Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Circle 2016
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
CIVIL LAW
Supreme Court decisions penned by Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
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Whether or not Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was
rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996;
2.
Ruling:
1. No. There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained
her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective
repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her
American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in
this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was,
and may still be, a holder of an American passport.
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage
certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment in which she stated
being an American citizen. The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino
citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of,
or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996
judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
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SPS. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA v. ANITA B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE LEON, and
VILMA B. DE LEON
G.R. No. 185063. July 23, 2009. Third Division. Velasco, Jr., J.
For the presumption to arise, it is not even necessary to prove that the property was acquired
with funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the
presumption that the property is conjugal.
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Ruling:
1.Yes. The subject property is the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. Article 160 of the
1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted
marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. For the
presumption to arise it is not even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of
the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption
that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired
does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal.
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHCBonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and
Anita. In a contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full
payment of the price. Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he
had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made more than
two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In net effect, the property was acquired
during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership.
2.Yes. It cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the
consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership
without the wifes consent. To a specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as
administrator, must, as a rule, be with the wifes consent. Else, the sale is not valid. So it is that in
several cases the Court ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal
partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is
incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes. The nullity, as we have explained, proceeds
from the fact that sale is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code.
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THE FAMILY
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO
G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of
their illegitimate children.
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that
time already married to someone else. Two sons were born out of their relationship. However, The
children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the
children in the Civil Registry. Petitioner, later on, left for the United States with her two children.
Thus, respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), appending a notarized Deed
of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent. Petitioner then filed an appeal with the
CA. CA modified the Decision of the RTC ruling that notwithstanding the fathers recognition of his
children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over them absent the most
compelling of reasons. It also maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by
respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally
protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname
"ANTONIO." Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration insofar
as it decreed the change of the minors surname to "Antonio." In it, she posits that Article 176 of the
Family Codeas amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language
may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without
the consent of their mother.
Issue:
Whether or not a father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation.
Ruling:
No. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children. On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And
where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision
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PROPERTY
ACCESSION
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. VICENTE VICTOR C. SANCHEZ et al.
G.R. No. 179518. November 19, 2014. THIRD DIVISION. Velasco, Jr., J.
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted and sown without right to indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith
may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace
things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may
compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Facts:
Vicente Victor C. Sanchez, Kenneth Nereo Sanchez and Imelda C. Vda. De Sanchez are owners
of a registered land. Felisa Yap (Yap), the widow of Kenneth Nereo Sanchez, and Jesus V. Garcia
(Garcia), doing business under the name Trans American Sales and Exposition, Inc. (TSEI), agreed to
the sale of the aforementioned property subject to the conditioned that Garcia shall cause the
reconstitution of the original title. Pursuant to this agreement, Yap turned over to Garcia the original
owners copy of TCT 156254 and other related documents. Unknown to Yap and Vicente, Garcia took
possession of the property and advertised the construction and sale of "Trans American Townhouse
V" thereon. Later, Garcia failed to pay the balance of the purchase price as agreed upon.
Thereafter, Yap and the Sanchezes filed before the RTC in Quezon City a Complaint dated for
the rescission of contract, restitution and damages with prayer for TRO/preliminary injunction
against TSEI and Garcia. Meanwhile, Garcia managed to cause the cancellation of TCT 156254 and its
replacement with TCT 383697 in the name of TSEI and use such to entice buyers who to buy the
townhouse units being constructed by TSEI on the subject lot. Furthermore, Garcia was able to
convey parts of the property to several buyers who intervened in the instant case: the spouses Jose
and Visitacion Caminas (Caminas), Reynaldo V. Maniwang (Maniwang), Generoso C. Tulagan
(Tulagan), Varied Traders Concept, Inc. (VTCI), and Arturo Marquez (Marquez).
The RTC ruled that anent the rights of intervenors, the Sanchezes to have a better right over
the subject property considering that the transactions between Garcia/TSEI and the intervenors
suffered from several irregularities, which they, the intervenors, in bad faith, ignored.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sanchezes and Yap are entitled to the remedies provided in Article 449450 of the Civil Code.
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DONATION
TIRSO MONTEROSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 105608, April 30, 2008, J. Velasco, Jr.
SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE MONTEROSO, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TIRSO MONTEROSO
G.R. No. 113199, April 30, 2008, J. Velasco, Jr.
The circumstance that parties to a void contract choose to ignore its nullity can in no way
enhance the invalid character of such contract. It is axiomatic that void contracts cannot be the subject
of ratification, either express or implied.
Facts:
Don Fabian Monteroso, Sr. married twice and sired eight (8) children, four (4) from each
union. In his first marriage with Soledad Doldol, Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin and Tirso were born.
After Doldol died, his second marriage with Sofia Pendejito bore Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and
Fabian, Jr. During the early part of his second marriage, Don Fabian filed before the CFI of Agusan an
intestate proceeding for the estate of his deceased first wife to obviate any dispute over the
inheritance. The project for partition was approved and the intestate estate of Doldol was partitioned
and distributed to her four (4) children in equal shares.
In the meantime, the children of Don Fabian from his first marriage married accordingly,
Soledad to Atty. Perfecto Cagampang, Sr., Reygula to Jose Bayan, Benjamin to Mauricia Nakila; and
Tirso to Melecia Tana. Benjamin died, leaving behind four (4) children and his wife. A year and a half
later, Don Fabian also passed away. This brings us to the objects of the squabble: the conjugal
patrimonies of Don Fabian from his two (2) successive marriages. The children of Benjamin filed
with the RTC a complaint for recovery of property with damages against their uncle, Tirso.
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ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS(ALU) and DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES UNIONALU(DWUEU-ALU) v. CA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF PALO, LEYTE(RCAP) and
DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN(DWUT)
G.R. No. 156882, October 31, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.
Laches means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which by the exercise of due diligence could or should have been done earlier.
Facts:
RCAP is a corporation sole which sold to Societas Verbum Dei(SVD) the subject 13 parcels of
land. While the conveying document was not notarized, the SVD was able to secure the
corresponding TCTs over the subject lots, but the deed conditions, restrictions, and reversionary
right of the RCAP were not annotated. Due to labor unrest, DWUT, run by the SVD, and the Union
engaged in a protracted legal battle. RCAP filed a petition for annotation. RTC dismissed the petition.
RCAP filed a MR. RTC denied the MR on the ground of laches noting that it took the RCAP 37 years
after the execution of the deed of sale before taking judicial action to assert his rights. CA reversed
and held that the RCAP was not barred by laches from asserting his legal right to cause the
annotation of the pertinent paragraphs of the deed of sale on the TCTs covering the subject
properties. It ratiocinated that despite the lapse of 37 years, the annotation would not be inequitable
or prejudicial to any party since the SVD, under whose name the TCTs of the subject properties were
issued, did not interpose any objection to the annotation. It noted that the RTC Order did not specify
the party who would be prejudiced by the annotation.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of laches.
Ruling:
No. According to settled jurisprudence, "laches" means "the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that whichby the exercise of due diligence
could or should have been done earlier." Verily, laches serves to deprive a party guilty of it of any
judicial remedies. Elements: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom the
defendant claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in
asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendants conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge
or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which the
defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded
to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.
The 4th and most important element, that is, injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held barred, is not present under the
premises. As the CA aptly observed, no prejudice can result from the annotation pleaded by the RCAP
since the SVD, the property purchaser, did not oppose the annotation as evidenced by a
manifestation the DWUT filed before the RTC. More so, no prejudice can befall the Union for no
judgment lien has attached or been imposed over the subject properties and, as earlier explained,
there is no showing that the subject properties are the only properties the DWUT has or that its other
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EXTINGUISHMENT OF OBLIGATIONS
PAYMENT OR PERFORMANCE
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. LIM SIO WAN, METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., and
PRODUCERS BANK.
G.R. No. 133179, March 27, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
Payment made by the debtor to a wrong party does not extinguish the obligation as to the
creditor, if there is no fault or negligence which can be imputed to the latter.
Facts:
Respondent Lim Sio Wan deposited with petitioner Allied Banking Corporation a money
market placement of PhP 1,152,597.35 for a term of 31 days. Then, a person claiming to be Lim Sio
Wan called up an officer of Allied to pre-terminate the money market placement, to issue a managers
check representing the proceeds of the placement, and to give the check to one Deborah Dee Santos.
Allied issued a check, which was cross-checked "For Payees Account Only" and given to Santos. The
Allied check was deposited with Metrobank in the account of FCC as Producers Banks payment of its
obligation to FCC. Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check. The check was sent to Allied through
the PCHC. Upon the presentment of the check, Allied funded the check even without checking the
authenticity of Lim Sio Wans purported indorsement. Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second
money market placement. Upon the maturity date of the first money market placement, Lim Sio Wan
went to Allied to withdraw it. She was then informed of the events that transpired but she denied it
authorizing it. The bank manager then assured her that her money would be recovered. However,
when she realized that the promise would not happen, she sent a demand letter to Allied. Allied
refused to pay claiming that Lim Sio Wan authorized the pre-termination.
Issue:
Whether or not Allied and Metrobank is liable to Lim Sio Wan.
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HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES AND CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD. vs. DYNAMIC PLANNERS AND
CONSTRUCTION CORP.
G.R. Nos. 169408 & 170144, April 30, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
An obligee is deemed to have waived strict compliance by an obligor with an obligation when
there is an actual knowledge and with intentional acceptance of an incomplete performance, and under
circumstances that would indicate an intention to consider it as complete.
Facts:
Hanjin was awarded a contract for the construction of Davao International Airport Project. It
entered into a Subcontract Agreement with Dynamic wherein Hanjin agreed to pay Dynamic a down
payment within 20 days from contract execution, however, it was paid in 10 installments and also
payments for progress billings came late. Dynamic found design deficiency and called Hanjins
attention to it but upon the prodding of Hanjin which relied on a contrary assessment, Dynamic
proceeded with the construction. The flawed design manifest themselves by cracks appearing in the
beams to the second floor. Upon investigation, it was found out that there was a failure of structural
design. Dynamic recommended post-tensioning but Hanjin refused and it eventually approved the
use of carbon fiber to be used by a new subcontractor. Hanjin served notice that it will not pay the
progress billings for works done after April 2000. By December 2002, when project works had
reached a 94% completion level, Hanjin took over the Project because of alleged abandonment.
Hanjin claims that Dynamic should not be entitled to the retention money because of the delay and
Dynamics subsequent abandonment. Dynamic denies the abandonment but admits suspending work
due to Hanjins act of withholding the release of the down payment and the payment of its progress
billing.
Issue:
Whether or not Dynamic abandoned the work and whether or not it is entitled to the
retention money.
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BENGUET CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD and J.G. REALTY AND MINING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 163101, February 13, 2008, Velasco J.
When the mode of payment embodied in the contract is complied with by obligee, the contract
is deemed consummated and cannot be cancelled for non-payment by reason of non-compliance of a
requirement not indicated in the contract.
Facts:
Benguet Corporation and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to
Purchase (RAWOP), wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims. Thus,
on August 9, 1989, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its
intention to develop the mining claims. However, J.G. Realty, through its President sent a letter to the
President of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating the RAWOP on the following
grounds: (a) The fact that the company has failed to perform the obligations set forth in the RAWOP,
i.e., to undertake development works within 2 years from the execution of the
Agreement; (b) Violation of the Contract by allowing high graders to operate on our claim (c) No
stipulation was provided with respect to the term limit of the RAWOP. (d) Non-payment of the
royalties thereon as provided in the RAWOP.
Thereafter, J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP
with the Legaspi City Panel of Arbitrators (POA) which cancelled the RAWOP and subsequently
affirmed by Mining Adjudication Board (MAB). Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the cancellation of the Royalty agreement for alleged breach of contract by
non payment is proper.
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CONSIGNATION
B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC. v. ROSARIO ALZUL
G.R. No. 169501, June 8, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J.
Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities
whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment and it generally requires a prior
tender of payment.
Facts:
Alzul purchased from B.E. San Diego 4 subdivision lots and took possession of the property.
Alzul signed a "Conditional Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights" which assigned to Wilson Yu
her rights under the Contract to Sell in which B.E. San Diego was notified. The contract in Alzuls
name was cancelled and a new one was issued in favor of Yu. Alzul informed B.E. San Diego about
Yu's failure to pay the amounts due and manifested that she would be the one to pay the installments.
Alzul filed for rescission of the conditional deed of assignment against Yu and caused the annotation
of notices of lis pendens on the titles. The RTC ruled in favor of Alzul and was affirmed by the CA. B.E.
San Diego notified Alzul that the contract was declared rescinded and the lots were sold to Spouses
Ventura who later filed an action for Quieting of Title with Prayer for Cancellation of Annotation and
Damages. The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses but was reversed upon appeal.
Alzul tried to serve payment upon B.E. San Diego but the latter refused to accept it. Hence,
Alzul made a manifestation regarding the refusal. Alzul's counsel wrote a letter to B.E. San Diego
citing the latter's refusal and that due to it, Alzul would just consign the balance before the proper
judicial authority but such was rejected by B.E. San Diego. Hence, Alzul filed an action for
consignation and specific performance before the HLURB which was dismissed. Upon appeal to the
OP, it ruled that there was no valid consignation since the period had already prescribed. However, it
was reversed by the CA stating that although there was no valid consignation it found that justice
would be better served by allowing Alzul to effect the consignation.
Issue:
Whether or not Alzul is still entitled to consignation despite the lapse of the period
prescribed by the Court.
Ruling:
No. We agree with petitioner's assertion that even granting arguendo that the instant case
for consignation was instituted within the 30-day period or within a reasonable time thereafter, it
would still not accord respondent relief as no valid consignation was made. Certainly, the records
show that there was no valid consignation made by respondent before the HLURB as she did not
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P.L. UY REALTY CORP. v. ALS MANAGEMENT AND DEV. CORP. and ANTONIO S. LITONJUA
G.R. No. 166462, October 24, 2012, Velasco, J.
Art. 1306 of the Civil Code guarantees the freedom of parties to stipulate the terms of their
contract provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Thus, when the provisions of a contract are valid, the parties are bound by such terms under the
principle that a contract is the law between the parties.
Facts:
PLU (vendor) and ALS (vendee) executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage covering a
parcel of land. Notably, the parties stipulated in paragraph 4.a of the Deed of Absolute Sale with
Mortgage on the eviction of informal settlers: It is understood that the VENDOR shall have the
property clear of any existing occupants/squatters, the removal of which shall be for the sole
expenses & responsibilities of the VENDOR & that the VENDEE is authorized to withhold payment of
the 1st 24% installment unless the above-undertaking is done and completed to the satisfaction of
the VENDEE. Subsequently, the parties executed a Partial Release of Mortgage attesting to the
payment by ALS of the first installment. ALS, however, failed to pay the 2nd payment despite
demands. PLU filed a Complaint. RTC declared that the removal of the informal settlers on the
property is still a subsisting and valid condition, thus it found the obligation of ALS to pay the balance
of the purchase price has not yet fallen due and demandable and it dismissed the case for being
premature. PLU filed another complaint and RTC dismissed it.
Issue:
Whether or not the stipulation in paragraph 4.a between PLU and ALS is valid.
Ruling:
YES. Art. 1306 of the Civil Code guarantees the freedom of parties to stipulate the terms of
their contract provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy. Thus, when the provisions of a contract are valid, the parties are bound by such terms
under the principle that a contract is the law between the parties.
Here, both parties knew for a fact that the property subject of their contract was occupied by
informal settlers, whose eviction would entail court actions that in turn, would require some amount
of time. They also knew that the length of time that would take to conclude such court actions was
not within their power to determine. Despite such knowledge, both parties still agreed to the
stipulation that the payment of the balance of the purchase price would be deferred until the
informal settlers are ejected. There was never any allegation that PLU was coerced into signing the
Deed of Sale with Mortgage or that its consent was in any way vitiated. PLU was free to accept or
decline such contracted provision. Thus, PLU cannot be allowed to renege on its agreement. It is to be
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INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
Inadequacy of the consideration, however, does not render a contract void under Article 1355
of the Civil Code. Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven that there
was fraud, mistake or undue influence.
Facts:
Philippine Coconut Administration(PCA) have the largest membership in the COCOFUND. A
part of the coconut levy funds was acquired by the United Coconut Planters Bank(UCPB). Cojuangco
had the exclusive option to acquire UCPBs controlling interests. The 1st agreement was by and
between Cojuangco for and in his behalf and Pedro Cojuangco in which the former was purportedly
accorded the option to buy the option shares. The 2nd agreement had PCA, for itself and for the
benefit of the coconut farmers, purchase from Cojuangco the shares of stock subject of the 1st
Agreement.
While the 64.98% portion of the option shares ostensibly pertained to the farmers, the
corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the farmers equity were in the name of
and delivered to PCA. There were, however, shares forming part of the aforesaid 64.98% portion,
which ended up in the hands of non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the UCPB capital stock were
not covered by any of the agreements. PCA agreed to expeditiously distribute the UCPB shares
purchased to such coconut farmers holding registered COCOFUND receipts on equitable basis. As
found by the Sandiganbayan, the PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase
of the said 72.2% equity, albeit it would later reimburse itself from the coconut levy fund. And per
Cojuangcos own admission, PCA paid, out of the CCSF, the entire acquisition price for the 72.2%
option shares. It would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation on maintaining Cojuangcos
equity position in the bank, PCA would cede to him 10% of its subscriptions to (a) the authorized but
unissued shares of UCPB and (b) the increase in UCPBs capital stock. In all, from the "mother" PCA
shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of 95,304 UCPB shares broken down as follows: 14,440
shares + 10% (158,840 shares) + 10% (649,800 shares) = 95,304.
Issue:
Whether or not the PCA-COJUANGCO agreement is a valid contract.
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KINDS OF CONTRACTS
ANTHONY ORDUA, DENNIS ORDUA, and ANTONITA ORDUA v. EDUARDO J. FUENTEBELLA,
MARCOS S. CID, BENJAMIN F. CID, BERNARD G. BANTA, and ARMANDO GABRIEL, JR.
G.R. No. 176841, June 29, 2010, Velasco, Jr., J.
The Statute of Frauds expressed in Article 1403, par. 2 of the Civil Code applies only to
executory contracts. The legal consequence of non-compliance with the Statute does not come into play
where the contract in question is completed, executed or partially consummated.
Facts:
Gabriel, Sr. sold the subject lot to petitioner Antonita Ordua, payable in installment, but no
formal deed was executed to document the sale. The installments were paid to Gabriel, Sr. and later
to Gabriel, Jr. after the formers death. Improvements were thereafter made by petitioner. Without
the knowledge of petitioners, Gabriel, Jr. sold the property to Banta, who then sold the same to the
Cids and ultimately it was ceded to respondent Fuentebella. Petitioner, after being demanded by
Fuentebella to vacate the disputed land, then filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Title,
Reconveyance with damages with a prayer to acquire ownership over the subject lot upon payment
of their remaining balance. The RTC dismissed the petition because the verbal sale was
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The CA affirmed this ruling.
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SALES
DOUBLE SALE
RUPERTA CANO and JESUS CARLO GERARD VDA DE VIRAY v. SPS JOSE and AMELITA USI
G.R. No. 192486, November 21, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
A double sale situation arises when the following requisites concur: (a) The two (or more) sales
transactions must constitute valid sales; (b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to
exactly the same subject matter; (c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the
subject matter must each represent conflicting interests; and (d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over
the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each have bought from the very same seller.
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Whether EIB is authorized to sell the DMCI shares for the purpose of reacquiring the KKP
Ruling:
NO. Under the agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant, the right to sell or
dispose of the properties of petitioners by EIB is unequivocally confined to payment of the
obligations and liabilities of petitioners to EIB and none other. Thus, when EIB sold the DMCI shares
to buy back the KKP shares, EIB acted beyond the ambit of its authority as agent. Such act is surely
illegal and does not bind petitioners as principals of EIB.
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TING TING PUA v. SPOUSES BENITO LO BUN TIONG and CAROLINE SIOK CHING TENG
G.R. No. 198660, October 23, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
The collection of interest in loans or forbearance of money is allowed only when these two
conditions concur: (1) there was an express stipulation for the payment of interest; (2) the agreement
for the payment of the interest was reduced in writing. Absent any of these two conditions, the money
debtor cannot be made liable for interest.
Facts:
Respondents owed Petitioner a sum of money way back in 1988 for which the latter gave her
several checks. All of the checks, however, were dishonored and petitioner has not been paid the
amount of the loan plus the agreed interest. Eventually, respondents approached her to get the
computation of their liability including the 2% compounded interest. After bargaining to lower their
liability, respondents gave her another postdated check but like the other checks, the drawee bank
likewise dishonored this check.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. As aptly held by the court a quo, however, respondents cannot be obliged to pay the
interest of the loan on the ground that the supposed agreement to pay such interest was not reduced
to writing. Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary interest, specifically mandates
that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. Thus, petitioner is
entitled only to the principal amount of the loan plus the allowable legal interest from the time of the
demand, at the rate of 6% per annum.
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REAL MORTGAGE
Philippine National Bank v. Spouses Alejandro and Myrna Reblando
G.R. No. 194014 September 12, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately
led another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
Facts:
Alejandro and Myrna Reblando (Reblando) obtained a loan from the Philippine National
Bank (PNB). To secure the payment of their loan, the spouses Reblando executed a real estate
mortgage over two parcels of land. The spouses Reblando defaulted on their payment. So, PNB was
prompted to commence an extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage over the two parcels of land. PNB
was the lone bidder and the lots were awarded to them. The redemption period lapsed without the
spouses Reblando redeeming the parcels of land. So, PNB became the owner thereof upon securing a
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CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
CONRADA O. ALMAGRO v. SPS. MANUEL AMAYA, SR. and LUCILA MERCADO, JESUS MERCADO,
SR., and RICARDO MERCADO
G.R. No. 179685, June 19, 2013, Velasco, Jr., J.
The identification and classification of lands and qualification of farmer-beneficiaries are
factual determination performed by government officials and personnel with expertise in the line of
work they are doing. Their findings, conclusions/recommendations and final actions on the matter,
after thorough investigation and evaluation, have the presumption of regularity and correctness.
Facts:
Conrada allowed spouses Amaya to construct a house on a 46-square meter portion of Lot
No. 13333 on the condition that no additional improvements shall be introduced and that they shall
leave the area upon a 90-day notice. A decade later, Conrada asked the Amayas to vacate. Instead of
heeding the vacation demand, the Amayas, built permanent improvements on their house. Conrada
filed a Complaint against the Sps. Amaya before the DARAB for "Ejectment, Payment of Rentals with
Damages. In their Answer, the Amayas asserted possessory rights over the area on which their house
stands and a portion of subject they are cultivating, they claimed, monthly-rental paying tenantfarmers. Said portion, the Amayas added, has been placed under Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27. Conrada on the other hand contends that the lot has
been primarily devoted to vegetables production and cultivation, not to corn or rice, thus, outside the
ambit of the OLT under PD 27.
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Whether or not said portions are primarily devoted to vegetable production, as petitioner
Ruling:
No. PD 27 encompasses only rice and corn land, i.e., agricultural lands primarily devoted to
rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy. In the instant case, since the
landholdings cultivated by respondents are primarily devoted to vegetable production, it is definitely
outside the coverage, and necessarily cannot properly be placed under the umbrella, of PD 27.
It must be stressed that the issuance of the EPs in the instant case creates a presumption
which yields only to a clear and cogent evidence that the awardee is the qualified and lawful owner
because it involves a tedious process. Moreover, the identification and classification of lands and
qualification of farmer-beneficiaries are factual determination performed by government officials
and personnel with expertise in the line of work they are doing. Their findings,
conclusions/recommendations and final actions on the matter, after thorough investigation and
evaluation, have the presumption of regularity and correctness.
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ENRIQUETA M. LOCSIN v. BERNARDO HIZON, CARLOS HIZON, SPS. JOSE MANUEL & LOURDES
GUEVARA
G.R. No. 204369, September 17, 2014, Velasco Jr., J.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the
purchase or before receiving any notice of another persons claim.
Facts:
Enriqueta M. Locsin, owner of the subject property located in Quezon City went to the United
States after entering into a compromise agreement in 1993 with Billy Aceron against whom the
former filed an ejectment case. However Locsin, did not know that Marylou Bolos had secured a new
TCT in her favor by registering a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Locsin in 1979. Bolos
later sold the subject lot to Bernardo Hizon for P1,000,000 but the land was titled to Carlos name
who is Bernardos son. Despite Bernardos promise for a win-win situation with Locsin, he still sold
the property for P1,000,000 to Spouses Guevarra who in turn mortgaged the property. Locsin then
filed an action for reconveyance, annulment and cancellation of the mortgage lien. The CA affirmed
the RTCs finding that the respondents were innocent purchasers for value.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondents were innocent purchasers for value.
Ruling:
No. Bernardo knew that Bolos never acquired possession over the lot. In his direct
testimony, Bernardo admitted that he knew of the prior compromise agreement entered by Locsin
with Aceron which recognized Locsin as the registered owner of the land. Having knowledge of the
foregoing facts, Bernardo and Carlos should have been impelled to investigate the reason behind the
arrangement. If Bolos already acquired ownership of the property as early as 1979, it should have
been her who entered into a compromise agreement with Aceron in 1993, not her predecessor-ininterest, Locsin, who, theoretically, had already divested herself of ownership thereof. The transfer to
Spouses Guevara was also suspicious since there was no deed evidencing the sale. It appeared that
the mortgage was a mere ploy to make it appear that the Sps. Guevara exercised acts of dominion
over the subject property when in fact the Spouses had lack of interest in protecting themselves in
the case.
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RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF SPOUSES DONATO SANCHEZ and JUANA MENESES,
represented by RODOLFO S. AGUINALDO
G.R. No. 212388, December 10, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.
It is well to emphasize that a petition for reconstitution of lost or destroyed OCT requires, as a
condition precedent, that an OCT has indeed been issued.
Facts:
Respondents filed an amended petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title
pursuant to Republic Act No. 26. However, due to difficulties encountered in securing the required
documents ordered by the trial court, respondents moved for the archiving of the case, which motion
was granted by the trial court. The amended petition for reconstitution was later revived when
respondents finally secured the said documents. The petition was published anew and trial later
ensued, with the following documents submitted by respondents in evidence. The RTC though
rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of sufficient evidence, ruling that R.A. No. 26
only applies in cases where the issuance of the OCT sought to be reconstituted has been established,
only that it was lost or destroyed. While acknowledging the existence of Decree No. 418121 which
was issued for the lot subject of the case, the RTC nevertheless held that there is no established proof
that OCT No. 45361 was issued by virtue of said Decree. Respondents insisted that there was
sufficient evidence to prove the issuance of OCT No. 45361.
Issue:
Whether or not the documents presented by respondents were sufficient to warrant the
reconstitution of the alleged lost OCT No. 45361.
Ruling:
No. The Court agrees with the trial court that no clear and convincing proof has been
adduced that OCT No. 45361 was issued by virtue of Decree No. 418121. The Decision dated March
21, 1930 and the Registrars Index Card containing the notation on OCT No. 45361 do not cite nor
mention that Decree No. 418121 was issued to support the issuance of OCT No. 45361. At this point,
it is well to emphasize that a petition for reconstitution of lost or destroyed OCT requires, as a
condition precedent, that an OCT has indeed been issued, for obvious reasons.
Assuming arguendo that respondents were able to sufficiently prove the existence of OCT
No. 45361 considering the totality of the evidence presented, the Court finds that reconstitution
thereof is still not warranted, applying Section 15 of R.A. No. 26. Before a certificate of title which has
been lost or destroyed may be reconstituted, it must first be proved by the claimants that said
certificate of title was still in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, among others. Here, the mere
existence of TCT No. 10202, later cancelled by TCT No. 44365, which, in turn, was superseded by TCT
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RECONVEYANCE
AQUALAB PHILIPPINES, INC. v. HEIRS OF MARCELINO PAGOBO, G.R. No. 182673, October 5,
2009, J. VELASCO JR.
An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the
plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the acts. Moreover, the defense of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with notice of a flaw in the title of his
transferor
Facts:
The heirs of Marcelino Pagobo were in actual possession of the disputed land in controversy
since it was acquired through homestead patent issued in 1969 until 1991 when Aqualab disturbed
their possession. Aqualab on the other hand claims their right to the land on the basis of transfer
from Gaw Kache.
The heirs of Pagobo filed a case in 1994 for the reconveyance of the land due to fraud.
Aqualab however move for the dismissal of the case arguing that an action for reconveyance due to
fraud prescribes in 4 or 10 years. Hence, on the ground of prescription, the subject transaction which
occurred in 1970 or more than 24 years later is already barred. Further, Aqualab also claims that
they are innocent purchaser for value.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the action of Pagobo is barred by prescription.
2. Whether or not Aqualab is an innocent purchaser for value.
Ruling:
1. No. Heirs of Pagobo have duly averred continuous possession until 1991 when such
possession was allegedly disturbed by Aqualab. Being in possession of the subject land. Hence,
Pagobos right to reconveyance or annulment of title has not prescribed or is not time-barred. The
prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years,
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, if the plaintiff is not in possession.
Thus, one who is in actual possession of a piece of land on a claim of ownership thereof may wait
until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.
In the instant case, the heirs of Pagobo were in possession until 1991, and until such
possession is disturbed, the prescriptive period does not run. Since respondents filed their complaint
in 1994, or three years after their possession was allegedly disturbed, it is clear that prescription has
not set in, either due to fraud or constructive trust.
2. No. In the instant case, it would appear that Anthony Gaw Kache, Aqualabs predecessorin-interest, was not in possession of subject lots. Such a fact should have put Aqualab on guard
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HOMESTEAD PATENT
Josephine Taguinod and Vic A Aguila v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 154654, September 14, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J
Settled in this jurisdiction is the rule that the rights of a holder of a homestead patent are
superior over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform Law but it must be
substantiated by substantial evidence
Facts:
Salud Alvarez Aguila was the registered owner of the disputed lots emanated from a
homestead patent. However prior for registration, Salud has to cancel the title of the lot and
registered in his name. Later on the lots were transferred to Vic A. Aguila and Josephine A. Taguinod
within the prohibition period provided by law. Thereafter, President Ferdinand Marcos promulgated
PD 27 for the emancipation of tenant-farmers from private agricultural lands they till that are
primarily devoted to rice and corn. Pursuant to PD 27, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
launched Operation Land Transfer (OLT) to implement and enforce the laws provisos of transferring
ownership to qualified tenant-farmers or farmer-beneficiaries of the rice or corn land they are
cultivating under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, with the landowner having retention of not
more than seven (7) hectares of agricultural land thereby including Vic Aguila and Josephine
Taguinods lots. Vic A. Aguila, Salud Aguila, on behalf of then minor Aguila, and Taguinod filed a
notarized application for retention. DAR PARO issued a Resolution granting the application for
retention under not more than seven (7) hectares and the excess shall be placed under OLT
Coverage. Office of the Presidential rendered a Decision reversing of DAR Secretary homestead
subject lots are superior than that of DAR law. CA reversed the decision of OP and ruled that
Taguinod and Aguila failed to discharge the burden of adducing evidence to prove the identities of
the original homestead patentees and that they are the direct compulsory heirs of the original
patentees.
Issue:
Whether or not Taguinod and Aguila proved with substantial evidence identities of the
original homestead patentees and that they are the direct compulsory heirs of the original patentees.
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REDEMPTION
ILIGAN BAY MANUFACTURING CORP., et al. v. HENRY DY
G.R. No. 140836 & 140907, June 8, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J.
In cases involving redemption, the law protects the original owner. It is the policy of the law to
aid rather than to defeat the owner's right.
Facts:
Iligan Bay Manufacturing Corp. (IBMC) constructed its oil mills on a parcel of land and later
IBMC became part of United Coconut Oil Mills (UNICOM). Henry Dy was a supplier providing
electrical and construction supplies for the oil mills. IBMC became bankrupt hence its creditors
initiated collection suits. UNICOM, as assignee, acquired the right over the loan accounts of IBMC and
the mortgage on the land where IBMC's oil mill was located. UNICOM foreclosed the mortgage and
acquired the lot. The Provincial Treasurer of Lanao del Norte certified that IBMC/UNICOM was
delinquent in paying its taxes, hence it levied the disputed lot and sold it to Dy being the highest
bidder. Due to IBMC'S unpaid obligations, Dy filed collection suits and a writ of attachment was
issued over the disputed lot. Dy exercised his right of redemption in the tax delinquency sale by
tendering a check and asked that a certificate of redemption be issued in his favor but the Provincial
Treasurer did not do so. Later, the President of UNICOM redeemed the lot and a certificate of
redemption was issued. The Office of the Provincial Treasurer informed UNICOMs president that
there was still an additional redemption price due from UNICOM. Due to UNICOM's failure to pay the
total redemption price, Dy requested that a final deed of sale be executed in his favor but was denied.
Hence, Dy filed a case for Mandamus with Damages. The RTC found that the refusal of the Provincial
Treasurer was proper since UNICOM had redeemed the subject property within the prescribed
period. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the redemption was not valid for failure to pay the total
redemption price.
Issue:
Whether or not UNICOM had validly redeemed the subject property.
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