BeyondJusticebyAgnesHeller(1987)

6.THEGOODLIFE(excerpt)

Beyond Justice
Goodness is beyond justice. However, since justice always has a moral
component, thegoodnessofapersoninvolvesthevirtueofjusticeandtheexercise
of this virtue. The development of endowments into talents (except for the
developmentofmoralendowments)hasnothingtodowithjusticeatleast,notin
mymodelofanincompleteethicopoliticaljustice.Thesameholdstrueofpersonal
attachments. This restriction, at least, not in my model of an incomplete ethico
political justice, is important. In premodern societies, both the development of
endowments into talents and personal attachments were socially regulated and
thus imputed to members of different clusters by the norms and rules of
superordination and subordination. Accordingly, both these things had something
todowith(formal)justice,thoughtoadifferentdegree.Ourmodernsenseofjustice
suggeststhatthisshouldnotbeso,andmodernmenandwomen,inthemain,agree
with the devalidating judgement The application of clusteral sociopolitical norms
to personal attachments and to the development of endowments into talents is
unjust. Put plainly, this means that being attached to one person rather than to
another,ordevelopingoneendowmentratherthananother,shouldberegardedasa
completely personal and individual matter. Acts, decisions, attitudes, if not
regulatedbysociopoliticalnorms,arenotmattersofjustice.
Theparamountrealityofmodernity,depictedinthetriadmodel,ischaracterized
by the increase in, and expansion of, social deregulation of the development of
endowments into talents and of personal attachments (of emotional intensity).
However, social deregulation does not bring with it the slackening of social
constraints,or,ifitdoes,thelatterisnotinproportiontotheformer.Indiscussing
distributivejusticeIhavealreadypointedoutthat,ifequalopportunitywerethe
case(asItisnot),theparamountrealitywouldstillplacepressureonouroptionsas
farasthedevelopmentofendowmentsintotalentsisconcerned.Thispressureisnot
normative but pragmaticinstrumental. None the less, it is pressure, and heavy
pressure at that. The same holds true of personal attachments, with one
modification: here, social pressure, although also of a pragmaticinstrumental
nature, takes on a pseudonormative character. There are fashionable personal
attachmentsandunfashionableones,andthepressuretokeeppacewithfashion

(whichofcourseischangingallthetime)isfairlypowerful.Owingtothisincreasing
deregulation,thechoice,inbothcases,isconsideredmerelypersonal,butitisnot
considerably more personal than it used to be, only somewhat more so.
Nevertheless, because of social deregulation, all maladjustments, mishaps,
discontentmentandfailuresensuingfromthechoiceoftalentsandattachmentsare
imputedtoindividual persons. Theideologyofourparamountrealitysuggeststhat
ourownlifeisourownmaking,andthatconsequentlyourdisastersarealsoofour
ownmaking,or,alternatively,ofthemakingofotherpersons.Ifwerealizethatthe
endowments we have developed into talents were not our best, that our emotions
were or are invested in the wrong person and in the wrong way,weusually blame
individual choices, either our own or those of other persons, and we vacillate
between selfreproach and reproaching those others. The more we are aware of
socialconstraints,andthemoreweareresolvednottocomplywiththem,themore
the development of our endowments into talents, and the choice of our personal
attachments, can be genuinely personal and individual. We then have a better
chance of avoiding despair, neurosis and crises of personality, and also a better
chanceofattainingthegoodlife.
Ihaveenumeratedthethreemajorfacetsofthegoodlife:beinganhonestperson,
developing certain endowments into talents (the best ones were are aware of) and
forming strong personal attachments. I have emphasized the individual and
personalcharacterofourchoicesintherealmbeyondjustice.Thiscallsforfurther
clarification.
The emphasis on the personal character of the choice does not contradict the
theoretical axiom of the intersubjective constitution of the world. We can only
choose between those options, values and action patterns which in fact exist,
which are socially given, though it is possible to modify them by making our
choices. Every single person can make the existential choice (choosing the choice
betweengoodandevil),because,sincehonestpeopledoexisttoday,thedistinction
betweengoodandevilstillremains.Wecanonlybeawareofthoseendowmentsthe
developmentofwhichintotalentsisalreadyapparentonthecognitiveorpractical
horizonofatleastonesingleformoflifewithwhichwearefamiliar.
Indiscussingjustice,IhavementionedtheCartesianmoment.Ifwegobeyond
justice,theCartesianmomentisnotatheoreticalattitude(thatofgeneraldoubt),
butanactofvolition:itisthemomentofthefundamentalintentionalact.Thereis
notjustonefundamentalintentionalactinaliferather,thereareseveralsuchacts,
althoughthenumberissmall.Ifwechoosetodevelopacertainendowmentintoa

talent, and later revoke this particular choice by making another choice, we have
performedtwofundamentalacts,but,ifwedothistoofrequently,ouractswillno
longerbefundamental,andthemomentoftheactwillnotbeCartesian.Inrespect
ofpersonalattachments,itisnotthechoiceofoneoranothersubjectobjectofour
attachment which is referred to as the Cartesian moment. Sometimes we do not
evenchooseinthepropermeaningoftheword,butaresimplycarriedaway.The
Cartesianmoment(thefundamentalintentionalact)isthechoiceofthecharacter
ofthepersonalrelationshipsinwhichweinvest.SuchaCartesianmomentcannot
be repeated too many times either. The paradigms of the intersubjective
constitution of the world must not degrade the individual person to the realm of
mereepiphenomena,and,ifthereisnoCartesianmomentleft,thepersonisindeed
intherealmofmereepiphenomena.
SincehonestyIstheoverarchingelementofthegoodlife,theexistentialchoiceis
theultimaterootofallCartesianmoments,ofallfundamentalchoices.Fundamental
choicesarenot determined bytheexistentialchoice(ifthiswereso,theywouldnot
be fundamental, and the Cartesian moment would be a fake). The notion root
involves both a limitation and a motivation. Choosing oneself as an honest person
meansnotchoosingsetsofmaximsintheknowledgethattoactaccordingtothese
sets of maximswillinvolve doing harmto others, just as itmeansnotchoosing to
develop into talents those endowments the exercise of which will harm others for
reasonsofprinciple,andnotformingsocialattachmentsofthetypewheretheother
partywillbewrongedforreasonsofprinciple.Choosingourselvesashonestpersons
can motivate us to choose sets of norms which enjoin us to help others and to
alleviatetheirsuffering,tochoosetodevelopintotalentsthoseendowmentsthatare
needed most by others, and which result in the greatest good, and to choose
personal attachments based on generous goodness. The existential choice of every
honestpersondelimitsallfundamentalchoicesintheseways.Butnoteveryhonest
person makes existential choices that motivate all the fundamental choices in the
waysjustdescribed.Iftheexistentialchoiceofhonestymotivatesussimultaneously
inallourfundamentalchoices,wearerighteoustoahigherdegree:oursisthena
supererogatoryandtransculturalrighteousness.
The good life is beyond justice. This is a basic tenet of the incomplete ethico
political concept of justice that I have argued for in this book. My ethicopolitical
conceptofjusticefollowsinthefootstepsofone tendencyoftheEnlightenment.It
reflects on the specific human condition of modernity whilst being aware of the
possibilities and limits of the human condition in general. It normatively founded

uponthegeneralizationofthegoldenrule,upontheuniversalmaximofdynamic
justice,andupontheuniversalvaluesoflifeandfreedom.Thenormativefoundation
ofthetheoryisthenormativefoundationofthebestpossiblesociopoliticalworld,of
apluralisticculturaluniverseinwhicheachcultureistiedtoeveryothercultureby
the bonds of symmetric reciprocity. The best possible sociopolitical world, where
sociopoliticalnormsandrules(laws)aresetbyjustprocedure(valuediscourse),was
said to be the condition of the good life of all. But the good life itself is beyond
justice.
In the framework of my incomplete ethicopolitical concept of justice, the good
lives must be viewed in the plural. Different ways of life can be good, and can be
equally good. Yet a lifestyle good for one person may not be good for another
person.Theauthenticpluralityofwaysoflifeistheconditionunderwhichthelifeof
eachandeverypersoncanbegood.In the best possible sociopolitical world, the
good life depends exclusively on the existential choice and the fundamental
choices of the individual. But, even if everyones good life is unique, even if the
good life depends on the existential choice and the fundamental choice, it is not a
solitaryenterprise,andcannotbe.Allthreeelementsofthegoodlifearerootedin
togetherness. The existential choice and the choice of types of personal
attachments are the choices of the human bond. We cannot develop our
endowments into talents except through cooperation with others. Choosing
ourselvesmeanstochoosethehumanbondandhumancooperationitisthechoice
ofothers.Bychoosingaformofthegoodlife,wechooseaformoftogetherness.And
theformoftogethernesswepractiselivesintheconcretenorms,inthecustoms,in
theformsofintercourseofacommunity,asociety,agroup.Thegoodlifeisalways
shared.Thechoiceofawayoflifeisachoiceofahumancommunitywithwhichwe
share our lives. Although the good life of each and every person is unique, it is
simultaneously shared by the members of a community, a group, a society.
However,inthemodeloftheincompleteethicopoliticalconceptofjustice,allthese
sharedwaysoflifeareagainunique:theycannotberankedandcompared.Theyare
equallygood,insofarastheycanequallyprovidethegoodlifefortheirmembers.
And, again, something is shared by all ways of life. groups, societies and
communitiesnamely,thereadinesstoparticipateinvaluediscourse.Thatiswhy
the goodness of every person includes the virtue of justice and the exercise of this
virtue in the public sphere, in the pursuit of public happiness. And that the good
person can also go beyond justice in the public sphere in all ways of life does not
overruletheinjunctionthatthe good person must be just.

Owing to the abstract nature of the model of an incomplete ethicopolitical

conceptofjustice,wecannotgiveageneral answertothequestionoftheextentto
whichhonestygoesbeyondjustice.Thisdependsverymuchontheparticularway
oflifeofthehonestperson.Activeandgenerousgoodnessisalwaysbeyondjustice.
Empathy,sympathy,magnanimity,forgiveness,thereadinesstohelp,toconsole,to
give advice all these are virtuous attitudes and acts beyond justice. However, as
mentioned, in a best possible sociopolitical world a person who is only a good
citizen can be a good (honest) person as well. Such a person will not go beyond
justiceinhisorhergoodness.Suchapersonwillnevercommitinjustice,butmight
sufferinjustice,somethingwhichcanalwayshappeneveninthebestpossiblesocio
politicalworld(though,bydefinition,notasarule).
Denizensofourpresentworld,wecometotheconclusionthatitisnotpossibleto
behonestwithoutsometimesgoingbeyondjustice.Apersonwhosuffersslanderin
order not to betray the confidence of a friend goes beyond justice. A person who
doesnotturnhisbackupontheunjustlypersecutedpersonwhoseeksshelter,but
risks freedom, risks life, to help this person, goes beyond justice. A person who
speaks his mind and knows that doing so jeopardises job or social position goes
beyondjustice.Apersonwhogivesgoodadviceinafamilydisputeandrisksbeing
hatedbyallpartiesconcernedgoesbeyondjustice.
Onecouldsaythat,ifsomeformofinjusticeisdonetoanother,andweoutweigh
itbyofferingourhandtothevictim,wedonotgobeyondjustice,butratherrestore
justice.Onecouldsaythatthisispreciselywhatanhonestpersondoes,whereasa
righteous person of the same ilk (up to the level of being a transculturally good
person)doessomethingaboveandbeyondthis.Thosewhoaremorerighteous(up
to the level of being a transculturally good person) are ,supererogatory in their
goodness, precisely because active goodness involves more than rectifying
injustice. This statement is approximately correct. On the other hand, the honest
persondoesmorethanrectifyinjustice.Thispersoncanbeguidedbytransclusteral
moral norms (as in example 1). She or he can also resort to transclusteral moral
norms and thereby devalidate existing sociopolitical rules. This is the case in our
secondexample.Veryoften,aformofpersecutionmaynotbeunjustintermsofthe
lawoftherelevantcountry(aswiththelegalpersecutionofJewsinNaziGermany),
but is unjust from the perspective of the moral and (alternative) social norms to
which the person is committed. In a way, rectifying injustice (in the second
example)isunjustintermsoftheformalconceptofjustice(themaximofjustice).
Sometimes the honest person can rectify injustices which occur through the

incorrectapplicationofvalidsocialandpoliticalrules.Thiscanbe,althoughitisnot
necessarily,thecaseinourfourthexample.Yet,ifitisthecase,thehonestperson
does not go beyond justice. At all events, we cannot be honest today unless we
occasionallygobeyondjustice.
However, going beyond justice is not simply a matter of single acts or choices.
Theexerciseofgoodnessbecomescharacter. Thecharactersofhonestpersonsare
different in kind, since the self which is homogenized is unique. But all honest
personshavean,auraoftheirown.Thisauracallsfortrust.Itcallsfortrustinall
facetsofliferegulatedbythenormsthehonestpersonhaschosen.Thejustperson
canalsobetrusted,butonanarrowerbasis.Weknowthatsheorhewillapplythe
validsociopoliticalnormsandrulesproperly.Itistheauraofthehonestperson,
hisorhercharacter,whichtakesthispersonbeyondjustice.
The idea that the honest person is beyond justice had to be argued for, even
thoughthiscouldonlybedonebriefly.Nosimilarargumentisnecessaryinorderto
prove that the development of our endowments into talents and the emotional
intensityofourpersonalattachmentscannotbereferredtointermsofjustice.Since
boththedevelopmentofourendowmentsintotalentsandourformingofpersonal
attachmentsarealreadysociallyderegulated,atleastinthemodernWesternworld,
we take these truths as selfevident. Social constraints, though still strong, are not
rules. We no longer make the evaluative statement that the development of one
endowment is just or more just compared with the development of another
endowment,andweacceptasamatterofcoursethatthereisnojusticeinlove.
Honesty (goodness, righteousness) is beyond justice. But beyond has the
connotation of higher, and not only of being different. The development of our
endowments into talents, and the character of our personal attachments, have
nothing to do with justice. Nothing to do has the connotation of being different,
notthatofhigher.
The good life has three constituents: honesty, the development of our best
endowmentsintotalents,andthestrengthofourpersonalattachmentsandofthese
threehonesty (goodness)istheoverarchingelement.Takingallthreetogether,the
good life, as an undivided and indivisible whole, is beyond justice.
Equal life chances for all, equal freedom for all, the regulative idea of the best
possiblesociopoliticalworld,canalsobeconceivedofasagoal.Yetthisgoalisstill
a means. The goal of the best possible sociopolitical world is worthy of pursuit

because it is the condition of the possibility of the good life for all. The only goal
which is not also a means is the good life for all. The goal of justice is beyond
justice.
And, indeed, this has always been so. Whenever people have raised their voice
against particular injustices and have made a claim for justice, they have
simultaneously made a claim for a better life for some. They have based this
claim on a moral right (the observance of interclusteral moral norms), and have
resorted to a particular interpretation of the values of freedom and life. Freedom
and life carry, in any interpretation, not only the connotation for whom, but also
theconnotationforwhat.
True enough, definitions of the good life vary. Nevertheless, they all involve,
thoughwithdifferentcontentanddifferentorchestration,thethreeconstituentsof
thegoodlifeenumeratedabove.Thus,bydiscussingthesethreeconstituents,Ihave
notinventedorsaidanythingnovel.TheonlythingIhavedoneistoofferananswer
to the question of how an honest person is possible today, and reaffirm the
deregulation of the two other facets of the good life. In so doing I have simply
redefined the good life as the adequate goal of a universally just procedure. The
goodlifesodefinedisthegoalofajustprocedure:itisbeyondjustprocedure.
Theuniversalizationofajustprocedurehasbeenpositedinuniversal(ultimate)
Time One.Time One ishere Inany Time One. But the universal (ultimate) Time
Oneisstillinthefuture.Thebearerofthefutureisdetermined:itcannotbeother
thanhumankind.Thelocalityofthefutureisalsodetermined:theearthmustbeits
centre.Butthetimeofthefuturethisremainsundetermined.Inapracticalsense,
it is the infinite. an infinite which cannot be grasped in terms of infinite
progression.Ourownculturemaybedoomed.Weacceptthispossibilitytoointhe
bargain we strike with life. Every particular Time One may go down with us. So
maythedynamicconceptofjustice.Somayrationalityofintellect.
Grantedallofthis.theincompleteethicopoliticalconceptofjusticestandsbythe
promiseoftheEnlightenment,whichhasnotfailed,althoughitcanfall.Thereare
onlytwoalternativestothisstand:theprophecyofDoomsday,andtheprophecyof
Salvation,andbotharefrivolous.Frivolityandphilosophydonotmix.Perhapsitis
oldfashioned to make a case for the honest person. But at least no wrong is
committedindoingso.

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