Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave
abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were
married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a
Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at
Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela
Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the
prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy;
from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she
used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual
vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has
been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out
of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount
of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of
Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that
he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been
disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted
him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-infact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and
administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized
to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The
petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over
said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and
Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the
time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management
and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of
action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is,
therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no
property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion
to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage
by a man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the
case of Yap v. CA 4 cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower
court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these
cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for
separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the
separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be
had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship between said
parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in
order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be
invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties
involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's
prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other
incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since
the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely
one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with
the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in
the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to
recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People v. Mendoza, 7 contends that
SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by
private respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore,
under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a
basis for the separation and distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated
while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is
bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. 8Petitioner himself does not dispute the
absolute nullity of their marriage. 9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are
cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish
the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void
there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge
whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the
courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases
involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier
ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the
husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court
stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article
1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action
for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra
v. Government Service Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not
only void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above
provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for
himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is
needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be
modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or
declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice
Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment,
they still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision
to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of
remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final
judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a
subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in
the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent
Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second
marriage and living with another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with
the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of
remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant
dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word
"solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in
conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it
finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly
qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the
interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering
irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of
remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well
invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage,
such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support
of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such
cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a
marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity.
But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of
remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void?
Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the
State." 20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the
stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of
a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the
basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to
the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no
legal effect and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be
reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for
nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could
conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the
courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an
open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of
marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought
to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in
the Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If
previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and
annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code
is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to
state in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the
dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the
misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the
Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to
"for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a
final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term
"solely" instead of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis
supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is
unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary
civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their
union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court
but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership.
In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the
petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident
of their marriage such as the separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein
shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as
the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court
dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I
should like, however, to put in a modest observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no judicial decree
is required to establish their nullity, except in the following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the Family
Code; viz.:
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability
for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will
not give it the status or the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific
instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void marriage.
Examples of these cases are children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to
psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition,
delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the
annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or born before the judicial
declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54,
Family Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered extant per se.
Neither the conjugal, partnership of gain under the old regime nor the absolute
community of property under the new Code (absent a marriage settlement), will apply;
instead, their property relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must hasten to add as a personal view,
however, that the exceptional effects on children of a void marriage because of the
psychological incapacity of a party thereto should have been extended to cover even the
personal and property relations of the spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages
where the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts and with little uncertainty,
the term "psychological incapacity" is so relative and unsettling that until a judicial
declaration of nullity is made its interim effects can long and literally hang on the balance
not only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also as regards third
persons with whom the spouses deal.
# Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I
should like, however, to put in a modest observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no judicial decree
is required to establish their nullity, except in the following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the Family
Code; viz.:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. (n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in case a party
thereto was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where an action or defense for the declaration of
nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took effect (Article 39, Family
Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed unaffected by the Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability
for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will
not give it the status or the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific
instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void marriage.
Examples of these cases are children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to
psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition,
delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the
annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or born before the judicial
declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54,
Family Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered extant per se.
Neither the conjugal, partnership of gain under the old regime nor the absolute
community of property under the new Code (absent a marriage settlement), will apply;
instead, their property relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must hasten to add as a personal view,
however, that the exceptional effects on children of a void marriage because of the
psychological incapacity of a party thereto should have been extended to cover even the
personal and property relations of the spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages
where the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts and with little uncertainty,
the term "psychological incapacity" is so relative and unsettling that until a judicial
declaration of nullity is made its interim effects can long and literally hang on the balance
not only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also as regards third
persons with whom the spouses deal.
# Footnotes
1 Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 28-29.
2 L-28093, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315.
3 Annex "J", Rollo, pp. 62-67, Justice Jorge S. Imperial, ponente and
Justices Luis A. Javellana and Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurring.
4 L-40003, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 229.
5 Annex "M", Rollo, p. 80.
6 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).
7 95 Phil. 845 (1954).
8 CIVIL CODE, art. 80, par. 4; FAMILY CODE, arts. 35, par. 4 and 41.
9 Rollo, pp. 102 and 106.
10 See: Note 6 at p. 1036; Note 7 at p. 848.
25 Art. 50 (2).
The issue before us however is not the scope nor even the interpretation of Art. 36 of the
Family Code. 1 Rather, the issue is the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition for
annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill of particulars filed in amplification of the
petition.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman Catholic Church
in Ermita, Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year later, their union turned sour. They
separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of
Joselitas psychological incapacity.
The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 7
January 1992. Therein it is alleged that "[s]ometime in 1987, petitioner came to realize
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage
although the same became manifest only thereafter." 2 Dissatisfied with the allegation in
the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court
granted. 3 Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that
. . . at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and
accept the demands made by his profession that of a newly qualified
Doctor of Medicine upon petitioners time and efforts so that she
frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother,
whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She argued that the "assertion
(in the Bill of Particulars) is a statement of legal conclusion made by petitioners counsel
and not an averment of ultimate facts, as required by the Rules of Court, from which
such a conclusion may properly be inferred . . . ." 4 But finding the questioned Bill of
Particulars adequate, the trial court issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing
Joselita to file her responsive pleading.
Joselita was not convinced. She filed a petition for certiorari with us. However, we
referred her petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution.
On 21 July 1992, the Court of Appeals denied due course to her petition thus
Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations in the Bill of
Particulars constitute the ultimate facts which the Rules of Court requires at this point. He
defines ultimate facts as
. . . important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of
the primary right and duty, or which directly make upon the wrongful acts
or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of
probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material
elements are to be established. It refers to principal, determinate facts
upon the existence of which the entire cause of action rests. 6
Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts,
or allegations of mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from reflection and
natural reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate facts which are to be
pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or traversible facts essential to the
statement of the cause of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will
prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of
those facts . . . 7
Private respondent further argues that "[c]onclusions of law and evidentiary matters need
not be stated in the complaint. The rules of pleading limit the statement of the cause of
action only to such operative facts as would give rise to the right of action of the plaintiff
to obtain relief against the wrongdoer. The details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence, statements of law, inferences and arguments need not be stated." 8
In a nutshell, the ultimate question is whether the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein
respondent is of sufficient definiteness or particularity as to enable herein petitioner to
properly prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.
A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause or
causes of action." 9 Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which the expected
evidence will support." 10 As stated by private respondent, "[t]he term does not refer to the
details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to
be established." It refers to "the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the
evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts." And a motion for bill of
particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already
states a sufficient cause of action. 11 A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters
which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information may be
obtained by other means. 12
We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of Particulars filed by
private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more details
from private respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. Indeed,
petitioner has already been adequately apprised of private respondents cause of action
against her thus
. . . . (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand
and accept the demands made by his profession that of a newly
qualified Doctor of Medicine upon petitioners time and efforts so that
she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her
mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner can already
prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already alleged that
"she (petitioner) was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his
profession . . . upon his time and efforts . . . " Certainly, she can respond to this. To
demand for more details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts
facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. 13 For sure, the additional facts called
for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain
evidentiary matters is not the function of a motion for bill of particulars. 14
We distinguish the instant case from Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic 15 where we said
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons,
names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of
property for identification purposes, the particular transactions involving
withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts
as would support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not
evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are material facts
that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that
the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against
him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
The aforementioned pronouncement cannot apply to the instant case. That ruling
involves alleged "misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nations
wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption,
betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power." The respondents therein pray for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. There, the alleged illicit
acts should be fully documented. The instant case, on the other hand, concerns marital
relationship. It would be unreasonable, if not unfeeling, to document each and every
circumstance of marital disagreement. True, the complaining spouse will have to prove
his case, but that will not come until trial begins.
Consequently, we have no other recourse but to order the immediate resumption of the
annulment proceeding which have already been delayed for more than two years now,
even before it could reach its trial stage. Whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated should be immediately determined. There is no point in unreasonably
delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple
who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life either
alone or in the company of each other.
A word on Art. 36 of the Family Code. 16 We do not see the need to define or limit the scope
of the provision. Not in this case, at least. For, we are not called upon to do so, the actual
controversy being the sufficiency of the bill of particulars. To interpret the provision at this
juncture would be to give an obiter dictum which is ill-timed. Besides, it appears that petitioner
in her memorandum has demonstrated a good grasp of what Art. 36 actually covers. Suffice it
to say that Mme. Justice Sempio-Diy, formerly of the Court of Appeals and a member of the
Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family code, explains
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the
questioned Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated 21 July 1992 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
# Footnotes
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by
the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which
declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos
("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him.
Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel
persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein
private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the
Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel
and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court
Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo
City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel
Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of
other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from
Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few
days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse
despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01
January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did.
When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training
program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25
August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all
his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial
Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article
36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the
complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had,
in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage
was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that
she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial
court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 2891, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate
with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to
communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her
husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less,
is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations
during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the
Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that
after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but
later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the
remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of
their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the
phrase "psychological or mental impotence" is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it
as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their
answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still
valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice
Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely
to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological
incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of
marriage.
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have
decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity"
because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the
reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law
should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even
under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil
Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family
Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church
on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in
Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive
or prospective in application.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director
Eufemio were for retroactivity.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten
years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding
to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law
as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee
would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which
reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted
mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no
juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of
the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as
an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm
was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of
marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob
gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use
of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant
to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54
of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance
that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that
incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call
up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July
1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that she
informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the
U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the
Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were
no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the
part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed,
without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her
whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer,
claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic
ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for
instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one
partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and
practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond
between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in
such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to
inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with
him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her
whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable
indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations,
although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to
a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes,
ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes
today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner
into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or
women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by
private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought
from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute
divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident
purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life
by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner
Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our
society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken
as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality
that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of
this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union
through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its
enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed,
not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the
Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being
separate and distinct from the other.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice
Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see
my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration
of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living
and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been
shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private
respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies
precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to
expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by
Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to
abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are,
however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention
by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call
up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July
1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that she
informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the
U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the
Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were
no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the
part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed,
without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her
whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer,
claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic
ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for
instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one
partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and
practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond
between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in
such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to
inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute
divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident
purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life
by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner
Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with
him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her
whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable
indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations,
although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to
a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes,
ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes
today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner
into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or
women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by
private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought
from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private
respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to
add some observations. The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy
written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the
present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of
including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP
Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in
favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years
of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested
to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the
effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal
separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our
society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken
as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality
that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of
this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union
through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its
enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed,
not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the
Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being
separate and distinct from the other.
Footnotes
1 Per Judge Enrique Garovillo.
2 Penned by Justice Jainal Rasul, concurred in by Justice Pedro Ramirez
and Ramon Mabutas, Jr.
3 Rollo, 37-42.
4 Rollo, 13-18.
5 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, July 26, 1986.
6 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 2, 1986.
7 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 9, 1986.
EN BANC
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in
addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a
marriage, namely, psychological incapacity. Since the Codes effectivity, our
courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of
psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel
provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the
herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has
labelled -- exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration -- Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world. Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the
need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
[2]
[3]
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and
Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that
their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridels
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after
their marriage; (2) Roridels refusal to perform some of her marital duties such
as cooking meals; and (3) Roridels failure to run the household and handle
their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel
and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a
father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on
whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986,
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been
the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very
intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in
March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their
child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown
that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual
who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the
couples best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to
free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
[4]
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina
was born on July 29, 1986;
3.That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner
wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and
that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of
Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits A to E-1. Reynaldo did not present
any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals
which affirmed in toto the RTCs decision.Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that the Court of Appeals made
an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase psychological
incapacity (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case, adding that the appealed
Decision tended to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world which is anathema to our culture.
In denying the Solicitor Generals appeal, the respondent Court
relied heavily on the trial courts findings that the marriage between the
parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities.
Then, it added its own opinion that the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as the Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family rights x x x. It concluded
that:
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court
of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that opposing and conflicting
personalities is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that
such ground is not simply the neglectby the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
The Courts Ruling
[5]
[7]
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
[10]
From their submissions and the Courts own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code
are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected
by the state.
[11]
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
[12]
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof.Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
[13]
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.
[14]
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to
grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the
foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo
Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur
Padilla, J., See Separate Statement.
[1]
Sixteenth Division composed of J. Segundino G. Chua, ponente and chairman; JJ. Serafin
V.C. Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of the RTC Decision
as follows:
[5]
To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his
marital obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature, irresponsible, dependent,
disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, and an infidel.These characteristics of respondent are
based on petitioners testimony that the former failed to be gainfully employed after he was
relieved from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel sometime in February, 1986,
leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the family. Also when they were separated in
fact, respondent practically abandoned both petitioner-mother and son except during the first
few months of separation when respondent regularly visited his son and gave him a monthly
allowance of P1,000.00 for about two to four months. Respondent is likewise dependent on
his parents for financial aid and support as he has no savings, preferring to spend his money
with his friends and peers. A year after their marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he
bought a house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque for about a million pesos. They then
transferred there only for the petitioner to discover a few months later that they were actually
renting the house with the respondents parents responsible for the payment of the
rentals. Aside from this, respondent would also lie about his salary and ability. And that at
present, respondent is living with his mistress and their child, which fact he does not deny.
It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent turned sour if we look at
the background of their relationship. During their college days, when they were still going
steady, respondent observed petitioner to be conservative, homely, and intelligent causing
him to believe then that she would make an ideal wife and mother. Likewise, petitioner fell in
love with respondent because of his thoughtfulness and gentleness. After a year, however,
they decided to break their relationship because of some differences in their personalities.
Almost five (5) years later, while they were working in Manila, petitioner and respondent
rekindled their love affair. They became very close and petitioner was glad to observe a more
mature respondent. Believing that they knew each other much better after two years of going
steady, they decided to settle down and get married. It would seem, therefore, that petitioner
and respondent knew each other well and were then prepared for married life.
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-up and
dominated their life together. Unexpectedly on both their parts, petitioner and respondent
failed to respond properly to the situation. This failure resulted in their frequent arguments
and fightings. In fact, even with the intervention and help of their parents who arranged for
their possible reconciliation, the parties could not come to terms.
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up because of their
opposing and conflicting personalities (sic). Neither of them can accept and understand the
weakness of each other. No one gives in and instead, blame each other for whatever problem
or misunderstanding/s they encounter. In fine, respondent cannot solely responsible for the
failure of other (sic) marriage. Rather, this resulted because both parties cannot relate to each
other as husband and wife which is unique and requisite in marriage.
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and woman with the basic
objective of establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1, Family Code). The unique
element of permanency of union signifies a continuing, developing, and lifelong relationship
between the parties. Towards this end, the parties must fully understand and accept the
(implications and consequences of being permanently) united in marriage. And the
maintenance of this relationship demands from the parties, among others, determination to
succeed in their marriage as well as heartfelt understanding, acceptance, cooperation, and
support for each other. Thus, the Family Code requires them to live together, to observe
mutual (love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Failure to observe)
and perform these fundamental roles of a husband and a wife will most likely lead to the
break-up of the marriage. Such is the unfortunate situation in this case." (Decision, pp. 5-8;
Original Records, pp. 70-73)
[6]
[7]
Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.
[8]
The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of the marriage tribunals
of each archdiocese or diocese in the country. Aside from heading the Appellate Tribunal,
Most. Rev. Cruz is also incumbent president of the Catholic Bishop's Conferrence of the
Philippines, Archbishop of Dagupan Lingayen, and holds the degrees of Doctor of Canon Law
and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also Secretaary General of the Second Plenary
Council of the Philippines -PCP II- held from January 20, 1991 to February 17, 1991, which is
the rough equivalent of a parliament or constitutional convention in the Philippine Church, and
[9]
where the ponente, who was a council member, had the privilege of being overwhelmed by
his keen mind and prayerful discernments.
Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired Minister of Justice,
author, noted civil law professor and law practitioner.
[10]
[11]
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the state.
Section 3. The state shall defend;
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and
the demands of responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
specialprotection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation , and other conditions
prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state may also do
so through just programs of social security."
"Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this code."
[12]
[13]
This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the other hand, the text used un
Santos vs. CA reads:
[14]
3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
The differrence in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruzs Memorandum is due to the
fact that the original Canon is written in Latin and both versions are differently-worded English
translations.
the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the
Court of Appeals 1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh.
"A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa,
Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of
their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the
second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City.
But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew.
They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City
for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during
siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They
slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.
Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20,
1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and
still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to
this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was
given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never
did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he
did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be
annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his
part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of
them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them
has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further
claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But,
the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to
have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant
claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not
continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this
case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to
return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the
defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still
very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between
the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage
entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila
Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the
Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with
petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally
absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of
both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the
lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between
them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private
respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there
was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there
remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that
public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts
intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the
admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial
is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for
annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision
seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not
based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a
testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner,
the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon
a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the
Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner
admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with
each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant
portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a
stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review
of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted
that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability.
Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code
(See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal
of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to
make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth
analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to
physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, i.e., physical
disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, why private respondent would
not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short
span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding
on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with
the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At
any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e.,
even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the
other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the
parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to
have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may
not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private
respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime
he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in
the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife
could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim that
the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than
to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable
resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of
a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to
discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family
Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is
actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless
it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent.
That is a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not
only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court.
SECOND DIVISION
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent
on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time
of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to
perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the
household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his
friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married,
cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having
affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent
endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease
(STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and
unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having
abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three
children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the
custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of
land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite,
purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with
him when he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992.[6]
On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents failure to file his answer, the
trial court issued an order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an
investigation to determine if there was collusion between the parties. [7] Only petitioner
appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor
found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial.[8]
Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:[9]
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian
University in Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than private
respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and botany. Private
respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two consecutive semesters. They
became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer private respondents
teacher.On January 1, 1981, they were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for
his tuition fees, while petitioner provided his allowances and other financial
needs. The family income came from petitioners salary as a faculty member of the
Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling
Tupperware products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice
andpolvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was
agreed that he would help petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to
customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift and had other women,
petitioners business suffered. Private respondent often had smoking and drinking
sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their
first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a certain Realita Villena to
private respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was
working in Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted
having an extra-marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end
her relationship with private respondent. For his part, private respondent said he
would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal
home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private respondent came back,
however, petitioner accepted him, despite private respondents infidelity in the hope of
saving their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get
a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in
1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991, because
he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the company. He
received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for the
needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the
entire amount within four months of his retirement.
two of them. Petitioner also told private respondent of her intention to file a petition
for the annulment of their marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioners letter. By this
time, he had already abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992,
petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private
respondents whereabouts had been unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioners childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine
Christian University, testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment. She
said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced private respondent to her
(Alfaro) as the formers sweetheart. Alfaro said she was not impressed with private
respondent who was her student in accounting. She observed private respondent to be
fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In November 1980, when
petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming
wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding
because she thought private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then
unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared happy during the early part
of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that private respondent started drinking
with his friends and going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioners claim
that private respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on relationships with
different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed that
petitioner was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private
respondent. After the first year of petitioners marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private
respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said
that private respondent was not close to his children and that he had abandoned
petitioner.[18]
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision [19] dismissing the petition
for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision
reads:[20]
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the
petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid
reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment
thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against
the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
....
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
....
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
....
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for
more than one year.
....
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions
psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a
marriage, has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as
constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been
enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the
petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the
Philippines, as there is no dispute that the gonorrhea transmitted to the
petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after
petitioners marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions
of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction
with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful reading of the
two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of this ground
(fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment
of petitioners marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and
proved in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered
its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v.
Court of Appeals,[21] the Court of Appeals held:[22]
good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitionerappellant who, herself, happened to be the college professor of her
respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even described her respondenthusband not as a problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8,
1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after
the marriage and there is no proof that the same have already existed at the
time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE
CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN
RULING
THAT
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT
WAS
NOT
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE
AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO
PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE
PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE
AMOUNT OF P3,000.00 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER
AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent should be annulled on the ground of private respondents psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed
to show that private respondents psychological incapacity existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. She argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of
private respondent became manifest only after the celebration of their marriage
should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.
respondents parents and petitioner supported him through college.After his schooling,
although he eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan
offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a
greater part of their marital life, private respondent was out of job and did not have
the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering,
and later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondents
condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very
objectives of marriage.
However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that
he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondents
youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As
pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:[25]
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise
cause of private respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[26] Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.[27]
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of
Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial courts finding with regard to the nonexistence of private respondents psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage,
are entitled to great weight and even finality.[28] Only where it is shown that such
findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon
petitioners contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for
their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over
the real property. These matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate
proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of
children which petitioner may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1]
Per Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros and concurred in by Justices Jorge S. Imperial (Chairman) and B.A. Adefuin-De la
Cruz.
[2]
RTC Records, p. 7.
[3]
Id., p. 8.
[4]
Id., p. 9.
[5]
Id., p. 10.
[6]
[7]
[8]
Id., p. 25.
[9]
TSN, pp. 6-56, Nov. 13, 1992; pp. 3-31, Dec. 8, 1992.
[10]
[11]
Id., p. 38.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
Id., p. 47.
[16]
[17]
Id., p. 48.
17
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
Supra, at 40-41.
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
THIRD DIVISION
BRENDA
B.
MARCOS, petitioner,
MARCOS, respondent.
vs. WILSON
G.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1)
on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu
at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which
was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the
Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and
F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in
1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in
Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the
other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air
Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge
from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential
Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations,
they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy
Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from
the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987
and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however
prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their
children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good
Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their
unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her
driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a
house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss
unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children
described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU,
Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D.,
for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the
appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to
support his family and his violent attitude towardsappellee and their
children, x x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not
been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in
this wise:
In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following
issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the
findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a
respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply
because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological
evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all
the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of
the Petition."[7]
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests
that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to
perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by
the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests
himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information
in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had
refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the
interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code [9] were
laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation
of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the
celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation
of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095."[10]
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented
in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common
children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not
lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had
lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six
years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to
give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and
not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence
showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are
those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Justice Bernardo LL Salas with the concurrence of Justices Fermin A. Martin Jr. (Division
chairman) and Candido V. Rivera (member).
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 24, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of
respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Virgilio V. Macaraig. Petitioner's Memorandum,
signed by Atty. Rita Linda V. Jimeno, had been filed earlier on November 5, 1999.
[6]
[7]
[8]
"The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article shall prescribe in ten years after
its celebration."
[10]
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for
failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her
failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
[11]
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is DENIED and
assailed
Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
[9]
"Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
[12]
"Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner,
to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly
showed signs of psychological incapacity to perform his marital covenant. His "true
color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became
apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends
daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning.When
cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap
and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened
to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared
from physical violence.
For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child by nature or by adoption."
THIRD DIVISION
LORNA
GUILLEN
PESCA, petitioner,
PESCA, respondent.
vs. ZOSIMO
leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the
marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon
City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally
resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that
they could stay together when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four
children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old
Richie.
A.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal
abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear
his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she
returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so
turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight oclock, respondent assaulted
petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered
black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City
General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against
respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed
with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued
respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their
of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity
has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an
expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity." [1]
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of
Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals,[2] promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, [3] promulgated on 13 February 1997,
should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling
could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be
merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the
application of the Santos and Molina dictashould warrant only a remand of the case
to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its
assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove
psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined in Santos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court
said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the
appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of
the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and
is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because
Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when,
for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has
additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in
trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological
incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint
and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a
declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution
and the foundation of the family[6] that the State cherishes and protects. While the
Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with
respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should
we.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman),
JJ., concur.
Panganiban,
[1]
[2]
240 SCRA 20
[3]
[4]
[5]
Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 285; Tanada vs. Guingona, 235
SCRA 507; Columbia Pictures, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 144.
[6]
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand
and elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He testified that his parents never
approved of his marriage as they still harbored hope that he would return to the
seminary.4 The early years of their marriage were difficult years as they had a hard time
being accepted as husband and wife by his parents and it was at this period that his wife
started exhibiting signs of being irritable and temperamental5 to him and his
parents.6 She was also obsessive about cleanliness which became the common source
of their quarrels.7 He, however, characterized their union as happy during that period of
time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new
house.8 In 1981, when he became busy with law school and with various community
organizations, it was then that he felt that he and his wife started to drift apart. 9 He then
narrated incidents during their marriage that were greatly embarrassing and/or
distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with an elderly neighbor; 10 when she
would visit him in his office and remark that the curtains were already dirty or when she
kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a ballpen from his table; 11 when
she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he was away; 12 when she
confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having an affair with
him;13 and other incidents reported to him which would show her jealous nature. Money
matters continued to be a source of bitter quarrels.14 Respondent Manuel could not forget
that he was not able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did not
approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very generous when it came to
celebrations of their parish priest.15 Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a
womanizer16 or that he had a mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their
conjugal properties and obligations.18
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuels Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner Juanita
seldom went to respondent Manuels office.19 But when she was there, she would call
witness to complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of the office. 20 One time,
witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through respondent Manuels drawer
looking for his address book while the latter was in Subic attending a conference. 21 When
petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she called witness, telling the latter
that she was looking for the telephone number of respondents hotel room in Subic. A
process server was requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town
proper. When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked
drawer. On another occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she
heard petitioner Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na
yan? Baka anak mo yan sa labas?"22
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose
professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita. 23 From
her psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco
contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner relational problem which
affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond with love, support and
understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to
the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged
themselves in a defective communication pattern which is characteristically
negative and deformed. This affected their competence to maintain the love and
respect that they should give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are
expected to use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and differences.
Whereas Juanita would be derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive and
obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and suppression. In his
effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to cover up for his felt or
imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental effects of his
unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the marriage. Both spouses, who
display narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with their other maladaptive
traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to each
others needs and feelings. The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy
and a progressive marriage. Manuel and Juanita have shown their
psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply with the fundamental
xxx
xxx
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses to
slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A wife, as in the instant
case, may have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of
irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now stand, the
dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such cases. In contrast to some
countries, our laws do not look at a marital partner as a mere refrigerator in the
Kitchen even if he or she sometimes may sound like a firetruck. 37
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 May 2001. 38
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the
psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically
incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.39 Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there is
empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a twoway process. An expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it is needed
by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship
with love "amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise conscious of its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi
vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less, but reverse and set aside the decision of the lower
court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but also of himself. 40
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The Courts Ruling
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we held that whether or
not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity
of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be closely
scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on "all
fours" with another. This, the Court of Appeals did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear
divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved
therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time of their wedding night on 22 May
1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed
the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the reason that an
essential marital obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that "the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity."
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we
have here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wifes outbursts
and overbearing ways, who finds his wifes obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign
on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for his
person and his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these inadequacies of
petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount
to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really
psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy should
give me a chance to have a new family." She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan
mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin." 48
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation
which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual
infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code.50 It must be shown that respondent Manuels
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state51 and not merely due to
his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent
Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child
at that particular point."52
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to
prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with
cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his
salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological
maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of
the marriage or that they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a
psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was
psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of
marriage.54
The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand,
does not help his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctors conclusion that
petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly
shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not from the
inception of their marriage as required by law but from her experiences during the
marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the
priesthood,55 her husbands philandering, admitted no less by him,56 and her inability to
conceive.57 Dr. Garcias report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew
professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt,
becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple.
This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination. 58
31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated
and given full force and effect. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a
window into the Siayngcoss life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a
married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband
consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.59 As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20-22.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves.
It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be
experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer
working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem. 61
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July
2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
10
Id. at 23.
11
Id. at 28-29.
12
Id. at 34.
13
Id. at 30.
30
Id. at 22.
14
Id. at 27-28.
31
15
Id. at 33.
32
Records, p. 169.
16
Id. at 30.
33
17
Id. at 37.
34
Ibid.
18
Id. at 43-44.
35
Ibid.
19
36
Id. at 6.
20
37
21
Id. at 9-13.
38
Id. at 209.
22
Id. at 14.
39
23
40
Rollo, p. 43.
24
41
25
42
26
43
Id.; Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755.
27
Id. at 7.
44
28
Id. at 11.
45
29
Id. at 12.
xxx
48
49
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 42; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010,
08 December 1999, 320 SCRA 76; Dedel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151867, 29 January
2004.
50
51
Ibid.
52
53
54
55
56
Id. at 111.
57
Id. at 110.
58
xxx
A: I started feeling that we somehow begun (sic) drifting apart because I was
developing a new field of interest in the legal profession. I was occupied with leading
various community organization (sic) including homeowners association. Maybe that
was when we started drifting apart. (TSN, 07 October 1998, at 22)
12. The certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is
dispensed with to avoid delay.
46
47
60
Dedel v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 50, citing Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 42,
at 36.
61
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity
became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his
family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did
not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing
at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion
for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion
on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition,
was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days
from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to
the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no
collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to present
her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She
thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M.
Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered
to make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to
this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological incapacity,
the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his
obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent
remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his
family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very
immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondents
mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision
dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on
the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the
cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should
petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around
and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and
assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of
the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the
spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a
Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the
psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations,
despite respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in
the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to
them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely
indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable
expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder
on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the
courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his
family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent
him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care
at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was
caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. 16 There was
no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context
of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that
Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we
ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological,not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply
here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a
Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the
Rollo, p. 29.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution
that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent,
terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
10
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August
28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Rollo, p. 14.
Article II, Section 12; and, Article XV, Sections 1 & 2 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
11
Republic of the Philippines vs. Dagdag, 351 SCRA 425 [2001] citing Republic
of the Philippines vs. Hernandez, 320 SCRA 76 [1999].
12
SO ORDERED.
13
14
15
16
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
grounds:
Second Division.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Rollo, p. 33.
Rollo, p. 52.
17
Rollo, p. 30.
18
19
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married
before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church
wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6
December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died
five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared
null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. 8
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed
that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and
instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only
confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from other
sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill
her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo
Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology,
when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold
Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed
her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a
luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented
an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of
Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as
the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner
later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him
when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes
Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they
were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip
to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public
market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.19 She spent
lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on
false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but
since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. 21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a
psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative
type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents persistent and
constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondents
extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was
no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another
woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations
by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the
allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities. 24 She
presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of
losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised
such intent from Davids act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot. 26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. 27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of
Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the
advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told
petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with
the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that
a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8
December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers
thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident
of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares. 29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she
merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates
from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands whereabouts. 30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people
from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their
marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and
unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient
for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to
refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the
series of tests conducted by his assistant,33together with the screening procedures and
the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led
him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism,
psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to
the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by
Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondents
psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which
was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test. 35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that
respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation, state of health,
singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly established. According to
the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of
lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37During the pendency of the appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with
modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that
only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals.
Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent
may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless
held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v.
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the
Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply
would not be
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes
the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should
have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the same time, Tolentino
noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the
essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the
marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of
Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." 65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further
affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief
Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity]
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since
then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from
the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically
incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been
consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to
design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific
examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret
the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.
Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended
by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of
psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the
particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and
experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the
Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since
1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides
courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same
time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a
case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary
understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed
the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of
the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological
incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had
bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from
canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of
marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It
would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of
influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been
derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial
interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on
psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this
Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76
marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the
nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages illequipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further
the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this
Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1
and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes
the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of
the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the
modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and
subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to
put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This
has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial
denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to
protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage,
not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances
warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations
to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of
this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who
corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications from Blackgold
Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims
pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from
the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered
petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80
couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One
of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think,
based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x
xx
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36
must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence.
However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private
parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological
incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the
parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of
concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers
human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication between
individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then
when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And
therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this
relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be
based on love, trust and respect.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly
explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent,
from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies,
fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters
to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income,
educational attainment, and family background, among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or
clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two
(2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the
department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that
there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in
constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic
obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for
the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioners
officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the
behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of
stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that
there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a
woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We
all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is
carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact
that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes
that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and
we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically
incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological
incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded
that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to
fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case
record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as the
supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination
of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioners
witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and
Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on
their own acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since the
trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to
dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert
witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its
finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has
been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling
lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities,
her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in
convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her
commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
pronounced:
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a
marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and
Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous
article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3)
and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to,
and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the
spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact
that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court
apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it
anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its
attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the
invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the
"lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was affirmed by
both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.92 In fact, respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause93was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from
contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based
on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the
Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in
tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the
substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously
undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative
component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its
practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and
reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding
matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as
well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial
court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church
rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a
similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the
trial court instead appreciated respondents version as correct, and the appellate court
affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have
diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts,
and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this
Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It
was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the
appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents condition was
incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned
to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondents aberrant behavior
remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her
excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is
incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents
condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite
grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had
petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead,
they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this
point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered
its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was
promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity
must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement
was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its
discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee, 96 then the
opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition
of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed
during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a
characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came
out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondents psychological
incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of
the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least,
there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent
promulgation of the trial courts decision that required a medical finding of incurability.
Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate
review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law
constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this
present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological
incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that
necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no
categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondents psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to
elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to
him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those
cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review,
where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have
seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this
case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not
pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36
relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate
in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would
have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was
tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are
sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has
been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact
that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral
requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of
Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital
bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite
her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent
challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on
respondents avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these
cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is
more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Attestation by the
Divisions Chairman, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August
1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under
Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
Footnotes
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Rollo, p. 86.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
Solemnized by Rev. Victor M. Navarro, Minister of the PCCC, Las Pias, Metro
Manila.
4
Id. at 1-2.
10
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
11
Supra note 8.
29
Id.
12
30
13
31
14
Id. at 95.
32
Id. at 77-78.
15
33
16
34
Rollo, p. 94.
17
35
18
36
19
37
Id. at 97-98.
20
Id.; records, p. 3.
38
21
39
Id. at 101-103.
22
40
23
Id.
41
Rollo, p. 95.
24
Id. at 93.
42
25
26
27
Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 105, 126 (1995),
citing Serrano v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 107 (1991).
43
Rollo, p. 82.
44
Id.
Id. at 73, 93.
The petitioning spouse and co-respondent in the case being Roridel O. Molina.
Id.
45
28
Id.
46
Rollo, p. 78.
There were two cases since 1997 wherein the Court did let stand a lower court
order declaring as a nullity a marriage on the basis of Article 36. These cases are
Sy v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 760 (2000), and Buenaventura v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 127358 & 127449, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 261. However,
in Sy, the Court found that the marriage was void ab initio due to the lack of a
marriage license at the time the marriage was solemnized, and thus declined to
pass upon the question of psychological incapacity. In Buenaventura, since the
parties chose not to challenge the trial courts conclusion of psychological
incapacity and instead raised questions on the award of damages and support,
the Court did not review the finding of psychological incapacity.
47
57
Subject to the same qualifications under Article 85 (3) of the Civil Code. See
note 56.
58
59
See Civil Code, Art. 1327 (2) in relation to Art. 1318 (1).
See Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 32-33 (1995). See also A.
Sempio Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines 37 (1988). A
contrary view though was expressed by Justice Ricardo Puno, also a member of
the Family Code commission. See Santos v. Court of Appeals, ibid.
60
48
It does not escape this Courts attention that many lower courts do grant
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36, and that these decisions are
not elevated for review to the Supreme Court.
49
50
Translated from the original Spanish by Justice F.C. Fisher. See F.C. Fisher,
The Civil Code of Spain with Philippine Notes and References 45 (Fifth Ed.,
1947). The original text of Article 83 (2) of the Spanish Civil Code reads: "No
pueden contraer matrimonio: x x x (2) Los que no estuvieren en el pleno ejercicio
du su razon al tiempo de contraer matrimonio."
51
62
Id.
63
Id. at 274.
64
Id. at 40, emphasis supplied. The Court further added, "[t]here is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to marriage." Id.
65
52
66
53
67
Id. at 677.
54
68
55
69
Unless the party of unsound mind, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with
the other as husband or wife. See Civil Code, Art. 85 (3).
56
81
University of Santo Tomas Hospital and UERM Memorial Medical Center. Dr.
Abcede likewise was the past president of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association.
TSN, February 23, 1994, p. 6.
82
83
84
85
71
Id. at 431; citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, 214 (1997),
Padilla, J., Separate Statement.
See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 32-39.
74
75
86
Id. at 850.
87
72
73
As shown by the Motion(s) for Early Resolution of the Case filed by petitioner
with the canonical declarations attached as annexes.
88
89
Id. at 97-98.
Thus, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48, wherein the
psychological incapacity of the petitioner was recognized by the Court from the
fact that he did not engage in sexual relations with his wife during their ten (10)
month marital cohabitation, remains a binding precedent, even though it was
decided shortly before the Molina case.
76
77
91
78
Id. at 680.
92
Id. at 101-103.
80
Rollo, p. 82.
"A restrictive clause is herewith attached to this sentence of nullity to the effect
that the respondent may not enter into another marriage without the express
consent of this Tribunal, in deference to the sanctity and dignity of the sacrament
of matrimony, as well as for the protection of the intended spouse."; rollo, p. 97.
93
94
95
Rollo, p. 82.
96
97
Id. at 37-39.
98
Id. at 39-40.
99
Id. at 33.
100
under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to
the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
"The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Id. at 39.
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and
most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself,
that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law
on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability
of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit
101
102
103
Id. at 593.
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
Promulgated:
February 28, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
him. On August 20, 1998, respondent went out of their dwelling for
his usual late night stints but he never came back the following
morning. They never lived together since.
Respondent is MANOLITO SAN JOSE, 31 years old with
last known address at 14-D Ibayo, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. He
is unemployed and stayed in school only to finish his secondary
education. He was described to be a happy-go-lucky individual
spending most of his time hanging out with friends. Considered to
be a bad influence, he was into gambling, drinking sprees and
prohibited drugs as well.
xxxx
REMARKS:
Through the evaluation of test data, correlated with clinical
interviews and description of their marital plight, it is the opinion of
the undersigned that the disintegration of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was caused primarily by the latters
psychological incapacity to perform the essential roles and
obligations of a married man and a father.
His behavioral pattern characterized mainly by constant
irresponsibility, lack of concern for the welfare of others, selfcentered orientation, absence of remorse, violent tendencies and his
involvement in activities defying social and moral ethics; suits
under the classification of Anti-Social Personality Disorder.
Such disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply
[immersed] within the system. It continues to influence the
individual until the later stage of life.[9] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
xxxx
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the
facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by
respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and
secondhand information fed to him by one side.
Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific
and unreliable.[23] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Also in Ferraris, this Court held that habitual alcoholism, just like
sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment, does not by itself
constitute ground for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity.[27] Neither is emotional immaturity and irresponsibility.[28] Or
failure or refusal to meet duties and responsibilities of a married man if it
is not shown to be due to some psychological (not physical) illness.[29]
While Molina then is not set in stone,[30] the facts and circumstances
attendant to this case do not warrant a deviation from it.
Associate Justice
SO ORDERED.
ATTESTATION
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Marriage Contract, Exhibit A, records, p. 51. In her testimony, however, Laila stated that she was
only 18 years old while Manolito was 19 years old (TSN, January 14, 2000, p. 11).
[2]
Exhibit B, id. at 6.
[3]
Exhibit B-1, id. at 7.
[4]
TSN, January 14, 2000, pp. 4-10.
[5]
Id. at 6-7, 13.
[6]
Records, pp. 1-4.
[7]
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by E.O. 227)
[8]
Records, pp. 52-57.
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[11]
310 Phil. 21 (1995).
[12]
RTC records, pp. 62-63.
[13]
Id. at 109.
[14]
CA rollo, pp. 73-86. Penned by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with the concurrence of Justices Noel G.
Tijam and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo.
[15]
Id. at 82-85.
[16]
Id. at 87-93.
[17]
Id. at 108-109. Penned by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with the concurrence of Justices Noel G. Tijam
and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo.
[18]
Rollo, pp. 7-41.
[19]
Id. at 15-16.
[20]
G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006.
[21]
TSN, April 13, 2000, pp. 6-7.
[22]
THIRD DIVISION
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE,
Petitioner,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 13, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting,
Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that
he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent.
Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their
travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.[4]
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their
pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And
they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back
to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his
parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward
agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.[5]
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get
married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.[6] The two then continued
to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe
was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed
Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena.[7] At one
point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who
suggested that they should stay at their parents home and live with
them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he
should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward
talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that
he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.[8]
uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,]
petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the
Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after
arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner
arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner
was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many
guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going
home, they will commission their military friends to harm his
family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he
should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[ ]and
relatives[ ]houses.Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to
escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament
and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military
escort.Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a
marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,]
petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live
instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents while they are still
studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would only
live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be
away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should
already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so
they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing
[that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own
family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he
chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing
the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited
and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to support
her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore,
respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that
they should live separate lives.
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision [16] declaring
the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
read:
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the session was
over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has
dropped any reference to wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage and to
mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases refer to
be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after
the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was
not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice
Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining
void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special
cases and special situations, hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in
the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a
ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to
being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the
time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled
is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of
change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the
time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons
are incapable of contracting marriage: 3. (those) who, because of
causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of
the Family Code: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law
recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity:
valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state,
the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal
annuls a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e.,
it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only
be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full
tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil
Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter
lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the
former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have
found themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of
the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage
under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons
contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in
effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old
canons: Canon #1081 required persons to be capable according to law
in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at
least not ignorant of the major elements required in marriage; and
Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and
external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line
of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for
annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence.
Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability
to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the
union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person
was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she
made during the wedding ceremony.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in
1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising
from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to
xxxx
assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks
of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is
not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially
at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985,
Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the
essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the
person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money
and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had
violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the
presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to
recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of
entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment,
is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness,
in which others are taken advantage of in order to achieve ones ends.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under
what rubric homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of
marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the
inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the
inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal
jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the
obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider,
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-tocase basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is
psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts
judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,[43] ruled that the
findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.[44]
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its
decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court
of Appeals,[45] explained that when private respondent testified under oath
before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony.Importantly, the
Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled
that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so
intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,[46] thus:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[47]
[51]
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy
provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.[57]
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion
of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such
cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give
professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of
the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but
rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in
psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage
breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result
of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that
a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both
grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field
of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of
the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties
prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment,
which we consider as adequate, produced the findings that both parties
are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality
disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental
Health discusses personality disorders as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are
characteristic of a persons recent and long-term functioning. Patterns
of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes
but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to
cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with
interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality
disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue
through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An
individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality
disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which the
disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational
adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived
by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal,
without an awareness of their behaviors.Such qualities may lead to
trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other
areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their
71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July
30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Delilah VidallonMagtolis and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp. 23-36.
[2]
Id. at 38-39.
[3]
TSN, September 12, 2000, p. 2.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id. at 2-3.
Records, p. 8.
[7]
TSN, September 12, 2000, pp. 3-4.
[8]
Id.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id. at 4.
[11]
Records, p. 1.
[12]
Id. at 24.
[13]
Id. at 36-37.
[14]
Id. at 39.
[15]
Id. at 48-55.
[16]
Id. at 61-66.
[17]
The dispositive portion of the RTCs July 30, 2001 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff EDWARD
KENNETH NGO TE and defendant ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ UY-TE, officiated by Honorable
Judge Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan, of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 82, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, on April 23, 1996, NULL AND VOID, ab initio, on the ground of the couples psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; and dissolving their property regime in accordance
with law, if there is any.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the City Civil Registry of Valenzuela City where the marriage
took place and City Civil Registry of Quezon City where this decision originated for proper recording.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 66.)
[18]
Records, pp. 67-68.
[19]
Supra note 1.
[20]
The dispositive portion of the CAs August 5, 2003 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed decision dated July 30, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 106, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q00-39720, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the marriage
between petitioner-appellee Edward Kenneth Ngo Te and respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te
VALID and SUBSISTING. The petition is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35.)
[6]
[21]
[42]
Dacanay, Canon Law on Marriage: Introductory Notes and Comments, 2000 ed., pp. 110-119.
326 Phil. 169 (1996).
[44]
Id. at 182.
[45]
334 Phil. 294, 300-304 (1997).
[43]
[46]
17, 2006, 495 SCRA 396;Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA
177; Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353; Villalon v. Villalon, G.R.
No. 167206, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 572; Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21,
2005, 470 SCRA 508; Carating-Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA
422; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735; Ancheta v.
Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900 (2004); Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 626 (2003); Choa v. Choa, 441
Phil. 175 (2002); Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713 (2001); Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975,
February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000); Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76.
[50]
See Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 668.
[51]
Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity, 2006 ed., pp. 14-16,
cites the following:
Canon 1095, 3 concerning psychological incapacity pointed out cases of various
psychological disorders from the Roman Rota as enumerated below (Fr. Bacareza, 1999).
6.1. From the 1917 Code of the Second Vatican Council
1. Coram Teodori in Italy on January 19, 1940 on Nymphomania.
2. Coram Heard on June 5, 1941 on Nymphomania.
3. Coram Heard in Quebec on January 30, 1954 on Lethargic Encephalitis.
4. Coram Mattioli in Quebec, Canada on November 6, 1956 on General
Paralysis.
5. Coram Sabbatani in Naples, Italy on June 21, 1957 on Nymphomania.
6. Coram Mattioli in Rome on November 28, 1957 on Schizophrenia.
7. Coram Lefebvre on December 19, 1959 on Nymphomania.
8. Coram De Jorio on December 19, 1961 on Schizophrenia.
6.2 From the Second Vatican Council to the Promulgation of the 1983 Code
9. Coram Monsigneur Charles Lefebre on the following:
a. Homosexuality,
b. Hypersexuality-Nymphomania,
c. Hypersexuality-Satyriasis, and
d. Affective Immaturity and Passive Dependent Personality.
10. Coram Monsigneur Lucien Anne on February 25, 1969 on Lesbianism.
11. Coram De Jorio on April 30, 1969 on Maturity of Judgment.
12. Coram Jose Maria Pinto Gomez on the following:
a. Serious Paranoid Schizophrenia (November 26, 1969),
b. Anti-Social Personality Disorder (March 18, 1971),
c. Vaginismus or Psychic impotence; Frigidity (July 15, 1977)
d. Neurasthenic Psychopath (April 20, 1979)
e. Sexual Disorder (December 3, 1982)
13. Coram Bruno on the following:
a. Hypersexuality-Nymphomania (December 15, 1972)
[57]
Referral Question: Data coming from informants and significant others (psychologists,
psychiatrists, physicians, parents, brothers, sisters, relatives, friends, etc.).
Test Administered (Dates): List by name
Background Information:
Current Life Situation: Presenting complaint (personal and marital conflict), history of
problem, and consequences in clients life.
emphasis. (Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity,
supra note 51, at 179-181.)
[63]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 15, 2003.
[64]
Kahn and Fawcett, The Encyclopedia of Mental Health, 1993 ed., pp. 291-292. See Bernstein,
Penner, Clarke-Stewart, Roy, Psychology, 7th ed., 2006, pp. 613-614, defining personality disorders as
long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as
dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in
childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others. Some
psychologists view personality disorders as interpersonal strategies or as extreme, rigid, and
maladaptive expressions of personality traits. (Citations omitted.)
[65]
Id. at 131.
[66]
Id. at 50-51.
[67]
Supra note 65.
[68]
THIRD DIVISION
BENJAMIN G. TING,
Petitioner,
- versus -
Promulgated:
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,
March 31, 2009
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
preceptorship program for the said field[9] and, in 1980, he began working
for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of its active
staff,[10] while Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer.[11]
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside
the November 17, 2003 Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution [2] in CA-G.R. CV No.
59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution,
affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code.[4]
The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen
Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in
medical school.[5] They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975
in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in
Maguikay, Mandaue City.[6] When their second child was born, the couple
decided to move to Carmens family home inCebu City.[7] In September
1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations [8] and thereafter
proceeded to take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to
anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the
1.
2.
3.
4.
pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their
children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.[28]
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking
and gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana
Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses children from 1987 to
1992.[29] Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when
Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.[30]
the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obras) interview
with Benjamins brothers.[34] Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra
observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality,
considering the latters good relationship with his fellow doctors and his
good track record as anesthesiologist.[35]
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its
Decision[36] declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found
him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an
excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extracurricular activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies,
which character traits find root in a personality defect existing even
before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff and
defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family
Code. x x x
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[37]
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the
same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.[48]
Hence, this petition.
II.
III.
this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who
have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants
the Molina doctrine.
to
know
if
we
have
abandoned
We have not.
[56]
Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts and the appellate courts rulings
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of
Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.[61] The psychological illness that must have
afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[62]
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present
professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause,
gravity and incurability of a partys alleged psychological incapacity, then
such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by
the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
[63]
while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioners
personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obras
opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamins
deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into
consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another
psychiatrist in South Africawho personally examined Benjamin, as well
as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview with Benjamins brothers.
[64]
Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.
and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
WE CONCUR:
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez per Special Order No.
602 dated March 20, 2009.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and
Sergio L. Pestao, concurring; rollo, pp. 78-89.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 110-111.
[3]
Id. at 35-45.
[4]
Art. 36 of the Family Code provides in full:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. [as amended by Executive Order No.
227 dated July 17, 1987]
[5]
TSN, December 7, 1994, morning, p. 4.
[6]
Id. at 12.
[7]
Id. at 17.
[8]
Id. at 14; Exhibit 3.
[9]
Id. at 13, 15.
[10]
Id. at 21-23.
[11]
Id. at 10.
[12]
Rollo, p. 48.
[13]
Id. at 35.
[14]
TSN, January 6, 1995, pp. 3, 8-9.
[15]
Rollo, p. 36.
[16]
Id. at 37.
[17]
Id.
[18]
Id. at 40.
[19]
Id. at 44.
[20]
Id. at 40.
[21]
Id.
[22]
Id. at 36.
[23]
Id. at 40.
[24]
Id. at 48-49.
[25]
Id. at 42, 49.
[26]
Id. at 49.
[27]
TSN, December 7, 1994, morning, pp. 23-25.
[28]
Id. at 26.
[29]
TSN, August 31, 1995, pp. 5-26.
[30]
Id. at 7-9.
[31]
[32]
Rollo, p. 38.
Id. at 39.
[33]
[55]
[34]
[56]
Id. at 41.
Id. at 54-55.
[35]
Id. at 42.
[36]
Id. at 35-45.
[37]
Id. at 45.
[38]
Id. at 47-65.
[39]
Id. at 64.
[40]
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
[41]
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[42]
Rollo, pp. 80-81.
[43]
Docketed as G.R. No. 150479.
[44]
CA rollo, pp. 199-202.
[45]
Rollo, pp. 78-79.
[46]
Supra note 1.
[47]
Pertinent portion of the CAs Amended Decision dated November 17, 2003 reads:
The foregoing considered and taking a cue on the adoption x x x of the Honorable Justices of the
Supreme Court of the new Rule On Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) which took effect on March 15, 2003, this Court
hereby RECONSIDERS itself and GRANTS the motion for reconsideration filed by the herein
petitioner-appellee on November 29, 2000. Consequently, respondent-appellants appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the DECISION of the court below declaring the marriage between CARMEN M.
VELEZ-TING and BENJAMIN G. TING null and void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines is hereby AFFIRMED.
WHEREFORE, in view thereof, we can not do any less but sustain the decision dated 29 August 2002
of the court below in Civil Case No. CEB-14826 declaring the marriage between petitioner-appellee
Carmen Velez-Ting and respondent-appellant Benjamin G. Ting void from the beginning under Article
36, Family Code (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987).
Consequently, the Decision of this Court promulgated on October 19, 2000 is hereby SET ASIDE and
a new one rendered AFFIRMING the appealed Decision of the Court a quo.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 88-89.)
[48]
Rollo, pp. 110-111.
[49]
De Mesa v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc., G.R. Nos. 153063-70, August 19, 2005, 467 SCRA
433, 440.
[50]
Id. at 438.
[51]
Art. 8 of the Civil Code provides in full:
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines.
[52]
G.R. Nos. 174153 and 174299, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160.
[53]
Id. at 308-312. (Citations and emphasis omitted.)
[54]
408 Phil. 713 (2001).
Rationale for the New Rules as submitted by the Committee on the Revision of Rules to the
Supreme Court, November 11, 2002, p. 3, as cited in Sta. Maria, Jr., Court Procedures in Family Law
Cases, 2007 ed., pp. 10-11.
[61]
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 180668
On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance for the
Republic of the Philippines and submitted a written authority for the City Prosecutor to
appear in the case on the States behalf under the supervision and control of the Solicitor
General.
In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually
failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties
of a husband.
Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always
asked his mother for financial assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfos
mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who
paid the monthly rental.
Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her husband to find employment.
She even bought him a newspaper every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too
old and most jobs have an age limit and that he had no clothes to wear to job interviews.
To inspire him, petitioner bought him new clothes and a pair of shoes and even gave him
money. Sometime later, her husband told petitioner that he already found a job and
petitioner was overjoyed. However, some weeks after, petitioner was informed that her
husband had been seen at the house of his parents when he was supposed to be at
work. Petitioner discovered that her husband didnt actually get a job and the money he
gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from his mother. When she confronted
him about the matter, Rodolfo allegedly cried like a child and told her that he pretended
to have a job so that petitioner would stop nagging him about applying for a job. He also
told her that his parents can support their needs. Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo was so
dependent on his mother and that all his decisions and attitudes in life should be in
conformity with those of his mother.
Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk
he became physically violent towards her. Their sexual relationship was also
unsatisfactory. They only had sex once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it. When
they discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was sacred and it
should not be enjoyed nor abused. He did not even want to have a child yet because he
claimed he was not ready. Additionally, when petitioner requested that they move to
another place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents, Rodolfo did not
agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow
her. But he did not.
During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfos first cousin, Florida de Ramos,
as a witness. In 1993, Ramos, the niece of Rodolfos father, was living with Rodolfos
family. She corroborated petitioners testimony that Rodolfo was indeed not gainfully
employed when he married petitioner and he merely relied on the allowance given by his
mother. This witness also confirmed that it was respondents mother who was paying the
rentals for the room where the couple lived. She also testified that at one time, she saw
respondent going to his mothers house in business attire. She learned later that Rodolfo
told petitioner that he has a job but in truth he had none. She also stated that respondent
was still residing at the house of his mother and not living together with petitioner.
Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas testified that
after examining petitioner for her psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be
mature, independent, very responsible, focused and has direction and ambition in life.
She also observed that petitioner works hard for what she wanted and therefore, she
was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. Dr. Villegas added that based on the information gathered from petitioner, she
found that Rodolfo showed that he was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine
strivings.
She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder were those
whose response to ordinary way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of
self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency
on other people. She added that the root cause of this psychological problem was a
cross-identification with the mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering
that respondents father was a seaman and always out of the house. She stated that this
problem began during the early stages in his life but manifested only after the celebration
of his marriage. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe because
he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibilities expected of a married
person. It was incurable because it started in early development and therefore deeply
ingrained into his personality.
Based on petitioners evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision dated October 25, 2004,
declaring the marriage between petitioner and Rodolfo as null and void ab initio, thus:
With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that
respondent totally failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondents
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of
improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a
result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual relationship since he could not
distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be
satisfactory as expected.
The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot
make his own decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital
obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the
respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed
to comply with his marital obligations.
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void
on the account of respondents severe and incurable psychological incapacity.
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo B.
Azcuata is hereby declared null and void abinitio pursuant to Article 36 fo the Family
Code.
The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Antipolo City are ordered to
make proper entries into the records of the parties pursuant to judgment of the court.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor and the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.3
On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision4 to correct the first name of
Rodolfo which was erroneously typewritten as "Gerardo" in the caption of the original
Decision.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that (a) the psychiatric report
of Dr. Villegas was based solely on the information provided by petitioner and was not
based on an examination of Rodolfo; and (b) there was no showing that the alleged
psychological defects were present at the inception of marriage or that such defects were
grave, permanent and incurable.
Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially ruled that petitioner
failed to sufficiently prove the psychological incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged
psychological disorder existed prior to the marriage and was grave and incurable. In
setting aside the factual findings of the RTC, the CA reasoned that:
The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondents alleged irresponsibility
and over-dependence on his mother is symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above
explained.
xxx xxx xxx
Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellees failure to prove that respondents supposed
psychological malady existed even before the marriage. Records however show that the
parties were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage and were living on
their own in a rented apartment. That respondent often times asks his mother for
financial support may be brought about by his feeling of embarrassment that he cannot
contribute at all to the family coffers, considering that it was his wife who is working for
the family. Petitioner-appellee likewise stated that respondent does not like to have a
child on the pretense that respondent is not yet ready to have one. However this is not at
all a manifestation of irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent has shown that he has
a full grasp of reality and completely understands the implication of having a child
especially that he is unemployed. The only problem besetting the union is respondents
alleged irresponsibility and unwillingness to leave her (sic) mother, which was not proven
in this case to be psychological-rooted.
The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only by his youth and emotional
immaturity which by themselves, do not constitute psychological incapacity (Deldel vs.
Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 461, 466 [2004]). At all events, petitioner-appellee has
utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a
case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of
solemnization of the contract, so immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot
be equated with psychological incapacity (Pesca vs. Pesca, 356 SCRA 588, 594 [2001]).
As held by the Supreme Court:
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13,
2007).
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated July 19, 2005 fo
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage berween petitioner-appellee Marietta C.
Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo B. Azcueta remains VALID. 5 (emphasis ours)
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the
evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that the appellate court
correctly ruled that the "totality of evidence presented by petitioner" failed to prove her
spouses psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and settled
jurisprudence.
We grant the petition.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.6 Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State
can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the
concern alone of the family members.7
Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Molina8 stringent guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing
it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x.9 (Emphasis supplied)
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.11 It should refer
to "no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."12 The intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.13
court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to
dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert
witness.20
Second, the root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the petition, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and
clearly explained in the trial courts decision.
The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully
employed and, despite pleas from petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt
to find employment; that from the choice of the family abode to the couples daily
sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that the couples inadequate sexual
relations and Rodolfos refusal to have a child stemmed from a psychological condition
linked to his relationship to his mother.
1avvphi1
convenient role model, but the reversal of roles became confusing that led to
ambivalence of his identity and grave dependency. Apparently, all the boys were hooked
up to his complexities, producing so much doubts in their capabilities in a heterosexual
setting. Specifically, Rodolfo tried, but failed. His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is
referable to an unconscious guilt feelings of defying the mothers love. At this point, he
has difficulty in delineating between the wife and the mother, so that his continuous
relationship with his wife produces considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle,
and crippled him psychologically.
Based on the above clinical data, family background and outcome of their marriage, it is
the opinion of the examiner, that Mrs. Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is mature, independent and
responsible and is psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and obligations of
marriage. Due to her numerous personal problems she has difficulty in handling her
considerable anxiety, at present. There are strong clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo
Azcueta is suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe
inadequacy that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.
The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and prolonged
dependence with a parent of the opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no longer
appropriate. This situation crippled his psychological functioning related to sex, self
confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity. It existed prior to marriage, but
became manifest only after the celebration due to marital stresses and demands. It is
considered as permanent and incurable in nature, because it started early in his life and
therefore became so deeply ingrained into his personality structure. It is severe or grave
in degree, because it hampered and interfered with his normal functioning related to
heterosexual adjustment.21
These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr. Villegas during her testimony,
the relevant portion of which we quote below:
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3rd among 5 boys. The father, who was perceived to
be weak, and his two elder brothers were all working as seaman. Rodolfo who was
always available to his mothers needs, became an easy prey, easily engulfed into her
system. The relationship became symbiotic, that led to a prolonged and abnormal
dependence to his mother. The mother, being the stronger and dominant parent, is a
Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the petitioner, what was your
psychological evaluation?
A: Ive found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta Azcueta as matured,
independent, very responsible, focused, she has direction and ambition in life
and she work hard for what she wanted, maam, and therefore, I concluded that
she is psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
the marriage, maam.
A: The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross identification with the
mother who is the dominant figure in the family, the mother has the last say and
the authority in the family while the father was a seaman and always out of the
house, and if present is very shy, quiet and he himself has been very submissive
and passive to the authority of the wife, maam.
Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness, what was your psychological
evaluation with regards to the respondent?
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, under what circumstance this
kind of psychological problem manifested?
A: Based on my interview, Ive found out that the husband Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage suffering from a psychiatric classification as Dependent Personality
Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings,
maam.
A: This manifested starting his personality development and therefore, during his
early stages in life, maam.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of problem existed to
Rodolfo Azcueta, the respondent in this case, before the celebration of the
marriage?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And it became manifested only after the celebration of the marriage?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it became manifested with the
that the manifestation came too late?
A: The manifestation came too late because the history of Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta
was very mild, no stresses, no demand on his life, at 24 years old despite the fact
that he already finished college degree of Computer Science, there is no demand
on himself at least to establish his own, and the mother always would make the
decision for him, maam.
Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of psychological problem severe?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Why do you consider this psychological problem severe, Madame Witness?
A: Because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibility that is
expected of a married person, maam.
Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?
A: It is incurable because it started early in development and therefore it became
so deeply ingrained into his personality, and therefore, it cannot be changed nor
cured at this stage, maam.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is Permanent?
A: It is permanent in nature, sir.
Q: And last question as an expert witness, what is the effect of the psychological
problem as far as the marriage relationship of Rodolfo Azcueta is concerned?
A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage relationship because
standard expectation is, the husband has to work, to feed, to protect, to love, and
of course, to function on (sic) the sexual duties of a husband to the wife, but in
this case, early in their marriage, they had only according to the wife,
experienced once sexual relationship every month and this is due to the fact that
because husband was so closely attached to the mother, it is a result of the
unconscious guilt feeling of the husband in defying the mothers love when they
will be having heterosexual relationship and therefore, at that point, he will not be
able to distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore, sex
relationship will not be satisfactory according to expectation, maam.22
In Te v. Te, we held that "[b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties."23
Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly explained the basis for its
decision, which we reproduce here for emphasis:
With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that
respondent totally failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondents
witnesses, save only in instance where the findings of the trial court or the experts are
contradicted by evidence.
We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfos irresponsibility and overdependence
on his mother can be attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact
that at the time of his marriage to petitioner, he was nearly 29 years old or the fact that
the expert testimony has identified a grave clinical or medical cause for his abnormal
behavior.
In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature of a dependent
personality disorder and how one afflicted with such a disorder would be incapacitated
from complying with marital obligations, to wit:
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume
the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice
from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to
live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty
doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and
has no goals and clear direction in life.24
Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent personality disorder
is automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of
marriage. We realize that psychology is by no means an exact science and the medical
cases of patients, even though suffering from the same disorder, may be different in their
symptoms or manifestations and in the degree of severity. It is the duty of the court in its
evaluation of the facts, as guided by expert opinion, to carefully scrutinize the type of
disorder and the gravity of the same before declaring the nullity of a marriage under
Article 36.
Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations
embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code.25 As noted by the trial court, as a result
of Rodolfos dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions and
cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital
obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68.
Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot
independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters that
spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and
emotional well-being of his spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36.
Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfos condition which has been deeply ingrained in his
system since his early years was supported by evidence and duly explained by the
expert witness.
At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds
itself in those instances when it is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a
particular point in time and apply them to situations and people in a society in flux. With
respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not only
developments in science and medicine but also changing social and cultural mores,
including the blurring of traditional gender roles. In this day and age, women have taken
on increasingly important roles in the financial and material support of their families. This,
however, does not change the ideal that the family should be an "autonomous" social
institution, wherein the spouses cooperate and are equally responsible for the support
and well-being of the family. In the case at bar, the spouses from the outset failed to form
themselves into a family, a cohesive unit based on mutual love, respect and support, due
to the failure of one to perform the essential duties of marriage.
This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te:
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the
Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the
sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological
disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in
Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the
very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will
simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.26 (emphasis ours)
In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.
Footnotes
Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate
Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal; rollo, pp. 37-50.
1
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated July 19, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Id. at 36.
Id. at p. 41.
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
SEC. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERASMIN
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Id. at 209-213.
10
11
Id. at 39.
12
Id. at 40.
13
Id.
14
Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 370.
ART. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter
should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the
exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not
compatible with the solidarity of the family.
ART. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family.
The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be
paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the
income or fruits of their separate properties. In case [of] insufficiency or
absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from
their separate properties.
Republic of the Philippines v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351
SCRA 425, 431.
15
16
17
ART. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and duty of
both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in
accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997, 266 SCRA 324,
330.
18
Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 105, 126 (1995),
citing Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 45125, April 22, 1991,196 SCRA
107, 110.
19
20
21
22
23
24
Id.
ART. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
25
26
RODOLFO A. ASPILLAGA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
Promulgated:
AURORA A. ASPILLAGA,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the
Decision[1] dated September
9,
2005 and
the
[2]
Resolution dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 68179, entitled Rodolfo A. Aspillaga v. Aurora A. Aspillaga.
SECOND DIVISION
On May 31, 2000,[4] the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the
parties psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated September
9, 2005, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and declared the
marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora Aspillaga valid. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the motion was also denied in a Resolution
dated December 20, 2005.
Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of
the fact that disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and
even normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.[12]
At this juncture while this Court is convinced that indeed both
parties were both found to have psychological disorders, nevertheless,
there is nothing in the records showing that these disorders are sufficient
to declare the marriage void due to psychological incapacity. We must
emphasize that said disorders do not manifest that both parties are truly
incapacitated to perform the basic marital covenants. Moreover, there is
nothing that shows incurability of these disorders. Even assuming their
acts violate the covenants of marriage, such acts do not show an
irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which will prevent
them from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future. At
the most, the psychiatric evaluation of the parties proved only
incompatibility and irreconcilable differences, which cannot be equated
with psychological incapacity as understood juristically.
As this Court has repeatedly declared, Article 36 of the Family
Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. Article 36 refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. The malady must be so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[13]
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
SECOND DIVISION
JORDAN CHAN PAZ,
Petitioner,
- versus -
Promulgated:
February 18, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the 9 August 2004[2] and 26 November
2004[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80473. In
lie to his brothers about his whereabouts. Jeanice further alleged that
Jordan was heavily dependent on and attached to his mother. After giving
birth to their son, Jeanice noticed that Jordan resented their son and spent
more time with his friends rather than help her take care of their
son. Jordan also demanded from his mother a steady supply of milk and
diapers for their son.
At the early stage of their marriage, Jeanice said they had petty fights but
that the quarrels turned for the worse and Jordan became increasingly
violent toward her. At one point, Jordan threatened to hurt her with a pair
of scissors. Jeanice also alleged that on 22 February 1999, Jordan
subjected her to verbal lashing and insults and threatened to hit her with a
golf club. Jeanice added that Jordan has not provided any financial
support or visited their son since she left their conjugal home.
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted
with Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive
behavior, delinquency and instability.[5] Gates concluded that
Jordans psychological maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted in
his family background. Gates added that with no indication of
reformation, Jordans personality disorder appears to be grave and
incorrigible.
JORDAN DENIED JEANICES ALLEGATIONS. JORDAN ASSERTED
THAT JEANICE EXAGGERATED HER STATEMENTS AGAINST
HIM. JORDAN SAID THAT JEANICE HAS HER OWN PERSONAL
INSECURITIES AND THAT HER ACTIONS SHOWED HER LACK
OF MATURITY, CHILDISHNESS AND EMOTIONAL INABILITY TO
COPE WITH THE STRUGGLES AND CHALLENGES OF
MAINTAINING A MARRIED LIFE.
On 6 June 2003, Jordan filed a Notice of Appeal. [9] The trial court
promptly approved Jordans appeal.
ON 10 FEBRUARY 2004, JEANICE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS
APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS.[10] IN HER MOTION,
JEANICE SOUGHT THE IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OF JORDANS
APPEAL ON THE GROUND THAT JORDAN FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH SECTION 20 OF A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC[11] WHICH PROVIDES:
SEC. 20. APPEAL.
(1) Pre-condition. No appeal from the decision shall be
allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion for
reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice
of judgment.
ON 9 AUGUST 2004, THE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSED
JORDANS APPEAL. ACCORDING TO THE COURT OF APPEALS,
THE RULES STATE IN MANDATORY AND CATEGORICAL TERMS
THAT THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR
NEW TRIAL IS A PRE-CONDITION BEFORE AN APPEAL FROM
THE DECISION IS ALLOWED. THE COURT OF APPEALS ADDED
THAT WHEN THE LAW IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, IT
ADMITS NO ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION BUT MERELY FOR
APPLICATION.
JORDAN FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. IN ITS 26
NOVEMBER 2004 RESOLUTION, THE COURT OF APPEALS
DISMISSED THE MOTION.
THE ISSUE
THE ONLY ISSUE LEFT TO BE RESOLVED IS WHETHER JORDAN
IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
[29]
WE SAID:
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
D. BRION
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
[33]
WHEREFORE,
WE GRANT THE
PETITION. WE SET
ASIDE THE 9 AUGUST 2004 AND 26 NOVEMBER 2004
RESOLUTIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. WEREVERSE THE
13 MAY 2003 DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
JOSE P. PEREZ
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ATTESTATION
I ATTEST THAT THE CONCLUSIONS IN THE ABOVE DECISION
HAD BEEN REACHED IN CONSULTATION BEFORE THE CASE
WAS ASSIGNED TO THE WRITER OF THE OPINION OF THE
COURTS DIVISION.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
[1]
[14]
Rollo, p. 182.
Id. at 317.
[16]
Id. at 330. See Section 2, Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended.
[17]
310 Phil. 21 (1995).
[18]
ID. AT 40.
[19]
G.R. No. 159220, 22 September 2008, 566 SCRA 154.
[20]
Id. at 162.
[21]
Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, 27 February 2008, 547 SCRA 123; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose,
G.R. No. 168328, 28 February 2007, 517 SCRA 123.
[22]
Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009, 579 SCRA 193.
[23]
TSN, 15 November 2000, pp. 9-11, 21-24.
[24]
Id. at 52.
[25]
Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, 14 August 2009; Bier v. Bier, supra note 21.
[26]
NAJERA V. NAJERA, G.R. NO. 164817, 3 JULY 2009, 591 SCRA 541; BIER V. BIER, SUPRA
NOTE 21.
[27]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
[28]
Id.
[29]
G.R. No. 162368, 17 July 2006, 495 SCRA 396.
[30]
Id. at 401.
[31]
TSN, 15 November 2000, p. 18.
[32]
G.R. No. 171042, 30 June 2008, 556 SCRA 711.
[33]
Id. at 727.
SECOND DIVISION
[15]
JOCELYN M. SUAZO,
Petitioner,
versus -
Promulgated:
ANGELITO SUAZO and
REPUBLIC OF
THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case
No. 97-1282.[2] The reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyns marriage
with respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985;
they were residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship,
Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having been
gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after
finding them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter,
Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married
on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived
with Angelitos parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped
schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as
household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was
most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent
quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter
found another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have
children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with
the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their
relationship, she alleged in her complaint:
xxxx
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July
1987, their relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels which
caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the
plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every
time they had a troublesome encounter;
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the
defendant to work or his indolence and his excessive drinking which
makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the
plaintiff causing their separation in fact in July 1987;
10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from
the time of their marriage and became very apparent as time went and
proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;
xxxx
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no
collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane
Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her
petition, including the alleged incidents of physical beating she received
from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on these
declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her
violently before they were married.
Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:
Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent
before you got married?
A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.
Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will
you describe his behavioural (sic) pattern before you got married?
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.
Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of
violent nature before you got married (sic), is there any signs (sic) of
violence?
A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.
Q. Even to other people?
A. He also quarrel (sic).[3]
xxxx
A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due
respect more often than not he even shouted at them for no apparent
reason (sic).
Court:
Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?
Court:
A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on
Anti-Social Personality Disorder (sic).
Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?
harmonious relationship during the less than one year and one thing
what is significant, respondent allowed wife to work as housemaid
instead of he who should provide and the petitioner never receive and
enjoy her earning for the five months that she work and it is also the
petitioner who took sustainance of the vices. (sic)
Court:
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of
the respondent (sic).
Court:
A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain
the marital relationship but what he need is to sustain his vices thru the
petitioner (sic).
Court:
Court:
Court:
Q. Why did you know?
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person
itself, the respondent is not aware that this kind of personality affect
the other party (sic).
Court:
Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?
A. They do not have children because more often than not the
respondent is under the influence of alcohol, they do not have peaceful
GENERAL DATA
be
her
her
the
the
this
point,
the
RTC
cited
the
THE CA RULING
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the
RTC decision, ruling that:
rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into
a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a
permanent compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to
engage in productive work and more stable relationships with
another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the
defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.
There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under
the same roof, the married life of the petitioner with the respondent
was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason be
extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict
handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the inviolability of the
marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the family
that the law seeks to protect. The concept of psychological incapacity
is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are convenient excuses
of parties to separate and divorce.
THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek
the reversal of the CA ruling based on the following arguments:
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it
totally disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage
null and void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should
be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that the finding of the Trial Court
as to the existence or non-existence of petitioners psychological
incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us (the
Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial
courts factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private
respondents witnesses vis--vis petitioners defenses are clearly and
manifestly erroneous;
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the
evidence presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or
describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section
14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the
advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may
aid in the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the
Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage must be proved.
All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family
Code that came to us were invariably decided based on the principles in
the cited cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36
when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te[17] (Te) which revisited
the Molina guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the
Family Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that
the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided
by experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.[18] Te thus
that
its
jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and
the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting
the abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it
merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The
subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting[20] follows Tes lead when it reiterated
that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the
rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages:[21]
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular
root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the
verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist
have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect
declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her
conclusion on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a
dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologists own
equivocation on this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she
herself may have realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity,
too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyns
assumed knowledge of Angelitos family background and upbringing.
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions
of why and to what extent was Angelitos personality disorder grave and
incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on Angelitos awareness of
and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the
more important concerns or requisites of psychological incapacity, all of
which are critical to the success of Jocelyns cause.
b. Jocelyns Testimony
The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological
report and the psychologists testimony impel us to proceed to the
evaluation of Jocelyns testimony, to find out whether she provided the
court with sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelitos psychological
incapacity.
Unfortunately,
we
find
Jocelyns
testimony
to
be
insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelitos habitual drunkenness,
gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she
received from him all of which occurred after the marriage. Significantly,
she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent
behavior,assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during
the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with
him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not
before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not
clarify when these beatings exactly took place whether it was near or at
the time of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a
clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its
related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while
indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or
mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited
jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of
psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness.
The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a
different treatment. While we may concede that physical violence on
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
-SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria III, and concurred in by Associate Justice Marina L.
Buzon and Associate Justice Santiago Javier Raada (both retired).
[2]
Penned by Judge Pedro de Leon Gutierrez.
[3]
TSN, March 31, 1998, pp. 16-17.
[4]
TSN, July 16, 1998, pp. 15-22.
[5]
Record, pp. 36-39.
[6]
Parenthetical notes supplied.
[7]
The RTC enumerated the requisites as follows: (1) that psychological incapacity refers to no less
than a mental not physical incapacity; (2) that the law intended psychological incapacity to be
confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage; and (3) that the psychological
condition must exist at the time of the marriage and must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. See citation at note 9.
[8]
- versus -
Promulgated:
Summons with a copy of the petition and its annexes were duly
served upon Bona who failed to file any responsive pleading during
the reglementary period.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling
to the Court of Appeals which sided with the OSGs contention that the
trial court erred in granting the petition despite Joses abject failure to
discharge the burden of proving the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court
Decision in its assailed Decision dated October 11, 2004, the dispositive
portion of which states:
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the
Court of Appeals for lack of merit in its assailed Resolution dated March
10, 2005.
Hence, this Petition.
The only issue before this Court is whether or not Bona should be
deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
The petition is without merit.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the
trial court hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
xxxx
Q: Other than the interviews what else did you do in order to evaluate
members of the parties?
A: I also interviewed (sic) the transcript of stenographic notes of the
testimonies of other witnesses, maam.
A: No, maam.
xxxx
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And what did she tell you, did she come for an interview?
Q: Now, Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you reside together
with your husband?
A: In Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to Manila, in Fort
Bonifacio.
Q: You mean, in the same house where petitioner and the respondent
lived together?
A: Yes. Maam.
Q: How long did you live in the house where the petitioner and the
respondent stay?
A: Twelve years now since 1983 to 1995.
Q: Where was the petitioner working at that time, from 1982 to 1995?
A: He is a soldier, a Colonel.
Q: Do you know where he was assigned during this time?
A: Yes, maam, G-3.
Q: May we know where this G-3 is?
A: Fort Bonifacio, maam.
Q: What about the wife, where does she stay?
A: At Fort Bonifacio, in their house.[26]
in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bonas desire to live with Jose would
later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal
home in Fort Bonifacio during the following decade.
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged
psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can
only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to
Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not
to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.[28]
While we are not insensitive to petitioners suffering in view of the truly
appalling and shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by
judicial precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements in
psychological incapacity cases that must be applied to the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 28-39; penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador with Associate Justices
Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring.
[2]
Id. at 41.
[3]
Id. at 42-46.
[4]
Id. at 28-33.
[5]
Id. at 46.
[6]
Id. at 39.
[7]
310 Phil. 21, 39 (1995).
[8]
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[9]
Id. at 676-680.
[10]
397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).
[11]
Toring v. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010.
[12]
G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.
[13]
Id. at 224-225.
[14]
Id. at 228.
[15]
TSN, September 14, 1998.
[16]
Records, pp. 70-74.
[17]
TSN, March 3, 1998.
[18]
TSN, July 1, 1998.
[19]
TSN, August 21, 1998.
[20]
TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 8.
[21]
TSN, September 14, 1998, p. 8.
[22]
Id. at 6-17.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
Petitioner,
Present:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 18 October 2006
Decision and the 12 March 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
1
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there
were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was
set for trial on the merits.
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was
able to establish respondents psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled
that even without Dr. Tayagspsychological report, the allegations in the
complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of
psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that
respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the
rest of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial
court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she obtained a
divorce abroad and married another man.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the
Solicitor General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the
Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City
and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information
and guidance.
5
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and
modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as follows:
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered
that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a
void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as
petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
7
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party.
In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void.
9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the
Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5)
of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
10
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition
and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not
apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short,
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should
be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
parties.
13
14
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
16
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Chairperson
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
10Article 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
produce the following effects:
Chief Justice
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be
considered legitimate and their custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided by the
court in a proper proceeding;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall
be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or
her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall
be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad
faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
3Id. at 45-46.
4Id. at 34.
5Id. at 46.
6A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective 15 March 2003.
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Article 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of
the marriage:
15Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
16Supra note 7.
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age
or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other
and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible disease found to be serious and appears
to be incurable.
11Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).
12Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 360 Phil. 932 (1998).
13Article 88 of the Family Code.
14Article 105 of the Family Code.
The Facts
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of St. Vincent
Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga del Norte. They lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga
del Norte and have two (2) children, namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda)
and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza), who were born on August 20, 1969 and
January 15, 1972, respectively.
6
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage (complaint) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. S-665, alleging that
Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations. In compliance with the Order dated January 5, 1999 of the RTC, the public
prosecutor conducted an investigation to determine if collusion exists between Rodolfo
and Natividad and found that there was none. Trial on the merits then ensued.
8
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met Natividad
when they were students at the Barangay High School of Sindangan, and he was forced
to marry her barely three (3) months into their courtship in light of her accidental
pregnancy. At the time of their marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18
years of age. He had no stable job and merely worked in the gambling cockpits as
"kristo" and "bangkero sa hantak." When he decided to join and train with the
10
11
army, Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house without his
consent. Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain
Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child named Julie Ann Terez. After cohabiting
with Terez, Natividad contracted a second marriage on January 11, 1991 with another
man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter in Cagayan de
Oro City. From the time Natividad abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take
care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza and he exerted earnest efforts to save their
marriage which, however, proved futile because of Natividads psychological incapacity
that appeared to be incurable.
12
13
14
15
27
16
17
For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear during trial, despite
service of summons. Nonetheless, she informed the court that she submitted herself for
psychiatric examination to Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfos
claims. Rodolfo also underwent the same examination.
The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no showing that Natividads
personality traits constituted psychological incapacity as envisaged under Article 36 of
the Family Code, and that the testimony of the expert witness was not conclusive upon
the court.
28
18
19
The CA Ruling
20
In a Decision dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, finding that
while Natividads emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves do
not necessarily equate to psychological incapacity, "their degree or severity, as duly
testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has sufficiently established a case of psychological disorder so
profound as to render [Natividad] incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations."
29
In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report, Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and
Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, finding that both parties suffered from "utter emotional immaturity [which] is
unusual and unacceptable behavior considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by
established norms of conduct." As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she
lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters.
Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired
a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition of both
parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only
manifested after. Based on the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the "couples union
was bereft of the mind, will and heart for the obligations of marriage."
21
22
30
23
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed an opposition to the complaint, contending
that the acts committed by Natividad did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as
contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under the Family Code.
24
25
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTCs
finding of psychological incapacity.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
32
so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved). The Court laid down more
definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code
in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, whose salient points are footnoted hereunder. These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements that the Court established in Santos.
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA, held that therein respondents
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological
incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual
promiscuity. In the same light, the Court, in the case of Pesca v. Pesca (Pesca), ruled
against a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein "utterly failed, both in her allegations
in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on
the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to
warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage," significantly noting that the "[e]motional
immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity." In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate courts finding that the petitioner
therein had not established that her husband "showed signs of mental incapacity as
would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for
in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage
and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a
psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been
identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the
incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature."
41
42
43
44
The Court maintains a similar view in this case. Based on the evidence presented, there
exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividads emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity.
1wphi1
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr.
Zalsos which does not, however, explain in reasonable detail how Natividads condition
could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of
psychological incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the types of
psychological tests which she administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in
her report the root cause of Natividad's condition and to show that it existed at the time of
the parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness of Natividad's behavior in
relation to her failure to perform the essential marital obligations sufficiently described in
Dr. Zalsos's report. Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of Natividad's
condition remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to
be drawn out as a bare conclusion and even self-serving. In the same vein, Dr. Zalsos's
testimony during trial, which is essentially a reiteration of her report, also fails to convince
the Court of her conclusion that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated. Verily,
although expert opm10ns furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by the courts, the
existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent
evidence. After poring over the records, the Court, however, does not find any such
evidence sufficient enough to uphold the court a quo's nullity declaration. To the Court's
mind, Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and
mother as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the
level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties'
marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or
be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. To hark back to what has been earlier
discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. In the final analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder
of this nature to exist in the present case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the
recognition that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family, the instant petition is hereby granted.
45
46
47
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2005 and
Resolution dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69103 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Footnotes
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Id. at 70-72.
Executive Order No. 209, as amended, entitled "THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES."
5
Records, p. 4.
Records, p. 7.
Id. at 8-A.
10
Id. at 83.
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
11
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
Id. at 83-84.
12
Id. at 84.
13
Id. at 85.
14
Id. at 89.
15
Id. at 45.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 89-90.
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
33
18
Id. at 19-20.
19
Id. at 28.
20
35
Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 40 (1995).
21
36
Id. at 39.
22
Id. at 38.
37
23
Id.
38
24
Id. at 9-14.
39
25
26
27
Id. at 96.
28
CA Rollo, p. 27.
29
30
Id. at 67.
31
Id. at 70-72.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
32
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095. (Id. at 276-280.)
40
Republic v. Galang, G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 524, 535-537.
41
42
Id. at 233.
43
44
Id. at 718.
See Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. No. 157649, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA
16, 25-32.
FIRST DIVISION
45
46
47
VALERIO E. KALAW,
Petitioner,
- versus -
Promulgated:
September 19, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
64240, which reversed the trial courts declaration of nullity of the herein
parties marriage. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFOREthe appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision
is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez
(Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually married
in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976.They had four children, Valerio (Rio),
Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair
with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in March 1983.[5]
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws)
and her four children with Tyrone.[6] Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with
Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.[7]
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their
children. He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented
house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver. [8] The househelp
would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got
sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed
with Malyn on weekends.[9]
In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to
go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later that
Tyrone brought the children to the US.[10] After just one year, Ria returned to
the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and
resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and
Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her
house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.[11]
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code.[12] He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to
perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological
incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards
Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyns
following acts:
1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she
played mahjong all day and all night;
2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the
early hours of the following day; and
3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone
discovered in flagrante delicto.[13]
He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well
as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyns expert witness.
[25]
He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations
regarding Malyns habits because he believed it is the courts duty to do so.
[26]
Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations
are indeed true.
Malyns version
Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.[27] While she admitted
playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She
maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always between
1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.[28] And in those instances, she always had Tyrones
permission and would often bring the children and their respective yayaswith
her.[29] She maintained that she did not neglect her duties as mother and wife.
Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however,
explained that she did so only to escape her physically abusive husband.[30] On
the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset
that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He called up the security guards and
instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette
ashes on Malyns head and proceeded to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing
another beating, Malyn rushed out of their bedroom and into her mother-inlaws room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-inlaw gave her P300 to leave the house.[31] She never returned to their conjugal
home.
Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes, because
she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came from her discovery that
Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.[32]
Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only
booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so drunk after
partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at
the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being fully clothed at that
time.[33] Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal
and parental rights under duress.[34]
After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously
visiting them in school. She later obtained partial custody of the children as an
incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which action
was subsequently dismissed for lack of interest).
As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was
suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug
dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.[35] Malyn
presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness.
Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her
psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual narrations culled from
these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a lousy mother because of her
mahjong habit,[36] while Malyn was fed up with Tyrones sexual infidelity, drug
habit, and physical abuse.[37] Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and
Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered problems because of
their personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise of their
marriage. Her diagnostic impressions are summarized below:
The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very
beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for marriage even after two
years of living together and having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone
who showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection she resisted his
overtures. She made it clear that she could take him or leave him. But the
minute she started to care, she became a different person clingy and
immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was
the most important person in his life. She became relationship-dependent. It
appears that her style then was when she begins to care for a man, she puts
all her energy into him and loses focus on herself. This imbalance between
thinking and feeling was overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted that the
thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when he was in his
younger years, he was often out seeking other women. His interest in them
was not necessarily for sex, just for fun dancing, drinking, or simply flirting.
Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted to
her husband who was a moody man with short temper and unresolved issues
with parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more about his
work and friends tha[n] he was about spending time with his family. Because
of Malyns and Tyrones backgrounds (both came from families with high
conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage. The conflicts
they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out of control Their individual
personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of their marriage.[38]
Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn
exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency, narcissism, and
compulsiveness.[39]
On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship
problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good relationship with her kids.
[40]
As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from
committing himself to his duties as a husband. He is unable to remain faithful
to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.[41]
Childrens version
The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for
their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would accompany their
mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her
friends. None of them reported being neglected or feeling abandoned.
The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only
Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her mother.
[42]
The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their mother
would visit them only in school.[43]
The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver
during the time that their dad was abroad.[44] While they did not live with their
mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in agreement that
their mother took care of them on weekends and would see to their
needs. They had a common recollection that the househelp would call their
mother to come and take care of them in Valle Verde whenever any of them
was sick.[45]
Other witnesses
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium,
testified that, for the duration of Tyrones confinement, the couple appeared
happy and the wife was commendable for the support she gave to her spouse.
[46]
He likewise testified that Tyrone tested negative for drugs and was not a
drug dependent.[47]
Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they
found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room. Contrary to Tyrones version,
he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the
hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn half-naked.[48]
Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of
Malyns group of friends. He stated on the stand that they would go on nightsout as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards.
and Jay; Tyrones live-in partner, Jocelyn;[50] and Tyrone and Malyns only
daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially stable and have positive
relationships with their children, she recommended that the custody of the
minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the interviews of family
members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more available to the children
and to exercise better supervision and care. The social worker commended the
fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made efforts to
visit her children clandestinely in their respective schools. And while she was
only granted weekend custody of the children, it appeared that she made efforts
to personally attend to their needs and to devote time with them.[51]
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couples de
facto separation, simply left the children for several years with only a maid and
a driver to care for them while he lived with his second family abroad. [52] The
social worker found that Tyrone tended to prioritize his second family to the
detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this history during the formative
years of the children, the social worker did not find Tyrone a reliable parent to
whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[53]
[49]
Social worker
The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to
conduct a social case study on the parties as well as the minor children. Arre
interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court
concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The courts Decision is
encapsulated in this paragraph:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from
psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital obligations under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage without as
much as understanding what it entails. They failed to commit themselves to
its essential obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of their children to
become responsible individuals. Parties psychological incapacity is grave,
and serious such that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage. The incapacity has been clinically established and was
found to be pervasive, grave and incurable.[54]
The trial court then declared the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.[55]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals[56]
Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the trial
courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both parties
allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of
psychological incapacity. The parties faults tend only to picture their
immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial
obligations.At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.
[57]
Moreover, the psychological report submitted by petitioners expert witness,
Dr. Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from
the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements for the
declaration of nullity of marriage.[58]
Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration[59] but the same was denied
on December 15, 2004.[60]
Petitioners arguments
Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings
of the trial court, which is the court that is in the best position to appreciate the
evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to prove that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations, to wit:
a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the
stand that respondents egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-obsession
and self-centeredness were manifestations of respondents NPD;[61]
b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD is grave
and incurable and prevents her from performing her essential martial
obligations;[62] and
c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the celebration of
the marriage because it is rooted in her upbringing, family background,
and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.[63]
Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void
because of psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioners part.[64]
Respondents arguments
Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her
alleged psychological incapacity.[65] She argues that the testimonies of her
children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was a
good, loving, and attentive mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrones allegation
that she was negligent and irresponsible.[66]
She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did
not interview her, their common children, or even Jocelyn. Moreover, her
report failed to state that Malyns alleged psychological incapacity was grave
and incurable.[67] Fr. Healys testimony, on the other hand, was based only on
Tyrones version of the facts.[68]
Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court Decision is
intrinsically defective for failing to support its conclusion of psychological
incapacity with factual findings.
Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a
change of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Withdraw
Comment and Memorandum.[69]She manifested that she was no longer
disputing the possibility that their marriage may really be void on the basis of
Tyrones psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the
case with justice.[70] Her manifestation and motion were noted by the Court in
its January 20, 2010 Resolution.[71]
Issue
repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the
frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these two
children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no
dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits
to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention
from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to
beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario
(an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove
that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that
respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that
petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with
another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated
with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a
ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the
behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding
that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the
evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts
would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the
children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they
narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and
cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts to see
and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father.There
was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial
duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both
failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link
their academic shortcomings to Malyns actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for
the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CAs
reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The
trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and
evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of
these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the
evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as
bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity,
which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to
each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but
certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CAG.R. CV No. 64240 areAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
[10]
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
In lieu of Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13,
2011.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 26-56.
[2]
Id. at 9-20; penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios and concurred in by Associate Justices
Regalado E. Maambong and Vicente Q. Roxas.
[3]
Id. at 22-23.
[4]
CA Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 19.
[5]
Social Case Study Report, p. 14; Records, Vol. I, p. 216.
[6]
TSN dated March 15, 1995, pp. 11-12.
[7]
Social Case Study Report, p. 14; Records, Vol. I, p. 216.
[8]
Social Case Study Report, pp. 11 and 13; id. at 213 and 215.
[9]
Dr. Dayans Psychological Evaluation Report, p. 7; id. at 259.
[46]
[56]
[47]
[57]