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G.R.No.L5272

TodayisSunday,July10,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L5272March19,1910
THEUNITEDSTATES,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
AHCHONG,defendantappellant.
Gibb&Gale,forappellant.
AttorneyGeneralVillamor,forappellee.
CARSON,J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused
himself,becausefromtheverynatureofthesefactsandfromthecircumstancessurroundingtheincidentupon
whichtheseproceedingsrest,nootherevidenceastothesefactswasavailableeithertotheprosecutionortothe
defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence
touchingthosedetailsoftheincidentastowhichtherecanbesaidtobeanydoubt,thefollowingstatementofthe
materialfactsdisclosebytherecordmaybetakentobesubstantiallycorrect:
Thedefendant,AhChong,wasemployedasacookat"Officers'quarters,No.27,"FortMcKinley,RizalProvince,
and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers'
quartersNo.27"asadetachedhousesituatessome40metersfromthenearestbuilding,andinAugust,19087,
wasoccupiedsolelyasanofficers'messorclub.Noonesleptinthehouseexceptthetwoservants,whojointly
occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running
alongthesideofthebuilding,bywhichcommunicationwashadwiththeotherpartofthehouse.Thisporchwas
coveredbyaheavygrowthofvinesforitsentirelengthandheight.Thedooroftheroomwasnotfurnishedwitha
permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by
placingagainstitachair.Intheroomtherewasbutonesmallwindow,which,likethedoor,openedontheporch.
Asidefromthedoorandwindow,therewerenootheropeningsofanykindintheroom.
OnthenightofAugust14,1908,atabout10o'clock,thedefendant,whohadreceivedforthenight,wassuddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is
there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by
someonebentuponforcinghiswayintotheroom.Duetotheheavygrowthofvinesalongthefrontoftheporch,
theroomwasverydark,andthedefendant,fearingthattheintruderwasarobberorathief,leapedtohisfeet
and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the
edgeofthechairwhichhadbeenplacedagainstthedoor.Inthedarknessandconfusionthedefendantthought
thattheblowhadbeeninflictedbythepersonwhohadforcedthedooropen,whomhesupposedtobeaburglar,
though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the
sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his
pillow,thedefendantstruckoutwildlyattheintruderwho,itafterwardsturnedout,washisroommate,Pascual.
Pascualranoutupontheporchandfelldownonthestepsinadesperatelywoundedcondition,followedbythe
defendant,whoimmediatelyrecognizedhiminthemoonlight.SeeingthatPascualwaswounded,hecalledtohis
employerswhosleptinthenexthouse,No.28,andranbacktohisroomtosecurebandagestobindupPascual's
wounds.
TherehadbeenseveralrobberiesinFortMcKinleynotlongpriortothedateoftheincidentjustdescribed,oneof
which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook and as defendant alleges, it was
becauseoftheserepeatedrobberieshekeptaknifeunderhispillowforhispersonalprotection.
Thedeceasedandtheaccused,whoroomedtogetherandwhoappeartohaveonfriendlyandamicableterms
priortothefatalincident,hadanunderstandingthatwheneitherreturnedatnight,heshouldknockatthedoor
andacquianthiscompanionwithhisidentity.Pascualhadleftthehouseearlyintheeveningandgoneforawalk
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with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibaez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the
nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and
MarianostoppedattheirroomatNo.28,PascualgoingontohisroomatNo.27.Afewmomentsaftertheparty
separated,CelestinoandMarianoheardcriesforassistanceanduponreturningtoNo.27foundPascualsitting
on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
LiuetenantsJacobsandHealy,whoimmediatelywenttotheaidofthewoundedman.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the
impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite
defendant'swarnings.
NoreasonableexplanationoftheremarkableconductonthepartofPascualssuggestsitself,unlessitbethatthe
boyinaspiritofmischiefwasplayingatrickonhisChineseroommate,andsoughttofrightenedhimbyforcing
hiswayintotheroom,refusingtogivehisnameorsaywhohewas,inordertomakeAhChongbelievethathe
wasbeingattackedbyarobber.
Defendantwasplacedunderarrestforthwith,andPascualwasconveyedtothemilitaryhospital,wherehedied
fromtheeffectsofthewoundonthefollowingday.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple
homicide,withextenuatingcircumstances,andsentencedtosixyearsandonedaypresidiomayor,theminimum
penaltyprescribedbylaw.
Atthetrialinthecourtbelowthedefendantadmittedthathekilledhisroommate,PascualGualberto,butinsisted
that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self
defense.
Article8ofthePenalCodeprovidesthat
Thefollowingarenotdelinquentandarethereforeexemptfromcriminalliability:
xxxxxxxxx
4Hewhoactsindefenseofhispersonorrights,providedtherearethefollowingattendantcircumstances:
(1)Illegalaggression.
(2)Reasonablenecessityofthemeansemployedtopreventorrepelit.
(3)Lackofsufficientprovocationonthepartofthepersondefendinghimself.
Undertheseprovisionswethinkthattherecanbenodoubtthatdefendantwouldbeentitletocompleteexception
fromcriminalliabilityforthedeathofthevictimofhisfatalblow,iftheintruderwhoforcedopenthedoorofhis
room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such
circumstances,woulddoubttherightofthedefendanttoresistandrepelsuchanintrusion,andthethiefhaving
forcedopenthedoornotwithstandingdefendant'sthricerepeatedwarningtodesist,andhisthreatthathewould
killtheintruderifhepersistedinhisattempt,itwillnotbequestionedthatinthedarknessofthenight,inasmall
room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have
been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking
promptly,withoutwaitingforthethieftodiscoverhiswhereaboutsanddeliverthefirstblow.
Buttheevidenceclearlydisclosesthattheintruderwasnotathiefora"ladron."Thatneitherthedefendantnor
hispropertynoranyofthepropertyunderhischargewasinrealdangeratthetimewhenhestruckthefatalblow.
That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was
repellingandresisting,andthattherewasnoreal"necessity"fortheuseoftheknifetodefendhispersonorhis
propertyorthepropertyunderhischarge.
Thequestionthensquarelypresentsitself,whetherinthisjurisdictiononecanbeheldcriminallyresponsiblewho,
byreasonofamistakeastothefacts,doesanactforwhichhewouldbeexemptfromcriminalliabilityifthefacts
wereashesupposedthemtobe,butwhichwouldconstitutethecrimeofhomicideorassassinationiftheactor
hadknownthetruestateofthefactsatthetimewhenhecommittedtheact.Tothisquestionwethinktherecan
bebutoneanswer,andweholdthatundersuchcircumstancesthereisnocriminalliability,providedalwaysthat
theallegedignoranceormistakeorfactwasnotduetonegligenceorbadfaith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
furendiinmurder,maliceincrimesintent)"cancelsthepresumptionofintent,"andworksanacquittalexceptin
those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal
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negligenceandincaseswhere,undertheprovisionsofarticle1ofthePenalCodeonevoluntarilycommittinga
crimeormisdeamorincurscriminalliabilityforanywrongfulactcommittedbyhim,eventhoughitbedifferentfrom
thatwhichheintendedtocommit.(Wharton'sCriminalLaw,sec.87andcasescitedMcClain'sCrim.Law,sec.
133andcasescitedPettitvs.S.,28Tex.Ap.,240Commonwealthvs.Power,7Met.,596Yatesvs.People,32
N.Y.,509Ishamvs.State,38Ala.,213Commonwealthvs.Rogers,7Met.,500.)
Thegeneralpropositionthusstatedhardlyadmitsofdiscussion,andtheonlyquestionworthyofconsiderationis
whethermaliceorcriminalintentisanessentialelementoringredientofthecrimesofhomicideandassassination
asdefinedandpenalizedinthePenalCode.Ithasbeensaidthatsincethedefinitionstheregivenoftheseaswell
as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts
constitutingthecrimeoroffensemustbecommittedwithmaliceorwithcriminalintentinorderthattheactormay
be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the
penaltiesdescribedtherein,unlessitappearsthatheisexemptedfromliabilityunderoneorotheroftheexpress
provisionsofarticle8ofthecode,whichtreatsofexemption.Butwhileitistruethatcontrarytothegeneralruleof
legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code
rarelycontainprovisionsexpresslydeclaringthatmaliceorcriminalintentisanessentialingredientofthecrime,
nevertheless,thegeneralprovisionsofarticle1ofthecodeclearlyindicatethatmalice,orcriminalintentinsome
form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions
modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently
committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is
different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more
apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and
indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of
theaffirmativecriminalintent"(Bishop'sNewCriminalLaw,vol.1,s.313)and,again,"Thereissolittledifference
betweenadispositiontodoagreatharmandadispositiontodoharmthatoneofthemmayverywellbelooked
upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm,
whichthecriminalshowsbycommittingit,andsincethisdispositionisgreaterorlessinproportiontotheharm
whichisdonebythecrime,theconsequenceisthattheguiltofthecrimefollowsthesameproportionitisgreater
orlessaccordingasthecrimeinitsownnaturedoesgreaterorlessharm"(Ruth.Ints.C.18,p.11)or,asithas
beenotherwisestated,thethingdone,havingproceededfromacorruptmid,istobeviewedthesamewhether
thecorruptionwasofoneparticularformoranother.
Article1ofthePenalCodeisasfollows:
Crimesormisdemeanorsarevoluntaryactsandommissionspunishedbylaw.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall
appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the
wrongfulactcommittedbedifferentfromthatwhichhehadintendedtocommit.
ThecelebratedSpanishjuristPacheco,discussingthemeaningoftheword"voluntary"asusedinthisarticle,say
thatavoluntaryactisafree,intelligent,andintentionalact,androundlyassertsthatwithoutintention(intentionto
do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the
words"conmalicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but
omittedfromthecodeof1870,because,asPachecoinsists,theiruseintheformercodewasredundant,being
impliedandincludedintheword"voluntary."(Pacheco,CodigoPenal,vol.1,p.74.)
Viada,whileinsistingthattheabsenceofintentiontocommitthecrimecanonlybesaidtoexemptfromcriminal
responsibilitywhentheactwhichwasactuallyintendedtobedonewasinitselfalawfulone,andintheabsence
ofnegligenceorimprudence,neverthelessadmitsandrecognizesinhisdiscussionoftheprovisionsofthisarticle
ofthecodethatingeneralwithoutintentiontherecanbenocrime.(Viada,vol.1,p.16.)And,aswehaveshown
above,theexceptionsinsisteduponbyViadaaremoreapparentthanreal.
Silvela,indiscussingthedoctrinehereinlaiddown,says:
Infact,itissufficienttorememberthefirstarticle,whichdeclaredthatwherethereisnointentionthereis
nocrime...inordertoaffirm,withoutfearofmistake,thatunderourcodetherecanbenocrimeifthereis
noact,anactwhichmustfallwithinthesphereofethicsifthereisnomoralinjury.(Vol.2,theCriminalLaw,
folio169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of
May31,1882,inwhichitmadeuseofthefollowinglanguage:
Itisnecessarythatthisact,inordertoconstituteacrime,involveallthemalicewhichissupposedfromthe
operationofthewillandanintenttocausetheinjurywhichmaybetheobjectofthecrime.
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And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil
effectsoftheinscriptionofhisthreesons,madebytheappellantinthecivilregistryandintheparochialchurch,
there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes
everyactionorommissionpunishedbylawnorisheguiltyofcriminalnegligence."
AndtothesameeffectinitssentenceofDecember30,1896,itmadeuseofthefollowinglanguage:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the
commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact
submittedtotheexclusivejudgmentanddecisionofthetrialcourt.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various
crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article
568,whichareasfollows:
Hewhoshallexecutethroughrecklessnegligenceanactthat,ifdonewithmalice,wouldconstituteagrave
crime,shallbepunishedwiththepenaltyofarrestomayorinitsmaximumdegree,toprisioncorreccionalin
itsminimumdegreesifitshallconstitutealessgravecrime.
Hewhoinviolationoftheregulationsshallcommitacrimethroughsimpleimprudenceornegligenceshall
incurthepenaltyofarrestomayorinitsmediumandmaximumdegrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being
subjecttotherulesprescribedinarticle81.
Theprovisionsofthisarticleshallnotbeapplicableifthepenaltyprescribedforthecrimeisequaltoorless
than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one
theretointhedegreewhichtheymayconsiderproper.
Theword"malice"inthisarticleismanifestlysubstantiallyequivalenttothewords"criminalintent,"andthedirect
inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice
(criminalintent),negligence,andimprudence,doesnotimposeanycriminalliabilityontheactor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word
"willful"asusedinEnglishandAmericanstatutetodesignateaformofcriminalintent.Ithasbeensaidthatwhile
theword"willful"sometimesmeanslittlemorethanintentionallyordesignedly,yetitismorefrequentlyunderstood
toextentalittlefurtherandapproximatetheideaofthemilderkindoflegalmalicethatis,itsignifiesanevilintent
withoutjustifiableexcuse.Inonecaseitwassaidtomean,asemployedinastatuteincontemplation,"wantonly"
or"causelessly"inanother,"withoutreasonablegroundstobelievethethinglawful."AndShaw,C.J.,oncesaid
thatordinarilyinastatuteitmeans"notmerely`voluntarily'butwithabadpurposeinotherwords,corruptly."In
EnglishandtheAmericanstatutesdefiningcrimes"malice,""malicious,""maliciously,"and"maliceaforethought"
arewordsindicatingintent,morepurelytechnicalthan"willful"orwillfully,"but"thedifferencebetweenthemisnot
great" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual,andsignifyingrathertheintentfromourlegaljustification.(Bishop'sNewCriminalLaw,vol.1,secs.428
and429,andcasescited.)
Butevenintheabsenceofexpresswordsinastatute,settingoutaconditioninthedefinitionofacrimethatitbe
committed"voluntarily,"willfully,""maliciously""withmaliceaforethought,"orinoneofthevariousmodesgenerally
construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that
with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr.
Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this
doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In
controversiesbetweenprivatepartiesthequoanimowithwhichathingwasdoneissometimesimportant,
notalwaysbutcrimeproceedsonlyfromacriminalmind.Sothat
Therecanbenocrime,largeorsmall,withoutanevilmind.Inotherwords,punishmentisthesentenceof
wickedness,withoutwhichitcannotbe.Andneitherinphilosophicalspeculationnorinreligiousormortal
sentimentwouldanypeopleinanyageallowthatamanshouldbedeemedguiltyunlesshismindwasso.It
isthereforeaprincipleofourlegalsystem,asprobablyitisofeveryother,thattheessenceofanoffenseis
thewrongfulintent,withoutwhichitcannotexists.Wefindthisdoctrineconfirmedby
Legalmaxims.Theancientwisdomofthelaw,equallywiththemodern,isdistinctonthissubject.It
consequentlyhassuppliedtoussuchmaximsasActusnonfacitreumnisimenssitrea,"theactitselfdoes
notmakemanguiltyunlesshisintentionwereso"Actusmeincitofactusnonestmeusactus,"anactdone
bymeagainstmywillisnotmyact"andothersofthelikesort.Inthis,asjustsaid,criminaljurisprudence
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differsfromcivil.Soalso
Moralscienceandmoralsentimentteachthesamething."Byreferencetotheintention,weinculpateor
exculpateothersorourselveswithoutanyrespecttothehappinessormiseryactuallyproduced.Letthe
resultofanactionbewhatitmay,weholdamanguiltysimplyonthegroundofintentionor,onthedame
ground,weholdhiminnocent."Thecalmjudgmentofmankindkeepsthisdoctrineamongitsjewels.In
timesofexcitement,whenvengeancetakestheplaceofjustice,everyguardaroundtheinnocentiscast
down.Butwiththereturnofreasoncomesthepublicvoicethatwherethemindispure,hewhodiffersin
actfromhisneighborsdoesnotoffend.And
InthespontaneousjudgmentwhichspringsfromthenaturegivenbyGodtoman,noonedeemsanother
todeservepunishmentforwhathedidfromanuprightmind,destituteofeveryformofevil.Andwhenever
apersonismadetosufferapunishmentwhichthecommunitydeemsnothisdue,sofarfromitsplacingan
evilmarkuponhim,itelevateshimtotheseatofthemartyr.Eveninfancyitselfspontaneouslypleadsthe
wantofbadintentinjustificationofwhathastheappearanceofwrong,withtheutmostconfidencethatthe
plea,ifitstruthiscredited,willbeacceptedasgood.Nowthesefactsareonlythevoiceofnatureuttering
oneofherimmutabletruths.Itis,then,thedoctrineofthelaw,superiortoallotherdoctrines,becausefirst
innaturefromwhichthelawitselfproceeds,thatnomanistobepunishedasacriminalunlesshisintentis
wrong.(Bishop'sNewCriminalLaw,vol.1,secs.286to290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract
justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law
excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals and compelled also by the
samedoctrineofnecessity,thecourtshaverecognizedthepowerofthelegislaturetoforbid,inalimitedclassof
cases,thedoingofcertainacts,andtomaketheircommissioncriminalwithoutregardtotheintentofthedoer.
Withoutdiscussingtheseexceptionalcasesatlength,itissufficientheretosaythatthecourtshavealwaysheld
that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the
intentofthedoerisclearandbeyondquestionthestatutewillnotbesoconstrued(casescitedinCyc.,vol.12,p.
158, notes 76 and 77) and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real
departurefromthelaw'sfundamentalprinciplethatcrimeexistsonlywherethemindisatfault,because"theevil
purposeneednotbetobreakthelaw,andifsufficesifitissimplytodothethingwhichthelawinfactforbids."
(Bishop'sNewCriminalLaw,sec.300,andcasescited.)
But,howeverthismaybe,thereisnotechnicalrule,andnopressingnecessitytherefore,requiringmistakeinfact
tobedealtwithotherwisethatinstrictaccordwiththeprinciplesofabstractjustice.Onthecontrary,themaxim
here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a
sufficientexcuse").(Brown'sLeg.Max.,2ded.,190.)
Sinceevilintentisingeneralaninseparableelementineverycrime,anysuchmistakeoffactasshowstheact
committedtohaveproceededfromnosortofevilinthemindnecessarilyrelievestheactorfromcriminalliability
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
accusedmustdependonthecircumstancesastheyappeartohim."(Reg.vs.Thurborn,1Den.C.,387P.vs.
Anderson,44Cal..,65P.vs.Lamb,54Barb.,342Yatesvs.P., 32 N. Y., 509 Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625
Reg.vs.Cohen,8CoxC.C.,41P.vs.Miles,55Cal.,207,209Nalleyvs.S.,28Tex.Ap.,387.)Thatistosay,
thequestionastowhetherhehonestly,ingoodfaith,andwithoutfaultornegligencefellintothemistakeistobe
determinedbythecircumstancesastheyappearedtohimatthetimewhenthemistakewasmade,andtheeffect
which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminalorotherwise,uponwhichheacted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts
which will justify a killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is
founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them he is legally guiltless of the homicide
though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other
words, and with reference to the right of selfdefense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the
doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions
apparentlyadverse,wheneveramanundertakesselfdefense,heisjustifiedinactingonthefactsasthey
appeartohim.If,withoutfaultorcarelessness,heismisledconcerningthem,anddefendshimselfcorrectly
according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth
otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec.
305,andlargearrayofcasestherecited.)
ThecommonillustrationintheAmericanandEnglishtextbooksoftheapplicationofthisruleisthecasewherea
man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of
mischief,andwithleveledpistoldemandshismoneyorhislife,butiskilledbyhisfriendunderthemistakenbelief
that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in
imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer
believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal
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liability,althoughifheknewtherealstateofthefactswhenhetookthelifeofhisfriendhewouldundoubtedlybe
guiltyofthecrimeofhomicideorassassination.Undersuchcircumstances,proofofhisinnocentmistakeofthe
factsovercomesthepresumptionofmaliceorcriminalintent,and(sincemaliceorcriminalintentisanecessary
ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the
presumptionestablishedinarticle1ofthecode,thatthe"actpunishedbylaw"wascommitted"voluntarily."
Parson,C.J.,intheMassachusettscourt,oncesaid:
Ifthepartykillinghadreasonablegroundsforbelievingthatthepersonslainhadafeloniousdesignagainst
him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such
design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the
degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's
case,Whart,Hom.,417,418,Lloyd'sreportofthecase,p.7.)
Inthiscase,Parker,J.,chargingthepetitjury,enforcedthedoctrineasfollows:
A,inthepeaceablepursuitofhisaffairs,seesBrushingrapidlytowardhim,withanoutstretchedarmsand
a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near
enoughinthesameattitude,A,whohasaclubinhishand,strikesBovertheheadbeforeorattheinstant
thepistolisdischargedandofthewoundBdies.Itturnsoutthepistolwasloadedwithpowderonly,and
thattherealdesignofBwasonlytoterrifyA.WillanyreasonablemansaythatAismorecriminalthathe
wouldhavebeeniftherehadbeenabulletinthepistol?Thosewhoholdsuchdoctrinemustrequirethata
man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded a
doctrinewhichwouldentirelytakeawaytheessentialrightofselfdefense.Andwhenitisconsideredthat
the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his
apprehension,nodangercanbesupposedtoflowfromthisprinciple.(Lloyd'sRep.,p.160.)
TothesameeffectarevariousdecisionsofthesupremecourtofSpain,citedbyViada,afewofwhicharehere
setoutinfullbecausethefactsaresomewhatanalogoustothoseinthecaseatbar.
QUESTIONIII.Whenitisshownthattheaccusedwassittingathishearth,atnight,incompanyonlyofhis
wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was
attendingtothefire,theresuddenlyenteredapersonwhomhedidnotseeorknow,whostruckhimoneor
twoblows,producingacontusionontheshoulder,becauseofwhichheturned,seizedthepersonandtook
from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow,
knockinghimtothefloor,andafterwardsstrikinghimanotherblowonthehead,leavingtheunknownlying
on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his fatherinlaw, to whom he
renderedassistanceassoonashelearnedhisidentity,andwhodiedinaboutsixdaysinconsequenceof
cerebralcongestionresultingfromtheblow.Theaccused,whoconfessedthefacts,hadalwayssustained
pleasantrelationswithhisfatherinlaw,whomhevisitedduringhissickness,demonstratinggreatgriefover
the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in selfdefense,
withallthecircumstancesrelatedinparagraph4,article8,ofthePenalCode?Thecriminalbranchofthe
AudienciaofValladolidfoundthathewasanillegalaggressor,withoutsufficientprovocation,andthatthere
didnotexistsrationalnecessityfortheemploymentoftheforceused,andinaccordancewitharticles419
and87ofthePenalCodecondemnedhimtotwentymonthsofimprisonment,withaccessorypenaltyand
costs.Uponappealbytheaccused,hewasacquittedbythesupremecourt,underthefollowingsentence:
"Considering,fromthefactsfoundbythesentencetohavebeenproven,thattheaccusedwassurprised
from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and
beaten,withoutbeingabletodistinguishwithwhichtheymighthaveexecutedtheircriminalintent,because
ofthetherewasnootherthanfirelightintheroom,andconsideringthatinsuchasituationandwhenthe
actsexecuteddemonstratedthattheymightendangerhisexistence,andpossiblythatofhiswifeandchild,
more especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so
withthesamestickwithwhichhewasattacked,hedidnotexceedthelimitsofselfdefense,nordidheuse
meanswhichwerenotrationallynecessary,particularlybecausetheinstrumentwithwhichhekilledwasthe
one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the
houseandtheconsterationwhichnaturallyresultedfromsuchstrongaggression,itwasnotgivenhimto
knownordistinguishwhethertherewasoneormoreassailants,northearmswhichtheymightbear,not
thatwhichtheymightaccomplish,andconsideringthatthelowercourtdidnotfindfromtheacceptedfacts
thatthereexistedrationalnecessityforthemeansemployed,andthatitdidnotapplyparagraph4ofarticle
8ofthePenalCode,iterred,etc."(SentenceofsupremecourtofSpain,February28,1876.)(Viada,Vol.I,
p.266.).
QUESTIONXIX.Apersonreturning,atnight,tohishouse,whichwassituatedinaretiredpartofthecity,
uponarrivingatapointwheretherewasnolight,heardthevoiceofaman,atadistanceofsome8paces,
saying:"Facedown,handoveryoumoney!"becauseofwhich,andalmostatthesamemoney,hefiredtwo
shotsfromhispistol,distinguishingimmediatelythevoiceofoneofhisfriends(whohadbeforesimulateda
different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying
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upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had
beenthevictimofajoke,andnotreceivingareply,andobservingthathisfriendwasacorpse,heretired
from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as
having acted in just selfdefense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code?
ThecriminalbranchoftheAudienciaofMalagadidnotsofind,butonlyfoundinfavoroftheaccusedtwoof
therequisitesofsaidarticle,butnotthatofthereasonablenessofthemeansemployedtorepeltheattack,
and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme
courtacquittedtheaccusedonhisappealfromthissentence,holdingthattheaccusedwasactingundera
justifiableandexcusablemistakeoffactastotheidentityofthepersoncallingtohim,andthatunderthe
circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting
justifiable.(Sentencesupremecourt,March17,1885.)(Viada,Vol.I,p.136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone
thrownagainsthiswindowatthis,heputshisheadoutofthewindowandinquireswhatiswanted,andis
answered"thedeliveryofallofhismoney,otherwisehishousewouldbeburned"becauseofwhich,and
observinginanalleyadjacenttothemillfourindividuals,oneofwhomaddressedhimwithblasphemy,he
firedhispistolatonethemen,who,onthenextmorningwasfounddeadonthesamespot.Shallthisman
bedeclaredexemptfromcriminalresponsibilityashavingactedinjustselfdefensewithalloftherequisites
oflaw?Thecriminalbranchoftherequisitesoflaw?ThecriminalbranchoftheAudienciaofZaragozafinds
that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal
responsibility,butnotthatofreasonablenecessityforthemeans,employed,andcondemnedtheaccused
to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court
acquittedthecondemned,findingthattheaccused,infiringatthemalefactors,whoattackhismillatnight
in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just selfdefense of his person,
property,andfamily.(SentenceofMay23,1877).(IViada,p.128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman
struckthefatalblowallegedintheinformationinthefirmbeliefthattheintruderwhoforcedopenthedoorofhis
sleepingroomwasathief,fromwhoseassaulthewasinimminentperil,bothofhislifeandofhispropertyandof
the property committed to his charge that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented
themselvestothedefendantatthetime,heactedingoodfaith,withoutmalice,orcriminalintent,inthebeliefthat
hewasdoingnomorethanexercisinghislegitimaterightofselfdefensethathadthefactsbeenashebelieved
themtobehewouldhavebeenwhollyexemptfromcriminalliabilityonaccountofhisactandthathecannotbe
saidtohavebeenguiltyofnegligenceorrecklessnessorevencarelessnessinfallingintohismistakeastothe
facts,orinthemeansadoptedbyhimtodefendhimselffromtheimminentdangerwhichhebelievethreatened
hispersonandhispropertyandthepropertyunderhischarge.
Thejudgmentofconvictionandthesentenceimposedbythetrialcourtshouldbereversed,andthedefendant
acquittedofthecrimewithwhichheischargedandhisbailbondexonerated,withthecostsofbothinstancede
oficio.Soordered.
JohnsonMorelandandElliott,JJ.,concur.
Arellano,C.J.,andMapa,J.,dissent.

SeparateOpinions
TORRES,J.,dissenting:
Thewriter,withduerespecttotheopinionofthemajorityofthecourt,believesthat,accordingtothemeritsofthe
case,thecrimeofhomicidebyrecklessnegligence,definedandpunishesinarticle568ofthePenalCode,was
committed,inasmuchasthevictimwaswilfully(voluntariomente)killed,andwhiletheactwasdonewithoutmalice
orcriminalintentitwas,however,executedwithrealnegligence,fortheactscommittedbythedeceasedcould
not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the
person who assaulted him was a malefactor the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a
knifethepersonwhowasaccustomedtoentersaidroom,withoutanyjustifiablemotive.
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should be
sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties
provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both
instances,therebyreversingthejudgmentappealedfrom.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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