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SECTION 17 SELF-INCRIMINATION

A. SCOPE OF RIGHT
G.R. No. 7081

September 7, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
TAN TENG, defendant-appellant.
Chas A. McDonough, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Harvey, for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This defendant was charged with the crime of rape. The complaint alleged:
That on or about September 15, 1910, and before the filing of this complaint, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Tan Teng did willfully, unlawfully and criminally, and employing force,
lie and have carnal intercourse with a certain Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age.
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found the defendant guilty of the
offense of abusos deshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal Code, and
sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days of prision correccional, and
to pay the costs.
From that sentence the defendant appealed and made the following assignments of error in this court:
I. The lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the physicians about having taken a certain
substance from the body of the accused while he was confined in jail and regarding the chemical
analysis made of the substance to demonstrate the physical condition of the accused with
reference to a venereal disease.
II. The lower court erred in holding that the complainant was suffering from a venereal disease
produced by contact with a sick man.
III. The court erred in holding that the accused was suffering from a venereal disease.
IV. The court erred in finding the accused guilty from the evidence.
From an examination of the record it appears that the offended party, Oliva Pacomio, a girl seven years of
age, was, on the 15th day of September , 1910, staying in the house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang
Street, in the city of Manila; that on said day a number of Chinamen were gambling had been in the habit
of visiting the house of the sister of the offended party; that Oliva Pacomio, on the day in question, after
having taken a bath, returned to her room; that the defendant followed her into her room and asked her
for some face powder, which she gave him; that after using some of the face powder upon his private
parts he threw the said Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in that
position for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio
discovered that the latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of
this discovery that Oliva related to her sister what happened upon the morning of the 15th of September.
The sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were

collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not
present at first. later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to violate
her.
Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his
clothing and examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore from the venereal disease
known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the
defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made
of the same. The result of the examination showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
During the trial the defendant objected strongly to the admissibility of the testimony of Oliva, on the
ground that because of her tender years her testimony should not be given credit. The lower court, after
carefully examining her with reference to her ability to understand the nature of an oath, held that she had
sufficient intelligence and discernment to justify the court in accepting her testimony with full faith and
credit. With the conclusion of the lower court, after reading her declaration, we fully concur. The defense
in the lower court attempted to show that the venereal disease of gonorrhea might be communicated in
ways other than by contact such as is described in the present case, and called medical witnesses for the
purpose of supporting the contention. Judge Lobingier, in discussing that question said:
We shall not pursue the refinement of speculation as to whether or not this disease might, in
exceptional cases, arise from other carnal contact. The medical experts, as well as the books,
agree that in ordinary cases it arises from that cause, and if this was an exceptional one, we think
it was incumbent upon the defense to bring it within the exception.
The offended party testified that the defendant had rested his private parts upon hers for some moments.
The defendant was found to be suffering from gonorrhea. The medical experts who testified agreed that
this disease could have been communicated from him to her by the contact described. Believing as we do
the story told by Oliva, we are forced to the conclusion that the disease with which Oliva was suffering
was the result of the illegal and brutal conduct of the defendant. Proof, however, that Oliva constructed
said obnoxious disease from the defendant is not necessary to show that he is guilty of the crime. It is
only corroborative of the truth of Oliva's declaration.
The defendant attempted to prove in the lower court that the prosecution was brought for the purpose of
compelling him to pay to the sister of Oliva a certain sum of money.
The defendant testifed and brought other Chinamen to support his declaration, that the sister of Oliva
threatened to have him prosecuted if he did not pay her the sum of P60. It seems impossible to believe
that the sister, after having become convinced that Oliva had been outraged in the manner described
above, would consider for a moment a settlement for the paltry sum of P60. Honest women do not
consent to the violation of their bodies nor those of their near relatives, for the filthy consideration of mere
money.
In the court below the defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination made by the
Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not
admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea. That to admit such
evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself. Judge Lobingier, in discussing that
question in his sentence, said:
The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer any questions, and the mere
fact that an object found on his person was examined: seems no more to infringe the rule

invoked, than would the introduction in evidence of stolen property taken from the person of a
thief.
The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection, the examination was
made by competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant was suffering from said
disease. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been found with stolen property upon
his person, there certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been taken for the
purpose of using the same as evidence against him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of
blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there certainly could
have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of
even suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated, taken from the defendant,
could not be used against him as evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be required to
give testimony against himself.
The question presented by the defendant below and repeated in his first assignment of error is not a new
question, either to the courts or authors. In the case of Holt vs. U.S. (218 U.S., 245), Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the court upon this question, said:
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is
a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not
an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in principle, would
forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and compare his features with a photograph in proof.
Moreover we are not considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself,
for when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the
evidence if material, is competent.
The question which we are discussing was also discussed by the supreme court of the State of New
Jersey, in the case of State vs. Miller (71 N.J. law Reports, 527). In that case the court said, speaking
through its chancellor:
It was not erroneous to permit the physician of the jail in which the accused was confined, to
testify to wounds observed by him on the back of the hands of the accused, although he also
testified that he had the accused removed to a room in another part of the jail and divested of his
clothing. The observation made by the witness of the wounds on the hands and testified to by
him, was in no sense a compelling of the accused to be a witness against himself. If the removal
of the clothes had been forcible and the wounds had been thus exposed, it seems that the
evidence of their character and appearance would not have been objectionable.
In that case also (State vs. Miller) the defendant was required to place his hand upon the wall of the
house where the crime was committed, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not his hand would
have produced the bloody print. The court said, in discussing that question:
It was not erroneous to permit evidence of the coincidence between the hand of the accused and
the bloody prints of a hand upon the wall of the house where the crime was committed, the hand
of the accused having been placed thereon at the request of persons who were with him in the
house.
It may be added that a section of the wall containing the blood prints was produced before the jury and
the testimony of such comparison was like that held to be proper in another case decided by the supreme
court of New Jersey in the case of Johnson vs. State (30 Vroom, N.J. Law Reports, 271). The defendant
caused the prints of the shoes to be made in the sand before the jury, and the witnesses who had

observed shoe prints in the sand at the place of the commission of the crime were permitted to compare
them with what the had observed at that place.
In that case also the clothing of the defendant was used as evidence against him.
To admit the doctrine contended for by the appellant might exclude the testimony of a physician or a
medical expert who had been appointed to make observations of a person who plead insanity as a
defense, where such medical testimony was against necessarily use the person of the defendant for the
purpose of making such examination. (People vs. Agustin, 199 N.Y., 446.) The doctrine contended for by
the appellants would also prevent the courts from making an examination of the body of the defendant
where serious personal injuries were alleged to have been received by him. The right of the courts in such
cases to require an exhibit of the injured parts of the body has been established by a long line of
decisions.
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a
witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own
lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on evidence, in discussing the question before us, said:
If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control] in whatever
form exercised, then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with
all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence
anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the
surrender of the evidential articles a clearreductio ad absurdum. In other words, it is not
merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . buttestimonial compulsion. (4 Wigmore,
sec. 2263.)
The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of
prisonersbefore trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations
implicating them in the commission of a crime. (People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119.)
The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a defendant
even, for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an application of the prohibition under discussion
certainly could not be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses,
can not violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the accused
as a witness it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Mr. Wigmore says
that evidence obtained in this way from the accused, is not testimony but his body his body itself.
As was said by Judge Lobingier:
The accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer any questions, and the mere
fact that an object found upon his body was examined seems no more to infringe the rule invoked
than would the introduction of stolen property taken from the person of a thief.
The doctrine contended for by the appellant would also prohibit the sanitary department of the
Government from examining the body of persons who are supposed to have some contagious disease.
We believe that the evidence clearly shows that the defendant was suffering from the venereal disease,
as above stated, and that through his brutal conduct said disease was communicated to Oliva Pacomio.

In a case like the present it is always difficult to secure positive and direct proof. Such crimes as the
present are generally proved by circumstantial evidence. In cases of rape the courts of law require
corroborative proof, for the reason that such crimes are generally committed in secret. In the present
case, taking into account the number and credibility of the witnesses, their interest and attitude on the
witness stand, their manner of testifying and the general circumstances surrounding the witnesses,
including the fact that both parties were found to be suffering from a common disease, we are of the
opinion that the defendant did, on or about the 15th of September, 1910, have such relations as above
described with the said Oliva Pacomio, which under the provisions of article 439 of the Penal Code makes
him guilty of the crime of "abusos deshonestos," and taking into consideration the fact that the crime
which the defendant committed was done in the house where Oliva Pacomio was living, we are of the
opinion that the maximum penalty of the law should be imposed. The maximum penalty provided for by
law is six years of prision correccional. Therefore let a judgment be entered modifying the sentence of the
lower court and sentencing the defendant to be imprisoned for a period of six years of prision
correccional, and to pay the costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 16444

September 8, 1920

EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner,


vs.
RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the City of Manila, respondent.
Alfredo Calupitan, and Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for petitioner.
Assistant City of Fiscal Felix for respondent.
MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue to restore her to her liberty.
The facts are not dispute. In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. On this case
coming on for trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petitioner of the
assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, nor become the
petitioner herein, to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if
she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of
her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was
found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the
medical examination required by the court.
The sole legal issue from the admitted facts is whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to
be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of
Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in the Constitution of the
United States and practically all state constitutions and in the common law rules of evidence, providing
that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. (President's
Instructions to the Philippine Commission; Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, section 5, paragraph 3; Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, section 3; paragraph 3; Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 [4]; United
States Constitution, fifth amendment.) Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an
infringement of the constitutional provision; the representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an
infringement of the constitutional provision. The trial judge in the instant case has held with the fiscal;

while it is brought to our notice that a judge of the same court has held on an identical question as
contended for by the attorney for the accused and petitioner.
The authorities are abundant but conflicting. What may be termed the conservative courts emphasize
greatly the humanitarianism of the constitutional provisions and are pleased to extend the privilege in
order that its mantle may cover any fact by which the accused is compelled to make evidence against
himself. (Compare State vs. Jacobs [1858], 50 N. C., 259 with State vs. Ah Chuey [1879], 14 Nev.,
79. See further State vs. Ah Nordstrom [1893], 7 Wash., 506; State vs. Height [1902]. 117 Iowa., 650;
Thornton vs. State [1903], 117 Wis., 338.) A case concordant with this view and almost directly in point is
People vs. McCoy ([1873], 45 How. Pr., 216). A woman was charged with the crime of infanticide. The
corner directed two physicians to go to the jail and examine her private parts to determine whether she
had recently been delivered of a child. She objected to the examination, but being threatened with force,
yielded, and the examination was had. The evidence of these physicians was offered at the trial and ruled
out. The court said that the proceeding was in violation of the spirit and meaning of the Constitution,
which declares that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
Continuing, the court said: "They might as well have sworn the prisoner, and compelled her, by threats, to
testify that she had been pregnant, and had been delivered of a child, as to have compelled her, by
threats, to allow them to look into her person, with the aid of a speculum, to ascertain whether she had
been pregnant and been delivered of a child. . . . Has this court the right to compel the prisoner now to
submit to an examination they are of the opinion she is not a virgin, and has had a child? It is not possible
that this court has that right; and it is too clear to admit of argument that evidence thus obtained would be
inadmissible against the prisoner."
It may be revealing a judicial secret, but nevertheless we cannot refrain from saying that, greatly
impressed with the weight of these decisions, especially the one written by Mr. Justice McClain, in
State vs. Height, supra, the instant case was reported by the writer with the tentative recommendation
that the court should lay down the general rule that a defendant can be compelled to disclose only those
parts of the body which are not usually covered. Buth having disabused our minds of a too sensitive
appreciation of the rights of accused persons, and having been able, as we think, to penetrate through the
maze of law reports to the policy which lies behind the constitutional guaranty and the common law
principle, we have come finally to take our stand with what we believe to be the reason of the case.
In contradistinction to the cases above-mentioned are others which seem to us more progressive in
nature. Among these can be prominently mentioned decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and
the Supreme Court of these Islands. Thus, the always forward looking jurist, Mr. Justice Holmes, in the
late case of Holt vs. United States ([1910], 218 U. S., 245), in resolving an objection based upon what he
termed "an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment," said: "The prohibition of compelling a man in
a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."
(See also, of same general tenor, decision of Mr. Justice Day in Adams vs. New York [1903], 192 U. S.,
585.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in two decisions, has seemed to limit the protection to
a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The constitutional limitation was said to be
"simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an
admission of his guilt." (U. S. vs. Tan Teng [1912], 23 Phil., 145; U. S. vs. Ong Siu Hong [1917], 36 Phil.,
735, and the derivatory principle announced in 16 Corpus Juris, 567, 568, citing the United States
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands as authority.)
Although we have stated s proposition previously announced by this court and by the highest tribunal in
the United States, we cannot unconcernedly leave the subject without further consideration. Even in the
opinion Mr. Justice Holmes, to which we have alluded, there was inserted the careful proviso that "we
need not consider how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself." Other courts have

likewise avoided any attempt to determine the exact location of the dividing line between what is proper
and what is improper in this very broad constitutional field. But here before us is presented what would
seem to be the most extreme case which could be imagined. While the United States Supreme Court
could nonchalantly decree that testimony that an accused person put on a blouse and it fitted him is not a
violation of the constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court of Nuevada could go so far as to require
the defendant to roll up his sleeve in order to disclose tattoo marks, and while the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands could permit substances taken from the person of an accused to be offered in
evidence, none of these even approach in apparent harshness an order to make a woman, possibly
innocent, to disclose her body in all of its sanctity to the gaze of strangers. We can only consistently
consent to the retention of a principle which would permit of such a result by adhering steadfastly to the
proposition that the purpose of the constitutional provision was and is merely to prohibit testimonial
compulsion.
So much for the authorities. For the nonce we would prefer to forget them entirely, and here in the
Philippines, being in the agrreable state of breaking new ground, would rather desire our decision to rest
on a strong foundation of reason and justice than on a weak one blind adherence to tradition and
precedent. Moreover, we believe that an unbiased consideration of the history of the constitutional
provisions will disclose that our conclusion is in exact accord with the causes which led to its adoption.
The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, was recognized in England in early
days, but not in the other legal systems of the world, in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack. A
legal shield was raised against odious inquisitorial methods of interrogating an accused person by which
to extort unwilling confessions with the ever present temptation to commit the crime of perjury. The kernel
of the privilege as disclosed by the textwriters was testimonial compulsion. As forcing a man to be a
witness against himself was deemed contrary to the fundamentals of republican government, the principle
was taken into the American Constitutions, and from the United States was brought to the Philippine
Islands, in exactly as wide but no wider a scope as it existed in old English days. The provision
should here be approached in no blindly worshipful spirit, but with a judicious and a judicial appreciation
of both its benefits and its abuses. (Read the scholarly articles of Prof. Wigmore in 5 Harvard L. R. [1891],
p. 71, and 15 Harvard L. R., 1902, p. 610 found in 4 Wigmore on Evidence, pp. 3069 et seq., and U.
S. vs. Navarro [1904], Phil., 143.)
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back once more to elements and
ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal laws is
to purgue the community of persons who violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men.
Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then provided, not to protect
the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is intemended to be so rigid as to embarrass the
administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth. No accused person should be afraid of the
use of any method which will tend to establish the truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use
torture to make the defendant admit her guilt might only result in including her to tell a falsehood. But no
evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be detrimental to the accused except
in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty person.
Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law cause of the
Constitution every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body.
It is extremely abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have the decide that such inviolability
of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's gaze. As Mr. Justice
Gray in Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. Botsford ([1891], 141 U. S., 250) said, "To compel any one, and
especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority,
is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass." Conceded, and yet, as well suggested by the same court,
even superior to the complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the inherent which the public has in

the orderly administration of justice. Unfortunately, all too frequently the modesty of witnesses is shocked
by forcing them to answer, without any mental evasion, questions which are put to them; and such a
tendency to degrade the witness in public estimation does not exempt him from the duty of disclosure.
Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the
public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
The protection of accused persons has been carried to such an unwarranted extent that criminal trials
have sometimes seemed to be like a game of shuttlecocks, with the judge as referee, the lawyers as
players, the criminal as guest of honor, and the public as fascinated spectators. Against such a loose
extension of constitutional guaranties we are here prepared to voice our protest.
Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a
shock to one's sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in
accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again we
lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the
rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care
will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary.
Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by
doctor of the same sex can be seen.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant fiscal for an examination of
the person of the defendant by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be
understood as subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal. The writ of habeas corpus
prayed for is hereby denied. The costs shall be taxed against the petitioner. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Avancea, Moir and Villamor, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 100720-23 June 30, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO CODILLA, GERMAN LUCAAS and MARCELO PUTULIN, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Erlich V. Barraquias for accused-appellants Lucaas and Putulin.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant R. Codilla.

REGALADO, J.:
Margarita Alpos, Helen Pepito and Letecia Pepito instituted four separate complaints with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 12, Ormoc City, for rape against accused-appellants Rolando Codilla, German

Lucanas and Marcelo Putulin. Two separate complaints were filed by Helen Pepito and Margarita Alpos
against Rolando Codilla in Criminal Cases Nos. 3739-0 and 3740-0, respectively. German Lucaas was
charged with the same offense of rape by the same Margarita Alpos in Criminal Case No. 3742-0, while
Marcelo Putulin was also charged with the same crime of rape by Letecia Pepito, sister of Helen, in
criminal Case No. 3741-0.
These complaints 1 were of the following tenor:
Criminal Case No. 3739-0
That on or about the 24th day of May, 1990, at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, at
Brgy. Concepcion, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, ROLANDO CODILLA y Dumalan, being then armed with a small
pointed bolo, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant herein, HELEN PEPITO y
Maglinte, against her will and in her own house.
All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstance that the said offense was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having given provocation for
the offense.
In violation of Article 335, Revised Penal Code.
Ormoc City. December 19, 1990.
(SGD.) HELEN M.
PEPITO
Complainant
Criminal Case No. 3740-0
That on or about the 27th day of November, 1990, at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning
at Brgy. Concepcion, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above- named accused, ROLANDO CODILLA y Dumalan, being then armed with a
handgun with unknown caliber, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant herein,
MARGARITA ALPOS, against her will and in her own house.
All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstance that the said offense was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having given provocation for
the offense.
In violation of Article 335, Revised Penal Code.
Ormoc City, December 21, 1990.
(SGD.) MARGARITA
ALPOS
Complainant

Criminal Case No. 3741-0


That on or about the 24th day of May, 1990, at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, at
Brgy. Concepcion, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, MARCELO PUTULIN y Genoguin, being then armed with a small
pointed bolo, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant LETECIA PEPITO y Maglinte,
against her will and in her own house.
All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstance that the said offense was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having given provocation for
the offense.
In violation of Article 335, Revised Penal Code.
Ormoc City, December 19, 1990.
(SGD.) LETECIA
PEPITO
Complainant
Criminal Case No. 3742-0
That on or about the 27th day of November, 1990, at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning,
at Brgy. Concepcion. Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused GERMAN LUCAAS y dela Cruz, being then armed with a
handgun with unknown caliber, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant herein,
MARGARITA ALPOS, against her will and in her own house.
All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstance that the said offense was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having given provocation for
the offense.
In violation of Article 335, Revised Penal Code.
Ormoc City, December 21, 1990.
(SGD.) MARGARITA
ALPOS
Complainant
The factual milieu of these cases, as correctly and succinctly summarized by the Solicitor General with
page references to the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial, is in concordance with the
findings of the trial court, and we adopt and reproduce the same hereunder:
In Criminal Case No. 3739-0, the private offended party, Helen Pepito, testified that she is
thirteen (13) years old, single and a student (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p. 13). At about 3:00
o'clock in the early morning of May 24, 1990, at Barangay Concepcion, Ormoc City, she
and her sister Letecia were awakened from their sleep by a heavy rain (tsn, Feb. 19,

1991, p. 15). When she opened her eyes, she was surprised to see two men wearing
briefs and sleeveless shirts (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p.16). The men were carrying bolos and
a flashlight (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p.15).
One of the men asked her if they had money. When she replied that she had none, she
was ordered to go down to the kitchen with him. She obeyed the man out of
overwhelming fear (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p. 18).
In the kitchen, one of the two men ordered her to remove her clothes. She initially
refused, but when the man pointed his bolo at her, she undressed herself. The men then
held both her hands, inserted his penis in her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her
(tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p. 19-20). When the carnal act was consummated, she felt pain, in
her private parts (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p. 20).
Helen Pepito identified the man who ravished her as Rolando Codilla (Ibid.).
Dr. Nelson Udtajan, Senior Resident Physician of the Ormoc District Hospital, testified
that he examined Helen Pepito on May 25, 1990. His findings, contained in Exhibit "A" of
Criminal Case No. 3739-0, show that Helen Pepito sustained lacerations in her hymen
and indubitably indicated consummation of the carnal act (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, pp. 7-9).
In Criminal Case No. 3741-0, the private offended party, Letecia Pepito, testified that she
is fifteen (15) years old, single and a student (tsn, March. 4, 1991, p. 3). In the early
morning of May 24, 1990, she was awakened from her sleep by a light coming from a
flashlight being focused on her face (tsn, Mar. 4, 1991, p. 4). When she opened her eyes,
she saw two men who pointed bolos at her and her sister, Helen Pepito. One man
ordered her sister to go down to the kitchen while the other brought her to the sala where
he ordered her to remove her panty (tsn, Mar. 1991, pp. 6-7). When she refused to
comply, the man pushed her to the ground, removed her panty himself and sexually
abused her (tsn, Mar. 4, 1991, p. 8).
Letecia Pepito identified the man who raped her as Marcelo Putulin (tsn, Mar. 4, 1991, p.
10).
The defense admitted the authenticity of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Nelson
Udtajan which found that Letecia Pepito's hymen sustained lacerations that indubitably
indicated the consummation of the carnal act (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, pp. 2-4).
Criminal Cases Nos. 3740-0 and 3742-0 involve the same private offended party,
Margarita Alpos, and the offenses were committed under the same circumstances and
time.
Margarita Alpos testified that at about 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of November 27,
1990, she was sleeping in her house at Barangay Concepcion, Ormoc City when she
was awakened by the fall of her gallon containing water (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, p. 5). She
stood up to go to the kitchen but was met by two men on the stairs who pointed a
flashlight on her face (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, pp. 5-6). The two men asked her to give some
money, but since she had no money at that time, the two men brought her upstairs. Once
upstairs, the two men put out the light coming from an oil lamp. One of the men then put
himself on top of Margarita and succeeded in having sexual with her (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991,

pp. 7-8). When he was through, the other man took his turn in sexually abusing Margarita
(tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, p. 8).
Margarita Alpos identified the two men who sexually abused her as Rolando Codilla and
German Lucaas (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, p. 7).
Dr. Edilberto Calipayan, Medical Officer IV of the Ormoc City Health Office, testified that
he examined Margarita Alpos at about 3:00 o'clock p.m. on November 27, 1990 and he
found that the victim had carnal intercourse with at least two men about thirteen (13)
hours prior to examination (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, pp. 4-7).
Sgt. Romeo Pearanda, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned to
Ormoc City, testified that at around 2:30 p.m. on November 27, 1990, he was at Brgy.
Concepcion, Ormoc City, responding to a rape case. Together with him were PFC
Mamerto Sarcol, Jr., PFC Diosdado Tagalog, Pat. Eduardo Bituin and CVO Manuel
Pepito (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, p. 32). They proceeded to the house of the Barangay Captain
who provided them with a guide to show them the place where the rape suspects were
hiding. The police were able to apprehend the suspects and brought them to the Ormoc
City Police Station. Margarita Alpos was able to identify two of the three suspects (Codilla
and Lucaas) during the custodial investigation of the case, as the persons who sexually
assaulted her (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, pp. 35-36).
Helen and Letecia Pepito likewise identified the persons who raped them as Codilla and
Putulin, respectively, at the Police Station during the custodial investigation of the case
(tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, pp. 30-31; 60). 2
Accused-appellants, anchoring their defense on denial and alibi, present different versions which, as
culled from the joint decision of the court a quo, are respectively of the substantial import recounted in the
succeeding paragraphs. 3
Appellant Rolando Codilla asserts that on the fateful day of May 24, 1990, at around 3:00 A.M., he was at
San Isidro, Leyte, working in the four-hectare cornland of Ernesto de la Cruz, having done so since the
middle part of March of the same year. He claims that he never left the place until August 6, 1990 when
he stopped working on the aforesaid land. This was corroborated by Ernesto de la Cruz who confirmed
having hired Codilla to harvest his corn from March, 1990 to August 6, 1990, and who supported Codilla's
claim that he never left San Isidro during this time.
Codilla also denies having had carnal knowledge of Margarita Alpos, claiming that on November 27,
1990, at about 3:00 A.M., when the alleged rape occurred, he was sleeping in their house at Sitio Tipik II,
Bgy. San Jose, Ormoc City.
Appellant German Lucaas, on his part, avers that having stayed in Manila for twelve (12) years, he came
home to Ormoc City on November 11, 1990 on board the M/V Cebuano Princess with appellant Marcelo
Putulin. On November 27, 1990, at about 3:00 A.M., he was at Sitio Tipik II, Bgy. San Jose, Ormoc City,
visiting his uncle, Gaudioso Potot.
Witness Gregoria Genoguin was presented by the defense to prove that she has known appellants
Codilla and Lucaas for fourteen years; that she was a resident of Sitio Tipik II, Bgy. San Jose, Ormoc
City; and that Codilla and Lucaas stayed in the barracks of Del Socorro at Brgy. Concepcion, Ormoc
City.

As for appellant Marcelo Putulin, he alleges that she was in Manila on January 10, 1989 and he stayed
there until November 11, 1990 when he returned to Ormoc City with appellant Lucaas. While in Manila,
he sustained himself by selling hotcakes. Florentina Putulin, Marcelo's mother, was also called to the
witness stand to testify to the fact that her son was in Manila from January, 1990 to November, 1990 and
that he never left Manila during this period.
At the arraignment, appellants Codilla and Lucaas, assisted by Atty. Crisologo S. Bitas, 4 and appellant
Putulin, assisted by Atty. Pablo Oliver, entered pleas of not guilty 5 and, after a joint trial on the merits, the
court a quo rendered a joint decision, with the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered:
1. In Crim. Case No. 3739-0, finding the accused ROLANDO CODILLA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the court
imposes upon the same ROLANDO CODILLA the sentence of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to indemnify HELEN PEPITO (in) the sum of P20,000.00;
2. In Crim. Case No. 3740-0, finding the accused ROLANDO CODILLA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the court
imposes upon the same ROLANDO CODILLA the sentence of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to indemnify MARGARITA ALPOS (in) the sum of P20,000.00;
3. In Crim. Case No. 3741-0, finding the accused MARCELO PUTULIN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the court
imposes upon the same MARCELO PUTULIN the sentence of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to indemnify LETECIA ALPOS (in) the sum of P20,000.00;
4. In Crim. Case No. 3742-0, finding the accused GERMAN LUCAAS guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the court
imposes upon the same GERMAN LUCAAS the sentence of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to indemnify MARGARITA ALPOS (in) the sum of P20,000.00;
As all three (3) accused are detention prisoners, the period of their detention shall be
credited in full if they conform in writing to the rules and conditions of convicted prisoners,
otherwise only 4/5 thereof. In the case of ROLANDO CODILLA, by reason of the two
sentences of Reclusion Perpetua, the two penalties shall be served successively in
accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED. 6
Appellants now invoke this Court's jurisdiction to review and reverse the decision of the court a quo,
contending that the latter supposedly erred: (1) in not considering the dubious circumstances surrounding
their arrest which is violative of their constitutional rights, and by indicating fabrication of charges against
them; (2) in not considering the conduct of the police investigators during the pre-trial identification of
appellants which was calculated to induce positive identification; (3) in giving credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses despite their incredibility and unworthiness, and (4) in not considering

acceptable jurisprudence that identification arising from suggestive police behavior is unreliabe and
inadmissible for being violative of an accused's right against self-incrimination. 7
During the pendency of this appeal, after it was proven that appellant Rolando Codilla escaped from the
Ormoc City Jail on July 27, 1991, the Court issued a resolution on April 6, 1992 8 dismissing his appeal
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which provides, inter alia, that "(t)he court may also,
upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison
or confinement or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." It is a judicial dictum that
where the accused escapes from custody or jumps bail during the pendency of his appeal, the appellate
court has the discretion to either postpone the resolution of his case until his recapture or to dismiss the
appeal. 9
Meanwhile, the Jail Warden of the Ormoc City Jail, Rodolfo D. Sonon, also manifested in a letter dated
August 11, 1992, that appellant German Lucaas was missing and the latter's whereabouts is unknown
up to the present. He expressed the belief that Lucaas was one of the victims of the flash flood which hit
Ormoc City last November 5, 1991. 10 In a resolution dated September 14, 1992, 11 the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) was ordered by this Court to investigate Lucaas' whereabouts. In response to NBI
queries, Jail Warden Sonon again manifested, in a letter dated September 22, 1992, 12 that Lucaas is
still missing.
After this investigation, the NBI submitted a report to this Court dated November 4, 1992, containing the
following excerpts:
03. . . . An interview was conducted at Ormoc City to determine the veracity of the report
submitted by the former City Jail Warden JUANITO CATIPAY. In an interview with
JUANITO CATIPAY he averred that because of the growing water occupying the ground
floor at around 11:30 in the morning, he decided to open the cell at the ground floor so
that the prisoners could take refuge at the second floor or other elevated portion of the
jail. Minutes later, several people took shelter at the second floor making it
unmanageable coupled with the circumstance that everybody was in panic and
concerned with his own safety. . . .
04. . . . In view thereof, based on the interview and the spot inspection conducted by this
Command coupled with the fact that nobody was ever recovered after the calamity which
was positively identified as that of GERMAN LUCAAS, plus the fact that no witness
could either confirm or deny the fact of death of herein subject, nor could this command
safely conclude the fact that he might still be alive, this Command after a careful search
for herein subject (in) in depth study of this matter respectively finds the following:
1. That as to GERMAN LUCAAS being one of the victims of the flashflood which hit
Ormoc City last November 5, 1991, this Command based on the foregoing premises had
found no basis to adopt such a conclusion.
2. That as to his present whereabouts, the same remains unknown.

13

Atty. Erlich V. Barraquias, counsel of the record for appellant Lucaas, manifested that he does not have
sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the whereabouts of his client, and that Juanito Lucaas, father
of said appellant, informed him that there has been no communication between him and his son since the
Ormoc City flash flood. 14

From the foregoing, it is not clear whether Lucaas died or merely escaped and is now hiding. At any rate,
in either case, his appeal will have to be dismissed and declared abandoned. If he has indeed escaped,
he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal in line with our pronouncement in People vs. Quiritan, et
al., 15 to the effect that if an accused-appellant escapes or refuses to surrender to the proper authorities,
he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal, and so his appeal should be dismissed. Moreover, he is
guilty of evasion of service of sentence under Article 158 of the Revised Penal Code. If, on the other
hand, he was indeed one of the victims of the Ormoc City tragedy, under Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code his criminal liability, with respect to the personal penalties, is totally extinguished and as to the
pecuniary penalties, since his death occurred while this case is pending appeal, the civil indemnity to be
paid subsists and must be charged against his estate. 16
The conviction of both appellants Codilla and Lucaas must, therefore be affirmed, with the modification
that their respective civil liabilities should be increased to an indemnity of P30,000.00 for each offended
party, respectively raped by them. The circumstances of nighttime, dwelling and use of a deadly weapon
shall hereinafter be discussed as matters of law involved in these cases and our disposition thereof,
although the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua has to be maintained.
As for appellant Putulin, his appeal from his conviction for the rape of Letecia Pepito stands and his
liability wherefore we shall now resolve, the discussion which follows being with reference to his criminal
liability alone.
This appellant starts his defense by challenging his warrantless arrest and detention for two days without
any charges being filed against him. 17 We have of necessity to reject this argument for the simple reason
that he is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest
or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be
made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. 18 Besides, this issue is being
raised for the first time by appellant before this Court. He did not move for the quashal of the information
before the trial court on this ground. Hence, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when
he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and
participating in the trial. 19
After considering the factual findings on which the impugned decision is based, we do not descry any
cogent reason to depart from the holding of the lower court. As has often been emphasized, on the matter
of credibility of witnesses the findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect, if
not conclusive effect, because it has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while
testifying. Such findings may only be disturbed on appeal if there is any showing that the trial court
overlooked some material or substantial fact which if given consideration will alter the assailed
decision 20 and, as we have just stated, we do not find any such arbitrary oversight or omission by the
court below.
Letecia's account regarding the rape committed upon her was given full faith and credit by the trial
court. 21 We agree with the latter that Letecia is a credible witness, having testified in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and having remained consistent on crossexamination. 22 Her story finds ample support in the testimony of her sister, Helen, who was likewise
deflowered on that fateful day of May 24, 1990. The two sisters were able to identify their abusers through
the "lamparilla" which was then lighted inside their house. 23 Moreover, their claims that they were raped
that early morning have been corroborated by Anita Royeras, the wife of the barangay captain of
Barangay Catayum, Ormoc City, who had been conducting a surveillance in their community and had
observed that the three suspicious-looking appellants used to go home at around 3:00 o'clock in the
morning. 24

Although Letecia could recognize her abuser, as shown by the fact that she was able to describe the
latter's physical features at the police station a day after the incident, she did not know his name nor his
whereabouts. 25Nevertheless, on November 28, 1990, she was able to identify her defiler, who turned to
be appellant Putulin, when the latter was picked up and placed in a police line-up together with the other
two appellants herein. 26 This positive identification was reiterated in open court during the trial. 27
The scenario and details of the sexual abuse were fully established by the evidence for the prosecution.
After barging into Letecia's room, appellant Putulin threatened her with a knife and ordered her to go to
the sala. Along the way, appellant continuously pushed her, causing her to fall to the ground and sustain
bruises on her elbow. Upon reaching the sala, appellant Putulin commanded her to remove her
underwear and, when she refused, he remove it himself and then satisfied his bestial desire. Despite the
struggle put up by the overpowered victim, the sexual abuse was consummated. 28 Letecia was paralyzed
with fear, causing her to succumb to appellant's animal instinct.
Considering her tender age, the force and intimidation exerted upon her suffice to constitute that requisite
element of rape. It is well settled that the force or violence required in rape cases is relative; when
applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible. 29 It need but be present, and so long as it brings
about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are beside the point.
So it must likewise be for intimidation, which is addressed to the mind of the victim and is, therefore,
subjective. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of
the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produces fear
fear that if the victim does not yield to the lecherous demands of the accused, something would
happen to her at that moment or even thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the
incident. Intimidation includes the moral kind, as the fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife. When
such intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering
resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable, to say the least, to expect the victim to act with
equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel; or to act like an adult or a mature and experienced
woman who would know what to do under the circumstances, or to have the courage and intelligence to
disregard the threat. 30
For an innocent girl who was then only fifteen years old, we are satisfied that the threats made by
appellant against this complainant engendered in her a well-grounded fear that if she dared resist or
frustrate his lustful advances, she would be killed. 31
The defense attempts to discredit her testimony on the theory that she, together with her sister Helen, did
not immediately reveal the incident to their parents who were just sleeping in the room nearby and,
instead, just let the time pass crying and sobbing in one corner. 32 This specious contention cannot pass
judicial muster.
The fact that she and her sister did not immediately divulge their ravishment does not necessarily mean
that they were not sexually desecrated. Being then of very tender ages and utterly innocent of the ways of
the world, their temporary silence is easily understandable. They could have been terrified by the threats
of their ravishers and shocked into insensibility by the satyric acts they were subjected to. Young and
naive as they were, they ingenuously opted to momentarily suffer in silence if only to avoid humiliation
and embarrassment that may be brought about by the public disclosure of such dastardly acts. 33
It is likewise of no moment that the rape occurred with the complainant's parents, brothers and sisters just
sleeping in the nearby room. 34 It is not impossible nor incredible for her family members to be in deep
slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault was being committed. As we have repeatedly
pointed out, rape can be committed even in places where people congregate: in parks, along the

roadside, within the school premises and even inside a house where there are other occupants. Lust is no
respecter of time or place. 35
We are convinced, in line with our previous rulings which we now repeat, that what motivated complainant
to come out in the open is her desire to obtain justice. It is unthinkable that a rural-bred and minor victim
like her would endure the embarrassment and humiliation of public disclosure that she had been ravished,
allow an examination of her private parts, and undergo the ordeal and expense of a court proceeding if
her story is a lie. 36Considering the inbred modesty and antipathy of a Filipina to the airing in public of
things that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that the complainant would assume and admit the
ignominy she had undergone if it were not true. 37 Besides, by testifying, she made public a painful and
humiliating secret which others would have simply kept to themselves forever, jeopardizing her chances
of marriage or foreclosing the possibility of a blissful married life as her husband may not fully understand
the excruciatingly painful experience which would always haunt her. 38
Appellant's alibi is too superficial and transparent to merit this Court's consideration, as he was even
caught fabricating stories to suit his defense. As correctly pointed out by the lower court, the fact that she
was in Manila since January 10, 1989 and returned to Ormoc City on November 11, 1990 does not
prevent him from being in Ormoc City on May 24, 1990 when the crime occurred. He was an unable to
present any witness who could prove to the satisfaction of this Court that on the precise date of May 24,
1990, at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, he was indeed in Manila.
On this point, we give credit to and quote with approval this observation of the court below:
On the claim of Marcelo Putulin that he was in Manila at the time Letecia and Helen
Pepito were raped on May 24, 1990, the accused's evidence does not inspire belief. The
assertion by accused Marcelo Putulin that he took a jeepney from Pier 17 to Makati and
he found the place where his mother lives by just asking people when he did not even
have the address of (his) mother is too incredible to be true. The court take judicial notice
that there are no jeepneys in the pier area of Manila that have a direct route to Makati
and it is absolutely impossible to find the place in Makati where his mother lives if he did
not even know the address. Marcelo Putulin's claim that he came to know Rolando
Codilla only in November 11, 1990, through German Lucaas, is belied by the fact that
the three of them were at one place at the barracks of (D)el Socorro in Brgy. Concepcion,
at the time of their arrest and their claim that they worked in the farm of (D)el Socorro is
too shallow. Marcelo Putulin and German Lucaas told the court that they had work in
Manila and came to Ormoc City in November 1990 to take a vacation. If true, why did
they have to work as farm laborers when their purpose in coming to Ormoc was to take a
vacation? 39
Being aware of appellant's prevarications, the trial court had to advise the former's counsel not to ask
appellant any more re-direct questions, with the warning that he would "just be exposing this witness to
perjury." 40 Not even appellant's mother, Florentina, could sustain his fabricated defense, for when asked
how she was able to say that her son never left Manila for Ormoc City from January to November, 1990,
all she could say was: "Because every Sunday I have to visit him in his place because Sunday is my dayoff." 41 The rape occurred on May 24, 1990 which was a Thursday. It is, therefore, possible for appellant to
have arrived in Manila before Sunday, that is, before May 27, 1990, just in time for his mother's visit.
Besides, mother and son rendered conflicting testimonies on the witness stand, to which the former's
attention had to be called by the trial court:

Q Do you know if that was the first time that your son Marcelo Putulin
arrived in Manila, that is January, 1990?
A Last January 15, 1990, it was the third time that Marcelo Putulin have
gone (sic) to Manila, and the first time he went to Manila he was yet
single; the second time he was already married. 42
xxx xxx xxx
Q But you are not aware that your son testified that it was the first time,
on January 10, 1990, that he left for Manila, no other date and year when
he has gone to Manila?
A Maybe he was just frightened because he is innocent and
illiterate. 43
xxx xxx xxx
Q When your son Marcelo Putulin arrived in Manila in January 1990, did
he go direct(ly) to your house or did you meet him at the pier?
A No. sir, because he went direct(ly) to my uncle and there he called by
telephone.
COURT
Q Your son testified in court that he went direct(ly) to you, as a matter of
fact the court was rather surprised with the way he testified that he just
took a jeepney from the pier to Makati and the court takes judicial notice
that there are no jeepneys to Makati. What can you say about this?
A. Maybe he was frightened because he was not used to testify before
the court because he is illiterate. 44
The foregoing testimonial colloquy clearly does violence to what we have held in a number of cases that
evidence, to be worthy or credit, must not only proceed from a credible source but must, in addition, be
credible in itself. And by this is meant that it shall be natural, reasonable and probable as to make it easy
to believe. 45
Appellant also asserts that the police investigators induced positive identification by placing him and the
two other appellants in a police line-up by themselves only and by having them undress, thus violating
their right against self-incrimination. 46 We disagree.
The right against self-incrimination has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion. 47 It
prohibits the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. 48 Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid and
prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a
person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." 49

With the passage of time, this has been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature acquired
under circumstances of duress." An act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to disclosure
of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution. This should be distinguished,
parenthetically, from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute which are not meant to unearth
undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation, like requiring
him to take part in a police line-up.50 In fact, it has been held that to require a person to remove his
garments would not be violative of the right against self-incrimination. To require the accused to put on a
pair of pants and a hat to determine whether they fitted him for measuring or photographing of a party, or
the removal or replacement of garments or shoes, are not within the privilege against self-incrimination
too. 51
Contrary to appellant's asseverations, there was no undue influence exerted by the police upon the
complainant which induced the latter to positively identify him. As already noted, even right after the
incident, complainant was able to describe the features of her rapist at the police headquarters, and upon
being given the chance to identify the malefactor at the police line-up, she did so without faltering.
The cases to which appellant clings for his protection, far from favoring his cause, actually work against
him. First, in People vs. Cruz, 52 the lighting situation in the house was wholly uncertain and rendered
highly suspect and questionable, if not altogether infirm, the ability of the two girls to shape out a positive
identification of the appellant therein. Moreover, the identification at the police station was attended by a
great deal of whispered conversations, as well as by at least one unexplained conference elsewhere in
the municipal building, at which they were present immediately prior to their being confronted by the
accused. Furthermore, the witnesses there were unable to identify the accused at sight.
In the cases of People vs. Hassan 53 and People vs. Domingo, et al., 54 the eyewitnesses were not
positive enough as to the identity of the assailant. In fact, in the latter case, the witness even declared that
he would not be able to recognize the assailant, even if he were to see him again. In Chavez vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 55 there was no issue as to proper identification, but only as to the accused being called by
the prosecution to the witness stand.
In the instant case, the environs were conducive enough for complainant to recognize her debaucher at
the time of the incident. As earlier stated, the "lamparilla" was still lighted when herein appellant barged
into her room. Moreover, upon seeing the suspect at the police line-up, she immediately identified him
without even the least prodding from the law enforcers.
As we have heretofore observed, a consideration of the modifying circumstances attendant to this case
would be virtually of academic value insofar as the aggravation of appellants' criminal liability and the
corresponding penalty therefor are concerned, 56 in view of the constitutional constraint thereon. It is felt,
however, that a disquisition is in order for future guidance as a sub silentio treatment may be
misconstrued as implying the non-applicability of said circumstances to these cases.
We rule that the court a quo erred in not appreciating the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and
dwelling. Nighttime, according to Viada, is that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk and
ending at dawn. 57 Our Civil Code defines nights as from sunset to sunrise. 58 When the rapes were
committed at 3:00 A.M. on May 24, 1990, it was still "nighttime," and this aggravating circumstance can
be considered as long as it is proved, even if not alleged in the information. 59 It is obvious that appellant
Putulin and his two other co-appellants specially sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission
of the crimes without their being recognized, aside from ensuring their unmolested escape. They chose to
unleash their evil deeds at the unholy hour of 3:00 o'clock in the morning, taking advantage of the
stillness of a sleeping world. 60

The crime having been perpetrated in the house of the complainant, there can be no serious debate that
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling should properly be appreciated, considering the sanctity of
privacy which the law accords to a human abode.
The use of a deadly weapon which is considered as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape 61 is
likewise to be appreciated to constitute the offenses charged in these cases into what are jurisprudentially
referred as qualified rapes, such circumstance being alleged in each of the complaints in these cases and
it being uncontroverted that herein appellant was armed with a pointed bolo, appellant Codilla with a bolo
and a handgun, while appellant Lucaas used a handgun, to realize their criminal objectives.
Nevertheless, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court on appellants shall remain
because of the death penalty until the restoration thereof by congressional fiat.
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that the civil indemnity, which accused-appellants Rolando
Codilla, German Lucaas and Marcelo Putulin must pay to each of their victims for every crime of rape
committed by them against the latter, is hereby increased to P30,000.00; and that the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and dwelling, together with the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly
weapon, are duly taken account of in point of law as above explained and are hereby made of judicial
record in these cases, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is consequently AFFIRMED, with costs
against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LINDES PAYNOR,accused-appellant.


DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
For the fatal stabbing of Carmelita Aguinaldo at Barangay Rizal, Roxas, Isabela, herein accusedappellant Lindes Paynor, alias Jess, was charged with the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 23-285
of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela.
The factual backdrop of this tragic occurrence, culled from the records of the trial court and the
testimonies adduced therein, commenced at around 4:00 P.M. of September 18, 1991 when a middleaged teacher, Carmelita Aguinaldo, was stabbed and killed inside her classroom at
theRoxas Central Elementary School. A ten-year old pupil, by the name of Fresnaida Magaway, narrated
how the events unfolded.
She testified that in the afternoon of September 18, 1991 she was assigned as a cleaner and, while
sweeping the ground near her classroom, she noticed a man who was holding a pointed knife, near the
classroom of the victim. The man entered the room of the teacher, stabbed her, and went out of the room
headed west towards the fence of the school, carrying the pointed bladed weapon in his hand and
passing in front of the witness. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Aguinaldo emerged from the room
saying Manang, nabagsol na kon, literally meaning, Manang, I am stabbed, then she fell to the
ground.[1]
The immediate reaction of this young witness was to seek help from her teachers, so she went into
the classroom of her teacher, Ms. Hermogena Uy, and told her about Ms. Aguinaldo. She then took her

belongings from the classroom and proceeded immediately to where Ms. Aguinaldo fell down and there
she saw Mrs. Leticia Navarro embracing the victim, with Mrs. Elizabeth Dumlao by their side. A tricycle
came and the teachers rushed the victim to the nearby hospital. She followed her teachers to the
hospital, where Ms. Aguinaldo was pronounced dead on arrival.
Fernando Castillo, a policeman, who had responded to the crime report, testified that he went to the
hospital and inquired whether someone saw the stabbing. According to him, Fresnaida Magaway came
forward and told them that she saw a man in blue maong pants, and white T-shirt printed in front, using
slippers and a brown hat, and with a green towel wrapped around his neck. He entered the school yard
and went to the room of Ms. Aguinaldo where he stabbed her with a pointed bladed weapon. She further
said that if the man would be presented to her, she could recognize him. [2]
The police investigators then went to the house of the family of the deceased and asked the family
members if they had a suspect in the killing of Ms. Aguinaldo. The family of the deceased pointed to
appellant, the jilted boyfriend of the victims sister, as a possible suspect. The policemen then
proceeded to the house of appellant, but they were informed that he was at the Tagalag auto repair shop
having his motorcycle repaired.[3]
At the Tagalag auto repair shop, the policemen saw appellant wearing maong pants, white T-shirt
with markings in front, with a yellow towel wrapped around his neck and a brown hat on his
head. Appellant was invited by them to their station where he was identified by Fresnaida Magaway as
the person who stabbed and killed Ms. Aguinaldo. On the strength of said positive identification, appellant
was detained at the police station.
An information was filed on September 19, 1991, charging appellant with the murder of Carmelita
Aguinaldo, with evident premeditation and treachery as attendant circumstances, by the infliction of a fatal
stab wound on her chest, and committed at the time and on the date and place earlier narrated. [4]
No preliminary investigation having been conducted prior to the filling of that information, appellants
counsel filed a motion for preliminary investigation on September 23, 1991 with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, at Ilagan, Isabela. On October 18, 1991, presiding Judge Teodulo E. Mirasol issued an order
directing the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.
Denying appellants motion for his release from detention in the meantime, said court issued an
order on November 8, 1991 that x x x the court is of the opinion that the arrest is lawful, considering that the accused was arrested
immediately after the commission of the offense, the police officers acting with promptness after a
credible information furnished them by a credible witness. That the police acted with personal knowledge
of facts fed them by a witness who has no sufficient time to reflect on what she was going to tell the police
(is) indicative of truthfulness in pointing to the accused as the author of the stabbing. [5]
On November 22, 1991, a resolution was issued by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
maintaining the information filed on September 19, 1991. On December 12, 1991, appellant was duly
arraigned and, on his plea of not guilty to the charge for murder the court below thereafter proceeded with
the trial.
The prosecution based its case primarily on the testimony of a lone eyewitness, and this in the
person of a ten-year old girl, Fresnaida Magaway. Considering that doubts may be entertained in view of
her tender years, and for a graphic illustration and clearer appreciation of what actually transpired on the

afternoon of 18 September 1991 as seen through the eyes of this eyewitness, we quote the pertinent
transcripts of stenographic notes of her testimony:
Q Do you know the name of that man whom you pointed to the court?
A

Yes, sir.

Q Will you please tell his name if you know?


A

Jessie Paynor, sir.

Q Can you recall the attire and appearance of the accused whom you pointed to when he stabbed
Ms. Aguinaldo in her room on September 18, 1991, at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon?
A

He ha(d) a white t-shirt, denim pants and he ha(d) a woven hat and a green towel. (The witness
demonstrating as if the towel was wrapped around her neck) [6]
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q Did you not tell Mrs. Uy that you saw the man who stabbed Mrs. Aguinaldo?
A

I told her sir, but I did not tell the name.

Q Do you know the name of the person at the time you told Mrs. Uy the identity of the assailant?
A

Jessie, sir.

Q Yes, did you mention the name of Jessie to Mrs. Uy when you told Mrs. Uy that you saw the
stabbing of Mrs. Aguinaldo?
A

No sir.

Q Can you tell this court why you failed to inform Mrs. Uy your teacher, the identity of the
assailant?
A

I did not tell her sir because I followed Mrs. Aguinaldo.

Q You did not tell her or you failed to tell her because you immediately followed where Mrs.
Aguinaldo was brought to, is that what you mean?
A

Yes, sir.

Q Now, that person whom you identified as Jess, from the way you testify, you already know him,
is that correct, at the time of the stabbing?
A

Yes, sir.[7]
x

Q Now how did you notice if it is true that you recognized for the third time that he was walking to
and fro in front of your room and the room of Mrs. Aguinaldo the identity of the assailant of Mrs.
Aguinaldo?
A

Because he was walking to and fro my attention was attracted.

Q So when the third time that you noticed him walking to and fro, could you tell the court what
special feature of that person walking to and fro attracted your attention?
A

I saw the face, sir.

Q Is that the only thing that you saw in that person, his face?
A

I saw the apparel, sir.

Q And it was at the fourth time that he walked to and fro when he entered the room of Mrs.
Aguinaldo?
A

Yes, sir.

Q And during that time he was walking to and fro you already saw him holding a knife, is that
correct?
A

Not yet, sir.

Q At what point in time did you see him if you saw him h(o)ld a knife?
A

I did not yet see the knife he used to stab Mrs. Aguinaldo, sir.

COURT:
Q Yes, did you see any knife in his possession during or after the incident?
A

After Mrs. Aguinaldo was stabbed I saw him holding the knife because he was facing me at that
time.

Q So that was the only time that you saw him, I mean the assailant, holding a knife when he
passed by you?
A

Yes, sir.

Q And when the assailant came out of the room of Mrs. Aguinaldo how did he leave the room, he
ran, he walk(ed), or what?
A

After maam Aguinaldo was stabbed the assailant ran away, sir.[8]

As earlier stated, both in the police station and then in open court, the young girl positively identified
appellant as the person she saw on September 18, 1991 who stabbed and killed the victim, Mrs.
Carmelita Aguinaldo.

Appellant denied having been anywhere near the school on September 18, 1991 and insisted that he
was at the Tagalag auto repair shop, busy having his motorcycle repaired. Testifying in his defense,
appellant blandly declared that he went to the repair shop at 2:10 in the afternoon of that day, to have his
motorcycle repaired; that he had to push his motorcycle to the shop and when they tested it there, it
would not start; that the owner suggested and he agreed that the engine be overhauled; that he was at
that shop all the time, helping in the overhauling until 5:00 P.M. when policemen arrived and invited him to
go with them to the police station.[9]
The testimony of appellant was corroborated by Cecilio Tagalag who testified that the former was at
their motor shop from 2:00 to 5:00 p.m. on September 18, 1991 and left only when he was picked up by
the police authorities at around 5:00 oclock that afternoon. [10]
The trial court rendered judgment on April 21, l994, finding against appellant and commending the
lone eyewitness for the prosecution, Fresnaida Magaway. These words of said court therein are worth
repeating, before the dispositive portion that follows:
Cross examined on several occasions, this young girl stuc(k) to the testimony that it was the accused
whom she saw enter the room, then left followed by the victim shouting for help. During these gruelling
and excruciating cross-examinations, she never faltered. She never showed any sign of fear. She never
wavered, she stuc(k) to her testimony.
This girl is no ordinary girl. She is made of metal far better than some adults. For adults are always
mindful of their safety and their families. Even if they have actually seen a person shot to death, stabbed
to death, or mauled to death, they would not come out in the open and volunteer the information that they
saw the killing. Either they keep quiet, or deny having witnessed such incident. But this girl is
different. She volunteered to describe the attire of the accused.
x x x
If only witnesses who see actual killings, have the guts and the courage of this girl, all unsolved criminal
cases would be solved. This girl shames the adults, especially those who do not come out (in) the open
when they witness crimes. If only those witnesses were Fresnaida Magaway, all crimes would have been
solved, and the malefactors sent to jail. This girl is an epitome of courage and guts. Fearless and
intelligent, she has done what adults shu(n) to do. [11]
x x x
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder provided for and penalized by article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and
imposes upon him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, together with all the necessary penalties provided
by law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 pesos, without however,
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay cost. [12]
Appellant now seeks the reversal of that verdict, claiming that the trial court erred: (1) in giving
credence to the testimony of Fresnaida Magaway in convicting him in spite of the material flaws,
contradictions, and improbabilities inherent in her testimony; (2) in admitting in evidence the following
physical evidence: white T-shirt, denim pants, green towel, and hat, in spite of the clear violation of
the Miranda doctrine during the custodial investigation of the accused; (3) in convicting him based on
mere circumstantial evidence from an account of one highly questionable witness; and (4) in convicting
him of the offense charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation.[13]

Appellant specifically laments the mode by which Fresnaida Magaway identified him, theorizing that
if the witness really knew him, she should have mentioned his name the moment she was asked by the
police as to who stabbed the victim, instead of resorting to a descriptive identification. [14]
He likewise also argues that there was a violation of the Miranda rights of an accused when he was
identified by the witness while he was seated on a bench of the investigation room. The manner
employed by the investigators in obtaining his T-shirt, pants, towel, slippers, and hat, according to
appellant, was a further violation of his rights as these items were taken from him in the absence of his
counsel.
The defense also asserts that the lower court relied upon the testimony of a highly questionable
witness in the person of Fresnaida Magaway, and that the conviction of appellant was based purely on
circumstantial evidence which should not have been taken as proof beyond reasonable doubt that he
really stabbed the victim to death. The final contention is that the prosecution failed to prove either that
there was treachery employed by the accused in the killing of the victim or that there was evident
premeditation on his part to take her life.
On the allegation of inconsistency and flaws in the testimony of a single eyewitness, a thorough
review of the transcripts of stenographic notes, particularly those on the testimony of witness Fresnaida
Magaway, does not reveal any major inconsistency. Instead, the Court is regaled by the unswerving and
consistent position of the witness that appellant was the only one whom she saw on that occasion and
that he stabbed and killed her teacher, Mrs. Aguinaldo. Any minor lapses therein tend to buttress, rather
than weaken, her credibility since they show that she was neither coached nor were her answers
contrived.[15]
The contention of appellant that the expected reaction of the witness should have been to identify
him by name is an obvious non sequitur. What should be considered as a general or common rule is that
witnesses to a crime react in different ways. In the instant case, the youthful witness was unable to
immediately reveal the name of appellant to the police as she was evidently scared or confused and, as
she explained, she also failed to name appellant at that time since her concern and thoughts were of her
teacher whom she followed to the hospital. Surely, we can not fault the young girl for her confusion and
fear, it being her first time to witness such a crime of violence.
The important thing is that when she testified at the trial, she was firm, spontaneous and categorical
in her declaration that it was appellant whom she saw that afternoon, and that it was he who entered the
classroom of her teacher and stabbed the latter with a pointed bladed weapon. The witness stood by her
declaration, unshaken throughout the entire trial, and never showed any hesitation in her testimony.
Another fact worth stressing is that the witness had no motive whatsoever to fabricate a serious
charge against appellant. When there is no showing that the principal witness for the prosecution was
actuated by an improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated, and his testimony is thus
entitled to full faith and credit.[16]
Appellant then asseverates that there was a violation of his rights while under custodial investigation,
in light of the Miranda doctrine, when allegedly the police investigators unceremoniously stripped him of
his clothing and personal items, and the same were later introduced as evidence during the trial. The
Court is not persuaded. The protection of the accused under custodial investigation, which is invoked by
appellant, refers to testimonial compulsion. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution provides that such
accused shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the right
to waive the right to counsel in the presence of counsel, and that any confession or admission obtained in
violation of his rights shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. As held in People vs. Gamboa,[17] this

constitutional right applies only against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is
proposed to be examined. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or
measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing
things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion. [18]
The desperate ploy of appellant that the evidence against him was purely circumstantial does not
even warrant refutation. It was definitely established by the prosecution that appellant was actually the
one who treacherously attacked the victim. Eyewitness Magaway unequivocally stated and lucidly
described how she saw appellant actually stabbing Mrs. Aguinaldo, [19] and even demonstrated during the
ocular inspection the specific part of the room where the crime was committed and where she herself was
when she witnessed the dastardly deed. [20] As already explained, the defense failed to show that the
witness had ill motives in testifying against appellant and there is no doubt in the mind of this Court that
the witness really had no personal ill feelings against him. The conclusion that irresistibly emerges,
therefore, is that the witness was just honestly relating what she really saw on September 18, 1991, and
that she so testified because of her desire for justice and redress for the terrible wrong against her
teacher.
The fourth error assigned by appellant that evident premeditation and treachery were not proved
merits some comment. It is correct that evident premeditation was not established. There is no evidence
or showing on record when and how appellant planned and prepared for the killing of the victim. His
allegation that there was no treachery, however, is a different matter. The attack against Mrs. Aguinaldo
was so sudden that, although she was stabbed by appellant while she was facing him, the unexpected
attack in itself constituted treachery. The victim was caught unaware and did not have any opportunity to
defend herself. Also, from the means and methods adopted by appellant to commit the crime, it would be
incredible to assume that the same were not deliberately adopted to insure the consummation of the
felony.
Lastly, there can be no sensible debate that appellants defense of alibi has to be rejected. It is
elementary that for this discredited defense, credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the
accused to be at the scene of the crime is indispensable. [21] In the present case, the court below found
that appellant was then just one kilometer away from the scene of the crime. [22] Furthermore, the defense
of alibi can not prevail over the positive identification of the accused by an eyewitness who had no
improper motive to falsely testify.[23]
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against accusedappellant Lindes Paynor.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 133025. February 17, 2000]


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RADEL GALLARDE,accusedappellant. Rtcspped
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, finding
accused-appellant Radel Gallarde[1] (hereafter GALLARDE) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder in Criminal Case No. T-1978 and sentencing him to suffer thepenalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay the heirs of Editha Talan (hereafter EDITHA) the amount of P70,000 as actual damages.[2]
On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide in an
information whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of May 1997, in the evening, amidst the field located at Brgy.
Trenchera, [M]unicipality of Tayug, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with one EDITHA TALAN, a minor-10 years of age, against her will
and consent, and thereafter, with intent to kill, cover the nose and mouth of the said minor
resulting to her death and then bury her in the field, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said EDITHA TALAN.[3]
During the arraignment on 1 September 1997, GALLARDE, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea
of not guilty.[4] Trial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the holding of the pre-trial
conference.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Mario Fernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente,
Felicisimo Mendoza, Alfredo Cortez, Renato Fernandez, SPO4 Oscar B. Lopez, and Dr. Perfecto
Tebangin. The relevant and material facts established by their testimonies are faithfully summarized in the
Appellees Brief as follows: Korte
In the evening of May 26, 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in
Brgy. Trenchea, Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were
appellant Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel
Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon.
Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. A fluorescent lamp
illuminated them as they partook beer (TSN dated October 13, 1997, pp. 3-4).
After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and appellant to dine in the kitchen. As
they partook of the meal, appellant suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to
urinate. Outside the house, he chanced upon appellant and Editha talking to each other.
Jaime whistled at appellant but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted towards the
road leading to his house (Id., pp. 4-6).
Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed
her and asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would look for appellant.
Soon Editha left enroute to where appellant fled (Id., pp. 7-8).
By 10:00 oclock that evening, the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco,
Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renatos place where they talked and relaxed. Moments
later, Roger arrived and informed them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group
to help look for her (Id., p. 10).
Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her
daughters disappearance. The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and
nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search the houses,

dikes and fields to look for the missing child. The searchers used a lighted rubber tire
(TSN dated Sept. 24, 1997, pp. 8-10 and 24).
When Jaime mentioned that appellant was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the
searchers went back to the house of appellant. About 7 meters away from appellants
house, one of the searchers, Alfredo Cortez, found Edithas left foot slipper (TSN dated
October 22, 1997, pp. 4-6). Suddenly, Edwin Fernandez announced: "Tata, Radel is
here!" pointing to the toilet about 6 meters away from appellants house. The searchers
found appellant squatting with his short pants. His hands and knees were covered with
soil. When confronted by ex-kagawad Hernandez why he was there, appellant answered
he was relieving himself (Id., pp. 11-16).
Asked where Editha was, appellant replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her."
When told "according to Jimmy, you were with Editha," appellant responded "I let her
go and brought her back to the dike and let her go home." To the next question, "where
did you come from since a while a go you were not yet in this toilet?" appellant answered
"I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry
and countered that appellants statement was impossible because Kiko was with him
drinking (Id., pp. 16-20). Sclaw
After the confrontation at the toilet, Ex-kagawad Fernandez brought appellant to Brgy.
Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that appellant was the last person seen
talking with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers (Id., pp. 21-22).
Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. As she reached for her
slipper, she saw Edithas right foot slipper (the other one was earlier found near the
house of appellant) (Id., pp. 23-24).
Around 3 meters farther from Edithas right foot slipper; another slipper was found. It was
old, 8 to 9 inches in length and appellant was seen wearing it in the morning of that day
(TSN dated Sept. 25, 1997, pp. 25).
The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses. Along the way, they saw a wide
hole among the disheveled grass. Ex-kagawad Fernandez accidentally dropped the
lighted rubber tire and as his nephew Freddie picked it up, the latter exclaimed: "Uncle,
look at this loose soil!" Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and
then Edithas hand pitted out. The Fernandez screamed in terror (Id., pp. 5-6).
Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is here, she is now
here already dead!" Mindful of appellants safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring
appellant to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on board a
vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of appellant, saying: "Here is
the suspect in the disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving
him to you" (TSN dated Oct. 21, 1997, pp. 4-5).
The policemen together with appellant proceeded to where the people found Editha. One
of the policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when
she was recovered. (Id., pp. 9-10).
The cause of Edithas death as revealed in the post-mortem examination showed
"suffocation of the lungs as a result from powerful covering of the nose and mouth,

associated with laceration of the vagina and raptured hymen (Exh. "T", TSN dated Oct.
23, 1997, pp. 22-23)."[5] Sclex
On the other hand, GALLARDE was the lone witness for the defense. He interposed a denial and the alibi
that he was at home with his mother and brothers at the time the crime occurred. He declared that he is
18 years old, single, a former construction worker. He knew EDITHA, a neighbor whom he considered as
a sister because she used to come to his house. They never had a quarrel or misunderstanding. He
neither raped not killed Editha.[6]
On cross-examination by the prosecutor and to questions propounded by the court, GALLARDE admitted
that he saw Editha on the night of 6 May 1997 in her parents house, particularly in the kitchen. He was
there because he joined a group drinking Colt 45 beer, as he was called by Rudio Fernandez. He drank
and had dinner in the kitchen. After dinner he returned to the drinking place and eventually went home
because he was then a little drunk. He knows Kgd. Mario Fernandez, but after he left the Talan residence
he did not see Kgd. Fernandez anymore. Kgd. Fernandez saw him inside his (Gallardes) toilet on the
night of May 6; thereafter Fernandez took him to the barangay captain and later he was turned over to the
PNP at Camp Narciso Ramos. The police informed him that he was a suspect in the rape and killing of
Editha Talan, and he told them that he did not commit the crime. At the Talan residence he was wearing
short pants and rubber slippers. Fernandez asked him at the police headquarters to pull down his shorts
and he complied. He was then wearing briefs with a hemline that was a little loose. He was informed that
a cadaver was recovered near his house. When he was asked questions while in police custody, he was
not represented by any lawyer.
GALLARDE further declared on cross-examination and on questions by the court that he considered
Editha Talan as a sister and her parents also treated him in a friendly manner. When he came to know
that Edithas parents suspected him of the crime, he was still on friendly terms with them. However, he did
no go to them to tell them he was innocent because they brandished a bolo in anger.
Finally, he testified that in the evening of May 6 he came to know that Editha died. She was still alive
when he was drinking at the back of the Talan house and left for home. From the time he arrived, he
never left again that night, and his mother and brothers knew it for a fact. [7]
On 12 February 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting GALLARDE of the crime of murder
only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge. It
observed: Xlaw
Exh. "T" and Dr. Tebangins testimony thereon show that the late Editha Talan sustained
slit wounds inflicted as a means of suffocating her to death, a laceration of the lower
portion of her vagina, and a ruptured hymen. What allegedly oozed from her vagina was
blood, coupled with dirt. Had there been observed the presence of even just a drop of
seminal fluid in or around her vagina, the Court would readily conclude that the laceration
and rupture resulted from phallic intrusion. Without such observation, however, "carnal
knowledge" as element of rape would be an open question.
The trial court did not appreciate the alternative circumstance of intoxication either as a mitigating or
aggravating circumstance pursuant to Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code because GALLARDEs
alleged inebriation on the night of 6 May 1997, was not satisfactorily proven.
As to the civil aspect of the case, the trial court considered the stipulation of the parties on 27 October
1997 fixing a liquidated amount of P70,000 as actual damages, and leaving the matter of moral damages
to the discretion of the court. The trial court was not inclined to award moral damages because the

"evidence before it tends to disclose that on the night of 6 May 1997, before she died, Editha was a
much-neglected child."
Accordingly, in its decision[8] of 12 February 1998, the trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court
hereby convicts the accused RADEL GALLARDE Y HERMOSA of the crime of MURDER,
and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs
of the late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. [9]
His motion for reconsideration,[10] having been denied by the trial court in its Resolution [11] of 28 February
1998, GALLARDE seasonably appealed to us.
We accepted the appeal on 9 September 1998.
In his Appellants Brief filed on 16 March 1999, GALLARDE alleges that the trial court committed the
following errors:
1.......In convicting [him] of the crime of murder in an information for rape with
homicide. Xsc
2.......In concluding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that [he]
was responsible for the death of Editha Talan.
3.......In not acquitting [him] on the ground of notches of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
[12]

We sustain GALLARDEs contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder in an information
charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory portion of the information shows that
there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance. Although it is true that the term "homicide" as
used in special complex crime of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and
includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape, [13] it is settled
in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as
to one of the component offense, the accused can be convicted of the other.[14] In rape with homicide, in
order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying
circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. [15] It is fundamental that
every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of
requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.[16]
In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance, GALLARDE cannot
be convicted of murder. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is
charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and
convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is
charged in the complaint or information for which he is tried, or is necessarily included in that which is
charged. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is
put on trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information
under which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right. [17] Scx

Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court that the evidence for the prosecution, although circumstantial,
was sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of GALLARDE for the death of EDITHA.
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt.[18] The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to
sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an
accused from any criminal liability.[19] Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had on the
basis of circumstantial evidence, provided that the established circumstances constitute an unbroken
chain which leads one to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilty.[20]
The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial
evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (1) there must be more than one circumstance;
(2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a
conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused. [21]
The importance of circumstantial evidence is more apparent in the prosecution of cases of rape with
homicide. The nature of the crime of rape, where it is usually only the victim and the rapist who are
present at the scene of the crime, makes prosecutions for the complex crime of rape with homicide
particularly difficult since the victim can no longer testify against the perpetrator of the crime. In these
cases pieces of the evidence against the accused are usually circumstantial. [22]
The circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together, leads to no other
conclusion than that GALLARDE, and no other else, killed EDITHA and that he is guilty therefor. We
quote with approval the lower courts enumeration of the circumstantial evidence in this case: Scmis
1. Gallarde, 18, and Editha, 10, were neighbors and friends, even as she used to
frequent his place.
2. Both were at the Talan residence on the night of May 6, 1997 while neighbors indulged
themselves in beer.
3. Among said neighbors Cabinta saw them hand in hand by the toilet situated five (5)
meters east of the Talan kitchen.
4. After Cabinta whistled he saw Gallarde run home towards north after letting go of
Edithas hands. Neighbor Clemente also noticed that Gallarde disappeared, and that
Editha returned to the kitchen.
5. Cabinta followed Editha back to the kitchen, and saw her holding a kerosene lamp.
She told him that she was going to look for "Dalpac," and off she went in the same
direction Gallarde took.
6. Gallarde wore short pants and rubber slippers at the drinking place. Subsequently he
was seen wearing shorts in his own toilet.

7. At past 10:00 in the evening during an intensive search for the then missing Editha, her
lifeless body was found in a shallow grave situated some distance behind Gallardes
residence.
8. Before Edithas body was discovered, a searcher found a girls slipper (Exh. "B"), 5-6
inches long, among thickets seven meters away from Gallardes house.
9. Another searcher saw a second slipper (Exh. "B-1"), of the same color and size as the
first one. Both slippers were Edithas, the searchers recalled.
10. A third rubber slipper (Exh. "C") was thereafter found in the field, near Exh. "B-1." It
was an old slipper, 8-9 inches long and with a hole at the rear end.
11. Soil stuck to each one of the three slippers. Missc
12. Gallarde was not at home when searchers went to look for him there, after Cabinta
told them that Editha was last seen with Gallarde.
13. When Gallarde was discovered squatting in the dark toilet behind his house and
beside the thickets, his shorts were up and on. His hands and knees were soiled.
14....... At the toilet he was asked the innocent question of where Editha was and he
answered revealingly, thus: "I did not do anything to her" and "I let her go and brought her
back to the dike and let her go home."
15. When asked where he had been, as the toilet was first seen empty, Gallarde said he
was with Kiko and he slept at the latters house, which answer Mario Bado promptly
refuted saying, "Vulva of your mother Kiko was with me drinking." Bado and Kiko were
not at the place of the Talans that night.
16. Yanked out of the dark toilet near his own house, Gallarde joined Kgd. Mario
Fernandez sans protest.
17. Dr. Tebangin found on Edithas cheeks two slit wounds, each being an inch away from
her nostrils. Both wounds were fresh and reddish.
......From the lower portion of Edithas vagina blood oozed, accompanied by dirt.
......Her hymen was ruptured and was still bleeding.
......The medico-legal concluded that there must have been a forceful covering of Edithas
nose and mouth because of the presence of the slit wounds on both sides of her face,
and that in 30 seconds unconsciousness and weakening resulted, with the vaginal
injuries contributing to her death.[23] Misspped
As to the crime of rape, there is much to be desired with respect to the prosecutions evidence therefor,
but not for the reason adduced by the trial court, namely, the absence of spermatozoa in EDITHAs private
part and thereabout. It is well settled that the absence of spermatozoa in or around the vagina does not
negate the commission of rape.[24] Our doubt on the commission of rape is based on the fact that there is
at all no convincing proof that the laceration of the vagina and the rupture of the hymen of EDITHA were

caused in the course of coitus or by a male organ. Our meticulous reading of the testimony of Dr.
Tebangin disclosed that he was never asked if the laceration and the rupture could have been caused by
the penis of a human being. Needless to state, these could have been caused by any object other than
the penis of a person.
We cannot sustain the contention of GALLARDE that he was not positively identified as the assailant
since there was no eyewitness to the actual commission of the crime. It does not follow that although
nobody saw GALLARDE in the act of killing EDITHA, nobody can be said to have positively identified him.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness
to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may
identity a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the
very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be
instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime,
he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for
instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before
and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms
part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of
the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly
positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted
unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until
and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is
settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may
draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.[25]If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove
identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community
would be denied proper protection. Spped
As discussed above, the circumstantial evidence as established by the prosecution in this case and
enumerated by the trial court positively established the identity of GALLARDE, and no one else, as the
person who killed EDITHA.
We cannot agree with the trial courts rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I," "J" and "K") taken of
GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while [GALLARDE]
was already under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures of an accused even without the
assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against
self-incrimination.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination [26] proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does
not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. [27] The
essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence
against himself through a testimonial act.[28] Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery
may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; [29] and an accused may
be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical
determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; [30] to
expel morphine from his mouth;[31] to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with
bloody footprints;[32] and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced,
or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. [33]

There is also no merit in GALLARDEs argument that the failure of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the place and time of the commission of the crime is fatal and will justify his
acquittal. Jospped
The place, time and date of the commission of the offense are not essential elements of the crime of rape
with homicide. The gravamen of the offense is the carnal knowledge of a woman and that on the occasion
of or as a reason thereof, the crime of homicide was committed. Conviction may be had on proof of the
commission of the crime provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to
the date of the filing of the complaint or information, within the period of the statute of limitation, and within
the jurisdiction of the court.[34]
The allegation of the place of commission of the crime in the complaint or information is sufficient if it can
be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court. [35] The rule merely requires that the information
shows that the crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The Court may even
take judicial notice that said place is within its jurisdiction. [36]
As to the time of the commission of the crime, the phrase "on or about" employed in the information does
not require the prosecution "to prove any precise date or time," but may prove any date or time which is
not so remote as to surprise and prejudice the defendant." [37]
Contrary to the claim of GALLARDE, the prosecution was able to establish the proximate time of the
commission of the crime, which was sometime between 9:00 p.m., when GALLARDE left the house of
Talan followed by EDITHA, and 10:30 p.m., when the body of EDITHA was found. This was further
corroborated by the examining physician who testified, on the basis of the degree ofrigor mortis, that
EDITHA died more or less, at 10:00 p.m. of 6 May 1997. [38]
Likewise, GALLARDEs alibi and bare denial deserve no consideration. He did not present witnesses who
could confirm his presence in his house. No member of his family corroborated him on this matter. The
defenses of denial and alibi, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and selfserving, deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[39]Sppedjo
Moreover, even assuming that GALLARDEs claim is true, his stay in his house did not preclude his
physical presence at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity. The place where the body of EDITHA was
found buried was a few meters from his house, the place pointed to in the alibi and can be reached in a
short while. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It
is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission.[40]
Besides, no evil motive has been established against the witnesses for the prosecution that might prompt
them to incriminate the accused or falsely testify against him. It is settled that when there is no showing
that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that
the witnesses were not so actuated and their testimonies are thus entitled to full faith and credit.
[41]
Testimonies of witnesses who have no motive or reason to falsify or perjure their testimonies should be
given credence.[42]
With respect to GALLARDEs claim that he was arrested without warrant, suffice it to say that any
objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.
[43]
The records show no objection was ever interposed prior to arraignment and trial. [44]GALLARDEs

assertion that he was denied due process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest is negated by his voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea
he entered during arraignment and by his active participation in the trial thereafter.[45] It is settled that any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
[46]
It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had
been filed and the accused arraigned and trial commenced and completed and a judgment of conviction
rendered against him.[47] Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a
valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error; such arrest does not negate
the validity of the conviction of the accused.[48] Nexold
Homicide, which we find to be the only crime committed by GALLARDE, is defined in Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code and is punished with reclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying
circumstance, it shall be imposed in its medium period. GALLARDE is entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Accordingly, he can be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from ten (10) years of the medium period of prision mayor asminimum to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of the medium period of reclusion temporalas maximum.
As to the civil aspect of the case, the parties agreed on P70,000 as liquidated damages. This should be
construed as actual damages. However, as indemnity for death, the additional sum ofP50,000, per current
case law, should be awarded.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Tayug, Pangasinan, in
Criminal Case No. T-1978 finding accused-appellant RADEL GALLARDE guilty of the crime of murder is
hereby modified. As modified, RADEL GALLARDE is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal, of the crime of Homicide, defined under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of the medium period of
of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of the medium period
of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Editha Talan, the sum of P70,000 as
liquidated actual damages and P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Editha Talan.
Costs against accused-appellant RADEL GALLARDE in both instances.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DELFIN RONDERO,accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
When an accused appeals from the judgment of the trial court, he waives the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open for review of the appellate court,
which is then called to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable.
[1]
With this precept in mind, this Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice, will not hesitate to render the
proper imposable penalty, whenever it sees fit, even the supreme penalty of death.
Before us is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch
41, sentencing herein accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetuafor the crime of homicide.

The facts of the case are as follows:


On the evening of March 25, 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta. When he
noticed that his nine year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke up his parents to inquire about his
sisters whereabouts. Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of a
neighbor, Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the
house of a Barangay Captain to ask for assistance and also requested their other neighbors in Pugaro,
Dagupan to look for Mylene.
The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00 oclock in the morning of March 26,
1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary School and the seashore in vain. They even
returned to the school and inspected every classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo
started on his way home. When he was about five (5) meters away from his house, Maximo, who was
then carrying a flashlight, saw herein accused-appellant Delfin Rondero pumping the artesian well about
one (1) meter away. Accused-appellant had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his
bloodied hands.[2]
Maximo hastily returned to the school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however,
revealing that the person he saw was the latters own son. [3] Maximo and Andong continued their search
for Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men decided to go home. After some time, a restless
Maximo began to search anew for her daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the barangay
secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found Mylenes lifeless body
lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. [4] Her right hand was raised above her head, which was
severely bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked from the waist down
and had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand
were some hair strands. A blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body
while the other slipper was found behind her back.
Half an hour later, five (5) policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. They
found a pair of shorts[5] under Mylenes buttocks, which Maximo identified as hers. Thereafter, Maximo
led the policemen to the artesian well where he had seen accused-appellant earlier washing his
hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with blood. [6] After the investigation, the
policemen, together with Maximo, went back to their headquarters in Dagupan City. There, Maximo
disclosed that before they found Mylenes body, he saw accused-appellant washing his bloodstained
hands at the artesian well.[7] Acting on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested accusedappellant.
An autopsy of the body of the victim conducted by the Assistant City Health Officer of Dagupan City,
Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, revealed the following injuries:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Contusion hematoma, anterior chest wall, along the midclavicular line, level of the 2nd
intercostal space, right.
2. Contusion hematoma, along the parasternal line, level of the 1 st intercostal space, left.
3. Contusion hematoma, posterior aspect, shoulder, left.
4. Contusion hematoma, anterior axillary line, level of the 3rd intercostal space. left.

5. Contusion hematoma, anterior aspect, neck.


6. Contusion hematoma, lower jaw, mid portion.
7. Contusion hematoma, periorbital, right.
8. Lacerated wound, 1x x , maxillary area, right.
9. Contusion hematoma, temporal area, left.
10. Contusion hematoma, mid frontal area.
11. Lacerated wound x x , frontal area, left.
12. Contusion hematoma, occipital area, right.
13. Abrasion, medial anterior aspect, elbow, left.
14. Abrasion, lateral aspect, buttock, right.
15. Abrasion, antero lateral aspect, iliac crest, right.
16. Contusion hematoma, upper lip.
17. Avulsion, upper central and lateral incisors.
18. Fresh laceration of the hymen at 1:00 oclock, 6:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock position. Fresh
laceration of the labia minora at 6:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock position.
INTERNAL FINDINGS
Massive intracranial hemorrhage with brain tissue injury. Fracture of the right occipital bone.
Note:
Vaginal smear was done at the Gov. Teofilo Sison Memorial Provl Hosp. Laboratory and the result
showed no sperm cell seen. (March 26, 1994)
Cause of death: Cardio Respiratory Arrest
Due to: Massive Intracranial Hemorrhage Traumatic[8]
For Mylenes burial, her parents spent P5,043.00 during her wake, [9] P9,000.00 for funeral
expenses[10] and P850.00 for church services and entombment.[11]
On March 28, 1994, the hair strands which were found on the victims right hand and at the scene of
the crime, together with hair specimens taken from the victim and accused-appellant, were sent to he
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination. [12]

Meanwhile, on March 30, 1994, accused-appellant was formally charged with the special complex
crime of rape with homicide in an information which reads:
The undersigned 4th Assistant City Prosecutor accuses DELFIN RONDERO y Sigua, of Pugaro District,
Dagupan City, of the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of March, 1994, in the city of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, DELFIN RONDERO y Sigua, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, criminally, and forcibly have carnal knowledge with one MYLENE J. DORIA,
a 9-year old girl, against her will and consent, and thereafter, with intent to kill, criminally and unlawfully
employed violence against her person, thereby causing the death of said MYLENE J. DORIA, as
evidenced by the Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Asst. City Health Officer, this city, to the
damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased, MYLENE J. DORIA in the amount of not less
than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential damages.
Contrary to Article 335 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. In the meantime, the NBI sent a fax
message to the Dagupan City Police Station saying that it could not conduct an examination on the hair
strands because the proper comparative specimens were not given. The NBI suggested that hair strands
be pulled, not cut, from the suspect and from the victim on the four regions of their heads so that all parts
of the hair strands, from root to tip, may be presented. [13] Thereupon, accused-appellant, who executed a
waiver of detention including a waiver of the provisions of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution on the
rights of the accused during custodial investigation, [14] was allegedly convinced by a certain Major Wendy
Ocampo to give sample hair strands. Another police officer went to the Dorias residence to get hair
samples from Mylene, who had not yet been interred. The hair strands taken from accused-appellant and
the victim were later indorsed to the NBI for laboratory testing. [15] Comparative micro-physical examination
on the specimens showed that the hair strands found on the right hand of the victim had similar
characteristics to those of accused-appellants, while the hair specimen taken from the crime scene
showed similar characteristics to those of the victims. [16] Alicia P. Liberato, the NBI Senior Forensic
Chemist who conducted the microscopic examination on the hair samples, later reiterated the aforesaid
findings in court.[17]
At the trial, Dr. Cornel, the physician who conducted the autopsy on Mylene at around 9:30 oclock in
the morning of March 26, 1994, testified that the victims death probably occurred before 11:00 oclock in
the evening of March 25, 1994 judging from the rigidity of her lower and upper extremities. He explained
that the contusions and hematoma found on Mylenes body were possibly caused by a blunt instrument, a
clenched fist or a piece of wood. [18] The lacerated wounds on her face may have been caused by a bladed
instrument, not necessarily sharp, or by hitting her head on a concrete wall with jagged edges. The
abrasions on her elbow, right buttock and upper hip may have been caused by a rough object that came
in contact with her skin. [19] Dr. Cornel also explained that the victims upper and lateral incisors may have
been avulsed by a sudden blow in the mouth using a blunt instrument, stone or wood. He added that the
fresh hymenal lacerations at 1:00 o'clock, 6:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock positions and the fresh laceration
of the labia minora at 6:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock positions could have been caused either by sexual
intercourse or by an object forcibly inserted in Mylenes vagina. [20]
Accused-appellant resolved not to testify at the trial, opting instead to present his wife and his father
as witnesses to account for his whereabouts on the night of the gruesome incident.
Christine Gonzales, wife of accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1994, at around 7:00
oclock in the evening, she had a quarrel with her husband. Accused-appellant was then slightly drunk

and apparently irked when supper was not yet ready. He slapped his wife and shouted invectives at her,
causing a disturbance in the neighborhood and prompting his father, who lived just a house away, to
intervene. When accused-appellant refused to be pacified, his father hit him in the nose, mouth and
different parts of the body.[21] His father left accused-appellant profusely bleeding. Accused-appellant then
changed his blood-stained clothes and went to bed with his wife. It was a little after 8:00 oclock in the
evening.
Christine woke up the next day at around 7:00 oclock in the morning. She washed some clothes
including the blood-stained ones her husband wore the night before. After doing the laundry, she went
out to pay her father a visit. On her way back home, Christine was informed by a child that her husband
was arrested by the police. Christine rushed home and found some policemen taking the newly washed
undershirt and short pants of accused-appellant from the clothesline. The policemen brought Christine
with them to the police headquarters for questioning. When asked about the blood on her husbands
clothes, Christine told them about their quarrel the night before. [22]
Accused-appellants father, Leonardo Rondero, corroborated Christines story. He testified that on
the night in question, at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, he was resting at home, located only a house
away from his sons, when he heard the latter having a heated discussion with Christine. Embarrassed at
the scene that his son was creating at such an hour, Leonardo went to he couples house to pacify the
slightly inebriated accused-appellant. Accused-appellant ignored his father and continued shouting at his
wife. Leonardo then hit him several times causing his nose and mouth to bleed profusely that it stained
his sandoand short pants. Startled at the injuries that his son sustained, Leonardo went home. Early the
next morning, March 26, 1994, at around 1:30 oclock, Leonardo was awakened by his neighbor, Maximo
Doria, who sought his assistance to search for his missing nine-year old daughter Mylene. Leonardo
willingly obliged. Thus, Maximo, Leonardo and the barangay secretary searched the nearby houses for
hours but failed to find Mylene.[23]
On October 13, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment [24] convicting accused-appellant of the crime
of murder and sentencing him to death. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE:
For the crime you had wilfully and deliberately committed, this court finds you guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder defined and punished by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659, in relation to
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, together with all its attendant aggravating circumstances without
any mitigating circumstance of whatever nature.
You, Delfin Rondero, are hereby therefore sentenced to die by electrocution pursuant to Article 81 of
Republic Act No. 7659, for your heinous crime as charged in the information as a punishment and as an
example to future offenders.
You are hereby further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim by paying to them an amount of
P60,000.00 for the loss of life of Mylene J. Doria; P15,000.00 for consequential damages and
P100,000.00 as moral damages.
May God have mercy on your soul.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration. On November 10, 1995, the trial court issued an
order modifying its earlier decision, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of homicide and sentencing

him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead, on the ground that under Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act, the penalty for homicide is reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age.[26]
In this appeal, accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER AMENDED TO HOMICIDE AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER
LIFE IMPRISONMENT (sic) AND TO INDEMNIFY THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN THE
AMOUNT OF P175,000.00 BASED ONLY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF
HOMICIDE.
III. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY TO
(sic) THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE DESPITE ILLEGAL ARREST AND ILLEGAL DETENTION
OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[27]
The appeal has no merit.
Accused-appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is not
strong enough to sustain his conviction, asserting that Maximo Dorias testimony that he saw him about a
meter away washing his bloodied hands at an artesian well was highly improbable inasmuch as it was
dark at that time. Accused-appellant also considered it strange that when Maximo saw him, he did not
bother to ask if he had seen Mylene. Finally, accused-appellant alleges that the slippers presented in
court as evidence are not the same ones which were recovered at the scene of the crime since the
pictures presented in court did not show the leaf painted in red on the left slipper.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.- Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in
issue may be established by inference. [28] Such evidence is founded on experience and observed facts
and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to
be proved.[29] Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction in criminal cases when there is more than
one circumstance, derived from facts duly given and the combination of all is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The test for accepting circumstantial evidence as proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is: the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with each other
and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accuseds guilt and inconsistent with
his innocence.

In the case at bar, the prosecution avers that there are several circumstances availing which, when
pieced together, point to accused-appellant as the author of the gruesome crime committed on the night
of March 25, 1994, to wit:
1. A few hours after the victims probable time of death, Maximo saw accused-appellant, with
an ice pick clenched in his mouth, washing his bloodied hands at an artesian well. [30]
2. A pair of slippers which Maximo identified as belonging to accused-appellant was found at
the scene of the crime. One was found beside the victims body while the other was under
her buttocks.[31] Maximo positively pointed to accused-appellant as the owner of the pair of
slippers because of a distinguishing mark of the painting of a red leaf on the left
slipper. Maximo said accused-appellant used to frequent their house wearing the same pair
of slippers for over a year.[32]
3. The hair strands which were found on Mylenes right hand and the hair strands taken from
accused-appellant were shown to have similar characteristics when subjected to microscopic
examination.[33]
4. Accused-appellants undershirt and short pants which he wore on the night of March 25,
1994 had bloodstains. His wife admitted having washed the undershirt and short pants in
the early morning of March 26, 1994.[34]
Contrary to the allegations of accused-appellant, the evidence presented by the prosecution is
sufficient to sustain his conviction. Maximo stated on the witness stand that he was able to identify
accused-appellant because he focused his flashlight on him while he was washing his bloodstained
hands at an artesian well located only a meter away from where Maximo was standing. [35] Maximo
considered it wise not to talk to accused-appellant because at that time he had an ice pick clenched in his
mouth and looked slightly drunk. As to the allegation that the slippers presented in court were not the
same ones recovered at the scene of the crime, suffice it to say that the photographs taken of the crime
scene were not focused only on the pair of slippers; hence, the red leaf may be too minuscule to be
noticed. In any case, the pair of slippers shown in the photographs corroborate the testimony of the
prosecutions witnesses that a pair of rubber slippers were indeed recovered at the scene.
It might not be amiss to note that Maximo was not shown to have had any motive to impute so grave
a wrong on accused-appellant. Prior to the incident, accused-appellant used to frequent Maximos house
for a visit.[36] On the night of the incident, Maximo even sought the help of accused-appellants father to
search for Mylene.
On the other hand, the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense are incredulous, to say the
least. Leonardo Rondero, accused-appellants father, testified that he mauled his son in an effort to pacify
him during a heated altercation with his wife, Christine. Leonardo said that he felt embarrassed because
his son was shouting invectives at Christine and was causing a scene in the neighborhood so he hit the
accused-appellant several times. Leonardos curious way of pacifying his son resulted in bodily injuries
on the latter. Strangely, despite his sustained injuries and profuse bleeding, accused-appellant and his
wife just went to sleep after Leonardo left. [37] We find it unnatural that a father, a barangay kagawad,
would repeatedly hit his son in an effort to pacify him in the middle of a marital spat. We find it even more
unnatural that one who was bleeding profusely would act so insouciant as to just to go to sleep without
attending to his injuries.
Accused-appellant alleges that while in the custody of police officers, some hair strands were taken
from him without his consent and submitted to the NBI for investigation, in violation of his right against self

incrimination. Aside from executing a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
accused-appellant executed a waiver of the provisions of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution
regarding the rights of an accused during custodial investigation. [38] It appears, however, that the waivers
were executed by the accused without the assistance of a counsel of his own choice.
The use of evidence against the accused obtained by virtue of his testimony or admission without the
assistance of counsel while under custodial investigation is proscribed under Sections 12 and 17, Article
III of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.


The aforesaid rules are set forth in the Constitution as a recognition of the fact that the psychological
if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations in the absence of procedural safeguards is
inherently coercive in nature. However, to paraphrase Justice Sanchez in the case of Chavez vs. Court
of Appeals,[39]Compulsion does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of
unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free
and rational choice or impair his capacity for making rational judgment would be sufficient. So is moral
coercion tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant. Needless to say, the abovementioned provisions are an affirmation that coercion can be mental as well as physical and that the
blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition. [40]
It bears emphasis, however, that under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body
of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness [41] and morphine
forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. [42] Consequently,
although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the
NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from
the accused under duress.
On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are
inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police
officers. Accused-appellants wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in their
house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. [43] This was never rebutted by the
prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the fruit of the poisonous tree, evidence
illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained

evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, accused-appellants garments, having
been seized in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in
court as evidence.
Nevertheless, even without the admission of the bloodied garments of the accused as corroborative
evidence, the circumstances obtaining against accused-appellant are sufficient to establish his guilt.
Having disposed of the foregoing, we now come to the issue of whether accused-appellant should be
convicted of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
It is a jurisprudential rule that an appeal throws a whole case to review and it becomes the duty of
the appellate court to correct such error as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are
made the subject of assigned errors or not.[44]
The trial court dismissed the charge of rape holding that it has not been adequately proven due to
the absence of spermatozoa in the victims private part. It is well settled that the absence of spermatozoa
in the victims private part does not negate the commission of rape for the simple reason that the mere
touching of the pudenda by the male organ is already considered as consummated rape. Mylene Doria
was naked from waist down when she was found. Her private organ had hymenal lacerations at 1:00
oclock, 6:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock positions. There were fresh lacerations in the labia minora at 6:00
oclock and 9:00 oclock positions as well. The trial judge even noted that it can be conclusively deduced
that her sex organ was subjected to a humiliating punishment. While the examining physician speculated
that the lacerations could have been caused by a piece of wood or rounded object, he did not rule out the
possibility of forcible sexual intercourse.
The presence of physical injuries on the victim strongly indicates the employment of force on her
person. Contusion was found on Mylenes face, arms and thighs. In rape cases, when a woman is
forcibly made to lie down, she will utilize her elbow as the fulcrum so that abrasions will be observed. In
an attempt to stand, the victim will flex her neck forward. The offender will then push her head
backwards, causing hematoma at the region of the occiput. To prevent penetration of the male organ,
she will try to flex her thighs and the offender will give a strong blow to the inner aspects of both thighs so
that the victim will be compelled to straighten them. [45]
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, aside from the hymenal lacerations, the examining
physician testified that Mylene sustained abrasions on her left elbow, right buttock and right upper hip and
contusion hematoma at the occipital area, i.e., back part of the head, right side. [46] Indeed, the physical
evidence indubitably tells a harrowing crime committed against nine-year old Mylene Doria in a manner
that no words can sufficiently describe.
Anent accused-appellants third assignment of error, it might be true that accused-appellants
warrantless arrest was not lawful. The police officers who arrested him had no personal knowledge of
facts indicating that he was the perpetrator of the crime just committed. His warrantless arrest was not
based on a personal knowledge of the police officers indicating facts that he has committed the gruesome
crime but solely on Maximos suspicion that he was involved in the slaying of Mylene since he was seen
washing his bloodied hands in the early morning of March 26, 1994. [47] Nevertheless, it is hornbook
knowledge that any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused is deemed waived when, instead of
quashing the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, the accused voluntarily submits himself to
the court by entering a plea of guilty or not guilty during the arraignment and participating in the
proceedings.

Finally, we reiterate that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called to render judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether favorable
or unfavorable, and whether they are made the subject of assigned errors or not. This precept should be
borne in mind by every lawyer of an accused who unwittingly takes the risk involved when he decides to
appeal his sentence.
Accused-appellants guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt for the rape and brutal
slaying of Mylene Doria, this Court has no other recourse but to impose the penalty of death upon
accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, when by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death. At this juncture, it should be stated that four justices of the court have continued to
maintain the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless,
they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that this law is constitutional and that the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
The award of P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victim is increased to P75,000.00 in line
with our ruling in People vs. Mahinay.[48] The award of moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00 is
reduced to P50,000.00. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the sum of P15,000.00 as
consequential damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City finding accusedappellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide is
MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
charge of special complex crime of rape with homicide committed against Mylene J. Doria and is
accordingly sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim the sum of P75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P15,000.00 as
consequential damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President
for possible exercise of pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150224

May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,


vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25,
sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount
of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of

P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to P511,410.00,
and costs of litigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a certain
KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a
bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim,
and on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by
means of force and violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn
Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West,
Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband,
appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to
appellant earlier that morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in
Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn
that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she would just
stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in
the house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel.
They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back door of the
kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he
was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the
ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house. 6 She
later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth
at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house
of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a
black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had
stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellants eyes were "reddish and sharp."
Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyns husband
then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel. 8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were
off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She
noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up
the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was
tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body
that was cold and rigid.9

Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her
granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a
flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her
intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A
daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in Isabel
Dawangs house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the naked
body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of
the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked
cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters
from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylynss
death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar
Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They
suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (Hes running away!). Police Officer
Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away. Appellant
was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him. 12 He was
charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not
guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his Brief,
appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellants contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This
Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been

overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. 13 Well-entrenched is the rule that the
findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent
reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being
that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial
judges assessment of credibility deserves the appellate courts highest respect. 15 Where there is nothing
to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.16
The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused
committed the crime.17
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised,
were found on the victims abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out of her
body.18 Rigor mortisof the vicitms body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m.
on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine (9) to
twelve (12) hours prior to the completion ofrigor mortis.19 In other words, the estimated time of death was
sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within which
the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C.
Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim, 20 Dr.
Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr.
Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual
intercourse with the victim.21In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by the prosecution that
the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm
indicating resistance to the appellants assault on her virtue. 22
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen
from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellants gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. 23 A persons DNA is the
same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is
the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine,
skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic
structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins. 25
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect
to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For
purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime
committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and
ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion
in the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological
evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victims body or at the
crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the

victims body during the assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical
contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant,
DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime. 28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used
the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With
PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus,
getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify
small samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. 29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an
expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. 30 Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of
examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene
types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken
from the victims vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and
the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine
criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters.
Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other
jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles
could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater
discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of
scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained
through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant
and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular
biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen found in the victims vaginal canal, the trial
court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the
victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellants wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels;
(3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning
on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June
30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt
with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m.,
wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly
left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty
white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8)
The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim,

Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second
floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along
the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victims vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J");
(11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12)
DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13)
Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being
indicative of guilt.35
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of
the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur:
(1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 36
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him
as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right
against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from
the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded
is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly
taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair
samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial
compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA,
as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the
incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that
there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to
a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional
on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing
involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court.
Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual
determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellants twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied
shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawangs house during the time
when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not
demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same time,
especially in this case where the two places are located in the same barangay.40 He lives within a one

hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to reach
one house from the other. This fact severely weakens his alibi.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible error in
convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Appellants assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere
conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a minimum
of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus value." 41 This may be
necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being
exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant
but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of
such evidence against the likely harm that would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the court
can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of
certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt. 42 This requires that
the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole,
to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged. 43 In view
of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral
certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit. 44
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw the
victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang. 45 She witnessed the appellant
running down the stairs of Isabels house and proceeding to the back of the same house. 46 She also
testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar
attempted to rape her after she came from the school." 47 The victim told Judilyn about the incident or
attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and violated body was found dead in her
grandmothers house on June 25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz
Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our
family."49 According to Judilyn, who was personally present during an argument between her aunt and the
appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I
will kill all your family and your relatives x x x."50 These statements were not contradicted by appellant.
Thus, appellants motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a rule
in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts
or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words
that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. 51
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the
occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victims lips by stabbing her
repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.

The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge
of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation;
and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation,
appellant killed the woman.52 However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation
be employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation. 54 The fact that
the victims hymen is intact does not negate a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis
into the lips of the female genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for
conviction of rape.55 The strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to
stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual
abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.56
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victims aunt. He is seven years older than the victim
Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law,
together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents,
approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-laws house. Being a relative by affinity within
the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court maintain their
position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be
lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00, 57 actual damages incurred by the family of the
victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00, 58 and moral damages of
P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary damages
cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.60
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in
Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex
crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the
family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in
actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.
Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 32025. September 23, 1929.]
FRANCISCO BELTRAN, Petitioner, v. FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and

FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, Respondents.


Gregorio P. Formoso and Vicente Formoso for Petitioner.
The respondents in their own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COMPULSORY APPEARANCE OF WITNESSES AT FISCALS
INVESTIGATIONS; REFUSAL OF WITNESS TO WRITE FROM DICTATION. The fiscal under section
1687 of the Administrative Code, and the competent judge, at the request of the fiscal, may compel
witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this power must be
exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The petitioner, in
refusing to write down what the fiscal had to dictate to him for the purpose of verifying his handwriting and
determining whether he had written certain documents alleged to have been falsified, seeks protection
his constitutional privilege.
2. ID.; RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT; TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. The right was
promulgated, both in the Organic Law of the Philippines of July 1, 1902 and in paragraph 3, section 3 of
the Jones Law, which provides (in Spanish); "Ni se le obligara (defendant) a declarar en contra suya en
ningun proceso criminal," and recognized in our Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section
15 (No. 4) and section 56. The English text of the Jones Law reads as follows; "Nor shall he be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," thus, the prohibition is not restricted to not
compelling him to testify, but extends to not compelling him to be a witness.
3. ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE. "The rights intended to be protected by the
constitutional provision that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself
is so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and
the evidence obscure, that it is the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal
rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the wellestablished doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but
embraced as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in
short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret." (28 R. C. L., par. 20, page 434, and
notes.)
4. ID.; ID.; CASES INAPPLICABLE. There have been cases where it was lawful to compel the accuse
to write in open court while he was under cross-examination (Bradford v. People, 43 Pacific Reporter,
1013), and to make him write his name with his consent during the trial of his case (Sprouse v. Com., 81
Va., 374, 378); but in the first case, the defendant, in testifying as witness in his own behalf waived his
constitutional privilege not to be compelled to act as witness; and in the second, he also waived said
privilege because he acted voluntarily.
5. ID.; ID.; PREPARATION AND CREATION OF EVIDENCE BY TESTIMONIAL ACT. This
constitutional prohibition embraces the compulsory preparation and creation by a witness of selfincriminatory evidence by means of a testimonial act. "For though the disclosure thus sought" (the
production of documents and chattels) "be not oral in form, and thought the documents or chattels be
already in existence and not desired to be first written and created by a testimonial act or utterance of the
person in response to the process, still no line can be drawn short of any process which treats him as a
witness; because in virtue of it he would be at any time liable to make oath to the identity or authenticity or
origin of the articles produced." (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 864, 865, latest edition.) IN the case before us,
writing is something more than moving the body, or hand, or fingers; writing is not purely mechanical act;
it requires the application of intelligence and attention; writing means for the petitioner here to furnish,
through a testimonial act, evidence against himself.
6. ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF CRIMES; PRIVILEGE, REASON FOR EXISTENCE OF. It cannot be
contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioners handwriting is not

granted, the crime would go unpunished. The petitioner is a municipal treasurer, and it should not be
difficult for the fiscal to obtain a genuine specimen of his handwriting by some other means. But even
supposing that it is impossible to secure such specimen without resorting to the means herein complained
of by the petitioner, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It
might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases
are accidental and do not constitute the raison detre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists
for the protection of innocent persons.
7. ID.; ID.; DISTINCTION BETWEEN VILLAFLOR-SUMMERS CASE AND CASE AT BAR. The
difference between this case and that of Villaflor v. Summers (41. Phil., 620, is that in the latter the object
was to have the petitioners body examined by physicians, without being compelled to perform a positive
act, but only an omission, that is, not to prevent the examination, which could be, and was, interpreted by
this court as being no compulsion of the petitioner to furnish evidence by means of a testimonial act; all of
which is entirely different from the case at bar, where it is sought to make the petitioner perform a positive
testimonial act, silent, indeed, but effective, namely, to write and give a sample of his handwriting for
comparison.
DECISION
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge
ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his won handwriting from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioners handwriting
and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaints filed in these proceedings; but the
respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the order
prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below, and against which the instance
action was brought, is based on the provisions of section 1687 of the Administrative Code and on the
doctrine laid down in the cases of People v. Badilla (48 Phil., 718); United States v. Tan Teng (23 Phil.,
145); United States v. Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735), cited by counsel for the respondents, and in the case
of Villaflor v. Summers (41 Phil., 62) cited by the judge in the order in question.
Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of
the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this
power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear.
And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional
provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.
Therefore, the question raised is to be decided by examining whether the constitutional provision invoked
by the petitioner prohibits compulsion to execute what is enjoined upon him by the order against which
these proceedings were taken.
Said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law which (in Spanish) reads: "Ni se le
obligara a declarar en contra suya en ningun proceso criminal" and has been incorporated in our Criminal
Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4) and section 56.
As to the extent of this privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the English text of the Jones Law,
which is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."

This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." Moreover, as we are concerned with a
principle contained both in the Federal constitution and in the constitutions of several states of the United
States, but expressed differently, we should take it that these various phrasings have a common
conception.
"In the interpretation of the principle, nothing turns upon the variations of wordings in the constitutional
clauses; this much is conceded (ante, par. 2252). It is therefore immaterial that the witness is protected by
one Constitution from testifying, or by another from furnishing evidence, or by another from giving
evidence, or by still another from being a witness. These various phrasings have a common conception,
in respect to the form of the protected disclosure. What is that conception?" (4 Wigmore on Evidence, p.
863, 1923 ed.)
As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of
evidence.
"The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of crime shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation so great
when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that it is the duty of courts liberally to
construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their
invasion. Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not
merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than
by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret." (28 R.
C. L., paragraph 20, page 434 and notes.) (Italics ours.)
The question, then, is reduced to a determination of whether the writing from the fiscals dictation by the
petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latters handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning
of the constitutional provision under examination.
Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain writing or
signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-examination but compelled to write in open court in order
that the jury may be able to compare his handwriting with the one in question. It was so held in the case
of Bradford v. People (43 Pacific Reporter, 1013) inasmuch as the defendant, in offering himself as
witness in his own behalf, waived his personal privileges.
Of like character is the case of Sprouse v. Com. (81 Va., 374, 378), where the judge asked the defendant
to write his name during the hearing, and the latter did so voluntarily.
But the cases so resolved cannot be compared to the one now before us. We are not concerned here
with a defendant, for it does not appear that any information was filed against the petitioner for the
supposed falsification, and still less is it a question of a defendant on trial testifying and under crossexamination. This is only an investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it. And let it
further be noted that in the case of Sprouse v. Com., the defendant performed the act voluntarily.
We have also come upon a case wherein the handwriting or the form of writing of the defendant was
obtained before the criminal action was instituted against him. We refer to the case of People v. Molineux
(61 Northeastern Reporter, 286).
Neither may it be applied to the instant case, because there, as in the aforesaid case of Sprouse v. Com.,
the defendant voluntarily offered to write, to furnish a specimen of his handwriting.
We cite this case particularly because the court there given prominence to the defendants right to decline
to write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote. The following appears in the body of said decision
referred to (page 307 of the volume cited):

"The defendant had the legal right to refuse to write for Kinsley. He preferred to accede to the latters
request, and we can discover no ground upon which the writings thus produced can be excluded from the
case." (Italics ours.)
For this reason it was held in the case of First National Bank v. Robert 941 Mich., 709; 3 N. W., 199), that
the defendant could not be compelled to write his name, the doctrine being stated as follows:
"The defendant being sworn in his own behalf denied the indorsement.
"He was then cross-examined and questioned in regard to his having signed papers not in the case, and
was asked in particular whether he would not produce signatures made prior to the note in suit, and
whether he would not write his name there in court. The judge excluded all these inquiries, on objection,
and it is our these rulings that complaint is made. The object of the questions was to bring into the case
extrinsic signatures, for the purpose of comparison by the jury, and we think the judge was correct in
ruling against it."
It is true that the eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited (volume 4, page 878), says:
"Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege. Nor is the removal or replacement of his
garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to
be done. Requiring him to make specimens of handwriting is no more than requiring him to move his body
. . ." but he cites no case in support of his last assertion on specimens of handwriting. We noted that in
the same paragraph 2265, where said author treats of "Bodily Exhibition," and under proposition "1. A
great variety of concrete illustrations have been ruled upon," he cites many cases, among them that of
People v. Molineux (61 N. E., 286) which, as we have seen, has no application to the case at bar because
there the defendant voluntarily gave specimens of his handwriting, while here the petitioner refuses to do
so and has even instituted these prohibition proceedings that he may not be compelled to do so.
Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the
fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the
petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to
that of producing documents of chattels in ones possession. And as to such production of documents or
chattels, which to our mind is not so serious as the case now before us, the same eminent Professor
Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864):
". . . 2264, Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. 1. It follows that the production of
documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to a
subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other form of process treating him as a witness (i. e.
as a person appearing before the tribunal to furnish testimony on his moral responsibility for truth- telling),
may be refused under the protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded." (And he cites the
case of People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119, 38 N. E., 1003.)
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is
compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for
in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or
chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing,
evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. And for this reason the same
eminent author, Professor Wigmore, explaining the matter of the production of documents and chattels, in
the passage cited, adds:
"For though the disclosure thus sought be not oral in form, and though the documents or chattels be
already in existence and not desired to be first written and created by a testimonial act or utterance of the
person in response to the process, still no line can be drawn short of any process which treats him as a

witness; because in virtue of it he would be at any time liable to make oath to the identity of authenticity or
origin of the articles produced." (Ibid., pp. 864-865.) (Italics ours.)
It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioners
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the
petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to
obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means complained of herein, that is not reason for trampling upon a
personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed
in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison detre of the
privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
With respect to the judgments rendered by this court and cited on behalf of the respondents, it should be
remembered that in the case of People v. Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not appear that the defendants
and other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not refuse to answer,
they must be understood to have waived their constitutional privilege, as they could certainly do.
"The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed, may be waived by any
one entitled to invoke it." (28 R. C. L., paragraph 29, page 442, and cases noted.)
The same holds good in the case of United States v. Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145), where the defendant did
not oppose the extraction from his body of the substance later used as evidence against him.
In the case of Villaflor v. Summers (41 Phil., 62), it was plainly stated that the court preferred to rest its
decision on the reason of the case rather than on blind adherence to tradition. The said reason of the
case there consisted in that it was a case of the examination of the body by physicians, which could be
and doubtless was interpreted by this court, as being no compulsion of the petitioner therein to furnish
evidence by means of a testimonial act. In reality she was not compelled to execute any position act,
much less a testimonial act; she was only enjoined from something, preventing the examination; all of
which is very different from what is required of the petitioner in the present case, where it is sought to
compel his to perform a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of his handwriting for the
purpose of comparison. Beside, in the case of Villaflor v. Summers, it was sought to exhibit something
already in existence, while in the case at bar, the question deals with something not yet in existence, and
it is precisely sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by means, evidence not yet in
existence; in short, to create this evidence which may seriously incriminate him.
Similar considerations suggest themselves to us with regard to the case of United States v. Ong Siu Hong
(36 Phil., 735), wherein the defendant was to compelled to perform any testimonial act, but to take out of
his mouth the morphine he had there. It was not compelling him to testify or to be a witness or to furnish,
much less make, prepare, or create through a testimonial act, evidence for his own condemnation.
Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that the respondents and those under
their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down
dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
Without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

B. VARIOUS PROCEEDINGS
G.R. No. L-29169

August 19, 1968

ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner,


vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN
OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA, respondents.
Estanislao E. Fernandez and Fausto Arce for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions invoking jurisdiction of
this Court is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in
the trial which resulted in his conviction1 he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to
testify against himself. There is his prayer, too, that, should he fail in this, he be granted the alternative
remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for
failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to this Court for the
reason that he was raising purely questions of law.
The indictment in the court below the third amended information upon which the judgment of
conviction herein challenged was rendered, was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird
car, Motor No. H9YH-143003, with Plate No. H-16648 Pasay City '62 together with its accessories worth
P22,200.00. Accused were the following: Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo
Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita",
Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias"Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul
Doe.2
Averred in the aforesaid information was that on or about the 14th day of November, 1962, in Quezon
City, the accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and without the consent of the owner
thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in asporting the motor vehicle above-described.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been identified nor apprehended,
pleaded not guilty.1wph1.t
On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in Quezon City.
The trial opened with the following dialogue, which for the great bearing it has on this case, is here
reproduced:.
COURT:
The parties may proceed.
FISCAL GRECIA:
Our first witness is Roger Chavez [one of the accused].
ATTY. CARBON [Counsel for petitioner Chavez]:
I am quite taken by surprise, as counsel for the accused Roger Chavez, with this move of the
Fiscal in presenting him as his witness. I object.

COURT:
On what ground, counsel? .
ATTY. CARBON:
On the ground that I have to confer with my client. It is really surprising that at this stage, without
my being notified by the Fiscal, my client is being presented as witness for the prosecution. I want
to say in passing that it is only at this very moment that I come to know about this strategy of the
prosecution.
COURT (To the Fiscal):
You are not withdrawing the information against the accused Roger Chavez by making [him a]
state witness?.
FISCAL GRECIA:
I am not making him as state witness, Your Honor.
I am only presenting him as an ordinary witness.
ATTY. CARBON:
As a matter of right, because it will incriminate my client, I object.
COURT:
The Court will give counsel for Roger Chavez fifteen minutes within which to confer and explain to
his client about the giving of his testimony.
xxx

xxx

xxx

COURT: [after the recess]


Are the parties ready? .
FISCAL:
We are ready to call on our first witness, Roger Chavez.
ATTY. CARBON:
As per understanding, the proceeding was suspended in order to enable me to confer with my
client.
I conferred with my client and he assured me that he will not testify for the prosecution this
morning after I have explained to him the consequences of what will transpire.
COURT:

What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.


And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand
including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose
his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this
witness to the question would incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions
which would incriminate him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witnessstand.
ATTY. CARBON:
I submit.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. CRUZ [Counsel for defendants Pascual and Meneses]: .


MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:
This incident of the accused Roger Chavez being called to testify for the prosecution is something
so sudden that has come to the knowledge of this counsel.
This representation has been apprised of the witnesses embraced in the information.
For which reason I pray this court that I be given at least some days to meet whatever testimony
this witness will bring about. I therefore move for postponement of today's hearing.
COURT:
The court will give counsel time within which to prepare his cross-examination of this witness.
ATTY. CRUZ:
I labored under the impression that the witnesses for the prosecution in this criminal case are
those only listed in the information.
I did not know until this morning that one of the accused will testify as witness for the prosecution.
COURT:
That's the reason why the court will go along with counsels for the accused and will give them
time within which to prepare for their cross-examination of this witness.
The court will not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness.

Call the witness to the witness stand.


EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
ROGER CHAVEZ, 31 years old, single, buy and sell merchant, presently detained at the Manila
Police Department headquarters, after being duly sworn according to law, declared as follows:
ATTY. IBASCO [Counsel for defendant Luis Asistio]:
WITH THE LEAVE OF THE COURT:
This witness, Roger Chavez is one of the accused in this case No. Q-5311.
The information alleges conspiracy. Under Rule 123, Section 12, it states:
'The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.'
COURT:
That is premature, counsel. Neither the court nor counsels for the accused know what
the prosecution events to establish by calling this witness to the witness stand.
ATTY. IBASCO:
I submit.
COURT: The Fiscal may proceed.3
And so did the trial proceed. It began with the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez by "Fiscal Grecia".
Came the judgment of February 1, 1965. The version of the prosecution as found by the court below may
be briefly narrated as follows:
A few days before November 12, 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a Chinese, driving a
Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in
the market for such a car, Chavez asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively
and left his address with Chavez. Then, on November 12, Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop
informed him about the Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that he had changed his mind about buying a
new car. Instead, he told Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for P10,000.00 to cover an
indebtedness in Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see Luis Asistio, who he knew
was lending money on car mortgages and who, on one occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00
on the same Buick car. Asistio however told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise the money.
His plan was to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a
buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with
the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to be a car agent
was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling his
Thunderbird. 1wph1.t

In the morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged for an appointment.
Sometime in the afternoon. Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang
was introduced as the interested buyer. Sumilang's driver inspected the car, took the wheel for a while.
After Sumilang and Lee agreed on the purchase price (P21.000.00), they went to Binondo to Johnson
Lee's cousin, Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the car was registered. Thereafter, they went to see a lawyer
notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez for the drafting of the deed of sale. After the deed of sale
was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the vendor, and Sumilang's driver
and Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto.
As payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove in the
Thunderbird car to that place. The deed of sale and other papers remained in the pockets of Johnson
Lee.
At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the
Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be brought to the
restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer. 4
Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who had left the table to pose for
pictures with some fans and come back, again left never to return. So did Chavez, who disappeared after
he left on the pretext of buying cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They
went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately
reported its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it.
Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio
Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to
Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the
14th of November, the registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and
three days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan.
From the court's decision, Ricardo Sumilang's version, corroborated in part by Asistio, may be condensed
as follows:
In the last week of September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas station. The latter informed
him that there was a Thunderbird from Clark Field for sale for a price between P20,000.00 and
P22,000.00. Chavez said that it could be held for him with a down payment of P10,000.00.
To raise this sum, Sumilang and Chavez, on October 1, went to the house of a certain Nena Hernaez de
los Reyes who wrote out a check for P5,000.00 as a loan to Sumilang. That check was exhibited in court.
Sumilang and Chavez then went to Pasay City to see a certain Mario Baltazar, an agent of the Pasay City
Mayor, and Narsing Cailles, Chief of the Fire Department. Sumilang asked the two for a P10,000-loan
backed up by the P5,000.00-check aforesaid on condition that it should not be cashed immediately as
there were not enough funds therefor. Baltazar and Cailles agreed to give the money the nextday as long
as the check would be left with them and Sumilang would sign a promissory note for P10,000.00. Baltazar
later informed Sumilang that Chavez picked up the money the next day. Four or five days afterwards,
Chavez returned P4,000.00 to Sumilang because P6,000.00 was enough for the deposit. And so,
Sumilang gave back the P4,000.00 to Baltazar.
About the end of October or at the beginning of November, Chavez asked Sumilang for another
P3,000.00. Sumilang sent Chavez to Baltazar and Cailles, with a note requesting that they accommodate
him once more. He also sent a check, again without funds. Baltazar gave the money after verifying the
authenticity of the note.

On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the car was ready if
Sumilang was ready with the rest of the money. So Sumilang got P9,000.00 from his mother and another
P4,000.00 from his aparador. He immediately gave P6,000.00 to Chavez, intending to pay out the
balance upon the car's delivery. It was then that Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already bought by
a Chinese who would be the vendor.
The purchase price finally agreed upon between Sumilang and Johnson Lee was P21,000.00, plus
P500.00 agents commission at the expense of the buyer. Sumilang told Lee that he already paid part of
the price to Chavez.
At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang accommodated. There, Sumilang, also
saw a friend, "Ging" Pascual. In the course of their conversation at the bar, Sumilang mentioned the
proposed transaction thru Chavez. Pascual warned that Chavez was a "smart" agent and advised that
Sumilang should have a receipt for his money. A certain Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make out a
receipt for Chavez to sign.
After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his fans, Bimbo showed him the
receipt already signed by Chavez. Sumilang requested Pascual and Bimbo to sign the receipt as
witnesses. And they did. This receipt was offered as an exhibit by the prosecution and by Sumilang.
When Sumilang was ready to leave Eugene's, Johnson Lee turned over to him the deed of sale, the
registration papers and the keys to the car. After shaking hands with Lee, Sumilang drove away in the car
with his driver at the wheel.
Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to a film shooting at
Bulacan. He saw Asistio with many companions. Asistio liked his Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio
offered to buy it from him for P22,500.00. As the offer was good, and knowing Asistio's and his friends'
reputation for always getting what they wanted, Sumilang consented to the sale. Asistio tendered a down
payment of P1,000.00; the balance he promised to pay the next day after negotiating with some financing
company. Before said balance could be paid, the car was impounded.
The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, strengthened by Baltazar's and Cailles'
corroborations, that he paid good money for the car. Sumilang was thus cleared. So was Asistio whom the
trial court believed to be a mere buyer of the car. And so, the prosecution's theory of conspiracy was
discounted.
As to the other accused, the court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita" and Lorenzo
Meneses alias "Lory". The accused "Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in the first place he was not
identified by Johnson Lee in court.
As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a
matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt."5 The trial court branded him "a self-confessed culprit". 6 The court further continued:
It is not improbable that true to the saying that misery loves company Roger Chavez tried to drag
his co-accused down with him by coloring his story with fabrications which he expected would
easily stick together what with the newspaper notoriety of one and the sensationalism caused by
the other. But Roger Chavez'accusations of Asistio's participation is utterly uncorroborated. And
coming, as it does, from a man who has had at least two convictions for acts not very different
from those charged in this information, the Court would be too gullible if it were to give full
credence to his words even if they concerned a man no less notorious than himself. 7

The trial court then came to the conclusion that if Johnson Lee was not paid for his car, he had no one but
Roger Chavez to blame.
The sum of all these is that the trial court freed all the accused except Roger Chavez who was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of not less than ten (10) years, one (1) day, as minimum and not more than
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or
Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo
the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The Thunderbird car then in the custody
of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who was directed to return to Asistio the
sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract
price for the car.
The foregoing sentence was promulgated on March 8, 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
On April 18, 1968, the Court of Appeals required Atty. Natividad Marquez, counsel for Roger Chavez, to
show cause within ten days from notice why Chavez' appeal should not be considered abandoned and
dismissed. Reason for this is that said lawyer received notice to file brief on December 28, 1967 and the
period for the filing thereof lapsed on January 27, 1968 without any brief having been filed.
On May 13, 1968, Atty. Marquez registered a detailed written explanation. She also stated that if she were
allowed to file appellant's brief she would go along with the factual findings of the court below but will
show however that its conclusion is erroneous.8
On May 14, 1968, the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing explanation, resolved to dismiss the
appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing. For, on June 21, 1968, the Court of Appeals, through a per
curiam resolution, disposed to maintain its May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City
Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court of
Appeals, to turn him over to Muntinlupa Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment below, and
ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.
It was at this stage that the present proceedings were commenced in this Court.
Upon the petitions, the return, and the reply, and after hearing on oral arguments, we now come to grips
with the main problem presented.
We concentrate attention on that phase of the issues which relates petitioner's assertion that he was
compelled to testify against himself. For indeed if this one question is resolved in the affirmative, we need
not reach the others; in which case, these should not be pursued here.
1. Petitioner's plea on this score rests upon his averment, with proof, of violation of his right
constitutionally entrenched against self-incrimination. He asks that the hand of this Court be made to
bear down upon his conviction; that he be relieved of the effects thereof. He asks us to consider the
constitutional injunction that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," 9 fully echoed
in Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court where, in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled:
"(e) To be exempt from being a witness against himself." .
It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war with "the fundamentals of a
republican government"; 10 that [i]t may suit the purposes of despotic power but it can not abide the pure
atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom." 11 Mr. Justice Abad Santos recounts the historical

background of this constitutional inhibition, thus: " "The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its
origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused
persons, which has long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from
the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against
the exercise of arbitrary power, was not uncommon even in England. While the admissions of confessions
of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating
evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under
investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the
temptation to press, the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a
corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state
trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so
odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in
that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent
acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded
in English, as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system
impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the states, with one accord, made a
denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim which in
England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a
constitutional enactment." (Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S., 591, 597; 40 Law. ed., 819, 821)." 12 Mr. Justice
Malcolm, in expressive language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in England in the early days "in
a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack." 13 An old Philippine case [1904] 14 speaks of this
constitutional injunction as "older than the Government of the United States"; as having "its origin in a
protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person"; and as having been
adopted in the Philippines "to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring
accused persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to give testimony regarding the offenses with
which they were charged."
So it is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the
discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; 15 it is
fundamental to our scheme of justice. Just a few months ago, the Supreme Court of the United States
(January 29, 1968), speaking thru Mr. Justice Harlan warned that "[t]he constitutional privilege was
intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and foresighted." 16
It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern. To
repeat, it is mandatory; it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right. Taada and
Fernando (Constitution of the Philippines, 4th ed., vol. I, pp. 583-584) take note of U.S. vs. Navarro,
supra, which reaffirms the rule that the constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of
public policy and humanity; of policy because it would place the witness against the strongest temptation
to commit perjury, and of humanity because it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress
every species and degree of which the law abhors. 17
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his
guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable
against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime.
Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand
with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the
product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from
making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be
sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." 18

2. With the foregoing as guideposts, we now turn to the facts. Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case.
He was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify for the People during the first
day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened
by the clear cut statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's
emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness
stand including the accused," and that defense counsel "could not object to have the accused called on
the witness stand." The cumulative impact of all these is that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He
was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. The foregoing situation molds a solid
case for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence.
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an
ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question
requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, 19 and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness
stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. 20 For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a
witness for the People would be to incriminate him. 21 The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the
certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction." 22 This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial. 23
And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall not be compelled to
furnish evidence against himself "is not the probability of the evidence but it is the capability of
abuse." 24 Thus it is, that it was undoubtedly erroneous for the trial judge to placate petitioner with these
words:.
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand
including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose
his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this
witness to the question would incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions
which would incriminate him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand.
Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertsons Rep. I, 208, 244, quoted in VIII
Wigmore, p. 355, 25 While a defendant's knowledge of the facts remains concealed within his bosom, he is
safe; but draw it from thence, and he is exposed" to conviction.
The judge's words heretofore quoted "But surely counsel could not object to have the accused called
on the witness stand" wielded authority. By those words, petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force;
they deprived him of his will to resist; they foreclosed choice; the realities of human nature tell us that as
he took his oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, no genuine consent underlay
submission to take the witness stand. Constitutionally sound consent was absent.
3. Prejudice to the accused for having been compelled over his objections to be a witness for the People
is at once apparent. The record discloses that by leading questions Chavez, the accused, was made to
affirm his statement given to the NBI agents on July 17, 1963 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 26 And this
statement detailed the plan and execution thereof by Sumilang (Vasquez), Asistio and himself to deprive

the Chinese of his Thunderbird car. And he himself proceeded to narrate the same anew in open court.
He identified the Thunderbird car involved in the case. 27
The decision convicting Roger Chavez was clearly of the view that the case for the People was built
primarily around the admissions of Chavez himself. The trial court described Chavez as the "star witness
for the prosecution". Indeed, the damaging facts forged in the decision were drawn directly from the lips of
Chavez as a prosecution witness and of course Ricardo Sumilang for the defense. There are the
unequivocal statements in the decision that "even accused Chavez" identified "the very same Thunderbird
that Johnson Lee had offered for sale"; that Chavez "testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that Chavez is "a self-confessed culprit". 1wph1.t
4. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate
himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived
his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a
witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless
answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this
circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a case
of compelled submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the
power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The
court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then
and thereon the first day of the trial.
It matters not that, after all efforts to stave off petitioner's taking the stand became fruitless, no objections
to questions propounded to him were made. Here involve is not a mere question of self-incrimination. It is
a defendant's constitutional immunity from being called to testify against himself. And the objection made
at the beginning is a continuing one. 1wph1.t
There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal,
andintelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of
choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his
privilege on vague and uncertain evidence." 28 The teaching in Johnson vs. Zerbst 29 is this: "It has been
pointed out that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." A
waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege." Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
The foregoing guidelines, juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make
waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his
original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection - even to
the guilty. 30
5. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. 31 It is
traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained
such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. 32 Such defect results in the absence or
loss of jurisdiction 33 and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused
whose fundamental right was violated.34 That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral
attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. 35 This writ may issue even if another remedy
which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. 36 Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his
appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. 37 The writ may be granted
upon a judgment already final. 38 For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, 39 the writ of habeas corpus as
an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect 40 so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at

stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of another
constitutional right, in this wise:
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of
Counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to
a Federal Court's authority. When this right is properly waived, the assistance of Counsel is no
longer a necessary element of the Court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence. If
the accused, however, is not represented by Counsel and has not competently and intelligently
waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid
conviction and sentence depriving him of his liberty. A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial
may be lost "in the course of the proceedings" due to failure to complete the court as the Sixth
Amendment requires by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel,
who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If
this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction
to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and
oneimprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus. 41
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a
clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the
writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto.
Just as we are about to write finis to our task, we are prompted to restate that: "A void judgment is in legal
effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in
itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be
responsible as trespassers. ... " 42
6. Respondents' return 43 shows that petitioner is still serving under a final and valid judgment of
conviction for another offense. We should guard against the improvident issuance of an order discharging
a petitioner from confinement. The position we take here is that petitioner herein is entitled to liberty thru
habeas corpus only with respect to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branch, under which he was prosecuted and convicted.
Upon the view we take of this case, judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondent Warden of the
City Jail of Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in custody of petitioner Roger
Chavez by reason of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in Criminal
Case Q-5311, entitled"People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Ricardo Sumilang, et al., accused," to
discharge said Roger Chavez from custody, unless he is held, kept in custody or detained for any cause
or reason other than the said judgment in said Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in which event the discharge herein directed shall be effected when such
other cause or reason ceases to exist.
No costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-25018

May 26, 1969

ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,


vs.

BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and


ENRIQUETA GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.
Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor
Pedro A. Ramirez for respondent-appellant.
Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for intervenors-appellants.
FERNANDO, J.:
The broad, all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination clause, 1 whenever appropriately invoked, has
been accorded due recognition by this Court ever since the adoption of the Constitution. 2 Bermudez v.
Castillo,3decided in 1937, was quite categorical. As we there stated: "This Court is of the opinion that in
order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a
dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it." As
phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The provision, as doubtless it was designed, would
be construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of the individual intended to be served." 4
Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is the recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan,5where
it was held that a respondent in an administrative proceeding under the Anti-Graft Law 6 cannot be
required to take the witness stand at the instance of the complainant. So it must be in this case, where
petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first
witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for
malpractice. That was a correct decision; we affirm it on appeal.
Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of
Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical
Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative
case7 for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first
witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon,
petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be
exempt from being a witness against himself. Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of
such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitionerappellee would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a
restraining order from a competent authority.
Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of
Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional
right against self-incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture
or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character. With his assertion that he was entitled to the relief
demanded consisting of perpetually restraining the respondent Board from compelling him to testify as
witness for his adversary and his readiness or his willingness to put a bond, he prayed for a writ of
preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for a writ of prohibition.
On February 9, 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the
respondent Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative
case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon petitioner-appellee posting a bond in the amount
of P500.00.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner-appellee to
the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a

question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. It further elaborated the matter in the
affirmative defenses interposed, stating that petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object once he is in the
witness stand, for respondent "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,"
precluding the issuance of the relief sought. Respondent Board, therefore, denied that it acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, the complainants in
the administrative case for malpractice against petitioner-appellee, asking that they be allowed to file an
answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was duly filed by them
on March 23, 1965 sustaining the power of respondent Board, which for them is limited to compelling the
witness to take the stand, to be distinguished, in their opinion, from the power to compel a witness to
incriminate himself. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in
an administrative hearing.
A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to
be well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a
witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence this
appeal both by respondent Board and intervenors, the Gatbontons. As noted at the outset, we find for the
petitioner-appellee.
1. We affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to the principle announced by us
inCabal v. Kapunan. 8 In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan,
it appeared that an administrative charge for unexplained wealth having been filed against petitioner
under the Anti-Graft Act,9the complainant requested the investigating committee that petitioner be ordered
to take the witness stand, which request was granted. Upon petitioner's refusal to be sworn as such
witness, a charge for contempt was filed against him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a motion to
quash and upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We found for the petitioner in accordance with the
well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory
questions, but, also, to take the witness stand."
It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the matter referred to an a
administrative charge of unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever
property a public officer or employee may acquire, manifestly out proportion to his salary and his other
lawful income, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while
administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case before us is not
dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property but
the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation.
To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus distinguished, it suffices to refer to an American
Supreme Court opinion highly persuasive in character. 10 In the language of Justice Douglas: "We
conclude ... that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the
Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not
be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for
asserting it." We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly
result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.
2. The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and intervenorsappellants that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to allowing a
witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently
incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language of another American
decision, 11 is the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could

be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that
were all there is then it becomes diluted.lawphi1.et
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to
declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a
presumption of his guilt." 12 Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 13 speaking through Justice
Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain
silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free
genuine will."
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights
granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must
be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods
offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the
democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes
is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the
privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." 14
It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this
right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental,
current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according
to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment." 15 So also with the
observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy." 16 In the light of the above, it could thus clearly
appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now
on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination
clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as
to costs.
G.R. No. L-25966 December 28, 1979
FERMIN A. BAGADIONG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELICIANO S. GONZALES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes, CLEMENTE
ABUNDO, RAFAEL VILLANLUNA and FRANCISCO A. PERFECTO, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari instituted on April 27, 1966 by the petitioner to annul the
order 1 dated April 18, 1966 of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes in Civil
Case No. 546, entitled "Clemente Abundo and Rafael Villaluna, plaintiffs, versus Jorge V. Almojuela,
Dominador Monjardin, Fermin A. Bagadiong and Armando Ala, defendants, Francisco A. Perfecto,
intervenor." Alleged as ground for the petition is that the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The facts are as follows:


On January 12, 1966, the herein plaintiffs-respondents filed a aforementioned Civil Case No. 546 for
prohibition with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction with the Court of First Instance of
Catanduanes against defendants Jorge V. Almojuela, Dominador Monjardin, Fermin A. Bagadiong (the
herein petitioner) and Armando Ala who are the Governor, Vice Governor, Provincial Treasurer and
Provincial Auditor of the Province of Catanduanes, respectively. In the said petition, it is alleged that
defendants, including the herein petitioner, are authorizing, approving and effecting the disbursements of
public funds of the province for purposes stated in the alleged annual Provincial Budget of the Province
for the Fiscal Year 1965-1966 purporting on its face to have been approved by the Provincial Board on
August 23, 1965 under Resolution No. 62-A; that the aforesaid budget is falsified document because the
Provincial Board never approved the same, the alleged Provincial Board Resolution No. 62-A which is
claimed to have approved the said Budget does not exist; that upon discovery of the anomaly, plaintiffs
Clemente Abundo and Rafael Villaluna made representations with the Secretary of Finance on November
17, 1965, to have the alleged Board Resolution No. 62-A approving the budget, considered null and void
because the said plaintiffs never took part in the deliberation approving the said Resolution; that for the
defendants to continue making disbursements of public funds under the falsified budget, the people and
the government of the Province of Catanduanes will suffer irreparable damage and injury from which
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except the instant
petition. Plaintiffs pray that pending resolution of the petition on the merits, a preliminary injunction be
issued restraining the defendants from authorizing, approving and effecting the disbursements of public
funds on the basis of the said budget. 2
On January 14, 1966, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the respondent Judge against the
defendants commanding them to desist from authorizing and making any further disbursements of funds
from the budget in question. On January 17, 1966, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and
to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction. 3 A complaint in intervention 4 was filed on January 21, 1966
by herein respondent Francisco A. Perfecto praying, among others, that the annual budget of the
Province of Catanduanes for the fiscal year 1965-1966 be declared null and void ab initio, the same being
falsification that all original parties to the case be ordered to refund the province all moneys purportedly
appropriated under the falsified budget and disbursed and collected by them, respectively; and that all the
said original parties be condemned, jointly and severally, to pay the Province of Catanduanes an amount
equal to all disbursements under the falsified budget, by way of exemplary damages.
On January 31, 1966, the respondent judge denied the motion to vacate and lift the writ of preliminary
injunction in an order 5 dated January 31, 1966.
When the Civil Case No. 546 was called for trial on April 18, 1966, counsel for plaintiffs called one of the
defendants, the herein petitioner, Fermin A. Bagadiong, to the witness stand as one of the witnesses for
the plaintiffs. Counsel for the defendants raised the objection that the said party cannot be called as a
witness for the plaintiffs because it would violate his constitutional right against self-incrimination. On the
other hand, counsel for the plaintiffs contended that this being purely a civil action, the right against selfincrimination is not involved, and if any testimony elicited from the herein petitioner would tend to
incriminate himself, there would be ample time for the herein petitioner to raise the proper objection.
The respondent Judge in his order 6 held that the position taken by the counsel for the plaintiffs is legally
correct, thereby, ruling that the petitioner may testify as a witness for the plaintiffs.
After a verbal motion to reconsider the aforesaid order was denied by the respondent Judge, the herein
petitioner filed with this Court the instant petition, claiming as earlier stated, that the respondent Judge
acted in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the herein petitioner to

testify for the respondents in Civil Case No. 546, and that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
After the respondents have filed their answer to the instant petition, as required by this Court, both parties
submitted their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument, after which the case was considered
submitted for decision.
The principal issue raised in the instant case is whether or not respondent Judge acted in excess of his
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the herein petitioner to testify as a witness for
the herein respondents, despite his claim of violating his right against self-incrimination.
The petitioner contends that the provision of the Rules of Court which authorizes a party to call the
adverse party to the witness stand applies only to purely civil actions where the defendant does not run
the risk of being prosecuted for any offense. Likewise, the petitioner assets that the right against selfincrimination can only be claimed when the incriminatory question is being propounded and not before, by
a mere witness, but not by a party defendant, as in the case at bar. We find no merit to these contentions.
There is no legal impediment for a party to call any of the adverse parties to be his witness, as clearly
provided in Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which expressly provides:
A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading questions. A party may
call on adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate
him by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had
been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be contradicted and
impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the
adverse party only upon the subject-matter of his examination in chief.
It is in a criminal case, when the accused may not be compelled to testify, or to so much as utter a word,
even for his own defense. 7 But while the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination protects a
person in all types of cases, be they criminal, civil or administrative, 8 said privilege, in proceedings other
than a criminal case against him who invokes it, is considered an option to refuse to answer incriminating
question, and not a prohibition of inquiry.
As aptly stated by this Court in the case of Gonzales vs. Secretary of Labor, et al: 9
Except in criminal cases, there in no rule prohibiting a party litigant form utilizing his
adversary as a witness. As a matter of fact, Section 83 of Rule 123, Rules of Court,
expressly authorizes a party to call an adverse party to the witness stand and interrogate
him. This rule is, of course, subject to the constitutional injunction not to compel any
person to testify against himself. But it is established that the privilege against selfincrimination must be invoked at the proper time, and the proper time to invoke it is when
a question calling for a criminating answer is propounded. This has to be so, because
before a question is asked there would be no way of telling whether the information to be
elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on Evidence (Vol.
6, pp. 4926-4927), a person who has been summoned to testify "cannot decline to
appear, nor can he decline to be sworn as a witness" and "no claim of privilege can be
made until a question calling for a criminating answer is asked; at that time, and generally
speaking, at that time only, the claim of privilege may properly be imposed." (Emphasis
supplied).

In the instant case, petitioner invoked the privilege even prior to any question being propounded, and
simply declined to take the witness stand. In the above-cited Gonzales case, it will be noted that the
privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked when a question calling for an incriminating answer is
propounded, because before a question is asked, there would be no way of telling whether the
information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not. Moreover, the herein petitioner was
being directed to take the stand, not in a criminal case where he is an accused but in civil action. This is
expressly permitted by Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which authorizes a party to call any
adverse party as his witness.
In the later case of Suarez v. Tengco, 2 SCRA 71, 73-74, the following was stated:
Here, petitioner invoked the privilege even prior to any question, and simply declined to
take the witness stand. Note that in the Gonzales case, above-cited, the adverse party
was directed to take the witness stand in proceedings to investigate an alleged failure to
pay overtime compensation, which, under corresponding special laws, carries a penal
sanction. Here, petitioner was being directed to take the stand, not in a criminal case
where he is an accused, but in an independent civil action which, although arising from
the same facts involved in a criminal case pending before the same court, is still be
regarded by law as an "entirely separate and distinct" action, governed by a
corresponding different set of rules (Civil Code of the Phil., Art. 2177).
The almost exact similarity of the instant case and the case just cited leaves no room for doubt, and there
is complete justification therefore that the same ruling must be applied here.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition to prohibit the respondent judge from directing petitioner to take the
witness stand and testify is denied, without prejudice to petitioner's properly invoking the guaranty against
self-incrimination when questions are propounded to him on the stand. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174340

October 17, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF CAMILO L.
SABIO,petitioner,
J. ERMIN ERNEST LOUIE R. MIGUEL, petitioner-relator,
vs.
HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman, and the HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
and THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES of the Senate, HONORABLE SENATOR JUAN
PONCE-ENRILE, in his official capacity as Member, HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, Senate
President, SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, and the SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former President Corazon C. Aquino installed her regime by
issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1,1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG). She entrusted upon this Commission the herculean task of recovering the ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates.2 Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: "No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding

concerning matters within its official cognizance." Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG's
unhampered performance of its task.3
Today, the constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples upon the
Senate's power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The facts are undisputed.
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No.
455 (Senate Res. No. 455),4 "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by
the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors."
The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC
skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as compared to the previous year's mere P106 thousand;
WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called
Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months,
over P73 million had been allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability report given to
PHC and PHILCOMSAT;
WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive
committee of Philcomsat has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to
a relative of an executive committee member; to date there have been no payments given,
subjecting the company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.25 million in 2004;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to protect the interest of the Republic of the Philippines in the
PHC, PHILCOMSAT, and POTC from any anomalous transaction, and to conserve or salvage
any remaining value of the government's equity position in these corporations from any abuses of
power done by their respective board of directors;
WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in
aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors.
Adopted.
(Sgd) MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO

On the same date, February 20, 2006, Senate Res. No. 455 was submitted to the Senate and referred to
theCommittee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations and Committee on Public Services.
However, on March 28, 2006, upon motion of Senator Francis N. Pangilinan, it was transferred to
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises.5
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote
Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public
meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455. 6
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. 7 At the same
time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum,8 approved by Senate
President Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio
Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006
and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455. Similar subpoenae
were issued against the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, namely: Benito V.
Araneta, Philip J. Brodett, Enrique L. Locsin, Manuel D. Andal, Roberto L. Abad, Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Julio J.
Jalandoni, Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao, Alma Kristina Alloba and Johnny Tan. 9
Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August 18, 2006, he
reiterated his earlier position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other hand, the directors and
officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation relied on the position paper they previously filed, which raised
issues on the propriety of legislative inquiry.
Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa O. Coscolluela, under the authority of Senator Gordon, sent another
notice10 to Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject matter set on
September 6, 2006. The notice was issued "under the same authority of the Subpoena Ad
Testificandum previously served upon (him) last 16 August 2006."
Once more, Chairman Sabio did not comply with the notice. He sent a letter 11 dated September 4, 2006 to
Senator Gordon reiterating his reason for declining to appear in the public hearing.
This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order dated September 7, 2006 requiring Chairman Sabio
and Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should not be cited in
contempt of the Senate. On September 11, 2006, they submitted to the Senate their Compliance and
Explanation,12 which partly reads:
Doubtless, there are laudable intentions of the subject inquiry in aid of legislation. But the
rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods.
(Brillantes, Jr., et al. v. Commission on Elections, En Banc [G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004])
On this score, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 should not be ignored as it explicitly provides:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.

With all due respect, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative
inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to provide protection to the PCGG in order to
ensure the unhampered performance of its duties under its charter. E.O. No. 1 is a law, Section
4(b) of which had not been amended, repealed or revised in any way.
To say the least, it would require both Houses of Congress and Presidential fiat to amend or
repeal the provision in controversy. Until then, it stands to be respected as part of the legal
system in this jurisdiction. (As held in People v. Veneracion, G.R. Nos. 119987-88, October 12,
1995: Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under
the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries
within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of
Law, and ought to 'protect and enforce it without fear or favor,' 4 [Act of Athens (1955)] resist
encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal
beliefs.)
xxxxxx
Relevantly, Chairman Sabio's letter to Sen. Gordon dated August 19, 2006 pointed out that the
anomalous transactions referred to in the P.S. Resolution No. 455 are subject of pending cases
before the regular courts, the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court (Pending cases include:
a. Samuel Divina v. Manuel Nieto, Jr., et al., CA-G.R. No. 89102; b. Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation v. Manuel Nieto, et al.; c. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v.
Manuel D. Andal, Civil Case No. 06-095, RTC, Branch 61, Makati City; d. Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation v. PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation, et al., Civil Case
No. 04-1049) for which reason they may not be able to testify thereon under the principle of sub
judice. The laudable objectives of the PCGG's functions, recognized in several cases decided by
the Supreme Court, of the PCGG will be put to naught if its recovery efforts will be unduly
impeded by a legislative investigation of cases that are already pending before the
Sandiganbayan and trial courts.
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, (203 SCRA 767, 784 [1991]) the Honorable
Supreme Court held:
"[T]he issues sought to be investigated by the respondent Committee is one over which
jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has been preempted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation
of an issue already before the Sandigabayan would not only pose the possibility of
conflicting judgments between a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, but if the
Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the
possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the
Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.
xxxxxx
IT IS IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS that the Commission decided not to
attend the Senate inquiry to testify and produce evidence thereat.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an Order13 directing Major General

Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under
arrest for contempt of the Senate. The Order bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the
majority of the Committees' members.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his
office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where
he was detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen,
Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No.
174340.
Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier, and the PCGG's nominees to
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, likewise filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition against the same respondents, and also against Senate President Manuel Villar, Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the entire Senate. The case was docketed as G.R. No.
174318.
Meanwhile, Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its officers and directors, namely: Philip G. Brodett, Luis
K. Lokin, Jr., Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao, Roberto L. Abad, Alma Kristina Alobba and Johnny
Tan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the Senate Committees on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Gordon and Arroyo,
and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174177.
In G.R. No. 174340 (for habeas corpus) and G.R. No. 174318 (for certiorari and prohibition) Chairman
Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier; and the PCGG's nominees Andal and Jalandoni
alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any
justifiable reason; second, the inquiries conducted by respondent Senate Committees are not in aid of
legislation; third, the inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; and fourth, respondent Senate Committees are not
vested with the power of contempt.
In G.R. No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers
alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees have no jurisdiction over the subject matter stated in Senate
Res. No. 455;second, the same inquiry is not in accordance with the Senate's Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; third, the subpoenae against the individual petitioners are void
for having been issued without authority; fourth, the conduct of legislative inquiry pursuant to Senate Res.
No. 455 constitutes undue encroachment by respondents into justiciable controversies over which several
courts and tribunals have already acquired jurisdiction; and fifth, the subpoenae violated petitioners' rights
to privacy and against self-incrimination.
In their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents countered: first, the issues raised in the
petitions involve political questions over which this Court has no jurisdiction; second, Section 4(b) has
been repealed by the Constitution; third, respondent Senate Committees are vested with contempt
power; fourth, Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly
published; fifth, respondents have not violated any civil right of the individual petitioners, such as
their (a) right to privacy; and (b) right against self-incrimination; and sixth, the inquiry does not constitute
undue encroachment into justiciable controversies.

During the oral arguments held on September 21, 2006, the parties were directed to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from date.
In the meantime, per agreement of the parties, petitioner Chairman Sabio was allowed to go home. Thus,
his petition for habeas corpus has become moot. The parties also agreed that the service of the arrest
warrants issued against all petitioners and the proceedings before the respondent Senate Committees
are suspended during the pendency of the instant cases. 14
Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of whether Section 4(b) of E.O.
No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. On this lone issue hinges the merit of the contention of
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners that their refusal to appear before respondent Senate
Committees is justified. With the resolution of this issue, all the other issues raised by the parties have
become inconsequential.
Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting
respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry by
exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding, thus:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in
any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.
To determine whether there exists a clear and unequivocal repugnancy between the two quoted
provisions that warrants a declaration that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution, a
brief consideration of the Congress' power of inquiry is imperative.
The Congress' power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our
shores through McGrain v. Daugherty,15 cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.16 In those earlier days, American
courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate. The 1864 case of Briggs v.
MacKellar17explains the breath and basis of the power, thus:
Where no constitutional limitation or restriction exists, it is competent for either of the two bodies
composing the legislature to do, in their separate capacity, whatever may be essential to enable
them to legislate.It is well-established principle of this parliamentary law, that either house
may institute any investigationhaving reference to its own organization, the conduct or
qualification of its members, its proceedings, rights, or privileges or any matter affecting the
public interest upon which it may be important that it should have exact information, and
in respect to which it would be competent for it to legislate. The right to pass laws,
necessarily implies the right to obtain information upon any matter which may become the
subject of a law. It is essential to the full and intelligent exercise of the legislative
function.In American legislatures the investigation of public matters before committees,
preliminary to legislation, or with the view of advising the house appointing the committee
is, as a parliamentary usage, well established as it is in England, and the right of either
house to compel witnesses to appear and testify before its committee, and to punish for

disobedience has been frequently enforced.The right of inquiry, I think, extends to other
matters, in respect to which it may be necessary, or may be deemed advisable to apply for
legislative aid.
Remarkably, in Arnault, this Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that the
power of inquiry is "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function," thus:
Although there is no provision in the "Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words,the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does
not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse
must be had to others who possess it."
Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress' power of inquiry, provisions on such power made their
maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution. 18 Then came the 1987 Constitution
incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution,
as influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. 19
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of
"any of its committee." This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power
upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively
perform its investigative function are also available to the committees. 20
It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court's high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, 21 where it
categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the power of
inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate."
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI,
Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of
inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such
exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. 22 It even extends "to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish."23 PCGG belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the
absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that:
"Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives."

The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and
charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in
trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may
need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties
pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not
their rulers.24
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public
accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other
administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only
institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government
v. Pea,25 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as "obiter" the portion of the majority opinion
barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the
PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to
make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and
constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a)
were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability "for
anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order," the
constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so
viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members
and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution
and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987
Constitution. x x x.
xxxxxx
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the
PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members
were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan26 reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned upon by this
Court even before the filing of the present petitions.
Corollarily, Section 4(b) also runs counter to the following constitutional provisions ensuring the people's
access to information:
Article II, Section 28
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to
exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in
public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation.
In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.27 the Court explained that an informed citizenry is essential to the existence
and proper functioning of any democracy, thus:
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive
and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent
that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the
participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating
thereto can such bear fruit.
Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress but
also the citizenry. The people are equally concerned with this proceeding and have the right to participate
therein in order to protect their interests. The extent of their participation will largely depend on the
information gathered and made known to them. In other words, the right to information really goes handin-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is
meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in
checking abuse in the government.28 The cases ofTaada v. Tuvera29 and Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission30 have recognized a citizen's interest and personality to enforce a public duty and to bring an
action to compel public officials and employees to perform that duty.
Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff
information and other data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this must not be countenanced.
In Senate v. Ermita,31 this Court stressed:
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however,
any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such
investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be
in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby
denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter
before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other
government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it
creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect
violates the Constitution or its basic principles.32 As shown in the above discussion, Section 4(b) is
inconsistent withArticle VI, Section 21 (Congress' power of inquiry), Article XI, Section 1 (principle of
public accountability),Article II, Section 28 (policy of full disclosure) and Article III, Section 7 (right to
public information).
Significantly, Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed, or revoked.

The clear import of this provision is that all existing laws, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances inconsistent or repugnant to the Constitution are repealed.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions invalidating laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters
of instructions and other executive issuances inconsistent with the Constitution. In Pelaez v. Auditor
General,33 the Court considered repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
authorizing the Executive to change the seat of the government of any subdivision of local governments,
upon the approval of the 1935 Constitution. Section 68 was adjudged incompatible and inconsistent with
the Constitutional grant of limited executive supervision over local governments. In Islamic Da'wah
Council of the Philippines, Inc., v. Office of the Executive Secretary,34 the Court declared Executive Order
No. 46, entitled "Authorizing the Office on Muslim Affairs to Undertake Philippine Halal Certification," void
for encroaching on the religious freedom of Muslims. InThe Province of Batangas v. Romulo,35 the Court
declared some provisions of the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001 unconstitutional for
violating the Constitutional precept on local autonomy. And in Ople v. Torres,36 the Court likewise declared
unconstitutional Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System," for being violative of the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.
These Decisions, and many others, highlight that the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is "the
basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including
the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it
conflicts with the Constitution."37 Consequently, this Court has no recourse but to declare Section 4(b)
of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
Significantly, during the oral arguments on September 21, 2006, Chairman Sabio admitted that should this
Court rule that Section 4(b) is unconstitutional or that it does not apply to the Senate, he will answer the
questions of the Senators, thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Okay. Now, if the Supreme Court rules that Sec. 4(b) is unconstitutional or that it does not
apply to the Senate, will you answer the questions of the Senators?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Your Honor, my father was a judge, died being a judge. I was here in the Supreme Court
as Chief of Staff of Justice Feria. I would definitely honor the Supreme Court and the rule
of law.
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You will answer the questions of the Senators if we say that?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Yes, Your Honor. That is the law already as far as I am concerned.
With his admission, Chairman Sabio is not fully convinced that he and his Commissioners are shielded
from testifying before respondent Senate Committees by Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. In effect, his
argument that the said provision exempts him and his co-respondent Commissioners from testifying
before respondent Senate Committees concerning Senate Res. No. 455 utterly lacks merit.

Incidentally, an argument repeated by Chairman Sabio is that respondent Senate Committees have no
power to punish him and his Commissioners for contempt of the Senate.
The argument is misleading.
Article VI, Section 21 provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
It must be stressed that the Order of Arrest for "contempt of Senate Committees and the Philippine
Senate" wasapproved by Senate President Villar and signed by fifteen (15) Senators. From this, it
can be concluded that the Order is under the authority, not only of the respondent Senate Committees,
but of the entire Senate.
At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of
powerto the committees. Father Bernas, in his Commentary on the 1987 Constitution, correctly pointed
out its significance:
It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of investigation not
just of Congress but also of "any of its committees." This is significant because it constitutes a
direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the means
which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are
also available to the Committees.38
This is a reasonable conclusion. The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of
Congress must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. Otherwise, Article
VI, Section 21 will be meaningless. The indispensability and usefulness of the power of contempt in a
legislative inquiry is underscored in a catena of cases, foreign and local.
In the 1821 case of Anderson v. Dunn,39 the function of the Houses of Congress with respect to the
contempt power was likened to that of a court, thus:
But the court in its reasoning goes beyond this, and though the grounds of the decision are not
very clearly stated, we take them to be: that there is in some cases a power in each House of
Congress to punish for contempt; that this power is analogous to that exercised by courts
of justice, and that it being the well established doctrine that when it appears that a
prisoner is held under the order of a court of general jurisdiction for a contempt of its
authority, no other court will discharge the prisoner or make further inquiry into the cause
of his commitment. That this is the general ruleas regards the relation of one court to another
must be conceded.
In McGrain,40 the U.S. Supreme Court held: "Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always
accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed."
The Court, in Arnault v. Nazareno,41sustained the Congress' power of contempt on the basis of this
observation.

In Arnault v. Balagtas,42 the Court further explained that the contempt power of Congress is founded upon
reason and policy and that the power of inquiry will not be complete if for every contumacious act,
Congress has to resort to judicial interference, thus:
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses
is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and
information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the
disclosure of such knowledge and information if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its
power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of
separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective
authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be full and complete,
independently of the other's authority or power. And how could the authority and power
become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy
against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate
remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts
committed against its authority or dignity.43
In Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete,44 the Court
characterized contempt power as a matter of self-preservation, thus:
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that
branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch,
asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is,
therefore, sui generis x x x.
Meanwhile, with respect to G.R. No. 174177, the petition of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its
directors and officers, this Court holds that the respondent Senate Committees' inquiry does not violate
their right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected." This is just another way of saying that the power of
inquiry must be "subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on government action." As held
in Barenblatt v. United States,45 "the Congress, in common with all the other branches of the
Government, must exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on
governmental action, more particularly in the context of this case, the relevant limitations of the
Bill of Rights."
First is the right to privacy.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. 46 Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous
regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a
"constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men,"47 but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks."48
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two guarantees that
explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a person's "right to be let alone" or the "right to determine
what, how much, to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed."49 Section

2 guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." Section
3 renders inviolable the "privacy of communication and correspondence" and further cautions that
"any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding."
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion.50 Applying this determination to these cases, the important inquiries
are: first, did the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable
expectation of privacy?; andsecond, did the government violate such expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senate's public hearing to deliberate on
Senate Res. No. 455, particularly "on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in
the operations by their respective board of directors." Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners' acts
committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the said corporations, particularly
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy
over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest. Certainly,
such matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc,51 the Court, in line with Whalen v. Roe,52 employed the rational basis
relationship test when it held that there was no infringement of the individual's right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the opportunities
for official corruption, maintain a standard of honesty in public service, and promote morality in public
administration.53 In Valmonte v. Belmonte,54 the Court remarked that as public figures, the Members of the
former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals,
and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the right
of the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to privacy of
financial transactions.
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging
in millions of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling
reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporations, as well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary
legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding
PCGG's efficacy. There being no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of those directors and
officers over the subject covered by Senate Res. No. 455, it follows that their right to privacy has not been
violated by respondent Senate Committees.
Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that this right maybe invoked by the said
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation only when the incriminating question is
being asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions
to be asked of them."55 That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying
respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused,
such issue may be presented before the courts. At this juncture, what is important is that respondent
Senate Committees have sufficient Rules to guide them when the right against self-incrimination is
invoked. Sec. 19 reads:

Sec. 19. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination


A witness can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question tends to elicit an
answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. However, he may offer to answer any
question in an executive session.
No person can refuse to testify or be placed under oath or affirmation or answer questions before
an incriminatory question is asked. His invocation of such right does not by itself excuse him from
his duty to give testimony.
In such a case, the Committee, by a majority vote of the members present there being a quorum,
shall determine whether the right has been properly invoked. If the Committee decides otherwise,
it shall resume its investigation and the question or questions previously refused to be answered
shall be repeated to the witness. If the latter continues to refuse to answer the question, the
Committee may punish him for contempt for contumacious conduct.
The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues
being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any
prosecution of criminal or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a
legislative purpose.
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it their duty to cooperate
with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting
obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.
In fine, PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio
Conti, and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors and officers, must comply with the Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify in public
hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 174340 for habeas corpus is DISMISSED, for being moot. The
petitions in G.R Nos. 174318 and 174177 are likewise DISMISSED.
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution. Respondent Senate
Committees' power of inquiry relative to Senate Resolution 455 is upheld. PCGG Chairman Camilo L.
Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti and Tereso Javier; and Manuel
Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors
and officers, petitioners in G.R. No. 174177, are ordered to comply with the Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify in public
hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.
SO ORDERED.

C. IMMUNITY STATUTES

G.R. Nos. 71208-09 August 30, 1985


SATURNINA GALMAN AND REYNALDO GALMAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE MANUEL PAMARAN AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES
AUGUSTO AMORES AND BIENVENIDO VERA CRUZ OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE
HONORABLE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ, TANODBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR
GENERAL PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT.
LEONARDO MOJICA SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. PROSPERO BONA AND AlC ANICETO
ACUPIDO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 71212-13 August 30, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the TANODBAYAN (OMBUDSMAN), petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR GEN. PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT.
PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO,
SGT. PROSPERO BONA AND AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO, respondents.

CUEVAS, JR., J.:


On August 21, 1983, a crime unparalleled in repercussions and ramifications was committed inside the
premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. Former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.,
an opposition stalwart who was returning to the country after a long-sojourn abroad, was gunned down to
death. The assassination rippled shock-waves throughout the entire country which reverberated beyond
the territorial confines of this Republic. The after-shocks stunned the nation even more as this ramified to
all aspects of Philippine political, economic and social life.
To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and
exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, 1 P.D. 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc
Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly known as the Agrava Board. 2 Pursuant to the
powers vested in it by P.D. 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses
appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a
subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board Among the witnesses who appeared,
testified and produced evidence before the Board were the herein private respondents General Fabian C.
Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, 3 Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica,
Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. 4
UPON termination of the investigation, two (2) reports were submitted to His Excellency, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another one,
jointly authored by the other members of the Board namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon,
Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera. 'the reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the
TANODBAYAN for appropriate action. After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the
TANODBAYAN 5 filed with the SANDIGANBAYAN two (2) Informations for MURDER-one for the killing of
Sen. Benigno S. Aquino which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10010 and another, criminal Case No.
10011, for the killing of Rolando Galman, who was found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the
prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, private respondents were
charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice.

Upon arraignment, all the accused, including the herein private ate Respondents pleaded NOT GUILTY.
In the course of the joint trial of the two (2) aforementioned cases, the Prosecution represented by the
Office of the petition TANODBAYAN, marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the individual
testimonies of private respondents before the Agrava Board. 6 Private respondents, through their
respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. Private respondent Gen. Ver filed a formal
"Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence against
him in the above-entitled cases" 7 contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. He prayed that his
aforesaid testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the
other private respondents likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective individual
testimonies invoking the same ground. 8 Petitioner TANODBAYAN opposed said motions contending that
the immunity relied upon by the private respondents in support of their motions to exclude their respective
testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against selfincrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. 9 Respondent SANDIGANBAYAN ordered the
TANODBAYAN and the private respondents to submit their respective memorandum on the issue after
which said motions will be considered submitted for resolution. 10
On May 30, 1985, petitioner having no further witnesses to present and having been required to make its
offer of evidence in writing, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN, without the pending motions for exclusion
being resolved, issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of the parties, the pending motions for
exclusion and the opposition thereto, together with the memorandum in support thereof, as well as the
legal issues and arguments, raised therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the
prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other documentary evidences. 11 On June 3, 1985, the
prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence" which includes, among others, the testimonies of
private respondents and other evidences produced by them before the Board, all of which have been
previously marked in the course of the trial. 12
All the private respondents objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the same ground
relied upon by them in their respective motion for exclusion.
On June 13, 1985, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN issued a Resolution, now assailed in these two (2)
petitions, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other
evidence produced by the private respondents in view of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. 13
Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the said Resolution having been DENIED, they now come
before Us by way of certiorari 14 praying for the amendment and/or setting aside of the challenged
Resolution on the ground that it was issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Private prosecutor below, as counsel for the mother of deceased
Rolando Galman, also filed a separate petition for certiorari 15 on the same ground. Having arisen from
the same factual beginnings and raising practically Identical issues, the two (2) petitioners were
consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt with and resolved in this Decision.
The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of the testimonies given by the eight (8)
private respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board.
It is the submission of the prosecution, now represented by the petitioner TANODBAYAN, that said
testimonies are admissible against the private respondents, respectively, because of the latter's failure to
invoke before the Agrava Board the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. Since private respondents did not
invoke said privilege, the immunity did not attach. Petitioners went further by contending that such failure
to claim said constitutional privilege amounts to a waiver thereof. 16 The private respondents, on the other

hand, claim that notwithstanding failure to set up the privilege against self- incrimination before the Agrava
Board, said evidences cannot be used against them as mandated by Section 5 of the said P.D. 1886.
They contend that without the immunity provided for by the second clause of Section 5, P.D. 1886, the
legal compulsion imposed by the first clause of the same Section would suffer from constitutional infirmity
for being violative of the witness' right against self- incrimination. 17 Thus, the protagonists are locked in
horns on the effect and legal significance of failure to set up the privilege against self-incrimination.
The question presented before Us is a novel one. Heretofore, this Court has not been previously called
upon to rule on issues involving immunity statutes. The relative novelty of the question coupled with the
extraordinary circumstance that had precipitated the same did nothing to ease the burden of laying down
the criteria upon which this Court will henceforth build future jurisprudence on a heretofore unexplored
area of judicial inquiry. In carrying out this monumental task, however, We shall be guided, as always, by
the constitution and existing laws.
The Agrava Board, 18 came into existence in response to a popular public clamor that an impartial and
independent body, instead of any ordinary police agency, be charged with the task of conducting the
investigation. The then early distortions and exaggerations, both in foreign and local media, relative to the
probable motive behind the assassination and the person or persons responsible for or involved in the
assassination hastened its creation and heavily contributed to its early formation. 19
Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth and in fact, and
to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and
circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons
criminally responsible therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. For indeed, what
good will it be to the entire nation and the more than 50 million Filipinos to know the facts and
circumstances of the killing if the culprit or culprits will nevertheless not be dealt with criminally? This
purpose is implicit from Section 12 of the said Presidential Decree, the pertinent portion of which provides

SECTION 12. The findings of the Board shall be made public. Should the findings warrant
the prosecution of any person, the Board may initiate the filing of proper complaint with
the appropriate got government agency. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment
and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction.
And as safeguard, the P.D. guarantees "any person called to testify before the Board the right to counsel
at any stage of the proceedings." 20 Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be denied
that in the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain
witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects
are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person
testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not
merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more
importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation therein.
Among this class of witnesses were the herein private respondents, suspects in the said assassination, all
of whom except Generals Ver and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time they were
summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, Presidential
Decree No. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses
against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness stand,
testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so. 21 The jeopardy of
being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they

cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined
and protected by our fundamental law. 21-a Both these constitutional rights (to remain silent and not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet when
they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of
the testimony given by them.
Of course, it may be argued is not the right to remain silent available only to a person undergoing
custodial interrogation? We find no categorical statement in the constitutional provision on the matter
which reads:
... Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. ... 22 (Emphasis supplied)
Since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, we now have a mass of jurisprudence 23 on this specific
portion of the subject provision. In all these cases, it has been categorically declared that a person
detained for the commission of an offense undergoing investigation has a right to be informed of his right
to remain silent, to counsel, and to an admonition that any and all statements to be given by him may be
used against him. Significantly however, there has been no pronouncement in any of these cases nor in
any other that a person similarly undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense, if not
detained, is not entitled to the constitutional admonition mandated by said Section 20, Art. IV of the Bill of
Rights.
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by having it
inserted between the words "under" and investigation", as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any
person " goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. 24 Neither
are we impressed by petitioners' contention that the use of the word "confession" in the last sentence of
said Section 20, Article 4 connotes the Idea that it applies only to police investigation, for although the
word "confession" is used, the protection covers not only "confessions" but also "admissions" made in
violation of this section. They are inadmissible against the source of the confession or admission and
against third person. 25
It is true a person in custody undergoing investigation labors under a more formidable ordeal and graver
trying conditions than one who is at liberty while being investigated. But the common denominator in both
which is sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter
convict him. This is the lamentable situation we have at hand.
All the private respondents, except Generals Ver and Olivas, are members of the military contingent that
escorted Sen. Aquino while disembarking from the plane that brought him home to Manila on that fateful
day. Being at the scene of the crime as such, they were among the first line of suspects in the subject
assassination. General Ver on the other hand, being the highest military authority of his co-petitioners
labored under the same suspicion and so with General Olivas, the first designated investigator of the
tragedy, but whom others suspected, felt and believed to have bungled the case. The papers, especially
the foreign media, and rumors from uglywagging tongues, all point to them as having, in one way or
another participated or have something to do, in the alleged conspiracy that brought about the
assassination. Could there still be any doubt then that their being asked to testify, was to determine
whether they were really conspirators and if so, the extent of their participation in the said conspiracy? It
is too taxing upon one's credulity to believe that private respondents' being called to the witness stand
was merely to elicit from them facts and circumstances surrounding the tragedy, which was already so
abundantly supplied by other ordinary witnesses who had testified earlier. In fact, the records show that
Generals Ver and Olivas were among the last witnesses called by the Agrava Board. The subject matter

dealt with and the line of questioning as shown by the transcript of their testimonies before the Agrava
Board, indubitably evinced purposes other than merely eliciting and determining the so-called surrounding
facts and circumstances of the assassination. In the light of the examination reflected by the record, it is
not far-fetched to conclude that they were called to the stand to determine their probable involvement in
the crime being investigated. Yet they have not been informed or at the very least even warned while so
testifying, even at that particular stage of their testimonies, of their right to remain silent and that any
statement given by them may be used against them. If the investigation was conducted, say by the PC,
NBI or by other police agency, all the herein private respondents could not have been compelled to give
any statement whether incriminatory or exculpatory. Not only that. They are also entitled to be
admonished of their constitutional right to remain silent, to counsel, and be informed that any and all
statements given by them may be used against them. Did they lose their aforesaid constitutional rights
simply because the investigation was by the Agrava Board and not by any police investigator, officer or
agency? True, they continued testifying. May that be construed as a waiver of their rights to remain silent
and not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves? The answer is yes, if they have the option to
do so. But in the light of the first portion of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the awesome contempt power of
the Board to punish any refusal to testify or produce evidence, We are not persuaded that when they
testified, they voluntarily waived their constitutional rights not to be compelled to be a witness against
themselves much less their right to remain silent.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it
may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his
will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational
judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion 'tending to force
testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant. 26
Similarly, in the case of Louis J. Lefkowitz v. Russel 27 Turley" citing Garrity vs. New Jersey" where certain
police officers summoned to an inquiry being conducted by the Attorney General involving the fixing of
traffic tickets were asked questions following a warning that if they did not answer they would be removed
from office and that anything they said might be used against them in any criminal proceeding, and the
questions were answered, the answers given cannot over their objection be later used in their
prosecutions for conspiracy. The United States Supreme Court went further in holding that:
the protection of the individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced
statements prohibits use in subsequent proceedings of statements obtained under threat
or removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen or other
members of the body politic. 385 US at 500, 17 L Ed. 562. The Court also held that in the
context of threats of removal from office the act of responding to interrogation was not
voluntary and was not an effective waiver of the privilege against self- incrimination.
To buttress their precarious stand and breathe life into a seemingly hopeless cause, petitioners and
amicus curiae (Ex-Senator Ambrosio Padilla) assert that the "right not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself" applies only in favor of an accused in a criminal case. Hence, it may not be invoked by
any of the herein private respondents before the Agrava Board. The Cabal vs. Kapunan 28 doctrine
militates very heavily against this theory. Said case is not a criminal case as its title very clearly indicates.
It is not People vs. Cabal nor a prosecution for a criminal offense. And yet, when Cabal refused to take
the stand, to be sworn and to testify upon being called as a witness for complainant Col. Maristela in a
forfeiture of illegally acquired assets, this Court sustained Cabal's plea that for him to be compelled to
testify will be in violation of his right against self- incrimination. We did not therein state that since he is
not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and
testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question which tends to
elicit an answer that will incriminate him is profounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the character of the

suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistently been held to
extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited
upon a witness, whether a party or not. 29 If in a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were
involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is secured in favor of the
defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing investigation before a Fact
Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by him, hang on the
balance. Further enlightenment on the subject can be found in the historical background of this
constitutional provision against self- incrimination. The privilege against self- incrimination is guaranteed
in the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the Philippines, the same principle obtains as a
direct result of American influence. At first, the provision in our organic laws were similar to the
Constitution of the United States and was as follows:
That no person shall be ... compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself.

30

As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads:


No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision
also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify
against himself" applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding that the proceedings before the
Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case
No doubt, the private respondents were not merely denied the afore-discussed sacred constitutional
rights, but also the right to "due process" which is fundamental fairness. 31 Quoting the highly-respected
eminent constitutionalist that once graced this Court, the former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, due
process
... is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due
process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds
of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly, it has been Identified as freedom from
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play(Frankfurter, Mr. Justice
Holmes and the Supreme Court, 1983, pp. 32-33). It exacts fealty "to those strivings for
justice and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn
from considerations of fairness that reflect (democratic) traditions of legal and political
thought."(Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche 1960, 363 US 20, at 487). It is not a narrow or
'"echnical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances."(Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy 1961, 367 US 1230) Decisions based on
such a clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society. (Bartkus vs. Illinois, 1959, 359 US 121). Questions of due process are not to be
treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. (Pearson v. McGraw, 1939,
308 US 313).
Our review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations and
admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal adherence to and compliance with due process. The manner
in which the testimonies were taken from private respondents fall short of the constitutional standards
both under the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE and under the EXCLUSIONARY RULE in Section 20, Article IV.
In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of private respondents cannot
be admitted against them in ally criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of

constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by law. Nevertheless, We shall rule on
the effect of such absence of claim to the availability to private respondents of the immunity provided for
in Section 5, P.D. 1886 which issue was squarely raised and extensively discussed in the pleadings and
oral arguments of the parties.
Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity"; and the other,
which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows:
"Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection
with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity
to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates." 32 Examining
Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section 5 thereof, which reads:
SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing
books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a
subpoena issued by the Board on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required
of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his
testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection
with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having
invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that
such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for
perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from
office. (Emphasis supplied)
it is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity
from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the
basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from
prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self- incrimination. He is merely saved from
the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise ... he still runs the risk of being
prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self- incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the
hallmark of due process, demands that private respondents should have been informed of their rights to
remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them.
This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no
obligation to so inform them.
It is for this reason that we cannot subscribe to the view adopted and urged upon Us by the petitioners
that the right against self-incrimination must be invoked before the Board in order to prevent use of any
given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. A literal interpretation
fashioned upon Us is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, which is the first test of
admissibility. It reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. As herein
earlier discussed, this exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions, 33 whether
made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense. Any interpretation of a statute which will give it a meaning

in conflict with the Constitution must be avoided. So much so that if two or more constructions or
interpretations could possibly be resorted to, then that one which will avoid unconstitutionality must be
adopted even though it may be necessary for this purpose to disregard the more usual and apparent
import of the language used. 34 To save the statute from a declaration of unconstitutionality it must be
given a reasonable construction that will bring it within the fundamental law. 35 Apparent conflict between
two clauses should be harmonized. 36
But a literal application of a requirement of a claim of the privilege against self- incrimination as a
condition sine qua non to the grant of immunity presupposes that from a layman's point of view, he has
the option to refuse to answer questions and therefore, to make such claim. P.D. 1886, however,
forecloses such option of refusal by imposing sanctions upon its exercise, thus:
SEC. 4. The Board may hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and impose
appropriate penalties therefor. A person guilty of .... including ... refusal to be sworn or to
answer as a witness or to subscribe to an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to
do so may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by the Board. ...
Such threat of punishment for making a claim of the privilege leaves the witness no choice but to answer
and thereby forfeit the immunity purportedly granted by Sec. 5. The absurdity of such application is
apparent Sec. 5 requires a claim which it, however, forecloses under threat of contempt proceedings
against anyone who makes such claim. But the strong testimonial compulsion imposed by Section 5 of
P.D. 1886 viewed in the light of the sanctions provided in Section 4,infringes upon the witness' right
against self-incrimination. As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative the
testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive
protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered. 37 Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886,
immunity must in fact be offered to the witness before he can be required to answer, so as to safeguard
his sacred constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired results
the private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights are therefore,
in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if
IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on
the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby
are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by
P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which the same
law practically strips away from the witness.
With the stand we take on the issue before Us, and considering the temper of the times, we run the risk of
being consigned to unpopularity. Conscious as we are of, but undaunted by, the frightening
consequences that hover before Us, we have strictly adhered to the Constitution in upholding the rule of
law finding solace in the view very aptly articulated by that well-known civil libertarian and admired
defender of human rights of this Court, Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, in the case of People vs.
Manalang 38 and we quote:
I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of the interests of society with the
rights and freedoms of the individuals. I have advocated the balancing-of-interests rule in
an situations which call for an appraisal of the interplay of conflicting interests of
consequential dimensions. But I reject any proposition that would blindly uphold the
interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity of any human being. (Emphasis
supplied)
Lest we be misunderstood, let it be known that we are not by this disposition passing upon the guilt or
innocence of the herein private respondents an issue which is before the Sandiganbayan. We are merely

resolving a question of law and the pronouncement herein made applies to all similarly situated,
irrespective of one's rank and status in society.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS and finding the instant petitions without merit, same
are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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