REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
CALOOCAN CITY
BRANCH 125

BARANGAY 181, DISTRICT

I, CALOOCAN CITY as
represented by BRGY. CAPT.
LUCY P. FABULAR, AND
CIVIL CASE NO. C-1155
BRGY.182,
DISTRICT
I,
(2014) FOR: INJUNCTION
CALOOCAN
CITY
as
(with Urgent Prayer for
represented by BRGY. CAPT. Temporary Restraining Order
ROEL E. BRIN,
and/or Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiffs,
- versus MAYNILAD
WATER
SERVICES,
INC.
and
CARMEL DEVELOPMENT,
INC.,
Defendant.
x ------------------------------------- x

REPLY/OPPOSITION

[To: Plaintiffs Comment/Opposition (to Carmels Motion to

Dismiss) dated 15 May 2015, copy received 25 May 2015]
Respondent CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, INC., by counsel,
respectfully submits the instant Reply/Opposition to the Plaintiffs
Comment/Opposition dated 15 May 2015 filed by the Plaintiffs, on
the basis of the following presentation:
Plaintiffs
have
no
legal
personality to institute the action
as against Carmel.
--------------------------------------------

1.
From Plaintiffs discussion on this issue, it is clear that
they fail to understand why they lack legal personality to institute
this action. In its defense the Plaintiffs merely stated that,
Furthermore, Barangays 181 and 182 are local government units,
juridical persons and entities authorized by law pursuant to the
Local Government Code of 1991 and their respective
representatives have been duly authorized. There is not doubt that
herein petitioners can be parties in this civil action. 1

2.
Plaintiffs have skirted the key issue hovering on legal
personality to institute action as evident and readily shown in their
Barangay Resolutions attached to their Complaint.
3.
Herein respondents do not contest that the Barangays are
local government units that can file legal actions in general. The crux
of why Plaintiffs have no legal personality to institute the present
action is because the Barangays have not authorized the filing of a
case against Carmel.
4.
When the Motion with Leave of Court to Admit the Amended
Complaint to Implead Carmel Development Inc. as Party-Defendant was
filed on 30 September 2014, Plaintiffs included a new Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping dated 29 September 2014.
However, a perusal of the amended complaint shows that the
Plaintiffs authority to file case is still anchored on their May 2014
Barangay Resolutions which authorized them only to file cases
against Maynilad Water Services, Inc. The lack of authority to file an
Amended Complaint against Carmel is readily seen in Plaintiffs
own Annexes A and B Barangay Resolutions which makes no
mention whatsoever of a complaint to be filed against Carmel but
only of Maynilad.
5.
It must be remembered that the Barangay Captains
Fabular and Brin (hereinafter referred to as Fabular and Brin)
allegedly filed this case on behalf of the Barangays and not in their
own personal capacities. Thus, when Fabular and Brin signed the
verification amending the case, they merely signed it on behalf of the
Barangay. Accordingly, they must be properly authorized to do so by
the Barangay. However, as shown earlier, the Fabular and Brin have
not proffered any Barangay Resolution authorizing them to amend
the complaint to include Carmel and neither are there any valid
and existing resolutions on the authority of Fabular and Brin to
sign a complaint against Carmel.
1

Paragraph 21, Page 5 of the Plaintiffs Comment/Opposition.

2

6.
The Barangays have not proffered any Barangay
Resolution authorizing them to amend the complaint to include
Carmel. In the absence of any such Resolution or authority, the
Amended Complaint must necessarily be dismissed.
While
the
IBP-OCA
Memorandum
on
Policy
Guidelines dated March 12, 2002
caution defendants/respondents
to exercise caution when filing
Motions
to
Dismiss,
this
guideline does not serve as a bar
for filing these types of motions.
--------------------------------------------7.
It is a legal precept too obvious and plain to be repeated
that IBP-OCA Memorandum on Policy Guidelines dated 12 March
2002 merely cautions litigants to exercise restraint when filing
Motions to Dismiss. It is clear and patently apparent that that the
Policy Guidelines mean no more than that. It is beyond cavil that this
does not eliminate the right of a defendant to file a motion to dismiss
provided that the grounds therefor exist.
8.
A Motion to dismiss is a procedural remedy afforded to
litigants under the law and are specifically provided for under Rule
16 of the Rules of Court when the grounds therefor exist, to wit:
Section 1. Rule 16. Grounds. Within the time for but before the
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to
dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(a)
That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party;
(b)
That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the claim;
(c)
That the venue was improperly laid;
(d)
That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e)
That there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same case;
(f)
That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by
the statute of limitations;
(g)
That the pleading asserting the claim sets no cause of
action;
(h)
That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs
pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished;
(i)
That the claim on which the action is founded in
unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and

(j)
That a condition precedents for filing the claim has not been
complied with.

9.
According to the arguments proffered in their
Comment/Opposition, counsel for the plaintiffs would have this
Court believe that with a mere stroke of its pen, the IBP-OCA
overruled rules of procedure that have been laid down by the
Supreme Court itself.
10. In the hierarchy of rules on procedure, it is beyond
dispute that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure have preference over
IBP-OCA Memorandum on Policy Guidelines dated 12 March 2002.
By its very definition, these are mere guidelines and cannot be said
to remove vested remedies available to litigants under the Rules.
11. At this juncture, it would be beneficial to analyze the
reason for the IBP-OCA Memorandum on Policy Guidelines. The
rationale and purpose to caution restraint when filing motions to
dismiss is to forestall the filing of dilatory motions that only serve to
prolong and delay the proceedings. However, this rationale is not
present and met in the case at bar. Here, there are valid grounds for
the cases outright dismissal, such as plaintiffs the lack of authority
to file the present case. Accordingly, it is needless to further prolong
the proceedings in the case as it is dismissible outright and this is
why the herein respondents opted to file a Motion to Dismiss.
12. Unless there is another rule of procedure or piece of
legislation which removes Motions to Dismiss as a remedy available
to litigants, the Policy Guidelines cited by the plaintiffs cannot be
said to supersede the specific provisions of the Rules of Court.
13. The Rules of Court specifically allow and authorize the
filing of a Motion to Dismiss, the IBP-OCA Guidelines are merely a
reminder that parties should observe restraint in filing Motions to
Dismiss and does not serve as an absolute prohibition to filing such a
motion.
14. Accordingly, the plaintiffs bald, unsupported and
unsubstantiated assertion that Motions to Dismiss are prohibited
under the Rules of Court is absolutely ridiculous and deserves scant
consideration from this Honorable Court. The plaintiffs argument
that the instant, Motion to Dismiss violates procedures2 is completely
unfounded in both fact and law.
2

Page 2, Plaintiffs Comment/Opposition (To Carmels Motion to Dismiss).

4

Under the Rules, Motions to

Dismiss are not required to be
verified.
--------------------------------------------15. Under our laws and jurisprudence, the only pleadings or
papers that must to be verified are only those which are specifically
required to be under the Rules of Court or any other rule of
procedure. In fact, Section 4 Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure specifically state that,
Section 4.

Verification. Except when otherwise specifically

required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit. xxx

16. A motion to dismiss is not an initial pleading which is

required to be verified under the rules. Counsel for plaintiffs
assertion that a motion to dismiss must be verified is laughably
erroneous, simplistic and so ludicrous that it need not even be
commented upon.
17. With all due respect, it is clear that counsels for the
plaintiffs need to refresh themselves with current rules and
procedures lest they require their own clients to verify all the
pleadings and motions they file with this Honorable Court. It appears
that the counsel for the plaintiff is unaware of the rule of long
standing and application that states that a motion to dismiss need not
be verified. Or it is possible that the counsel for the plaintiffs may
have been reading procedural rules under different jurisdictions, for
our laws, rules and jurisprudence of any instance when Motions to
Dismiss are required to be verified.
18. Despite its assertion that a motion to dismiss must be
verified, it is readily apparent that the plaintiffs have failed to cite
any rule of procedure or piece of jurisprudence that specifically
requires such a verification. This is a blatant and clear omission
because no such rule or procedure or exists. This argument is merely
an attempt on the part of the plaintiffs to mislead this Honorable
Court.
19. Plaintiff and counsel should exercise caution in
advancing an argument for its cause which tends to mislead the
Honorable Court, especially when it involves a specific rule of
5

procedure that does not really exist under this jurisdiction. Thus, this
argument by the defendant is easily dispensed with.
The filing of the Motion to
Dismiss was duly authorized by
Carmel.
--------------------------------------------20. For its third argument, the plaintiffs claim that the Motion
to Dismiss was not authorized by the respondent Corporation
Carmel.
21. Respectfully, this argument clearly shows the plaintiffs
penchant for fiction and propensity to conjure legal principles out
of thin air.
22. Plaintiffs state that, it is elementary under this jurisdiction
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of real party
in interest 3. Plaintiffs use of this principle of procedure is
unavailing and inapplicable. In the case of a Motion to Dismiss, the
rules are bereft of any provision which mandates that a Motion to
Dismiss must be accompanied by a Secretarys Certificate or Board
Resolution authorizing an officer to file or institute a Motion.
23. As counsels for Carmel, counsels warrant the authority
given by the Board, and such authority, if and when expressly
needed to be shown or substantiated, may be produced in court at
any given time when so requested by this Honorable Court.
24. The only instance where a corporations Secretarys
Certificate or Board Resolution is necessary in pleading is in cases
where the pleading must be accompanied by a verification and such
Secretarys Certificate would appoint someone to represent it and
sign a verification in its behalf.
25. Carmel obtained the services of the undersigned to
represent it as its legal counsel. As counsel for the respondent
Carmel, the undersigned are authorized to represent Carmel and file
pleadings and motions on its behalf. Accordingly, the plaintiffs
argument should not be given any credence and weight.
The
Amended
Complaint
violates the settled principles of
3

Paragraph 13, Plaintiffs Comment/Opposition.

6

res judicata and litis pendentia

--------------------------------------------26.
Well-settled in law is the principle of Res Judicata which
literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It also refers to the
"rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the
former suit." 4
27.
The concept of Res Judicata is covered by Section 47 (b)
and (c) of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect
of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(a)

In case of a judgment or final order against a

specific thing or in respect to the probate of a will,
or the administration of the estate of a deceased
person, or in respect to the personal, political, or
legal condition or status of a particular person or his
relationship to another, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or
administration, or the condition, status or
relationship of the person; however, the probate of
a will or granting of letters of administration shall
only be prima facie evidence of the death of the
testator or intestate;

(b)

In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with

respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any
other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors in interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c)

In any other litigation between the same parties or

their successors in interest, that only is deemed to
have been adjudged in a former judgment or final

Blacks Law Dictionary

7

order which appears upon its face to have been so

adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
(Emphasis supplied.)
28. In Mallion vs. Alcantara 5 the Supreme Court explained
the above cited provision, viz:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The
effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a
specific thing or in respect to the probate of a will,
or the administration of the estate of a deceased
person, or in respect to the personal, political, or
legal condition or status of a particular person or his
relationship to another, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or
administration, or the condition, status or
relationship of the person; however, the probate of
a will or granting of letters of administration shall
only be prima facie evidence of the death of the
testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is,
with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as
to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors in interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was

G.R. No. 141528, 31 October 2006.

8

actually and necessarily included therein or

necessary thereto.
(Emphasis supplied.)
29.
The present Amended Complaint is, and should be
barred by prior judgment. Res Judicata in this sense requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment
is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits;
and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 6
30.
The question of ownership has already been long decided
by the Supreme Court in the Reversion Case wherein MHAI, of
which the Plaintiffs are members, sought to intervene in the
Reversion proceedings initiated by the Republic of the Philippines.
31.
Whereas the acts sought to be restrained by the Plaintiffs
in the instant case have likewise been settled in the case of
Malacaang Homeowners Association Inc. vs. Securicor Agency
wherein the Plaintiffs, through their agent MAHAI, filed a Petition
for Injunction against the agent of Defendant Carmel.
32.
The case at bar was instituted by Barangays 181 and 182
seemingly in a ploy to pretend that there is no identity of parties to
the above cited cases. In fact, Plaintiffs Fabular and Brin have long
been involved in the line of cases mentioned above. Likewise, the two
Barangays constituents are members of the Malacaang
Homeowners Association and Batang Pangarap. Clearly, it cannot be
denied that there is an identity of parties in this case and the attempt
to file the case in the name of the Barangay is an illusory stratagem
to hide the true parties of the case.
33.
In fine, all the requisites for Res Judicata to apply are
present here. There were former judgments that became final which
were rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties. The judgment thereon was based on the merits and
that as between the first set of cases and the instant case there is
identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
34.
The Complaint, in reality, is a disguised attempt to seek a
new and different relief from that which the Courts have already
adjudged in the Reversion Case and Malacaang Homeowners
6

Ibid.
9

Association Inc. vs. Securicor Agency. In fact, the instant case is

reminiscent of the most recent injunction case filed against
Respondent Carmel involving the very same property and same
injunctive relief, i.e. the case of Batang Pangarap Association Inc. vs.
Carmel Development Inc., which Petition was denied by the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129 on 20 May 2013.
35.
The present case is likewise violative of the principle of
litis pendentia, as a similar case was brought by plaintiff Barangays
just last December 2014. In the case of BARANGAY 181 represented by
Hon. Lucy P. Fabular and 182 represented by Hon. Emmanuel N. Llorca,
ZONE 16, DISTRICT 1, CALOOCAN CITY vs. Carmel Development,
Inc., Gregorio Araneta III, Securicor Security and Investigation Services,
Inc. and Manila Electric Company 7 therein Petitioners (1) seek the
issuance of a permanent injunction enjoining respondents from
prohibiting Meralco from entering Pangarap Village and undertaking
maintenance and restoration works and (2) seek the issuance of an
order ordering Carmel, Araneta and Securicor to pay petitioners
reasonable and equitable amounts for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.
36.
Herein defendant Carmel prayed for the dismissal of the
captioned case and this issue is currently submitted for resolution
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan Branch 122.
37.
Clearly, the present case was filed as a disguised way of
filing another case against Carmel which prays for similar relief
which have already been previously ruled upon by Courts of
competent jurisdiction and which is currently being relitigated
again in the case involving Meralco. The Plaintiffs should not be
allowed to needlessly prolong this issue by filing baseless and
unsubstantiated cases against Carmel. This is precisely the principle
behind res judicata and litis pendentia. It is clear as day that the
plaintiffs should not be allowed to subvert these well-settled
principles of law.
Counsel for Plaintiffs have not
formally
entered
their
appearance as counsel for the
plaintiffs.
--------------------------------------------

Special Civil Action Case No. C-1185(2014). The Complaint in the captioned case is attached hereto as
ANNEX 14
10

43. When the collaborating counsel for the plaintiffs filed

their Motion for Time, they failed to submit any retainers agreement
with the plaintiffs or conforme of the lead counsel for the plaintiffs,
signifying their consent to be represented by Atty. Ancheta, Jr.
Instead, there is only a signature by Atty. Aguilar which
acknowledges that she received a copy of the Motion for Time. It is
indubitable that Atty. Ancheta, Jr. has failed to enter his appearance
as collaborating counsel in this case. Thus, any pleadings he files
must be considered as mere scraps of paper without any merit
whatsoever.
44. Collaborating counsels for plaintiffs should not be
allowed to supersede and by-pass the rules of procedure in this
manner.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the
Honorable Court summarily GRANT the Motion to Dismiss for all
the grounds prayed for therein.
Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for.
Makati City for Caloocan City, 08 June 2015.

RHOAN L. PURUGGANAN
Counsel for the Respondent
IBP NO. 983680 / 01 06 15 / ISABELA
PTR NO. 4750674 / 01 05 15 / MAKATI CITY
MCLE Certificate of Compliance IV- 0011088/1-3-2013
Roll of Attorneys No. 44473

MARIA FRANCES M. MARFIL

Counsel for the Respondent
IBP NO. 983677/01-06-15/Manila III
PTR NO. 4750677/01-05-15/ MAKATI CITY
11

MCLE Compliance No. IV-0014840/03-25-2013

Roll of Attorneys No.61721

Address:

Suite 6-A Adamson Centre,

121 L.P. Leviste Street
Salcedo Village
Makati City, Metro Manila
Telephone Number: 8131706

Copy furnished:
ATTY. MA. FILIPINAS M. AGUILAR
Counsel for Plaintiff
27 M. Francisco Street
Caloocan City
ATTY. RESTITUTO M. ANCHETA, JR.
Collaborating Counsel for the Petitioners
Room 304, CCI Building
Natividad St. Ermita, Manila
Manila, NCR 1011
ATTY. MARIANA CLAUDETTE D. GUILBERT
Counsel for defendant Maynilad
Maynilad Water Services, Inc.
MWSS Compound, Katipunan Avenue
Balara, Quezon City
NOTICE
Docket Clerk
Regional Trial Court Branch 125
Caloocan City
Greetings:
The undersigned hereby requests and gives notice that the
foregoing Reply/Opposition be submitted for the consideration and
resolution of the Honorable Court.

12

MARIA FRANCES M. MARFIL

EXPLANATION
The foregoing Reply/Opposition was filed and served to the
above-named party via registered mail due to temporary manpower
constraints.
MARIA FRANCES M. MARFIL

13