Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
October 1, 2014)
FACTS:
In July 1988, Antonio Garcia (seller) and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., through Ramon Garcia (buyer) entered into a deed
of absolute sale and purchase of shares of stocks. The contract was entered into to prevent the shares from being sold
at public auction to pay the outstanding obligations of Mr. Garcia. The shares of stocks was one class A share in
Alabang Country Club, Inc., and one proprietary membership in the Manila Polo Club, Inc., under the name of
Antonio Garcia. However, the said shares were sold at public auction under the Philippine Investment System
Organization.
Ferro Chemicals field against Antonio Garcia. Garcia was charged with estafa under Article 318 (Other Deceits) of
the Revised Penal Code for allegedly misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the shares subject of the
contracts entered into were free from all liens and encumbrances.
RTC acquitted Antonio Garcia for insufficiency of evidence. Ferro Chemicals filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied by the RTC in July 29, 1997. In August 25, 1997, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. appealed to the CA,
entitled, Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of the Case)," as to the civil
aspect of the case.
On October 15, 1997, the Makati Prosecutors Office and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. also filed a petition with the SC,
assailing the decision of the RTC acquitting Antonio Garcia. Ramon Garcia, President of Ferro Chemicals, Inc.,
signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition for certiorari. In its resolution dated
November 16, 1998, the SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and an entry of judgement was made on December
24, 1998.
On the other hand, the CA on August 11, 2005, awarded Ferro Chemicals, Php1M as actual loss with legal interest
and attorneys fees in the amount of Php20,000. The CA found that Antonio Garcia failed to disclose the Philippine
Investment and Savings Organizations lien over the club shares.
Mr. Garcia filed a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the decision and resolution of the CA.
ISSUES:
1
2
3
HELD:
1
proceedings and even until it reached the SC, it was ruled that: applying the general rule, jurisdiction
is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties.
The failure of the parties to raise the matter of jurisdiction also cannot be construed as a waiver of the
parties. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be waived by the parties. The assailed decision is
void, considering that it originates from a void decision of the Regional Trial Court for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
2
No. The civil action cannot proceed independently of the criminal case. This includes subsequent
proceedings on the criminal action such as an appeal. In any case, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. joined the
public prosecutor in filing the petition for certiorari before the SC. Ramon Garcia, President of Ferro
Chemicals, Inc., signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition for
certiorari.
However, private complainants in criminal cases are not precluded from filing a motion for
reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused.
An exception to the rule that only the Solicitor General can bring actions in criminal proceedings
before the CA or SC is "when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a
lower court."
In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or
the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or
acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is
concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State
only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended party MAY NOT undertake such
motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case. However, the offended
party or private complainant MAY file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or
acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned.
This is in consonance with the doctrine that: the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily
carry with it the extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from
the criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in
the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise
exists.
Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused's acquittal, the
offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based
upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
However, if the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court acquitting
the accused and private complainant/s FAILED TO RESERVE THE RIGHT to institute a
separate civil action, the civil liability ex delicto that is inherently attached to the offense is likewise
appealed. The appeal of the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the petition for
certiorari assailing the acquittal of the accused. Private complainant cannot anymore pursue a
separate appeal from that of the state without violating the doctrine of non-forum shopping.
But, if private complainant reserved the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto before the RTC or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal
case in accordance with Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. In these situations, the filing of an appeal as
to the civil aspect of the case cannot be considered as forum shopping.
Since, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve it rite to institute a separate civil action prior to the filing
of the criminal case in accordance with Rule 111 of the Rule of Court, the petition was denied. The
resolution of the SC issued on November 16, 1998 denying the petition for certiorari was reiterated.
tribulations concomitant with the proceedings in this case, before several courts, for
the last ten (10) years. Petitioner says that the complaint was for forcible abduction,
not abduction with consent; but, as already adverted to, the latter is included in the
former. This allegation implies that Ester is a minor living under patria protestas,
and, hence, single, thus leading to the presumption that she is a virgin. She was
taken by force from their dwelling when her mother was away and brought to a
secluded area and raped. CA and CFI affirmed. Cost against Valdepenas
People v. Lagon (G.R. 45815 / 18 May 1990)
IN RE: Determined by Allegations of Complaint
On 7 July 1976, aninformation for estafa was filed against accused Lagon for
allegedly issuing a check for payment of goods without having sufficient funds. The
city court of Roxas, however, dismissed the information for the very reason that the
penalty prescribed for crime charged had become beyond the latter courts
authority to impose. It appears that when the crime was committed (April 1975), the
law vested the city court with jurisdiction. However, by the time the information was
filed (July 1976), P.D. 818 increased the penalty for the same.
Well-settled is the doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal
law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the
commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of
the commission of the offense charged. In this regard, considering the passage of
P.D.818, jurisdiction of the case now pertained to the CFI of Roxas and not with the
city court.
Zaldivia v Reyes
G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277
Facts: A complaint was filed before the fiscals office constituting an offense in
violation of a city ordinance. The fiscal did not file the complaint before the court
immediately but instead filed it 3 months later. The defendants counsel filed a
motion to quash on ground that the action to file the complaint has prescribed. The
fiscal contends that the filing of the complaint before his office already interrupts
the prescription period.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office
constituting a violation against a special law/ordinance interrupts prescription.
Held: The mere filing of complaint to the fiscals office does not interrupt the
running of prescription on offenses punishable by a special law. The complaint
should have been filed within a reasonable time before the court. It is only then that
the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted.
ISSUE: Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,
2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense
HELD: No. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.
The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. In Zaldivia v.
Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also
featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on
May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial
Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of
the Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial
proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it
resulted in the dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of
Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of
filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning
the effects of its ruling: The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may
prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutors office if, intentionally or
not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However,
that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent
as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning
of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against
respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the
period of prescription of such offense.
Held. Yes. Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which is the law applicable to B.P. 22 cases, [v]iolations
penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less
than two years. Under Section 2 of the same Act, [t]he prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30)
days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore prescribes in four (4) years in
accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon
the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997.
The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile,
respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for
suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The matter was raised before the
Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only
after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed
with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which
motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated
proceedings only in 2000
blown trial on the merits, where rules on admissibility of testimonies and other evidence strictly
apply.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutor had overstretched her duties that would amount to grave
abuse of discretion warranting the review of the court
HELD: Yes. The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the accused
depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor. Courts will not interfere with the conduct of
preliminary investigations, or reinvestigations, or in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an offender.
Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch.
Differently stated, as the matter of whether to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part,
courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the corresponding information, upon a
complaint, where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing of an action
in court. In sum, the prosecutors findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to
review by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of
discretion. We find such reason for judicial review here present. We sustain the appellate courts
reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of the DOJ.
The Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her
findings dealt mostly with what respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was
committed. She delved into evidentiary matters that could only be passed upon in a fullblown
trial where testimonies and documents could be fairly evaluated in according with the rules of
evidence. The issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual matters that cannot be
threshed out conclusively during the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for
the presentation of prosecutions evidence in support of the charge. The validity and merits of a
partys defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. By taking into
consideration the defenses raised by petitioner, the Investigating Prosecutor already went into the
strict merits of the case.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
DENIED for lack of merit.
CRESPO VS MOGUL
FACTS:
Assistant Fiscal Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for estafa against Mario Crespo. When the case was set for arraignment,
the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. The respondent
denied the motion. Court of Appeals restrained the judge from enforcing his threat
to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of
Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.
Then, Usec of Justice resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution
of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate
dismissal of the information filed against the accused. A motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal. However, the Judge
denied the motion and set the arraignment stating. A motion and restraining order
was filed again in the CA but was dismissed. Thus, this case.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by
the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case
was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the
arraignment and trial on the merits.
RULING:
YES. It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of
the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and
control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private
persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant. It is through the conduct of a
preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie
case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with
the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. Thus, a fiscal who asks
for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and
Courts that grant the same commit no error. In a clash of views between the judge
who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the
offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the
accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. The
filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in
Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at
such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court.Whether the accused had
been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a
review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the
Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and
require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is
done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the
Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to
proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable
the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused
should be convicted or acquitted.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is
filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who
has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.