decree entitles the
adopted to a change of first name
RULING:
No. The Court modified the order of Judge
Hernandez, affirming the adoption of Kevin
and giving him the surname Munson, but
maintaining his given name, so that he is
known as Kevin Earl Andrade Munson.
RATIO:
- An adoption decree does not entitle the

adoptee to a change of first name, but only to a
change of surname. Change of first name can be
achieved only through a Rule 103 proceeding.
- According to Art. 189 of the Family Code:
For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed
to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both
shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters.
- The change of surname was deemed a natural
consequence of an adoption. In contrast, the
creation of the adoptive relationship does not
give the adopter license to change the adoptees
registered first name. Such a change is beyond
the scope of an adoption proceeding.
- The change of first name may only be done by
strictly complying with Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court. It is an independent and separate
proceeding whose result cannot be granted
through any other proceeding.
- Further, the adoption and the change of name
are not actions that warrant a joinder.
A joinder of causes of action is the union of two
or more civil causes of action in the same
complaint, declaration or petition, even if each
of them could be made the basis of a separate
suit. Joinder is usually left to the discretion of a
litigant party, though there are certain
requisites: a. It will not violate the rules on
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and b.
The causes of action arise out of the same
contract, transaction or relation between the
parties, or are for demands for money, or are of
the same nature and character.
- The Court held that there is no relation
between the petition for adoption and the
petition for a change of name. They are not of
the same nature and character, and do not
present any common question of fact or law.
Thus, they do not warrant a joinder.
- Also, there is no legal ground for the change of
name. The grounds for change of name
recognized by jurisprudence are the following: a.
Espaola
288 332
Republic v. Hernandez
G.R. No. 117209 ll Feb. 9, 1996 ll Regalado, J.
The name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; b. The
change results as a legal consequence of
legitimation or adoption; c. The change will
avoid confusion; d. One has continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name and was unaware of alien parentage; e.
The change is based on a sincere desire to adopt
a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice
to anybody; and f. When the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
- The Court held that Kevins baptism under the

new name or the continuous use of it by him, his
family and their friends do not constitute proper
and reasonable ground for a legal change of
name. When a name given in church records or
by which one is known by the community is
different from that in the civil register, it is
unofficial and cannot be recognized as ones real
name.
- Lastly, the change of name without proper
proceeding will be prejudicial to the State.
Because the State is naturally interested in the
methodical administration of justice and the
maintenance of its system of identifying its
citizens, it stands to be prejudiced by the
wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case.
Espaola
289 332
In Re, Adoption of Stephanie Garcia

G.R. No. 148311 ll Mar. 31, 2005 ll Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
KEYWORDS: Natural father who adopted her
illegitimate daughter petitions for her use of her
mothers surname as her middle name
FACTS:
- Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia.
- Stephanie's mom is Gemma Astorga Garcia
and Steph has been using her mother's
middle name and surname.
- When Hector became a widower, he
became qualified to become Stephanie's
adopting parent.
- With the petition for adoption, he prayed
that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be
changed to Garcia, her mother's surname,
and her last name Garcia to Catindig.
- RTC granted the adoption. Likewise, it ruled
that the name would be Stephanie Nathy
Catindig. However, RTC denied Honorato's
motion for reconsideration, saying that there
is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his/her
biological mother as his/her middle name.
ISSUE:
WON an illegitimate child, upon adoption by
her natural father, can use the surname of
her natural mother as her middle name
RULING:
Petition granted. The assailed decision is

partly modified in the sense that Stephanie
should be allowed to use her mothers
surname GARCIA as her middle name.
RATIO:
- Yes. The Court observed that there was no law,
even in the FC that regulated the use of a middle
name.
- However, as correctly observed by the OSG,
members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the FC recognized
the Filipino custom of adding the surname of
the child's mom as middle name.
- As adoption's underlying intent is geared to
favor the adopted child, laws or judgments
must be construed in favor of the child.
- As one of the effects of adoption is that the
adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopter for all intents and purposes, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all rights
provided by law to a legitimate child w/o
discrimination of any kind, including the right
to bear the surname of her mother and
father.
- Lastly, as stated by the OSG, it is necessary
to maintain Stephanie's filiation w/ her
natural mother. This is in connection with Art.
189 of the Family Code w/c states that the
adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her
biological parent.
- Besides, she's living with her mother right
now, obtaining support from Honorato.
Hermosisima
290 332
Reyes v. Sotero
G.R. No. 167405 ll Feb. 16, 2006 ll Ynares-Santiago, J.
KEYWORDS: Relatives of adopter contest
adoptees adoption papers in estate
proceedings
FACTS:
- Respondent Corazon Chichioco, together
with the other collateral relatives of the
deceased, filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration and settlement
of the estate of Elena Lising before the RTC
of Tarlac.
- Ana Joyce Reyes filed an opposition to the
petition, alleging the she is the only rightful
heir as the adopted daughter of the deceased
Elena and Serafin Delos Santos, and that
there is no need for an administrator as
there was no debt to settle.
- As proof of adoption, she presented the
judicial decree registered in the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac. She also
included a copy of the decree of final
distribution issued by Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office, showing that the benefits of
the deceased Serafin was paid to his wife,
Elena, and daughter, Ana.
- Respondents tried to cast a doubt on the
authenticity of the judicial declaration and
decree presented by the petitioner, alleging
that the natural mother of Ana committed
fraud. They filed a criminal complaint
against the petitioner but this did not
prosper for want of evidence.
- However, RTC enjoined Ana from using the
property because she allegedly converted the
basement as billiards den without the
judgment of the administration. The clerk of
court, Atty. Saguyod was delegated as
administrator of the estate. This was reversed
by CA but demanded for more pieces of

evidence to overturn the cast of doubt on her
adoption.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner needed to give additional
evidence to prove her adoption
RULING:
Petition granted. The Court did not remand
the issue back to the RTC to avoid the
clogging of the courts dockets and ruled that
there is no need for further admission of
evidence in the lower court.
RATIO:
- No. A copy of the judicial declaration of
adoption and a copy of the clerk of court that
the decree was in file in the general docket of
the RTC Tarlac, both under the seal of the
proper issuing officers. There is the
presumption that these have been regularly
issued as part of the official duties that said
public officers perform. The fact that it is a
public document, found in the Civil Registry is
a prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. These are sufficient proof that the
petitioner is adopted by the Delos Santos
spouses.
- Mere imputations of irregularities will not
case cloud of doubt on the presumption of
validity of these documents, unless proven
to the contrary. Furthermore, it cannot be
assailed collaterally in a special proceeding
for administration and must be raised in a
separate proceeding contesting the validity of
the documents.
Macariola
291 332
Ex Parte Devine
398 So. 2d 686 ll Mar. 27, 1981 ll Maddox, J.
KEYWORDS: Father challenges tender years
presumption on equal protection grounds
WON the tender years presumption violates

the equal protection
FACTS:
- Alice Devine and Christopher Devine were
married in 1966 and separated in 1979. As a
consequence of their separation, the matter
of who would gain custody of their children
was decided by the Court.
- During the proceedings that would
eventually determine who custody of their
children would go to, the Court could not find
any substantial reason that would render
either Alice or Christopher suitably unfit to
raise their children. However, owing to the
fact that the children still fell within ages
covered by the tender years presumption,
custody was granted to the mother. This was
because in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, custody of children whose ages fell
within the scope of the tender years doctrine
would always go to the mother.
- The father contested the decision and
brought the case all the way up to the
Supreme Court of Alabama.
RULING:
Yes. The tender years presumption is
unconstitutional because it violates equal
protection.
ISSUE:
RATIO:
- By placing upon fathers who intended to
gain custody of their children upon separation
from their spouse an additional requirement
of proving that their wife was unfit and not
placing any similar requirement of the
mothers, the law unjustly favored the
mothers.
- Under the tender years presumption, it
would not matter if the father was objectively
the parent better suited to raise his children.
If he could not prove that his wife was unfit to
raise their children who were under the
tender years, then custody would
automatically be awarded to his wife.
- Hence, the tender years presumption not
only prejudiced fathers, it also potentially
prejudiced children whose best interests the
Court must consider when deciding custody
hearings.
Marin
292 332
Espiritu v. CA
G.R. No. 115640 ll Mar. 15, 1995 ll Melo, J.
KEYWORDS: Mother kissing bad man; custody
battle between married couple whose
relationship soured
FACTS:
- Petitioner Reynaldo and private respondent
Teresita maintained a common law
relationship while working in the states
where they had a child named Rosalind. They
returned to the Philippines to marry. At the
states they had a second child named
Reginald.
- Soon after, their relationship soured and
Teresita left for California from their home in
Pittsburgh.
- Reynaldo returned to the country and filed a
bigamy case against Teresita after learning
that a marriage was subsisting when they
lived together. Teresita soon filed a habeas
corpus suit praying for custody of the two
kids below seven years old.
- RTC thru Judge Bersamin (future Justice and
ponente of De Castro v. JBC) denied the
petition and awarded custody to Reynaldo.
CA, however, reversed the decision based on
Art. 213 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
1. WON CA erred in giving custody based
solely on Art 213 of the FC
2. WON the tender years presumption
prevails at the time of filing the petition or at
the time of decision
3. WON the basis for denying custody was
biased and unfair
RULING:
Petition granted.
RATIO:
1. Yes. The CA was swayed by an abstract
presumption of law (by none other than
Sempio- Diy) rather than an appreciation of

relevant facts. Whether a child is over or under
seven, the paramount criterion must always be
the child's interests.
2. It prevails at the time of the decision.
- The children have already made their choice to
be with their father, being over seven years of
age.
- Teresita contested, saying that the
presumption must prevail having filed the
petition before the children were 7 yrs. old.
- The Court held that considerations involving
the choice of the child must be ascertained at
the time that either parent is given custody of
the child. If parent chosen suffers a character
change, the matter of custody can always be
reexamined. Once the choice has been made,
the burden returns to the court to investigate of
the parent chosen is unfit.
3. No. The basis noted by Judge Bersamin was
not biased and unfair.
- The findings of Social Worker Emma Lopez
and Psychologist Macabulos were not made
for the purpose of litigation but for travel
clearance and school purposes, respectively.
They found that Rosalind hated her mom
after catching her in the act of having an
affair with her dad's co- worker and she
suffered emotional disturbance.
- The contention that Teresita's habit of
flirting did not fall under compelling reasons
was ruled in the negative, for her illicit and
immoral activities had caused emotional
disturbances, personality conflicts and
exposure to conflicting moral values.
Reynaldo, however, has proven himself to be
a fit parent, being able to attend to the needs
of the children unlike Teresita who
abandoned the family home (to pursue the
affair).
Nuez
293 332
Celis v. Cafuir
G.R. No. L-3352 ll Jun. 12, 1950 ll Montemayor, J.
KEYWORDS: Mom executes two documents
allegedly renouncing her custody over child
FACTS:
- Respondents Soledad Cafuir and her
husband appealed the decision of the lower
court granting the writ of habeas corpus to
Ileana (Nenita) Celis and ordering
the
delivery of the child to petitioner.
- Petitioner, after giving birth to Joel (John)
Cafuir turned over custody to Soledad, fearing
the extreme displeasure and anger of her
father over her illicit relations with Joels
father, an American soldier to whom she had
not been married.
- Soledad provided for all the needs and
comforts of the child, including a nurse hired
to care for the child.
- After marrying Agustin Rivera, petitioner
filed a suit for habeas corpus.
- The CFI of Manila granted said petition,
ordering the Sheriff, who then had custody of
the boy, to deliver said child to his mother,
petitioner Ileana.
- Respondents argued that petitioner
executed the following documents to the
effect that she had renounced her custody of
and patria potestas over her child.
1. TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
I hereby entrusted to Mrs. Soledad Cafuir x x x
my son named John Cafuir, for the reason
that I don't have the means to bring the
child up. Anybody who may claim my son for
adoption in the future without the consent of
the undersigned is hereby ignored.
(Sgd.) NENITA CELIS Mother
2. TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
I, Nenita Celis, x x x hereby designate Mrs.
Soledad Cafuir x x x to be the real guardian of
my son, named Johnny Cafuir. No one has
the right to claim for adoption except Mrs.
Soledad Cafuir.
(Sgd.) NENITA CELIS Mother
- The trial court found and ruled that under

these two exhibits signed by petitioner, there
is no basis for finding that she had renounced
the custody of her child in favor of
respondent Soledad.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner Ileana Celis, by executing
the above documents, renounced custody
of and patria potestas over her child
RULING:
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with
the modification that respondent Soledad is
ordered to deliver the boy to petitioners.
RATIO:
- No. In the first document, she merely
entrusted her son to Soledad because she did
not have the means to bring him up. The
word "entrusted" cannot convey the idea of
definite and permanent renunciation of the
mother's custody of her child. Meanwhile, the
second document merely designated
respondent Soledad as the "real guardian" of
the child. The designation of one as the
guardian of another cannot and does not
mean that said guardian will always assume
and discharge the duties of the office or
position. Guardianship is always or almost
invariably understood to be temporary.
- Furthermore, the very last paragraph to the
effect that "no one has the right to claim for
adoption except Mrs. Soledad Cafuir,"
envisages a future act; it means that no one
else may adopt the boy except respondent. It
does not mean, however, that she has
already adopted him. She may or may not
adopt him. It is something yet to be done in
the future. This the respondent has not done.
- This decision is in consonance with Art.210
of the FC: Parental authority and
responsibility may not be renounced or
transferred except in the cases authorized by
law.
Ordoyo
294 332
Sy v. CA
G.R. No. 124518 ll Dec. 27, 2007 ll Tinga, J.
KEYWORDS: Mom praying in the rain; custody
battle after dad charges mom unfit
FACTS:
- Respondent Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a
petition for habeas corpus against petitioner
Wilson Sy before the RTC, praying that said writ
be issued ordering Sy to produce their two
minor children.
- Writ was issued in favor of the respondent
along with an order for petitioner to pay
P50,000 a month for support so petitioner
appealed to the CA, alleging that the court erred
in awarding to the respondent sole custody of
the minor children and in ordering petitioner to
provide respondent with monthly support of
P50, 000.
- CA held that petitioner was unable to
substantiate his contention that respondent was
unfit to have custody and that questions as to
care and custody of children may be raised in a
petition for the writ of habeas corpus.
Moreover, contrary to his claim, petitioner was
properly heard on the matter involving support
for the respondent. Motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
1. WON CA erred in granting custody of minor
children to respondent
2. WON CA erred in ordering petitioner to pay
support
RULING:
CA decision affirmed. Custody of children
remains with respondent Mercedes Tan Uy- Sy,
and the petitioner Wilson Sy is ordered to pay
P50, 000 a month for support, of which is merely
provisional as the amount may be modified.
RATIO:
1. No. The applicable provisions to the case at
hand are Art. 213 of the FC and Sec 6, Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court.
- In all controversies involving the custody of

minors, the sole and foremost consideration is
the physical, educational, social and moral
welfare of the child concerned, taking into
account the respective resources and social and
moral situations of the contending parents.
However, the law favors the mother if she is fit
enough to have custody over her children so
that they may not only receive her attention,
care, supervision but also have the advantage
and benefit of a mothers love and devotion for
which there is no substitute. The love, solicitude
and devotion of a mother cannot be replaced by
another and are worth more to a child of tender
years than all other things combined. Hence, no
child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
- Trial Court was correct in granting custody to
the respondent given that at the time the case
was decided, the children were below seven
years of age.
2. No. Petitioner contends that matter of
support was not included in the prayer for
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, hence,
court had no reason to order him to provide
support for respondent.
- However, applying Sec 5, Rule 10 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, since the issue of support was
tried with the implied consent of the parties, it
should have been treated in all respects as if it
had been raised in the pleadings. Respondent,
under direct examination during the trial,
expressed the need for support which was to be
taken from the petitioner.
- Art. 203 of the Family Code states that the
obligation to give support is demandable from
the time the person who has a right to receive
the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall
not be paid except from the date of judicial or
extrajudicial demand. It was clear from the
respondents testimony that there was a need
for support, and such testimony served as the
demand
for
the
said
support.
Pagdanganan
295 332
Feldman v. Feldman
358 N.Y.S.2D 507 ll Jul. 15, 1974 ll Benjamin, J.
KEYWORDS:
Screw Magazine, sexually liberated mom, child
custody
DOCTRINE:
Unusual sexual practices of wife do not ipso
facto mean she is unfit for custody of their
children.
FACTS:
- Parties were married and had two children.
Wife eventually filed for divorce based on
cruel treatment, and was awarded custody
of their two minor children. Wife
subsequently cohabited with another man.
- When husband visited former wifes house,
he saw a copy of Screw Magazine and
letters (some with explicit photos attached)
responding to advertisements about having
fun and games (sex) with other couples.
- Husband then filed for habeas corpus,
seeking custody of their children.
- Upon presentation of evidence to the court,
it was determined that the wifes private
sex life in no way affected her children. Her
children never saw the offensive material, it
was proven that the children were still well
provided for emotionally and physically (in
fact, both children were class officers in
school), and the atmosphere at their home
was happy and cheerful.
- However, the lower court gave custody to
father based on her wild lifestyle and
stated:
- "The record and exhibits indicate her desire
to experiment sexually. It cannot be that
the best interests and welfare of the two
impressionable children of the marriage will

be best served by awarding their custody
'to one who proclaims, and lives by, such
extraordinary ideas of right conduct.
ISSUE:
WON giving custody to the wife is against
the best interests of the children given that she
is sexually liberated
HELD:
- No. Amorality, immorality, sexual deviation
and what we conveniently consider
aberrant sexual practices do not ipso facto
constitute unfitness for custody. By its
decision the trial court stated, in effect, that
all fathers and mothers who participate in
this culture of "free sex" are unfit parents.
- Although the contents of Screw Magazine
may be offensive to some, the court cannot
prohibit individuals from reading in the
privacy of their own homes. Also, the
private sex life of individuals is within the
penumbra of the right to privacy.
- Sole concern is for the best interests of the
children. In this case, both children have
resided with the mother since birth, a
change of custody at this late date should
not be made unless there is a showing that
she is unfit to continue as the custodial
parent. The father, to whom the trial court
awarded custody, is not presently
remarried and lives in a room in his parents'
apartment. He is employed on a full-time
basis during the day and the record
indicates he works on the average of two
nights per week as a musician.
Poblador
296 332
Santos Sr. v. CA
G.R.No. 113054 ll Mar. 16, 1995 ll Romero, J.
KEYWORDS:
Mother v grandparents, child custody
DOCTRINE:
Only when the parent present is shown to
be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents
exercise substitute parental authority.
FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos Sr., an army
lieutenant, and Julia Bedia, a nurse by
profession, were married and had a son. From
the time the boy was released from the
hospital, his grandparents (Bedia spouses) were
the ones taking care of him. The Santos couple
agreed to place their son in the temporary
custody of Julia's parents. Julia then left for the
US. Respondents were the ones to provide for
all of Leouel Jr.'s needs. On one visit, Leouel Sr.
along with his brothers, took (abducted) his son
from the grandparents. The grandparents filed a
"Petition for Care, Custoy, and Control of Minor
Ward Leouel Santos, Jr." RTC and CA granted
the petition. Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC and CA erred in granting
custody of Leouel Jr. to his grandparents
HELD:
Yes. The right of custody accorded to
parents springs from the exercise of authority.
Patria potestas is a mass of rights and
obligations which the law grants to parents for

the purpose of the children's physical
preservation and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the education
of their heart and senses. Parental authority
and responsibility are inalienable and may not
be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law. When a parents entrusts the
custody of a minor to another, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it doesn't constitute a renunciation
of parental authority.
The law vests on the father and mother joint
parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of absence or death
of either parent, the parent present shall
continue exercising parental authority. Only in
case of the parents' death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority
be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
The fact that he was unable to provide
financial support for his minor son from birth up
to over three years when he took the boy from
his in-laws without permission, should not be
sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent
right to the child's custody. While petitioner's
previous inattention is inexcusable and merits
only the severest criticism, it cannot be
construed as abandonment. His appeal of the
unfavorable decision against him and his efforts
to keep his only child in his custody may be
regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past
misdeeds.
Quiambao
297 332
Pablo Gualberto v. Gualberto

G.R. No. 154994 ll Jun. 28, 2005 ll Panganiban, J.
KEYWORDS:
Lesbian mom, child custody
FACTS:
- Jocelyn took her 4-year old son with her to
Mindoro when she decided to abandon her
Crisanto, her husband.
- Crisanto commissioned Renato Santos to
conduct a surveillance on Jocelyn and found
out that she was having lesbian relations
with one Noreen Gay, this was
corroborated by the house helper of the
spouses who stated that Jocelyn was often
out and on one occasion slapped the child.
ISSUES:
1. WON Petition for Review was filed beyond
the deadline (Oct 24, 2002)
2. WON petition was premature
3. WON CA gravely abused its discretion when
it ordered the trial court judge to "consider,
hear and resolve the motion to lift the
award of custody pendent lite" without any
proper motion by Jocelyn and after the
April 3, 2002 Order of the trial court had
become final and executor.
4. WON Section 1 of Rule 36 (for judges to
state clearly and distinctly the reasons for
their dispositions) violated
5. WON art FC Art 213 which stated that no
child under 7 years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise
should be applied instead of FC Art 211
HELD:
1. No. Husband claims that the petition was
sent only on Nov 4, 2002 according to the
Registry Bill. Rules of Court Sec 3 states that
the date of mailing of motions, pleadings
and other papers or payments or deposits,
as shown by the post office stamp on the
envelope or the registry receipt, shall be
considered as the date of their filing,
payment, or deposit in court. The envelope
shall be attached to the records of the
case.
Records reveals that copies of the
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Petition were sent to this Court and to

the parties by registered mail at the
Bian, Laguna Post Office on October
24, 2002. This is the date clearly
stamped on the face of the envelope.
Postmaster satisfactorily clarifies that
Registry Bill No. 88, which shows the
date November 2, 2002, merely
discloses when the mail matters
received by the Bian Post Office on
October 24, 2002, were dispatched or
sent to the Central Mail Exchange for
distribution to their final destinations.
Crisantos motion was mailed on Sept 12,
2002, Jocelyn filed her motion for extension
on Sept 17, 2012, and she might still have
been unaware that he had moved for
partial reconsideration. She should have
notified the court as soon as she was
notified of the filing of his motion. But her
lapse may be excused in the interest of
resolving substantive issues.
No. Grave abuse of discretion is committed
when an act is 1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or 2)
executed "whimsically or arbitrarily" in a
manner "so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined." A court of competent jurisdiction
is vested with the authority to resolve even
unassigned issues.
Award of temporary custody is subject to
change as circumstances may warrant. Even
the award of child custody after a judgment
on a marriage annulment is not permanent;
it may be reexamined and adjusted if and
when the parent who was given custody
becomes unfit.
No. Refers only to decisions and final orders
on the merits, not to those resolving
incidental matters. Here, the declaration of
the nullity of marriage is the subject of the
main case, in which the issue of custody
pendent lite is an incident.
Yes. The general rule that children under
seven years of age shall not be separated
from their mother finds its raison detre in
the basic need of minor children for their
Quilala
298 332
Pablo Gualberto v. Gualberto

G.R. No. 154994 ll Jun. 28, 2005 ll Panganiban, J.
mothers loving care. If she has erred, as in
cases of adultery, the penalty of
imprisonment and the (relative) divorce
decree will ordinarily be sufficient
punishment for her. Moreover, her moral
dereliction will not have any effect upon the
baby who is as yet unable to understand
the situation. The word "shall" in Article 213
of the Family Code and Section 642 of Rule
99 of the Rules of Court has been held to
connote a mandatory character.
It is not enough for Crisanto to show merely

that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also
demonstrate that she carried on her purported
relationship with a person of the same sex in
the presence of their son or under
circumstances not conducive to the childs
proper moral development. Such a fact has not
been shown here. There is no evidence that the
son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual
proclivities or that his proper moral and
psychological development suffered as a result.
Quilala
299 332
Goldstein v. Goldstein
341 A. 2D 51 ll Jul. 17, 1975 ll Joslin, J.
KEYWORDS:
Smart child, Israel, child custody
FACTS:
- Wife filed for a decree of divorce against
husband but was denied by the Family
Court. Also, the custody of their 9 year old
daughter Ann Robin was given to the father
(she was still given visitation rights).
- Husband and child went to live in Israel.
Wife initiated series of proceedings to
compel their return and that custody over
their daughter be given to her.
- After 3 years, Supreme Court of Israel
granted her petition.
- Trial judge determined to reestablish their
mother-daughter relationship. The hearing
determined the following:
Both parents were fit to have custody
of their daughter
Their daughter is a smart girl.
There was threat of war and terrorist
activity in Israel (husband acknowledge
such violence)
That child cannot be considered to be
Jewish until her mother upon the
consent of her mother
- Ann Robin admitted she loves her father
more than her mother and wishes to go
with him to Israel
- She also said that she had no desire to visit
with her mother but agreed, after the trial
justice's urgings, that it would be a "fair
bargain" if he were to condition her being
allowed to live with her father in Israel
upon her visiting willingly with her mother
for 4 weeks during each summer.
- Trial justice gave custody to husband (with
the conditions stipulated above)
Wife claimed that the trial justice

disregarded such factors as the policy
favoring the awarding of young children,
especially girls, to a fit mother, the
preference sometimes given to a resident
parent when both are equally fit, and
legislative policy that a minor should be
allowed to nominate his own guardian only
if he is at least 14 years old and, even then,
only if his choice receives Probate Court
approval.
ISSUE:
Was the awarding of the child's custody to
the father justified?
HELD: YES!
Wife's claim answered:
Those factors would have simply been
placed on the scales together with the
other relevant considerations weighed by
the trial justice, such as the parties' equal
suitability to have the child's custody, the
psychiatric evidence of the child's
emotional stability and intelligence, the trial
justice's opportunity to observe her
demeanor, appearance, and attitude, and
his obvious conclusion therefrom that her
expressed desire to be with her father was
not a mere whim and was entitled to
substantial weight.
(BASTA ANG POINT, EQUAL ANG POSITION NG
BOTH PARENTS; HENCE, HINDI NAG ABUSE
YUNG JUDGE TO GIVE WEIGHT SA GUSTO NUNG
BATA. Note also that the judge gave visitation
rights to the mother, so binigyan pa rin niya ng
chance si wife to be with the child)
Ramos
300 332
Laxamana v. Laxamana
G.R.No. 144763 ll Sep. 3, 2002 ll Ynares-Santiago, J.
KEYWORDS:
Lawyer turned drug dependent dad, child
custody
FACTS:
Petitioner Reymond Laxamana was a
graduate of Bachelor of Laws while respondent
Ma. Lourdes Laxamana held a degree in Banking
and Finance. Upon marriage, respondent quit
her job in order to become a full time
housewife while petitioner managed buy and
sell, fishpond and restaurant businesses (he did
not pass the bar). The couple had three
children. In October 1991 petitioner was
confined in Estrellas Home Care Clinic for being
a drug dependent. He was again confined in
1996 for rehab. In 1997, petitioner was declared
drug free but respondent alleged otherwise
stating that petitioner has become irritable
since his return and had even maltreated her at
one point.
Respondent abandoned petitioner in June 1999
taking the children with her. Petitioner filed a
writ for habeas corpus for visitation rights
which the court granted. The parties were
ordered to undergo psychological evaluation
which they passed except for the pyschologists
opinion that petitioner, in his belief, was not
completely drug free.
ISSUE:
WON the lower courts decision erred when
it resolved the issue of custody without trial.
HELD:
Yes. The paramount interests of the
children were not given due consideration.

Instead, the court a quo relied on the basis of
the psychological report of the spouses
conditions to render its decision. This is held to
be insufficient to justify awarding custody to
the mother. The results of the psychiatric
evaluation showing that he is not yet
"completely cured" may render him unfit to
take custody of the children, but there is no
evidence to show that respondent is unfit to
provide the children with adequate support,
education, as well as moral and intellectual
training and development. Moreover, the
children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at
the time of the promulgation of the decision,
yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to
which parent they want to live with. It is clear
that - every child [has] rights which are not and
should not be dependent solely on the wishes,
much less the whims and caprices, of his
parents. His welfare should not be subject to
the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone.
Where, as in this case, the parents are already
separated in fact, the courts must step in to
determine in whose custody the child can
better be assured the rights granted to him by
law. The need, therefore, to present evidence
regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A
careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no
such evidence was introduced in the CFI. This
latter court relied merely on the mutual
agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure,
this was not sufficient basis to determine the
fitness of each parent to be the custodian of the
children. The case was remanded to the lower
courts.
Reposar
301 332
Garska v. McCoy
278 S.E. 2D 357 ll May 26, 1981 ll Neely, J.
KEYWORDS:
Trailer baby, adoption, child custody
SUMMARY:
Grandparents filed adoption petition to
adopt the child. Natural father of the child filed
writ of habeas corpus, claiming the custody of
child.
FACTS:
Gwendolyn McCoy, then 15, left her
grandparents to live with her mother. She got
pregnant by Michael Garska who was sharing
the trailer with her mother. McCoy returned to
her grandparents home. During pregnancy she
did not receive support from Garska. McCoy
signed a consent agreeing to the adoption of
her son by her grandparents Alitzers. Upon
learning of the adoption, Garska visited the
baby and started to send weekly money orders.
The Alitzers filed a petition for adoption while
Garska filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
to secure custody of his son. Both proceedings
were consolidated. The petition for adoption
was dismissed because the baby had not
resided with the Alitzers for the requisite 6

months before filing. The circuit court gave
custody to Garska saying that he is the natural
father, that he is better educated than the
mother, that he is more able to support the
child.
ISSUE:
1. WON custody of the child should go to the
father or the mother and
2. WON the primary caretaker doctrine can be
used in this case.
HELD:
The best interests of the child are best
served in awarding custody to the primary
caretaker parent, regardless of sex. The primary
caretaker is a natural or adoptive parent who
has been primarily responsible for caring and
nurturing the child. However, the absolute
presumption in favor of a fit primary caretaker
parent applies only to children of tender years.
The mother is the primary caretaker parent and
there is no finding that she is unfit.
Reyes
302 332
Salientes v. Abanilla
G.R.No. 162734 ll Aug. 29, 2006 ll Quisumbing, J.
KEYWORDS:
Evil in-laws
FACTS:
- Loran and Antonette are the parents of the
2-year old Lorenzo Emmanuel.
- They lived with the wifes parents.
However, due to problems with his in-laws,
Loran suggested to his wife that they
transfer to their own place but she refused.
Thus, he left the house of the Salientes
-
Thereafter, Loran was prevented from

seeing his son. He then filed a Petition for
habeas corpus and custody in the RTC.
RTC: directed Antonette and her parents to
bring Lorenzo to the court
CA: dismissed their petition. It also held
that the RTC was still about to conduct a full
inquiry in a summary proceeding regarding
the cause of the minors detention and his
custody.
Hence, they appealed for certiorari in the
SC.
ISSUE:
WON the father may be prevented to visit
his son based on the Tender Years Presumption
(TYP).
RATIO:
NO.
Art 213 FC (TYP) only deals with the judicial
adjudication of custody and serves as a
guideline for the proper award of custody by
the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter
argument for Lorans petition for custody, but it
cannot serve as a basis for preventing the father
to see his own child. Nothing in the said
provision disallows a father from seeing or
visiting his child under seven years of age.
Also Art 211 FC states that the father and
the mother have joint parental authority over
their children. This parental authority also
includes joint custody.
Although they are already separated de
facto, the issue has yet to be adjudicated by the
court. In the absence of judicial grant of custody
to one parent, both parents are still entitled to
the custody of the child.
Reyes
303 332
Cabanas v. Pilapil
G.R.No. L-25843 ll Jul. 25, 1974 ll Fernando, J.
KEYWORDS:
Uncle v mother over childs money
FACTS:
Florentino Pilapil had a child, Milian Pilapil
with Melchora Cabanas. Francisco Pilapil is
Florentinos brother. Before Florentino died, he
insured himself and instituted his child as
beneficiary with his brother to act as trustee
during the childs minority. Upon his death,
proceeds went to Francisco. The mother filed a
complaint seeking the delivery of the sum to
the child. The mother filed the bond required by
the Civil Code. The uncle contends that he has
the right to retention by invoking the terms of
the insurance policy.
ISSUE:
WON the mother has the right to
administer the property of the child
HELD:
The mother has the right

- Art 320 CC: The father, or in his absence,
the mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under
parental authority. If the property is more
than 2,000 pesos, the father or mother shall
give a bond subject to the approval of the
Court of First Instance.
- Art 321 CC: The property which the
unemancipated child has acquired or may
acquire with his work or industry, or by any
lucrative title, belongs to the child in
ownership, and in usufruct to the father or
mother under whom he is under parental
authority and whose company he lives.
- Besides the law being clear, the court also
took into consideration the standard of the
best interest of the child. The court found
that since the child lives with the mother
and there are no signs of a lack of maternal
care, all the more should the mother be the
administrator.
Sevilla
304 332
Libi v. IAC
G.R.No. 70890 ll Sep. 18, 1992 ll Regalado, J.
KEYWORDS:
Twisted Romeo and Juliet
DOCTRINE:
CC 2180 Parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from
criminal offenses committed by their minor
children under their legal authority or control,
or who live in their company, unless it is proven
that the former acted with the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent such
damages.
FACTS:
- Julie Gotiong (age 18) and Wendell Libi
(aged 1819) were sweethearts
- Julie broke up with Libi for being sadistic
and irresponsible, Wendell persistently
tried to reconcile with her Jan 14, 1979
Julie and Wendell died from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same
firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver
licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio
Libi (Wendells father)
- There were no eye witnesses
- Libis family contends that an unknown
third party, whom Wendell may have
displeased or antagonized by reason of his
work as a narcotics informer of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU),
must have caused Wendell's death and then
shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and
thereby avoid identification.
ISSUE:
WON Wendells parents are civilly liable for
their sons action (YES)
HELD:
Amelita Libi (Wendells mom) admitted that
her son knew the keys to the deposit box
holding the gun was in her bag and that the gun
is now missing from the deposit box. This
showed a lack of due diligence of a good father
of a family
Wendells parents never knew that the gun
was taken from the deposit box since 1978 as
evidenced by a picture (of Wendell holding the
gun) given to Julie and Wendell was said to
have kept said gun in his car for his supposed
role of CANU agent
Court Held: It is still the duty of parents to
know the activity of their children who may be
engaged in this dangerous activity involving the
menace of drugs. Had the defendantsappellees been diligent in supervising the
activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping
said gun from his reach, they could have
prevented Wendell from killing, Julie Ann
Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:
The father, and in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by their minor children who
live in their company.'
Tan de Guzman
305 332
Lindain v. CA
G.R.No. 95305 ll Aug. 20, 1992 ll Grio Aquino, J.
FACTS:
Widowed mother of minor petitioners who
owned a parcel of land sold the land to
defendants- spouses in 1966. Defendants knew
that the sale was illegal, the owners being
minors, but bought the land anyway. Petitioners
therefore sued to declare the sale null and void
in 1987. RTC ruled in favour of petitioners. CA
reversed RTCs ruling, holding that property
under P2,000 may be sold without judicial
approval by father/mother acting as legal
administrator of minor owners.
ISSUE:
1. WON a parent, as legal administrator of
property owned by his/her minor children,
can sell said property without judicial
approval
2. WON defendants purchased the land in
good faith
3. WON the action for reconveyance has
prescribed
RATIO:
NO. Parent, as legal administrator, only has
powers of possession and management and no
powers of disposition or encumbrance.
Status as legal administrator of a parent comes

from NCC Art 320:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence
the mother, is the legal administrator of
the property pertaining to the child
under parental authority.
If the property is worth more than P2,000,
the father or mother shall give a bond subject
to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
NO. They knew that the sale was illegal, the
mother having had no judicial authority to enter
into the transaction, yet they bought the
property anyway. Therefore, they were
purchasers in bad faith.
From Gatioan v Gaffud: One who acquires
or purchases real property with knowledge of a
defect in the title of his vendor cannot claim
that he acquired the title thereto in good faith
as against the owner of the property or for an
interest therein.
NO. Real actions for immovables prescribe after
30 years. Sale was made in 1966 and action was
filed in 1987 (only 22 years after).
Tejano
306 332
People v. Silvano
G.R.No. 127356 ll Jun. 29, 1999 ll Per Curiam
KEYWORDS:
Sex as punishment
DOCTRINE:
It is the duty of the father to give her love
and
affection,
advice
and
counsel,
companionship and understanding. The Code
recognizes the authority of parents to discipline
their children but not to the extent that the
father would force her daughter to have sex
with him under the mask of punishment.
FACTS:
The father, David Silvano y Hayag had been
sexually abusing her daughter, Sheryl, since she
was 13 years old. Three days after she had
turned 16, and on the pretense of punishment
for coming home late, the father raped his
daughter. She went to school the next day and
did not come home for two weeks until she
reported the incident to the authorities.
ISSUE:
WON the appellant is guilty of qualified
rape punishable by death penalty? YES.
HELD:
The fundamental presumption of innocence
enjoyed by appellant was overcome with the
requisite quantum of proof; his guilt was proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Sec 11 of RA 7659
imposes death penalty to qualified rape
committed by the victims parent. The following
elements of rape were proven:
i. Sexual congress the testimony of the
victim and the medical report stating that
she is no longer a virgin
ii. With a woman his own daughter
iii. By force and without consent substituted
by the moral ascendancy of the offender
over the victim
iv. Victim is under 18 years of age at the time
of the rape
v. The offender is the parent proven by the
certificate of live birth of Sheryl.
The father is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and is given death penalty with P50,000 as
moral damages andP75,000 for civil indemnity.
Arguments of the defendant and the answers of

the court: (most to least relevant in the
discussion)
1. He denied allegation because he provides
her financial, material and educational
support. nonsequitur, the fact that he
supports her does not give him the license
to rape her. It is the obligation of parents to
support their children (Arts 195 and 220
FC). The ratiocination of the father is a
product of a sick mind of a sick parent. The
status of being a parents entails the natural
right and duty not only of the caring for and
rearing of unemancipated children but
above all the development of their moral,
mental and physical character and wellbeing. The Family Code recognizes the
parents rights and duties to impose
discipline but it does not authorize them to
force their children to copulate with them,
or invade their honor and violate their
dignity nor does it give them the license to
ravish the product of their marital union.
The appellant provided her with perversed
and distorted moral and spiritual guidance
to the extent that brainwashing her that sex
with the father is part of sex education. It is
the duty of the father to give her love and
affection,
advice
and
counsel,
companionship and understanding, but she
got humiliation and destruction of her life,
good future and the very essence of her
existence.
2. The victim offered only a token of
resistance: this cannot be construed as
voluntary submission to appellants desires.
The law does not impose upon a victim the
burden of proving resistance. The latters
moral ascendancy over the former
substitutes for violence or intimidation. A
woman at her age can only cower in fear
and into submission.
3. That the mother is using the rape case to
further her separation with her husband.
Untenable for no mother in her right mind
would subject her daughter to humiliation,
disgrace and trauma, attendant to the
prosecution of rape, if she were not
motivated solely to incarcerate the person
Tiangco
307 332
People v. Silvano
G.R.No. 127356 ll Jun. 29, 1999 ll Per Curiam
responsible for the defilement of her
daughter.
4. The behavior of her daughter after the
alleged incident is not consistent with the
behavior of a raped victim. Without merit
for different people react differently. The
failure of the victim to immediately reveal
the incestuous acts is not indicative of
fabricated charges. Her shame and genuine
fear of what the appellant might do to her
brothers and mother prevented her from
reporting the incident.
5. The testimony of the girl could not convict
him (credibility) the presumption that a
young and decent Filipina would not
humiliate herself unless that is the truth for
it is her natural instinct to protect her
honor.
6. That he could not have raped her in a small
room where her other brothers are

sleeping. That it is highly improbable that a
series of acts constituting the rape lasted
for 40 minutes. (And really lame excuse that
it is only 10:30 where people are not yet
soundly asleep) lacks merit for lust is no
respecter of time and place. This is a trivial
matter as lust may be consummated in a
matter of seconds or it could last hours
depending
on
the
parties
and
circumstances.
7. The irregularity regarding his arrest because
of the invitation from the police station
he waived any objection when he
submitted himself under the jurisdiction of
the court. Furthermore, he was convicted
not on the basis of what was illegally
obtained by the police, but on the credible
testimony of the witness.
Tiangco
308 332
Shields v. Gross
58 N.Y.2D 338 ll Mar. 29, 1983 ll Simons, J.
KEYWORDS:
Brooke Shields story, child model, Sugar and
Spice
DOCTRINE:
Other rights and duties in exercise of
parental authority > Section 50 of Civil Rights
Law: A person, firm or corporation that uses
for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of
trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living
person without having first obtained the
written consent of such person, or if a minor of
his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a
misdemeanor"
From the Family Code, Article 220 (6): To
represent them in all matter affecting their
interest
From Tolentino, page 620: No person
below eighteen years of age may be employed
or allowed to work in any place of work or
employment without the written consent of his
parent, guardian or person having custody over
him.
NATURE:
The parties have filed cross appeals.
Defendant requests reinstatement of the trial
court's judgment. Plaintiff requests, in the
alternative, that the order of the Appellate
Division be modified by striking the limitation
enjoining use only for purposes of advertising
and trade, or that the order of the Appellate
Division should be affirmed or, failing both of
these, that a new t rial be granted.
FACTS:
Plaintiff, Brooke Shields is a well-known
actress who was previously a child model.
When she was 10 years old she obtained
several modeling jobs with defendant, Garry
Gross, through her agent, the Ford Model
Agency.
In 1975, she got a job involving a series of
photographs to be financed by Playboy Press
requiring plaintiff to pose nude in a bathtub
back in 1975. These photos were known to be
used in a publication entitled "Portfolio 8" (later
renamed "Sugar and Spice").
Before the photographic sessions, plaintiff's
mother and legal guardian, Teri Shields,

executed two consents in favor of defendant.
After the pictures were taken, they were used
not only in the agreed publication but also in
other publications and in a display of largerthan-life photo enlargements in the windows of
a store on Fifth Avenue in New York City. It
must be noted, however, that this was with the
knowledge of plaintiff and her mother. As a
matter of fact, even the plaintiff used the
photos in a book that she published about
herself. Her mother had to obtain an
authorization from defendant to use them.
Over the years defendant has also
photographed
plaintiff
for
other
advertisements.
In 1980 plaintiff learned that several her
photographs had appeared in a French
magazine called "Photo" and were disturbed by
that publication. Upon learning that the
defendant intended to give other publications
her pictures, she attempted to buy the
negatives.
In 1981, she commenced this action in tort
and contract seeking compensatory and
punitive damages and an injunction permanent
ly enjoining defendant from any further use of
the photographs. Special Term granted plaintiff
a preliminary injunction. Although it
determined that as a general proposition
consents given by a parent pursuant to section
51 barred the infant's action, the plaintiff
claimed that the consents were invalid or
restricted the use of the photographs. The court
ruled that the consents were unrestricted as to
time and use and it therefore dismissed
plaintiff's complaint. However, it granted
plaintiff limited relief by permanently enjoining
the defendant from using the photographs in
"pornographic magazines or publications whose
appeal is of a predominantly prurient nature"
and it charged him with the duty of policing
their use.
The Appellate Division, by a divided court,
modified the judgment on the law and granted
plaintiff a permanent injunction enj oining
defendant from using the pictures for purposes
of advertising or trade. Two Justices voted for
the res ult believing that plaintiff possessed a
Yumol
309 332
Shields v. Gross
58 N.Y.2D 338 ll Mar. 29, 1983 ll Simons, J.
common-law right to disaffirm the consent
given defendant by her parent. While another
Justice added that the consents were governed
by section 3-105 of the General Obligations Law
and therefore could be interpreted to have
expired after three years. But it accepted the
trial court's findings that the consents were
valid and unrestricted as to time and use.
ISSUE:
WON an infant model may disaffirm a prior
unrestricted consent executed on her behalf by
her parent and maintain an action pursuant to
section 51 of the Civil Law Rights against her
photographer for republication of photographs
of her. NO.
RATIO:
Historically, New York common law did not
recognize a cause of action for invasion of
privacy. In 1909, however, responding to a
previous court decision, the Legislature enacted
sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.
Section 50 is penal and makes it a misdemeanor
to use a living person's name, portrait or picture
for advertising purposes without prior "written
consent". Sect ion 51 is remedial and creates a
related civil cause of action on behalf of the
injured party permitting relief by injunction or
damages. Section 51 of the statute further
states that the prior "written consent" which
will bar the civil action is to be as "above
provided", referring to section 50 which in turn
provides that: "A person, firm or corporation
that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture
of any living person without having first
obtained the written consent of such person, or
if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
The statute acts to restrict an advertiser's
prior unrestrained common-law right to use
another's photograph until written consent is
obtained. Once written consent is obtained,
however, the photograph may be published as
permitted by its terms. It may abrogate an
infant's common-law right to disaffirm the
consent or, conversely, it may confer upon
infants the right to make binding. Where a
statute expressly permits a certain class of

agreements to be made by infants, it settles the
question and makes the agreement valid and
enforceable.
By adopting section 51, a new cause of
action was created and it provided in the
statute itself the method for obtaining an
infant's consent to avoid liability. Construing the
statute strictly, the parent's consent is binding
on the infant and no words prohibiting
disaffirmance are necessary to effectuate the
legislative intent. Inasmuch as the consents in
this case complied with the statutory
requirements, they were valid and may not be
disaffirmed.
The consents cannot also be considered as
void because it failed to comply with the
provisions of section 3-105 of the General
Obligations Law requiring prior court approval
of infants' contracts. This statute applies only to
performing artists, such as actors, musicians,
dancers and professional athletes. Moreover,
the Legislature has purposively differentiated
between child performers and child models.
Thus, what are referred to in the
aforementioned statute are child performers
and not child models. Furthermore, section 3105 was not designed to expand the rights of
infants to disaffirm their contracts but to
provide assurance to those required to deal
with infants that the infants would not later
disaffirm executory contracts to the adult
contracting party's disadvantage. Sections 50
and 51 are interpreted to serve the same
purpose.
The court, as a parting statement gave the
advice that if a parent wished to limit the
publicity and exposure of her child then he/she
need only limit the use authorized in the
consent, for a defendant's immunity from a
claim for invasion of privacy is no broader than
the consent executed to him.
The order of the Appellate Division should
be modified that striking the further injunction
against the use of the photographs for uses of
advertising and trade, and as so modified, the
order should be affirmed.
Yumol
310 332
Silva v. CA and Gonzales

G.R.No. 114742 ll Jul. 17, 1997 ll Vitug, J.
KEYWORDS:
Businessman-actress love child, child custody
DOCTRINE:
Included in parental authority is the
parents right to the company of the children.
FACTS:
- Silva, a married businessman and Gonzales,
an unmarried actress, had an illicit
relationship from which two children were
born. When the relationship ended, Silva
filed for custodial rights of the children, on
allegation that Gonzales refused to allow
him the company of the children on
weekends; Gonzales counter-claim: Silva
engaged in gambling and womanizing.
- RTC: awarded Silva visitorial rights but
deprived him of taking the kids out without
written consent from the mother. Pending
Gonzales appeal, she married a Dutch
national and moved to Holland with the
kids.
- CA: welfare of the child shall be the
paramount consideration (PD 603, Art. 8); a
system of rotation of custody (mother,
weekdays, father, and weekends) might not
be conducive to their upbringing, and that
Art. 3 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code
provides: every child has the right to be
brought up in an atmosphere of morality
and rectitude for the enrichment and the
strengthening of his character. (5) and
Every child has the right to protection
against exploitation, improper influences,
hazards and other conditions or
circumstances prejudicial to his physical,
mental, emotional, social and moral
development. (8) Best Interest of minor
children:
deny
visitorial/temporary
custodial rights to father. A home with one
parent is more normal than two separate
homes. Art. 176, FC: illegitimate children
are under the parental authority and use
the surname of their mother.
noncustodial parent to his or her child/children)

HELD:
Inherent and natural rights of parents over
their children:
Art. 150, FC:
family relations include those between
parents and children.
Art. 209, 220 of FC:
the natural right and duty of parents
and those exercising parental authority
to, among other things, keep children in
their company and to give them love
and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding.
1987 Constitution: natural and primary rights
of parents in the rearing of the youth. Nothing
in these provisions limit such rights to
legitimate parent-children relationships.
-
Laws on support and successional rights go

beyond legitimate family members and
encompass illegitimate relationships too.
- Declaration of nullity of marriages (Art. 49,
FC) provides for appropriate visitation rights
to parents not given custody of their
children.
- The Supreme Court ruled that a few hours
spent with their father could not be
detrimental to the children. Furthermore,
allegations of the mother against the
father (re: womanizing and gambling)
cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render
father as unfit; allegations are a product of
the mothers unfounded imagination; no
immoral man would take the trouble to
spend on legal action to see his illegitimate
children.
RTC decision reinstated. Fathers visitorial
rights restored.
ISSUE:
WON the father is entitled to visitorial
rights to his children? (The right of access of a
Alampay
311 332
Palisoc v. Brillantes
G.R.No. L-29025 ll Oct. 4, 1971 ll Teehankee, J.
KEYWORDS:
Daffon 1, fistfight, school liability
QUICK READ:
Daffon killed Palisoc in a fistfight while at
school so the parents of the latter are suing
Daffon + member of the Board of Directors,
President and Instructor of MTI invo king Art.
2180.TC absolved all co-defendants using
doctrine in Mercado requiring a kind of living
and boarding arrangement between the
student and school for the latter to be liable as
suggested by the phrase so long as they
remain in custody. Ct reversed TC and said
there was nothing in the law that requires that
kind of arrangement and that the liability stems
from the substitute parental authority that
requires them to exercise protective and
supervisory custody over the students as long
as theyre attending school even during recess
time. Mercado dictum was set aside and Ct held
that Daffon, President and Instructor were
jointly and severally liable for damages [12k]
arising from Palisocs death. Brillantes was not
being a mere board director [only head of trade
school liable].
FACTS:
Dominic Palisoc [16] and Virgilio Daffon
were classmates at the Manila Technical
Institute (MTI), a non-academic institution.
While Daffon was working on a machine at the
schools laboratory, he remarked that Palisoc
was acting like a foreman. Palisoc slightly
slapped Daffon in the face. The latter retaliated
with a barrage of blows causing Palisoc to
retreat. While retreating, Palisoc stumbled on
an engine block and fell unconscious. He died
thereafter. The cause of death was internal
injuries probably caused by strong fist blows.
Parents of Palisoc sued Antonio Brillantes
[member of Board of Directors], Teodosio
Valenton [President], and SantiagoQuibulue
[instructor] along with Daffon. Daffon was of
legal age at the time of the incident, hence the
parents were not liable under Art 2180.The trial
court found Daffon guilty for quasi-delict, but
absolved the defendants-officials of MTI, citing
the ruling in Mercado v CA.
ISSUE:
Whether defendants school officials are
jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors
HELD:
YES. Valenton (head) and Quibule (teacher)
are liable for damages under Art 2180 CC.
Brillantes is not liable as being a member of the
schools board of directors. School heads and
teachers, to a certain extent, stand in loco
parentis to students who remain in their
custody. Custody, as used in Art 2180, means
the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over
their students for as long as they are in
attendance in the school, including recess time.
The basis of the presumption of negligence in
Art 2180 is some culpa in vigilando that the
parents, teachers, etc.are supposed to have
incurred in the exercise of their authority.
Where the parent places the child under the
custody of the teacher, the latter, and not the
parent, should be the one responsible for the
tortuous act of the child. Palisoc. The
unfortunate death could have been avoided,
had said defendants but complied with their
duty of providing adequate supervision over the
activities of the students in the school premises
to protect their students from harm, whether at
the hands of fellow students or other parties.
NOTE:
The basis of TC for absolving is a dictum in
Mercado v CA which is also based on
another dictum in Exconde, both of which
are set aside in this case
Brillantes was the former owner of the
school but during the occurrence of the
incident, the school was already
incorporated thus hes not liable as being a
member of the Board. The school could be
held liable but since it wasnt properly
impleaded, then Ct cant hold it liable.
DISSENT (Makalintal):
The size of enrollment of educational
institutions makes it highly unrealistic to
consider students as in the custody of
Bayona
312 332
Palisoc v. Brillantes
G.R.No. L-29025 ll Oct. 4, 1971 ll Teehankee, J.
teachers or school heads merely from the fact
of enrollment and class attendance, unless the
latter can prove due diligence. The restrictive
interpretation of Art 2180 in Mercado should be
maintained. Under Art 2180, parents are
responsible for the tortious acts of their minor
children who live in their company. Since the
basis of liability of teachers and school heads is

in loco parentis, the said provision should be
applied by analogy, i.e. so long as they remain
in their custody should be equated with who
live in their company; and school heads and
teachers should not be responsible for damages
caused by children who are no longer minors.
Bayona
313 332
Amadora v. CA
G.R.No. L-47745 ll Apr. 15, 1988 ll Cruz, J.
KEYWORDS:
Student killer, Daffon 2, school liability
FACTS:
- April 13, 1972: Alfredo Amadora, a high
school graduating student of Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos went to school to submit his
Physics experiment. However, while he was
in the auditorium, his classmate Pablito
Daffon fired a gun that mortally hit him. He
died at 17. Daffon was convicted of
homicide thru reckless imprudence.
- Amadoras parents filed a civil action for
damages under Art. 2180 CC against the
school, its rector (HS principal), dean of
boys, and the Physics teacher, together
with Daffon and 2 other students through
their parents. The complaint against
students was later dropped.
- CFI Cebu: defendants were liable in the sum
of P294,984.00 (death compensation, loss
of earning capacity, costs of litigation,
funeral
expenses,
moral
damages,
exemplary damages & attorneys fees)
- CA: reversed, all defendants absolved
completely.
i. As per Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 45, CC
Art. 2180 is not applicable since the
school was an academic institution of
learning & not a school of arts & trades.
ii. Students were not in custody of the
school at the time of the incident since
the semester had already ended.
iii. No clear identification of the fatal gun.
iv. Defendants
exercised
necessary
diligence in preventing injury.
- Petitioners claim their son was still under
schools custody because he went to school
to comply w/a requirement for graduation.
While the respondents allege that in
submitting the said report, Amadora was no
longer in their custody since the semester
was over.
- A gun was confiscated by Sergio Damaso,
the Dean of boys, from Jose Gumban on
April 7, 1972. It was an unlicensed pistol
which was later returned to Gumban
without reporting such to the principal or
taking further action. Gumban was one
Daffons companions when the incident

happened. Petitioners claim it was this gun
that killed their son which respondents
rebutted by saying there was no proof that
they were one and the same.
ISSUES + RDS:
WON Art 2180 CC can be applied in this
case (WON it can be applied to all schools): YES
The Court mentioned 3 cases which were
decided in relation to Art 2180 CC.
- Exconde v Capuno: Capuno, a student
of Balintawak Elementary School and a
boy scout attended a Rizal Day parade
on city school supervisors instructions.
Afterwards, Capuno boarded a jeep and
drove it recklessly that it turned turtle
killing 2 passengers. SC exculpated
school in obiter dictum (it was not party
to the case) since it was not a school of
arts & trades. Some justices dissented
claiming that liability under CC Art.
2180 applied to teachers in general &
heads of schools of arts & trades in
particular.
- Mercado v. CA: a student cut a
classmate with a razor blade at the
Lourdes Catholic School, QC. Exconde
ruling reiterated. Custody requirement
was defined as a situation where
student lives and boards with the
teacher such that control, direction &
influences on pupil supersede those of
parents
- Palisoc v. Brillantes: a 16-yr old student
was killed by a classmate with fist blows
in the lab of Manila Technical Institute.
Court ruled that even if offender was
already of age and not boarding in the
school, the head and teacher-in-charge
were solidarily liable with him. So long
as they remain in their custody means,
according to J. Teehankee, that the
protective and supervisory custody that
school, its heads and teachers exercise
over students for as long as they are at
the attendance in the school including
recess time. No such requirement as
actual living and boarding in the school
Reyes
314 332
Amadora v. CA
G.R.No. L-47745 ll Apr. 15, 1988 ll Cruz, J.
before such liability is attached, hence

setting aside the dicta in the previous
cited cases. It should also be noted that
even students of age were still covered
by provision since they are equally in
custody of school and subject to its
discipline.
CC Art. 2180 applies to all schools whether
academic or non-academic.
- General Rule: Where the school is
academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for
the tort committed by the student will
attach to the teacher in charge of such
student.
- Exception: In establishments of arts and
trades, only the head thereof will be
held liable
- History of disparity:
- Head of school of arts & trades
exercised closer tutelage over his
students who apprenticed to their
master, the school head. He was
personally involved in teaching his
students who usually boarded
w/him & thus he exercised constant
control, supervision & influence.
- Head of academic school: exercised
only administrative duties over
teachers who were directly dealing
w/students. Thus, teacher is liable.
- No reason to differentiate the vigilance
expected from teachers from academic
institutions and non-academic ones.
What is the duration of the responsibility of
the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades over the students?
- The laws custody requirement is not
limited to boarding with school
authorities. It is not co-terminous with
the semesters. There is custody for as
long as he is under the control and
influence of school, and is within its
premises regardless of time and is in
pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, exercise & enjoyment of a

legitimate student right/privilege which
includes relaxing in the campus.
Under similar circumstances, teacherin-charge should be liable for his
students torts. He need not be
physically present or in a position to
prevent the injury. Custody refers more
to his influence on the child & the
discipline instilled. Teacher is liable
regardless of students age.
Teacher should be liable & not school
itself unless he can prove that he
exercised the diligence of a good father.
This defense is made available to the
teacher
considering
that
his
responsibility/influence over the child
cannot be equated to that of the
parents. WRT liability for kids of the age
of majority, leniency should be
observed in assessing teachers
responsibility considering that parents
are no longer liable for the acts of their
emancipated children.
HELD:
PETITION DENIED.
1. Rector and Dean not liable because they
are not teachers-in-charge; only had
general authority over students.
2. Teacher-in-charge: not disclosed by
evidence. Just because Amadora went to
school in connection with a physics report
does not necessarily make physics teacher
the teacher-in-charge. Besides, theres no
showing that the teacher was negligent in
any manner.
3. Dean of boys no proof that the gun he
released was the same gun that killed
Amadora.
4. School only teacher or head is
responsible.
NOTE: This is just a revised version of a digest
that
I
got
from
the
internet.
Reyes
315 332
St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos

G.R.No. 143363 ll Feb. 6, 2002 ll Pardo, J.
KEYWORDS:
Reckless minor driver
DOCTRINE:
Liability
for
damages
caused
by
acts/omissions of a minor is on those given the
authority and responsibility to take charge of
them pursuant to Art. 219 FC. However, the
proximate cause of the acts/omissions should
be proved to be the negligence of the person
given authority, otherwise the parents of the
minor should be liable.
FACTS:
- Appeal via certiorari of the school on the
decision of the CA granting payment for
damages to the parents of a minor who
died in a vehicular accident on a schoolsanctioned activity.
- St. Marys Academy conducted an
enrollment drive where prospective
enrollees schools are visited to campaign.
Deceased Sherwin Capistranos was part of
the group. They rode a jeep owned by
Vivencio Villanueva and driven by minor
James Daniel II. The jeep turned turtle and
Sherwin died.
- CA ruled that the school has liability
pursuant to Art. 218 of the FC which grants

them substitute parental authority. The
Court also held the parents of the minor
driver who was absolved due to his minority
liable.
ISSUE:
WON the school is liable for the death of
the student.
HELD & RD:
NO. The school is liable for the death if the
proximate cause was the negligence of the
school teachers/ administrators having charge
of the student. The Court reversed the CA
decision because they found that the
Capistranos were unable to prove that the
proximate cause of the death was the
negligence of the school. The cause of the
accident was not the recklessness of the minor
driver but the mechanical defect of the jeep.
Hence, the liability should be pinned on the
minors parents primarily.
The case is remanded to the trial court for
determination of liability of the parents of
James Daniel II and the owner of the jeep.
Cristobal
316 332
Vancil v. Belmes
G.R.No. 132223 ll Jun. 19, 2001 ll Sandoval - Gutierrez, J.
KEYWORDS:
US citizen grandma v mother, guardianship
DOCTRINES:
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. But if either parent is alive,
grandparent should prove parents unsuitability
in order to claim rights of substitute parental
authority.
Courts should not appoint persons as
guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of
our courts for they will find it difficult to protect
the wards.
FACTS:
In May 1987, Bonifacia Vancil, a naturalized
US citizen, commenced before the RTC of Cebu
City guardianship proceedings over the persons
and properties of minors Valerie (6) and Vincent
(2), her grandchildren from his son Reeder C.
Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died in the
US, with his common-law wife, Helen G.
Belmes. It is claimed in the petition that the
minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines
and have an estate consisting of proceeds from
their fathers death pension benefits with a
probable value of P100,000. Bonifacia Vancil
was eventually appointed legal and judicial
guardian over the persons and estate the
children.
Helen submitted an opposition to the
subject guardianship proceedings asseverating
that she had already filed a similar petition for
guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City.
She then followed this with a motion for the
Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a
New One, asserting that she is the natural
mother in actual custody of and exercising
parental authority over the minors at Maralag,
Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are
permanently residing; that the petition was
filed under an improper venue; and that at the
time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was
a naturalized American citizen and a resident
thereof.
RTC rejected and denied Belmes motion to
remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as
guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead

ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the
office and perform her duties as such guardian
upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00.
Upon appeal in 1988, CA reversed RTCs
decision based on legal provisions (Civil Code,
PD 603, FC Art.225) and Rules of Court (Sec.7,
Rule 93) which vests parental authority and
guardianship of minor children to their parents
without need of court appointment.
In 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with SC
petition for review on certiorari.
Helen stated in her Manifestation/Motion
that at the time of the petition, Valerie was
already 18 years old and should no longer be
included in the guardianship proceedings, which
CA noted and eventually ruled petition as moot
with respect to her.
ISSUE:
Who between the mother and grandmother
of minor Vincent should be his guardian
RULING:
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
RATIO:
Helen, being the natural mother of the
minor, has the preferential right over that of
petitioner to be his guardian, as provided under
Art. 211, FC which provides:
Art. 211. The father and the mother
shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their common
children. In case of disagreement, the
fathers decision shall prevail, unless
there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Bonifacias claim to be the guardian of said
minor can only be realized by way of substitute
parental authority pursuant to Art. 214, FC:
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute
parental authority shall be exercised by
the surviving grandparent.
Bonifacia
then,
as
Cruz
the
surviving
317 332
Vancil v. Belmes
G.R.No. 132223 ll Jun. 19, 2001 ll Sandoval - Gutierrez, J.
grandparent, can exercise substitute parental
authority only in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of respondent. Considering that
the mother is very much alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent,
Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to
be the minors guardian, respondents
unsuitability. She, however, has failed to
provide convincing evidence showing that
Helen is not suited to be the guardian of
Vincent. She merely insists that Helen is morally
unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that the
latters live-in partner raped Valerie several
times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is
no longer a subject of the guardianship
proceeding.
Even assuming that Helen is unfit as
guardian of minor Vincent, Bonifacia cannot

qualify as a substitute guardian as she is an
American citizen and a resident of Colorado,
and as such, she will not be able to perform the
responsibilities and obligations required of a
guardian. In addition to this, her old age and her
conviction of libel will give her a second thought
of staying in the Philippines. Generally, courts
should not appoint persons as guardians who
are not within the jurisdiction of our courts,
despite not being a statutory requirement for
guardianship or administration, for they will
find it difficult to protect the wards and their
properties.
SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
AUTHORITY
Cruz
318 332
Abiera v. Orin
G.R.No. 3236 ll Mar. 27, 1907 ll Mapa, J.
KEYWORDS:
Sibling war, special administrator
FACTS:
- Vicenta, Mariano and Petra Cacao were
siblings. Petra Cacao married Juan Abiera.
Petra Cacao died.
- Vicenta married defendant Miguel Orin.
They have no children. Vicenta Cacao died.
- In 1898, Mariano Cacao, Juan Abiera and
Miguel Orin entered into an extrajudicial
partition of properties/animals acquired
during the marriage of Vicenta Cacao and
Miguel Orin. Specifically, Orin was to pay
the other two P1,000 each.
- Abiera was representing his children by
Petra Cacao. Because of the circumstances,
the natural nephews became heirs of
Vicenta Cacao.
- Juan Abiera died. Plaintiff Sebastian Abiera
became administrator of his estate.

As special administrator, plaintiff demanded
the P1,000 from Orin; lower court decided
in plaitiffs favor.
ISSUES:
WON Sebastian Abiera may demand
payment as special administrator to the estate
of the father of the heirs?
HELD:
NO. The obligation was executed in favor of
the heirs, not in favor of Juan Abiera, who was
merely representing them. Sebastian Abiera
could only manage Abieras estate, not those of
third persons. Juan Abiera cannot transfer his
right to represent his children to Sebastian.
The right to represent the children is
attached to parental authority or guardianship.
This is a personal right. It died with Juan Abiera.
Dantes
319 332
Cortes v. Castillo
G.R.No. L-16903 ll Mar. 18, 1921 ll Malcolm, J.
KEYWORDS:
Adulterous mom, custody
QUICK READ:
The mother who was found guilty of
adultery was deemed unfit to acquire custody
of her children from her mother-in-law.
FACTS:
- Maria Cortes was found guilty of adultery
by the trial court but Col. Alejandro Herrera,
her husband, condoned her and came back
to live with her.
- On the suspicion that she might be
committing adultery again, he left, took the
kids with him, and stayed with his mother.
He filed an action for divorce, but
- He died in the line of duty (he was a
policeman,
apparently)
Maria then
proceeded to re-obtain custody of her
children from her mother-in-law but the
latter refused.
- The trial court sided with the mother-inlaw.
- Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
WON A woman found guilty of adultery is
unfit for custody of her children - Yes
RATIO:
(The entire ratio is just one paragraph long, and
I might as well copy it verbatim)
"Article 171 of the Civil Code, presumably
still in force, because of continued judicial
construction and enforcement, provides that
parents who, by the example set by them, tend
to corrupt their offspring, may be deprived by
the courts of their parental authority. (There
can also be noted sections 770 and 771 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.) This provision of the
law imposes a discretionary power on the
courts, which should be made use of, with a
primary regard for the welfare of the minor.
(See 2 Manresa, Codigo Civil, pp. 63, et seq.;
decision of the supreme court of Spain, June 23,
1905.) Both under the civil law and the common
law, the best interests of the child is the
paramount consideration"
De Castro
320 332
Chua v. Cabangbang
G.R.No. L-23253 ll Mar. 28, 1969 ll Castro, J.
KEYWORDS:
Hostess, Betty the adopted child
DOCTRINE:
Abandonment
authority
terminates
abandonment rather than fitness that

divests the mother with parental
authority
parental
Art. 332 of the Civil Code

The courts may deprive the parents of
their parental authority or suspend the
exercise of the same if they should treat
their children with excessive harshness
or should give them corrupting orders,
counsels or examples, or should make
them beg or abandon them.
NATURE OF PETITION:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal dismissing Pacita Chuas
petition for habeas corpus for the custody of
her daughter Betty from respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner, when she was still at the prime
of youth, worked as a hostess in nightclubs
She slept with different men, but she got
pregnant with 2 children from a certain Sy
Sia Lay and 1 daughter with Victor Tan
Villareal
She gave her youngest daughter to a
comadre in Cebu
The custody of the other daughter, Betty,
was acquired by Mr. and Mrs. Cabangbang
during the formers early years (4 months
old)
- They christened her Grace Cabangbang
Petitioner now wants to get custody of
Betty
- She contends that Villareal took the
child away and gave her to the couple
- The couple avers that they found the
baby, wrapped in a bundle, at the gate
of their residence
ISSUE:
WON the custody of the child can be
granted back to the mother
HELD:
NO, petitioner abandoned the child, thus
she has lost her parental authority over the
child
RATIO:
CFI ruled that the mother was unfit to have
parental authority, as she is not an upright
woman.
- But SC ruled that it was more of an
Therefore, abandonment is one of the

grounds for depriving authority over the
parent
- Mere acquiescence to the giving by
Villareal to the spouses is not sufficient
to constitute abandonment
- But since she waited for a period of 5
years before she filed the petition for
custody, it is more believable that she
did abandon the child
- More proof that she doesnt really love
the child
- She admitted under oath that she
wants the child back so that Sy Sia
Lay, the alleged father, would
resume providing the petitioner
and the child support which he
peremptorily withheld and ceased
to give when she gave the child
away
- Also, she expressed her willingness
to drop the case if the spouses paid
her in cash and a jeep
- Not to mention that she gave her
other child to a comadre in Cebu
because she couldnt support her
SIDE ISSUE:
Petitioner contends that no child under 7
years of age shall be taken away from her
mother.
- Moot and academic, as she is already
11 years old
We therefore affirm the lower courts decision,
not on the grounds cited by it, but upon a
Dilag
321 332
Chua v. Cabangbang
G.R.No. L-23253 ll Mar. 28, 1969 ll Castro, J.
ground which the court overlooked i.e.,
abandonment by the petitioner of her child
Dilag
322 332
In Re, Edward C
126 Cal.App.3d 193 ll Nov. 30, 1981 ll Barry-Deal, J.
KEYWORDS:
Divine punishment, child maltreatment
DOCTRINE:
Maltreatment of a child is not privileged
simply because it is imposed in the guise of
freedom of religious expression. Whether the
discipline is excessive or a lifestyle is harmful to
the child must be measured in the light of an
objective standard of reasonableness under all
circumstances.
FACTS:
3 kids: Eric, Marlee and Edward
During the maternal grandmas two-week
visit in March 1980, she observed the father
disciplining the three children by hitting
them with a leather strap, looped over.
Although the boys were spanked a few
times with clothing on, Marlee was beaten
at least a dozen times, usually on her bare
flesh. The boys witnessed Marlee's
whippings, heard her cry, and listened to
their father, while administering the
beating, explain to the children that he was
doing it because God wanted him to and
that it was Biblically ordained.
There were other forms of discipline and
parental control:
a. Marlee was made to sleep in her
underwear on a plastic sheet on the
floor with no bedding in 60 degree
weather as punishment for wetting
b. One night Marlee was strapped three
times during the night for wetting the
bed
c. The children were made to stand in a
corner for long periods and were
lectured about God at mealtime. One
night, after three hours of dissertation
by the father, the dinner was cold and
the children fell asleep without eating
d. After school the children were not
allowed to go outside the home, to visit
friends, or to have friends visit them
e. When Marlee was unable to recall what
she learned in church, she receive a
severe beating that there was blood in

her underpants
When the grandma reported it to the
police, the latter looked at the 3 childrens
signs of abuse. A visual check of Marlee
revealed numerous abrasions, bruises, and
lacerations on her buttocks, legs, and arms;
she was taken into protective custody.
(Apparently, there were no significant
bruises on the boys.) Note that Marlee is
only 8 years old.
The father refuses counselling and said that
he does not need one, only a counselling
with the Lord.
ISSUE:
W/N the maltreatment is justified by the
religion? NO
HELD:
Sufficiency of Evidence
The court reasoned that the "parental
preference" and the "child's best interests"
standards are usually compatible, but when the
rights of the parents conflict with those of the
child, "`... the legal system should protect the
child's interests. Not only is the child a helpless
party but the parents should suffer the
consequences of their inadequacy rather than
the child. Thus, in any proceeding to remove a
child from the parents, either temporarily or
permanently, the court must balance the
fundamental rights of the parents against the
fundamental rights of the child.
Mistreatment of a child, however, is not
privileged because it is imposed in the guise of
freedom of religious expression. Whether
discipline is excessive or a lifestyle is harmful to
the child must be measured in the light of an
objective standard of reasonableness under all
the circumstances.
Reunification of the Family
Until the father cooperates to counselling
program, reunification of the family will be
detrimental to the family.
Dolot
323 332
Prince v. Massachusetts
321 U.S. 158 ll Jan. 31, 1944 ll Rutledge, J.
KEYWORDS:
Jehovas Witness magazine, child labor
FACTS:
Sarah Prince was the aunt and legal
custodian of 9 year old Betty Simmons. One
night, the kid and Princes legit children insisted
they come with Prince in distributing Jehovahs
Witness literature magazines (Watchtower and
Consolation) on the streets. The children used
to come with her, but she was chastised by the
school attendance officer, Mr. Perkins. She was
then convicted of violating Massachusetts
comprehensive child labor law, which prohibits
any boy under twelve or any girl under eighteen
to sell, expose, or offer to sell any newspapers,
magazines, periodical or any other articles of
merchandise of any description, or exercise the
trade of bootblack or scavenger, or any other
trade, in any street or public place. Specifically
she was found guilty of the complaints:
a. Furnishing her (Betty) with magazines,
knowing she was to sell them unlawfully,
that is, on the street;
b. As Betty's custodian, permitting her to work
contrary to law.
Prince argues that the law violated her
Fourteenth Amendment right to exercise her
religion and her equal protection rights, in
particular because the children themselves
were ministers of their religion as well.
ISSUE:
Does the freedom of religion of the First
Amendment, and the parental rights secured by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibit Massachusetts from
enforcing the child labor law?
HELD:
No. The States authority to prevent child
labor overrides the constitutional protections in

this case. Two liberties are at stake, the parents
right to bring up the child in the way he should
go, and the childs right to practice his or her
religion. The custody, care, and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents. However,
neither rights of religion nor rights of
parenthood are beyond limitation. The state as
parens patriae may guard the general interest
in a youths well being by requiring school
attendance, and regulating or prohibiting the
childs labor.
The appellant urges that the activity in this
case in no way harmed the niece. However, the
states authority over childrens activities is
broader than over like actions of adults. This is
peculiarly true of public activities and in matters
of employment. Legislation appropriately
designed to reach such evils (like the crippling
effects of child employment, and the possible
harms arising from other activities subject to all
the diverse influences of the street) is within
the state's police power, whether against the
parent's claim to control of the child or one that
religious scruples dictate contrary action.
This case reduces itself to the question of
whether the presence of the childs guardian
puts a limit on the states power. The parent
may martyr themselves, but this does not mean
they may martyr the child before the child
reaches the age of majority. Massachusetts had
determined that an absolute prohibition,
though limited to streets and public places and
to the incidental uses proscribed, is necessary
to accomplish its legitimate objectives.
DISSENT:
"Religious freedom is too sacred a right to
be restricted or prohibited in any degree
without convincing proof that a legitimate
interest of the state is in grave danger."
Enad
324 332
Strunk v. Strunk
445 S.W.2D 145 ll Sep. 26, 1969 ll Osborne, J.
KEYWORDS:
Sibling love, organ transplant, substituted
judgement
FACTS:
Arthur and Ava Strunk had two sons:
Tommy, 28, married, and suffering from a fatal
kidney disease called chronic glomerulus
nephritis; and Jerry, 27, handicapped by a
speech defect, feeble-minded and committed
to a state institution for such individuals.
In order to keep Tommy alive, he had an
artificial kidney and was undergoing treatment,
but this could no longer be sustained. A kidney
transplant would better help him survive.
The Strunks and other relatives were tested
for the compatibility of their blood type or
tissue with that of Tommys, but only Jerrys
was found to be acceptable.
Tommy and Jerrys mother Ava thus
petitioned the county court, praying for the
authority to proceed with the operation.
The county court held that going through
with the organ donation would beneficial to
both the brothers. First, Tommy would have a
new, better-functioning kidney. Second, Jerry
would not have to lose his brother, on whom he
was
emotionally
and
psychologically
dependent.
Upon the appeal of the guardian ad litem,
Morris E. Burton, the Franklin Circuit Final Court
adopted the findings of the country court and
also ruled to allow the transplant.
ISSUE:
Whether a court may permit an organ
transplant from an incompetent ward of the
state at the petition of his mother and
committee.
RATIO:
YES. The Court AFFIRMED the judgment of
the lower courts and PERMITTED THE ORGAN
TRANSPLANT, reasoning that:
A. Through the doctrine of substituted
judgment, the court has jurisdiction on all
matters pertaining to a wards well-being.
The doctrine of substituted judgment is the
right of the court to act in behalf of any person
with a legal disability, not only with regard to
their property, but also in the interest of their
well-being.
This power has been delegated by the
courts to the incompetents committees. The
court stated its belief that such power would
not extend so far as to allow a committee to
subject his ward to serious surgical techniques
[] unless the life of his ward be in jeopardy.
Thus, in this case, it was only in exercise of
this delegated power that Ava Strunk, the
mother and committee of Tommy, sought the
approval of the county court, and only in
exercise of the power conferred by the doctrine
of substituted judgment did the county court
give its permission.
B. The surgery would be for the benefit of
both brothers.
The Department of Mental Health was
amicus curiae. It recommended that the surgery
be permitted not only so that Tommys life may
be saved, but also to prevent Jerry from feeling
any guilt if his brother were to die.
The court also noted that all the members
of the immediate family have recommended
the transplant, in addition to the Dept. of
Mental Health and the county and circuit
courts.
Based on the lower courts findings that the
procedure would be to Jerrys best interest, the
judgment was affirmed.
Espaola
325 332
Conservatorship of Valerie N
40 Cal.3d 143 ll Oct. 21, 1985 ll Grodin, J.
FACTS:
- Valerie N, 29 years old, is inflicted with
Down Syndrome and has an IQ of 30. Living
w/ mother and stepfather
- Mother instituted a court proceeding for
appointment as conservators and also
requested for additional powers to sterilize
Valerie through tubal ligation
- Reason? Valerie was sexually aggressive at
the sight of men. She would kiss, hug and sit
on random men's laps. Though she is not
sexually
active,
she
masturbates
excessively.
- Mother fears when she leaves her daughter
and the harm she may suffer if she does get
pregnant.
- Failed behavior modification. Also rejected
contraceptive pills. Other contraceptive
devices like intrauterine devices would be
harmful.
- Lower court granted conservatorship but
ruled that it had no jurisdiction to order the
sterilization since Subdivision (d) of 2356
prohibits other persons from obtaining
sterilization for a conservatee without the
latter's consent
ISSUE:
1. WON State law is unconstitutional
2. WON Court can grant the parent's request
for Valerie's sterilization
HELD:
1) Yes, said state law is unconstitutional. It
violates the conservatee's privacy and
liberty interests protected by the 14th
Amendment of the US Constitution
- Sterilization is encompassed in the right
to privacy to choose an option of

procreation. It is also protected by the
interest of the 14th Amendment's equal
protection clause. To say that consent
of the conservatee is necessary to get
sterilization would be to deny the
choice of those who will not be able to
understand the consequences.
True protection of procreative choice
can only be accomplished if state
permits court-supervised substitute
judgment of the conservator to be
exercised on behalf of a conservatee
Denying mentally retarded women the
choice to be sterilized denies them
same rights as would those women who
are not mentally retarded enjoy
Although the Court found that the state
interest is to give mentally retarded
women the choice to be able to
procreate later, it is overbroad and
takes away the rights of those women
who could not make the choice for
themselves
2) NO
- Lack of sufficient evidence from parents
about the necessity of sterilization
- They didn't provide proof that Valerie
can become pregnant
- Did not provide proof that besides the
pills, they have tried other less-intrusive
way
of
making
Valerie
take
contraceptives
Court affirms lower court's decision without
prejudice for more factfinding for the parents
and to petition again
Hermosisima
326 332
Johnson v. Calvert
5 Cal.4th 84 ll May 20, 1993 ll Panelli, J.
KEYWORDS:
Surrogate mom
DOCTRINE:
Under California law, she who intended to
bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own is the natural
mother.
PROOF GIVEN:
For the Calverts; Evidence of blood tests
showing that Crispina is genetically related to
the child
FACTS:
Mark and Crispina Calvert are married but
unable to have a child. Anna Johnson offered to
serve as surrogate mother. The two parties
enter into a contract where Anna serves as
surrogate, while the Calverts pay her $10,000 in
installments as well as purchase a life insurance
policy for Johnson. The relationship between
the two sides soured, with Anna demanding the
payment of the balance or else she would
refuse to give up the child. The Calverts
responded with a lawsuit seeking a declaration
that they were the legal parents of the child.
Upon the birth of the child, it was proven
through blood tests that Anna was NOT the
genetic mother of the child. The trial court ruled
that 1) the Calverts were the genetic, biological
and natural parents of the child, 2) Anna had no
parental rights to the child, and 3) the surrogacy
contract was legal and enforceable against
Annas claims, all of which were affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
1. WON Anna can claim custody of the child
2. WON the surrogate contract violates public
policy
HELD:
1. NO. Because undisputed evidence shows
that Anna gave birth to the child and that
only Crispina is genetically related to such
child, and no clear legislative preference is
given between blood tests and gestation as
means of establishing a mother and child
relationship, then the case can only be
decided by looking at the intent of both
parties as manifested by the surrogacy
agreement. Basing it on such agreement, it
is clear then that the parties aim was to
bring the Calverts child into the world, and
not for them to donate the zygote to Anna.
From the outset, Crispina intended to be
the mother of the child. Annas act of
carrying the child may have been
indispensible for eventually giving birth to
him, but she would not have been able to
do so had she manifested her intent to keep
the child as her own prior to the
implantation of the zygote. Although the
Uniform Parentage Act, which bases parent
and child rights on the existence of a parent
and child relationship, recognizes both
genetic consanguinity and giving birth as
means of establishing a mother and child
relationship, when the two means do not
coincide in one woman, she who intended
to procreate the child is the natural mother
under California law.
2. NO. Gestational surrogacy is completely
different from adoption, and as such,
should not be subject to adoption statutes.
Both parties voluntarily agreed to
participate in in vitro fertilization before the
child was conceived. Moreover, the
financial considerations given to Anna
($10,000 and the purchase of an insurance
policy) were NOT for her giving up her
parental rights over the child but rather for
carrying the child and undergoing labor.
327 332
Gillick v. West Norwalk

Oct. 17, 1985 ll House of Lords
KEYWORDS:
Parental consent for contraceptives for under
16
FACTS:
The Department of Health and Social
Security issued a circular to area health
authorities containing, inter alia, advice to the
effect that a doctor consulted at a family
planning clinic by a girl under 16 would not be
acting
unlawfully
if
he
prescribed
contraceptives for the girl, so long as in doing so
he was acting in good faith to protect her
against the harmful effects of sexual
intercourse. The circular further stated that,
although a doctor should proceed on the
assumption that advice and treatment on
contraception should not be given to a girl
under 16 without parental consent and that he
should try to persuade the girl to involve her
parents in the matter, nevertheless the
principle of confidentiality between doctor and
patient applied to a girl under 16 seeking
contraceptives and therefore in exceptional
cases the doctor could prescribe contraceptives
without consulting the girl's parents or
obtaining their consent if in the doctor's clinical
judgment it was desirable to prescribe
contraceptives. The plaintiff, Victoria Gillick,
who had five daughters under the age of 16,
sought an assurance from her local area health
authority that her daughters would not be given
advice and treatment on contraception without
the plaintiff's prior knowledge and consent
while they were under 16. When the authority
refused to give such an assurance the plaintiff
brought an action against the authority and the
department seeking:
1. A declaration that the advice contained in
the circular was unlawful, because it
amounted to advice to doctors to commit
the offence of causing or encouraging
unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl
under 16, contrary to section 28(1) of the
Sexual Offences Act 1956, or the offence of
being an accessory to unlawful sexual
intercourse with a girl under 16, contrary to
section 6(1) of that Act; and
2. a declaration that a doctor could not give
advice and treatment on contraception to

any child of the plaintiff below the age of 16
without the plaintiff's consent, because to
do so would be unlawful as being
inconsistent with the plaintiff's parental
rights.
The judge held
i. that a doctor prescribing contraceptives to
a girl under 16 in accordance with the
advice contained in the department's
circular would not thereby be committing
an offence of causing or encouraging
unlawful sexual intercourse with the girl,
contrary to section 28(1) of the 1956 Act;
and
ii. that a parent's interest in his or her child
did not amount to a 'right' but was more
accurately described as a responsibility or
duty, and accordingly giving advice to a girl
under 16 on contraception without her
parent's consent was not unlawful
interference with parental 'rights'. He
accordingly dismissed the plaintiff's action.
The plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeal, which granted the declarations sought,
on the grounds that a child under 16 could not
validly consent to contraceptive treatment
without her parents' consent and that therefore
the circular was unlawful. The Department
appealed to the House of Lords.
ISSUE:
WON a doctor can lawfully prescribe
contraception for a girl under 16 without the
consent of her parent.
JUDGMENT:
NO (with an exception). Clearly a doctor
who gives a girl contraceptive advice or
treatment not because in his clinical judgment
the treatment is medically indicated for the
maintenance or restoration of her health but
with the intention of facilitating her having
unlawful sexual intercourse may well be guilty
of a criminal offence. It would depend upon the
doctors intention. The departments guidance
avoids the trap of declaring that the decision to
Macariola
328 332
Gillick v. West Norwalk

Oct. 17, 1985 ll House of Lords
prescribe the treatment is wholly a matter of
the doctors discretion. He may prescribe only if
she has the capacity to consent1 or if
exceptional circumstances exist which justify
him in exercising his clinical judgment without
parental consent. The adjective clinical
emphasizes that it must be a medical judgment
based upon what he honestly believes to be
necessary for the physical, mental and
emotional health of his patient. The bona fide
exercise by a doctor of his clinical judgment
must be a complete negation of the guilty mind
which is an essential ingredient of the criminal
offence of aiding and abetting the commission
of unlawful sexual intercourse.
only as long as they were needed for the

protection of the child and such rights yielded
to the child's right to make his own decisions
when he reached a sufficient understanding and
intelligence to be capa ble of making up his own
mind. Accordingly, a girl under 16 did not,
merely by reason of her age, lack legal capacity
to consent to contraceptive advice and
treatment by a doctor. According to Lord
Scarman, the parental right to determine
whether or not their minor child below the age
of sixteen will have medical treatment
terminates if and when the child achieves
sufficient understanding and intelligence to
understand fully what is proposed." (Also
known
as
the
Gillick
Competence)
*Parental rights were recognized by the law
Macariola
329 332
Curtis v. School Committee

420 Mass. 749 ll Jul. 17, 1995 ll Liacos, CJ
KEYWORDS:
Condom vending machine
FACTS:
On January 2, 1992, the Falmouth School
committee voted in favor of executing the
condom availability program within the campus.
The effects of this would be to make condoms
available to students in two ways: 1. upon
request, 2. through vending machines located
within school premises. Apart from making
condoms available to students who might want
to avail of such, the program also provided
counselling by school officials and printed
materials that contained information about
STDs and the role of condom of protecting their
(the studentss) health in that regard.
Additionally, the memorandum that outlined
the means of implementing the program also
stated the intent of the school districts
superintendent to impart the message that only
sexual abstinence is the foolproof method of
keeping safe from STDs. The condom availability
program took effect on January 2, 1992.
In reaction to its implementation, several
students enrolled in the Falmouth public system
assailed the program alleging that it infringed
their constitutional rights. They presented two
main arguments:
1. The program violates their right to familial
privacy and their guaranteed liberties as
parents in the control of the education and
upbringing of their children (protected by
the 14th Amendment)
2. The program violates their right to free
exercise of religion (Protected by the 1st
Amendment)
ISSUE:
WON the condom availability program
violated the constitutionally-protected rights of
the petitioners
HELD:
NO, petitioners failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to demonstrate to the Court that the
condom availability program violated rights
guaranteed by the constitution.
With Regard to the Claims Regarding
Familial Privacy:
According to the petitioners the programs

in question invaded the constitutionally
protected zone of privacy which surrounds
the family. While the Court acknowledged the
rights of families to privacy as well as the
interests that the parents sought to protect, it
held that the petitioners did not sufficiently
demonstrate
the
violation
of
their
constitutionally-protected rights by the condom
availability program. The Court noted the lack
of coercion as the primary ground for ruling
that the program in question did not violate the
constitutional rights of the parties involved.
Coercion was defined as where the
governmental action is mandatory and provides
no outlet for the parents, such as where refusal
to participate in a program results in a sanction
or in expulsion. The Court held that since the
students were not forced to avail of the
condoms nor required to undergo counseling
and read the information pamphlets regarding
STDs, then there was no coercion present. In
essence, the condom availability program
affected students on a voluntary, not
compulsory, basis. Therefore, there was no
supplanting of parental authority by school
officials as a result of this program. As a result
of such ruling, the inclusion of an opt-out clause
or parental notification were deemed
unnecessary.
With Regard to the Claims Regarding Free
Exercise of Religion:
The Court ruled that the condom availability
program did not place any burden on the ability
of the petitioners to exercise their religion.
Again, in justifying its ruling, the Court pointed
to the fact that student participation in the
program was not compulsory. Neither was
there penalties prescribed by the program for
those who do not wish to participate because it
may be contrary to their religious beliefs. Mere
exposure to programs that may be offensive or
contrary to the religious beliefs of the
petitioners does not amount to a constitutional
violation of their right to freely exercise their
religion.
Petitions dismissed. The program in question
does not violate any constitutional right of the
Marin
330 332
Curtis v. School Committee

420 Mass. 749 ll Jul. 17, 1995 ll Liacos, CJ
petitioners.
Marin
331 332
Roe v. Doe
29 N.Y. 2D 188 ll Jul. 7, 1971 ll Scileppi, J.
KEYWORDS:
Disobedient daughter
FACTS:
Jane Roe was the guardian of a 20 year-old
student on the University of Louisville
(Kentucky) who was supported until 1970 by
her wealthy father (John Doe) who was an
attorney in New York. She was instructed to
take up residence in her college dormitory but,
in defiance of her father's orders, she bunked
with one of her female classmates. Upon
learning of this, Doe instructed her to return to
New York. Instead of obeying him, she decided
to finish her academic year, paying for tuition
and other expenses by selling her car. She then
moved back to NY, but lived in the home of a
friend. She now instituted the present action
wherein she claimed that her father should
furnish support from the time he stopped
sending her money until the time she returned
to NY.
Family court ruled in favor of Roe, ordering
Doe to pay for the support of his daughter, he
willfully disobeyed the order and was thus
sentenced to be committed to jail for 30 days.
The commitment was stayed on appeal, which
in turn ruled for Doe, hence this petition.

HELD:
The decision of the Appellate Court should
be affirmed, only requiring Doe to pay for
tuition and health fees. A minor of employable
age and in full possession of her faculties,
voluntarily and without cause, abandons the
parents' home against the will of the parents,
and for the purpose of avoiding parental
control, she forfeits her right to demand
support.
Child's right to support and parent's right to
custody are reciprocal. The father may establish
and impose reasonable regulations for the
child.
The obligations of parenthood, under
natural and civil law, require of the child
"`submission to reasonable restraint, and
demands habits of propriety, obedience, and
conformity to domestic discipline'
She cannot enlist the aid of the court in
frustrating that authority, reasonably exercised,
by requiring that her father accede to her
demands and underwrite her chosen lifestyle or
as here, run the risk of incarceration.
Nuez
332 332

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