Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
No. 01-2317
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Joseph Daniel Gallagher, GILL & SIPPEL, Rockville,
Maryland, for Appellant. Andrew Jay Graham, KRAMON &
GRAHAM, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
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Geoffrey H. Genth, KRAMON & GRAHAM, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
OPINION
MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:
This is a professional malpractice action filed by a Chapter 11
debtor against the law firm that represented him in his bankruptcy
case. We hold that the district court had bankruptcy jurisdiction over
this action under 28 U.S.C. 1334 because the malpractice claim
arose in the bankruptcy case. In addition, we affirm the district courts
award of summary judgment to the law firm because the malpractice
claim is barred on res judicata grounds by an earlier order of the
bankruptcy court.
I.
The facts and procedural history are not disputed. On December
29, 1997, Henry Grausz, M.D., filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition
in the District of Maryland. Grausz was represented by Bradford F.
Englander and his law firm, Linowes & Blocher, LLP (collectively,
the "Linowes firm"). One of Grauszs major creditors was John F.
Sampson, who was acting in his capacity as liquidator of GFI Commercial Mortgage, L.P. In October 1997, shortly before Grausz filed
for bankruptcy, Sampsons predecessors had obtained a judgment for
$5.17 million plus interest against Grausz in California state court.
Grausz appealed the California judgment, and based on the judgment,
Sampson filed a proof of claim for approximately $6.5 million in
Grauszs bankruptcy case. These events prompted communication
between Grausz and Sampson. Grausz, with the assistance of
Englander, negotiated and entered into a settlement agreement with
Sampson that was approved by the bankruptcy court on June 8, 1998.
Several provisions of the settlement agreement are pertinent. First,
Grausz agreed to withdraw his appeal from the California judgment.
In return, Sampson agreed to accept an allowed, unsecured, nonpriority claim of $4 million in Grauszs bankruptcy case. Second,
Grausz agreed to file amended schedules of assets and liabilities. He
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summary judgment to the Linowes firm on the ground that the bankruptcy courts final fee order barred the malpractice claim under principles of res judicata. After reviewing the district courts decision de
novo, see Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736, 739 (4th Cir. 1990), we
hold that Grauszs malpractice claim is barred.
We look to res judicata principles developed in our own case law
to determine whether an earlier federal judgment, including the judgment of a bankruptcy court, bars a claim asserted in a later action.
Keith, 900 F.2d at 739; see also Harnett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308,
1312-13 (4th Cir. 1986). The later claim is precluded when:
1.) the prior judgment was final and on the merits, and rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance
with the requirements of due process; 2) the parties are identical, or in privity, in the two actions; and, 3) the claim[ ] in
the second matter [is] based upon the same cause of action
involved in the earlier proceeding.
In re Varat Enters., Inc., 81 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996).
We agree with the district courts determination on the first element, which is not contested, that the bankruptcy courts final fee
order approving the Linowes firms second and final fee application
is a final judgment on the merits. This order resolved all issues relating to the Linowes firms fee applications in the Grausz bankruptcy,
including the matter of finalizing the interim fee award.
As to the second element, Grausz argues that there is not a sufficient identity of parties in the two actions the fee application proceeding and the legal malpractice case to support a res judicata
defense. Specifically, he claims that he was not a "party in interest"
in the fee application proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. 502(a) (allowing a
"party in interest" to challenge claims made against the estate). By the
time the Linowes firm filed its fee applications, a trustee had been
appointed to administer Grauszs bankruptcy estate. According to
Grausz, the trustee, as the representative of the estate, was the party
in interest opposite the Linowes firm in the fee applications. Grausz
says that he had no interest in the outcome of the fee proceeding. We
disagree. In the bankruptcy context a party in interest is one who has
GRAUSZ v. ENGLANDER
a pecuniary interest in the distribution of assets to creditors. Willemain v. Kivitz, 764 F.2d 1019, 1022 (4th Cir. 1985). Here, Grauszs
disclosure statement and plan of liquidation projected that there
would be insufficient funds in the estate to pay off all nondischargeable priority claims, including claims for taxes and for back alimony
and support. If legal fees were reduced or disallowed, there would be
more money available in the estate to pay the nondischargeable priority claims, and Grauszs personal liability would be reduced. Grausz
therefore had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the fee applications, making him a party in interest to that proceeding. Cf. McGuirl
v. White, 86 F.3d 1232, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1996). As a result, there
is an identity of parties in the fee proceeding and the malpractice case.
We turn to the third element in the res judicata analysis, whether
"the claim[] in the second matter," the malpractice action, is "based
upon the same cause of action involved in the earlier [fee] proceeding." Varat, 81 F.3d at 1315. Our court recognizes that "[n]o simple
test exists to determine whether [claims are based on the same cause
of action] for claim preclusion purposes." Pittston Co. v. United
States, 199 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 1999). Generally, we say that
"claims are part of the same cause of action when they arise out of
the same transaction or series of transactions, or the same core of
operative facts." Varat, 81 F.3d at 1316 (citations omitted). The "core
of operative facts" in the two actions here the fee application proceeding and the malpractice action are the same. Both actions
relate to the nature and quality of legal services the Linowes firm provided to Grausz in connection with the bankruptcy proceeding. See In
re Iannochino, 242 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir. 2001); In re Intelogic Trace,
Inc., 200 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that the "central transaction" involved in the fee application and malpractice claim was the
provision of professional services). The fee application proceeding
necessarily included an inquiry by the bankruptcy court into the quality of professional services rendered by the Linowes firm. The court
was required to "consider the nature, the extent, and the value of such
services" before awarding fees. 11 U.S.C. 330(a)(3). See also Iannochino, 242 F.3d at 47; Intelogic, 200 F.3d at 387. By granting the
Linowes firms second and final fee application, the bankruptcy court
impliedly found that the firms services were acceptable throughout
its representation of Grausz. The order approving the second and final
fee application finalized the fees awarded on the first interim fee
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sonal property. Sampsons suit was not tried until after the final fee
order; and, according to Grausz, the bankruptcy court relied on a different breach of the settlement agreement failure to list community
property interests to deny Grausz a discharge. Grausz contends
that he could not have anticipated that the court would find that his
nondisclosure of community property was a breach, and thus he could
not have foreseen the need to object (at the time of the fee proceeding) on the ground that the Linowes firm negligently failed to advise
him on community property issues. This argument ignores that the
bankruptcy court relied in part on the inadequacy of the packing list
to deny the discharge. Moreover, it ignores that Grauszs malpractice
complaint alleges that the Linowes firm was negligent in allowing
him to use the packing list in amended Schedule B without verifying
it, and it ignores that Grausz knew by the time the final fee order
was entered about the problems with the packing list and his dissatisfaction with the firms work. Again, before the final fee order
was entered, Grausz knew that the Linowes firm had advised him
about the use of the packing list in amended Schedule B, he knew that
Sampson relied on the inadequacy of the packing list to allege breach
of the settlement agreement in the nondischargeability suit, and he
believed that Englander had performed incompetently in negotiating
the settlement agreement with Sampson. In short, by the time the
bankruptcy court entered the final fee order for the Linowes firm,
Grausz knew or should have known there was a real likelihood that
he had a malpractice claim against the firm.
We turn to the second practical consideration, whether the fee proceeding in bankruptcy court provided Grausz with an effective opportunity to litigate his malpractice claim. Grausz could have objected to
the Linowes firms fee application and included with his objection a
claim for affirmative relief on account of the firms alleged malpractice. See Intelogic, 200 F.3d at 389-90. In that event, the matter would
have become an adversary proceeding. See Fed. Bankr. R. 3007. Procedural mechanisms were therefore available for Grausz to raise his
malpractice claim in connection with the fee proceeding.
Grausz claims, however, that forcing him to assert his malpractice
claim in bankruptcy court deprives him of his right to a jury trial. If
there is a right to a jury trial, there are procedures to accommodate
that right. An adversary proceeding brought by a debtor to assert a
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