League of Cities of the Ph. vs. Senate of the Ph.

During the 11th congress, 57 bills were filed before the HR seeking the
conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities. Only 33 bill were enacted.
During the 12TH Congress, RA 9009 was enacted amending sec. 450 of the LGC
stating the requirements to qualify for a conversion into a city (It increases the
income requirement from P20,000,000 to P100,000,000 annually). Thereafter the
HR issued a joint resolution exempting the remaining municipalities with pending
cityhood bills in the income requirement. However the senate failed to approve the
said resolution. In the 13th Congress the remaining municipalities filed their
individual cityhood bills with common provision exempting them from the 100M
income requirement. The said bills were approved both by the HR and the senate
and lapsed into law. Herein petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the said
laws. Among the issues raised whether it violated Sec.10 Art X of the Consti and
whether the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
The SC ruled in the negative. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The
deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as
the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved
resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have no legal
significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by
subsequent Congresses.
Note: After several MR and flipflop of the SC, in its April 12, 2011 Ruling it declared
that the above cityhood laws are constitutional.

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Purisima

RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Herein petitioner asked the court to declare the said law unconstitutional
because it unduly delegates to the President the power to fix revenue targets
without sufficient standard and it violates the doctrine of separation of powers by
creating a Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the laws implementing
rules
1. Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete

when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or

implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegates authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented.

RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the
law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
2. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must
follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures"
specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and
presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should
be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must
be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class. Congress, in the
guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by
subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance
of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or
disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with
the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or

enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its
members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken
effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its
members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive
branch charged with the implementation of the law.

Fabian vs. Desierto

Lidasan vs. COMELEC

Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act
No. 4790, entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur, was passed. Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios
located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790.
Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter
registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA
4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly
indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory
several barrios from Cotabato in violation of Sec.26 Art. VI of the Consti (1 bill 1
subject)
The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power.
First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language
sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import
of the single subject thereof. The title did not inform the members of Congress the
full impact of the law.

Tobias vs. Abalos

Before the enactment of RA 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong." Mandaluyong and San Juan is under a single congressional district.
Herein petitioners questioned the validity of the said law because according to them
it violated the one bill one subject rule. It is their contention that the law has
two subject, first converting mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city and second
the division of Mandaluyong and San Juan into two Congressional district. It also
violated Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House
of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also
provides that within three years following the return of every census, the Congress

shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided

in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any
census showing that the minimum population requirement was attained.
The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With
regards to the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its
conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal
construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this
court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number
of representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not
absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law.
Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675
is not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed
law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the
minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met,
the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress
of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative district

BANAT vs. COMELEC

Herein petitioners questioned the Panganiban formula that If a party-list
garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats (this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from
the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.)
The petitioners also averred that the 2% threshold of Sec. 11 of RA 7941
(Party-List System Act) is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list
election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the
Constitution.
No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional
basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified
for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Instead, the 2%
rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is
guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less
than 2% to also get a seat.
The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.

Farinas vs. Executive Secretary

Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance

Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716
otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred
that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution.
Petitioners contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the
Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two
distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners
point out that although Art. VI, SS 24 was adopted from the American Federal
Constitution, it is notable in two respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in
the Philippine Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on other
bills" in the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be
considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the
essence of H. No. 11197.
The SC ruled that it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by
the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist
that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the
House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with
amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution
simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they
are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the
filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the
House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3
readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and
third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had
certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings
on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Arroyo vs. Devenecia

Herein petitioners were congressmen challenging the validity of RA 8240
(amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing socalled sin taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes). It is their
contention that it was passed in violation of the rules of the HR.
The SC ruled that it is unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department of the Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the
Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when the
petitioners can find their remedy in their own department.
Rules are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a
particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be
given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.

Miller vs. Mardo

Consolidated cases questioning the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A,
prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission
under the authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241,
insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor
created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation
pay, etc.
It is the petitioners contention that the GSRC in issuing RP 20-A repeals the
Judiciary Act regarding the jurisdiction of CIR over cases under workmens
compensation law.

Senate vs. Ermita

Garcillano vs. House of Rep.

Arnault vs. Nazareno
Senate blue ribbon committee vs. Judge Majaducon
Pascual vs. Sec. of Public Works and Com.