Diamond Taxi v.

Llamas
FACTS:
1.
Llamas worked as a taxi driver for petitioner Diamond Taxi, owned and operated by
petitioner Bryan Ong.
2.
On July 18, 2005, Llamas filed before the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegal
dismissal against the petitioners.
3.
The petitioners denied dismissing Llamas.
4.
They claimed that Llamas had been absent without official leave for several days,
beginning July 14, 2005 until August 1, 2005.
5.
The petitioners submitted a copy of the attendance logbook to prove that Llamas had
been absent on these cited dates.
6.
They also pointed out that Llamas committed several traffic violations in the years
2000-2005 and that they had issued him several memoranda for acts of insubordination and
refusal to heed management instructions.
7.
They argued that these acts traffic violations, insubordination and refusal to heed
management instructions constitute grounds for the termination of Llamas employment.
8.
Llamas failed to seasonably file his position paper.
9.
On November 29, 2005, the LA rendered a decision dismissing Llamas complaint for
lack of merit.
10.
The LA held that Llamas was not dismissed, legally or illegally. Rather, the LA declared
that Llamas left his job and had been absent for several days without leave.
11.
Llamas received a copy of this LA decision on January 5, 2006. Meanwhile, he filed his
position paper on December 20, 2005.
12.
In his position paper, Llamas claimed that he failed to seasonably file his position paper
because his previous counsel, despite his repeated pleas, had continuously deferred
compliance with the LAs orders for its submission.
13.
Hence, he was forced to secure the services of another counsel on December 19, 2005
in order to comply with the LAs directive.
14.
On the merits of his complaint, Llamas alleged that he had a misunderstanding with
Aljuver Ong, Bryans brother and operations manager of Diamond Taxi, on July 13, 2005 (July
13, 2005 incident).
15.
When he reported for work on July 14, 2005, Bryan refused to give him the key to his
assigned taxi cab unless he would sign a prepared resignation letter.
16.
He did not sign the resignation letter. He reported for work again on July 15 and 16,
2005, but Bryan insisted that he sign the resignation letter prior to the release of the key to
his assigned taxi cab.
17.
Thus, he filed the illegal dismissal complaint.
18.
On January 16, 2006, Llamas filed before the LA a motion for reconsideration of its
November 29, 2005 decision.
19.
The LA treated Llamas motion as an appeal per Section 15, Rule V of the 2005 Revised
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (the governing NLRC Rules of Procedure at the time Llamas
filed his complaint before the LA).
20.
In its May 30, 2006 resolution, the NLRC dismissed for nonperfection Llamas motion for
reconsideration treated as an appeal.
21.
The NLRC pointed out that Llamas failed to attach the required certification of nonforum shopping per Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Rules.
22.
Llamas moved to reconsider the May 30, 2006 NLRC resolution; he attached the
required certification of non-forum shopping.
23.
When the NLRC denied his motion for reconsideration in its August 31, 2006 resolution,
Llamas filed before the CA a petition for certiorari.
24.
The CA reversed and set aside theassailed NLRC resolution. It pointed out that noncompliance with the requirement on the filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping, while
mandatory, may nonetheless be excused upon showing of manifest equitable grounds proving
substantial compliance.
25.
As the CA found equitable grounds to take exception from the rule on certificate of nonforum shopping, it declared that the NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed Llamas appeal purely on a technicality.
26.
To the CA, the NLRC should have considered as substantially compliant with this rule
Llamas subsequent submission of the required certificate with his motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:
1.
Yes. The CA correctly found that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Llamas appeal on mere technicality.
2.
Article 223 (now Article 229) of the Labor Code states thatdecisions (or awards or
orders) of the LA shall become final and executory unless appealed to the NLRC within ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the decision. Consistent with Article 223, Section 1, Rule VI
of the 2005 NLRC Rules also provides for a ten (10)-day period for appealing the LAs decision.
3.
Under Section 4(a), Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Rules, the appeal shall be in theform of a
verified memorandum of appeal and accompanied by proof of payment of the appeal fee,
posting of cash or surety bond(when necessary), certificate of non-forum shopping, and proof
of service upon the other parties.
4.
Failure of the appealing party to comply with any or all of these requisites within the
reglementary period will render the LAs decision final and executory.
5.
Indisputably, Llamas did not file a memorandum of appeal from the LAs decision.
Instead, he filed, within the ten (10)-day appeal period, a motion for reconsideration.
6.
Under Section 15, Rule V of the 2005 NLRC Rules, motions for reconsideration from the
LAs decision are not allowed; they may, however, be treated as an appeal provided they
comply with the requirements for perfecting an appeal.
7.
The NLRC dismissed Llamas motion for reconsideration treated as an appeal for failure
to attach the required certificate of non-forum shopping per Section 4(a), Rule VI of the 2005
NLRC Rules.
8.
Ordinarily, the infirmity in Llamas appeal would have been fatal and would have
justified an end to the case.
9.
A careful consideration of the circumstances of the case, however, convinces us that
the NLRC should, indeed, have given due course to Llamas appeal despite the initial absence
of the required certificate.
10.
We note that in his motion for reconsideration of the NLRCs May 30, 2006 resolution,
Llamas attached the required certificate of non-forum shopping.
11.
Moreover, Llamas adequately explained, in his motion for reconsideration, the
inadvertence and presented a clear justifiable ground to warrant the relaxation of the rules.
12.
To recall, Llamas was able to file his position paper, through his newcounsel, only on
December 20, 2005. He hired the new counsel on December 19, 2005 after several repeated,
albeit failed, pleas to his former counsel to submit, on or before October 25, 2005 per the LAs
order, the required position paper.
13.
On November 29, 2005, however, the LA rendered a decision that Llamas and his new
counsel learned and received a copy of only on January 5, 2006.
14.
Evidently, the LAs findings and conclusions were premised solely on the petitioners
pleadings and evidence. And, while not the fault of the LA, Llamas, nevertheless, did not have
a meaningful opportunity to present his case, refute the contents and allegations in the
petitioners position paper and submit controverting evidence.
15.
Faced with these circumstances, i.e., Llamas subsequent compliance with the
certification-against-forum-shopping requirement; the utter negligence and inattention of
Llamas former counsel to his pleas and cause, and his vigilance in immediately securing the
services of a new counsel; Llamas filing of his position paper before he learned and received
a copy of the LAs decision; the absence of a meaningful opportunity for Llamas to present his
case before the LA; and the clear merits of his case (that our subsequent discussion will
show), the NLRC should have relaxed the application of procedural rules in the broader
interests of substantial justice.
16.
Indeed, while the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory,
this requirement should not, however, be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the
objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forumshopping.
17.
Consistently, we have emphasized that rules ofprocedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. A strict and rigid application which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice should not be
allowed. No procedural rule issacrosanct (inviolable) if such shall result in subverting justice.

Paquito V. Ando v Andresito Y. Campo, Et. Al.

Facts:
Petitioner was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI).
Respondents were hired by PACSIas pilers or haulers tasked to manually carry bags of sugar.
In June 1998, respondents were dismissed from employment.They filed a case for illegal
dismissal and some money claims with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC),Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City.
NLRC decided in the favor of respondents directing petitioner to pay442,702.Petitioner and
PACSI appealed to the NLRC in a decision but failed to perfect his appeal because he did not
pay thesupersedes bond. It also affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision with modification of the
award for separation pay to four other employees who were similarly situated. Upon finality of
the decision, respondents moved for its execution.
[9] To answer for the monetary award, NLRC Acting Sheriff Romeo Pasustento issued a Notice
of Sale on Execution of Personal Property over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-140167 in the name of "Paquito V. Ando x x x married to Erlinda S. Ando."This
prompted petitioner to file an action for prohibition and damages with prayer for theissuance
of (TRO) before the RTCBacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the property belonged to him and
his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, couldnot be subject of the execution sale. Since it
is the corporation that was the judgment debtor, execution should be madeon the latter's
properties. RTC denied the prayer for TRO because lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the NLRC
Manual onthe Execution of Judgment, petitioner's remedy was to file a third-party claim with
the NLRC Sheriff. Despite lack of jurisdiction, however, the RTC went on to decide the merits
of the case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. CA affirmed
RTC decision hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether RTC has jurisdiction over disputes arising from labor decisions.Whether the notice of
sale was valid.
Held:
CA did not, in fact, err in upholding the RTC's lack of jurisdiction to restrain the
implementation of the writ of executionissued by the Labor Arbiter.The Court has long
recognized that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise
from andare incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in labor
cases by appropriate officers andtribunals of the Department of Labor and Employment. To
hold otherwise is to sanction splitting of jurisdiction which isobnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice.Thus, it is, first and foremost, the
NLRC
Manual on the Execution of Judgment that governs any question on the executionof a
judgment of that body. The
NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment deals specifically with third-party claims incases
brought before that body. It defines a third-party claim as one where a person, not a party to
the case, asserts titleto or right to the possession of the property levied upon. It also sets out
the procedure for the filing of a third-party claim.There is no doubt in our mind that
petitioner's complaint is a third- party claim within the cognizance of the NLRC.Petitioner may
indeed be considered a "third party" in relation to the property subject of the execution vis-vis the Labor Arbiter's decision.
There is no question that the property belongs to petitioner and his wife, and not to the
corporation. Itcan be said that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, not to
petitioner alone. Thus, the property belongs to athird party, i.e., the conjugal partnership. At
the very least, the Court can consider that petitioner's wife is a third partywithin
contemplation of the law.The broad powers granted to the Labor Arbiter and to the National
Labor Relations Commission by Articles 217, 218 and224 of the Labor Code can only be
interpreted as vesting in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connectionwith or
relating to labor disputes, as the controversy under consideration, to the exclusion of the
regular courts.

COLLEGE OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION v. NLRC and ATTY. MARIUS F. CARLOS,

PH.D.
FACTS:
Petitioner, through its President, appointed respondent as its acting dean effective from
June 1996- May 2000, with an understanding that upon expiration of his term, he shall be
appointed as a full time professor without diminution of his teaching salary as Dean. After the
expiration of his term, respondent requested for the payment of overload pay, arguing that
the regular full time load of a faculty member is only six and he had 8. Petitioner however
denied the claim and directed to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against
him for engaging in the practice of law and teaching law in another law school without prior
permission from the petitioner.
Respondent admitted that he was teaching at Araullo University without written
permission because it was unnecessary. As to his law practice, he explained that the only case
he was handling was a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which was referred to
him by petitioner's Vice-President for Academic Affairs. Respondent said that his demotion
from Dean of the Department to a Faculty member was without legal basis and that the nonrenewal of his appointment as Dean was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, tainted with abuse of
discretion, and injurious to his integrity and reputation.
Petitioner refused to accept the explanation and gave respondent two options: to become a
full-time professor or a part time professor. Since respondent did not choose any, petitioner
informed respondent that he will not be assigned any teaching load for the succeeding
semester pursuant to Section 16.8, CHED Memorandum No. 19, series of 1998, which requires
professors to give a formal notice when teaching in another school.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal. The LA ruled that respondent was
illegally dismissed and ordered his reinstatement. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision was set
aside but the NLRC ordered to reinstate complainant as full-time professor. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration arguing that respondent should be directed to refund the petitioner
all the amounts he received by way of payroll reinstatement but the same was denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the CA but the same was also denied. Upon denial of
its motion for reconsideration, the instant petition is filed to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reversal of the LA's decision would require respondent to reimburse
petitioner all the salaries and benefits he received pursuant to the immediate execution of the
LA's erroneous decision
HELD:
LABOR LAW
Even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is
obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed
employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.
It was held in Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora, citing Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
that:
Even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory
on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during
the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has
been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with
finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is
entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period.
It is not disputed at this point that the LA erred in ordering respondent's reinstatement as
Dean. The NLRC ruled that respondent should have been merely reinstated as a full-time law
professor, because the term of his appointment as Dean had long expired. However, such
mistake on the part of the LA cannot, in any way, alter the fact that during the pendency of
the appeal of his decision, his order for respondent's reinstatement as Dean was immediately
executory. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that: In any event, the decision of the Labor
Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is

concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either
be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The
posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided
therein.

Moreover, it bears stressing that the manner of immediate reinstatement, pending appeal, or
the promptness thereof is immaterial, as illustrated in the following two scenarios:
Situation No. 1. (As in the cases of Air Philippines Corporation and International Container
Terminal Services, Inc.) The LA ruled in favor of the dismissed employee and ordered his
reinstatement. However, the employer did not immediately comply with the LA's directive. On
appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA and found that there was no illegal dismissal. In this
scenario, We ruled that the employee is entitled to payment of his salaries and allowances
pending appeal.
Situation No. 2. (As in the present case) The LA ruled in favor of the dismissed employee and
ordered the latter's reinstatement. This time, the employer complied by reinstating the
employee in the payroll. On appeal, the LA's ruling was reversed, finding that there was no
case of illegal dismissal but merely a temporary sanction, akin to a suspension. Here, We also
must rule that the employee cannot be required to reimburse the salaries he received
because if he was not reinstated in the payroll in the first place, the ruling in situation no. 1
will apply, i.e., the employee is entitled to payment of his salaries and allowances pending
appeal.
Thus, either way we look at it, at the end of the day, the employee gets his salaries and
allowances pending appeal. The only difference lies as to the time when the employee gets it.
DENIED

Garcia v. KJ Commercial
Facts:
1.
Respondent KJ Commercial is a sole proprietorship. It owns trucks and engages in the
business of distributing cement products.
2.
On different dates, KJ Commercial employed as truck drivers and truck helpers
petitioners Garcia, et. al.
3.
On 2 January 2006, petitioners demanded for a P40 daily salary increase. To pressure KJ
Commercial to grant their demand, they stopped working and abandoned their trucks at the
Northern Cement Plant Station in Sison, Pangasinan.
4.
They also blocked other workers from reporting to work. On 3 February 2006,
petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
salary andnon-payment of service incentive leave and thirteenth month pay.
5.
On October 30, 2008, the Labor Arbiter held that KJ Commercial illegally dismissed
petitioners.
6.
KJ Commercial appealed to the NLRC. It filed before the NLRC a motion to reduce bond
and posted a P50,000 cash bond.
7.
On March 9, 2009, the NLRC dismissed the appeal.
8.
Under the Revised Rules of the NLRC, a motion to reduce bond shall only be entertained
when the following requisites concur:
(1) The motion is founded on meritorious ground; and
(2) A bond of reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted.
9.
In this case, the NLRC found that the instant motion is not founded on a meritorious
ground.
10.
KJ Commercial filed a motion for reconsideration and posted aP2,562,930 surety bond.
In its February 8, 2010 Resolution, the NLRC granted the motion and set aside the Labor
Arbiters October 30, 2008 Decision.
11.
The NLRC opts to resolve and grant the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondentappellant seeking for reconsideration of Our Decision promulgated on March 9, 2009
dismissing the Appeal for non-perfection, there being an honest effort by the appellants to
comply with putting up the full amount of the required appeal bond.
12.
Thus, the NLRC did not find that the petitioners were illegally dismissed.
13.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.
14.
In its 25 June 2010 Resolution, the NLRC denied the motion for lack of merit.
15.
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
16.
In its 29 April 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed
the NLRCs 8 February and 25 June 2010 Resolutions.
17.
Hence, the present petition.
18.
Petitioners raise as issue that the Labor Arbiters 30 October 2008 Decision became
final and executory; thus, the NLRCs 8 February and 25 June 2010 Resolutions and the Court
of Appeals 29 April 2011 Decision are void for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners claim that KJ
Commercial failed to perfect an appeal since the motion to reduce bond did not stop the
running of the period to appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of KJ Commercial of the motion to reduce bond stopped the running
of the period to appeal.
Held:
1.
The Supreme Court clarifies that the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows the filing of
a motion to reduce bond subject to two conditions: (1) there is meritorious ground, and (2) a
bond in a reasonable amount is posted.
2.
The filing of a motion to reduce bond and compliance with the two conditions stop the
running of the period to perfect an appeal.
3.
The NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny the motion to reduce bond, and it may
rule on the motion beyond the 10-day period within which to perfect an appeal. Obviously, at
the time of the filing of the motion to reduce bond and posting of a bond in a reasonable
amount, there is no assurance whether the appellants motion is indeed based on
meritorious ground and whether the bond he or she posted is of a reasonable amount.
Thus, the appellant always runs the risk of failing to perfect an appeal.

4.
Section 2, Article I of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC states that, These Rules shall
be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines and other relevant legislations, and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
expeditious and inexpensive resolution and settlement of labor disputes.
5.
In order to give full effect to the provisions on motion to reduce bond, the appellant
must be allowed to wait for the ruling of the NLRC on the motion even beyond the 10-day
period to perfect an appeal.
6.
If the NLRC grants the motion(to reduce bond) and rules that there is indeed
meritorious ground and that the amount of the bond posted is reasonable, then the appeal is
perfected.If the NLRC denies the motion, the appellant may still file a motion for
reconsideration as provided under Section 15, Rule VII of the Rules.
7.
If the NLRC grants the motion for reconsideration and rules that there is indeed
meritorious ground and that the amount of the bond posted is reasonable, then the appeal is
perfected. If the NLRC denies the motion, then the decision of the labor arbiter becomes final
and executory.
8.
In any case, the rule that the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the
running of the period to perfect an appeal is not absolute. The Court may relax the rule.
Jurisprudence tells us that in labor cases, an appeal from a decision involving a monetary
award may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The Court, however,
has relaxed this requirement under certain exceptional circumstances in order to resolve
controversies on their merits. These circumstances include: (1) fundamental consideration of
substantial justice; (2) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3)
special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the
issue involved.
9.
Some of these cases include: (a) counsels reliance on the footnote of the notice of the
decision of the labor arbiter that the aggrieved party may appeal within ten (10) working
days; (b) fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (c) prevention of miscarriage of
justice etc.

PFIZER, INC., ET AL, Petitioner, v. GERALDINE VELASCO, Respondent.

FACTS:
On 5 December 2003, the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision declaring the dismissal of
Velasco, an employee of Pfizer, illegal, ordering her reinstatement with backwages and further
awarding moral and exemplary damages with attorneys fees. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed
the same but deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages. Pfizer filed with the Court
of Appeals a special civil action for the issuance of a writ ofcertiorariunder Rule 65 to annul
and set aside the aforementioned NLRC issuances.In a Decision dated November 23, 2005,
the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of respondents dismissal from employment.
Velasco filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals resolved in the assailed
Resolution dated October 23, 2006, wherein it affirmed the validity of Velasco's dismissal from
employment but modified its earlier ruling by directing Pfizer to pay respondent her wages
from the date of the Labor Arbiters Decision dated December 5, 2003 up to the Court of
Appeals Decision dated November 23, 2005.
Pfizer filed the instant petition assailing the CA decision. In PFIZER's view, it should no longer
be required to pay wages considering that it had already previously paid an enormous sum to
respondent under the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a serious but reversible error when it ordered Pfizer to pay
Velasco wages from the date of the Labor Arbiters decision ordering her reinstatement until
November 23, 2005, when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision declaring Velascos
dismissal valid.
HELD:
The petition is without merit.
LABOR LAW: Reinstatement orders; "refund doctrine."
Pfizer's previous payment to respondent of the amount ofP1,963,855.00 (representing her
wages from December 5, 2003, or the date of the Labor Arbiter decision, until May 5, 2005)
that was successfully garnished under the Labor Arbiters Writ of Execution dated May 26,
2005 cannot be considered in its favor.Not only was this sum legally due to respondent under
prevailing jurisprudence but also this circumstance highlighted Pfizer's unreasonable delay in
complying with the reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter. It only required respondent to
report for work on July 1, 2005, almost two years from the time the order of reinstatement
was handed down in the Labor Arbiters Decision dated December 5, 2003.
In the seminal case of Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
the Court held that an award or order of reinstatement is immediately self-executory without
the need for the issuance of a writ of execution in accordance with the third paragraph of
Article 223 of the Labor Code. In the case at bar, Pfizer did not immediately admit respondent
back to work which, according to the law, should have been done as soon as an order or
award of reinstatement is handed down by the Labor Arbiter without need for the issuance of
a writ of execution.Thus, respondent was entitled to the wages paid to her under the
aforementioned writ of execution.
In any case, Pfizer implores the Court to annul the award of backwages and separation pay as
well as to require respondent to refund the amount that she was able to collect by way of
garnishment from Pfizer as her accrued salaries, considering the reversal of the decision of
the Labor Arbiter by the CA. However, this is without merit, since the prevailing principle is
that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is
obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed
employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.
DENIED.

FACTS:
Private respondent Geraldine L. Velasco was terminated from employment with petitioner
PFIZER, INC. The Labor Arbiter rendered its decision declaring the dismissal of Velasco illegal,
ordering her reinstatement. PFIZER appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) but its appeal was denied. The CA upheld the validity of respondents dismissal from
employment but ordered Pfizer to pay Velasco wages from the date of the Labor Arbiters
decision ordering her reinstatement until November 23, 2005, when the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision declaring Velascos dismissal valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a serious but reversible error when it ordered
Pfizer to pay Velasco wages from the date of the Labor Arbiters decision ordering her
reinstatement until November 23, 2005, when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
declaring Velascos dismissal valid.
HELD:
Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.
LABOR LAW
The order of reinstatement is immediately executory.The unjustified refusal of the employer to
reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time
the employer failed to reinstate himdespite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is
a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of
reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. PFIZER did not
immediately admit respondent back to work which, according to the law, should have been
done as soon as an order or award of reinstatement is handed down by the Labor Arbiter
without need for the issuance of a writ of execution.Thus, respondent was entitled to the
wages paid to her under the writ of execution.
DENIED

SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL.

FACTS:
ArisPhilippines permanently ceased operations on 9 October 1995 displacing
5,984 rank-and-fileemployees. On 26 October 1995, FAPI was incorporated prompting former
Aris employees to file a case for illegal dismissal on the allegations that FAPI was acontinuing
business of Aris. Sarah Lee Corporation (SLC), Sarah Lee Philippines (SLP) and Cesar Cruz
were impleaded as defendants being major stockholders of FAPI and officers of Aris,
respectively.
On 30 October 2004, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of 5,984 Aris
employeesillegal and awarded them monetary benefits amounting to P3,453,664,710.86.
Thejudgment award is composed of separation pay of one month for every year of service,
back wages, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The Corporations filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond.
They
posted a P4.5 Million bond. The NLRC granted the reduction of the appeal bond andordered
the Corporations to post an additional P4.5 Million bond.
The 5,984 former Aris employees, represented by Emilinda Macatlang (Macatlang
petition), filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals insisting that the appeal was
not perfected due to failure of the Corporations to post the correct amount of the bond which
is equivalent to the judgment award.
While the case was pending before the appellate court, the NLRC prematurely
issued an order setting aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter for being procedurallyinfirmed.
The Court of Appeals, on 26 March 2007, ordered the Corporations to post an
additional appeal bond of P1 Billion
PETITIONERS' CONTENTION: That by the filing of the motion to reduce the bond and the
positing of the bond of Php 4.5m, roughly equivalent to the 10% of the original judgment
award is enough to perfect an appeal.
That the Confession of Judgement submitted by the Petitioners that is only
signed by some of the aggrieved workers instead of the 5,984 illegally dismissed employees
and only an amount of P342,284,800.00 is enough as a substitute for a valid compromise
agreement that will dismiss the cases in dispute.
RESPONDENTS' CONTENTIONS: That the appeal bond made by Petitioners are not enough to
perfect an appeal due to its amount being below the directed amount given by the Courts
That the Confession of Judgement submitted by Petitions are not enough to
satisfy the claims of Respondents for being grossly inadequate to satisfy their claims and that
they lack all of the signatures and/or consent of all the 5,984 illegally dismissed employees
running counter to the nature of a compromise agreement.
ISSUE:
1) WON the appeal bond of roughly Php 4.5M is enough to perfect an appeal.
2) WON the Confession of Judgement can be accepted as a valid compromise agreement
between the parties.
HELD:
1) NO. The Corporations should have followed the direction of the Court and filed the
additional amount requested by the Courts for the perfection of the appeal so that the NLRC
may proceed to try the merits of the case for illegal dismissal. The 10% requirement pertains
to the reasonable amount which the NLRC would accept as the minimum of the bond that
should accompany the motion to reduce bond in order to suspend the period to perfect an
appeal under the NLRC rules. The 10% is based on the judgment award and should in no case
be construed as the minimum amount of bond to be posted in order to perfect appeal.
Should the NLRC, after considering the merit of the Motion to Reduce Appeal
Bond determines that a greater amount or the full amount of the bond needs to be posted by
the appellant, then the party shall comply accordingly. The appellant shall be given a period of
10 days from notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal by posting the
required appeal bond.

The Petitioners are then directed to post the amount of PHP 725M in cash or
surety bond within 10 days of the decision to continue with the determination of the merits of
the alleged illegally dismissed Respondents through the NLRC.

2) NO. The Confession of Judgement cannot be accepted as a valid compromise agreement.

A confession of judgment is an acknowledgment that a debt is justly due and
cuts off all defenses and right of appeal. It is used as a shortcut to a judgment in a case where
the defendant concedes liability. It is seen as the written authority of the debtor and
adirection for entry of judgment against the debtor.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It is an agreement
between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their
difficulties by mutual consent in the manner which they agree on, and which everyone of
them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing.Acompromise must not
be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy; and must have been freely and
intelligently executed by and between the parties.
Article 273 of the Labor Code of the Philippines authorizes compromise agreements
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, in conformity with the basic policy of the State "to
promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations,
includingvoluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or
industrial disputes. Acompromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is
reasonable and theemployee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what
he was entering into.
A review of the compromise agreement shows a gross disparity between the amount offered
by the Corporations compared to the judgment award. The judgment award is
P3,453,664,710.86 or each employee is slated to receive P577,149.85. On the other hand, the
P342,284,800.00 compromise is to be distributed among 5,984 employees which would
translate to only P57,200.00 per employee. From this amount, P8,580.00 asattorney's fees will
be deducted, leaving each employee with a measly P48,620.00. In fact, the compromised
amount roughly comprises only 10% of the judgment award.

WENPHIL v. ABING