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SEVERINO BARICUATRO, JR VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 105902, 9 February 2000; Second Division (Buena, J.)


Facts: On October 16, 1968, Severino Baricuatro, Jr., now deceased and
substituted by his legal heirs, bought two (2) lots on an installment basis from
Constantino M. Galeos, one of the private respondents in this petition. The
two lots, designated as Lot Nos. 9 and 10, are part of the Victoria Village
(presently called Spring Village), a subdivision project in Pakigne,
Minglanilla, Cebu. Lot Nos. 9 and 10 were sold on an installment basis for
P3,320.00 and P4,515.00, respectively. Petitioner, however, was unable to pay
the full amount to respondent Galeos. At the time the original action for
quieting of title was filed in the trial court, petitioner had an unpaid balance of
P1,000.00 as to Lot No. 9 and P3,020.00 as to Lot No. 10. As emphasized by
the Court of Appeals, the contract of sale involving Lot No. 10 expressly
provided that "the parties both agree that a final deed of sale shall be executed,
in favor of the buyer upon full and complete payment of the total purchase
price agreed upon."
After the sale, petitioner introduced certain improvements on the said lots and
started to reside therein in 1970. However, on December 7, 1968, about two
(2) months from the date of the previous sale to petitioner, respondent Galeos
sold the entire subdivision, including the two (2) lots, to his co-respondent
Eugenio Amores. Subsequently, petitioner was informed by respondent Galeos
about the sale to respondent Amores and was advised to pay the balance of the
purchase price of the two (2) lots directly to respondent Amores.
After the sale of the entire subdivision to respondent Amores, he allegedly
took possession thereof and developed the same for residential purposes.
Respondent Amores registered the deed of sale covering the entire subdivision
on February 13, 1969 and secured the transfer of the title to the same in his
name. Subsequently, respondent Amores sold the two (2) lots to the spouses
Mariano and Felisa Nemenio, two of the respondents herein. Prior to the sale,
however, petitioner was informed through a letter by respondent Amores

about the impending sale of the two (2) lots but the former failed to respond.
The respondent spouses Nemenio caused the transfer of the titles to the said
lots and the issuance of tax declarations in their names. Thereafter, the
respondent spouses Nemenio demanded from petitioner to vacate the said lots
but the latter refused to do so. Thus, a complaint for quieting of title was filed
by the respondent spouses Nemenio against petitioner.
The Trial court rendered a decision, declaring Nemenio spouses as the owners
of the disputed lot. Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial
court.
Issues: 1) WON Amores was in good faith when he registered the sale.
2) WON the respondent spouses Nemenio are purchasers in good faith.
Held:
1) No, Amores was not in good faith when he registered the land.
For a second buyer to successfully invoke the protection provided by article
1544 of the Civil Code, he must possess good faith from the time of
acquisition of the property until the registration of the deed of conveyance
covering the same. In the case at bar, Amores was in good faith when he
bought the subdivision, However, when he registered his title he already had
knowledge of the previous sale. The preponderance of evidence supports the
finding that he already had knowledge of the previous sale of the disputed lots
to petitioner, as showed in the cross examinations. Such knowledge tainted his
registration with bad faith. To merit protection under article 1544, the second
buyer must act in good faith from the time of the sale until the registration of
the same.
2) No, the respondent spouses Nemenio are not purchasers in good faith.
It appears from the records that while respondent spouses Nemenio bought the
disputed lots from respondent Amores on December 27, 1974, they registered
the deeds of sale only on August 30, 1976. Respondent Mariano Nemenio

admitted on cross-examination that the first time he visited petitioners


residence was in early 1975. Having visited petitioners residence in early
1975, respondent spouses Nemenio cannot claim to be purchasers in good
faith when they registered their title to the disputed lots on August 30, 1976.
The registration by the respondent spouses Nemenio was done in bad faith,
hence, it amounted to no "inscription" at all.
The case was held in favour of Petitioner.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO
vs.
HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA
Facts:

Respondent filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and/or


Accion Reinvindicatoria
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City against the
Iglesia Ni Cristo
(INC)

Heirs of Santos alleged therein that, during his lifetime, Enrique Santos was
the owner of a 936-square-meter parcel of land located in Tandang Sora,
Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 57272.He had
been in possession of the owners duplicate of said title and had been in
continuous, open, adverse and peaceful possession of the property. He died
onFebruary 9, 1970 and was survived by his wife, Alicia Santos, and other
plaintiffs, who were their children. Thereafter, plaintiffs tookpeaceful and
adverse possession of the property, and of the owners duplicate of said title.

Sometime in February 1996, heirs of santos learned that iglesia ni cristo was
claiming ownership over the property. They alleged that EnriqueSantos,
during his lifetime, and his heirs, after his death, never encumbered or
disposed the property. In 1996, Santos had the property fencedbut Iglesia ni
Cristo deprived them of the final use and enjoyment of their property. Thus,
Santos filed for the quieting the title of plaintiffs over and/or recover
possession of their said property in the name of deceased Enrique Santos.

Petitioner argues that the action (either Quieting of Title or


Accion Reinvindicatoria
) had prescribed, the same having beenfiled only on October 24, 2001 beyond
the statutory ten-year period therefor

Trial court and CA later ruled in favor of Private Respondents. CA stated that
as to the issue of prescription, the appellate court held that theprescriptive
period should be reckoned from 1996, when petitioner claimed ownership and
barred respondents from fencing the property.

Hence this petition.


Issue:

Whether or not respondent judge gravely erred and abused her discretion
when she held that the action for quieting of titleand/or accion reinvindicatoria
(civil case no. Q-01-45415) has not yet prescribed
Petitioners argument:

That the action of respondents, whether it be one for quieting of title or an


accion reinvindicatoria, had prescribed whenthe complaint was filed on
October 24, 2001. Petitioner asserts that this is because when respondents
filed their complaint, theywere not in actual or physical possession of the
property, as it (petitioner) has been in actual possession of the property since
1984when TCT No. 321744 was issued to it by the Register of Deeds
Ruling:

As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, the action of respondents


was one for quieting of title under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, inrelation to
Article 476 of the New Civil Code. The latter provision reads:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicialto said
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An
action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to
real property or any interest therein.

A cloud is said to be a semblance of a title, either legal or equitable, or a


cloud of an interest in land appearing in some legal form butwhich is, in fact,
unfounded, or which it would be inequitable to enforce.
38
An action for quieting of title is
imprescriptible
until the claimant isousted of his possession.

Petitioners claim that it had been in actual or material possession of the


property since 1984 when TCT No. 321744 was issued in its favor isbelied by
the allegations in the complaint that respondents had been in actual and
material possession of the property since 1961 up to thetime they filed their
complaint on October 24, 2001.

Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative reinvindicatory action


against petitioner. It bears stressing that an accionreinvindicatoria is a remedy
seeking the recovery of ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi
, and
jus fruendi
as well. It is an actionwhereby a party claims ownership over a parcel of land
and seeks recovery of its full possession.
41
Thus, the owner of real property in actualand material possession thereof
may file an
accion reinvindicatoria
against another seeking ownership over a parcel of land including
jusvindicandi
, or the right to exclude defendants from the possession thereof.

Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property when


they filed their complaint against petitioner on October 24, 2001, the
prescriptive period for the reinvindicatory action had not even commenced to

run, even if petitioner was able to secure TCT No.321744 over the property in
1984.

Thus, petition is denied. CAs decision is affirmed

VDA DE AVILES V. CA
264 SCRA 473

FACTS:
Aviles was the owner of this parcel of land and was in actual possession.
Carlos, with the intent of creating a color of title over the land, constructed
bamboo fences and moved the earthen dikes. This prompted the owner to file
an
action
for
quieting
of
title.
HELD:
Boundary disputes are not cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title.

Ongsiako vs Ongsiako

HELD:

Plaintiff: Caridad Ongsiaco

(1) No, the donation was not effectively revoked.


(2) No more cause of action because it had already prescribed.
(3) No, action had already prescribed.
RATIO:

Defendant: Emilia Ongsiaco


Ponente: Reyes

(1)

In order to set aside the donation, the revocation will only be effective upon
court judgment or consent of the donee. In this case, there was neither a
court judgment ordering the revocation, nor was there a consent of Ramon
& Emilia.
(2)

The legal easement of water is classified as continuous, therefore subject to


prescription by non-user for the period required by law. Under CC 631,
easements are extinguished by non-user for 10 years, which in the case of
continuous easements, shall be counted from the day on which an act
contrary to the same took place.
In this case, the dike was constructed in 1937/1938 (before the war) and the
action was only brought on 1951, way beyond the prescription period.
Furthermore, Caridad cannot argue that the dams constitute a nuisance and
by virtue of CC 698, lapse of time does not legalize any nuisance,
therefore, her action does not prescribe.
o First, the complaint does not set forth any fact which shows that the
dam is a nuisance.
o Even assuming arguendo that it is indeed nuisance, CC 631 which
is a more particular law which applies to easements in particular
will prevail over CC 698 which applied to nuisances in general
(simple rule in stat con: apply particular provisions over general
ones). In such a case, action had already prescribed

FACTS:

Mother of Caridad & Emilia Ongsiako executed a deed of donation inter


vivos, donating to her children a piece of land.
According to the mother, when she made the donation, a greater area was
allotted to Ramon & Emilia because their shares were low lands through
which flowed the excess water from higher estates. Later on, she learned
that Ramon & Emilia started constructing dikes which impeded the natural
flow of water coming from the higher estates. Hence, she executed a
document revoking the donation in favor of Ramon and Emilia and
adjudicated their revoked shares to Caridad as mojera and the rest in equal
shares.

ISSUE (the 3 issues in this case relate to the 3 causes of action):


(1) WON the donation was effectively revoked by virtue of the document
drawn by the mother.
(2) (TOPICAL) WON there exists a cause of action for violation of right
of legal easement of water.
(3) WON there exists a cause of action for alleged fraudulent reduction of
Caridads share.

(3)

Prescribed because more than 20 years had elapsed since the partition
(prescription: 10 years after partition only).

JUDGMENT: COMPLAINT FOR ALL 3 CAUSES OF ACTION ARE


DISMISSED.

THE HEIRS OF SALUD DIZON SALAMAT, et al vs. NATIVIDAD


DIZON TAMAYO, et al

conformity of the other heirs. The subject property is also declared for
taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 10376 in the name of
respondent.

FACTS:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals dated
June 15, 1993.
Agustin Dizon died intestate on May 15, 1942 leaving behind his five children
Eduardo, Gaudencio, Salud, Valenta and Natividad as surviving heirs. Among
the properties left by the decedent was a parcel of land in Barrio San Nicolas,
Hagonoy, Bulacan, with an area of 2,188 square meters covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 10384.
On January 8, 1944, Eduardo sold his hereditary rights in the sum of P3,000 to
his sister Salud Dizon Salamat. The sale was evidenced by a private document
bearing the signatures of his sisters Valenta and Natividad as witnesses.

The trial court noted that the alleged endowment which was made orally by
the deceased Agustin Dizon to herein respondent partook of the nature of a
donation which required the observance of certain formalities set by law.
Petitioners contend that Lot 2557, described and covered by OCT 10384 in
the name of the heirs of Agustin Dizon is part of the Dizon estate while
respondent claims that her father donated it to her sometime in 1936 with the
consent of her co-heirs. In support of her claim, respondent Natividad
presented a private document of conformity which was allegedly signed and
executed by her elder brother, Eduardo, in 1936.
Petitioners, however, question the authenticity of the document inasmuch as it
is marred by unexplained erasures and alterations.
ISSUE:

On June 2, 1949, Gaudencio likewise sold his hereditary rights for the sum of
P4,000 to his sister Salud. The sale was evidenced by a notarized document
which bore the signature of Eduardo Dizon and a certain Angela Ramos as
witnesses. Gaudencio died on May 30, 1951 leaving his daughters Priscila D.
Rivera and Maria D. Jocson as heirs.
Sometime in 1987, petitioners instituted an action for compulsory judicial
partition of real properties registered in the name of Agustin Dizon with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Malolos, Bulacan. The action was
prompted by the refusal of herein respondent Natividad Dizon Tamayo to
agree to the formal distribution of the properties of deceased Agustin Dizon
among his heirs. Respondent's refusal stemmed from her desire to keep for
herself the parcel of land covered by OCT 10384 where she presently resides,
claiming that her father donated it to her sometime in 1936 with the

Whether or not Lot 2557 located in Barrio San Nicolas, Hagonoy, Bulacan,
part of the Dizon estate.
HELD/RULING:
Art 749 of the Civil Code reads:
In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy. The acceptance may be made in the
same deed of donation or in a separate public document, unless it is done
during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate

instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form and this
step shall be noted in both instruments.

No. 14376 is of no moment. It is well settled that tax declarations or realty tax
payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership. 15

It is clear from Article 749 that a transfer of real property from one person to
another cannot take effect as a donation unless embodied in a public
document.

As regards the improvements introduced by the respondent on the questioned


lot, the parties should be guided by Article 500 of the Civil Code which states
that: "Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting for benefits received
and reimbursements for expenses made. . . ."

In any case, assuming that Agustin really made the donation to respondent,
albeit orally, respondent cannot still claim ownership over the property. While
it is true that a void donation may be the basis of ownership which may ripen
into title by prescription, it is well settled that possession, to constitute the
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be adverse and under a claim of title.
Respondent was never in adverse and continuous possession of the property. It
is undeniable that petitioners and respondent, being heirs of the deceased, are
co-owners of the properties left by the latter. A co-ownership is a form of a
trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other and possession of a coowner shall not be regarded as adverse to other co-owner but in fact is
beneficial to them. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the
inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all,
entitled to possession of the property.
The elements in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to
the cestui que trust or the co-owner are: (1) that he has performed unequivocal
acts of repudiation amounting to ouster of the cestui que trust or other coowners (2) that such positive acts or repudiation have been made known to the
cestui que trust or other co-owners and (3) that the evidence thereon must be
clear and convincing.
Not one of the aforesaid requirements is present in the case at bar.
Finally, the fact that the subject property is declared for taxation purposes in
the name of respondent who pays realty taxes thereon under Tax Declaration

Gallemit vs. Tabliran


(Co-ownership; Without intent for profit)
F: This suit concerns the partition of a piece of land held pro indiviso which
the plaintiff and the defendant had acquired in common from its original
owner. By the refusal of the defendant to divide the property, the plaintiff was
compelled to bring the proper action for the enforcement of partition.
Petitioner asserts that a contract of partnership was created between them.
Defendant simply denied the its existence.
I: W/N partnership exists.
H:

No. It does not appear that any contract of partnership whatever was
made between them for the purposes expressed in article 1665 of the
Civil Code, for the sole transaction performed by them was the
acquisition jointly by mutual agreement of the land in question,
since it was undivided, under the condition that they each should pay
one-half of the price thereof and that the property so acquired should
be divided between the two purchasers; and as, under this title, the
plaintiff and the defendant are the co-owners of the said land, the
partition or division of such property held in joint tenancy must of
course be allowed, and the present possessor of the land has no right to
deny the plaintiff's claim on grounds or reasons unsupported by proof.

MANUEL T. GUIA VS. CA AND JOSE B. ABEJO GR NO. 120864 October


8, 2003
Facts: Two parcels of land covering a fishpond equally owned by
PrimitivaLejano and LorenzaAraniego. The one half undivided portion
owned by Araniego was later purchased by plaintiff from his father
TeofiloAbejo, the only heir of the original owner (husband of Araniego).
Prior to this sale, the whole fishpond was leased by the heirs
of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo
in favor of De Guia. De Guia continues to possess the entire fishpond and
derived income therein despite the expiration of the lease contract and
several demands to vacate by TeofiloAbejo and by his successor-ininterest, Jose Abejo.Abejo filed a complaint for recovery of possession
with damages against De Guia. However, Abejo failed to present evidence
of the judicial or extrajudicial partition of the fishpond.

Issue: Whether a co-owner can file ejectment case against a co-owner?


Whether Abejo was entitled to rent?

Held: Under Article 484, there is co-ownership whenever the ownership


of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. A co-owner of
an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole
he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of
a portion which is truly abstract. Article 487 also provides that anyone of
the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. This article covers all
kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Any co-owner may file an

action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against
another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive
ownership of the property. However, the only purpose of the action is to
obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek
exclusion of the defendant from the property because as a co-owner he
has a right of possession.
If one co-owner alone occupies the property without opposition from the
other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners
cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement
to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who
dwells in the house.
The Lejano Heirs and TeofiloAbejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND
to DE GUIA. After DE GUIAs lease expired in 1979, he could no longer
use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent.

ROBLES v. CA- Action for quieting of title | Free patent

valid
(2)
whether
REM
between
Hilario
(3) whether issuance of free patent is valid

and

RBC

is

valid

FACTS

HELD

Petitioners (all surnamed Robles) trace their ownership of a parcel of land


(9,985 sq m.) to Leon and Silvino, their grandfather and father, respectively.
Upon Silvinos death in 1942, said petitioners inherited the property and
started cultivation thereof. Hilario Robles, private respondent and half-brother
of the petitioners, was entrusted with the payment of land taxes due on the
property. In 1962, Hilario caused both the cancellation of the tax declaration
covering the property and its transfer to Ballane (his father-in-law). Ballane
mortgaged the property and, for some reason, the tax declaration thereon was
subsequently named to Hilario. The latter then mortgaged the property to
private respondent Rural Bank of Cardona. The mortgage was foreclosed and
said bank acquired by public bidding the property which was then sold by it to
the spouses Santos. Petitioners learned of the mortgage only in 1987.
Subsequently, the action was filed, impleading also as parties-defendant the
Director of Lands and the District Land Officer sue to an issuance of a free
patent in favour of spouses Santos. Trial court ruled in favour of petitioners,
declaring null the patent, declaring the heirs of Silvino absolute owners of the
subject land. CA reversed on the ground that petitioners no longer had title to
the property.

(1) Petitioners have valid title by virtue of their continued and open
occupation and possession as owners of the subject property.
In this case, the cloud on petitioners title emanate from the apparent validity
of the free patent issued and the tax declarations and other evidence in favour
of respondents ultimately leading to the transfer of the property to spouses
Santos. WRT title of the spouses Santos, such is deemed invalid/inoperative
insofar as it is rooted in the title and appropriation of Hilario. Hilario could
not have prejudiced the rights of his co-heirs as co-owners of the real estate.
He must have first repudiated the ownership clearly and evidently. CA failed
to consider the irregularities in the transactions involving the property. No
instrument/deed of conveyance was presented to show any transaction
between petitioners and Ballane or even Hilario.

ISSUES
(1) whether petitioners have the appropriate title essential to an action for
quieting of title (relevant issue) and whether title claimed by respondents is

(2) Mortgage was only valid insofar as Hilarios undivided interest is


concerned there being co-ownership between the heirs. Court also delved into
gross negligence which amounted to bad faith on part of bank by not
exercising due diligence in verifying the ownership of the land considering
such
was
unregistered.
Free patent was also not valid, the land in question having been converted ipso
jure to private land by virtue of the adverse possession in the concept of
owners since.

(3) 1916 by the petitioners. Issuance of patents covering private lands is out of
the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands or Bureau of Lands.
Hence, the sale of the property in favour of the spouses Santos WRT the share
of Hiario was valid but the patent issued was null.

MINDANAO v YAP
FACTS: Rosenda and Sotero were among co-owners of 3 parcels of land,
which they sold to Ildefonso Yap for some P100K without the consent of the
other co-owners. They included in the sale certain buildings and laboratory
and other educational equipment within the said properties, which were
actually owned by Mindanao Academy. Mindanao Academy and the other coowners assailed the validity of the sale. The trial court declared the sale null
and void. Yap contends that Erlinda, one of the co-owners owning 5/12 share
of the co-ownership, does not have the standing to challenge the sale for being
in bad faith.
ISSUE: W/N the sale is null and void as to its entirety
HELD: YES. Although the general rule is that if a co-owner alienates the
entire property without the consent of the other co-owners, the sale will affect
only his share, such rule does not apply if the property cannot be
partitioned/subdivided. In this case, aside from the fact that Rosenda and
Sotero cannot sell the entire property including the school equipment, they
cannot dealer or intermediary between the field office and the
customers. Thus, it is not liable for the said taxes.

Bongalon v. CA
Facts:
Rosalia is the owner of a lot and sometime in the year 1943, her 3 children,
Trinidad, Conchita and Teodora executed a deed of sale conveying to Cirila a
part of the lot.
o On the same day, Cirila, Trinidad and Conchita and Teodora executed
another deed of sale conveying to Pedro Bongalon a part of the lot for a
consideration.
However, acting alone, Cirila executed another deed of absolute sale
conveying the said lot to Amparo which was subsequently declared in her
name for tax purposes and paid real estate taxes therefor.
Meanwhile, in an extrajudicial settlement instituted by Pedro, he declared
that Cirila is the only heir of Rosalia and therefore, he is the only heir of Cirila
making the subject property's TCT here issued in his own name. He thereafter
filed a case for Quieting of title and Recovery of portion of the property and
damages against Amparo alleging that he is the registered owner of such
property.
o In support of his claim during the trial he presented the deeds of absolute
sale executed to him and the extrajudicial settlement declaration that Cirila
was the owner of the entire lot which she later sold to Amparo (double sale).
The trial court ruled that Pedro was the rightful owner of the property and
ordered Amparo to vacate the land in question.
o Respondent appealed to the CA and reversed the RTC decision saying that,
the basis of the complaint of Pedro is that he inherited the said property as
evidenced by the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate but such extrajudicial
settlement is tainted with fraud and misrepresentation since there are 7
more children.
Issues:
What is the basis and extent of Pedro's interest in the subject property?
Whether or not the sale to Amparo casts a cloud on Pedro's title.
Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is valid.

Ratio:
When Rosalia died, she passed on the piece of property to her surviving
spouse and their five children. Such heirs inherited the lot in co-ownership at
1/6 undivided share each. After their father died, their shares increased to 1/5
each. Since they were co-owners of the property, the extent of Pedro's share
in the property is only up to the undivided shares of Cirila, Trinidad,
Teodora and Conchita (the sellers). He did not acquire ownership of the
entire lot since the other co-owners did not take part in the sale.
o Each co-owner has dull ownership of his part and may alienate it but the
alienation affects only the portion which pertains to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.
The deed of sale to Amparo casts a cloud on Pedro's title. (Cloud means
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but in truth it is invalid).
o The sale to Amparo is invalid because at the time of the execution, Cirila
had no interest to sell the lot because she already sold her interest to Pedro.
Pedro falsely stated that Cirila was the only heir of Rosalia and in
turn, he was the sole heir of Cirila. This is not a minor defect and renders
the Extrajudicial settlement void. But this cancellation does not deprive him of
the right to maintain action for quieting title. He has interest over the lot
insofar as it as sold to him by the co-owners.

GO ONG VS. CA

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER


THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER PETITIONERS ADMINISTRATION IS

G.R. No. 75884


September 24, 1987
FACTS: 2 parcels of land under 1 TCT are owned by alfredo and when he
died, his wife julita go ong was appointed administratrix of his estate. Julita
thereafter mortgaged 1 lot to Allied Banking Corp. to secure a loan obtained
by JK Exports, annotated as a lien on the original TCT, with the following
notation: mortgagees consent necessary in case of subsequent alienation or
encumbrance of the property
On the loan there was due a sum and Allied tried to collect it from Julita.
Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial
approval which the bank had allegedly promised to secure from the court. In
response thereto, the bank averred that it was Julita who promised to secure
the courts approval.
Trial court ruled for Julita, stating that the contract is valid. CA affirmed with
modification the lower courts decision

NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL.


HELD: contract is valid
Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval,
quoted Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court . The CA aptly ruled that
Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, since the
mortgage was constituted in her personal capacity and not in her capacity as
administratrix of the estate of her husband. Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code
applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in connection with,
for instance, the sale or mortgage of property under administration for the
payment, say of a conjugal debt, and even here, the conjugal and hereditary
shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite judicial approval for the
reason already adverted to hereinabove, provided of course no prejudice is
caused others, including the government.
Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the CA cannot be faulted in
ruling that the questioned mortgage constituted on the property under
administration, by authority of the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack
of judicial approval, with respect to her conjugal share and to her hereditary
rights.

Petitioner cited cases arguing that in the settlement proceedings of the estate
of the deceased spouse, the entire conjugal partnership property of the
marriage is under administration. While such may be in a sense true, that fact
alone is not sufficient to invalidate the whole mortgage, willingly and
voluntarily entered into by the petitioner.. Under similar circumstances, this
Court applied the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code, where the heirs
as co-owners shall each have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage
it, and even effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership
The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court
cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of private respondent to dispose
of her Ideal [not inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with her
husbands death, and her hereditary rights accrued from the moment of the
death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code) share in the co-heirship and/or
co-ownership formed between her and the other heirs/co-owners (See Art.
493, Civil Code, supra.).

G.R. No. L-44426 February 25, 1982


SULPICIO CARVAJAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ** and EUTIQUIANO CAMARILLO
and LIBERATA CACABELOS,respondents.
Facts:
The subject lot was originally owned by
Hermogenes Espique and his wife and after their
death, the lot was succeeded by their children,
Maria, Evaristo, Faustino, Estefanio and Tropinio.
Petitioner then averred that he purchased the 2/5
of the lot from Estefanio and respondents
purchased 1/5 of the lot from Evaristo. The part of
the land in controversy was the 1/5 portion. This
prompted the private respondents to file a case of
ejectment and recovery of possession, where in
fact there has been no partition yet on the subject
lot. Both the lower court and the appellate court
ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the co-owners may sell a specific part of
the co-owned property without partition.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in negative and
reversed the decision of the lower court.
The fact that the sale executed by Evaristo G.
Espique in favor of respondents and the sale

executed by Estefanio Espique in favor of


petitioner were made before the partition of the
property among the co-heirs does not annul or
invalidate the deeds of sale and both sales are
valid. However, the interests thereby acquired by
petitioner and respondents are limited only to the
parts that may be ultimately assigned to Estefanio
and Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of
the estate
7
subject to provisions on subrogation
of the other co-heirs to the rights of the strangerpurchaser provided in Article 1088 of the Civil
Code.
Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir
cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of
the inheritance. Without partition, either by
agreement between the parties of by judicial
proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific
portion of the estate. For where there are two or
more heirs, the whole estate such heirs.
1
Upon
the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes
the undivided owner of the whole estate left wtih
respect to the part of portion which might be
adjudicated to him, a community of ownership
being thus formed among the co-owners of the
estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided

PILAPIL VS. CA

by TCT No. 4026 which, in turn, was superseded by TCT No. 4029, indicating

NOVEMBER 11, 2010 ~ VBDIAZ

as owners Agaton, Vitaliana, Maxima, and Antonio. The sale to petitioners


was inscribed at the back of TCT No. 4029 as Entry No. 10903 on March

PILAPIL VS. CA

29, 1962.

G.R. No. 55134

Later, Antonio sold his one-fourth share to his cousin Bensig, who ceded one-

December 4, 1995

half thereof to the spouses Visitacion Otadora and S. Aldrin, by a deed of

FACTS: In the instant petition for review on certiorari, questioning the

quitclaim. Because of such, TCT No. 4029 was cancelled and supplanted by

decision of the CA affirming the decision of the trial court.

TCT No. 4484, which showed Agaton, Vitaliana, Maxima, Bensig, and the

Felix Otadora was the registered owner of a parcel of land (273,796-sqm) in

spouses Visitacion and S. Aldrin as owners of Lot 8734-B-5. Petitioners

Ormoc city covered by OCT No. 26026. He died and was survived by his

names did not appear among the owners, although in the memorandum of

wife Leona and 3 children (vitaliana, Maxima and Agaton). Subsequently,

encumbrances at the back of TCT No. 4484 regarding the sale to them by

Leona and the three children sold portions of said lot, leaving a portion with

Vitaliana was retained.

an area of 51, 019 sqm (Lot 8734-B-5) . Then Leona died.

Despite the sale of 18, 626 sqm of their undivided share in said lot earlier

On March, 1962, the Otadora siblings, together with their nephew Antonio,

made in favor of petitioners, Agaton AGAIN sold his one-fourth share in the

executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and confirmation of sales, giving

lot to his daughter Carmen covered by TCT No. 9130. Vitaliana on the other

each of them one-fourth undivided share in the remaining property. That

hand, RE-SOLD her one-fourth share to Maxima. 4 days later, Maxima sold

very same day, Vitallana and Agaton sold to petitioners Pilapil and

her now one-half share to her sons Dionisio and Macario who were able to

Penaranda an undivided portion of the, measuring 18,626 sqm of

register the said properties in their names. On Sept, 1971, TCT was issued

lot Lot 8734-B-5.The deed of sale, which was executed in the presence of

to spouses Visitacion and S. Aldrin, and another TCT for Carmen and her

Antonio and another witness, specified that the possession and ownership of

husband.

the property sold shall be transferred to the buyers from the date of the

Upon discovery of the new titles, petitioners filed a protest with the register of

instrument. The deed of extrajudicial partition was annotated onOCT No.

deeds or Ormoc city, who in a letter informed Carmen, S. ALdrin, Macario

26026. Because of such partition, OCT No. 26026 was cancelled and replaced

and Dionisio of the existence of the deed of sale in favor of petitioner and

required them to present their original titles for proper annotation. Such

owners duplicate copy of the title, in violation of Section 55 of the Land

request was, however, ignored.

Registration Act (Act No. 496).


The CA said that OCT No. 26026 thereby became inexistent, it having been

On July 1972, Carmen and her husband Masias sold the one-fourth share

already cancelled by TCT(s) Nos. 4026 and 4029. It would have been against

sold by Carmens father to her to respondent Serafica and Sons

the law to have the deed of sale registered in TCT No. 4029 without an order

Corp. which was not able to register the same because of the annotation in

from the proper court authorizing such registration, specifically because OCT

TCT No. 9130 earlier made showing the sale in favor of petitioners. Because

No. 26026 had already undergone two cancellations, first by TCT No. 4026

of this, the corporation charged the vendors with estafa before the City

and then by TCT No. 4029 .It held that Appellants should have filed the

Fiscals Office, but the complaint did not prosper.

necessary petition with the proper court asking that the Register of Deeds be

Petitioners therefore filed, on December 1973, a complaint for quieting of

authorized to annotate the deed of sale executed by Agaton Otadora and

title, annulment of deeds, cancellation of titles, partition, and recovery of

Vitaliana Otadora in their favor. The said title was, therefore, null and void,

ownership with damages, against herein private respondents. The complaint

and the same did not acquire the effect of a constructive notice to the whole

alleged, among other things, that petitioners succeeded in possessing only

world of the interest over the land in question of the plaintiffs-appellants. At

12,000 square meters of the lot and needed 6,626 square meters more to

most, the deed of sale is merely a contract between the plaintiffs-appellants

complete the total area purchased from Vitaliana and Agaton in 1962.

and the vendors appearing therein but without any binding effect upon their
persons and upon whom bad faith cannot be imputed. Also, The deed of sale

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the defendants (Serafica &

did not specify what part of the 1/4 share of each of the registered owners who

Sons Corporation)and against the plaintiffs (Pilapil) hereby dismissing

executed the sale was sold to the appellants. The CA also agreed with the

plaintiffs complaint, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants for

lower court that H. Serafica & Sons Corporation was an innocent

attorneys fee, to vacate the lot in question and deliver the same to defendant.

purchaser for value as it was not required by law to go beyond TCT No.

In its decision dated June 1994, the court a quo concluded that the annotation

9130 which, on its face, appeared to be unencumbered.

on TCT No. 4484 of the sale by Vitaliana and Agaton in favor of

ISSUE: petitioners argue that the CA erred in holding that:

petitioners was null and void because the latter failed to surrender the

(1) The annotation of the sale in their favor on TCT No. 4029 is ineffectual;

(2) The deeds of sale respectively executed by Agaton and Vitaliana in favor

(2) It is undisputed that after the sale of the lot to petitioners, the same vendors

of Carmen and Maxima are valid and superior to that executed earlier by

sold the same property to persons who cannot be considered in law to be

Agaton and Vitaliana in their favor;

unaware of the prior sale to the petitioners.

Petitioners contend that the liability of the Otadoras who sold the same

Considering these relationships and contrary to the findings of the courts

property twice should have been determined to avoid multiplicity of suits

below, the vendees, Carmen and Maxima, cannot be considered as third

HELD: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and

parties who are not bound by the prior sale between Agaton and Vitaliana as

SET ASIDE. Petitioners are declared the lawful owners of 18,626 square

vendors and petitioners as vendees, because there is privity of interest between

meters of said lot and the unclaimed lot of petitioners be taken in equal

them and their predecessors. The reason for this is that the validity of a title

portions from the shares thereof of Agaton and Vitaliana or their successors-

to a piece of property depends on the buyers knowledge, actual or

in-interest.

constructive, of a prior sale. While there is no direct proof that Carmen and

(1) The court below correctly ruled that the annotation of Entry No. 10903 in

Maxima actually knew of the sale to petitioners, they are deemed to have

the certificates of title was not made in accordance with law. To affect the land

constructive knowledge thereof by virtue of their relationship to both Agaton

sold, the presentation of the deed of sale and its entry in the day book must be

and Vitaliana. Hence, it has become immaterial if the sale to petitioners was

done with the surrender of the owners duplicate of the certificate of

properly annotated on the correct certificate of title or not.

title. Production of the owners duplicate of the certificate of title is required

It is not disputed that of the 25,510 square meters which pertain to Vitaliana

by Section 55 of Act No. 496 (now Section 53 of PD No. 1529), and only after

and Agaton as their combined undivided share in Lot No. 8734-B-5, an area of

compliance with this and other requirements shall actual registration retroact

18,626 square meters had been sold to petitioners who, in turn, were able to

to the date of entry in the day book. However, nonproduction of the owners

possess only 12,000 square meters thereof. Thus, at most, Vitaliana and

duplicate of the certificate of title may not invalidate petitioners claim of

Agaton had a remainder of 6,884 square meters of undivided share which they

ownership over the lot involved considering the factual circumstances of this

could have legally disposed of. As it turned out, however, they sold

case.

their entireindividual one-fourth shares to Carmen and Maxima who, as earlier


concluded, were privy to the prior sale to petitioners.

Thus, when Carmen sold the property to H. Serafica and Sons

managed to possess only 12,000 square meters of the 18,625 square meters

Corporation, she no longer had any rights of dominion to transmit, since

they bought from Agaton and Vitaliana, the whole area purchased by them

her own father who sold to her the property had himself earlier

should be taken from the shares of Agaton and Vitaliana upon partition of the

relinquished his ownership rights in favor of the petitioners. Accordingly,

property.

Carmen transmitted no right to the corporation.


Under these circumstances, the corporation, having failed to obtain relief
through the criminal complaint filed against the spouses Carmen Otadora and
Luis Masias, and having relied on the unencumbered transfer certificate of
title shown to it by the Masias spouses, is entitled to damages.
As regards the sale made by Vitaliana to her sister Maxima, the former can
no longer transmit any property rights over the subject lot when she sold it
to her own sister as she had previously sold the same property to
petitioners. Moreover, as Vitalianas sister, Maxima was actually a co-owner
of Lot No. 8734-B-5 which, at the time of the sale to petitioners, was not yet
partitioned and segregated. Maxima was, therefore, privy to the contract
On the matter of whether the rights of co-owners had been transgressed by the
sale to the petitioners, the trial court erroneously ruled that there should be
proof of compliance with Article 1623 of the Civil Code requiring the vendor
of the property to give a written notice of sale to the other co-owners.
In view of the foregoing, the sale to the petitioners must be respected by the
successors-in-interest of Agaton and Vitaliana. Inasmuch as petitioners had

CRUZ v LEIS- Redemption and Co-ownership


Redemption by a co-owner doesn't terminate the co-ownership nor give her
title to the whole property subject of the co-ownership

Whether or not the land in question is conjugal property, and therefore subject
to the rules on co-ownership?

HELD:
FACTS:
Leis and Isidro married each other in 1923. Isidro subsequently acquired from
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources a parcel of land, which
was titled in her name, with the description that she was a widow. Leis only
passed away in 1973 without executing a will.
Isidro then secured a loan from Cruz (PhP 15,000, with 5% interest) secured
by a mortgage on the land from DANR, but failed to pay on due date. Isidro
executed 2 contracts in favor of Cruz: an Deed of Absolute Sale and a
Contract indicating a pacto de retro sale. Isidro still failed to repurchase the
property within 1 year, so she consolidated the ownership of the land in favor
of Cruz.
When Isidro died, Cruz demanded her heirs to vacate the premises. The heirs
then filed a complaint with the RTC averring that the land was conjugal
property having been purchased during their marriage. The RTC found in
favor of the heirs. The case was appealed to the CA, but the CA merely
affirmed the ruling because Cruz failed to get a judicial order to have the land
consolidated in his name after failure of Isidro to comply with the
requirements of the right to repurchase (Art. 1607).

ISSUE:

Although the land was purchased during the marriage, upon Leis death, the
conjugal property regime ceased, and gave Isidro an equal portion of Leis
half of the property to be divided among his legitimes. Co-ownership of the
land then began.
However, upon failure of Isidro the heirs to exercise the right to repurchase,
the ownership of the land transferred to Cruz. Despite the TCT being void for
non-compliance with 1607, the ownership did not transfer back to the heirs,
for compliance with 1607 is merely for purposes of registering the title in the
Torrens System.

FERNANDEZ VS. TARUN

desire for partition but this was rejected by the latter. Hence the suit for

G.R. No. 143868

partition and damages

November 14, 2002


FACTS: a fishpond was originally covered by a OCT, co-owned by the

RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA reversed the decision. Hence this

Fernandez siblings. 2 of the 5 siblings, Antonio and Demetria, sold their

petition.

respective shares to the spouses Tarun, both registered and annotated on the
OTC.

HELD: Petitioners aver that the sale to respondents is void, because it did not

Later, the co-owners of the subject fishpond and another fishpond executed a

comply with the requirements of the Civil Code. According to them, they

Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of 2 parcels of registered land with exchange

were not notified of the sale, but learned about it only when they received the

of shares. Among the parties to the deed are the Fernandez siblings. It was

summons for the partition case. They claim their right to redeem the property

stipulated in the deed that the parties recognize and respect the sale in favor of

under the following provisions of the Civil Code:

Spouses Tarun stated above.

Article 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in


case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a t hird

By virtue of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, Angel Fernandez exchanged

person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner

his share on the 2nd fishpond to the shares of his co-owners in the remaining

shall pay only a reasonable one.

portion of the first fishpond, making Angel and the Spouses Tarun co-owners

In this case, it is quite clear that respondents are petitioners co-owners. The

of the first fishpond. By virtue of said deed, a TCT was issued in the name of

sale of the contested property to Spouses Tarun had long been consummated

Angel and spouses Tarun. However, it was Angel and later on his heirs who

before petitioners succeeded their predecessor, Angel Fernandez. By the time

remained in possession of the entire fishpond.

petitioners entered into the co-ownership, respondents were no longer third

When Angel was still alive, Spouses Tarun sought the partition of the property

persons, but had already become co-owners of the whole property. A third

and their share of its income. Angel refused to heed their demand. After the

person, within the meaning of Article 1620, is anyone who is not a co-owner.

death of Angel, Spouses Tarun wrote his heirs (petitioners herein) of their

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